Burley: Question 4 on the Perihermenias

Burley: Question 4 on the Perihermenias (1301)

Index

4.01 Arguments that being and essence are not the same.

4.1 Arguments that being and essence are the same.

4.20 The opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius.

4.22 Against the opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius

4.26 The opinion of Thomas and Giles

4.27 Against the opinion of Thomas and Giles

4.30 Opinion of Henry of Ghent

4.33 Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent

4.36 Opinion holding that being and essence differ only the mode of signifying

4.37 Against this opinion

4.40 The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

4.50 Objections

4.601 Replies to the main arguments

This is (I think) the first translation into English of Walter Burley's 1301 work, Questions on the Perihermenias.

Life
Burley was born 1274/5, possibly in Burley-in-Wharfedale, Yorkshire. He was at Oxford some time between 1294 and 1309. He was probably a fellow student of Ockham, and probably heard Duns Scotus lecture. He spent seventeen years as a courtier in Britain and Avignon (1327-1344). He was a fairly prolific writer. There are about 50 works attributed to him. He died some time after 1344. I have something about Burley at the blog here. Apparently Burley was arrested in 1336 for chopping down a tree, about a year before his late commentary. We don't know if these events were connected.

Questions on the Perihermenias (1301)
There are five questions in the whole work (not included here).

Whether an utterance primarily signifies a thing or an affection. This was a standard question in works on the Perihermenias
The sophisma 'Only a father exists, therefore not only a father exists'
Whether an assertion is composed from utterances or from things or from concepts
Every phoenix exists: whether existential being is of the essence of a thing caused (translated here)
On the truth of 'Every phoenix exists'

Question 4 is translated here. The question consists of fourteen arguments that existence and essence are different. These are followed by Burley's exposition of the view of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius, who also thought existence and essence are different. Avicenna thought that 'being' and 'thing' signify different things in all languages, because otherwise otherwise ‘existing thing’ would be redundant.

In his Questions on the Perihermenias, probably written in the early 1290s, Scotus approvingly mentions some of the arguments mentioned here, such as Boethius' argument that in all things save God, that which exists is different from that by which it exists, and Averroes' argument that in a substantial transformation a thing loses its name and definition. However, Burley argues against their view.

Then Burley discusses and argues against the view of Thomas and Giles of Rome, who said that being is not the essence of a thing, but nonetheless proceeds from the essential principles of a thing of which it is the being.

Next, he considers three views holding that being and essence are the same. The first belongs to Henry of Ghent, who argues that essence is understood to 'share in being' by understanding ‘essence’ as something abstract, indifferent to being and non-being. The second, possibly held by Siger of Brabant, is that essence and being are the same and only differ in the mode of signifying. ‘Essence’ signifies a thing absolutely, and ‘being’ signifies a thing concerning its accidents. The third is the view of Godfrey of Fontaines, which Burley seems to agree with. He considers objections to this view, with replies.

He ends with replies to the fourteen main arguments.

Other commentaries
Burley wrote at least two other works on the Perihermenias. There is the so-called "Middle Commentary", in Gonville and Caius 448/409, ff. 32a-56b, St. Johns College 100, ff. 67ra-73rb amd British Museum, Royal 12 F XIX, ff. 14ra-23ra (also incomplete in the mutilated Cambridge ms. Gonville and Caius 139/79). It is so-called because its length is between the Quaestiones and the "late edition" of 1337, and because it is probably to be dated between the other two. The late edition of 1337 is more elaborate, representing Burley's late position.

Sources
The two manuscripts used by Brown are Gonville-Caius 645/668 ff. 60-76 (C) and Gonville-Caius 512/543 (G). The two texts are close, and G appears to be copied from C. Brown used C as the main text and noted significant variants of G, except where G was evidently correcting C. Brown says that at the top of Gonville-Caius 645/668 f.60r is written Quaestiones datae a Magistro Waltero de Burley super librum perihermeneias, anno domini m°ccc°p°, establishing the date as 1301. It may be Burley's earliest work, according to Ottman and Wood, p.6).

