Chapter
II.
THE
CONCEPT: THE NAME: THE TERM
3. Adequate, Clear and Obscure Concepts
5. Categorematic and Syncategorematic Words
7. Singular, General and
Collective Terms
8. Abstract and Concrete
Terms
9. Connotative and
Non-Connotative Terms
10. Positive and Negative
Terms
11. Absolute and Relative
Terms
12. Terms of First and Second Intention
13. Univocal, Equivocal
and Analogous Terms
15. The 'Suppositio' of
the Term
§
1. The
Concept. We have already explained what are the grounds, on
which Logic takes cognizance of the Concept. Considered in isolation, the concept is not
an act by which the mind attains truth. It can neither be termed true nor
false. But concepts are the material of which our mental acts, true and false,
consist. Every judgment of necessity
contains two concepts. Hence the treatment of the concept is fundamental in the
science of Logic. And in every science it is of vital importance that the
primary notions should be accurately grasped. There is truth in that saying of
Aristotle's, which in the middle ages had passed into a proverb : "What
is at the beginning but a small error, swells to huge proportions at the
close." [N1]
In the first
place it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the Concept or intellectual idea properly so called,
and the Phantasm or Mental picture. Whenever I think of an object, I simultaneously
form a sensible picture of it in my imagination. If for instance I judge that
fishes are vertebrate, or that the sun is round, I cannot do so without
imagining to myself a sensible representation of a fish, or of the sun.
Sometimes, indeed, as when I think of some abstract subject, such as 'virtue',
the image of the mere word 'virtue' will serve my purpose: but some image is requisite, nor does the
intellect ever operate save in connection with a phantasm. [N2]
This mental picture
is however very different from the concept. This will be easily understood, if
we notice that to judge "The sun is round", I must in thought have
separated the attribute of roundness from the thing I term "the sun".
No sensible image can effect such a separation. It can only picture the single
object "a round sun". If again I say, "This glass is
transparent", I have in thought separated the attribute
"transparency" from the thing "glass". This power of separation
requires a higher faculty than that of the imagination, namely the faculty of thought
or intelligence. It is the intellect alone that has this wonderful
power of distinguishing two things which in nature are inseparably conjoined,
of severing its roundness from the sun, its transparency from the glass. Thus I can look at a single object, e.g., the
paper I am using, and consider separately its whiteness, its smoothness, its
oblong shape, its opacity, etc.
The mind's
power of thus separating in thought things which in the real order are one, is
known as its power of abstraction. The characteristic feature by which the Concept differs from the Phantasm, is
its universality. A Concept is equally representative of
all objects of the same character. Thus if I see a circle drawn on a
chalk-board, the concept which I form of that geometrical figure will express
not merely the individual circle before me, but all circles. The figure I see
is of a definite size, and is in a particular place. But my mind by an act of
abstraction omits these individual characteristics, and forms the concept of a
circle as it is enunciated in Euclid's definition. This concept is applicable to every circle
that ever was drawn. When however I form
the phantasm of a circle, my phantasm must necessarily represent a figure of
particular dimensions. In other words the concept of the circle is universal:
the phantasm is singular. Similarly, if I form a concept of 'man', my concept
is applicable to all men. But a phantasm of a man must represent him as
possessed of a certain height, with certain features, with hair of a definite
colour, etc.
We have only
to consider any object to see that all the concepts which we can form of it
have this universal character. Thus, glancing out of the window, I see a
garden-roller. My mind conceives it as a roller, as cylindrical, as iron, as
dusty, cold and so on. Every one of these concepts is universal, and thus
applicable to any other thing which resembles the roller in that one attribute,
no matter how much it may differ from it in others. The concept of 'roller' is equally applicable
to the ponderous machine with which the county-council repairs the highways:
that of 'cylindrical' expresses perfectly the shape of the candle on my
mantel-piece while the concept of 'cold' is appropriate to the water in the
neighbouring fountain. These various concepts are not, of course, so many
isolated units in the mind. They unite to form a single composite concept. But
that composite concept is a universal, and would express all similar rollers. [N3]
It must not be
thought that the intellect has no means of knowing individuals. It knows the
individual by advertence to the phantasm from which the universal idea is
abstracted [N4]. But the work of the
intellect, as distinct from that of sense, is to express the individual object
of sense-perception in a series of universal concepts. Thus it is the
intellectual faculty which enables us to conceive the individual Socrates as a
'man,' or as a 'vertebrate,' or as a 'father.'
§
2. Repugnant Concepts. Concepts are said to be repugnant, when, as
mutually exclusive, they cannot be united in one composite concept.
It is not all
concepts which can be brought together to form a composite concept such as
those described in the last section. There are some which are incompatible, so
that the one necessarily postulates the exclusion of the other. These are known
as repugnant concepts. Thus it is impossible to form the concept of 'a
thinking stone': for the concept of 'a stone' expresses lifeless matter, and
the concept 'thinking' expresses living intelligence. Just as in the real order
a thing cannot both live and not live, so in the order of thought such a thing
is inconceivable.
