Anselm's Monologion Chapters 1-4

Anselm's Monologion chapters 1-4

Chapter 1 There is something that is the best, the greatest, the highest, of all existing things.
Chapter 2 The same topic continued
Chapter 3 There is a Nature which exists through itself, which is the highest of all existing things, and through which exists whatever is
Chapter 4 The same topic continued

Latin English

ANSELMUS: MONOLOGION --- SCANNED FROM: S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi opera omnia Vol.1, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, pp.5-87. Translated by Sidney Norton Deane, text taken from The Logos Virtual Library.

Biographical Note. S. N. (Sidney Norton) Deane was born on June 10, 1878 in Westmoreland, NY to Reverend James and Annie M. (Bosworth) Deane. He was educated at Crown Point Union School in Crown Point, NY as well as at home with his sister Mary, and brothers Allen and John. Deane went on to graduate from Yale University as valedictorian of his class in 1902, and earned his Ph.D. there in 1914. In 1904-05 he traveled to Athens where he studied at the American School of Classical Studies. When he returned home, Deane worked as an Assistant Curator of Antiques at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, where he later became Secretary to the Director. He then went on to study abroad at the University of Bonn in 1908-1909. In 1912, Deane came to Smith College were he worked as an Associate Professor of Greek, and gained his full professorship in 1914. He worked as a curator at the Museum of Classical Antiquities and as Librarian for the college. He was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, the American Philological Society and the American Archaeological Society. After 31 years of service at Smith College, Sidney Norton Deane died on May 4, 1943 at the age of 65.

1. QUOD SIT QUIDDAM OPTIMUM ET MAXIMUM ET SUMMUM OMNIUM QUAE SUNT. 1. There is something that is the best, the greatest, the highest, of all existing things.

/13/ Si quis unam naturam, summam omnium quae sunt, solam sibi in aeterna sua beatitudine sufficientem, omnibusque rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod aliquid sunt aut quod aliquomodo bene sunt, per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem et facientem, aliaque perplura quae de deo sive de eius creatura necessarie credimus, aut non audiendo aut non credendo ignorat: puto quia ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem sola ratione persuadere. If any man, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is highest of all existing beings, which is also sufficient to itself in its eternal blessedness, and which confers upon and effects in all other beings, through its omnipotent goodness, the very fact of their existence, and the fact that in any way their existence is good; and if he has no knowledge of many other things, which we necessarily believe regarding God and his creatures, he still believes that he can at least convince himself of these truths in great part, even if his mental powers are very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.

Quod cum multis modis facere possit, unum ponam, quem illi aestimo esse promptissimum. Etenim cum omnes frui solis iis appetant quae bona putant: in promptu est, ut aliquando mentis oculum convertat ad investigandum illud, unde sunt bona ea ipsa, quae non appetit nisi quia iudicat esse bona, ut deinde ratione ducente et illo prosequente ad ea quae irrationabiliter ignorat, rationabiliter /14/ proficiat. In quo tamen, si quid dixero quod maior non monstret auctoritas: sic volo accipi ut, quamvis ex rationibus quae mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur, non ob hoc tamen omnino necessarium sed tantum sic interim videri posse dicatur. And, although he could do this in many ways, I shall adopt one which I consider easiest for such a man. For, since all desire to enjoy only those things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that this man should, at some time, turn his mind’s eye to the examination of that cause by which these things are good, which he does not desire, except as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason leads the way and follows up these considerations, he advances rationally to those truths of which, without reason, he has no knowledge. And if, in this discussion, I use any argument which no greater authority adduces, I wish it to be received in this way: although, on the grounds that I shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as if necessarily, yet it is not, for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but merely that it can appear so for the time being.

Facile est igitur ut aliquis sic secum tacitus dicat: Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint, quorum tam multam diversitatem et sensibus corporeis experimur et ratione mentis discernimus: estne credendum esse unum aliquid, per quod unum sint bona quaecumque bona sunt, an sunt bona alil per aliud? Certissimum quidem et omnibus est volentibus advertere perspicuum quia, quaecumque dicuntur aliquid ita, ut ad invicem magis vel minus aut aequaliter dicantur: per aliquid dicuntur, quod non aliud et aliud sed idem intelligitur in diversis, sive in illis aequaliter sive inaequaliter consideretur. Nam quaecumque iusta dicuntur ad invicem sive pariter sive magis vel minus, non possum intelligi iusta nisi per iustitiam, quae non est aliud et aliud in diversis. It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are goods so innumerable, whose great diversity we experience by the bodily senses, and discern by our mental faculties, must we not believe that there is some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good? Or are they good one through one thing and another through another? To be sure, it is most certain and clear, for all who are willing to see, that whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute in such a way that in mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or less, or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue of some fact, which is not understood to be one thing in one case and another in another, but to be the same in different cases, whether it is regarded as existing in these cases in equal or unequal degree. For, whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared one with another, whether equally, or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except through the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and another in another.

