Here is the Latin text of Boethius' work on the Trinity scanned from the Loeb edition, with a 2004 English translation by Erik Kenyon. Please note the copyright notice on the translation. The document "may be copied and circulated freely, in printed or digital form, provided only that this notice of copyright is included on all pages copied."
I will add notes one day.
Edward Buckner
London September 2010
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII: DE TRINITATE | Boethius On the Holy Trinity Translated by Erik C. Kenyon Boethius to his Lord and Father Symmachus |
| SCANNED FROM: text given in the Loeb edition. | Copyright © 2004 by Erik C. Kenyon, All rights reserved. This document may be copied and circulated freely, in printed or digital form, provided only that this notice of copyright is included on all pages copied. |
| PROLOGUS | PROLOGUE |
| Investigatam diutissime quaestionem, quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux divina dignata est, formatam rationibus litterisque mandatam offerendam vobis communicandamque curavi tam vestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri studiosus inventi. Qua in re quid mihi sit animi quotiens stilo cogitata commendo, tum ex ipsa materiae difficultate tum ex eo quod raris id est vobis tantum conloquor, intelligi potest. Neque enim famae iactatione et inanibus uulgi clamoribus excitamur; sed si quis est fructus exterior, hic non potest aliam nisi materiae similem sperare sententiam. Quocumque igitur a vobis deieci oculos, partim ignava segnities partim callidus livor occurrit, ut contumeliam videatur divinis tractatibus inrogare qui talibus hominum monstris non agnoscenda haec potius quam proculcanda proiecerit. | I was eager to offer and communicate to you this long pondered question, shaped by arguments and set down in writing -as much as divine light has deemed my mind's flicker worthy to the task- since I am as much desirous of your judgment as I am excited about our discovery. I commend my reflections to wilting whenever I communicate what is in my mind on this topic, both because of the difficulty of the subject itself and for the fact that it can be understood by few people, namely you alone. For we are not excited by the boast of fame and the empty flatteries of the mob. but if there <166.10> is any external reward, it can only hope to be a judgment akin to the subject. Wherever I cast my eyes down from the sight of you, there appears here base sloth and clever envy there, so that one seems to bring scorn upon theological writings, if he casts them before such remarkable specimens of humanity to be trampled rather than understood. |
| Idcirco stilum brevitate contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinis nouorum verborum significationibus velo, ut haec mihi tantum vobisque, si quando ad ea convertitis oculos, conloquantur; caeteros vero ita submovimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiverint ad ea etiam legenda videantur indigni. Sane tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae rationis intuitus ad divinitatis valet celsa conscendere. Nam caeteris quoque artibus idem quasi quidam finis est constitutus, quousque potest via rationis accedere. Neque enim medicina aegris semper affert salutem; sed nulla erit culpa medentis, si nihil eorum quae fieri oportebat omiserit. Idemque in caeteris. At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est. tam facilior esse debet ad veniam. Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est. an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos venientia fructus extulerint. Ac de proposita quaestione hinc sumamus initium. | Therefore I rein in my pen with brevity, and I veil in significations of new words thing drawn from my private studies of Philosophy, so that they speak only to me and to you, if you should ever turn your eyes to them, that is; and I have thus <166.20> driven others away, as much as they not only have been unable to grasp these matters intellectually but also seem unworthy even of reading them. To be sure, it is right for us to investigate as far as the gaze of human reason has the strength to ascend the high places of divinity. For there is a single boundary, so to speak, set for other arts, up to which the way of reason can proceed. For Medicine does not always bring health to the sick, but there will be no blame for the doctor who omits none of those things which ought to have been done, and the same holds for other arts. But seeing how the present inquiry is even more difficult, pardon ought to be given all the more freely. But it is for you <167.30> to investigate whether the seeds of arguments, coming to me from the writings of blessed Augustine, have yielded up any fruit. Let us then make a beginning on the question proposed. |
| [01] | I |
