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Introduction
Siger of Brabant: life
Work
Influence
Summary
References
Question 20 Whether 'man' signifies two-footed animal, it is necessary that he be so.
Question 21 Whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] exists or not.
Notes
Introduction
The passages below are questions 20 and 21 of Siger of Brabant's questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics, concerning the problem of propositions with non-existent subjects. Although Siger is probably better known for his discussion of the question whether the proposition 'Man is an animal' is true if no individual men exist (not available in the Logic Museum), the passages here concern two related questions, namely whether (question 20) a thing named is necessarily what it is signified to be by the name (thus, is man necessarily a rational animal, given that 'man' means rational animal), and whether (question 21) a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing it signifies exists or not.
The questions are connected with one another, and divided the philosophers of the middle and late thirteenth century along party lines. Siger argued, as here, that when a name has a definition (such as 'rational animal', in the case of man), the definition is predicated necessarily of whatever has the name. Thus 'every man is an animal' is necessarily true because the definition of man is predicated of man.
Question 20 is whether, if a noun signifies 'X', it is necessary that anything denoted by the noun is X. Siger argues that what a name signifies is said necessarily of what is signified by the name. Therefore, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily a two-footed animal. Question 21 is whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] exists or not. Siger argues that a name has a 'single understanding' or single meaning, whether or not there is anything in reality that corresponds to the name. Another reason is that a name signifies one thing according, as it were, to its logical nature [ratio] [N1], and so there is always a single nature, there is a single signification. Therefore, although in reality there is not a single thing that we can predicate both being and non being, nevertheless in the name's logical nature there is one thing of which both can be predicated.
On the question of whether 'Man is an animal' is true if no individual men exist [N2] (not included here), Siger claimed that the hypothesis is absurd because in the Aristotelian perspective of nature the human species is eternal (Van Steenberghen 1977, pp. 265-9). Whereas Aristotle suggests that words signify concepts, Siger, it is objects that are the primary signification of words. Common terms signify the essence of things, rather than the other determinations that accompany a thing in real existence. The essence is the foundation of the signifying unity of the common term. A concept is thus the secondary object of the term, co-signified by it (cf Bazan 1980, Putallaz and Imbach 1997, p. 86).
We have no precise date for when the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicae was completed. It is unlikely to have been before 1265 (when Siger was only 25), nor after 1276, when Siger appeared on a charge of heresy, then fled to the papal court in Italy. It was probably completed in the early 1270's. (note to edit the omnis homo page accordingly)
Siger was born about 1240 in the Duchy of Brabant. He attended the University of Paris about 1255-7. At that time the full range of Aristotle's work were being incorporated into the curriculum, after being initially banned in 1215 [N3]. By 1266 he was probably a master of arts, in which position he remained until the end of his career. He was a prominent member of a group of teachers, mostly at the Faculty of Arts in Paris, known to historians as the 'Latin Averroists' or 'secular Aristotelians', who aimed to interpret Aristotle in a secular way. They taught the eternity of the world, the unity of the passive intellect in men, collective immortality, determinism and the absence of free will.
These interpretations were felt by many to challenge Christian faith, and Siger was exposed to persecution from the Church as well as from purely philosophical opponents. Averroism was denounced by Bonaventura in 1267, and in December 1270 was condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities. In the same year, Thomas Aquinas [N4] challenged the Averroistic interpretation of De Anima proposed by Siger.
In 1276 the French Inquisition summoned Siger to appear before a tribunal at Noyon, although he seems to have been acquitted. In 1277 there was a general condemnation of Aristotelianism, instigated by the Archbishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier (known as the 'Parisian Condemnations'). These included a special clause directed against Boethius of Dacia, and Siger. Both fled to Italy.