The difference
between what is inconceivable and what is unimaginable should be
carefully noted. There are many things, that cannot be represented in our
imagination, which nevertheless contain no repugnance — as for instance, colour to the blind from birth.
On the other hand, some things are quite inconceivable, and hence impossible,
of which I can form some kind of image. Perhaps, it is possible to imagine a
thinking stone.
§ 3. Adequate, Clear and Obscure Concepts. A concept is said to be adequate
when it represents distinctly all the notes which go to make up an object.
It is plain that in regard to individual things such concepts are impossible.
We cannot form a concept representing every characteristic of even the smallest
flower. We can however have adequate concepts of mathematical figures in their
universal aspect. Euclid's definitions express
adequate concepts of the figures with which they deal. A concept is clear when,
although it does not represent all the notes of an object, it yet contains a
sufficient number to distinguish that object from any other. Thus our knowledge
of nature may be very limited, but our concepts of the chief tribes of animals
have a degree of definiteness amply sufficient to enable us accurately to
distinguish one from another. A concept is obscure when our knowledge is
insufficient to distinguish the object of thought from other things. Thus a man
may have a general idea of what is meant by prudence and by fortitude and may
nevertheless be incapable of distinguishing prudence from timidity, fortitude
from rashness.
We have intimated
(Ch. 1, § 2) that Logic takes account not only of thought but
of language the verbal expression of thought. Hence after the consideration of
the Concept, we must say something of the Name. A Name is a
word or group of words which by convention signifies the concept of the
speaker, and the object of that concept.
It is of importance to observe that the name is immediately
significative of the concept, and only mediately of the thing: that is to say,
it is the name of the thing in question, because the concept, which it
immediately expresses, is the concept of that thing. That this is so may be easily seen. I can
give the same name to many different individuals, because the same universal
concept expresses them all. Socrates, Plato, Peter, Paul are each of them
termed man. For one and all, in virtue of similar characteristics, are
truly represented by the same concept.
Names signify
the particular characteristics contained in the concept, which they express,
but they are the names of the thing, which the concept represents to us.
The
Name is the expression of our thought, considered out of all relation to its
position in a proposition. Since Logic
considers names merely in so far as they are actual or possible terms,
we shall, in dealing with the distinctions which we are about to enumerate,
speak of them as distinctions of terms.
The distinction immediately following constitutes an exception for
reasons that will appear.
§
5. Categorematic and
Syncategorematic Words.
It is plain,
that it is not every word, which can be used as a term. Many can only be so
used in conjunction with other words, e.g., in, but, well, me. Hence, we
at once distinguish words into two classes: --
A
Categorematic word is one, which can be used as a term without being
accompanied by any other word.
A
Syncategorematic word is one, that can only enter into a term in
conjunction with other words.
These
expressions are derived from the Greek words kategorein - to predicate; and syn
- together with.
Substantives,
Pronouns, Adjectives and Participles are categorematic words. It will be
noticed, however, that adjectives and participles can only be predicates. They
cannot stand as the subject of a sentence, except where there is ellipsis of
the substantive. If we say, The unjust shall perish, 'unjust' stands for
'unjust men'.
Adverbs,
Prepositions, Conjunctions, and Interjections are syncategorematic. We can it
is true employ them as the subjects of those propositions in which we speak of
the mere words themselves; as for instance, if we say, 'When is an adverb of time,' 'When is a
word of four letters.' But in this case we use them in a different sense,
namely as signifying the mere vocal sound, or the written characters.
A term which
is composed of categorematic and syncategorematic words, is spoken of as a many-worded
term. Terms consisting of a single categorematic word are known as single-worded terms.
The student
should be on his guard against speaking of syncategorematic terms. If a
word is said to be syncategorematic, it is thereby affirmed to be incapable of
being a term.
§
6. Divisions of Terms. We enumerate here the various divisions of terms.
It should be observed that every term may receive a place in each of the
divisions, since the various divisions are based on different principles. What are called the logical
characteristics of a term, are expressed by referring it to its due
position under each head. All the divisions are of considerable logical
importance.
(1)
General and Singular Terms.
(2)
Concrete and Abstract Terms.
(3)
Connotative and Non-connotative Terms.
(4)
Positive and Negative Terms.
(5)
Absolute and Relative Terms.
(6)
Terms of First Intention and Terms of Second Intention.
(7)
Univocal, Equivocal and Analogous Terms.
§ 7. Singular, General and Collective Terms.
A Singular term is one which can be used in the same sense of only one individual thing. Such, for instance,
are 'the present king of Spain,' 'the capital city of Italy,' 'Walter Scott.'
To this class belong all proper names. A
Proper Name is a word whose sole
purpose is to denote an individual thing. Other Singular terms which are
not proper names, are called significant Singular terms, since
they tell us something about the object. They are formed by using General
terms, and restricting them to designate but one of the many individuals to
which they might be applied. Thus 'king' is a term applicable to a number of
individuals in history: but if I say 'the present King of Spain,' I limit the
sense of the term to one of the class. A
frequent way in which terms are thus restricted, is by mentioning the time and
place to which reference is made. In the instance just employed, the particular
reference of the term' king' is thus indicated.
