Introduction
§2 On the order of utterances and of concepts in signifying.
§3 What is an affection of the soul, or concept?
§4 Is it a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding?
§5 An irrational opinion: it is a species of thing.
§6 A more probable opinion: it is the act of understanding, itself.
§7 A probable opinion: it is an 'effigy' or fiction.
§8 Three opinions: (1) an absurd opinion: it is an external thing.
§9 (2) It is a quality subjectively existing in the mind.
§10 (3) Syllogisms and universals are fictions, having only objective existence in the soul.
§11 The difference between spoken utterances and writings, and affections of the soul.
§12 Of concepts, and of simple and complex utterances.

Introduction

This is the first time on the Web for Ockham's commentary on Aristotle's Perihermenias (De Interpretatione, On Exposition). The Latin (section (book I, sections 2 to 12) is transcribed from the Latin edition of A. Gambatese and S. Brown, the translation into English is mine (also a first, I think – it is ironic that most of Ockham's work has never been translated into his own native language – a version of which he would have certainly spoken, being alive when Chaucer was born in 1345).

This section of the commentary is interesting for its extended discussion of 'mental language'. This is the idea that there exists in the mind (or 'in the soul') a language of conceptual terms, corresponding to the language of written and spoken terms. Conceptual terms are the 'mental words' that the blessed Augustine (De Trinitate XV), says do not belong to any language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be spoken outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.

Mental terms signify the same things as spoken and written ones. Thus, the mental term dog signifies a dog, just like the written term 'dog'. But the mental term signifies a dog naturally, primarily, and without any need for agreement or convention, whereas the written term signifies it by convention, and secondarily. The concept signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies only according to voluntary imposition.

Ockham discusses this idea in much-quoted sections of the Summa Logicae, also available in the Logic Museum here. But he leaves the question of what these mental terms might be. Here, he gives an extended treatment of the question, although it is one which, he says, belongs to metaphysics rather than logic.

In section 2 ('on the order of utterances and of concepts in signifying') Ockham discusses the 'order of signifying' of spoken terms and concepts in the mind, a question which much occupied the minds of medieval philosophers. Is it words or concepts which primarily signify? He argues that it is primarily a concept that signifies a thing. A word, by contrast, primarily signifies a concept, but secondarily (via the concept) signifies a thing. Thus if there were to be a change in what the concept signified, this would immediately result in a change in what the word signified, without any new imposition or institution to established the meaning of the word. This is clear, he says,if we consider the relation between written words and spoken words. If we decided that the spoken word 'man' were to signify whiteness, the written word 'man' would immediately signify whiteness.

In the short section 3 ('what is an affection of the soul, or concept?'), Ockham introduces the subject which occupies much of what is to come, namely the nature of the 'affection of the soul', the concept which spoken terms primarily signify. He says it is for the metaphyician, not the logician, to decide what sort of thing this affection may be, i.e whether it is some thing external to the soul, or something really existing in the soul, or something made up, existing only in the soul objectively. Nonetheless, he cannot forbear from given some the opinions of others (together with a few of his own opinions) on the subject.

In section 4 ('is an affection a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding?') he considers the opinion that an 'affection of the soul', is some quality of the soul, distinct in reality from the act of understanding, taking the act of understanding, itself as an object. This quality is a true likeness of the thing outside, on account of which it represents the thing itself outside, and stands for it by its nature, just as an utterance denotes things by institution.

In section 5 ('an irrational opinion: an affection is a species of thing') he considers the opinion that this affection of the soul is something that can be subject or a predicate, from which a proposition in the mind is composed, and which corresponds to a proposition in an utterance, and that this affection is a species of thing which naturally represents a thing, and so can naturally denote the thing in a proposition. He says that this opinion seems to him to be more irrational than the first, because such a species is not to be supposed on account of [its] superfluity (Talis species non est ponenda propter superfluitatem is one of the famous formulations of 'Ockham's Razor', discussed by Thorburn in a Logic Museum page here. He objects that, according to Aristotle there is nothing in the soul that is really distinct from the soul. Also, if this were so, then such affections would remain in the soul, with the soul itself thinking nothing, and there would be propositions in the soul when nothing actually was thought.

In section 6 ('a more probable opinion among opinions supposing that concepts are qualities: an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself') he considers the opinion that an affection of the soul is the act of understanding, itself. He thinks is the most probable of all the opinions which propose that such affections are really in the soul.

He first gives the view in a way that makes it seem probable, which is that one who has the singular thought expressed by 'Socrates runs' comprehends that the person, Socrates himself, is running. Thus an act of understanding, by its nature and without any imposition, denotes the very thing of which it is [an understanding]. General thoughts, such as expressed by 'a man runs', involve an understanding which is not true of one thing more than another, i.e. not of Socrates more than of Plato. And similarly, for 'an animal runs', there would be an act of understanding by which it would be no more understood this animal, than that animal, and so on.

But this view faces certain difficulties. Is there something understood by the the thought corresponding to the word 'man'? Either something or nothing. But we cannot say nothing, for the same reason it is impossible for there to be vision, and nothing to be seen, or for there to be loving, and nothing to be loved. It is likewise impossible for their to be thought, and nothing thought of. But if the thought has something, this is either something in the soul or something outside the soul. If outside the soul, and it is not a universal, for there is no such thing. Therefore it is a singular thing; but this cannot be not more one thing than another (i.e. not more Plato than Socrates, or any other man) therefore everything. Thus, when I understand 'man' or grasp the proposition 'a man is an animal', I understand every man, and think about many men who I will never see, or whom have I ever thought, which seems an absurdity. (Reminding us perhaps of Frege's remark that if I utter a sentence with the grammatical subject 'all men', I do not wish to say something about 'some Central African chief' wholly unknown to me).

Ockham addresses these problems, together with some other difficult questions, including whether a proposition in the mind that corresponds to 'every man is an animal' is complex in the same way that the spoken proposition is complex, and whether we can distinguish the mental propositions corresponding to 'every animal is a white thing' from the one corresponding to 'every white thing is an animal'

In section 7 ('A probable opinion: affections of the soul are effigies or fictions') Ockham discusses a view he seems to favour. An intention of the soul, or a concept or affection of the soul is nothing other than a predicable or 'subjectible' in a proposition in the mind, to which there corresponds a predicable or subjectible in utterance, and, generally, affections of the soul, whether intentions of the soul or concepts, are propositions in the mind, or syllogisms, or parts of them. These mental terms and propositions are 'effigies' or 'fictions'. They are not true qualities of the mind, and are not real beings existing subjectively in it, but they are certain things thought by the mind whose being is nothing other than being thought. They exist in the sense that a building designed by an architect really exists, which exists in virtue of being designed or made-up, and so does not exist in reality. This made-up thing can also be called an 'intention', because it is not real, and has intentional being, i.e. being thought of in the soul.

This view is not entirely clear. If a thing has being by being thought, is this not a kind of being? But what kind of being? Ockham himself notes the difficulty of supposing that anything can be understood by us, which does not exist in reality, nor any part of it, and which is neither a substance nor a property of anything.

In sections 8 to 10 ('A threefold opinion on the quiddity of affections, propositions, syllogisms and universals') he considers three views, of which the first is an absurd one: that 'affections of the soul are things outside, conceived'.

(1) The first view turns out to be the one which Ockham is famous in his opposition to, namely, of the real existence of universals: that a thing outside that is conceived or understood is an affection of the soul, in that way by which some suppose that beyond singular things there are universal things, and that singular things conceived are subjects in singular propositions, and universal things conceived are parts of a universal proposition.

He spends little time on refuting it (presumably considering that his other writings are refutation enough). He dismisses it, saying that, as far as it supposes there are some things outside, beyond singulars, existing in them, it is to be deemed altogether absurd and destructive of the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy, and reproved by Aristotle in VII Metaphyics, and that those holding it are unready for science.

(2) In section 9 ('Affections of the soul are qualities subjectively existing in the mind'), he considers the second view: that affections of the soul are certain qualities of the mind, which actually exist there just as whiteness exists in a wall, or coldness in water. This is apparently defended by Averroes in his commentary on book V of the Metaphysics.

There are difficulties with this view. Figments such as the chimaera, the goat-stag are imaginable, yet do not exist in reality. Similarly, everyone has tried in themselves to imagine castles and mountains of gold and things of that sort, which do not have, and cannot have any real being. Similarly, a house designed by a builder has no real being before it has actually been built. Furthermore, being outside the mind is divided into Aristotle's ten categories. Into what category does being in the mind fall into? If it is a quality of the mind, then it is a quality, and thus falls under the ten categories, and then it is not distinguished from being outside the mind, but is itself such a being.

Replying on behalf of those who say it is a real being, Ockham argues that 'a chimaera exists in reality' has distinct meanings according to whether 'chimaera' denotes personally, or materially or simply. If it denotes personally (i.e. if it is meant to denote a chimaera itself) it is false. But if it denotes materially (i.e. if it stands for the word 'chimaera') or simply (it stands for the concept of a chimera), it is true, for the word 'chimaera', and the concept chimaera both exist in reality. Similarly the proposition 'a chimaera is understood' is false, if 'chimaera' is meant to stand for a chimaera, but true, if it stands either for the word itself, or for the concept of a chimaera. (An argument he repeats in Summa Logicae II.72).

And when someone invents something, he invents in the sense that he spins out such and such acts of understanding, the same way someone lying invents many things, by uttering many lies, 'and yet there is nothing altogether except an utterances, or utterances, and yet he is said to invent, because he says something by which it is implied it is otherwise than it is'. To the argument that things are divided into the ten categories, he replies that signs are contained under one category, just as all utterances are contained under the category of quality, and so beings in the mind are contained under the category of quality.

Thus, he argues, it can reasonably be held that every proposition in the mind which is not composed from signs instituted at pleasure is composed from real qualities of the mind, or is some quality of the mind equivalent to such a composite.

(3) In section 10 ('Syllogisms and universals are fictions, having only objective existence in the soul') he discusses the view that affections of the soul, also propositions and syllogisms and universals are nothing but certain fictions, having only 'objective existence', i.e. a being-thought-about, nowhere really existing, which are fictions in the sense that they are not real beings. This is similar to the view he has considered in section 7 above.

Such a fiction has intentional being. It is more to be distinguished from things in external reality, than any such things are distinguished from one another, yet it also is more assimilated to the thing it represents, than any other external thing, for if it could be really produced as it was in imagination, it would truly be similar in reality to a thing outside.

In section 11 ('The difference between spoken utterances and writings, and affections of the soul'), he returns to Aristotle's text (16ª 6-9) where Aristotle makes a distinction between utterances and written signs on the one hand, and the affections of the soul on the other, saying that just as written letters are not the same among all men (as with Greek, Hebrew and Latin script), so spoken words are not the same eveywhere, because there is a different language [idioma] for the Greeks, the Latins, the Hebrews and the barbarians.

However, affections of the soul which spoken and written words primarily signify are the same for all men. (I.e. the English word 'dog' is different from the French word 'chien' and the Latin word 'canis'. But the mental concept or 'affection' that these different words signify is the same for all). Ockham alludes to a passage in De Anima where this is discussed in more detail. However, this passage has never been found.

In section 12 ('Of concepts, and of simple and complex utterances) Ockham discusses the passage in 16ª 9-18, where Aristotle distinguishes understanding where there is no truth or falsity, from understanding where there is truth and falsity. With the former, there is no complexity. With the latter, we have a proposition, which is complex. Truth and falsity consists in composition and division. An affirmative sentence [oratio] is composed of name and verb, is true or false. But simples, i.e. a name or a verb taken by itself, have no composition, and are neither true nor false. For example, if 'a man' or 'a white thing' are said, and no verb is added, neither something true nor something false is signified.

Here, Ockham digresses again into a discussion about whether the proposition in the mind is simply an act of understanding, taking something outside the mind as an object, or whether it is itself an object of another understanding.