It is not known exactly how Siger died, and there are various stories about his death. According to John Peckham, archbishop of Canterbury, he perished miserably [ref needed]. A Brabantine chronicle says that he was assassinated by an insane secretary (a clerico suo quasi dementi) [ref: Britannica 1911]. Dante, in the Paradiso (x. 134-6), says that he found 'death slow in coming'. A 13th century sonnet by Durante (xcii. 9-14) says that he was executed at Orvieto [ref: Britannica 1911].
He is supposedly mentioned in Dante's Divine Comedy - (Paradiso, canto X, 133-8), where he is located within Paradise, beside Aquinas and Isidore of Seville (a curiosity, given that Siger was a secular Aristotelian, Dante a Thomist, but perhaps Dante only knew of Siger as a persecuted philosopher, or perhaps, as Van Steenberghen has suggested, Siger's position was closer to Aquinas than his surviving works imply).
In his search for a truthful interpretation of Aristotle, Siger discovered inconsistencies between Aristotelian doctrine and orthodox Christian belief. This brought him into conflict with Thomas Aquinas, whose object was to reconcile Aristotle and the Church. Aquinas argued in On the Unicity of the Intellect that the Averroistic reading of Aristotle was altogether contrary (repugnare omnino) to their true meaning. Siger replied with his treatise On the Intellective Soul, saying his intention was to determine what was said according to the texts of the philosophers, not what he thought on his own behalf. Historical truth should not be hidden, even if it contradicts the truth and wisdom which has been given to us by revelation. Aristotle is not the only authority in philosophy and is su bject, like all philosophers, to error (see Bazan 1980a, pp. 234-54).
Siger is sometimes credited with the 'double truth' doctrine. This has different versions. According to one verson, we can affirm contradictory propositions, first as a philosopher, then as a Christian. For example, I can hold as a philosopher that the world is eternal, but as a Christian that the world is created. According to another version, we can express what Aristotle taught, without expressing our own views.
Aquinas was suspicious of the second view, accusing its adherents of bad faith. 'Among those who labour in philosophy, some say things that are not true according to faith, and when told that what they say goes against faith, they answer that it is the Philosopher who says so; as to themselves they do not affirm it, they are only repeating the philosopher's words'. Quoted by Etienne Gilson, History of Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York 1955, p. 398.
Influence
Mandonnet rediscovered Siger's work in the 1890's. This was of some importance to our understanding of medieval philosophy, suggesting it could no longer be viewed simply as theology, although it is still not clear how we should interpret his work. According to Mandonnet, he was an Averroist who endorses Christian doctrine only because it is expedient. Van Steenberghen, by contrast, regards him as a sincere Christian whose position was close to that of Aquinas.
His works include logical works (Impossibilia, Quaestiones logicales, Sophismata); commentaries on Aristotle (In III De Anima, De generatione, Physics, Metaphysics), and the Treatises De Necessitate et contingentia causarum, De aeternitate mundi, and De anima intellectiva, some of which were published by Mandonnet in 1899.
References (Primary)
Siger of Brabant, 'Utrum nomen idem significet et univoce re existente et non existente', in Quaestiones in Metaphysicam; ed. Graiff, Questions sur la Metaphysique, Louvain 1948, 224-8.
Summary
Question 20 is whether if 'man' signifies two-footed animal, it is necessary that he be so. It seems that it is, because what a name signifies is the 'essence' (quod quid est) of a thing, not some accidental property. Thus the name of a thing is necessarily predicated of it. Siger replies that a name signifies a definition, and a definition signifies the essence of a thing whether it exists in reality (outside the soul) or not. Thus it is necessary that Caesar, as signified, is a man. But because Caesar does not now exist in reality, it is not necessary that Caesar is man – indeed, now he is not.