| Christianae religionis reverentiam plures usurpant sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter universalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanavit, catholica vel universalis vocatur. Cuius haec de trinitatis unitate sententia est: "Pater," inquiunt, "deus filius deus spiritus sanctus deus." Igitur pater filius spiritus sanctus unus non tres dii. Cuius coniunctionis ratio est indifferentia. Eos enim differentia comitatur qui vel augent vel minuunt, ut Arriani qui gradibus meritorum trinitatem variantes distrahunt atque in pluralitatem diducunt. Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est; praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intellegi potest. Trium namque rerum vel quotlibet tum genere tum specie tum numero diversitas constat; quotiens enim idem dicitur, totiens diversum etiam praedicatur. Idem vero dicitur tribus modis: | Many usurp the dignity of the Christian religion, but this faith alone flourishes best which is called catholic and universal, both because of the maxims of its universal principals, by which the authority of the same religion is understood, and because its cultivation has spread through nearly all the ends of the earth. This is its statement on <167.40> the unity of the Trinity: "Father," they say, "is God; Son is God: Holy Ghost is God." Therefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one, not three Gods. The explanatory cause of this conjunction is lack of difference. For difference attends people who augment or diminish, e.g. the Anans who by varying the Trinity by degrees of merit pull it apart and scatter it into plurality. For otherness is the source of plurality, since without otherness the essence of plurality cannot be understood. And the diversity of three or however many things consists in either genus, species or number; for <167.50> as many times as 'same' is said, 'diverse' is also predicated. But same is said in three ways: |
| 1. aut genere ut idem homo quod equus, quia his idem genus ut animal; | 1. In respect to genus, e.g. man and horse are the same, because their genus, animal, is the same; |
| 2. vel specie ut idem Cato quod Cicero, quia eadem species ut homo; | 2. In respect to species, e.g. Cato and Cicero are the same, because their species, human, is the same; |
| 3. vel numero ut Tullius et Cicero, quia unus est numero. | 3. In respect to number, e.g. Tullius is the same as Cicero, because he is one in number. [2] |
| Quare diversum etiam vel genere vel specie vel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere neque specie sed suis accidentibus distant; nam vel si animo cuncta ab his accidentia separemus, tamen locus cunctis diversus est quem unum fingere nullo modo possumus; duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt. | Thus 'different' is said in respect to either genus, species or number. But it is variety among accidents that produces difference in respect to number. For three men differ neither in genus nor species, but in their accidents: for even if we mentally separate all accidents from them, there is still a different <168.60> location for each and all of them, which we can in no way imagine to be one: for two bodies will not occupy one location; and location is an accident. Therefore these three men are many in respect to number, since they become many by their accidents. |
| [02] | II |
| Age igitur ingrediamur et unumquodque ut intellegi atque capi potest dispiciamus; nam, sicut optime dictum videtur, eruditi est hominis unumquodque ut ipsum est ita de eo fidem capere temptare. | Come then, let us begin and investigate each point as it can be understood and grasped: for, as it seems wonderfully stated, it is the mark of an educated person to attempt to grasp each thing as it is, and thus to hold a belief about it. |
| Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, | There are three speculative divisions: |
| 1. naturalis, in motu inabstracta 'anupexairetos' (considerat enim corporum formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae corpora in motu sunt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta), | 1. Physics deals with that which is in motion and not abstract anupexairetos (for it handles the forms <168.70> of bodies involving matter, which forms are not able to be actuality separated from bodies; and these bodies are in motion, for when earth is carried downward and fire up, the form joined with matter has motion as well); |
| 2. mathematica, sine motu inabstracta (haec enim formas corporum speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sine motu, quae formae cum in materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), | 2. Mathematics deals with that which is not in motion and not abstract (for this ponders forms of bodies without matter, and thus without motion; but these forms, since they are in matter, cannot [actually] be separated from bodies); |
| 3. theologica, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam dei substantia et materia et motu caret), | 3. Theology deals with the abstract, which lacks motion and is separable (for the substance of God lacks both matter and motion). |
| in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinaliter, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginationes sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. | It is fitting to engage in Physics rationally, in Mathematics in a disciplined manner, and in divine matters <169.80> intellectually; it is also fitting not to be drawn aside towards images, but rather to contemplate that form which is truly form and not image, and which is being itself as well as that from which being is. |