Latin	English
§2 DE ORDINE VOCUM ET CONCEPTUM IN SIGNIFICANDO	ON THE ORDER OF UTTERANCES AND OF CONCEPTS IN SIGNIFYING
SUNT ERGO EA [c. 1; 16ª 3-6] In ista parte ponit Philosophus ordinem vocum [N1] de quibus determinabit ad alia. Et primo hoc facit; secundo ponit inter ea unam differentiam. Dicit ergo primo quod voces prolatae sunt notae passionum animae, et ea quae scribuntur sunt notae vocum prolatarum.	THEREFORE THERE ARE THINGS. In this part the philosopher gives the order of utterances about which he will determine with respect to other things. And first he does this; second he gives one difference between them. Therefore he says first that spoken utterances are marks of affections in the soul, and things that are written are marks of spoken utterances.
Hic primo notandum est quod non intendit Philosophus quod voces omnes proprie et primo significant passiones animae, quasi sint impositae ad significandum principaliter passiones animae. Sed multae voces et nomina primae intentionis [N2] sunt impositae ad significandum primo res, sicut haec vox 'homo' imponitur primo ad significandum omnes homines et nonnisi quando sunt homines, ita quod quando cessant esse homines, cessant significari per hanc vocem 'homo'. Dicit tamen Philosophus quod vox est nota passionis animae propter quendam ordinem eorum in significando, quia primo passio significat res et secundario vox significat non passionem animae sed easdem res quas significat passio; ita quod si passio mutaret significata sua statim vox eo ipso, sine omni nova impositione vel institutione, mutaret significata sua. Et istud est manifestius de voce et scripto, nam possum instituere hanc vocem 'homo' ad significandem talem rem; postea possum sic instituere hanc dictionem 'homo' scriptam, dicens sic: instituo hanc dictionem scriptam non ad significandum hanc vocem prolatam 'homo', sed ad significandum istam eandem rem quam significat haec vox prolata et nihil aliud, ita quod quidquid significatur per hanc vocem et pro quocumque tempore, quod illud idem et non [348] aliud pro eodem tempore significetur per dictionem scriptam. Hoc posito, dictio scripta non significabit vocem sed rem tantum, et si vox mutaret significatum suum, statim eo ipso dictio scripta mutaret significatum suum. Et ita apparet de facto. Unde si omnes homines de novo imponerent hanc vocem 'homo' ad significandum illud idem quod significatur per hanc vocem 'albedo', nulla facta mutatione de scriptura, qui postea scriberet istam 'homo est animal', - alius diceret sibi quod scriberet falsum -, non significaret vocem sed rem, et hoc propter ordinem in significando, quia scilicet dictio scripta non imponitur ad significandum nisi illud idem quod significatur per vocem et nihil aliud. Hoc tamen non est nisi ad placitum instituentis. Et sicut est talis ordo in significando inter vocem at scripturam, ita est talis ordo in significando inter vocem et passionem animae. Et propter illum ordinem dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt notae passionum. Et sic debent intelligi omnes auctoritates [N3] philosophorum et aliorum [N4] hoc sonantium.	Here we should note, first of all, that the Philosopher does not mean that all utterances properly and primarily signify affections of the soul, as though they were imposed for signifying principally affections of the soul. But many utterances and names of first intention are imposed for signifying in the first place things. For example, the utterance 'man' is imposed in the first place for signifying all men, and only when they are men, so that when they cease to be men, they cease to be signified by the utterance 'man'. Yet the Philosopher says that an utterance is the mark of affection in the soul, on account of a certain order in signification, because primarily an affection signifies things, and secondarily an utterance signifies not an affection of the soul but the very same things which the affection signifies, so that if there were to be a change in what the affection signified, by that fact there would immediately be a change in what the utterance signified, without any new imposition or institution. And this is more manifest concerning utterance and writing, for I can institute the name 'man' to signify such a thing. Afterwards I can thus institute the written expression 'man', saying 'I institute this written expression not to signify the spoken utterance 'man', but to signify that same thing the spoken word signifies, and nothing else', so that whatever is signified by this utterance and at whatever time, that same thing and no other is signified at the same time by the written expression. Given this, a written expression will not signify an utterance, but only a thing, and if there were a change in what the utterance signified, by that fact immediately there would be a change in what the written expression signified. And so it appears in fact. Wherefore if all men were to impose anew the utterance 'man' for signifying that same thing that is signified by the utterance 'whiteness', with no change made in writing, someone who afterwards were to write 'a man is an animal', another would say to him that he writes something false. He would not signify an utterance but a thing, and this is on account of the order of signifying, namely because a written expression is not imposed for signifying unless it is that same thing that is signified by the utterance, and nothing else. This, nonetheless, is only at the pleasure of the one instituting. And just as there is such an order of signifying between utterance and writing, so there is such an order of signifying between utterance and affection of the soul. And on account of that order the Philosopher says that utterances are marks of affections. And so should [speak] all the authorities of the philosophers and of others who 'sound off' on this [subject].
§3 QUID EST PASSIO ANIMAE SIVE CONCEPTUS?	WHAT IS AN AFFECTION OF THE SOUL, OR CONCEPT?
Secundo videndum est quid sit ista passio [N5]. Et est dicendum quod passio acciptur aliter hic et in libro Praedicamentorum. Quomodo autem [349] ibi accipiebatur, dictum fuit ibi [N6]. Sed in proposito accipitur passio animae pro aliquo praedicabili de aliquo, quod non est vox nec scriptura, et vocatur ab aliquibus intentio animae, ab aliquibus vocatur conceptus. Qualis autem sit ista passio, an scilicet sit aliqua res extra animam, vel aliquid realiter exsistens in anima, vel aliquod ens fictum exsistens tantum in anima obiective, non pertinet ad logicum sed ad metaphysicum considerare. Verumtamen aliquas opiniones quae possent poni circa istam difficultatem volo recitare.	Second, it is to be seen what this affection is. And it is to be said that 'affection' is taken in another way here and in the book of Categories (the Praedicamenta). In what way it was taken there, was said there. But in what is proposed [here], an affection of the soul is taken for something predicable of something, which is not an utterance, nor writing, and is called by some an 'intention' of the soul, and by some a 'concept'. But what kind of thing this affection may be, i.e. whether it is some thing external to the soul, or something really existing in the soul, or something made up, existing only in the soul objectively, does not pertain to the logician to consider, but to the metaphysician. Nevertheless, I wish to read out some opinions which could be given about this difficulty.
§4 ESTNE PASSIO QUALITAS ANIMAE DISTINCTA AB ACTU INTELLIGENDI?	IS AN AFFECTION A QUALITY OF THE SOUL DISTINCT FROM THE ACT OF UNDERSTANDING?
Posset igitur poni una talis opinio, scilicet quod passio animae, de qua Philosophus hic loquitur, est aliqua qualitas animae distincta realiter ab actu intelligendi, terminans sicut obiectum ipsum actum intellegendi, quae quidem qualitas non habet esse nisi quando est actus intelligendi [N7]. Et ista qualitas est vera similitudo rei extra, propter quod repraesentat ipsam rem extra et pro ipsa supponit ex natura sua sicut vox supponit pro rebus ex institutione.	Accordingly, we could give one such opinion: namely that an affection of the soul, which the Philosopher speaks about here, is some quality of the soul, distinct in reality from the act of understanding, taking [terminans] as an object the act of understanding, itself, which quality of course does not have being except when it is the act of understanding. And this quality is a true similitude of the external thing, on account of which it represents the external thing itself, and stands for it from its nature, just as an utterance denotes things by institution.
Sed sive ista opinio sit vera sive false, contra eam sunt aliquae diff[350]icultates: una quia Philosophus non videtur ponere in anima nisi potentias et habitus et passiones sive actus, sicut habetur II Ethicorum [N8]. Cum igitur talis qualitas non sit habitus nec potentia nec actus, ut manifestum est secundum istam opinionem, non videtur quod sit vera qualitas mentis.	But whether this opinion be true or false, it faces certain difficulties. One, because the Philosopher does not seem to grant [anything] in the soul except potentialities, and habits and affections or acts, just is is held in II Ethics. Accordingly, since such a quality is not a disposition [habitus], nor a potentiality nor an actuality, as is manifest according to the second opinion, it does not seem that it is a true quality of the mind.
Similiter, videtur quod ista qualitas non sit obiectum intellectus, quia passiones animae ponuntur ut correspondeant vocibus ut scilicet aliquid intelligatur prolata voce et concepto suo significato. Sed quando dico sic 'animal', et alius audit et novit significationem istius vocis, non videtur intelligere aliquam talem qualitatem, quia videtur intelligere animal in communi. Sed talis qualitas non potest esse animal in communi, quia illa qualitas, si ponatur, ita distinguitur ab animali sicut albedo vel calor, cum sit unum accidens spirituale in anima, et calor est accidens corporale in corpore; et accidens spirituale videtur magis distingui ab animali quam accidens corporale.	Similarly, it seems that this quality is not an object of the understanding, because affections of the soul are supposed in order to correspond to utterances, i.e. so that something may be understood by a spoken utterance, and by the concept of it that is signified. But when I say 'animal', and another hears, and knows the signification of that utterance, he does not seem to understand some such quality, because he seems to understand 'animal' in common. But such a quality cannot be animal in common, because that quality, if it be granted, is so distinguished from animal as whiteness or heat, since there is a spiritual accident in the soul, and heat is a corporeal accident in a body, and a spiritual accident seems more to be distinguished from animal than a corporeal accident.
§5 OPINIO IRRATIONALIS: PASSIO EST SPECIES REI	AN IRRATIONAL OPINION: AN AFFECTION IS A SPECIES OF THING
Alia posset esse opinio [N9] quod passio animae, de qua loquitur Philosophus hic, est aliquid subicibile vel praedicabile, ex quo componitur propositio in mente quae correspondet propositioni in voce; et quod ista passio est species rei quae naturaliter repraesentat rem, et ideo potest naturaliter pro re in propositione supponere.	Another opinion could be that an affection of the soul, of which the Philosopher speaks here, is something that can be a subject, or predicate, from which a proposition in the mind is composed, which corresponds to a proposition in an utterance, and that this affection is a species of thing which naturally represents a thing, and for that reason can naturally denote the thing in a proposition.
[351] Sed haec opinio videtur mihi magis irrationalis quam prima, tum quia talis species non est ponenda propter superfluitatem, sicut patebit alias [N10]; tum quia, sicut dictum est contra priorem opinionem, in anima non est aliquid realiter distinctum ab anima nisi habitus vel actus secundum Philosophum; tum quia tunc tales passiones remanerent in anima, ipsa anima nihil cogitante, et essent propositiones in anima quando nihil actualiter cogitaret.	But this opinion seems to me to be more irrational than the first, both because such a species is not to be supposed on account of [its] superfluity, just as will be clear elsewhere, and because, just as was said against the previous opinion, according to the Philosopher there is nothing in the soul that is really distinct from the soul, except conditions or acts, and [also] because then such affections would remain in the soul, with the soul itself thinking nothing, and there would be propositions in the soul when nothing actually was thought.
§6 OPINIO PROBABILIOR INTER OPINIONES PONENTES CONCEPTUS ESSE QUALITATES: PASSIO ANIMAE EST IPSE ACTUS INTELLIGENDI	A MORE PROBABLE OPINION AMONG THE OPINIONS GRANTING THAT CONCEPTS ARE QUALITIES: AN AFFECTION OF THE SOUL IS THE ACT OF UNDERSTANDING, ITSELF.
Alia posset esset opinio [N11], quod passio animae est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia ista opinio videtur mihi probabilior de omnibus opinionibus quae ponunt istas passiones esse subiective et realiter in anima tamquam veras qualitates ipsius, ideo circa istam opinionem primo ponam modum ponendi probabiliorem, si debeat poni; se[352]cundo ponam inconvenientia vera vel apparentia contra eam, et respondebo ad ea illo modo quo reputo tenentem eam ad ea debere respondere.	Another opinion could be that an affection of the soul is the very act of understanding. And because that opinion seems to me more probable of all the opinions which suppose that these affections are subjectively and really in the soul, as much as they are true qualities of it, for that reason, concerning that opinion, first I will give the manner of giving it that is more probable, if it ought to be given, second, I will give the true or apparent inconsistencies [inconvenientia] against it, and I will reply to them in that manner by which I think one holding them ought to reply to them.
Dico igitur quod qui vult tenere praedictam opinionem potest supponere quod intellectus apprehendens rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem in se quae est tantum istius singularis, et vocatur passio animae, potens ex natura sua supponere pro illa re singulari. Ita quod sicut ex institutione haec vox 'Sortes' supponit pro illa re quam significat, - ita quod audiens istam vocem 'Sortes currit', non concipit ex ea quod haec vox 'Sortes' quam audit currit, sed quod res significata per illam vocem currit -, ita qui videret vel intelligeret aliquid affirmari de illa intellectione singularis rei, non conciperet illam intellectionem esse talem vel talem, sed conciperet ipsam rem cuius est, esse talem vel talem. Ita quod sicut vox ex institutione supponit pro illa re, ita ipsa intellectio ex natura sua sine omni institutione supponit pro re cuius est. Sed praeter istam intellectionem istius rei singularis format sibi intellectus alias intellectiones quae non magis sunt istius rei quam alterius, sicut haec vox 'homo' non magis significat Sortem quam Platonem; ideo non magis supponit pro Sorte quam pro Platone. Ita esset de tali intellectione, quod non magis ea intelligitur Sortes quam Plato, et sic de omnibus aliis hominibus. Ita etiam esset aliqua intellectio qua non magis intelligeretur hoc animal quam illud animal et sic de aliis. Breviter igitur ipsae intellectiones animae vocantur passiones animae et supponunt ex natura sua pro ipsis rebus extra vel pro aliis rebus in anima sicut voces ex institutione.	Accordingly, I say that one who wishes to hold the previous opinion can suppose that the understanding, apprehending one thing, draw out one cognition in him which is only of that singular, and it is called an affection of the soul, being capable by its nature to denote that singular thing. So that, for example, by imposition the name 'Socrates' denotes that thing which it signifies, so that one hearing the utterance 'Socrates runs' does not comprehend from it that the utterance 'Socrates' which he hears, runs, but that the thing signified by that utterance runs, so that one who would see or would understand something to be affirmed of that act of understanding of the singular thing, would not comprehend that act of understanding to be such-and-such, but would comprehend that thing, of which it is, to be such-and-such. So that, just as the utterance by imposition denotes that thing, so the act of understanding by its nature without any imposition denotes the thing of which it is [an understanding]. But beyond that act of understanding of that singular thing, the understanding forms to itself other acts of understandings which are not more of that thing than the other, just as the utterance 'man' does not signify Socrates more than Plato, so for that reason does not denote Socrates more than Plato. Thus, of such an act of understanding, it would be the case that Socrates is not understood by it any more than Plato. Thus also there would be some act of understanding by which it would be no more understood this animal, than that animal, and so for others. Accordingly, these acts of understanding of the soul are briefly called 'affections' of the soul, and denote by their nature the external things themselves, or other things in the soul such as utterances by imposition.