Question 21 is whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] actually exists. An argument that it does, is that a name establishes a single understanding with the thing [signified] existing or not existing, wherefore it signifies the same, and unequivocally. Against this, it may be argued that with Caesar existing and not existing, 'Caesar' does not have a single understanding, for the understanding is not of a single thing, similarly not the signification. For when we consider things in reality, you will find nothing there of which you can say first that it exists, and then that it does not exist. Siger replies that a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, whether the thing exists or not. One reason is that our understanding of it remains one, with it existing or not existing, therefore also the signification. To the argument that it is not possible to find any thing in reality, which can exist then not exist, he argues that the understanding of it does not cease to exist, nor does its signification.
References (Secondary)
Bazan, B.C., 'La theorie de la signification chez Siger de Brabant', in Progress in Linguistic Historiography: Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottowa, August, August 1978, ed. Konrad Koerner, Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Bazan, B.C., Article 'Siger of Brabant', in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Gracia & Noone, Oxford 2006.
Mandonnet, P., Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme latin du XIII e siecle (Fribourg, 1899); G. Paris, "Siger de Brabant" in La Poesie du moyen age (1895); and an article in the Revue de Paris (Sept. 1st, 1900).
Van Steenberghen, F., (1977), Maitre Siger de Brabant, Paris: Publications Universitaires, Louvain, Vander-Oyez S.A
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| [224] Quaestio 20 QUAERITUR UTRUM HOMO SIGNIFICAT ANIMAL BIPES NECESSE SIT IPSUM ESSE HOC | Question 20. Whether 'man' signifies two-footed animal, it is necessary that he be this. |
| Consequenter circa rationem ARISTOTELIS quaeritur utrum, si homo significat animal bipes, necesse sit ipsum esse animal bipes; et idem intelligatur in aliis. Et videtur quod sic, ratione faciente fidem, quia quod quid est aliquid dicitur de illo cuius est et necessario : quid enim magis veriusque dicetur de aliquo, quam id quod ipsum est? Sed illud quod nomen significat est quod quid est eius quod significatur, et non aliquod accidens eius. Quare illud quod nomen significat necessario dicitur de eo quod significatur per nomen. Quare, si homo significat animal bipes, necessario homo est hoc. | Consequently, concerning this argument [rationem] of Aristotle, it is asked whether, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily a two-footed animal, and the same may be understood in other [cases]. And it seems that it is so, by reason creating faith, because what-something-is [N5] is said of that of that of which it is, and necessarily, for what is said more truly of anything, than what that thing itself is [N6]? But what the name signifies is the what-it-is of what it signifies, and not some accidental property of it. Wherefore, what a name signifies is said necessarily of what is signified by the name. Wherefore, if 'man' signifies a two-footed animal, he is necessarily this. |
| Contra : quaedam est definitio quae dicit quod est, quod significatur per nomen, et tamen non est definitio indicans quid est [225] esse rei, ut dicitur IIº Posteriorum, ut definitio tragelaphi [N8], si igitur praedicare illud quod significatur per nomen non est nisi praedicare significatum, et ipsum quandoque non habet quod quid est, manifestum quod non oportet significatum per nomen esse hoc necessario. | On the other hand, something is a definition when it says what it is that is signified by a name, and yet it is not a definition indicating what the being [N9] of a thing is, as is said in the second book of the Posterior Analytics [N7], for example the definition of 'goat-stag'. If, accordingly, predicating what is signified by the name is nothing except predicating what is signified, and that thing sometimes does not have the what-it-is, it is manifest that what is signified by a name does not have to be so [hoc] necessarily. |
| Item, Caesar significat hominem, et tamen Caesar non est homo. Quod significet hominem patet, quia Caesar idem significat quod prius ipso existente et non existen[f. 109ra]te, et ipso existente significabat hominem : significabat enim individuum hominis et de ratione individui est species. | Likewise, 'Caesar' signifies a man, yet Caesar is not a man. That it may signify a man is clear, because 'Caesar' signifies the same that it did before, with him existing, and with him not existing, and with him existing it signified the man, for it signified the individual man, and the species is of the nature of the individual. |