Ergo cum certum sit quod omnia bona, si ad invicem conferantur, aut aequaliter aut inacqualiter sint bona, necesse est, ut omnia sint per aliquid bona, quod intelligitur idem in diversis bonds, licet aliquando videantur bona dici alia per aliud. Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, would prove either equally or unequally good, necessarily they are all good by virtue of something which is conceived of as the same in different goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another.

Per aliud enim videtur dici bonus equus quia fortis est, et per aliud bonus equus quia velox est. Cum enim dici videatur bonus per fortitudinem et bonus per velocitatem, non tamen idem videtur esse fortitudo et velocitas. For, apparently it is by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, because he is strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because he is swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not appear to be the same thing.

Verum si equus, quia est fortis aut velox, idcirco bonus est: quomodo fortis et velox latro malus est? Potius igitur, quemadmodum fortis et velox latro ideo malus est quia noxius est, ita fortis et velox: equus idcirco bonus est quia utilis est. Et quidem nihil soles putari bonum nisi aut propter aliquam utilitatem, ut bona dicitur salus et quae saluti prosunt, aut propter quamlibet honestatem, sicut pulchritudo aestimatur bona et quae pulchritudinem iuvant. But if a horse, because he is strong and swift, is therefore good, how is it that a strong, swift robber is bad? Rather, then, just as a strong, swift robber is bad, because he is harmful, so a strong, swift horse is good, because he is useful. And, indeed, nothing is ordinarily regarded as good, except either for some utility—as, for instance, safety is called good, and those things which promote safety—or for some honorable character—as, for instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes beauty.

Sed quondam iam perspecta ratio nullo /15/ potest dissolvi pacto, necesse est omne quoque utile vel honestum, si vere bona sunt, per idipsum esse bona, per quod necesse est esse cuncta bona, quidquid illud sit. But, since the reasoning which we have observed is in no wise refutable, necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honorable, if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is.

Quis autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona, esse magnum bonum? lllud igitur est bonum per seipsum, quondam omne bonum est per ipsum. But who can doubt this very being, through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must be, then, a good through itself, since every other good is through it.

Ergo consequitur, ut omnia alia bona sint per aliud quam quod ipsa sunt, et ipsum solum per seipsum. At nullum bonum, quod per aliud est, aequale aut maius est eo bono, quod per se est bonum. Illud itaque solum est summe bonum, quod solum est per se bonum. Id enim summum est, quod sic supereminet aliis, ut nec par habeas nec praestantius. Sed quod est summe bonum, est etiam summe magnum. Est igitur unum aliquid summe bonum et summe magnum, id est summum omnium quae sunt. It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another being than that which they themselves are, and this being alone is good through itself. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone good through itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other beings, that it is neither equalled nor excelled. But that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing beings.

2. DE EADEM RE. 2. The same topic continued.

Quemadmodum autem inventum est aliquid esse summe bonum, qveniam cuncta bona per unum aliquid sunt bona, quod est bonum per seipsum: sic ex necessitate colligitur aliquid esse summe magnum, quondam quaecumque magna sunt, per unum aliquid magna sunt, quod magnum est per seipsum. Dico autem non magnum spatio, ut est corpus aliquod; sed quod quanto maius tanto melius est aut dignius, ut est sapientia. Et quondam non potest esse summe magnum nisi id quod est summe bonum, necesse est aliquid esse maximum et optimum, id est summum omnium quae sunt. But, just as it has been proved that there is a being that is supremely good, since all goods are good through a single being, which is good through itself; so it is necessarily inferred that there is something supremely great, which is great through itself. But, I do not mean physically great, as a material object is great, but that which, the greater it is, is the better or the more worthy,—wisdom, for instance. And since there can be nothing supremely great except what is supremely good, there must be a being that is greatest and best, i. e., the highest of all existing beings.

3. QUOD SIT QUAEDAM NATURA, PER QUAM EST, QUIDQUID EST, ET QUAE PER SE EST, ET EST SUMMUM OMNIUM QUAE SUNT. 3. There is a Nature which exists through itself, which is the highest of all existing things, and through which exists whatever is.