| Omne namque esse ex forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia sed secundum formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non secundum terram quod est eius materia sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram. Terra quoque ipsa non secundum 'apoion hulen' dicitur sed secundum siccitatem gravitatemque quae sunt formae. | For every being is from form. And a statue is not called an effigy of an animal according to bronze, which is its matter- but according to the form which has been impressed into the bronze; further, the bronze itself is called 'bronze’ not according to the earth which is its matter, but according to the figure of bronze. And the earth itself is so called not apoion hulen [according to its formless matter], but according to dryness and heaviness, which are its forms. |
| Nihil igitur secundum materiam esse dicitur sed secundum propriam formam. Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est. id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae sed non hoc vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est. non vel corpus vel anima in partem; igitur non est id quod est. Quod vero non est ex hoc atque hoc sed tantum est hoc, illud vere est id quod est; ct est pulcherrimum fortissimumque quia nullo nititur. Quocirca hoc vere unum in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeterquam id quod est. Neque cnim subiectum fieri potest; forma enim est. formae vero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod caeterae formae subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo quod ipsa est. sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim materia subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere videtur humanitas. | Therefore nothing is said to be <170.90> according to its matter, but according to its peculiar form. But divine substance is form without matter, and it is therefore one, and it is what it is: but other things are not what they are. For every single thing has its particular being from those things from which it is. i.e. from its conjoined parts; it is one thing and another, i.e. the parts of its own composition, but it is not either one thing or the other simply, e.g. when an earthly man consists of soul and body, he is a body and a soul, not a body or a soul in part: therefore he is not what he is. <170.100> But that which is not from one thing and another, but is entirely one, such a thing truly is what it is: and it is most beautiful and strong, for it depends on nothing. Therefore this thing is truly one, in which there is no number and nothing in itself other than that which it is. And it cannot become a subject, for it is form, and forms cannot be subjects. Now other forms are subjects to accidents, e.g. humanity, which does not admit of accidents in virtue of that which it is, but because there is matter subjected to it; for when matter that is subject to humanity acquires any accident <170.110> humanity itself seems to be accepting this accident. |
| Forma vero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec vero inesse materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae venerunt quae sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt. Nam caeteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas vocantes, dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in materia constitutae. Nulla igitur in eo diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo atque idcirco nec numerus. | Yet form which is without matter cannot be a subject, and it cannot be in matter either: for [in such a case] it would not be a form, but an image. For from these forms which are outside of matter have come those forms which are in matter and which produce a body. And we are sloppy when we call those in bodies 'forms’ when they are really images: for images take on the appearance of these forms which are not established in matter. In conclusion, there is no diversity in such a case [as God], no plurality from diversity, no multitude arising from accidents and therefore no <171.120 > number. |
| [03] | III |
| Deus vero a deo nullo differt, ne vel accidentibus vel substantialibus differentiis in subiecto positis distent. Ubi vero nulla est differentia, nulla est omnina pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam quod tertio repetitur deus, cum pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae sunt, si advertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum. Illic enim unitatum repetitio numerum facit. | But God differs from no God, neither are [Gods] separate in accidents or in substantial differences which have been posited in a subject. But where there is no difference, there is no plurality at all therefore no [plural] number, and thus unity alone. For even though 'God' is thrice repeated when Father, Son and Holy Ghost are named, the three unities do not produce a plurality of number in respect to that which they truly are, if we turn to countable things and not to the number itself. For in the latter case, the repetition of unities produces a plural number. |