| QUAESTIO 21. UTRUM NOMEN IDEM SIGNIFICET ET UNIVOCE RE EXISTENTE ET NON EXISTENTE | Question 21. Whether a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, when the thing [it signifies] exists or not. |
| Gratia huius quaeritur utrum nomen idem significet et univoce, re existente et non existente. Videtur quod sic. Nomen constituens intellectum unum nunc et prius, non significat aequivoce nunc et prius, sed univoce; sed nomen re existente et non existente unum intellectum constituit; quare significat idem et univoce. | On account of this, it is asked whether a name signifies the same thing, and unequivocally, when the thing exists in reality, and does not exist in reality. And it seems that it does. A name establishing a single understanding now and then, does not signify equivocally now and then, but unequivocally. But a name establishes a single understanding with the thing [signified] existing or not existing, wherefore it signifies the same, and unequivocally. |
| Contra: significatio una non aequivoca debet esse unius sicut intellectus unus est unius; sed Caesare existente et non existente, Caesar non habet intellectum unum: non enim est intellectus eius intellectus unius; similiter nec significatio. Considera enim ad res, nihil invenies de quo posses enuntiare primo quod est, deinde quod non est, sicut ista enuntiatur de Socrate : nihil enim unum in re manet nisi subiectum mutationis, quod [226] nihil est nisi in potentia; huius autem unius non est significatio; quare &c. | On the contrary side: a single signification, not equivocal, ought to be of one thing just as one understanding is of one thing. But with Caesar existing and not existing, 'Caesar' does not have a single understanding, for the understanding of him is not the understanding of a single thing, similarly not the signification. For turn your consideration [considera .. ad] to things. You will find nothing of which you can assert first that it is, and then that it is not, in the way that this is asserted of Socrates. For no single thing remains in reality unless it is the subject of change, which is nothing except potentially, but of this single thing there is no signification, wherefore &c. |
| Solutio. Ad primam quaestionem dicendum quod si nomen significat aliquid, sive sit res naturae sive rationis, sive fictum sive verum, id quod significat nomen necessarium est praedicari de significato per nomen : significat enim nomen quod quid est eius cuius est nomen, ut praeostensum est; quid autem verius praedicatur de aliquo quam suum quod quid est? Est tamen advertandum propter rationem ad oppositum quod, cum nomen aliquod habeat definitionem dicentem quid significat nomen, ista definitio praedicatur necessario de eo quod significatur per nomen. Dicit enim AVICENNA quod illud potest habere rationem rei vel entis et quidditatis quod non est extraneum, sed non potest habere rationem rei vel entis quod {est extraneum} omnino : ratio enim rei qua res est res, non est nisi quod est. Et hoc etiam vult ARISTOTELES : dicit enim in principio huius IV quod non ens esse non ens dicimus, per hoc probans esse ens aliquo modo. Definitio igitur rei non dicit quod quid est rei extra animam, sed aliquo modo rei sive in anima sive extra animam. | Solution (1). To the first question [N11] it must be said that if a name signifies something, whether it be a thing of nature or a thing of reason, that which the name signifies is necessarily to be predicated of what is signified by the name, for the name signifies the what-it-is of the name, as was shown before. But what is more truly predicated of something than its what-it-is? And yet it is to be noticed, on account of the opposing argument, that when a name has a definition saying what the name signifies [N12], that definition is predicated necessarily of what is signified by the name. For Avicenna [N10] says that something can have the nature of a thing or of a being, and of a quiddity that is not extraneous, but cannot have the nature of a thing or of a being that is altogether extraneous, for the nature of a thing by which the thing is a thing, is nothing unless it exists. And this is also as Aristotle would have it, for he says in the beginning of book 4 that we say a non being is a non being [N13], proving by this that it is a being in some manner. Accordingly, a definition of the thing does not mean [dicit] the what-is-it of the thing outside the soul, but in some way [the what-is-it] of the thing, whether it is in the soul or outside it. |