Denique non solum omnia bona per idem aliquid sunt bona, et omnia magna per idem aliquid sunt magna sed quidquid est, per unum aliquid uidetur esse. Omne namque quod est, aut est per aliquid aut per nihil. Sed nihil est per nihil. Non enim vel cogitari potest, ut sit aliquid non per /16/ aliquid. Therefore, not only are all good things such through something that is one and the same, and all great things such through something that is one and the same; but whatever is, apparently exists through something that is one and the same. For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist by virtue of something.

Quidquid est igitur, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est unum aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt. Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquid per quod sunt, aut eadem plura singula sunt per se, aut ipsa per se invicem sunt. Whatever is, then, does not exist except through something. Since this is true, either there is one being, or there are more than one, through which all things that are exist. But if there are more than one, either these are themselves to be referred to some one being, through which they exist, or they exist separately, each through itself, or they exist mutually through one another.

At si plura ipsa sunt per unum, iam non sunt omnia per plura sed potius per illud unum, per quod haec plura sunt. But, if these beings exist through one being, then all things do not exist through more than one, but rather through that one being through which these exist.

Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, utique est una aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se, quam habent, ut per se sint. Non est autem dubium quod per id ipsum unum sint, per quod habent, ut sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum unum cuncta sunt, quam per plura, quae sine eo uno esse non possum. If, however, these exist separately, each through itself, there is, at any rate, some power or property of existing through self (existendi per se), by which they are able to exist each through itself. But, there can be no doubt that, in that case, they exist through this very power, which is one, and through which they are able to exist, each through itself. More truly, then, do all things exist through this very being, which is one, than through these, which are more than one, which, without this one, cannot exist.

Ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniam irrationabilis cogitatio est, ut aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse. But that these beings exist mutually through one another, no reason can admit; since it is an irrational conception that anything should exist through a being on which it confers existence.

Nam nec ipsa relative sic sunt per invicem. Cum enim dominus et servus referantur ad invicem, et ipsi homines qui referuntur, omnino non sunt per invicem, et ipsae relationes quibus referuntur, non omnino sunt per invicem, quia eaedem sunt per subiecta. For not even beings of a relative nature exist thus mutually, the one through the other. For, though the terms master and servant are used with mutual reference, and the men thus designated are mentioned as having mutual relations, yet they do not at all exist mutually, the one through the other, since these relations exist through the subjects to which they are referred.

Cum itaque veritas omnimodo excludat plura esse per quae cuncta sint, necesse est unum illud esse, per quod sunt cuncta quae sunt. Therefore, since truth altogether excludes the supposition that there are more beings than one, through which all things exist, that being, through which all exist, must be one.

Quoniam ergo cuncta quae sunt, sunt per ipsum unum, proculdubio et ipsum unum est per seipsum. Quaecumque igitur alia sunt, sunt per aliud, et ipsum solum per seipsum. At quidquid est per aliud, minus est quam illud per quod cuncta sunt alia, et quod solum est per se. Quare illud quod est per se, maxime omnium est. Since, then, all things that are exist through this one being, doubtless this one being exists through itself. Whatever things there are else then, exist through something other than themselves, and this alone through itself. But whatever exists through another is less than that, through which all things are, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that which exists through itself exists in the greatest degree of all things.

Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est. Quod autem maxime omnium est, et per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid est id necesse est esse summe bonum et summe magnum, et summum omnium quae sunt. Quare est aliquid, quod, sive essentia sive substantia sive natura dicatur, optimum et maximum est et summum omnium quae sunt. There is, then, some one being which alone exists in the greatest and the highest degree of all. But that which is greatest of all, and through which exists whatever is good or great, and, in short, whatever has any existence—that must be supremely good, and supremely great, and the highest of all existing beings.