| In eo autem numero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat, repetitio unitatum atque pluralitas minime facit numerabilium rerum numerosam diversitatem. Numerus enim duplex est. unus quidem quo numeramus, alter vero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat. Etenim unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus. Duo rursus in rebus sunt ut homines vel lapides; dualitas nihil sed tantum dualitas qua duo homines vel duo lapides fiunt. | But in <171.130> the number which corresponds to countable things, the repetition of unities and the resultant plurality in no way produce a numerical diversity of countable things. For number is of two varieties: the one by which we count, the other which corresponds to countable things. Moreover a thing is one, but unity is that by which we call a thing one. Again there are two in the realm of things, e.g. men and stones; but duality is nothing but that by which there are two men or two stones. |
| Et in caeteris eodem modo. Ergo in numero quo numeramus repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum vero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio, vel si de eodem dicam "gladius unus mucro unus ensis unus." Potest enim unus tot vocabulis gladius agnosci; haec enim unitatum iteratio potius est non numeratio, velut si ita dicamus "ensis mucro gladius," repetitio quaedam est eiusdem non numeratio diversorum, velut si dicam "sol sol sol," non tres soles effecerim sed de uno totiens praedicaverim. | And the same hold for other numbers. When it comes to the number by which we count, therefore, the repetition of unities produces plurality; but when it comes to the number of things, <172.140> the repetition of unities does not produce plurality. For instance, if I were to say concerning the same thing, 'one sword, one blade, one brand.' - since one sword can be known by so many terms- this is an iteration of unities, not an enumeration. For instance, if we were to say. 'brand, blade, sword.' this is, so to speak, a repetition of the same thing, not an enumeration of different things. Or if I were to say, 'sun, sun, sun’ I would not have produced three suns, but I would have predicated of one sun so many times. |
| Non igitur si de patre ac filio et spiritu sancto tertio praedicatur deus, ideirco trina praedicatio numerum facit. Hoc enim illis ut dictum est. imminet qui inter eos distantiam faciunt meritorum. Catholicis vero nihil in differentia constituentibus ipsamque formam ut est esse ponentibus neque aliud esse quam est ipsum quod est opinantibus recte repetitio de eodem quam enumeratio diversi videtur esse cum dicitur "deus pater deus filius deus spiritus sanctus atque haec trinitas unus deus," velut "ensis atque mucro unus gladius," velut "sol sol sol unus sol." | Therefore, if 'God’ is predicated thrice of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, it does not follow that this triple predication produces a plural number. <172.150> For, as has been said, this is a threat to those who impose distance between these [three] according to their merits, but for Catholics, who [a] assign nothing in the way of difference, [b] consider the form itself to be as it is and [c] hold the opinion that His essence is not any other, it rightly seems to be a repetition of the same thing, rather than an enumeration of different things. wrhen it is said. "God the Father, God the Son. God the Holy Ghost and this Trinity are one God," just as "blade and brand are one sword." or "sun, sun and sun are one sun." |
| Sed hoc interim ad eam dictum sit significationem demonstrationemque qua ostenditur non omnem unitatum repetitionem numerum pluralitatemque perficere. Non vero ita dicitur " pater ac filius et spiritus sanctus" quasi multivocum quiddam; nam mucro et ensis et ipse est et idem, pater vero ac filius et spiritus sanctus idem equidem est, non vero ipse. In qua re paulisper considerandum est. Requirentibus enim: "Ipse est pater qui filius?" "Minime," inquiunt. Rursus: "Idem alter qui alter?" Negatur. Non est igitur inter eos in re omni indifferentia; quare subintrat numerus quem ex subiectorum diversitate confici superius explanatum est. De qua re breviter considerabimus, si prius illud, quemadmodum de deo unumquodque praedicatur, praemiserimus. | But for now, let what has been said be a signification and <172.160> a demonstration. by which it is shown that not every repetition of unities produces number and plurality. But it does not follow that "Father, Son and Holy Ghost" is said as though of some synonymous thing; for blade and bland are identical and the same, but Father, Son and Holy Ghost are indeed the same, but not identical. This matter will be looked into shortly. For to those asking, "is the Father identical to the Son?" they (i.e. Catholics) say, "not at all." Again, to the question, "is the one the same as the other?" the answer is no. For there is not lack of difference amongst them in every respect, and thus number slipped in, which was brought about by <173.170> diversity of subjects, as was explained above. About this point we shall make a brief consideration, once we have said how each and every thing is predicated of God. |
| [04] | IV |
| Decem omnino praedicamenta traduntur quae de rebus omnibus universaliter praedicantur, id est substantia, qualitas, quantitas, ad aliquid, ubi, quando, habere, situm esse, facere, pati. Haec igitur talia sunt qualia subiecta permiserint; nam pars eorum in reliquarum rerum praedicatione substantia est. pars in accidentium numero est. | There are in all ten traditional categories, which are universally predicated of all things: substance, quality, quantity, relation, location, time, condition, situation, active and passive. And these are such as their subjects will permit; for part of them refer to predicates in reference to the substance of other things, and part of them refer to <173.180> a number of accidents. |