Notes on the translation
None of my translations in the Logic Museum have been through any sort of peer review process. Most of them have been through a single draft only - typically by typing in the English as I read the Latin. Use them with caution :)

References

Brown, Stephen, "Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermenias", Franciscan Studies 34 (1974) 200-295.
Brown, Stephen, "Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary onm Aristotle's Perihermenias", ch. 9. Translation clearing house, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma
Kretzmann, Norman, "Final Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione, ch. 9. Translation clearing house, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma
Wood, Rega and Ottman, Jennifer, "Walter Burley, His Life and Works", Vivarium 37 (1999).

Edward Buckner, London, March 2011

Latin	English
QUAESTIO QUARTA	Question 4
(4.01) Omnis phoenix est. Circa istud quaerantur duo: Primo an esse exsistere sit de essentia rei causatae. [261]	Every phoenix exists. Concerning this question four things are asked. First, whether existential being belongs to the essence of a thing caused.
[Quod esse et essentia non sunt idem]	[That being and essence are not the same]
(4.01) Videtur quod non: Per rationem Algazelis, I suae Metaphysicae, cap. 6) [N2]: Quaestio quid est et quaestio an est differunt: quaestio quid est quaerit de essentia et quaestio an est quaerit de esse. Si autem esse et essentia essent idem, quaestio quid est et quaestio an est non differunt.	(1) It seems not – by the reasoning of Al-Ghazali (in his Metaphysics chapter 6. The question of what something is and the question whether it exists are different. The question of what-something-is is about essence, and the question whether it exists is about being. But if being and existence were the same, the question of what something is and the question whether it exists would not be different.
(4.02) Et hoc confirmat ipse [N3] sic: Rationabiliter quaerit quid fecit nigredinem esse, sed non quaeritur rationabiliter quid fecit nigredinem esse nigredinem; et similiter: Bene quaeritur an nigredo sit sed non bene quaeritur an nigredo sit nigredo. Si tamen esse et essentia essent idem, [N4] una quaestio esset rationabilis sicut et alia.	And he confirms it as follows. It is reasonable to ask what makes blackness exist, but it is not reasonable to ask what makes blackness be blackness, and similarly it is valid to ask whether blackness exists, but not reasonable to ask whether blackness is blackness. But if being and essence were the same, one question would be as reasonable as the other.
(4.03) Istam rationem confirmo sic: A generante vel producente rem in esse non habet res quod sit idem quod est, ut a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes nec humanitas quod sit humanitas; sed a generante habet res quod sit in actu; igitur essentia rei et esse in actu differunt.	I confirm this reasoning as follows. From the one generating or producing a thing into being, the thing does not acquire its being the same as itself. For example, from the one who generates Socrates, Socrates does not acquire the fact that he is Socrates, nor that his humanity is his humanity. But from the one generating, a thing acquires its actual existence. Therefore the essence of a thing and its being in actuality are different.
(4.04) Praeterea, actio agentis terminatur ad aliquid absolutum, quia ad respectivum non terminatur actio; sed ad essentiam rei quantum ad id quod est non terminatur actio agentis, sed per actionem agentis efficitur res quod habet esse in actu; igitur esse in actu est aliquid absolutum differens ab essentia.	(2) Moreover, the action of an agent is terminated by something absolute, because action is not ended by something relative. But the action of an agent is not terminated by the essence of a thing in respect of that which it is. Rather, that the thing has being in actuality is brought about by the action of an agent. Therefore being in actuality is something absolute, different from essence.
(4.05) Praeterea, in omni transmutatione subiectum differt ab utroque terminorum; per hoc enim probat Philosophus, I Physicorum [N5], quod materia est alia a forma. Sed essentia aliquando est sub esse et aliquando est sub non-esse et transmutatur a non-esse in esse; igitur essentia non est eadem cum esse nec etiam cum non-esse.	(3) Moreover, in every transmutation the subject differs from both of the terms. From this, the Philosopher (I Physics) proves that material is different from form. But essence is sometimes subordinated to being, sometimes subordinated to non-being, and is transmutated from non-being into being; therefore essence is not the same as being, nor either with non-being.