Sed contra istam opinionem potest argui multipliciter. Primo sic: accipio cognitionem communem sive confusam quae correspondet isti voci 'homo' vel isti voci 'animal', et quaero aut aliquid intelligitur ista cognitione aut nihil. Non potest dici quod nihil, quia sicut impossibile est esse visionem et nihil videri, vel esse dilectio[353]nem et nihil diligi, ita impossibile est esse cognitionem nihil cognosci illa cognitione. Si aliquid cognoscitur ista cognitione, aut aliquid in anima aut aliquid extra animam. Si aliqua res extra animam, - et non res universalis quia nulla talis est, sicut ostensum est in praecedentibus libris et amplius ostendetur in isto libro [N12] -, ergo aliqua res singularis cognoscitur tali cognitione sed non magis una quam alia; igitur vel quaelibet vel nulla; sed non nulla, ergo quaelibet intelligitur. Et ita quando intelligerem hominem vel formarem istam propositionem in anima 'homo est animal', ego intelligerem omnem hominem, et ita intelligerem et cognoscerem multos homines quos numquam vidi nec de quibus unquam cogitavi; quod videtur inconveniens.	But against this opinion it can be argued in many ways. First thus: I accept the cognition, common or confused, which corresponds to the utterance 'man' or 'animal', and I ask whether something is understood by that cognition or nothing. We cannot say 'nothing', because just as it is impossible for there to be vision, and nothing to be seen, or for there to be loving, and nothing to be loved, so it is impossible for their to be cognition, and nothing cognised. If something is cognised by that cognition, it is either something in the soul or something external to the soul. If something external to the soul, and it is not a universal thing because there is no such thing, just as was shown in the preceding books and is further shown in this book. Therefore some singular thing is cognised by such a cognition, but not more one thing than another, therefore either everything, or nothing. But not nothing, therefore everything is understood. Thus, when I would understand 'man' or would form the proposition 'a man is an animal', I would understand every man, and thus I would cognise many men who I would never see, nor of whom have I ever thought, which seems an absurdity.
Si autem tali cognitione cognoscitur aliquid exsistens in anima, quaero quid? Et non potest dari nisi ipsa intellectio, et ita intellectio se ipsa cognosceretur; quod videtur inconveniens.	But if by such a cognition something existing in the soul is cognised, I ask: what? And it nothing can be given except that act of understanding, and thus the act of understanding is known by itself, which seems an absurdity.
Confirmatur: sic dicendo in anima, sine omni voce prolata vel concepta, 'omnis homo potest currere', aut intelligitur aliquis homo aut nullus homo aut aliquid aliud ab homine. Si dicatur quod aliquis homo intelligitur, et non magis unus quam alius, nec magis homo qui est quam homo qui potest esse, quia ita supponit pro illis qui possunt esse homines sicut pro illis qui sunt homines, et illi qui possunt esse homines sunt infiniti, ergo tali intellectione infinita intelliguntur. Si autem nullus homo intelligitur, manifestum est quod nulla alia res extra animam intelligitur. Igitur vel nihil intelligitur vel aliquid aliud in anima intelligitur. Et non potest dari aliquid aliud rea[354]liter in anima quod intelligatur nisi ipsa intellectio; igitur ipsa intellectio se ipsa intelligitur; quod videtur inconveniens.	This is confirmed: in saying 'in the soul', without every spoken or conceived utterance, 'every man can run', there is either understood some man, or no men, or something other than a man. If it is said that some man is understood, and no more one than another, no more a man who exists [est] than a man who can exist, because [the proposition] denotes those who can be men, just as for those who are men, and those who can be men are infinite, therefore by such an act of understanding infinitely many things are understood. But if no man is understood, it is manifest that no other thing external to the soul is understood. Accordingly, either nothing is understood, or some other thing in the soul is understood. And there cannot be given some other thing really in the soul that is understood, except the act of understanding, itself. Accordingly, the act of understanding, itself is understood by itself, which seems an absurdity.
Praeterae, accipio actum sciendi propositionem, et quaero quid intelligitur tali actua? Aut simplex aut compositum. Non simplex, quia omnis propositio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato et copula ad minus. Si compositum, quaero ex quibus componitur ista propositio? Aut ex rebus praecise [N13], et tunc propositio esset a parte rei et non tantum in intellectu. Aut componitur ex aliquibus in intellectu, et non ex actibus intelligendi, quia tunc praeter actum intelligendi propositionem essent alii actus ex quibus componeretur propositio, et ita essent multi actus simul. Igitur aliquid aliud ab actu intelligendi intelligitur, quod tamen est in intellectu, et per consequens illud verius erit passio de qua Philosophus hic loquitur quam actus intelligendi.	Moreover, I accept the act of knowing a proposition, and ask, what is understood by such an act? Either something simple, or composite. Not simple, because every proposition is composed of subject, predicate and copula at least. If composite, I ask from what is this proposition composed? Either precisely out of things, and then the proposition would be on the side of things, and not only in the intellect. Or it is composed from things in the intellect, and not from acts of understanding, because then beyond the act of understanding a proposition would be other acts of which a proposition was composed, and thus there would be many acts together. Accordingly, something other than the act of understanding is understood, which nevertheless is in the understanding, and by consequence that will be more the 'affection' of which the Philosopher speaks here, than the act of understanding.
Et si dicatur quod actus apprehendendi sive sciendi unam propositionem non est aliquis unus actus simplex, sed est actus compositus ex multis actibus, qui omnes actus faciunt unam propositionem; contra hoc: tunc istae propositiones 'omnis homo est animal' et 'omne animal est homo' non distinguerentur in mente. Nam si ista propositio in mente non sit nisi actus intelligendi compositus ex istis intellectionibus particularibus, cum non possit esse hic aliquis actus particularis in una propositione quin sit in alia, nec diversitas ordinis impedit sicut in voce impedit, non videtur quomodo possit distingui in mente. Similiter, actus sciendi distinguitur ab omnibus illis actibus divisim et simul sumptis, quia omnes possunt esse simul quamvis non sit actus sciendi.	And if it is said that the act of apprehending or knowing one proposition is not some one simple act, but is an act composed from many acts, which make all the acts one proposition. Against this, then the propositions 'every man is an animal' and 'every animal is a man' would not be distinguished in the mind. For if this proposition in the mind is nothing except the act of understanding, composed from those particular acts of understanding, since there cannot here be some particular act in one proposition but that it is in another, neither does a diversity of order prevent [this], such as prevents it in an utterance, it is not apparent how it can be distinguished in the mind. Similarly, the act of knowing is distinguished from all those acts divisively and taken together, because all can exist at the same time, although it is not an act of knowing.
Ad ista potest respondere qui vult tenere istam opinionem. Ad [355] primum potest dici quod tali intellectione confusa intelliguntur res singulares extra, sicut habere intellectionem hominis confusam non est aliud quam habere unam cognitionem qua non magis intelligitur unus homo quam alius, et tamen quod tali cognitione magis cognoscitur sive intelligitur homo quam asinus. Et hoc non est aliud quam quod talis cognitio aliquo modo assimilationis magis assimilatur homini quam asino, et non magis isti homini quam illi. Et secundum illud videtur consequenter dicendum quod tali cognitione confusa possunt infinita cognosci. Nec magis videtur hoc esse inopinabile quam quod eadem dilectione vel desiderio possunt infinita diligi vel desiderari. Sed hoc secundum non videtur inopinabile, nam potest aliquis diligere omnes partes alicuius continui quae sunt infinitae, vel potest appetere quod omnes partes continui durent in esse, et tamen non appetitur esse tali appetitu nisi aliqua pars continui, et non magis una quam alia. Oportet quod omnes appetantur, quae tamen sunt infinitae. Similiter, potest aliquis appetere esse omnibus hominibus qui possunt esse, qui tamen sunt infiniti, quia infiniti possunt generari. Sic igitur posset dici quod eadem cognitio potest esse infinitorum, non tamen erit cognitio propria alicui illorum, nec ista cognitione potest unum distingui ab alio, et hoc propter aliquam similitudinem specialem istius cognitionis ad individua illa et non alia.	To this, one who would hold this opinion can reply [as follows]. To the first it can be said that by such a confused act of understanding singular things external to us are understood, just as to have a confused act of understanding of a man is nothing other than to have one cognition by which one man is not understood more than another, and nevertheless that by such a cognition a man is more cognised or understood than a donkey. And this is no other than that such a cognition, by some manner of assimilation is more assimilated to a man than to a donkey, and no more to this man than that man. And according to that, it seems consequently to be said that by such a confused cognition, infinitely many can be known. Nor does this seem more incapable of being thought [inopinabile] than that by the same loving or longing there can be infinitely many things loved or longed for. But the second does not seem incapable of being thought, for someone can love all the parts of some continuous thing, which are infinite, or can desire [appetere] that all the parts of a continuous thing endure in being, and yet it is not desired to be [so] by such a desire, unless some [i.e. any] part of the continuous thing [is desired], and not one [part] more than another. It must be that all are desired, which nevertheless are infinite. Similarly, someone can desire to be in all the men who can exist, who nevertheless are infinite, since infinitely many can be born. Thus, accordingly, it can be said that the same cognition can be of infinitely many things, yet there will not be a proper cognition of some particular one of those, nor by that cognition can one be distinguished from another, and this by some specific similitude of that cognition to those individuals, and not to others.
Ad secundum potest dici multipliciter. Uno modo, quod propositio in mente est unum compositum ex multis actibus intelligendi, sicut haec propositio in mente 'homo est animal' non est aliud quam actus quo confuse intelliguntur omnes homines et actus quo intelliguntur confuse omnia animalia; et unus est actus qui cor[356]respondet copulae. Vel potest dici quod ista propositio est unus actus aequivalens talibus tribus actibus simul exsistentibus in intellectu, et tunc secundum istum modum dicendi propositio non est aliquod compositum realiter sed tantum per aequivalentiam, hoc est, est aequivalens tali composito.	To the second, many things can be said. In one way, that the proposition in the mind is one thing composed of many acts of understanding, for example, the proposition in the mind 'a man is an animal' is nothing other than the act by which confusedly all men are understood, and an act by which confusedly all animals are understood. And there is one actuality which corresponds to the copula. Or it can be said that this proposition is one act equivalent to such three acts together existing in the understanding, and then, according to that manner of speaking, the proposition is not something really composed, but only by equivalence, that is, it is equivalent to some composition.
Sed tunc est difficile salvare quomodo istae propositiones distinguuntur in mente 'omne animal est album', 'omne album est animal' et huiusmodi, quia in mente non distinguuntur propter ordinem diversum illo modo quo distingui possunt in voce. Nam coniunctio signi cum una voce prolata vel cum alia reddit manifeste propositionem diversam. Sed hoc non potest salvari in mente, quia tales actus intelligendi in mente, cum simul sint et in eodem subiecto, quia in intellectu, non possunt habere talem ordinem diversum, nec potest idem actus intelligendi componi plus cum uno quam cum alio.	But then it is difficult to preserve in what way the propositions 'every animal is a white thing' [and] 'every white thing is an animal' are distinguished in the mind, because in the mind they are not distinguished in the diverse order in that way by which they can be distinguished in the utterance. For the conjunction of the sign [i.e. 'every'] with one thing spoken by an utterance or with another thing, manifestly yields a diverse proposition. But this cannot be preserved in the mind, because such acts of understanding in the mind, when they are together and in the same subject (because in the understanding) cannot have such a diverse order. Nor can the same act of understanding be composed more with one than with the other.
Ad istud potest dici quod propositio potest esse actus intelligendi aequivalens toti uni propositioni compositae ex realiter distinctis, si talem ordinem haberent qualem habent in voce. Et tunc erunt propositiones distinctae secundum quod distinguerentur propositiones correspondentes si termini earum seu partes aliter at aliter ordinarentur. Aliter posset dici quod in propositione in mente correspondet unus actus intelligendi compositus ex signo universali et termino communi, et ideo in propositione in mente correspondente isti propositioni prolatae 'omne animal est album' correspondet unus actus tamquam pars propositionis isti toti 'omne animal' et alius actus isti 'album', sed in propositione in mente correspondente isti propositioni 'omne album est animal' correspondet unus actus isti toti 'omne album' et alius isti termino 'animal'. Et ita istarum propositionum in mente 'omne animal est album' et 'omne album est animal' non sunt easdem partes, quia actus intelligendi correspondens isti toti 'omne album' distinguitur ab actu intelligendi correspondente praecise isti termino 'album'. Et ita esset proportionaliter dicendum de aliis.	To this, it can be said that a proposition can be an act of understanding equivalent to one entire proposition composed out of really distinct things, if they had such an order which they have in the utterance. And then there will be propositions distinct according as the corresponding propositions would be distinguished if their terms or parts were ordered in one or the other way. Otherwise it can be said that in a proposition in the mind there corresponds one act of understanding composed of the universal sign and the common term, and for that reason in the proposition in the mind corresponding to the spoken proposition 'every animal is a white thing' there corresponds one act, as if part of the proposition, to the whole expression 'every animal', and another act to 'a white thing', but in the proposition in the mind corresponding to the proposition 'every white thing is an animal' there corresponds one act to the whole expression 'every white thing', and another to the term 'an animal'. And thus, of the propositions in the mind 'every animal is a white thing' and 'every white thing is an animal' there are not the same parts, because the act of understanding corresponding to the whole expression 'every white thing' is distinguished from the act of understanding corresponding precisely to the term 'a white thing'. And so it would be proportionally said of the others.