4. DE EADEM RE. 4. The same topic continued.

Amplius. Si quis intendat rerum naturas, velit nolit sentit non eas omnes contineri una dignitatis paritate sed quasdam earum distingui /17/ graduum imparitate. Qui enim dubitat quod in natura sua ligno melior sit equus, et equo praestantior homo, is profecto non est dicendus homo. Cum igitur naturarum aliae aliis negari non possint meliores, nihilominus persuadet ratio aliquam in eis sic supereminere, ut non habeas se superiorem. Si enim huiusmodi graduum distinctio sic est infinite, ut nullus ibi sit gradus superior quo superior alius non inveniatur, ad hoc ratio deducitur, ut ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo fine claudatur. Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi qui nimis est absurdus. Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua natura, quae sic est alicui vel aliquibus superior, ut nulla sit cui ordinetur inferior. Furthermore, if one observes the nature of things he perceives, whether he will or no, that not all are embraced in a single degree of dignity; but that certain among them are distinguished by inequality of degree. For, he who doubts that the horse is superior in its nature to wood, and man more excellent than the horse, assuredly does not deserve the name of man. Therefore, although it cannot be denied that some natures are superior to others, nevertheless reason convinces us that some nature is so preeminent among these, that it has no superior. For, if the distinction of degrees is infinite, so that there is among them no degree, than which no higher can be found, our course of reasoning reaches this conclusion: that the multitude of natures themselves is not limited by any bounds. But only an absurdly foolish man can fail to regard such a conclusion as absurdly foolish. There is, then, necessarily some nature which is so superior to some nature or natures, that there is none in comparison with which it is ranked as inferior.

Haec vero natura quae talis est, aut sola est aut plures eiusmodi et aequales sunt. Now, this nature which is such, either is single, or there are more natures than one of this sort, and they are of equal degree.

Verum si plures sunt et aequales: cum aequales esse non possint per diversa quaedam sed per idem aliquid, illud unum per quod aequaliter tam magnae sunt, aut est idipsum quod ipsae sunt, id est ipsa earum essentia, aut aliud quam quod ipsae sunt. But, if they are more than one and equal, since they cannot be equal through any diverse causes, but only through some cause which is one and the same, that one cause, through which they are equally so great, either is itself what they are, that is, the very essence of these natures; or else it is another than what they are.

Sed si nihil est aliud quam ipsa earum essentia: sicut earum essentiae non sunt plures sed una, ita et naturae non sunt plures sed una. Idem namque naturam hic intelligo quod essentiam. But if it is nothing else than their very essence itself, just as they have not more than one essence, but a single essence, so they have not more than one nature, but a single nature. For I here understand nature as identical with essence.

Si vero id, per quod plures ipsae naturae tam magnae sunt, aliud est quam quod ipsee sunt, pro certo minores sunt quam id, per quod magnae sunt. Quidquid enim per aliud est magnum, minus est quam id, per quod est magnum. Quare non sic sunt magnae, ut illis nihil sit maius aliud. If, however, that through which these natures are so great is another than that which they are, then, certainly, they are less than that through which they are so great. For, whatever is great through something else is less than that through which it is great. Therefore, they are not so great that there is nothing else greater than they.

Quod si nec per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possibile est tales esse plures naturas quibus nihil sit preestantius, nullo modo possum esse naturae plures huiusmodi. Restat igitur unam et solam aliquam naturam esse, quae sic est aliis superior, ut nullo sit inferior. Sed quod tale est, maximum et optimum est omnium quae sunt. Est igitur quaedam natura, quae est summum omnium quae sunt. Hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ipsa sit per se id quod est, et cuncta quae sunt, sint per ipsam id quod sunt. But if, neither through what they are nor through anything other than themselves, can there be more such natures than one, than which nothing else shall be more excellent, then in no wise can there be more than one nature of this kind. We conclude, then, that there is some nature which is one and single, and which is so superior to others that it is inferior to none. But that which is such is the greatest and best of all existing beings. Hence, there is a certain nature which is the highest of all existing beings. This, however, it cannot be, unless it is what it is through itself, and all existing beings are what they are through it.

Nam cum paulo ante ratio docuerit id quod per se est et per quod alia cuncta sunt, esse summum omnium existentium: aut e converso id quod est summum, est per se et cuncta alia per illud, aut Brunt plura summa. Sed plura summa non esse manifestum est. Quare est quaedam natura vel substantia vel essentia, quae per se est bona et magna, et per /18/ se est hoc quod est, et per quam est, quidquid vere aut bonum aut magnum aut aliquid est, et quae est summum bonum, summum magnum, summum ens sive subsistens, id est summum omnium quae sunt. For since, as our reasoning showed us not long since, that which exists through itself, and through which all other things exist, is the highest of all existing beings; either conversely, that which is the highest exists through itself, and all others through it; or, there will be more than one supreme being. But it is manifest that there cannot be more than one supreme being. There is, therefore, a certain Nature, or Substance, or Essence, which is through itself good and great, and through itself is what it is; and through which exists whatever is truly good, or great, or has any existence at all; and which is the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being or subsisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing beings.