A proper name on the
other hand tells us nothing about the object. Its one purpose is to serve as a
distinguishing mark. Many proper names indeed once had a meaning. But in so far
as they are used as proper names, the meaning they had is disregarded, and they
are employed solely for the purpose of identification.
A General or Universal term is one which can be
used in the same sense distributively
of many things. A term is said to
be used 'distributively ', when it can be applied to each of
the objects taken separately. Thus
'man,' 'soldier,' 'Englishman,' 'white,' 'black,' are affirmed of each of the
objects to which they are applied.
It is not
requisite that there should actually be a plurality of objects, to which the
name is applied. It suffices, that it should be capable of such application.
Thus 'six-masted steam-ship' is a term, which for very many years was
applicable to one ship only, 'The Great-Eastern': but there was nothing in the
nature of things to prevent the existence of an indefinite number of six masted
steam-ships.
It will be
well to give careful attention to the way in which these General terms are
formed. The mind, when considering some object, attends to some feature in it,
which is, or may be, precisely similar to features present in other objects:
and it abstracts from all other features save this. Thus I may look at the ink in my bottle, and abstracting from its liquid state, its
taste, etc., may consider it simply as black. The ink has many other qualities
besides this. It is, moreover, an individual thing, and as such must have
something in it, which is absolutely peculiar to itself, and is possessed by
nothing else. But all this, my concept
and the term which manifests the concept do not express. The term
'black' may indeed be said to include implicitly all the other
qualities, for it does not exclude the supposition that the subject which is
black, possesses also many other attributes.
If the word 'black,' like the word 'blackness,' involved the exclusion
of everything save the attribute of blackness alone, we could not say, 'The ink
is black,' just as we cannot say, 'The ink is blackness.' The term 'black'
neither excludes, nor explicitly expresses the other attributes.
Then follows
another step. I observe that my concept of 'black' is equally representative of
all other black objects. Mentally there is nothing to distinguish the
representations of an indefinite number of black things, in so far as they are
black. The same concept expresses all. It is a Universal concept, and
the word signifying it is a General
term.
It is thus
that all our General terms arise. For instance, experience shows us certain
animals possessing peculiar characteristics common to all alike. We group the
more marked of these characteristics into a concept, e.g., that of a horse: and
wherever we see an animal possessed of these features, we term it a horse.
The
characteristics thus expressed in a common concept are styled the Intension or Comprehension of the General term.
The individuals to which the term is applicable are said to
constitute its Extension. Since
the time of Mill, English writers have more usually employed the words Connotation
and Denotation to signify respectively Intension and Extension.
A
Collective term is one that is applied to a group of similar
objects, the term not being applicable to the objects taken singly. A Collective term may be either a proper name,
or a significant Singular term, or a General term. Thus the term 'army' is collective, since it is predicable of
the soldiers taken as a group, and not singly. It is also a General term, for
it is applicable to many different armies. 'The National Portrait Gallery' is a
Collective term signifying the pictures taken together as a group. It is also a
significant Singular term. 'The Alps' is a Collective term, which is a proper
name.
It is
requisite to a Collective term that the objects should be capable of being
considered from some point of view common to all. Thus the members of a family,
though differing in many points, are alike as sharers in one home. For this
reason, the definition requires that there should be 'similar objects'.
The names of
substances, such as 'water', 'gold' 'lead' are sometimes spoken of as Substantial
terms. When they are used to signify all the water or gold that exists,
they may be ranked as Singular terms.
When they are employed to signify different portions of the substance, they
become General terms.
§
8. Abstract and Concrete Terms. An Abstract
term is the name of a nature or attribute considered in separation from
the subject in which it inheres, e.g., whiteness, height, humanity. [N5]
A Concrete
term is a name which expresses a nature or attribute as inherent in a
subject, e.g., white, high, ebullient, man.
We have
already, when speaking of the Concept (§ 1), dealt with the abstractive power
of the mind, in virtue of which it is able to sever an attribute from the
subject in which it inheres, and to form such concepts as that of
'whiteness.' Light will be thrown on
this mental operation, if we notice the distinction between a Substance and an
Accident. A Substance is a thing which
can possess independent existence, as e.g., Peter, Paul, man, lion. An Accident
can only exist as inhering in a Substance, e.g., whiteness, prudence,
transparency. In the Abstract concept we
represent Accidents as though they were isolated from the subject in which they
inhere.
The basis for
this way of conceiving them, is found in the fact that the Accident which
inheres in a Substance is not identical with the Substance. The whiteness of
the animal is not the animal itself. The colour of the animal might alter, and
yet the animal would be the same individual as before. Hence the mind is naturally led to conceive
the quality as an independent entity, as something which the animal has, and by
which it is determined and qualified.
But it is not
Accidents alone which are expressed by Abstract terms. By an act of the mind
the substantial nature itself can be represented in this abstract form, as
though it were an accidental determination.