Et secundum istam opinionem posset dici quod omnis propositio [357] in mente, quae non est aliquo modo vox nex scriptura, componitur ex intellectionibus et nullo modo ex rebus. Et ita, si aliquis affirmaret Sortem esse Platonem vel negaret, illa propositio non componeretur ex Sorte et Platone, sed ex intellectionibus Sortis et Platonis [N14], vel esset una intellectio aequivalens istis distinctis intellectionibus Sortis et Platonis et intellectioni quae copula vocatur, et etiam intellectioni quae vocatur negatio si sit propositio negativa. Et tunc cuilibet voci significativae, sive sit categorema sive syncategorema, correspondet una intellectio vel potest correspondere, quae eundem modum significandi respectu eiusdem habeat naturaliter qualem habet dictio prolata ex institutione. Sicut singultus infirmorum et gemitus et multae tales voces naturaliter illud idem significant quod possunt significare voces significativae ad placitum, ita intellectiones animae, quas Philosophus hic vocat passiones animae, possunt naturaliter significare illud idem quod voces institutae ad placitum significant; et non tantum hoc, immo potest aliqua intentio unica naturaliter significare – et eodem modo – quod significat aliquod compositum ex voce categorematica et syncategorematica. In hoc tamen est differentia quod vox significat non tantum proferenti sed etiam audientibus; intellectiones autem animae non significant nisi ipsi animae intellegenti, et hoc quia alii passiones animae non possunt apprehendere.	And according to that opinion it could be said that every proposition in the mind, which is not in some way an utterance nor something written, is composed from acts of understanding and in no way from things. And thus, if someone were to affirm that Socrates was Plato, or deny it, that proposition would not be composed out of 'Socrates' or 'Plato' but out of the acts of understanding of 'Socrates' and 'Plato', or there would be one act of understanding equivalent to the distinct acts of understanding of 'Socrates' and 'Plato', and to the act of understanding which is called the copula, and also to the act of understanding which is called negation, if it is a negative proposition. And then to any significative utterance, whether it be categorematic or syncategorematic, there corresponds, or there can correspond one act of understanding, which has naturally the same manner of signifying in respect of the same [thing] the way that the spoken expression has by institution. Just as the gasping and sighing of the feeble and many such utterances naturally signify that same thing which significative utterances can signify at pleasure, so the acts of understanding of the soul, which the Philosopher calls 'affections of the soul', can naturally signify that same thing which utterances instituted at pleasure signify. And not only that, indeed some unique intention can naturally signify, and in the same way, what something composed from an utterance categorematic and syncategorematic. Yet in this there is a difference: that an utterance signifies not only to one uttering [it], but also to those hearing [it]. But acts of understanding of the soul do not signify except to the very soul that is understanding, and this [is] because others cannot apprehend the affections of the soul.
Ad formam igitur rationis potest responderi quod refert loqui de actu sciendi propositionem et de actu apprehendendi, quia actus apprehendendi magis erit ipsa propositio quam ipsius propositionis, et ita apprehendere propositionem non est aliud quam formare propositionem. Et tunc quando quaeritur quid intelligitur tali propositione in mente: aut simplex aut compositum? - potest dici quod nec simplex nec compositum. Sicut, verbi gratia, per istam propositionem 'homo est animal', non apprehenditur proprie loquendo nec simplex nec compositum, sed ista propositio in mente est actus intelligendi quo apprehenditur omnis homo et etiam omne animal confuse, et quod idem numero est homo et animal, quia hoc denota[358]tur per eam, et ita tali propositione intelliguntur plura, non tamen compositum. Et quando dicitur quod omnis propositio componitur ex subiecto et praedicato et copula, potest dici quod hoc est verum de propositionibus prolatis et scriptis. Sed de propositione concepta, quae tantum est in mente, potest dici quod aliqua componitur ex tali subiecto et praedicato et copula, et aliqua est aequivalens tali composito. Et hoc sufficit ad propositionem. Et ideo secundum istum modum dicendi verius esset dicendum quod propositio non semper intelligitur quando est in anima, sed est quo intelliguntur res vel intentiones animae, hoc est actus intelligendi, quia tunc propositio est actus intelligendi. Sed si loquamur de actu sciendi aliquam propositionem, sic potest dici quod ille actus est alius actus a propositione. Et ideo quando aliqua propositio in mente scitur, tunc sunt dua actus intellectus simul, scilicet ipsa propositio et actus alius quo scitur illa propositio. Nec unquam invenitur ab Aristotele quod negaret duos actus intellectus posse simul esse in intellectu, et maxime de actibus ordinatis cuiusmodi sunt propositio et actus sciendi eam.	Accordingly, to the form of reasoning it can be replied that it relates speaking to the act of knowing and the act of apprehending a proposition, because the act of apprehending will be more the proposition itself more than of the proposition, and thus to apprehend a proposition is nothing other than to form a proposition. And then, when it is asked what is understood by such a proposition in the mind, whether it is simple or complex, it can be said that it is neither simple nor complex. Just as, for example, by the proposition 'a man is an animal' there is not apprehended, properly speaking, either something simple or composite, but rather that proposition in the mind is the act of understanding by which every man and also every animal is confusedly apprehended, and that 'man' is the same in number with 'animal', because that is what is meant by it [the proposition], and thus by such a proposition several things are understood, yet not a composite. And when it is said that every proposition is composed from subject and predicate and copula, it can be said that this is true of spoken propositions and writings. But of a conceived proposition, which is only in the mind, it can be said that some are composed from such a subject and predicate and copula, and some are equivalent to such a composite. And this suffices in respect of the proposition. And for that reason, according to that manner of speaking, it would more truly be said that a proposition is not always understood when it is in the mind, but it is by which are understood things or intentions of the soul, that is, the act of understanding, because then a proposition is the act of understanding. But if we speak of the act of knowing some proposition, thus it could be said that that act is another act from the proposition. And for that reason, when some proposition in the mind is known, then there are two acts of understanding together, namely the proposition itself, and the other act by which that proposition is known. Nor is it ever found from Aristotle that he would deny that two acts of the understanding can be together in the understanding, and particularly of the ordered acts of which sort are the proposition and the act of knowing it.
Sic igitur, qui vellet, posset tenere istam opinionem: quod passiones animae, de quibus loquitur Philosophus, sunt intellectiones, quae est opinio probabilis et concordat in ista conclusione communi cum praecedentibus quod passiones animae sunt verae qualitates mentis. Et qui vult tenere istam opinionem, reputo quod magis dicet convenienter, si dicat quod omnes propositiones, syllogismi, quaecumque intentiones animae, et universaliter omnia quae vocantur entia rationis sunt vere entia realia positiva et verae qualitates mentis realiter informantes mentem, sicut albedo informat realiter parietem at calor ignem. Et tunc divisio entis in ens in anima et ens extra animam non est alia quam si divideretur ens in qualitates mentis et in alia entia.	Thus accordingly, whoever wished, could hold that opinion: that the affections of the soul, of which the Philosopher speaks, are acts of understanding, which is the probable opinion and agrees in that common conclusion with the preceding ones, that affections of the soul are truly qualities of the mind. And whoever wishes to hold that opinion, I deem it that it is more appropriately said, if he says that all propositions, syllogisms, any intentions of the soul, and generally all things which are called beings of reason are truly beings that are real, positive and true qualities of the soul, really informing the soul, just as whiteness really informs a wall, and heat a fire. And then the division of being into being in the soul and being external to the soul is not other than if being were divided into qualities of the mind, and other things.
[359]
§7 OPINIO PROBABILIS: PASSIONES ANIMAE SUNT IDOLA SEU FICTA	A PROBABLE OPINION: AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE EFFIGIES OR FICTIONS
Praeter istas opiniones posset poni alia opinio [N15] quod intentio animae seu conceptus sive passio animae non est aliud quam praedicabile vel subicibile in propositione in mente, cui correspondet praedicabile seu subicibile in voce; et universaliter quod passiones animae sive intentiones animae sive conceptus sunt propositiones in mente vel syllogismi vel partes eorum. Sed posset poni quod talia non sunt verae qualitates mentis, nec sunt entia realia exsistentia subiective in anima, sed tantum sunt quaedam cognita ab anima, ita quod esse eorum non est aliud quam ipsa cognosci; et possunt vocari idola secundum modum loquendi aliquorum [N16] vel quaedam ficta secundum modum loquendi aliorum [N17]. Et per hunc modum potest dici quod [360] intellectus apprehendens singulare fingit consimile singulare et illud singulare sic fictum non est alicubi exsistens realiter, non plus quam castrum quod artifex fingit exsistit realiter antequam producat ipsum, et tamen est tale in esse ficto quale est aliud extra. Et propter istam causam potest supponere in propositione pro re ex qua fingitur, et potest vocari passio pro eo quod non habet esse nisi per operationem animae Potest etiam vocari intentio animae pro eo quod non est aliquid reale in anima ad modum quo habitus est aliquid reale in anima, sed habet tantum esse intentionale, scilicet esse cognitum, in anima. Et propter idem potest vocari conceptus mentis, et terminat actum intelligendi quando non intelligitur aliqua res singularis extra et tamen intelligitur aliquid commune rebus extra. Et illud sic formatum sive fictum potest dici universale, quia aequaliter respicit omnia a quibus abstrahitur per talem formationem sive fictionem. Et ex his formantur propositiones, quae propositiones intelliguntur et sciuntur; in multis tamen propositionibus non supponunt nisi pro rebus extra.	Beyond these opinions another opinion could be given: that an intention of the soul, or a concept or affection of the soul is nothing other than what can be a subject or predicate in a proposition in the mind, to which there corresponds a something that can be predicate or subject in utterance, and, in general, that affections of the soul, whether intentions of the soul or concepts, are propositions in the mind, or syllogisms, or parts of them. But it could be supposed that such things are not true qualities of the mind, nor are real beings existing subjectively in the soul, but are certain things thought by the mind, so that their being is nothing other than being thought. And they can called 'effigies' according to the manner of speaking of some, or certain 'fictions' [ficta] according to the manner of speaking of others. And by this manner it can be said that the understanding, apprehending a singular, invents [fingit] a similar singular, and that singular thus made up is not a thing existing in reality anywhere, no more than a castle that a builder has designed [fingit] really exists before he has produced it, and yet it is such in being by being made up, as is the other external thing. And for that reason [causa] it can, in the proposition, stand for [supponere] the thing from which it is invented, and it can be called an affection for that which does not have being except through the operation of the soul. It can also be called an intention of the soul, for that which is not something real in the soul in the way in which a disposition [habitus] is something real in the soul, but only has intentional being, namely, being cognised in the soul. And on account of the same [reason] it can be called a concept of the mind, and it terminates the act of understanding when some external singular thing is not understood, and yet something common to external things is understood. And that thing thus formed or made up can be called universal, because it faces equally all the things from which it is abstracted by such a formation of fiction. And from these, propositions are formed, which propositions are understood and known, yet in many propositions they do not denote except for external things.
Et contra istam opinionem non reputo aliquid ponderis nisi quod difficile est imaginari aliquid posse intelligi intellectione reali ab intellectu, et tamen quod nec ipsum nec aliqua pars sui nec aliquid ipsius potest esse in rerum natura, nec potest esse substantia nec accidens, quale poneretur tale fictum.	And against this opinion I do not think you will consider anything except that it is difficult to be imagined that something can be understood by a real act of understanding by the understanding, and yet that neither it nor some part of it [sui] nor an instance of it can be in rerum natura, nor can it be substance or accident, which kind of thing such a fiction would be supposed to be.
Similiter, tale fictum plus differret a re quacumque quam quae[361]cumque res ab alia, quia ens reale et ens rationis plus differunt quam quaecumque duo entia realia; igitur tale ens fictum minus assimilatur rei, igitur multo minus potest supponere pro re quam intellectio quae plus sibi assimilatur; et per consequens minus erit communis rei extra quam intellectio et minus habebit rationem universalis quam intellectio. Sed non propter aliud ponitur tale idolum sive fictum nisi ut supponat pro re et ut ex ea componatur propositio et ut sit communis ad res, quia ista negantur a rebus. Igitur cum ista verius possint intellectioni competere quam tali idolo, videtur quod superflue ponitur tale idolum sive fictum.	Similarly, such a fiction differs more from any thing than any thing from another [thing], because a real being and a being of reason differ more than any two real beings. Accordingly, such a contrived being is less assimilated to a thing, accordingly, much less can it denote a thing than an act of understanding which is more assimilated to it [sibi], and by consequence it will be less common to an external thing than an act of understanding and it will have less the nature [rationem] of a universal than an act of understanding. But such an effigy or fiction is only supposed on account of another thing so as to denote a thing, so as a proposition is composed from it, and so as to be common to things, because those [properties] were denied of things. Accordingly, since those could more truly belong to an act of understanding than such an effigy, it seems that such an effigy or fiction is supposed superfluously.
Similiter, quamvis praedicta propter alias rationes non possunt competere intellectioni, quia difficile est salvare quid intelligam tali intellectione [N18], tamen omnia illa possunt verius competere alicui qualitati exsistenti in anima, quae terminat actum intelligendi; quia si ponatur aliqua qualitas realiter exsistens in mente, cum illa sit reale ens et positivum sicut est substantia extra, verius assimilatur rei extra quam tale idolum sive fictum. Igitur magis proprie potest dici quod res extra intelligitur in tali qualitate, quam quod res extra intelligitur in tale idolo. Sive potest verius dici aliquo modo quod res extra intelligitur quia talis qualitas intelligitur quam possit dici quod res extra intelligitur quia tale idolum sive fictum intelligitur. Similiter, propter idem potest verius esse commune ad res extra et verius supponere pro re. Igitur propter istas rationes magis debet poni quod tales passiones animae, de quibus loquitur hic Philosophus, sunt qualitates mentis quam quod sunt talia idola sive ficta.	Similarly, although the things previously mentioned cannot belong to an act of understanding on account of other reasons, because it is difficult to preserve what I understand by such an act of understanding, yet all those can more truly belong to some quality existing in the soul which terminates the act of understanding, because if we suppose [ponitur] some quality really existing in the mind, since that is a real and positive being, just as is an external substance, it will be assimilated more to an external thing than to such an effigy or fiction. Accordingly, it can more properly be said that an external thing is understood in such a quality, than an external thing is understood in such an effigy. Or it can more truly be said in some way that an external thing is understood because such a quality is understood than it could be said that an external thing is understood because an effigy or fiction is understood. Similarly, on account of the same thing it can more truly be common to external things and more truly denote it. Accordingly, on account of these reasons it ought more to be supposed that such affections of the soul, of which the Philosopher speaks here, are qualities of the mind than that they are effigies or fictions.