Latin	English
ANSELMUS: MONOLOGION --- SCANNED FROM: S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi opera omnia Vol.1, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, pp.5-87.	Translated by Sidney Norton Deane, text taken from The Logos Virtual Library. Biographical Note. S. N. (Sidney Norton) Deane was born on June 10, 1878 in Westmoreland, NY to Reverend James and Annie M. (Bosworth) Deane. He was educated at Crown Point Union School in Crown Point, NY as well as at home with his sister Mary, and brothers Allen and John. Deane went on to graduate from Yale University as valedictorian of his class in 1902, and earned his Ph.D. there in 1914. In 1904-05 he traveled to Athens where he studied at the American School of Classical Studies. When he returned home, Deane worked as an Assistant Curator of Antiques at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, where he later became Secretary to the Director. He then went on to study abroad at the University of Bonn in 1908-1909. In 1912, Deane came to Smith College were he worked as an Associate Professor of Greek, and gained his full professorship in 1914. He worked as a curator at the Museum of Classical Antiquities and as Librarian for the college. He was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, the American Philological Society and the American Archaeological Society. After 31 years of service at Smith College, Sidney Norton Deane died on May 4, 1943 at the age of 65.
1. QUOD SIT QUIDDAM OPTIMUM ET MAXIMUM ET SUMMUM OMNIUM QUAE SUNT.	1. There is something that is the best, the greatest, the highest, of all existing things.
/13/ Si quis unam naturam, summam omnium quae sunt, solam sibi in aeterna sua beatitudine sufficientem, omnibusque rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod aliquid sunt aut quod aliquomodo bene sunt, per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem et facientem, aliaque perplura quae de deo sive de eius creatura necessarie credimus, aut non audiendo aut non credendo ignorat: puto quia ea ipsa ex magna parte, si vel mediocris ingenii est, potest ipse sibi saltem sola ratione persuadere.	If any man, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is highest of all existing beings, which is also sufficient to itself in its eternal blessedness, and which confers upon and effects in all other beings, through its omnipotent goodness, the very fact of their existence, and the fact that in any way their existence is good; and if he has no knowledge of many other things, which we necessarily believe regarding God and his creatures, he still believes that he can at least convince himself of these truths in great part, even if his mental powers are very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.
Quod cum multis modis facere possit, unum ponam, quem illi aestimo esse promptissimum. Etenim cum omnes frui solis iis appetant quae bona putant: in promptu est, ut aliquando mentis oculum convertat ad investigandum illud, unde sunt bona ea ipsa, quae non appetit nisi quia iudicat esse bona, ut deinde ratione ducente et illo prosequente ad ea quae irrationabiliter ignorat, rationabiliter /14/ proficiat. In quo tamen, si quid dixero quod maior non monstret auctoritas: sic volo accipi ut, quamvis ex rationibus quae mihi videbuntur, quasi necessarium concludatur, non ob hoc tamen omnino necessarium sed tantum sic interim videri posse dicatur.	And, although he could do this in many ways, I shall adopt one which I consider easiest for such a man. For, since all desire to enjoy only those things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that this man should, at some time, turn his mind’s eye to the examination of that cause by which these things are good, which he does not desire, except as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason leads the way and follows up these considerations, he advances rationally to those truths of which, without reason, he has no knowledge. And if, in this discussion, I use any argument which no greater authority adduces, I wish it to be received in this way: although, on the grounds that I shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as if necessarily, yet it is not, for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but merely that it can appear so for the time being.
Facile est igitur ut aliquis sic secum tacitus dicat: Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint, quorum tam multam diversitatem et sensibus corporeis experimur et ratione mentis discernimus: estne credendum esse unum aliquid, per quod unum sint bona quaecumque bona sunt, an sunt bona alil per aliud? Certissimum quidem et omnibus est volentibus advertere perspicuum quia, quaecumque dicuntur aliquid ita, ut ad invicem magis vel minus aut aequaliter dicantur: per aliquid dicuntur, quod non aliud et aliud sed idem intelligitur in diversis, sive in illis aequaliter sive inaequaliter consideretur. Nam quaecumque iusta dicuntur ad invicem sive pariter sive magis vel minus, non possum intelligi iusta nisi per iustitiam, quae non est aliud et aliud in diversis.	It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are goods so innumerable, whose great diversity we experience by the bodily senses, and discern by our mental faculties, must we not believe that there is some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good? Or are they good one through one thing and another through another? To be sure, it is most certain and clear, for all who are willing to see, that whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute in such a way that in mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or less, or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue of some fact, which is not understood to be one thing in one case and another in another, but to be the same in different cases, whether it is regarded as existing in these cases in equal or unequal degree. For, whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared one with another, whether equally, or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except through the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and another in another.