(4.06) Praeterea, essentia de se nec est necesse esse nec impossibile esse, quia si de se esset necesse esse non posset non esse, et si de se esset impossibile esse non posset esse; igitur essentia de se est possibile esse et non-esse. Sed nihil exsistit per hoc quod de se est possibile esse et non-esse, et essentia exsistit per esse; igitur esse non est idem quod essentia.	(4) Moreover, essence of itself is neither a necessary being, nor an impossible being. For if it were a necessary being, it could not possibly not be, and if of itself it were an impossible being, it could not possibly be. Therefore essence of itself is a possible being or possible non-being. But nothing exists because it is of itself a possible being or possible non-being, and essence exists through being. Therefore being is not the same as essence.
(4.07) Praeterea, si esse esset idem cum essentia, essentia de se esset determinata ad esse, et omne quod de se est determinatum [262] ad esse est ex se necesse esse; igitur quaelibet essentia esset ex se necesse esse; quod falsum est. Et haec est ratio Avicennae [N6].	(5) Moreover, if being were the same as essence, essence of itself would be determined to being, and everything that of itself is determined to being is a necessary being from itself. Therefore every essence would have necessary being from itself, which is false. And this is the reasoning of Avicenna.
(4.08) Praeterea, essentia de se est possibile esse; sed si aliquid de se sit possibile esse, efficiens non potest facere illud esse in actu nisi se ipsum illi imprimat vel aliquid aliud. Se ipsum non potest imprimere, quia essentia non imprimitur in essentiam; igitur efficiens imprimit aliquid aliud. Et illud erit aliquid absolutum, quia actio non terminatur nisi ad aliquid absolutum. Et efficiens non imprimit nisi esse; igitur esse est aliquid absolutum aliud ab essentia.	(6) Moreover, essence of itself has possible being. But if something of itself is a possible being, the efficient [cause?] cannot bring that thing into actuality unless it impresses itself to that, or to something else. It cannot impress itself, because essence is not impressed into essence, therefore the efficient [cause] impresses something else. And that will be something absolute, because action is not terminated except by something absolute. And the efficient [cause]does not impress [anything] except being. Therefore being is something absolute apart from essence.
(4.09) Praeterea, Boethius, libro De hebdomadibus [N7]: “In omnibus citra Primum aliud est quod est et quo est"; sed essentia est per esse; igitur esse est aliud ab essentia.	(7) Moreover, Boethius (De hebdomadibus) “in all things in all things save the First, ‘that which is’ is other than ‘that from which it is’". But essence exists through being, therefore being is something other than essence.
(4.010) Praeterea, secundum eundem [N8]: "Quidlibet citra Primum recidit a simplicitate Primi; in omnibus igitur citra Primum est aliqualis compositio." Sed ista compositio non potest intelligi de compositione ex materia et forma, quia compositio ex materia et forma non est in intelligentiis, quae tamen recedunt a simplicitate Primi. Haec igitur compositio intelligitur de compositione ex essentia et esse, et si hoc, essentia et esse non sunt eadem, quia idem non facit compositionem cum se ipso.	(8) Moreover, according to the same [authority], “Everything save the First falls short of the simplicity of the First, therefore in all things save the First, there is some kind of composition". But that composition cannot be understood as composition from material and form, because material and form does not exist in the Intelligences, which still fall short of the simplicity of the First. Therefore this composition is understood as the composition of essence and being, and if so, essence and being are not the same, because one and the same thing cannot form a composition with itself.
(4.011) Praeterea, secundum eundem [N9]: Omne quod est esse quod habet est per participationem Primi entis; igitur soli Primo inest esse essentialiter et causato per participationem; et per consequens esse non est de essentia rei causatae.	(9)Moreover, according to the same [authority], “Omne quod est esse quod habet is through the participation of the First [being]", therefore being essentially inheres in the First [being] alone, and in the effect by participation, and as a consequence being does not belong to the essence of the thing caused.