Thus we form the concept of 'humanity', though there is no real
distinction between the individual Peter and his human nature.
Since these
terms represent a single feature of the whole entity, as if it existed independently
and in isolation, they possess a logical characteristic to which attention was
called in the last section, viz. : that they cannot be predicated of the
subject to which they belong. We can
say, 'The horse is white' : for the concrete term 'white,' though
it expresses but one attribute, yet implicitly includes the whole object. But we cannot say, 'The horse is whiteness',
for the abstract term positively excludes the subject in which it inheres. We can say 'Socrates is man.' But we cannot
say 'Socrates is his humanity': for the abstract form of the word shows that
the characteristics, which Socrates has in common with other men, in virtue of
which he is called 'man’, are alone
to be considered, to the exclusion of those which are proper to himself.
Abstract terms have no plurals. The plurality that a quality may have in the
real order, it acquires in virtue of the concrete individuals, in which it
inheres. Hence when we conceive it in isolation, we have no means of conceiving
it multiplied. Where plural forms are
used, as when we speak of 'enthusiasms' or 'ineptitudes', we merely mean the
various instances in which the quality was realized. The quality as abstract,.
is incapable of multiplication. It follows from this that the only Abstract
terms which are general, are those which embrace a whole group of qualities.
Thus virtue is a general abstract term including 'justice', 'prudence', '
temperance’, 'fortitude'.
etc. But these latter names are all singular.
Mill
finds fault with "a practice, which if not introduced by Locke, has gained
currency chiefly from his example, of applying the expression 'Abstract name'
to all names, which are the result of abstraction or generalization, and
consequently to all general names."
The term Abstract name is, as Mill notices, restricted by traditional
usage to such as are considered in the present paragraph. Its application to
General terms is a mistake. On the two kinds of abstraction see St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I. Q. 40, Art. 3 [English version here].
§
9. Connotative and Non-Connotative Terms. This distinction is one of the traditional
divisions of terms. Its signification in recent English Logic is, however,
altogether different from that which it used to bear. The change is due to
Mill, who imposed a new meaning on the old terminology. The former sense of the words has fallen
almost altogether into oblivion among English writers, and on the other hand
much has been written on the distinction in its novel sense. We shall therefore
deal in the first place with the terms in their recent acceptation, and
subsequently add an account of their traditional meaning.
The
definitions given by Mill are as follows:
A Connotative Term is one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute. A Non-connotative Term is one which denotes a subject only, or an attribute only.
(1) Connotative Terms. We
have already mentioned that the word Connotation is understood by logicians to
mean the characteristics signified by a name; the word Denotation, to mean the
individual objects to which it is applicable. Every term which possesses both
these features is termed Connotative. Thus 'horse', 'man', 'the Czar',
'courageous', are Connotative terms. They are applicable to individual objects,
and they are given to these objects, because certain definite characteristics
signified by the name are present in them.
Not all the
characteristics possessed by the individuals in question enter into the
connotation of the name. The characteristics which constitute the connotation
are those only, because of which the name is given, and in the absence of
any of which it would be refused. Thus, though before the discovery of
Australia all swans of which the civilized world had experience were white, no
one dreamed of refusing the name swan to the newly- discovered black variety.
Nor do we deny the name of cat to Manx cats because they lack a tail. But the absence
of a single essential attribute would deprive the object of its right to
the class-name. Were an animal discovered, otherwise like the horse in
appearance, but with cloven feet, it should not be termed a horse.
The
explanation just given assumes that words possess a fixed and precise meaning.
This is of course an ideal not altogether realized. The English language,
perhaps even more than others, is lacking in this scientific precision. Yet it
will usually be found that among the educated, there are definite and
assignable characteristics implied by a name, in default of which it is not
applied to an individual. It is true that this connotation may vary. Our
knowledge as to the real nature of things increases; and thus we insensibly
alter the signification of a name.
Medieval writers would have under stood the term 'whale' as connoting a
special kind of fish. We have learnt that the whale is not a fish but a mammal.
There are comparatively few things, as to which we are sure that we possess the
ultimate connotation. In the case of
mathematical figures, we know it, for the law determining the construction of a
geometrical figure is within our mental grasp. But even when a connotation is
susceptible of change, these changes are not arbitrary. Science only calls on us to alter the
connotation of a term, when it has found some more fundamental characteristic,
in relation to which, those hitherto reckoned as its connotation are merely
derivative. Thus the advance of knowledge is ever tending to greater fixity of
connotation - to the discovery of what the name ought to mean.
Two other
views as to the connotation of a term call for mention, though neither of them
is defensible.
Some writers have
held that all the attributes possessed by the object of the name, whether they
are known or unknown, constitute its connotation. This is the view of Prof.
Jevons: "A term taken in its intent (i.e. connotation) has for its meaning
the whole infinite series of qualities and circumstances, which a thing
possesses". It is plain that if the
term primarily represents the concept, its connotation must concern the
thing as it is known, not the thing in its objective reality. The meaning of
the term is what the thought represents to us.