Ergo cum certum sit quod omnia bona, si ad invicem conferantur, aut aequaliter aut inacqualiter sint bona, necesse est, ut omnia sint per aliquid bona, quod intelligitur idem in diversis bonds, licet aliquando videantur bona dici alia per aliud.	Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, would prove either equally or unequally good, necessarily they are all good by virtue of something which is conceived of as the same in different goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another.
Per aliud enim videtur dici bonus equus quia fortis est, et per aliud bonus equus quia velox est. Cum enim dici videatur bonus per fortitudinem et bonus per velocitatem, non tamen idem videtur esse fortitudo et velocitas.	For, apparently it is by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, because he is strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because he is swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not appear to be the same thing.
Verum si equus, quia est fortis aut velox, idcirco bonus est: quomodo fortis et velox latro malus est? Potius igitur, quemadmodum fortis et velox latro ideo malus est quia noxius est, ita fortis et velox: equus idcirco bonus est quia utilis est. Et quidem nihil soles putari bonum nisi aut propter aliquam utilitatem, ut bona dicitur salus et quae saluti prosunt, aut propter quamlibet honestatem, sicut pulchritudo aestimatur bona et quae pulchritudinem iuvant.	But if a horse, because he is strong and swift, is therefore good, how is it that a strong, swift robber is bad? Rather, then, just as a strong, swift robber is bad, because he is harmful, so a strong, swift horse is good, because he is useful. And, indeed, nothing is ordinarily regarded as good, except either for some utility—as, for instance, safety is called good, and those things which promote safety—or for some honorable character—as, for instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes beauty.
Sed quondam iam perspecta ratio nullo /15/ potest dissolvi pacto, necesse est omne quoque utile vel honestum, si vere bona sunt, per idipsum esse bona, per quod necesse est esse cuncta bona, quidquid illud sit.	But, since the reasoning which we have observed is in no wise refutable, necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honorable, if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is.
Quis autem dubitet illud ipsum, per quod cuncta sunt bona, esse magnum bonum? lllud igitur est bonum per seipsum, quondam omne bonum est per ipsum.	But who can doubt this very being, through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must be, then, a good through itself, since every other good is through it.
Ergo consequitur, ut omnia alia bona sint per aliud quam quod ipsa sunt, et ipsum solum per seipsum. At nullum bonum, quod per aliud est, aequale aut maius est eo bono, quod per se est bonum. Illud itaque solum est summe bonum, quod solum est per se bonum. Id enim summum est, quod sic supereminet aliis, ut nec par habeas nec praestantius. Sed quod est summe bonum, est etiam summe magnum. Est igitur unum aliquid summe bonum et summe magnum, id est summum omnium quae sunt.	It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another being than that which they themselves are, and this being alone is good through itself. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone good through itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other beings, that it is neither equalled nor excelled. But that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing beings.
2. DE EADEM RE.	2. The same topic continued.
Quemadmodum autem inventum est aliquid esse summe bonum, qveniam cuncta bona per unum aliquid sunt bona, quod est bonum per seipsum: sic ex necessitate colligitur aliquid esse summe magnum, quondam quaecumque magna sunt, per unum aliquid magna sunt, quod magnum est per seipsum. Dico autem non magnum spatio, ut est corpus aliquod; sed quod quanto maius tanto melius est aut dignius, ut est sapientia. Et quondam non potest esse summe magnum nisi id quod est summe bonum, necesse est aliquid esse maximum et optimum, id est summum omnium quae sunt.	But, just as it has been proved that there is a being that is supremely good, since all goods are good through a single being, which is good through itself; so it is necessarily inferred that there is something supremely great, which is great through itself. But, I do not mean physically great, as a material object is great, but that which, the greater it is, is the better or the more worthy,—wisdom, for instance. And since there can be nothing supremely great except what is supremely good, there must be a being that is greatest and best, i. e., the highest of all existing beings.
3. QUOD SIT QUAEDAM NATURA, PER QUAM EST, QUIDQUID EST, ET QUAE PER SE EST, ET EST SUMMUM OMNIUM QUAE SUNT.	3. There is a Nature which exists through itself, which is the highest of all existing things, and through which exists whatever is.