[362] §8 TRIPLEX OPINIO DE QUIDDITATE PASSIONUM, PROPOSITIONUM, SYLLOGISMORUM ET UNIVERSALIIUM. OPINIO ABSURDA: PASSIONES ANIMAE SUNT RES EXTRA CONCEPTAE	§8 A THREEFOLD OPINION ON THE QUIDDITY OF AFFECTIONS, PROPOSITIONS, SYLLOGISMS AND UNIVERSALS. AN ABSURD OPINION: AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE EXTERNAL THINGS, CONCEIVED.
Dico igitur quod Philosophus passiones animae vocat illa ex quibus componitur propositio in mente [N19] vel syllogismus, vel componi potest. Sed quid sit illud? Potest esse triplex opinio in genere:	Accordingly, I say that the Philosopher calls 'affections of the soul' those things from which a proposition in the mind, or syllogism, is composed, or can be composed. But what may that be? There can be a threefold opinion in general:
Una est quod res extra concepta sive intellecto est passio animae, illo modo quo ponunt aliqui [N20] quod praeter res singulares sunt res universales, et quod res singulares conceptae sunt subiecta [363] in propositionibus singularibus et res universales conceptae sunt partes propositionum universalium.	One is that an external thing that is conceived or understood is an affection of the soul, in that way by which some suppose that beyond singular things there are universal things, and that singular things conceived are subjects in singular propositions, and universal things conceived are parts of a universal proposition.
Sed istam opinionem, quantum ad hoc quod ponit esse aliquas res extra praeter singulares exsistentes in eis, reputo omnino absurdam et destruentem totam philosophiam Aristotelis et omnem scientiam et omnem veritatem et rationem, et quod est pessimum error in philosophia et reprobatus ab Aristotele in VII Metaphysicae [N21], et quod tenentes eam sunt inhabiles ad scientiam.	But this opinion, as far as it supposes there are certain things external to us [extra], apart from singular things, existing in them, I deem altogether absurd and destructive of the whole philosophy of Aristotle, and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy, and reproved by Aristotle in VII Metaphyics, and that those holding it are incapable of knowledge.
§9 OPINIO PROBABILIS: PASSIONES ANIMAE SUNT QUALITATES SUBIECTIVE EXSISTENTES IN MENTE	§9 A PROBABLE OPINION: AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL ARE QUALITIES SUBJECTIVELY EXISTING IN THE MIND
Alia potest esse opinio [N22], quam reputo probabilem, quod passiones animae sunt quaedam qualitates mentis exsistentes subiective in mente ita vere et ita realiter sicut albedo exsistit in pariete vel frigus in aqua. Et pro ista opinione videtur esse Commentator VII [364] Metaphysicae. Et ita secundum Commentatorem universalia sunt qualitates mentis, et non sunt de substantia rerum extra nec partes earum. Et ideo secundum istam opinionem quodlibet universale quod non est universale per voluntariam institutionem, sicut est de voce vel scripto, est vere res una numero in se et vere singularis in se; est tamen universalis et communis per praedicationem et repraesentationem aliquo modo. Et hoc videtur dicere Avicenna [N23]. Et si tenerem istam opinionem dicerem quod nihil est imaginabile nisi sit ens reale vel possit esse vel aliquid aggregans talia quae sunt vel esse possunt entia realia.	There can be another opinion, which I deem probable, that affections of the soul are certain qualities of the mind existing subjectively in the mind, as truly and as really as whiteness exists in a wall, or coldness in water. And for this opinion there seems to be the Commentator in VII Metaphysics. And so according to the Commentator, universals are qualities of the mind, and are not of the substance of external things, nor are parts of them. And for that reason, according to that opinion, any universal that is not universal by voluntary institution (unlike the case of what is uttered or written), is truly a thing that is one in number in itself and truly singular in itself. Yet it is universal and common by predication and a representation in some manner. And Avicenna seems to say this. And if I were to hold that opinion I would say that nothing is imaginable unless it is a real being or could be, or some aggregate of such things as are, or which could be, real things.
Sed contra illud potest argui multipliciter: primo, quia figmenta, sicut chimera, hircocervus et huiusmodi, sunt imaginabilia ab intellectu et tamen non sunt in rerum natura nec secundum se nec secundum suas partes; quia si sic, ita vere essent in rerum natura sicut homo vel animal, vel saltem sicut populus et exercitus.	But against that one could argue in many ways. First, because figments, such as the chimaera, the goat-stag and things of that sort, are imaginable by the understanding and yet are not in rerum natura either according to themselves, or according to their parts, because if so, they would truly be in in rerum natura such as a man or an animal, or at least something such as 'a people', or 'a body' of men.
Similiter, quilibet experitur in se quod fingit castra et montes aureos et huiusmodi, quae nullum habent esse reale, nec habere possunt.	Similarly, anyone has tried in themselves to imagine [fingit] castles and mountains of gold and things of that sort, which have no real being, nor can have.
Similiter, artifex excogitat domum antequam producat eam, et tunc non habet esse reale.	Similarly, a builder designs a house before producing it, and then it does not have real being.
Praeterea, primo ens dividitur in ens in anima et in ens extra animam; secundo dividitur ens extra animam in decem praedicamenta [N24]. Tunc quaero: quomodo accipitur ens in anima in prima divisione? Aut pro aliqua qualitate reali ipsius mentis, et tunc continetur sub genere qualitatis; igitur non divideretur contra ens extra animam sed [365] esset aliquid contentum sub ente extra animam, quia contineretur sub qualitate et qualitas sub ente extra animam, sicut patet per secundam divisionem. Aut accipitur ibi ens in anima pro aliquo quod non est realiter in anima sed tantum sicut cognitum in cognoscente. Et tunc quaero: aut sic est in anima quod non est extra realiter et positive, et habetur propositum. Aut sic est in anima sicut in cognoscente, quod tamen est extra realiter, positive et subiective; et tunc non distinguitur contra ens extra animam, sed est ens extra animam.	Furthermore, being is first divided into being in the soul and into being external to the soul. Second, being external to the soul is divided in the ten categories. Then I ask: in what way is being taken in the mind in the first division? Either for some real quality of the mind itself, and then it is contained under the genus of quality. Acordingly, it is not divided from being external to the soul, but rather would be one of those things contained under being external to the soul, because it would be contained under quality, and quality under being external to the soul, just as is clear through the second division. Or being in the soul is taken there for something that is not really in the soul, but only as something cognised in the one cognising. And then I ask, whether it is in the soul thus, that is not really outside, and positive, and what was proposed holds. Or thus in the soul as in the one knowing, which nevertheless is really external, positively and subjectively, and then it is not distinguished from being external to the soul, but is a being external to the soul.
Hoc confirmatur per Commentatorem, VI Metaphysicae, commento ultimo [N25], ubi dicit sic: 'Illud quod est in cognitione ex hoc ente, est aut compositio aut divisio absque eo quod sit extra animam ens, quod est differens ab isto quod est in re, est illud quod significat aut quid aut quale aut quantum aut aliquid continuum cum alio, et haec sunt cetera praedicamenta'. Ex ista auctoritate patet quod Commentator dividit ens in anima, quod appellat verum et falsum, ab omnibus decem praedicamentis, et per consequens non continetur sub aliquo decem praedicamentorum, et per consequens non sunt substantiae nec quantitates, et sic de aliis. Manifestum est igitur quod non sunt talia entia realia.	This is confirmed by the Commentator, in VI Metaphyics, in the final comment, where he speaks thus: 'that which is in cognition from this being, is either a composition or a division without that which is being external to the soul, which is different from that which is in reality, is that which signifies either what it is, or what kind of thing it is, or how much, or something continuous with another, and these are the other categories'. From this authority it is clear that the Commentator divides being in the soul, that he calls the true and the false, from all the ten categories, and by consequence is not contained under one of the ten categories, and by consequence are not substances nor qualities, and other such things. Accordingly, it is manifest that they are not such real beings.
Et qui vult tenere praedictam opinionem, scilicet quod quidquid est imaginabile vel conceptibile est vere res realis vel aggregans tales res quae sunt vel fuerunt vel esse possunt, potest respondere ad primum illorum quando dicitur quod chimaera et huiusmodi sunt figmenta et non sunt realia, potest dicere quod haec est distinguenda 'chimaera est in rerum natura', eo quod chimaera potest supponere personaliter vel materialiter vel simpliciter. Si supponat personaliter, sic est false; si materialiter vel simpliciter, sic est vera, quia tam vox quam intentio animae est aliquid in rerum natura.	And someone who would hold the previous opinion, namely that whatever is imaginable or conceivable is truly a real thing or an aggregate of such things as are, or were, or could be, can reply to the first of those, when it is said that a chimaera and things of that sort are figments, and not real, can say that 'a chimaera is in rerum natura' is to be distinguished in that 'chimaera' can denote personally, or materially or simply. If it denotes personally, thus it is false. If materially or simply, thus it is true, for an utterance, as also an intention of the soul, is something in rerum natura.
[366] Et si quaeratur, numquid haec est vera 'chimaera intelligitur', potest dici quod si chimaera accipiatur personaliter, haec est falsa sicut haec est falsa 'non-ens intelligitur', accepto subiecto personaliter. Sed si subiectum accipiatur materialiter vel simpliciter, vera est. Et eodem modo dicendum est de omnibus talibus: 'hircocervus intelligitur', 'non-ens intelligitur', 'non-ens est ens', 'vacuum intelligitur', 'vacuum est opinabile', 'vacuum est ens rationis', 'contingit imaginari lineam infinitam', et de multis talibus.	And if it is asked, whether or not 'a chimaera is understood' is true, it can be said that if 'a chimaera' is taken personally, it is false, just as 'a non-being is understood' is false, taking the subject personally. But if the subject is taken materially or simply, it is true. And in the same way it is to be said of all such as 'a goat-stag is understood', 'a non-being is understood', 'a vacuum is understood', 'a vacuum is capable of being thought [opinabile]', 'it is possible for an infinite line to be imagined', and of many other such things.
Et si dicatur quod in omnibus talibus termini intelliguntur, dicendum est quod verum est. Et ideo tales propositiones 'chimaera intelligitur', 'vacuum intelligitur', et consimiles, concedendae sunt si subiecta supponant simpliciter vel materialiter, quia de illis sic supponentibus verificatur quod sunt termini propositionum, et non aliter.	And if it is said that in all such things the terms are understood, it is to be said that it is true. And for that reason such propositions as 'a chimaera is understood', 'a vacuum is understood', and similar, are to be allowed, if the subjects denote simply or materially, because concerning those things thus denoting it is verified that they are terms of propositions, and not otherwise.
Et si dicatur quod si tales propositiones sunt verae quando subiecta supponunt simpliciter, igitur subiecta supponunt pro aliquo saltem intelligibili et non pro se, igitur aliquid aliud est quod intelligitur pro quo tale subiectum supponit, dicendum est, sicut alias [N26] dixi, quod in multis propositionibus, quamvis termini supponant personaliter, non tamen supponunt pro aliquo, quia supponere personaliter potest terminus, quamvis non supponat pro aliquo; sed sufficit quod denotetur supponere pro aliquo [N27]. Sicut si nullus homo sit albus, in ista propositione 'homo albus est homo', subiectum non supponit pro aliquo sed implicatur supponere pro aliquo, et nec pro se nec pro voce; et ideo supponit personaliter. Ita est in istis 'chimaera intelligitur', 'vacuum est', 'non-ens est ens', et sic de consimilibus.	And if it is said that such propositions are true when the subjects denote simply, accordingly the subjects denote something at least intelligible and not for themselves, accordingly there is something else which is understood for what the subject denotes, it is to be said, as I have said elsewhere, that in many propositions, although the terms denote personally, yet they do not denote something, because a term can denote personally although it does not denote something, but it suffices that it is meant to denote something. Just as if no man is white, in the proposition 'a white man is white', the subject does not denote something but it is implied that it denotes something, and neither for itself nor for an utterance, and for that reason it denotes personally. Thus it is in these [propositions] 'a chimaera is understood', 'a vacuum exists', 'a non-being is a being', and thus of similar ones.
Ad secundum potest dici quod quando aliquis fingit castra vel huiusmodi, non aliter fingit nisi quia elicit tales vel tales intellectiones; sicut aliquis loquens fingit multa, quia scilicet profert multa men[367]dacia, et tamen nihil est ibi penitus nisi vox vel voces – et tamen dicitur fingere, quia loquitur aliquid per quod implicatur aliter esse quam est. Et ideo sicut fingens vocaliter veras voces profert, quibus tamen non correspondet aliquid tale in re nec est aliquid vere fictum nisi voces, ita fingens mentaliter causat veras intellectiones, vel alias qualitates, secundum aliam opinionem, quibus tamen nihil correspondet et tamen implicat aliquid correspondere; ideo dicitur fictum.	To the second it can be said that when someone makes up [fingit] a castle or something of that sort, he does not make up in another way except because he draws out such and such acts of understanding, just as someone speaking invents many things, namely because he utters many lies, and yet there is nothing altogether except an utterances, or utterances, and yet he is said to invent, because he says something by which it is implied it is otherwise than it is. And for that reason, inventing [things] vocally he speaks true utterances, to which nevertheless there does not correspond some such thing in reality, nor is there something truly invented except utterances, thus inventing mentally causes true acts of understanding, or other qualities, according to one opinion, to which nevertheless nothing corresponds, and which nevertheless implies something corresponding. And for that reason it is called an invention [fictum].