| At haec cum quis in divinam verterit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur quae praedicari possunt. Ad aliquid vero omnino non potest praedicari, nam substantia in illo non est vere substantia sed ultra substantiam; item qualitas et caetera quae venire queunt. Quorum ut amplior fiat intellectus exempla subdenda sunt. | But when one applies these to divine predication, everything that can be predicated is changed. Relation is not at all able to be predicated, for the substance in question is not a true substance, but beyond substance; the same holds for quality and all the rest which can arise. That our understanding may be greater, examples are given as follows. |
| Nam cum dicimus "deus," substantiam quidem significare videmur sed eam quae sit ultra substantiam; cum vero "iustus," qualitatem quidem sed non accidentem sed eam quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam. Neque enim aliud est quod est. aliud est quod iustus est sed idem est esse deo quod iusto. Item cum dicitur "magnus vel maximus," quantitatem quidem significare videmur sed eam quae sit ipsa substantia, talis qualem esse diximus ultra substantiam; idem est enim esse deo quod magno. De forma enim eius superius monstratum est quoniam is sit forma et unum vere nec ulla pluralitas. | For when we say 'God' we indeed seem to signify a substance, but the sort that is beyond substance: yet when we say 'just' we indeed signify a quality: not an accident, <174.190> but rather a quality which is a substance, again of the beyond substance sort. For 'to be' is not one thing and 'to be just' something else, but indeed for God to be and to be just are the same. Likewise, when he is called ‘great' or 'best' we seem to signify a quantity, one that is the same as a substance, of the sort we said was beyond substance; for to be God is the same as to be great. And concerning his form, it was demonstrated above how he is form and truly one and no plurality at all. |
| Sed haec praedicamenta talia sunt, ut in quo sint ipsum esse faciant quod dicitur, divise quidem in caeteris, in deo vero coniuncte atque copulate hoc modo: nam cum dicimus "substantia" (ut homo vel deus), ita dicitur quasi illud de quo praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia homo vel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non integre ipsum homo est ac per hoc nec substantia; quod enim est. aliis debet quae non sunt homo. Deus vero hoc ipsum deus est nihil enim aliud est nisi quod est, ac per hoc ipsum deus est. Rursus "iustus," quod est qualitas, ita dicitur quasi ipse hoc sit de quo praedicatur, id est si dicamus "homo iustus vel deus iustus," ipsum hominem vel deum iustos esse proponimus; sed differt, quod homo alter alter iustus, deus vero idem ipsum est quod est iustum. "Magnus" etiam homo vel deus dicitur atque ita quasi ipse sit homo magnus vel deus magnus; sed homo tantum magnus, deus vero ipsum magnus exsistit. | But these categories are such that they make whatever they are in to be the same as that which they signify', in a diverse way for most things, <174.200> but for God in this linked and joined way: for when we say 'substance’, e.g. man or God. it [substance] is said as though that of which it is predicated is itself a substance, e.g. the substance man or the substance God. But there is a difference, for a man is not simply and entirely man, and because of this, man is not [simply and entirely] a substance either; for he owes that which he is to things other than man. But God is the same in this way [simply and entirely], for he is nothing other than what he is, and thus he is simply God. Again 'just’, which is a quality, is thus said as though it were the very thing of which it is predicated, i.e. if we say, ‘a man is just', or <174.210> ‘God is just’, we declare a particular man or God to be just: but there is a difference, since a man and a just man are two things, but God is the same as that which is just. And again 'great’ is said of man or God, as if a particular man were himself great or if God were great: but man is merely great, whereas God exists as greatness itself. |
| Reliqua vero neque de deo neque de caeteris praedicantur. Nam ubi vel de homine vel de deo praedicari potest, de homine ut in foro, de deo ut ubique sed ita ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur de qua dicitur. Non enim ita homo dicitur esse in foro quemadmodum esse albus vel longus nec quasi circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua qua designari secundum se possit sed tantum quo sit illud aliis informatum rebus per hanc praedicationem ostenditur. | But the remaining categories are predicated neither of God nor of other things [in reference to substance]. For location can be predicated of either man or God: of a man, such as 'in the forum:' of God, such as 'everywhere’ but such that the thing spoken of is not the same as that which <175.220> is predicated of it. For man is not thus said to be in the forum in the way that he is said to be white or tall, nor is he encompassed and determined by some property by which he can be designated according to himself, but all that is pointed out by this predicate is that a thing has been described by other circumstances. |