| Et cum dicitur quod definitio dicens quid significat nomen, non dicit quod quid est, verum est rei extra animam, idest quod [227] quid est in re extra, quia ei non competit tale esse: sed dicit esse et quod quid est secundum esse quod sibi competit : ideo &c. | And when it is said that a definition saying what a name signifies, does not mean that which-it-is, it is true of a thing outside the soul, i.e. that which-it-is in outside reality, because such being does not belong to it, but rather it means being and that which-it-is according to the being which belongs to it. |
| Et cum dicitur quod Caesar significat hominem, et tamen non est homo, dicendum quod Caesar non significat hominem simpliciter, sed temporis determinati : sic enim habuit substantiam et definitionem. Unde transmutabile est secundum substantiam et definitionem, quod secundum eam tempore mensuratur. Et ideo praedicatum necessarium non habuit, sicut nec esse necessarium : significat enim singulare, et hoc de ratione sua est hic et nunc. Unde non significat hominem simpliciter, sed Caesarem, et quia ipse est temporis determinati, ideo non est homo nisi in tempore determinato ; et ideo potest Caesar, quando Caesar non est, non significare hominem. | And when it is said that 'Caesar' signifies a man, and yet he is not a man, it is to be said that 'Caesar' does not signify a man without qualification, but at a determinate time. For thus he had a substance and a definition. Wherefore a transmutable thing exists according to a substance and a definition, which is measured by a time according to it. And for that reason he did not have a necessary predicate, just as he [did not have] necessary being, for ['Caesar'] signifies a singular thing, and this is of its nature here and now. Wherefore it does not signify a man without qualification, but Caesar, and because he exists at a determinate time, for that reason he is not a man except at a determinate time. And for that reason 'Caesar', when Caesar does not exist, cannot signify a man. |
| Solutio. Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod nomen significat idem et univoce re existente et non existente. Et ratio una est quia unus manet intellectus de re, ipsa existente et non existente ; quare et significatio. Alia ratio est quia nomen significat unum secundum rationem, et ideo univoce semper eius quod significatur per nomen est una ratio, licet ipsum transmutetur secundum esse ; quare, cum significet nomen ipsum secundum rationem unum, idem et univoce significabit. | Solution (2). To the second question [N14] it must be said that a name signifies the same, and unequivocally, with a thing existing or not existing. And one reason is that the understanding of the thing remains one, with it existing or not existing, wherefore also the signification. Another reason is that a name signifies one thing according to a logical nature [rationem], and for that reason there is always a single logical nature unequivocally of what is signified by the name, although that may be changed according to being, wherefore, since a name signifies a single thing according to logical nature, it will signify the same thing and unequivocally. |
| Et cum arguitur quod non est dare aliquid unum in re, re [228] existente et non existente, dicendum quod significatio una debet esse unius secundum rationem et intellectum. Et quia quando cessat entitas rei non cessat intellectus eius, ideo nec unus intellectus nec una significatio : ex quo enim significatio non refertur immediate ad rem (sic enim cessaret cessante esse rei), sed refertur ad rem prout res refertur ad intellectum, et cessante esse non cessat intellectus, ideo nec significatio. Et ideo, quamvis in re non sit unum recipens praedicationem essendi et non essendi, tamen in ratione unum utrumque recipit. | And when it is argued that it is not [possible] to grant a single thing in reality, with the thing existing and not existing, it must be said that a single signification ought to be of a single thing according to logical nature, and understanding. And because, when the entity of a thing ceases to be, the understanding of it does not cease to be, for that reason neither [does] a single understanding nor a single signification [cease to be]. For from this the signification is not referred directly [immediate] to the thing, according as the thing is referred to the understanding, and in ceasing being, the understanding does not cease, and for that reason neither does the signification. And for that reason, although in reality there is not a single thing receiving predication of being and non being, still in logical nature [ratione] one thing receives both. |
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