Et si dicatur quod tunc omne figmentum esse vera res, et per consequens non esset figmentum, quia nulla res est figmentum, non plus una quam alia, ad istud potest dici quod potest concedi de virtute sermonis quod omne figmentum est vera res sicut omne mendacium est vera res, quia si sit mendacium vocale est vera vox vel voces; similiter, si sit mendacium mentale est vera intellectio vel intellectiones, vel aliae qualitates secundum aliam opinionem. Nec sequitur 'igitur non est figmentum', quia una res dicitur magis figmentum quam alia non quin sit vere res positiva sed quando tali non correspondet aliquid in re quale denotatur sibi correspondere. Et isto modo ista vox 'mons aureus' potest dici figmentum, quia sibi non correspondet aliquis mons aureus in re; ita est de omnibus figmentis in mente.	And if it is said that then every figment is a true thing, and in consequence would not be a figment, because no thing is a figment, not more one than another, it can be said to this, that it can be allowed, literally speaking [de virtute sermonis], that every figment is a true thing just as every lie is a true thing, because if it is a spoken lie, it is truly an utterance, or utterances. Similarly, if it is a mental lie it is truly an act (or acts) of understanding, or other qualities according to another opinion. Nor does 'accordingly it is not a figment' follow, because one thing is called more a fiction than another not because it is not a positive thing, but when to such a thing there does not correspond something in reality of the kind that it is meant to correspond to it. And in this way, the utterance 'golden mountain' can be called a figment, because some golden mountain does not correspond to it in reality. Thus it is with all figments in the mind.
Et si dicatur quod chimaera est figmentum, sed chimaera non est res positiva, igitur etc., potest dici quod haec est distinguenda 'chimaera est figmentum', eo quod 'chimaera' potest supponere personaliter, et tunc est falsa sicut haec est falsa 'chimaera est chimaera'; vel potest supponere simpliciter vel materialiter, et tunc est vera. Sed uniformiter accipiendo, minor est falsa.	And if it is said that a chimaera is a figment, but a chimaera is not a positive thing, accordingly &c, it can be said that 'a chimaera is a figment' is to be distinguished from the fact that 'chimaera' can denote personally, and then it is false, just as 'a chimaera is a chimaera' is false. Or it can denote simply or materially, and then it is true. But, taking it uniformly, the minor [premiss] is false.
[368] Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut artificem excogitare domum antequam producat eam non est artificem habere domum in esse obiectivo tantum, sed hoc est habere artem vel scientiam domus, quae est vera qualitas mentis, quae qualitas mentis, scilicet ars vel scientia, domus vocatur, sicut secundum Commentatorem, VII Metaphysicae [N28], ars et scientia sanitatis vocatur sanitas. Unde dicit sic ibidem, commento 23: 'Sanitas dicitur duobus modis: dicitur enim de forma quae est in anima et de habitu qui est in corpore, et ambo sunt idem, hoc est habent idem nomen. Sed sanitas invenitur secundo modo ab ea quae est secundum primum modum'. Et post: 'Sanitas dicitur duobus modis: dicitur enim de intellectu sanitatis qui est in anima et de sanitate in corpore exsistente'. Et post: 'Sanitas in rei veritate est definitio sanitatis quae est in anima, et scire ipsam non est sanitas quae est extra animam'. Ex isto patet quod sanitas vocatur ipsa definitio et scientia; et ita [domus in mente artificis] potest domus vocari. Et si quaeretur quid terminat illam intentionem tamquam obiectum, potest dici quod res extra, sed non plus una domus quam alia, sicut dictum est prius.	To the third, it is to be said that for a builder, for example, to design a house before he produces it is not for a builder to have a house in objective being only, but is to have the art or science of a house, which is a true quality of the mind, which quality of the mind, namely art or science, is called 'of a house', just as according to the Commentator (VII Metaphysics), the art and science of health is called health. Wherefore he says in the same place (comment xxiii) 'Health is said in two ways, for it is said of the form which is in the soul and of the disposition which is in the body, and both are the same, that is, they have the same name. But health is found in the second way from that which exists according to the first way'. And afterwards: 'Health is said in two ways, for it is said of the understanding of health which is in the mind, and of health existing in the body'. And later: 'health, in true reality, is the definition of health which exists in the soul, and to know that is not the health which exists external to the soul'. And from this it is clear that health is called that definition and science, and thus [the house in the mind of the builder] can be called a house. And if it is asked what terminates that intention as object, it can be be said that it is a thing outside, but not more one house than another, just as was said earlier.
Ad ultimum potest dici quod quando ens dividitur in ens in anima et in ens extra animam, quod accipitur ibi ens in anima pro ente quod est realiter et subiective in anima sicut intellectio vel aliqua alia qualitas mentis, ad modum quo ens ab aliquibus [N29] dividitur in res et signa rerum, et tamen in rei veritate signa sunt res. Et ulterius, sicut res dividitur in decem praedicamenta et tamen signa continentur sub uno praedicamento, sicut omnes voces continentur sub praedi[369]camento qualitatis, ita entia in anima continentur sub praedicamento qualitatis. Potest igitur dici quod istae divisiones non sunt per se subordinatae ad modum quo ordinantur istae divisiones: substantia, alia corporea, alia incorporea; substantia corporea, alia corpus animatum, alia corpus inanimatum; sed isto modo, entium alia sunt signa, alia significata; et significatorum, alia sunt qualitates, sicut ipsa signa sunt qualitates, et alia sunt substantiae, et sic de aliis. Ita debet dici in proposito quod ens dividitur in ens in anima et in ens extra animam; et postea sic debet fieri subdivisio quod entium extra animam quaedam sunt qualitates, sicut ipsa entia in anima sunt qualitates, et quaedam sunt substantiae.	To the final [objection] it can be said that when being is divided into being in the soul and being external to the soul, that being in the soul is taken there for a being that is really and subjectively in the soul, such as an act of understanding or some other quality of the mind, after the manner by which being is divided by some into things and signs of things, and yet in true reality signs are things. And further, just a thing is divided into the ten categories and yet signs are contained under one category, just as all utterances are contained under the category of quality, so beings in the mind are contained under the category of quality. Accordingly, it can be said that these divisions are not by themselves subordinated after the manner by which these divisions are ordered: substance, some corporeal, some incorporeal; corporeal substance, some animate body, some inanimate body; but in this manner, of beings, some are signs, others things signified; and of things signified, some are qualities, just as the signs themselves are qualities, and others are substances, and so for others. Thus, it ought to be said in what was given, that being is divided into being in the soul and being external to the soul. And thus afterwards a subdivision ought to be made: that of beings external to the soul, certain are qualities, just as the beings themselves that are in the soul are qualities, and certain are substances.
Et quando dicitur quod Commentator dicit quod 'ens, quod est differens ab isto', supple ente in anima, 'quod est in re, est illud quod significat aut quid', &c., 'et haec sunt cetera praedicamenta', debet sic glossari: quod haec continentur sub ceteris praedicamentis. Cum hoc tamen stat quod entia in anima contineantur sub aliquo illorum praedicamentorum.	And when it is said that the Commentator says that 'being, which is a different thing from this', supplement [this] by being 'in the soul'. 'Which is in reality, is that which signifies either what…&c', 'and these are the rest of the categories', ought to be glossed as follows: that these are contained under the rest of the categories. Although it nonetheless remains true [stat], that beings in the soul are contained under some of those categories.
Sic igitur potest teneri quod passiones animae et omnia praedicabilia et subicibilia, et universaliter omnia universalia et omnes propositiones et syllogismi et partes eorum, quae non sunt signa instituta ad placitum, sunt qualitates mentis reales, tamen spirituales, sicut subiectum earum est spiritus, et hoc vel quia sunt intellectiones, secundum unam opinionem, vel quaedam qualitates animae terminantes tamquam obiecta intellectiones animae. Et secundum istam opinionem potest probabiliter teneri quod omnis propositio in mente quae non componitur ex signis ad placitum institutis componitur ex realibus qualitatibus mentis, vel est aliqua qualitas mentis aequivalens tali composito, sicut tactum est supra.	Accordingly, it can thus be held that affections of the soul and whatever can be predicate and subject, and in general all universals and all propositions and syllogisms and the parts of them, which are not signs instituted at pleasure, are real qualities of the mind, yet spiritual, just as their subject is a spirit, and this either because they are acts of understanding, according to one opinion, or certain qualities of the soul, terminating, as if objects, the acts of understanding of the soul. And according to this opinion it can probably be held that every proposition in the mind which is not composed from signs instituted at pleasure is composed from real qualities of the mind, or is some quality of the mind equivalent to such a composite, just as was touched upon above.
[370] §10 OPINIO QUAE POSSET TENERI: PROPOSITIONES, SYLLOGISMI ET UNIVERSALIA SUNT FICTA, HABENTIA TANTUM ESSE OBIECTIVUM IN ANIMA	AN OPINION WHICH COULD BE HELD: PROPOSITIONS, SYLLOGISMS AND UNIVERSALS ARE FICTIONS, HAVING ONLY OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE IN THE SOUL
Tertia opinio principalis posset esse, sicut tactum est [N30], quod passiones animae, de quibus loquitur hic Philosophus, et propositiones et syllogismi et universalia omnia non sunt nisi quaedam ficta in anima habentia tantum esse obiectivum, hoc est esse cognitum, nullibi exsistentia realiter; quae ficta vocari possunt pro quanto non sunt entia realia. Et tunc sunt ponenda aliqua entia rationis distincta universaliter contra omnia entia realia et contra omnia existentia in praedicamentis; et tunc talia entia rationis essent omnia ficta sicut chimaera, hircocervus, et huiusmodi. Similiter, talia entia rationis essent aedificia sicut castra, domus, civitates, et huiusmodi, quae excogitantur ab artifice antequam producantur in esse reali.	The third principal opinion could be, just as was touched upon, that affections of the soul, which the Philosopher speaks about here, also propositions and syllogisms and universals, are all nothing but certain fictions in the soul, having only objective existence, that is, a cognised being, nowhere really existing, which can be called fictions as far as they are not real beings. And then there are to be supposed some beings of reason universally distinct from all real beings and from all things existing in the categories. And then such beings of reason would be all fictions such as the chimaera, the goat-stag, and things of that sort. Similarly, such beings of reason would be edifices such as castles, houses, cities, and things of that sort, which are designed by a builder before they are produced in real being.
Et qui vellet tenere istam opinionem, posset respondere ad primum in contrarium dicendo quod non est inconveniens aliquid intelligi ab intellectu quod nec est in rerum natura nec esse potest. Sed sufficit quod possit fingi ad similitudinem alicuius vel aliquorum exsistentium in rerum natura, sicut mons aureus non potest esse in rerum natura et tamen potest fingi ex monte et auro viso. Et tamen distinguendum esset de fictis, quia quaedam sunt ficta quibus nihil consimile in re potest correspondere, sicut est de chimaera et huiusmodi, et talia vocantur communiter ficta. Alia dicuntur ficta quibus tamen consimilia in esse reali correspondent vel correspondere possunt, et huiusmodi vocantur universalia secundum modum declaratum prius et alibi magis explanatum [N31].	And anyone who would hold this opinion, could reply to the first objection, saying that it is not absurd that there is something understood by the understanding that neither exists [est] nor can exist [esse] in reality. But it suffices that it could be invented [fingi] as a similitude of some thing, or of some things existing in rerum natura. And yet we would have to distinguish fictions [from one another], because certain things are fictions to which nothing similar can correspond in reality, such as the chimaera and things of that sort, and such things are commonly called 'fictions'. Other things are called fictions to which nonetheless there correspond (or can correspond) similar things in real being, and things of this sort are called universals according to the first manner [of speaking] clarified before, and [of which] more is explained elsewhere.
Ad aliud [N32] potest dici quod tale fictum seu idolum plus distin[371]guitur a re extra quam quaecumque res ab una alia; tamen in esse intentionali magis sibi assimilantur, in tantum quod si posset produci realiter sicut potest fingi, esset vere consimile realiter rei extra. Et propter istam rationem magis potest supponere pro re et esse communis et esse illud in quo res intelligitur quam intellectio vel aliqua alia qualitas. Et ita patet ad ultimam per idem.	To the other [objection], it can be said that such a fiction or effigy is more distinguished from an external thing than any one thing from another, yet in intentional being they are more assimilated to one another, in as much as if it could be really produced, just as it was imagined [fingi] it would truly be similar in reality to a thing outside. And on account of that reason it can more denote a thing and be common and be that in which a thing is understood than an act of understanding or some other quality. And by the same [reason], [the reply] is clear to the final [objection].
Sic igitur istas ultimas opiniones reputo probabiles. Quae tamen sit vera et quae falsa discutiant studiosi. Hoc tamen apud me omnino certum est, quod nec passiones animae nec universalia sunt aliqua extra animam et de essentia rerum singularium, sive sint conceptae sive non conceptae.	Thus accordingly I deem those final opinions probable. Which one nevertheless is true and which false, is discussed by the learned. Here nevertheless, it is altogether certain, to my mind [apud me], that neither affections of the soul nor universals are something external to the soul, or of the essence of singular things, whether they are conceived or not conceived.
Istis visis, quamvis infinita alia possent addi, est redeundum ad expositionen textus Aristotelis.	Now these things have been seen, although infinitely many could be added, it is [time] to return to the exposition of the text of Aristotle.
§11 DE DIFFERENTIA INTER VOCES PROLATAS AC SCRIPTAS ET PASSIONES ANIMAE	ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPOKEN UTTERANCES AND WRITINGS, AND AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL.
AC QUEMADMODUM... [c.1; 16ª 6-9]. In ista parte ponit Philosophus differentiam inter ista signa, scilicet inter voces et ea quae scribuntur ex una parte, et inter passiones animae, dicens quod sicut litterae scriptae non sunt eaedem apud omnes homines, quia aliis litteris utuntur Graeci, aliis Hebraei et aliis Latini, ita etiam voces non sunt eaedem apud omnes, quia aliud est idioma Graecorum, Latinorum, Hebraeorum et Barbarorum; ita quod in hoc conveniunt tam litterae quam voces quod non sunt eaedem apud omnes. Sed passiones animae in hoc differunt a praedictis, quia passiones animae quarum [372] litterae et voces sunt notae – modo in parte praecedenti exposito [N33] – sunt eaedem apud omnes. Sic res ipsae, quarum ipsae passiones animae sunt similitudines, sunt eadem apud omnes; sed de his dictum est in libro De Anima [N34], quia hoc est alterius negotii et non pertinet nisi ad librum De Anima.	AND IN THE WAY THAT ... [c.1; 16ª 6-9]. In this part the Philosopher makes a distinction between those signs, namely, between utterances and what are written on the one hand, and between the affections of the soul [on the other], saying that just as written letters are not the same among all men, because the Greeks use some letters, the Hebrews others, the Latins others, so also utterances are not the same among all, because there is a different language [idioma] for the Greeks, the Latins, the Hebrews and the barbarians, so that in this it belongs to letters as much as utterances, that they are not the same among all. But affections of the soul differ in this from the preceding, because the affections of the soul of which letters and utterances are marks (according to the manner in the part of the preceding exposition) are the same among all. Thus the things themselves, of which the affections of the soul are similitudes, are the same among all. But of these things it is spoken of in [the book] On the Soul, because this is another matter, and does not pertain except to [that] book.