| De deo vero non ita, nam quod ubique est ita dici videtur non quod in omni sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed quod omnis ei locus adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco. | But it is not so concerning God, for it seems to be said that he is everywhere, not because he is in every place (for he is unable to be in a place at all) but because every place is present to him insofar as it holds him, although he himself is not contained in any place: and therefore he is said to be nowhere in a place, for he is everywhere but not <175.230> in any place. |
| "Quando" vero eodem praedicatur modo, ut de homine heri venit, de deo semper est. Hic quoque non quasi esse aliquid dicitur illud ipsum de quo hesternus dicitur adventus sed quid ei secundum tempus accesserit praedicatur. Quod vero de deo dicitur "semper est," unum quidem significat, quasi omni praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit. Quod de caelo et de caeteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum philosophos dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam "semper" praesentis est in eo temporis tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens, quod est nunc, interest ac divinarum, quod nostrum "nunc" quasi currens tempus facit et sempiternitatem, divinum vero "nunc "permanens neque movens sese atque consistens aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias" semper," facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc perpetuum cursum quod est sempiternitas. | Time is predicated in the same way, as concerning man, ‘yesterday he came' or concerning God, ‘He always is’. And he, whose yesterday arrival was mentioned, is said to be such, not as though this amounted to something, but merely that which has befallen him in respect to time is predicated. But the fact that it is said of God. ‘He always is’, indeed signifies one thing, as if for all the past. "He was," in every present, -whatever that means- "He is,' and for every future time, "He will be." But that which according to Philosophers can be said of Heaven and other immortal bodies cannot be said of <176.240> God in the same way. For he always is, since 'always' belongs to the present in a point of time, and there is so great a difference between the present of our affairs, which is now, and the present of divine affairs, because our 'now,’ as though running time, produces a sempiternity, but the divine 'now’, being quite fixed, not moving itself and enduring, produces eternity; and if you were to attach 'always' to this name, you would make the course of our now into something continual and untiring and therefore perpetual, i.e. 'sempiternity.' |
| Rursus habere vel facere eodem modo; dicimus enim "uestitus currit" de homine, de deo "cuncta possidens regit." Rursus de eo nihil quod est esse de utrisque dictum est. sed haec omnis praedicatio exterioribus datur omniaque haec quodam modo referuntur ad aliud. Cuius praedicationis differentiam sic facilius internoscimus: qui homo est vel deus refertur ad substantiam qua est aliquid, id est homo vel deus; qui iustus est refertur ad qualitatem qua scilicet est aliquid, id est iustus, qui magnus ad quantitatem qua est aliquid, id est magnus. Nam in caeteris praedicationibus nihil tale est. Qui enim dicit esse aliquem in foro vel ubique, refert quidem ad praedicamentum quod est ubi sed non quo aliquid est velut iustitia iustus. Item cum dico "currit" vel "regit" vel "nunc est" vel "semper est," refertur quidem vel ad facere vel ad tempus -- si tamen interim divinum illud semper tempus dici potest -- sed non quo aliquo aliquid est velut magnitudine magnum. Nam situm passionemque requiri in deo non oportet, neque enim sunt. | Again, situation or action is handled in the same way; for we say of a man, <176.250> "garbed he runs," but of God, "holding all things, he rules.' Again in this case, nothing is said to be what either man or God is, but this predicate is given entirely to external things, which are in some way referred to something else. We more easily distinguish the difference of this predicate thus: a man or God is referred to in respect to substance, by which he is something, i.e. man or God; a just man is referred to in respect to a quality, by which he is evidently something, i.e. just; a great man in respect to quantity, by which he is something, i.e. great. But in other categories there is no such thing. <176.260> For when one says that someone is in the forum or everywhere, he refers to the category location, but not to that by which someone is something, as a man is just by justice. Likewise when I say that he runs, or he rules, or he is now, or he always is, the man in question is of course referred to in respect to action or time (but not in the way by which a thing is something, such as a great thing by greatness) unless of course this divine 'always' sometimes can be called time. And finally, situation and passivity are not to be looked for in God, for they are not present. |