(4.012) Et confirmatur ratione: Dicimus enim quod ignitum est calidum per participationem, et ignis est calidus per essentiam. Et ideo caliditas inest ignito per accidens et igni per essentiam. Sic videtur esse ex parte alia.	And this is confirmed by the following reasoning. For we say that what is kindled is hot through participation, and fire is hot through essence. And therefore hotness is in the kindled per accidens, and in the fire through essence. Thus it seems to be on the other side.
(4.013) Praeterea, esse potest demonstrari de re; sed essentia rei non potest demonstrari de re; igitur etc. Probatio assumpti: Nam esse potest quaeri: Convenienter enim quaeritur an homo sit; sed omne quaeribile est per demonstrationem certificabile. Cum igitur esse potest quaeri sequitur quod esse posset demonstrari.	(10) Moreover, being can be demonstrated of a thing. But the essence of a thing cannot be demonstrated of the thing, therefore etc. Proof of the assumption: for being cannot be asked about. For it can be appropriately asked whether a man exists, but everything that can be asked is certifiable by demonstration. Therefore, since being can be asked about, it follows that being could be demonstrated.
(4.014) Praeterea, quaestio quid est praesupponit quaestionem si est. Sed idem non praesupponit se ipsum; igitur aliud est quid et aliud esse.	(11) Moreover, the question what something is presupposes the question whether it exists. But one and the same thing does not presuppose itself. Therefore, what-something-is is one thing, and being is another.
(4.015) Praeterea, nihil potest intelligi sub opposito suae essentiae; sed essentia potest intelligi sub opposito esse — dicit enim Al[263]gazel [N10] quod possum intelligere quaternarium et ignorare si est; igitur essentia non est idem quod esse.	(12) Moreover, nothing can be understood under the opposite of its essence, but essence can be understood under the opposite of being; for Al-Ghazali says that I can understand the number four, and be ignorant whether it exists. Therefore essence is not the same as being.
(4.016) Praeterea, per Philosophum [N11]: Esse se habet ad ens sicut vivere se habet ad viventem; sed vivere non est essentia viventis; igitur esse non est essentia entis.	(13) Moreover, according to the Philosopher, ‘being stands to the existent in the same way that ‘to live’ stands to the person living. But to live is not of the essence of the living, therefore being is not the essence of an existent.
(4.017) Praeterea, haec esset per se "Sortes est," quia praedicatum esset de essentia subiecti, et per consequens haec esset necessaria. Et confirmatur ratione sic: Res semper est sub sua essentia; si igitur esse sit de essentia Sortis, sequitur quod Sortes semper sit sub esse.	(14) Moreover, ‘Socrates exists’ would be per se, because the predicate would belong to the essence of the subject, and as a consequence that proposition would be necessary. And it is confirmed by reasoning as follows. A thing is always subordinated to its essence. Therefore if being was of the essence of Socrates, it follows that Socrates is always subordinated to being.
[Quod esse et essentia sunt idem]	[That being and essence are the same]
(4.1) Ad oppositum: Si esse non sit de essentia, tunc essentiae per creationem adquiritur esse sicut subiecto quemadmodum materiae adquiritur forma per generationem; sed in omni transmutatione habente subiectum quod adquiritur per istam transmutationem producitur de subiecto; igitur esse producitur de essentia per creationem et ista creatio non esset de nihilo. Tu dices quod non est hic loquendum de creatione, quia Philosophus non posuit creationem; dicendum quod Philosophus habuit ponere creationem, quoniam ipse posuit quidlibet citra Primum esse effectum Primi.	To the opposite. If being does not belong to essence, then being is acquired by the essence as subject by creation, in the way that form is acquired by material by generation. But in every transmutation having a subject, what is acquired through that transmutation is produced in the subject. Therefore being is produced in the essence through creation and that creation would not be from nothing. You will say that we should not speak here of ‘creation’, since the Philosopher did not suppose that there was a creation [of the world]. It should be said that the Philosopher had to suppose creation, since he supposed that everything save the First is an effect of the First.