Others have
held that it should be taken to signify all that we know about the thing at the
present,. time. But many of these attributes are quite unimportant, and their
absence would never cause us to refuse the name to an object. Hence it is
manifestly inaccurate to speak of them as the meaning of the term. The only
satisfactory account of connotation is that which takes it to signify the
fundamental characteristics which determine the application of the term.
It is
frequently given as a rule that, 'As connotation 'increases, denotation
decreases and as denotation 'increases, connotation decreases.' This however
must be rightly understood. The rule is only true when we are dealing with a
number of classes arranged in hierarchical subordination. Thus in the series, Animals
- vertebrates - mammals - Felida - lions, we have such a series. The connotation
of 'vertebrate' is greater than that of 'animal' the denotation is less.
The connotation of 'lion' is the greatest of all; its denotation is least.
Except where
we are dealing with such classes, the rule is not verified. Thus I may increase
the connotation by adding some attribute, which is found in every member of the
class, as for instance crow - black crow. Here no change takes
place. Again the denotation of a term is increased by the birth of new
individuals but this makes no change in the connotation. It is, moreover,
inaccurate to state the rule in mathematical language, thus: "Connotation
and denotation vary in inverse ratio." There is no mathematical relation
between the two. One alteration in connotation may make an immense change in
denotation, as e.g. zebra - tame zebra.
(2) Non-connotative
Terms. The first kind of Non- connotative terms mentioned
by Mill are those which denote a subject only, not connoting any attribute.
This group consists solely of proper names. These are merely distinguishing
marks of the individuals, and are not held conditionally on their retaining
certain definite qualities. Connotative names on the other hand
are changed when the quality
changes: the man we once called 'thin', we afterwards call 'stout'. For
Connotative names primarily signify the characteristic or quality, and
secondarily the individual object to which they are applied. It is entitled to
the name, because it possesses the quality.
Proper names have no
meaning in this sense. A man cannot claim a proper name because he possesses
certain qualities. However zealous a philanthropist he may be, he cannot ask us
to call him Lord Shaftesbury.
This point has
been contested by Mr. Bradley and others, on the ground that names grow to
acquire a connotation, and that the name of a friend recalls his qualities to
my mind. It is true that it may recall them. But they do not therefore
constitute the connotation of the name.
The proper name designating an individual recalls his qualities by association.
So far are they from forming its connotation that though the individual may
lose them, he will not thereby lose his title to his name.
It has been
further urged that many proper names do in fact signify definite attributes.
Thus 'John Smith' is said to signify 'man' and 'Teuton'. Has then every male
Teuton a right to term himself John Smith? And is not 'John Smith' in all probability
the proper name of not a few negroes? It
can scarcely be urged that this name is really significative of attributes.
Again, it is true that many proper names of places and families originally
indicated the possession of certain attributes, e.g., 'Norfolk', 'Edinburgh',
'Southampton', 'Grosvenor'. But these have long lost all connection with the
meaning they once had. Nor can any argument be drawn from the fact that it is
possible to use such terms as 'a Don Quixote' as connotative. Such a use indicates
that the word has ceased to be a proper name.
The other kind
of Non-connotative terms are Abstract names. These signify an
attribute only. The question has been raised whether these terms are rightly
reckoned as non-connotative. Several logicians maintain that there is no term
without denotation. They hold that Abstract terms denote an object, namely the
quality which they connote; that their denotation and connotation coincide. A
consideration of what the denotation of a term truly is, will show that this
view cannot be admitted. The denotation consists of the real objects expressed
by the concepts. Now there is nothing in the real order corresponding to the
Abstract term.
In that term
our concept represents the attribute as though it were an independent entity.
That is to say, it represents it in a way in which no attribute can exist in
the real order. These terms therefore have no denotation.
*
The meaning attached to this division of terms by the Scholastic logicians was
altogether different from that which we have just discussed. They distinguish
them as follows: --
A Connotative term is one which expresses
an attribute as qualijy ing a subject.
A
Non-connotative term is one which expresses a nature or attri bute as an
independent entity.
All
adjectives are connotative terms: for each adjective signifies some special
attribute as qualifying some person or thing. Thus 'courageous' signifies the
attribute of 'courage' as determining some subject. 'Prudent' similarly
signifies the attribute of 'prudence' as qualifying a person [N6]. On the other hand all substantives, as 'man',
'father', 'humanity', 'paternity', signify some entity that is conceived as
independent and not as the qualification of a subject.
The
logical value of the distinction depends on the difference that there is in the
real order between Substances
and Accidents. Substances are expressed by
nouns-substantive. Accidents on the other hand are expressed by adjectives: for
an accident is not an independent entity, but a mere qualification of a sub
stance. Hence a distinction between them is necessary in the conceptual
representation of the real order: and this distinction is expressed by the Non-connotative and the Connotative term. Yet, as we have already had occasion to
notice, the power of the intellect
enables it to conceive things otherwise than as they actually exist.
It can conceive the accident as though it were an independent entity [N7]. When
it does so it em ploys the abstract term, and that term is a substantive and is
non-connotative.