Notandum est hic quod ex ista littera patet quod sunt aliqua signa rerum in mente, sive subiective sive obiective secundum diversas opiniones, quae sunt signa naturaliter, et non tantum ad placitum, cuiusmodi sunt voces et litterae.	It is to be noted here that from this passage it is clear that there are some signs of things in the mind, either subjective or objective according to diverse opinions, which are signs naturally, and not only at pleasure, of which sort are utterances and letters.
Secundo notandum quod res non sic sunt eaedem apud omnes quod quascumque res habent aliqui habeant omnes alii, sed sic sunt eaedem apud omnes quod diversi easdem res secundum speciem vel numerum vocant diversis nominibus et scribunt diversis litteris.	Second, it is to be noted that things are not thus the same among all, [in the sense ] that whatever things some have, all the others have, but that they are thus the same among all [in the sense ] that diverse [people] call the same things according to species or number by diverse names and write diverse letters.
Tertio notandum quod ista littera videtur sonare quod passiones animae, de quibus loquitur hic Philosophus, sunt qualitates mentis, quia dicit se de illis dixisse in libro De Anima; sed videtur quod in libro De Anima non loquitur nisi de anima et qualitatibus realibus eius.	Third, it is to be noted that in this passage it sounds as though [videtur sonare] affections of the soul, of which the Philosopher speaks here, are qualities of the mind, because he says that he has spoken of these things in the book On the Soul. But it seems that in [that] book he does not speak except of the soul and the real qualities of it.
§12 DE CONCEPTIBUS ET DE VOCIBUS INCOMPLEXIS ET COMPLEXIS	§12 OF CONCEPTS, AND OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX UTTERANCES
EST AUTEM QUEMADMODUM IN ANIMA ... [c.1; 16ª 9-18] In parte ista Philosophus reducit voces de quibus dicturus est ad unam divisionem, dicens quod sicut aliquando in anima est intellectus sine vero et sine falso, quando scilicet praecise est in anima incomplexum, et aliquando est cum vero vel cum falso, quando scilicet in anima est [373] propositio, ita est in voce. Nam in compositione vel divisione est veritas vel falsitas, hoc est oratio composita ex nomine et verbo affirmativa, vel talis oratio composita negativa, est vera vel falsa. Sed simplicia, scilicet nomina et verba per se sumpta, quae sunt consimilia intellectui simplicium quia sunt sine compositione et divisione, hoc est sine affirmatione et negatione, non sunt vera neque falsa. Verbi gratia, si dicatur 'homo' vel 'album' et nullum verbum sibi addatur, neque significat verum neque falsum. Et hoc probat, quia si aliquod tale nomen significaret verum vel falsum, hoc maxime videretur de nomine composito. Sed nomen compositum neque significat verum neque falsum si sibi non addatur neque esse neque non-esse, et hoc neque simpliciter neque ad tempus. Igitur multo magis nullum aliud nomen significat neque verum neque falsum per se sumptum. Et eadem ratio est de verbo, quod nullum verbum per se sumptum significat neque verum neque falsum.	NOW IN THE WAY THAT ... [c.1; 16ª 9-18]. In this part the Philosopher reduces the utterances about which he will speak into one division, saying that just as sometimes there is understanding in the soul without truth and falsity, namely when there is precisely in the soul something non-complex, and sometimes there is [understanding] with truth and falsity, namely when there is a proposition in the soul, [and] so [also] in utterance. For truth and falsity lies [est] in composition and division, that is, an affirmative sentence [oratio] composed of name and verb, or such a composite sentence that is negative, is true or false. But simples, namely name and verb taken by themselves, which are similar to the understanding of simple things because they are without composition and division, i.e. without affirmation and negation [denial], are neither true nor false. For example, if 'a man' or 'a white thing' are said, and no verb is added to them, it signifies neither the true nor the false. And he proves this, because if some such name were to signify the true or the false, this would particularly appear in [de] a composite name. But a composite name signifies neither the true nor the false if neither being nor non-being is added to it, and this is neither absolutely the case, nor in respect of time. Accordingly, much more is it so that no other name signifies either the true or the false taken by itself. And it is the same reasoning in respect of the verb, that no verb taken by itself signifies either the true or the false.
Intelligendum est hic primo quod 'intellectus' multipliciter accipitur. Aliquando accipitur pro potentia animae quae non distinguitur ab anima, sicut patebit in libro De Anima [N35]. Aliquando accipitur pro habitu principiorum, et sic accipitur in libro Posteriorum in diversis locis [N36], et in VI Ethicorum [N37], scientiam, sapientiam, artem et prudentiam. Aliquando accipitur pro ipsa intellectione. Et potest in proposito accipi primo modo et tertio modo. Si primo modo, tunc debet sic [374] exponi quod aliquando intellectus est cum vero vel cum falso, et aliquando non, hoc est intelligit aliquando intellectionem veram vel falsam, et aliquando non. Si tertio modo, tunc debet sic exponi quod intellectus, hoc est intellectio, aliquando neque est vera neque falsa, et aliquando est vera et aliquando falsa.	Here it is to be understood first that 'understanding' is taken in many ways. Sometimes it is taken for a potentiality of the soul which is not distinguished from the soul, just as will be clear in the book On the Soul. Sometimes it is taken pro habitu principiorum, and so it is taken in the book Posterior Analytics in many places, and in VI Ethics as knowledge, wisdom, art and prudence. Sometimes it is taken for the act of understanding, itself. And there can be taken in what was proposed in the first mode also a third mode. If in the first mode, then it ought thus to be explained that sometimes understanding is accompanied by the true and the false, and sometimes not, that is, it sometimes he understands the act of understanding as being true or false, and sometimes not. If in the third mode, then it ought thus to be explained that the understanding, that is, the act of understanding [intellectio], is sometimes neither true nor false, and sometimes is true, sometimes false.
Praeter praedictos modos 'intellectus' potest aliter accipi secundum diversas opiniones. Nam secundum unam opinionem prius recitatam [N38] potest intellectus accipi pro entibus rationis quae nullum habent esse nisi obiectivum, ex quibus secundum opinionem illam propositiones et syllogismi componuntur. Et tunc, quando Boethius [N39] dicit veritatem et falsitatem consistere in compositione vel divisione intellectuum, [tenentes illam opinionem] debent dicere quod accipitur intellectus pro talibus entibus rationis. Secundum aliam opinionem prius recitatam [N40] intellectus potest accipi pro aliquo formato in intellectu per ipsam intellectionem. Et illi habent dicere quod Boethius frequenter tali modo utitur intellectu et intellectibus.	Aside from the previous modes, 'understanding' can be taken in another way, according to diverse opinions. For according to one opinion given before, the understanding can be taken for beings of reason which have no being except objective, from which, according to that opinion, propositions and syllogisms are composed. And then, when Boethius says that truth and falsity consist in the composition or division of understandings [those holding that opinion] ought to say that the understanding is taken for such beings of reason. According to the other opinion mentioned before, the understanding can be taken for something formed in the understanding through that act of understanding. And those persons have to say that Boethius frequently uses 'understanding' and 'understandings' in such a manner.
Secundo notandum quod raro invenitur a Philosopho quod ponat aliquam veritatem vel falsitatem nisi in propositione; et ideo communiter Philosophus non vocat aliquid verum vel falsum nisi propositiones.	Second, it is to be noted that it is rarely found in [ab] the Philosopher that he supposes some truth or falsity, except in the proposition, and for that reason commonly the Philosopher does not call something true or false unless propositions.
Tertio notandum quod si teneatur una opinio prius recitata [N41], scilicet quod passiones animae sunt ipsae intellectiones, tunc dicendum est quod aliquae intellectiones ex natura sua sunt verba et aliquae intellectiones ex natura sua sunt nomina, sicut aliquae voces et aliquae litterae per institutionem sunt nomina et aliquae per institutionem sunt verba. Quia, sicut dicit Boethius hic [N42], sicut sunt [375] tres orationes, scilicet una quae scribitur, alia quae profertur, tertia quae coniungitur in anima, ita quaedam sunt nomina quae scribuntur, quaedam quae proferuntur, et quaedam sunt nomina et verba quae mente tractantur. Et tamen secundum istam opinionem non debet proprie loquendo concedi quod propositio in mente intelligitur ita quod terminet actum intelligendi, accipiendo proprie 'intelligi', nisi forte isto modo quo actus intelligendi intelligitur alio actu. Sed accipiendo 'intelligi' ut similiter se habeat ad intellectionem sicut 'proferri' se habet ad vocem, ita quod sicut 'proferre' est causare vocem ita 'intelligere' sit causare vel habere intellectionem tunc posset concedi quod propositio intelligitur et quod intellectus intelligit propositionem. Quia haec esset vera: intellectus habet subiective propositionem. Tamen hoc non obstante, debet concedi quod intellectus scit propositionem, quia sive propositio distinguatur ab intellectione et intellectionibus sive non, hoc est verum quod scientia tam habitualis quam actualis distinguitur a propositione, quia sive propositio sit intellectio sive non, ipsa potest esse in mente modo sibi convenienti ante omnem actum sciendi, et ita distinguitur ab actu sciendi et per consequens ab habitu.	Third, it is to be noted that if one opinion mentioned before were held, namely that affections of the soul are those very acts of understanding, then it is to be said that some acts of understanding by their nature are verbs, and some acts of understanding by their very nature are names, just as some words and some letters by institution are names, and some by institution are verbs. Because, just as Boethius says here, just as there are three kinds of sentences [orationes], namely one which is written, another which is spoken, a third which is conjoined in the mind, so certain are names which are written, certain are which are spoken, and certain are names and verbs which are dealt with in the mind. And yet according to that opinion it ought not to be allowed, properly speaking, that a proposition in the mind is understood so that it terminates the act of understanding, by taking properly 'is understood', unless perhaps as that manner by which the act of understanding is understand by another act. But by taking 'is understood' as similarly standing to the act of understanding just as 'is spoken' stands to utterance, so that just as 'to speak' is to cause an utterance, so 'to understand' is to cause or to have an act of understanding, then it could be allowed that a proposition is understood, and that the understanding understands a proposition. Because it would be true that the understanding subjectively has a proposition. Yet, not withstanding this, it ought to be allowed that the understanding knows a proposition, because - whether a proposition is distinguished from an act (or [et] the acts) of understanding, or not - it is true that knowledge [scientia] as much dispositional as actual, is distinguished from a proposition, because whether a proposition is distinguished from an act of understanding or not, the proposition itself can be in the mind in a way appropriate to it before every act of knowing, and is thus distinguished from the act of knowing, and in consequence from habit.
Ex ista sequitur quod quamvis intellectus habens unicam et simplicem intellectionem non posset habere propositionem si omnis propositio necessario sit composita, tamen intellectus habens unicum et simplicem actum sciendi potest scire propositionem. Praeter tamen illum actum sciendi habebit diversas intellectiones apprehensivas, quarum nulla erit actus sciendi; et tunc secundum istam opinionem quandocumque propositio esset in intellectu essent in illo intellectu diversae intellectiones. Immo si intellectus formaret in se talem propositionem 'Sortes est Sortes', haberet duas intellectiones habentes Sortem pro obiecto, quarum utraque ex natura sua esset nomen et unam tertiam mediam, quae esset ex natura sua verbum. Et si dicatur quod [376] tunc in eodem intellectu essent diversae intellectiones eiusdem speciei, posset dici, secundum illam opinionem, quod non est inconveniens, sicut unus simul et semel distinctis amoribus, saltem habitualibus, potest amare diversos homines.	And it follows that although understanding, having a unique and simple act of understanding, could not have a proposition, if every proposition necessarily is composite, yet an understanding having a unique and simple act of knowing, could know a proposition. Yet beyond that act of knowing it will have diverse apprehensive acts of understanding, of which none will be an act of knowing, and then, according to that opinion, whenever a proposition were in the understanding, there would be diverse acts of understanding in that understanding. Indeed, if the understanding were to form in itself such a proposition as 'Socrates is Socrates', it would have two acts of understanding having Socrates as an object, of which both by their nature would be a name, and of which one a third intermediate, which would be from its nature a verb. And if it is then said in the same understanding there would be diverse acts of understanding of the same species, it could be said, according to that opinion, that it is not an absurdity, just as one person at one and the same time can, by distinct loves, or at least by dispositions [to love?], can love diverse men.
Ultimo notandum est quod veritas et falsitas propositionis non sunt quaedam qualitates inhaerentes ipsi propositioni quo modo albedo inhaeret parieti, quia sine omni mutatione a parte propositionis, propter solam mutationem a parte rei, potest eadem propositio esse primo vera et postea falsa; sicut ista 'Sortes sedet', ipso sedente est vera, et postea, ipso surgente, sine omni mutatione a parte propositionis, est falsa. Sed veritas et falsitas sunt quaedam praedicabilia de propositione, importantia quod ita est a parte significati sicut denotatur per propositionem quae est signum; unde propositionem esse veram non est propositionem habere aliquam talem qualitatem in se sed propositionem esse veram est ita esse sicut significatur per propositionem. Unde si Sortes sedet, tunc haec est vera 'Sortes sedet', quia ita est sicut denotatur per istam propositionem 'Sortes sedet'; et si Sortes non sedet, tunc haec est falsa 'Sortes sedet', quia non est ita sicut denotatur per istam 'Sortes sedet'; et eodem modo de omnibus aliis est dicendum, ut dicetur infra [N43].	Finally, it is to be noted that the truth and falsity of a proposition are not certain qualities inhering in the proposition itself, in the way in which whiteness inheres in a wall, because by every change on the part of the proposition, on account of that change alone on the side of the thing, the same proposition can be first true, then false, such as 'Socrates is sitting', is true with him sitting, and afterwards, by him rising, without any change of the part of the proposition, is false. But truth and falsity are a sort of predicable of a proposition, meaning that things are so on the part of what is signified just as is denoted by means of the proposition which is a sign. Wherefore for a proposition to be true is not for the proposition to have some such quality in itself, but for the proposition to be true is to be so in the way signified by the proposition. Wherefore, if Socrates sits, then 'Socrates sits' is true, because things are so as denoted by means of 'Socrates sits'. And if Socrates does not sit, then 'Socrates sits' is false, because things are not so as denoted by 'Socrates sits'. And in the same way it is to be said of all other matters, as will be said below.