Dicit enim II Metaphysicae [N12] quod illud quod est primum verum et maxime ens est causa exsistendi omnibus entibus. Primum igitur produxit mundum: Aut igitur ex aliquo aut ex nihilo. Si ex nihilo, tunc creavit mundum. Si ex aliquo, et illud est effectus Primi, igitur producitur a Primo: Aut igitur nullo praesupposito aut aliquo praesupposito. Si nullo praesupposito, creavit illud. Si aliquo praesupposito, quaerendum esset de illo in infinitum.	For he says in Metaphysics II that what is the first true and utmost being is the cause of existence in all other things. Therefore the First [being] produced the world, therefore either from something or from nothing. If from nothing, then he created the world. If from something, and that is an effect of the First, then it is produced by the First. Therefore either with nothing presupposed or with something presupposed. If with nothing presupposed, he created it. If with something presupposed, we would have to ask about that ‘something’ and so on ad infinitum.
Et ideo concedendum est secundum philosophiam quod Primum creat aliquid et quod creavit mundum. Sed sive hoc sit ab aeterno sive non, non est cura. Et hoc videtur rationabile: Cum Primum sit infinitae virtutis intensive potest de non-ente facere ens, etsi ens et non-ens in infinitum different. Hoc etiam vult Commentator in De substantia orbis[N13], qui dicit quod absurdum est dicere Primum esse causam orbium solis quantum ad motum, quia est causa orbium quantum ad substantiam. Et idem vult Avicenna, VI Metaphysicae suae [N14], qui dicit quod Primum creavit primam intelligentiam, et ista aliam, sic usque ad orbes. Cum igitur isti philosophi creationem posuerunt et nos philosophantes ponere debemus. [264]	And therefore it should be conceded according to philosophy that the First creates something, and that he created the world. But whether from eternity or not, does not matter. And this seems reasonable: since the First is of infinite virtue intensively he can make being from non-being, even if being and non-being are different ad infinitum. The Commentator would also have this (De substantia orbis), who says that it is absurd to say that the First is the cause of the solar orbits regarding motion, because it is the cause of the orbits regarding substance. And Avicenna would have it the same way (Metaphysics), who says that the First created the first Intelligence, and that one created another, and so on for the orbits. Therefore, since those philosophers supposed there was creation, also we in philosophising ought to suppose the same.
(4.10) Ad principale: Arguo per rationem Commentatoris, IV Metaphysicae, commento 3: [N15] Causatum est: Aut igitur per essentiam aut per additum essentiae. Si per essentiam, habetur propositum quod esse sit de essentia. Si per additum essentiae, cum illud additum est, aut igitur est per essentiam aut per additum essentiae. Si per essentiam, eadem ratione fuit standum in primo. Si per additum essentiae, quaerendum est de illo addito, et sic in infinitum.	To the main argument: I argue by the reasoning of the Commentator (Metaphysics IV 3). An effect [causatum) exists: therefore [it exists] either through essence or through something added to essence. If through essence, I have what was to be proved: that being belongs to essence. If through something added to essence, since that is something added, therefore it is either through essence or something added to essence. If through essence, by the same reasoning we should have stopped with the original case. If by something added to essence, we would have to ask about that ‘something’ and so on ad infinitum.
Dicitur hic quod res est per additum suae essentiae sed illud additum non est, sicut Sortes est albus per albedinem sed ista albedo non est alba; contra: Illud quod non est non est additum essentiae, igitur si illud non esset non esset verum dicere quod res est per additum essentiae. Praeterea, si illud additum non sit, hoc non esset nisi quia illud additum est simplex, non compositum ex essentia et esse. Sed hoc non impedit, quia prima causa est et tamen in prima causa non est aliqua compositio ex essentia et esse.	It is said here that a thing exists by something added to its essence, but the thing which is added is not [something], in the way that Socrates is white through whiteness, but that whiteness is not white. Against: that which is not, is not something added to essence, therefore if it did not exist, it would not be true to say that a thing exists through something added to essence. Moreover, if what was added does not exist, this would not be the case unless because what was added is simple, rather than composed from essence and being. But this is not an obstacle, because the First Cause exists, yet there is no composition from essence and being in the First Cause.