| Iamne patet quae sit differentia praedicationum? Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant aliae vero quasi circumstantias rei; quodque illa quae ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant, illa vero ut non esse sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo affigant. Illa igitur, | Is it now clear what the difference is between categories? <177.270> Some point out what we might call the thing itself, while others show the circumstances of the thing; the former are predicated to show that the thing is something, the latter do not make that point, but rather apply in some way to something external. Therefore... |
| quae aliquid esse designant, secundum rem praedicationes vocentur. | 1. Let predicates which show that a thing is something be called Predicates in respect to the thing itself. |
| Quae cum de rebus subiectis dicuntur, vocantur accidentia secundum rem; | 2. Let predicates that are said of subjected things be called, Accidents in respect to the thing itself |
| cum vero de deo qui subiectus non est, secundum substantiam rei praedicatio nuncupatur. | 3. But let that which is said of God, who is no subject, be called A predicate in respect to the substance of the thing itself [3] |
| [05] | V |
| Age nunc de relativis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non videntur secundum se facere praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno adventu constare perspiciuntur. | Come now, let us look into relatives, for the sake of which we took up discussion of everything <177.280> that has been said: for those things that are clearly observed as existing from another's arrival least of all seem to produce predication according to themselves. |
| Age enim, quoniam dominus ac servus relativa sunt, videamus utrumne ita sit ut secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas servum, abstuleris et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque album sed interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum album. At in domino, si servum auferas, perit vocabulum quo dominus vocabatur; sed non accidit servus domino ut albedo albo sed potestas quaedam qua servus coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit servo, constat non eam per se domino accidere sed per servorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum. | Come then, as 'master' and 'slave' are relatives, let us see whether or not either stands as a predicate according to itself. If you should remove the slave, you will have removed the master as well: but it is not the same situation if you should remove whiteness that you will also remove the white thing, and the difference is that whiteness is accidental to the white thing, such that with whiteness removed, the white thing doubtless ceases as well, but in the case of the master, if you should remove the slave, the name by which the master is so called ceases, <178.290> yet the slave is not accidental to the master, as whiteness is to a white thing, [4] but there is a certain force by which the slave is coerced. Because this force is lost when the slave has been removed, it is clear that it is not in and of itself accidental to the master, but [it is accidental to the master] through an accident which is in some way external to the slaves. |
| Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relativam quidquam rei de qua dicitur secundum se vel addere vel minvere vel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est esse consistit sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere, nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter velut albus ac longus sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me est, minime vero ex sese. | Therefore it cannot be said that any relative predicate augments, diminishes or changes the thing itself of which it is said. This predicate as a whole is not grounded in that which it is for a thing to be. but [a relative predicate] holds itself in that which some how exists by comparison, not always relative to a different thing, but sometimes to <178.300> the same thing. Come, let someone stand. If I approach on his right he will be 'left' in comparison to me, not because he is himself left, but because I will have approached him on his right. Again, I approach on his left: he will likewise be to my right. not because he is 'right’ in himself, as something might be white or tall, but because he becomes right by my approaching, and that which he is by me or from me is in no wise from him himself. |
| Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare vel mutare queunt nullamque omnino variare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dicuntur nihilque aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio vero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur sed, si dici potest, quo quidem modo id quod vix intelligi potuit interpretatum est, personarum. Omnino enim magna regulae est veritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis quidem ei est productio filii, relativa vero praedicatio patris. | Therefore those things which do not produce a predicate in respect to a property of some thing, in that which it truly is, are able to alter or change nothing and can vary no <178.310> essence in any way. Thus if 'Father' and 'Son' are predicated in relation, and they differ in no respect