Cajetan on Nominal Essence

CAJETAN ON NOMINAL ESSENCE

The following is a parallel translation from Cajetan's commentary on Aquinas' Being and Essence where he explains the idea of nominal essence. He says the essential difference between the quid nominis (the nominal essence, the meaning of the name) and the quid rei (the real essence, the real nature of the thing) is that the quid nominis 'is the relation of the name to what it signifies', but the quid rei is the essence of the thing related or signified.

It is not altogether clearer than the any of the others to be found in this series of e-texts. See here for links to these.

Cardinal Thomas di Vio Cajetan(1468-1534) was a leader of the Dominicans who was involved in (unsuccessful) dialogues with Luther.

Reference: Thomas de Vio Cardinalis Cajetanus, Super Librum De Ente et Essentia Sancti Thomae (Opuscula Omnia, Bergomi, Typis Comini Venturae, 1590, p. 290).

Latin English

Sicut quid rei est quidditas rei, ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem, cum sit nota earum quae sunt obiective in anima passionum (ex primo Perihermeneias), non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc, quod est signum alicuius rei intellectae seu cogitatae. Just as real essence is a thing's 'what it is', so the nominal essence is the 'what it is' of a name: but a name, since it is the sign of things which are passions objectively in the soul (from the 1st of Aristotle's On Interpretation), does not have any other 'what it is' except this: that it is a sign of some thing understood or thought about.

Signum autem ut sic, relativum est ad signatum: unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud, quam cognoscere ad quid tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalia illius signati, per communia, per essentialia, per nutus, et quibusvis aliis modis. A sign, however, as such, is relative to the thing signified: wherefore to grasp the nominal essence is nothing but to grasp what such a name is related to, as sign to thing signified. Such a grasp, however, can be acquired through the accidental properties of that thing signified, or through its common, or its essential properties, or simply by a nod, or in any other ways you like.

Sicut a Graeco quaerentibus nobis quid nominis anthropos, si digito ostendatur homo iam percipimus quid nominis, et similiter de aliis. Just as, by our asking of a Greek about the nominal essence 'anthropos', if a man is pointed to, then we know now the nominal essence [of 'anthropos'], and similarly of other things.

Interrogantibus vero quid rei oportet assignare id quod convenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequate. But to those asking about the real essence, it is necessary to give that which belongs to the thing signified in virtue of its essence.

Et haec est essentialis differentia inter quid nominis et quid rei, scilicet quod quid nominis est relatio nominis ad signatum; quid rei vero est rei relatae seu significatae essentia. This is the essential difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei: namely, that the quid nominis is the relation of the name to what it signifies; but the quid rei is the essence of the thing related or signified.

Et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent: puta quod quid nominis sit non entium, complexorum, per accidentalia, per communia, per extranea; quid rei vero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia. And it is from this difference that all the rest that are usually enumerated follow: namely, that the quid nominis is of nonentities, complexes, by accidental, common, and external properties; while the quid rei is of incomplex entities [grasped] by their proper, essential properties.

Relatio enim vocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura, et complexa, et declarari per accidentalia et huiusmodi, essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis. For a word's relation can be terminated to non-existents, and it can be clarified by accidental and similar properties, but the thing's essence can be known only by proper, essential properties of incomplex things.

Latin	English
Sicut quid rei est quidditas rei, ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem, cum sit nota earum quae sunt obiective in anima passionum (ex primo Perihermeneias), non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc, quod est signum alicuius rei intellectae seu cogitatae.	Just as real essence is a thing's 'what it is', so the nominal essence is the 'what it is' of a name: but a name, since it is the sign of things which are passions objectively in the soul (from the 1st of Aristotle's On Interpretation), does not have any other 'what it is' except this: that it is a sign of some thing understood or thought about.
Signum autem ut sic, relativum est ad signatum: unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud, quam cognoscere ad quid tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalia illius signati, per communia, per essentialia, per nutus, et quibusvis aliis modis.	A sign, however, as such, is relative to the thing signified: wherefore to grasp the nominal essence is nothing but to grasp what such a name is related to, as sign to thing signified. Such a grasp, however, can be acquired through the accidental properties of that thing signified, or through its common, or its essential properties, or simply by a nod, or in any other ways you like.
Sicut a Graeco quaerentibus nobis quid nominis anthropos, si digito ostendatur homo iam percipimus quid nominis, et similiter de aliis.	Just as, by our asking of a Greek about the nominal essence 'anthropos', if a man is pointed to, then we know now the nominal essence [of 'anthropos'], and similarly of other things.
Interrogantibus vero quid rei oportet assignare id quod convenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequate.	But to those asking about the real essence, it is necessary to give that which belongs to the thing signified in virtue of its essence.
Et haec est essentialis differentia inter quid nominis et quid rei, scilicet quod quid nominis est relatio nominis ad signatum; quid rei vero est rei relatae seu significatae essentia.	This is the essential difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei: namely, that the quid nominis is the relation of the name to what it signifies; but the quid rei is the essence of the thing related or signified.
Et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent: puta quod quid nominis sit non entium, complexorum, per accidentalia, per communia, per extranea; quid rei vero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia.	And it is from this difference that all the rest that are usually enumerated follow: namely, that the quid nominis is of nonentities, complexes, by accidental, common, and external properties; while the quid rei is of incomplex entities [grasped] by their proper, essential properties.
Relatio enim vocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura, et complexa, et declarari per accidentalia et huiusmodi, essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis.	For a word's relation can be terminated to non-existents, and it can be clarified by accidental and similar properties, but the thing's essence can be known only by proper, essential properties of incomplex things.