Aliter dicitur quod res est per additum essentiae et illud additum est per suam essentiam et non per additum suae essentiae, nec tamen fuit eadem ratione standum in primo.	Otherwise it is said that a thing exists through something added to the essence, and that something exists through its essence and not through something added to its essence, yet not from the same reasoning that was valid in the first instance.
Verbi gratia: Si homo sit albus per additum sibi, ut per albedinem, si albedo foret alba hoc esset per suam essentiam et non per additum, nec tamen fuit eadem ratione standum in primo, quia si homo sit albus necessario hoc erit per additum suae essentiae; contra: Illud additum quo formaliter homo est non est in esse separatum ab homine etsi illud quo homo effective est sit in esse separatum ab homine. Illud igitur quo homo est formaliter est causatum; sed omnia causata sunt eiusdem rationis quantum ad hoc quod recedunt a simplicitate Primi, quantum etiam ad hoc quod sunt entia per participationem; igitur si illud additum ex se sit ens eadem ratione et quodlibet causatum.	For example. If a man is white by something added to him, for example by whiteness, [the] if whiteness were white, this would be by its essence and not by something added, yet not from the same reasoning that was valid in the first instance, because if a man is white this will necessarily be the case by something added to his essence. Against: that added ‘something’, by which man formally exists, is not separated in being from the man even if that from which the man effectively exists is separated in being from the man. Therefore, that from which the man exists formally is the effect, but all effects are of the same logical nature inasmuch as they fall short of the simplicity of the First, also inasmuch as they are beings by participation. Therefore if that ‘something’ added is from itself a being by the same reason, then also [this is true of] any effect.
Vel si concedatur quod illud causatum ex se habeat esse, tunc est concedendum quod in aliquo causato esse et essentia non differunt et tale causatum est ex se necesse esse, quod est inconveniens de quolibet causato. Et per istud potest probari quod Sortes de necessitate est, quia sequitur esse Sortis de necessitate est; igitur Sortes de necessitate est.	Or if it is conceded that this effect has being from itself, then it should be conceded that, in some effect, being and essence do not differ, and such an effect is - from itself - a necessary being, which is an absurdity for any effect. And by this means it can be proved that Socrates exists by necessity, because it follows that the being of Socrates exists of necessity, therefore Socrates exists by necessity.
Consequentia patet de se. Probatio antecedentis, nam esse Sortis est unus effectus, quia non fuit ab aeterno, et esse Sortis est: Aut igitur est totaliter idem cum suo esse aut differt a suo esse. Si detur quod differt a suo esse et suum esse est habens esse, aut igitur est totaliter idem cum suo esse, et tunc eadem ratione standum fuit in primo, aut differt a suo esse et quaerendum est de suo esse, et sic in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Si detur quod esse Sortis sit totaliter idem cum suo esse, tunc haec est necessaria: "Esse Sortis est," quia si aliquid sit tale quod ipsum est totaliter cum suo esse idem, illud de necessitate est. Istud argumentum tenent alii alterius opinionis [N16] sic [265] arguentes: Si esse Sortis sit totaliter idem cum Sorte, tunc Sortes de necessitate est.	The consequence is clear of itself. Proof of the antecedent: because the being of Socrates is one effect, because it did not exist from eternity, and the being of Socrates exists. Therefore, either he is totally the same as his being, or he differs from his being. If it is granted that he differs from his being, and his being has being, therefore either he is totally the same as his being – and then [the case is proved] by the same reasoning that was valid in the first case, or he differs from his being and then would have to ask about his being and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd. If it is granted that the being of Socrates is totally the same with his being, then ‘the being of Socrates exists’ is necessary, because if something is such that it is totally the same with its being, that thing necessarily exists. Some persons of another opinion held that argument, arguing that if the being of Socrates is totally the same as Socrates, then Socrates exists of necessity.