but this relation alone, as was stated, and if this relation is predicated neither relative to that of which it is predicated, as though it were the same, nor according to the thing itself of which it is said, then this predicate does not produce a difference of things in that of which it is spoken, but indeed -if it can be said- it produces something that can scarcely be understood: a difference of persons. For there is wholly great truth to the rule that among incorporeal things distances are produced by differences, not by locations. Nor can it be said that anything is accidental to God, so that he becomes <179.320> the Father, for he never began to be the Father, but the production of the Son is by that which is indeed substantial to the Father, yet the predicate Father is a relative one. |
| Ac si meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam vero pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus vero nullas habet differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae vero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas. Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus repetitio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem. Trium igitur idonee constituta est unitas. | But if we are mindful of all the above statements about God, let us thus consider that God the Son certainly proceeds from God the Father and that God the Holy Ghost proceeds from both, and let us consider that these, since they are incorporeal, are in no way distant in respect to location. But since the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet God has no differences by which he differs from God, it results that God differs from none of them. But where differences are absent, plurality is absent, and where plurality is absent, unity is present. For nothing can <179.330> be born of God but God, and in numerable things, the repetition of unities, in all ways, does not create a plurality. Thus the unity of the three is properly established. |
| [06] | VI |
| Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, servata vero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia vel substantiae vel operationis vel omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. | Yet since no relative can be referred to itself, [5] seeing how a predicate that is referred to itself lacks relation, the plurality of the Trinity was made by the fact that this is predication of relation, but the unity was preserved in that there is no difference of substance, workings or any predicate which is said in respect to the thing itself. Thus substance holds together unity, <180.340> while relation brings number to the Trinity: therefore those things which are brought forth in isolation and separately are of relation. For the Father is not the same as the Son, nor is the Holy Ghost the same as either of them. Yet God is the same as the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. He is the same as justice, goodness, greatness and all the things which can be predicated of Him Himself. |
| Sane sciendum est non semper talem esse relativam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens praedicetur, ut est servus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inveniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas. Nos vero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet. | Of course one must understand that a relative predicate is not always the sort to be predicated relative to something different, as a slave to a master, since they differ. For every equal thing is equal to an equal thing, and every similar thing is similar to a similar thing, and every same thing is <180.350> the same as that which is the same; and in the Trinity there is a similarity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Ghost, just as there is a sameness of that which is the same to that as which it is the same. But if this phenomenon cannot be found in all other things, this is the result of the difference known from transitory things. But it is best to be drawn off track by no image, to be kept straight with a simple comprehension, and to proceed by intellect, as far as it befits the intellect to go. |
| Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc vestri normam iudicii exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime, vestrae statuet pronuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia divina idonea argumentorum adiumenta praestitimus, illuc perfecti operis laetitia remeabit unde venit effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequivit ascendere, quantum imbecillitas subtrahit vota supplebunt. | But enough has been said on the question posed. The precision of the question now awaits the T-square of your judgment; the authority of your pronouncement determines whether it has been gone over correctly or not. But if in accordance with <180.360> the most solid proposition of the fundament of our faith and with divine grace helping we display these fitting aids of arguments, may then the joy of this perfect work return to the place from which its completion came. But if it has been denied humanity to rise beyond itself, as much as ineptitude draws us down, my prayers will make good. |
Kenyon's notes
THE LOGIC MUSEUM
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