Denique non solum omnia bona per idem aliquid sunt bona, et omnia magna per idem aliquid sunt magna sed quidquid est, per unum aliquid uidetur esse. Omne namque quod est, aut est per aliquid aut per nihil. Sed nihil est per nihil. Non enim vel cogitari potest, ut sit aliquid non per /16/ aliquid.	Therefore, not only are all good things such through something that is one and the same, and all great things such through something that is one and the same; but whatever is, apparently exists through something that is one and the same. For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist by virtue of something.
Quidquid est igitur, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est unum aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt. Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquid per quod sunt, aut eadem plura singula sunt per se, aut ipsa per se invicem sunt.	Whatever is, then, does not exist except through something. Since this is true, either there is one being, or there are more than one, through which all things that are exist. But if there are more than one, either these are themselves to be referred to some one being, through which they exist, or they exist separately, each through itself, or they exist mutually through one another.
At si plura ipsa sunt per unum, iam non sunt omnia per plura sed potius per illud unum, per quod haec plura sunt.	But, if these beings exist through one being, then all things do not exist through more than one, but rather through that one being through which these exist.
Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, utique est una aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se, quam habent, ut per se sint. Non est autem dubium quod per id ipsum unum sint, per quod habent, ut sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum unum cuncta sunt, quam per plura, quae sine eo uno esse non possum.	If, however, these exist separately, each through itself, there is, at any rate, some power or property of existing through self (existendi per se), by which they are able to exist each through itself. But, there can be no doubt that, in that case, they exist through this very power, which is one, and through which they are able to exist, each through itself. More truly, then, do all things exist through this very being, which is one, than through these, which are more than one, which, without this one, cannot exist.
Ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniam irrationabilis cogitatio est, ut aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse.	But that these beings exist mutually through one another, no reason can admit; since it is an irrational conception that anything should exist through a being on which it confers existence.
Nam nec ipsa relative sic sunt per invicem. Cum enim dominus et servus referantur ad invicem, et ipsi homines qui referuntur, omnino non sunt per invicem, et ipsae relationes quibus referuntur, non omnino sunt per invicem, quia eaedem sunt per subiecta.	For not even beings of a relative nature exist thus mutually, the one through the other. For, though the terms master and servant are used with mutual reference, and the men thus designated are mentioned as having mutual relations, yet they do not at all exist mutually, the one through the other, since these relations exist through the subjects to which they are referred.
Cum itaque veritas omnimodo excludat plura esse per quae cuncta sint, necesse est unum illud esse, per quod sunt cuncta quae sunt.	Therefore, since truth altogether excludes the supposition that there are more beings than one, through which all things exist, that being, through which all exist, must be one.
Quoniam ergo cuncta quae sunt, sunt per ipsum unum, proculdubio et ipsum unum est per seipsum. Quaecumque igitur alia sunt, sunt per aliud, et ipsum solum per seipsum. At quidquid est per aliud, minus est quam illud per quod cuncta sunt alia, et quod solum est per se. Quare illud quod est per se, maxime omnium est.	Since, then, all things that are exist through this one being, doubtless this one being exists through itself. Whatever things there are else then, exist through something other than themselves, and this alone through itself. But whatever exists through another is less than that, through which all things are, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that which exists through itself exists in the greatest degree of all things.
Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est. Quod autem maxime omnium est, et per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid est id necesse est esse summe bonum et summe magnum, et summum omnium quae sunt. Quare est aliquid, quod, sive essentia sive substantia sive natura dicatur, optimum et maximum est et summum omnium quae sunt.	There is, then, some one being which alone exists in the greatest and the highest degree of all. But that which is greatest of all, and through which exists whatever is good or great, and, in short, whatever has any existence—that must be supremely good, and supremely great, and the highest of all existing beings.
4. DE EADEM RE.	4. The same topic continued.