[N1] See Burley, Quaestiones in librum Periherm., q. 1 (ed. S.F. Brown, Franciscan Studies, XXXIV (1974), 202-17; Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 27, qq 1-3, n. 83 (ed. Vaticana, VI, 97).
[N2] According to the Kneales (Development, p229 ff), a form of the soul was called a ma'na by Avicenna (979-1037), which was translated as intentio by the Latins. This came to have the meaning of 'natural sign in the soul'. Avicenna also distinguished between signs of first and second understanding. A sign of first understanding applies to external things such as men, stones, &c. A sign of second understanding applies to abstract notions such as genus and species. Logic was only concerned with ma'ani of second understanding. 'Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis, secundum quod per eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum, non in quantum ipsae sunt intellectae et habent esse intelligible, quod esse nullo modo pendet ex materia, vel pendet ex materia sed non corporea' (Avicennae Opera, ed. Venice, 1508, Philosophia Prima, i.2, 70va. Avicenna said that these thought-forms have logical features which they could not possess as forms by themselves or as forms in individuals. 'In eis autem quae sunt extra non est essentialitas nec accidentalitas omnino, nec est aliquod complexum nec incomplexum nec propositio nec argumentatio nec caetera huiusmodi. Cum autem volumus considerare ad hoc ut sciamus eas, necesse est eas colligere in intellectu, et tunc necessario accident illis dispositiones quae sunt propriae tantum intellectui' (Avicennae Opera, ed. Venice, 1508, Logica, 2rb. This is the origin of the distinction between first and second 'intention' which Ockham alludes to here. Cf. Ockham's discussion of first and second intentions in II.12 of the Summa Logicae, in the Logic Museum here.
[N3] Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, I, cap. De Signis (PL 64, 409 BC).
[N4] Cf. Priscianus, Institutionum grammaticalium volumen maius, II, c. 3, n. 14 (A. Krehl, Lipsiae 1819, 65).
[N5] See Ockham, Scriptum in I Sent., d.2, q8 (Opera Theologica IV, ed. S. F. Brown & G. Gal, Bonaventure NY 1970, 266-92); d. 27, qq 2-3 (Opera Theologica IV, ed. G. Etzkorn & F. Kelly, Bonaventure, NY 1978, sub praelo.
[N6] Ockham, Expositio in librum Praedicamentum Aristot., c. 14 §7.
[N7] Cf. Scotus, Ordinatione, I, d. 27, qq. 1-3, n. 48 'In intelligentia autem non videntur esse nisi vel actualis intellectio, vel obiectum terminans illam intellectionem, vel secundum alios species genita in intelligentia de specie in memoria, quae 'species in intelligentia' praecedit actum intelligendi, vel secundum alios aliquid formatum per actum intellegendi, vel quinto secundum haec quinque, possunt esse quinque opiniones de verbo' (ed. Vaticana, VI, 84). According to Gambatese & Brown, the second opinion, which Ockham records here, Scotus also rejects. (loc cit., n. 54, p. 86).
[N8] cf. Aristot., Ethica Nicom., II, c. 4 (Moerbeke): 'Quia igitur quae in anima fiunt tria sunt, passiones, potentiae, et habitus, horum aliquod utique erit virtus' (1105b 19-21); De Anima, III, cc. 8-11, tt. 37-58 (431b 20- 34a 21); Averroes, in this part (ed. F.S. Crawford, pp. 503-32).
[N9] cf. Roger Marston, Quaestiones disputatae de emanatione aeterna, quaest. 6: 'Sicut ergo res sensibilis suam speciem gignit in oculo, quae species, quia per ipsam video rem extra, est mihi ratio videndi, sic etiam ex specie alicuius quae est in memoria, si velim de ipso actualiter recordari, gignitur quaedam species similis illi quae est in memoria in acie intelligentiae, et tunc actualiter cognosco, quia ex quo de non-intelligente in actu factus sum actu intelligens, oportet circa meum intellectum aliquam mutationem fieri in aliquo absoluto, et istud absolutum est species genita de thesauro memoriae expressa in acie intelligentiae' (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi VII, Quaracchi 1923, 118).
[N10] Ockham, In II Sent., qq. 14-15, ed. Boehner, 'The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham', Traditio, I (1943), 245-75.
[N11] cf. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 27, qq. 1-3, n. 59: 'Sequitur ergo, per viam divisionis, quod verbum est actualis intellectio' (ed. Vaticana, VI, 84); William of Nottingham, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2; 'Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod verbum mentale sit cognitio actualis, sicut plane dicit Augustinus XV De Trinitate, c. 11 & 17 … Per conceptum igitur nihil aliud intelligo nisi perfectam et completam rei intellectionem, quam credo Augustinum vocare formatam cogitationem' (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, cod. 300/514, ff. 77va & 78ra).
[N12] In Expositione in librum Porphyrii, prooem., §2 (supra, pp. 10-16); in Expositione in librum Praedicamentorum Aristot., c. 4, §2 & c. 8, §1 (supra, pp. 149-54); & infra, c. 5 §3 (398-402).
[N13] Burley, Quaestiones in librum Periherm., q. 3 (ed. cit., pp. 238-60) asks whether an assertion is composed of utterances, or things, or concepts.
[N14] I have inserted the quotation marks around the proper names, which of course would not have been there in the original manuscript, and which the editors did not insert in this edition.
[N15] According to Gambatese & Brown, this was the view which Ockham himself favoured. See also above §3. See the Ordinatio, up to distinction xvii, and books II-IV of the Reportatio
[N16] Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet II, q. 8: 'Teneo tamen probabilius quod in intellectu formetur quaedam forma quae non est actus intellegendi ... Tertio sic: sicut est in sensu, ita – suo modo – est in intellectu. Sed in sensu est dare tale idolum quo cognoscitur res, nec est notitia rei; ergo &c... Dico ergo, sicut alias dixi, quod verbum non est actus intelligendi, sed est quaedam forma specularis in qua res cogniscitur, ita etiam quod ipsa forma aliquo modo est nota, et homo per talem formam in se ipso causatam per actum intelligendi confusum'; et Quodlibet III, q. 1: 'Quantum ad primum sciendum quod aliquid dicitur dupliciter esse in intellectu: uno modo sicut in subiecto, sicut actus intelligendi et conceptus mentis et habitus intellectuales. Et ita sunt in intellectu sicut quaecumque accidentia sunt in eis quorum sunt accidentia sicut in subiecto. Alio modo aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu obiective. Esse autem in intellectu obiective idem est quod esse in prospectu intellectus sicut cognitum in cognoscente, eo modo quo dicitur esse in prospectu alicuius totum illud quod videt' (Quattuor Quodlibeta, ed. Venetiis 1486); cf. Etiam eiusdem, De intentionibus secundis, quaest. 2 (ed. Parisiis 1489).
[N17] Cf. Henry Harclay, Quaestiones ordinariae, quaest. 3: Utrum universale significet aliquam rem extra animam, aliam a singulari vel supposito, qui tenet quod 'in re extra animam nulla est res nisi singularis, et communitas non est re extra intellectum', et post: Tu dicis: ergo universale est figmentum, quod est contra Lincolniensem … Dico quod duplex est figmentum: figmentum philosophicum et poeticum. Poeticum figmentum falsum est in re… Sed alio modo fingit philosophus. Nam necessitate doctrinae fingit unum in intellectu simplici quod non est nec esse potest, cui sic facto attribuit illud quod illi rei inesset si esset in rerum natura, sine omni falsitate. Verbi gratia, geometer causa doctrinae fingit in consideratione lineam sine latitudine, et forte astrologus epicyclos et excentricos, non asserendo talia esse in rerum natura'. (ed. G. Gal, 'Henricus de Harclay, Quaestio de significato conceptus universalis', Franciscan Studies, XXXI (1971), 211, 225).
[N18] cf. supra, §6
[N19] Supra, §2, Ockham, Summa Logicae, pars I, c.1 (Opera Philosophica I, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gal & S. Brown, Bonaventure, NY 1974, 7ss.
[N20] According to Gambatese and Brown, Ockham probably had in mind certain views, less cautiously expressed, of Walter Burley. E.g. Quaestiones in librum Periherm., quaest. 1., n. 17: 'Tertio modo sumitur passio pro ipsa re ut nata est movere intellectum, et sic sumendo passionem voces significant passiones, quia nihil aliud est significare passiones isto modo quam significare rem ut est proportionata intellectui. Et isto modo quaelibet vox significat passionem' (ed. cit., p. 212); Commentarius in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis - Commentarius medius, n. 1. 73: 'Alia divisio enuntiationis accipitur, quia quaedam enuntiatio est de subiecto singulari et quaedam de subiecto universali, et haec divisio accipitur ex divisione rerum: Quaedam vero rerum sunt universalia et quaedam singularia (ed. cit., pp. 84s). Adhuc magis expresse asserit Gualterus universalia esse in re extra, in ultima redactione commentarii sui In librum Perihermanias Aristotelis, initio libri, ad textum: Primum oportet constituere, ubi dicit: 'Supposito tamen quod universalia sint res extra – quod verius est – dicendum quod nomen primae intentionis est nomen rei ut cadit sub primo conceptu intellectus'. Postea autem, ad textum: Necesse est enim enuntiare quoniam inest aliquid, Burlaeus praecise impugnationem a Guillelmo de Ockham hic factam in mente habere videtur: 'Secundo potest notari quod extra animam est aliqua res universalis et aliqua singularis. Patet hoc per divisionem rerum. Secundo, ex eodem potest notari quod enuntiatio componitur ex rebus extra animam quae sunt universalia et singularia; et ista sunt extra animam. Et tamen modernis non placent ista notabilia, qui nec ponunt universalia extra animam nec ponunt propositionem componi ex rebus extra animam (In Artem Veterem, Venetiis, 1541, rr. 67va, 75vb).
[N21] Aristot., Metaph., VII, c. 13, tt. 45-8 (1038b 10 – 1039a 3).
[N22] Cf. William of Alnwick, In I Sent. d.27: 'Responsio: primo ostendam quae natura et quae entitas sit operatio intellectualis… Quantum ad primum intendo ostendere quod operatio intellectualis sit qualitas de prima specie … Dico ergo quod operatio intellectualis est quaedam qualitas et quaedam forma absoluta perficiens intellectum' (cod. Patavii, Anton. 291, f. 60ra); Richard of Campsall, Contra ponentes naturam generis: 'Ideo dicendum est quod genus et species et huiusmodi universalia non sunt res extra animam, ita quod sit aliqua res communis, ut communiter imaginatur, quae sit communis multis. Sed sunt formae universales exisistentes in anima sicut in subiecto, quae tamen sunt formae singulares in essendo, sicut alia accidentia in anima. Et [cod. quod] pro tanto dicitur huiusmodi forma universalis quia intentio talis, cum sit una numero in anima, est communis sive universalis sic aut sic quia essentialiter plura, sicut patet de intellectione hominis vel animalis, cum sit una numero in anima est tamen communis, sicut genus et species, quia plura repraesentat'. (Florentiae, Bibl. Nat., conv. Soppr., cod. B.4. 1618, p. 93va). Codex iste scriptus est Neapoli 1331 et continet Expositionem Guillelmi de Ockham hic editam et in librum Elenchorum Aristotelis.
[N23] Avicenna, Metaph., V, c. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1508, f. 87r).
[N24] Cf. Aristot., Metaph., V, c. 7, tt. 13-14 (1017a 7 – 1017b 9); Averroes, in hunc locum (ed. Iuntina, VIII, ff. 55r-56r).
[N25] Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., VI, t. 8 (ed. cit., VIII, f. 72r).
[N26] Cf. Ockham, Summa Logicae, I.72 (Opera Philosophica I, pp. 214, 218); sed Summa nondum scripta.
[N27] Summa Logicae I.72, though as Boehner notes, the Summa was not written at this point.
[N28] Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., VII, t. 23 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, ff. 81v-82r).
[N29] Augustine, De doctrina christiana, I, c. 1, n. 2: 'Ex quo intelligitur quid appellem signa: res eas videlicet quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. Quamobrem omne signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est; non autem omnis res etiam signum est' (PL 34, 20, CSEL 80,9); Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, I, d. 1, c. 1 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV, Grottaferrata 1971, 55).
[N30] Supra, §7
[N31] cf. also Ockham, Scriptum in I Sent., d. 2, q. 8 (Opera Theologica II, ed. cit., pp. 283-89).
[N32] Supra, §7
[N33] Supra, §2.
[N34] Aristotle says this in the end of this text (16ª 9).
[N35] Namely in De Anima, which Ockham meant to complete. In Summa Logicae, parte I, c.10, he defines the understanding as follows 'Intellectus est anima potens intelligere' (Opera Philosophica I, ed. cit., p. 38, lin. 84).
[N36] Cf Aristot., Anal. Poster., I., c. 32 (88b 36).
[N37] Aristot., Ethica Nicom., VI, c.3 (1139b 16-17).
[N38] Supra, §§ 7 & 10
[N39] Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed 1a, I & ed. 2a, I, cap. De Signis (PL 64, 299s., 415 C).
[N40] Supra, §6.
[N41] Supra, §6
[N42] Boethius, In librum De interpretatione, ed. 2a, I, cap. De Signis (PL 64, 407 B).
[N43] Infra, cap. 6, §5.

THE LOGIC MUSEUM Copyright (Translation & introduction) (c) E.D.Buckner 2007.