The
Scholastic distinction is therefore philosophically justified. It corresponds
to a fundamental difference in our mental conceptions, and the logic of the
concept would be incomplete without it.
Mill,
as an adherent of the Empiricist school, rejected the distinction between
substance and accident. There was therefore no place in his logic for a
division of terms which involved its recognition. He solved the difficulty that
thus presented itself, by putting all general terms signifying substances on a
par with adjectives, and transferred them en bloc to the class of connotative names. The resulting division is devoid of
philosophical value. A division of terms in the science of Logic must express
different ways of conceiving the real order: and when a class of terms is
designated by a common name, this should indicate that all these terms are
conceived in a similar manner. This is
certainly not the case in regard to Mill's
Non-connotative terms. Proper names and Abstract names have conceptually
nothing in common. Proper names are not significant of any concept at all: they
simply denominate individual objects of sense- perception.
§
10. Positive and Negative Terms.
A Positive
Term is one which signifies the presence of some attribute.
A Negative
Term is one which signifies the absence of some attribute.
Thus as
examples of Positive terms, we may take 'living', 'present', 'equal'; and as
examples of Negative terms 'lifeless', 'absent', 'unequal', 'not-man',
'nonentity'. A special class of Negative
terms is constituted by what are called Privative Terms. These express
the absence of the attribute in an object in which it might have been
expected to exist, as for instance 'blind', 'dumb'. It would be correct to
speak of some animalculae as 'sightless' or 'eyeless' but not as 'blind' for
the term 'blind' implies the absence of sight where it is normally to be found
[N8].
It should be
noted that very many Negative terms, such as, e.g., 'impatient’, 'careless', 'inhospitable' are understood to
imply the presence of positive qualities, opposite to those designated by the
corresponding Positive terms.
There is,
however, one class of Negative terms to which no possible positive
signification can adhere, and which have as Mr. Keynes says, "a
thorough-going negative character". These are terms of the form 'not-man',
'not-white'. They denote everything which does not possess the positive quality
to which the negation is attached. They are called Infinite (i.e.
Indeterminate) terms (nomen
infinitum). The name was given them
by Aristotle, because they do not fulfil the natural purpose of the name, which
is to designate some determinate character or some definite individual. They
are wholly indeterminate in their signification: the term 'not-man' is equally
applicable to what is real and to the unreal. I can say 'A horse is not-man,'
and 'A griffin is not-man.'
Certain recent
logicians have denied that it lies within our power to form a concept of
'not-man'. They assert that we cannot hold together in a single thought things
which have nothing in common. It is quite true that we cannot hold together
things which have nothing in common, by means of a positive concept. We can
however do so by a negative concept. The logical significance of the Negative term lies
in this very fact, that it witnesses to our power to conceive the absence of
some quality as though it were a positive reality. We conceive negations
as though they were real things: we give them conceptual realization. The very fact that these terms can stand as
the subject or predicate of a sentence is a proof that there is a thought
corresponding to them [N9]. Were it not for this power of conceiving by
negations, we should have no thought corresponding to the word 'nothing'. It is
true we cannot imagine 'nothing' : but we can conceive it. The
proposition "Created Being was once nothing" gives an intelligible
sense. Similarly we can form concepts of 'not-man', 'not-white'.
§
11. Absolute and Relative Terms.
An Absolute
term is a name, which in ita meaning implies no reference to anything else.
A Relative
term is one, which, over and above the object it denotes, implies in its signification another object
also receiving a name from the same fact which is the ground of the first name.
We are all
familiar with certain names which are given in pairs; so that if an object
exists, to which one of the two may be applied, we know that there must also be
an object to which the other may be applied. Such are 'parent, child,' 'master,
servant,' 'king, subject', 'husband, wife,' 'equal, unequal,' etc., etc. If it can be truly affirmed of any one that
he is a parent, then there is also some one of whom the term 'child' is
predicated. If there is a master, there must also be a servant. Such terms are
known as Relative terms: and each is said to be the correlative of the
other. When a term does not involve a correlative, it is known as Absolute.
It should be
carefully observed that the mere fact of a relation between two objects, does not
make their names Relative names.
Peter and Andrew are not Relative names, though the two men be brothers. For a
name to be Relative, it must be such as to express a concept in which the
relation is the object of thought. Now I can conceive Peter, without thinking
of him as a brother: his brotherhood may be altogether outside my mind's field
of vision. But if I think of him as brother, then in my thought I necessarily refer
him to the person whose brother he is, and my thought is a relative concept. The Relative
term for the case in question must be one that signifies such a relative
concept. It must express Peter precisely under the aspect of his connection
with Andrew: it must be the term 'brother' (Categ. c. 7, § 8).
A Relative
term may be concrete or abstract. If the name signifies the related object, we
have the concrete relative, e.g., 'master', 'father'. If we express the
relation in separation from the object to which it belongs, it is abstract,
e.g., 'dominion', 'paternity'. Abstract relatives have their correlative terms.