Amplius. Si quis intendat rerum naturas, velit nolit sentit non eas omnes contineri una dignitatis paritate sed quasdam earum distingui /17/ graduum imparitate. Qui enim dubitat quod in natura sua ligno melior sit equus, et equo praestantior homo, is profecto non est dicendus homo. Cum igitur naturarum aliae aliis negari non possint meliores, nihilominus persuadet ratio aliquam in eis sic supereminere, ut non habeas se superiorem. Si enim huiusmodi graduum distinctio sic est infinite, ut nullus ibi sit gradus superior quo superior alius non inveniatur, ad hoc ratio deducitur, ut ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo fine claudatur. Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi qui nimis est absurdus. Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua natura, quae sic est alicui vel aliquibus superior, ut nulla sit cui ordinetur inferior.	Furthermore, if one observes the nature of things he perceives, whether he will or no, that not all are embraced in a single degree of dignity; but that certain among them are distinguished by inequality of degree. For, he who doubts that the horse is superior in its nature to wood, and man more excellent than the horse, assuredly does not deserve the name of man. Therefore, although it cannot be denied that some natures are superior to others, nevertheless reason convinces us that some nature is so preeminent among these, that it has no superior. For, if the distinction of degrees is infinite, so that there is among them no degree, than which no higher can be found, our course of reasoning reaches this conclusion: that the multitude of natures themselves is not limited by any bounds. But only an absurdly foolish man can fail to regard such a conclusion as absurdly foolish. There is, then, necessarily some nature which is so superior to some nature or natures, that there is none in comparison with which it is ranked as inferior.
Haec vero natura quae talis est, aut sola est aut plures eiusmodi et aequales sunt.	Now, this nature which is such, either is single, or there are more natures than one of this sort, and they are of equal degree.
Verum si plures sunt et aequales: cum aequales esse non possint per diversa quaedam sed per idem aliquid, illud unum per quod aequaliter tam magnae sunt, aut est idipsum quod ipsae sunt, id est ipsa earum essentia, aut aliud quam quod ipsae sunt.	But, if they are more than one and equal, since they cannot be equal through any diverse causes, but only through some cause which is one and the same, that one cause, through which they are equally so great, either is itself what they are, that is, the very essence of these natures; or else it is another than what they are.
Sed si nihil est aliud quam ipsa earum essentia: sicut earum essentiae non sunt plures sed una, ita et naturae non sunt plures sed una. Idem namque naturam hic intelligo quod essentiam.	But if it is nothing else than their very essence itself, just as they have not more than one essence, but a single essence, so they have not more than one nature, but a single nature. For I here understand nature as identical with essence.
Si vero id, per quod plures ipsae naturae tam magnae sunt, aliud est quam quod ipsee sunt, pro certo minores sunt quam id, per quod magnae sunt. Quidquid enim per aliud est magnum, minus est quam id, per quod est magnum. Quare non sic sunt magnae, ut illis nihil sit maius aliud.	If, however, that through which these natures are so great is another than that which they are, then, certainly, they are less than that through which they are so great. For, whatever is great through something else is less than that through which it is great. Therefore, they are not so great that there is nothing else greater than they.
Quod si nec per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possibile est tales esse plures naturas quibus nihil sit preestantius, nullo modo possum esse naturae plures huiusmodi. Restat igitur unam et solam aliquam naturam esse, quae sic est aliis superior, ut nullo sit inferior. Sed quod tale est, maximum et optimum est omnium quae sunt. Est igitur quaedam natura, quae est summum omnium quae sunt. Hoc autem esse non potest, nisi ipsa sit per se id quod est, et cuncta quae sunt, sint per ipsam id quod sunt.	But if, neither through what they are nor through anything other than themselves, can there be more such natures than one, than which nothing else shall be more excellent, then in no wise can there be more than one nature of this kind. We conclude, then, that there is some nature which is one and single, and which is so superior to others that it is inferior to none. But that which is such is the greatest and best of all existing beings. Hence, there is a certain nature which is the highest of all existing beings. This, however, it cannot be, unless it is what it is through itself, and all existing beings are what they are through it.
Nam cum paulo ante ratio docuerit id quod per se est et per quod alia cuncta sunt, esse summum omnium existentium: aut e converso id quod est summum, est per se et cuncta alia per illud, aut Brunt plura summa. Sed plura summa non esse manifestum est. Quare est quaedam natura vel substantia vel essentia, quae per se est bona et magna, et per /18/ se est hoc quod est, et per quam est, quidquid vere aut bonum aut magnum aut aliquid est, et quae est summum bonum, summum magnum, summum ens sive subsistens, id est summum omnium quae sunt.	For since, as our reasoning showed us not long since, that which exists through itself, and through which all other things exist, is the highest of all existing beings; either conversely, that which is the highest exists through itself, and all others through it; or, there will be more than one supreme being. But it is manifest that there cannot be more than one supreme being. There is, therefore, a certain Nature, or Substance, or Essence, which is through itself good and great, and through itself is what it is; and through which exists whatever is truly good, or great, or has any existence at all; and which is the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being or subsisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing beings.

THE LOGIC MUSEUM 2011