| 78 (77). QUAE SIT VIVA ET QUAE MORTUA FIDES.
| 78. Which faith is alive and which is dead.
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| Quapropter, quantacumque certitudine credatur tanta res: inutilis erit fides et quasi mortuum aliquid, nisi dilectione valeat et vivat. Etenim nullatenus fidem illam quam competens comitatur dilectio, si se opportunitas conferat operandi, otiosam esse sed magna se quadam operum exercere frequentia, quod sine dilectione facere non posses, uel hoc solo probari potest, quia quod summam iustitiam diligit, nihil iustum contemnere, nihil valet iniustum admittere. Ergo quondam quod aliquid operatur, inesse sibi vitam sine qua operari non valeret ostendit: non absurde dicitur et operose fides vivere, quia habet uitam dilectionis sine qua non /85/ operaretur, et otiosa fides non vivere, quia caret vita dilectionis cum qua non otiaretur.
| Hence, with however great confidence so important a truth is believed, the faith will be useless and, as it were, dead, unless it is strong and living through love. For, that the faith which is accompanied by sufficient love is by no means idle, if an opportunity of operation offers, but rather exercises itself in an abundance of works, as it could not do without love, may be proved from this fact alone, that, since it loves the supreme Justice, it can scorn nothing that is just, it can approve nothing that is unjust. Therefore, seeing that the fact of its operation shows that life, without which it could not operate, is inherent in it; it is not absurd to say that operative faith is alive, because it has the life of love without which it could not operate; and that idle faith is not living, because it lacks that life of love, with which it would not be idle.
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| Quare si caecus dicitur non tantum qui perdidit visum sed qui cum debet habere non habet: cur non similiter potest dici "fides sine" dilectione "mortua", non quia vitam suam id est dilectionem perdiderit sed quia non habet, quam semper habere debet? Quemadmodum igitur illa "fides quae per dilectionem operatur", viva esse cognoscitur, ita illa quae per contemptum otiatur, mortua esse convincitur. Satis itaque convenienter dici potest viva fides credere in id in quod credi debet, mortua vero fides credere tantum id quod credi debet.
| Hence, if not only he who has lost his sight is called blind, but also he who ought to have sight and has it not, why cannot, in like manner, faith without love be called dead; not because it has lost its life, that is, love; but because it has not the life which it ought always to have? As that faith, then, which operates through love is recognised as living, so that which is idle, through contempt, is proved to be dead. It may, therefore, be said with sufficient fitness that living faith believes in that in which we ought to believe; while dead faith merely believes that which ought to be believed.
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| 79 (78). QUID TRES SUMMA ESSENTIA QUODAMMODO DICI POSSIT.
| 79. What three the Supreme Being can in some respect be said to be.
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| Ecce patet omni homini expedire, ut credat in quandam ineffabilem trinam unitatem et unam trinitatem. Unam quidem et unitatem propter unam essentiam, trinam vero et trinitatem propter tres nescio quid. Licet enim possim dicere trinitatem propter patrem et filium et utriusque spiritum qui sunt tres: non tamen possum proferre uno nomine propter quid tres, velut si dicerem propter tres personas, sicut dicerem unitatem propter unam substantiam.
| And so it is evidently expedient for every man to believe in a certain ineffable trinal unity, and in one Trinity; one and a unity because of its one essence, but trinal and a trinity because of its three—what? For, although I can speak of a Trinity because of Father and Son and the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot, in one word, show why they are three; as if I should call this Being a Trinity because of its three persons, just as I would call it a unity because of its one substance.
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| Non enim putandae sunt tres personae, quia omnes plures personae sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias quot sunt personae; quod in pluribus hominibus, qui quot personae tot individuae substantiae sunt cognoscitur. Quare in summa essentia sicut non sunt plures substantia=, ita nec plures personae.
| For three persons are not to be supposed, because all persons which are more than one so subsist separately from one another, that there must be as many substances as there are persons, a fact that is recognised in the case of more men than one, when there are as many persons as there are individual substances. Hence, in the supreme Being, just as there are not more substances than one, so there are not more persons than one.
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| Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui: quid tres dicet esse patrem et /86/ filium et utriusque spiritum, nisi forte indigentia nominis proprie convenientis coactus, elegerit aliquod de illis nominibus quae pluraliter in summa essentia dici non possunt, ad significandum id quod congruo nomine dici non potest; ut si dicat illam admirabilem trinitatem esse unam essentiam vel naturam et tres personas sive substantias?
| So, if one wishes to express to any why they are three, he will say that they are Father and Son and the Spirit of both, unless perchance, compelled by the lack of a precisely appropriate term, he shall choose some one of those terms which cannot be applied in a plural sense to the supreme Being, in order to indicate what cannot be expressed in any fitting language; as if he should say, for instance, that this wonderful Trinity is one essence or nature, and three persons or substances.