Thus 'paternity' corresponds to 'filiation,' 'dominion' to 'subjection', the
'friendship' of the one friend to the 'friendship' of the other,
the 'equality' which is predicated of one of two equals, to that which is
predicated of the other.
The logical
significance of this division of terms will not have escaped notice. We are
here dealing with a special way in which the mind can represent the real order.
It is capable on the one hand of representing its object in isolation and on
the other it can represent it in the light of the connection by which it is
related to something else. Further, it
can fashion relations, even when they do not exist in the real order. Thus it
can conceive a thing, which is viewed under one aspect, as 'identical' with
itself viewed under another aspect. Yet in the real order there can be no such
thing as a relation of 'identity'. To have a real, as distinguished from a merely
conceptual relation, there must be two things, not one only.
§ 12. Terms of First and Second Intention. This distinction has been omitted by
many of the recent English logicians [N10].
It is, however, of the highest importance; and the student who has
thoroughly grasped its significance, will find his labour in the study of Logic
much lightened.
A term of
First Intention is one which is applicable to the object, as it exists in the
real order,
A term of
Second Intention is one which is applicable to the object, only as it exists in
the conceptual order. [N11]
Of the
terms which may be predicated of an object as signifying its attributes, not
all belong to it as it is in the real order. Some belong to it only in so far
as it is represented in the mind. Thus I may not only say, "The oak is a
forest-tree", "The oak is deciduous" but I may go on to say,
"The oak is the subject of my judgment", "The oak is a universal
concept". Here, as is manifest, I have two totally different orders of
predicates. One sort belongs to the object in its own natural mode of existence
the other belongs to it in so far as it is represented conceptually, in so far
that is, as it is realized in the logical order. To this class of terms belong
many with which we shall have to deal in subsequent discussions, such as genus,
species, major, minor and middle term, etc.
These two orders of predicates are called respectively terms of First Intention and terms of Second Intention. The
terminology will be understood, when it is remembered that intentio is a
word used by the medieval logicians to signify an act of the mind. The first act of the mind is that by which
the mind conceives and knows the thing as it is in the real order: the second
act of the mind is that by which it knows the thing as it is in the conceptual
order.
The reason why
we claim that the distinction is of primary importance, is that Logic is wholly
concerned with the consideration of things as they are in the conceptual order
- with things as they are mentally represented, and hence as they are subjects,
predicates, universal terms, etc. It is not
concerned with the real order as such, but with the manner in which the mind
represents that real order. Hence Logic is wholly concerned with Second
Intentions : and it was not without cause that the medieval logicians
defined it simply as the Science of
Second Intentions.
Thus
St. Thomas, Opusc. de Universalibus, c. 2, 'Logica principaliter est de
secundis intentionibus.' Scotus, Super Universalia Porphyrii, Q. 3, quotes the saying that 'Logic
deals with Second Intentions as applied to First,' which he attributes to
Boethius. It is however said not to occur in that author's works. Goudin (1640
- 1695) says, 'Omnes Thomistae assignant ens rationis sen secundas intentiones
pro objecto formali Logicae.' Logica
Maj. Quaest. Prae. Art. 1. This distinction first appears in the
works of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle.
§
13. Univocal, Equivocal and Analogous Terms.
A Univocal
Term is one which is always employed with the same intension. An Equivocal Term, on the other hand, is one which can be used to express two
entirely different meanings, as e.g. the word 'bit' is used to signify either
a morsel or part of a horse's harness. Equivocal terms are of no logical
importance. Properly speaking an equivocal term is not one but two terms. An Analogous Term is one which is employed to express meanings partly, but not
wholly, the same. These terms are of
two kinds. (1) One class do not, for our purpose, differ from Equivocal terms.
The word 'healthy' may serve as an example. As applied to a man, it means that
his physical condition is satisfactory. As applied to food, it signifies, not
that the food is physically sound, but that it is calculated to produce health
in man. The two meanings here, are as distinct as those of an Equivocal term.
(2) The other class of Analogous terms must be carefully noticed. These terms
do not, it is true, like Univocal terms, convey precisely the same meaning
wherever they are employed. When an Analogous term is applied to objects
between which the analogy exists, its meaning in the two cases is in so far
different, that the characteristic signified is present in different grades.
Yet we can express both forms of the characteristic in question by a single
concept, because there exists between them a likeness of proportion (analogia). When for instance we say that God is the
'cause' of the world, and that the sculptor is the 'cause' of the statue, the
word 'cause' is analogous. God causes the world in a different sense from that
in which the sculptor causes the statue. Yet owing to the proportional
resemblance between the two cases, we can form an Analogous concept, and employ
an Analogous term. Similarly the word
'thing' is analogous. We say that a man is a 'thing', and that a thought is a
'thing'; but a man and a thought are not things in the same sense.
§ 14. Opposition of Terms. Terms can be opposed to each other in the following ways: --
(1)
Contradictory Opposition is the opposition between a term and its negation,
e.g. 'man, not-man,' 'white, not-white'. It is characteristic of this
opposition that the two terms are not merely mutually exclusive, but they are
exhaustive of all possible things. Everything, no matter what it be, whether it
be matter or spirit, real or unreal, is either white or not white.
The opposition
which exists between Repugnant
terms, e.g. between 'red 'and' white,' is a special case of
Contradictory Opposition. The reason they exclude each other, lies in the fact
that while both are colours, they are colours of different species. What
is red cannot be also white. It is not-white.
(2) Contrary
Opposition is the opposition between two classes, which are furthest removed
from each other among those which belong to the same genus. Such are, for
instance, 'white, black', 'pious, impious', 'kind, cruel'. This opposition
arises because our concepts of certain series of qualities represent them as
passing by gradation from one extreme to the other: there is no abrupt
transition such as is found to exist between contradictories. Where this
gradation of qualities is found, the extremes are known as contraries.
Many logicians
speak of Contradictory opposition as formal, because it can be symbolically
represented as 'A, not-A': Contrary opposition they term material, because we
are unable to say whether two terms are contraries, unless we know the actual
things which they signify. On the view of Logic which we are defending, there
is no room for this distinction. The mental processes which can be symbolically
represented, do not differ in any essential from those which cannot. The mind
recognizes Contrary opposition between the concepts 'pious' and 'impious',
'white' and 'black', precisely in the same manner as it recognizes the
Contradictory opposition between 'A' and 'not-A'.
§ 15. The
'Suppositio' of the Term.
Even where we
are dealing with one and the same univocal term there are various ways in which
it may be construed. The same term may stand for something different. These
various uses of the term were termed by the Latin logicians its suppositiones,
(from supponere, 'to stand for'). Although a little repetition may be involved, it
will be well to distinguish here the principal among the different ways in
which a term may be used.
(1) Collective
and Distributive use. When anything is affirmed or denied of a plural
subject, the predicate may apply either to the individuals, who constitute the subject,
taken separately, or to them taken as a group. The former is known as the
distributive use (suppositio distributiva) of the term; the latter as
the collective use (suppositio collectiva). The propositions, "The
citizens raised a monument to the dead statesman", and "The citizens
voted in the election", will sufficiently illustrate the two cases.
(2) Real
and Logical use. This distinction depends on whether the speaker refers to
the object as it is in the real order, or as it is in his concept. Thus, if I
say "The King of England is at Windsor", the use is real (suppositio
realis). If I say, "'The King of England' is the subject of my
sentence" the use is logical (suppositio logica).
(3) Suppositio
materialis. When a word is taken to signify simply the spoken sound, or the
written symbol, it is said to be used in its suppositio materialis, e.g.
"'To run' is a verb". "'Run' is a word of three letters".
Footnotes
[N1] De Caelo, I.
C. 5. Parvus error
in principio fit magnus in fine.
[N2] The
term 'phantasm' is Aristotle's. Thus in De Anima, III.
c. 8 he tells us that "when we contemplate any thing, we are forced to
contemplate it in conjunction with a phantasm" and he proceeds to
distinguish carefully between the phantasm and the concept.
[N3] The
doctrine of this section is insisted on by Aristotle. "The universal nature
is evident to the intelligence, the individual to sense-perception. For the
intelligence deals with what is universal, and sense-perception with what is
particular. Physics; I c 5 sect 8. "The phantasm is as the perceptions of
sense, save that it is without material embodiment" De Anima, III. c. 8.
For a further consideration of the point, see Maber, Psychology (6th ed.),
235-238.
[N4]
Vide St. Thomas, De
Anima, iii. lect. 8. The interpretation here given by St. Thomas of the
passage de Anima, III. c. 4, § 7, is not only in full accord with Aristotle's
general doctrine, but is substantially the same as that proposed by Themistius
and by Siraplicius. Cf. Rodier, Traité de l'ame, l.c. Cf. also De Veritate, Q.
II. Art. 6.
[N5]
Subject in these definitions is used in a different sense from that in which we
have hitherto employed it. Hitherto we have been speaking of the subject of a
proposition - the subject of predication, as it is termed by logicians. But
real things are also termed the subjects of the qualities which inhere in them:
they are subjects of inhesion. It is in this sense that the word is here used.
[N6]
These Connotative terms when considered in relation to the characteristic, the
presence of which they signify, and from which they are etymologicallv derived,
were called Denominatives (Categ. c. 1.v, c.8. 27). The abstract attribute was
termed the Denominant.
[N7] The
abstract term does not represent the accident as a substance, but simply as an
independent determination. Only concrete terms can represent substance.
[N8] On
Privative terms see St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I. Q. 33, Art. 4, ad. 2 [Latin, English].
[N9]
"Quia tamen [nomen infinitum] significat per modum nominis quod potest
subjici et praedicari, requiritur ad minus suppositum in apprehensione."
[N10]
See however an accurate account by Sir William Hamilton in Edinburgh Review,
vol. 57, p. 210. "The distinction," he there says, "is necessary
to be 'known, not only on its own account as a highly philosophical
determination, 'but as the condition of any understanding of the Scholastic
Philosophy."
[N11]
Copyright © E.D.Buckner 2005.