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| Nam haec duo nomina aptius eliguntur ad significandam pluralitatem in summa essentia, quia persona non dicitur nisi de individua rationali natura, et substantia principaliter dicitur de individuis quae maxime in pluralitate consistunt. Individua namque maxime substant id est subiacent accidentibus, et ideo magis proprie substantiae nomen suscipiunt. Unde iam supra manifestum est summam essentiam quae nullis subiacet accidentibus proprie non posse dici substantiam, nisi substantia ponatur pro essentia. Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiliter illa summa et una trinitas sive trina unitas dici una essentia et tres personae sive tres substantiae.
| For these two terms are more appropriately chosen to describe plurality in the supreme Being, because the word person is applied only to an individual, rational nature; and the word substance is ordinarily applied to individual beings, which especially subsist in plurality. For individual beings are especially exposed to, that is, are subject to, accidents, and for this reason they more properly receive the name substance. Now, it is already manifest that the supreme Being, which is subject to no accidents, cannot properly be called a substance, except as the word substance is used in the same sense with the word Essence. Hence, on this ground, namely, of necessity, that supreme and one Trinity or trinal unity may justly be called one Essence and three Persons or three Substances.
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| 80. QUOD IPSA DOMINETUR OMNIBUS ET REGAT OMNIA ET SIT SOLUS DEUS.
| 80. The Supreme Being exercises dominion over all things and rules all things and is the only God.
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| Videtur ergo, immo incunctanter asseritur, quia nec nihil est id quod dicitur deus, et huic soli summae essentiae proprie nomen dei assignatur. Quippe omnis qui deum esse dicit, sive unum sive plures, non intelligit nisi aliquam substantiam, quam censet supra omnem naturam quae deus non est, ab hominibus et venerandam propter eius eminentem dignitatem et exorandam contra sibi quamlibet imminentem necessitatem.
| It appears, then—nay, it is unhesitatingly declared that what is called God is not nothing; and that to this supreme Essence the name God is properly given. For every one who says that a God exists, whether one or more than one, conceives of him only as of some substance which he believes to be above every nature that is not God, and that he is to be worshipped of men because of his preeminent majesty, and to be appeased for man’s own sake because of some imminent necessity.
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| Quid autem tam pro sua dignitate venerandum et pro qualibet re deprecandum, quam summe bonus et summe potens spiritus, qui dominatur omnibus et regit /87/ omnia? Sicut enim constat quia omnia per summe bonam summeque sapientem omnipotentiam eius facta sunt et vigent: ita nimis inconveniens est, si aestimetur quod rebus a se factis ipse non dominetur, sive quod factae ab illo ab alio minus potente minusue bono vel sapiente, aut nulla penitus ratione sed sola casoum inordinate volubilitate regantur; cum ille solus sit, per quem cuilibet et sine quo nulli bene est et ex quo et per quem et in quo sunt omnia.
| But what should be so worshipped in accordance with its majesty, and what should be so appeased in behalf of any object, as the supremely good and supremely powerful Spirit, who is Lord of all and who rules all? For, as it is established that through the supreme Good and its supremely wise omnipotence all things were created and live, it is most inconsistent to suppose that the Spirit himself does not rule the beings created by him, or that beings are governed by another less powerful or less good, or by no reason at all, but by the confused flow of events alone. For it is he alone through whom it is well with every creature, and without whom it is well with none, and from whom, and through whom, and in whom, are all things.
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| Cum igitur solus ipse sit non solum bonus creator sed et potentissimus dominus et sapientissimus rector omnium: liquidissimum est hunc solum esse, quem omnis alia natura secundum totum snum posse debet diligendo venerari et venerando diligere, de quo solo prospera sunt speranda, ad quem solum ab adversis fugiendum, cui soli pro quavis re supplicandum. Vere igitur hic est non solum deus sed solus deus ineffabiliter trinus et unus.
| Therefore, since he himself alone is not only the beneficent Creator, but the most powerful lord, and most wise ruler of all; it is clear that it is he alone whom every other nature, according to its whole ability, ought to worship in love, and to love in worship; from whom all happiness is to be hoped for; with whom refuge from adversity is to be sought; to whom supplication for all things is to be offered. Truly, therefore, he is not only God, but the only God, ineffably Three and One.
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