Praeterea, si illud additum per quod Sortes est de se habeat esse, et illud additum non de se est substantia, aut enim est accidens aut solum est in genere substantiae per reductionem. Tunc esse non primo competit substantiae, quia primo competit illo addito essentiae per quod additum essentia est.	Moreover, if that added ‘something’, through which Socrates exists, has being of itself, also that something is not of itself a substance: for either it is an accident, or it is alone in the genus of substance by reduction. Then being does not primarily belong to substance, because it primarily belongs to what is added to the essence, by means of which what is added the essence exists.
Praeterea, illud additum differt a suo esse, igitur non habet ex se suum esse. Probatio antecedentis: Illud additum est unus effectus habens esse de novo, igitur capit esse suum de novo; sed nihil capit se ipsum; igitur capit esse aliud a se. Et per hoc argumentum probatur processus in infinitum, nam esse Sortis est unus effectus, igitur capit esse; sed non capit se ipsum; igitur capit esse differens a se. Illud esse est unus effectus; igitur capit esse differens a se, cum nihil possit [N17] capere se ipsum. Et illud esse adhuc capit esse, et non se ipsum, igitur aliud esse, et sic in infinitum.	Moreover, the thing which is added differs from its being, therefore it does not have its being from itself. Proof of the antecedent: the thing added is a single effect having being de novo. Therefore it takes its being de novo. But nothing takes itself, therefore it takes a being other than itself And from this argument is proved an infinite regress, for the being of Socrates is a single effect, therefore it takes being. But it does not take itself, therefore it takes a being different from itself. That being is a single effect, therefore it takes a being different from itself, since nothing can take itself. And that being still takes being, and does not take itself, therefore [it takes] another being, and so ad infinitum.
(4.11) Ad principale: Generatio terminatur ad substantiam rei: Per hoc enim differt ab aliis mutationibus. Et generatio non terminatur nisi ad esse; igitur esse est substantia rei. Probatio minoris, nam generatio est transmutatio a non-esse in esse, igitur generatio terminatur ad esse. Istud confirmatur sic: Sicut nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu, sic nihil terminat actionem sive transmutationem nisi secundum quod est in actu. Sed esse est actus primus; igitur esse magis terminat generationem quam aliquid aliud.	To the main argument. Generation is terminated in the substance of a thing. For by this it differs from other mutations. And generation is not terminated except in being, therefore being is the substance of a thing. Proof of the minor: for generation is transmutation from non-being into being, therefore generation is terminated in being. That [argument] is confirmed as follows. Just as nothing operates except as it exists in actuality, so nothing terminates action or transmutation except as it exists in actuality. But being is first actuality, therefore being terminates generation more than anything else.
(4.12) Praeterea, si esse non sit de essentia rei, igitur posset demonstrari de re, quia per Philosophum, II Posteriorum [N18], esse non potest demonstrari nisi sit substantia. Sed esse non potest demonstrari, quia per Philosophum de subiecto debet praesupponi quid est et quia est. Esse igitur praesupponitur de subiecto, et per consequens non demonstratur de subiecto.	Moreover, if being is not the essence of a thing, then it could be demonstrated of a thing, because (according to the Philosopher, II Posterior Analytics), being cannot be demonstrated unless it is a substance. But being cannot be demonstrated, because (according to the Philosopher) ‘what something is’ and ‘that it is [something]’ ought to be presupposed. Being is therefore presupposed of a subject, and as a consequence is not demonstrated of a subject.
(4.13) Praeterea, homo et homo exsistens non differunt essentialiter; sed de intellectu hominis exsistentis est esse; igitur de intellectu hominis est esse. Et nihil est de intellectu hominis nisi sua essentia; igitur esse hominis est essentia hominis. Quod autem homo et homo exsistens non differant essentialiter patet, nam generato homine generatur homo exsistens, et generato homine exsistente generatur homo, igitur homo et homo exsistens non differunt. Sic enim arguit Philosophus, IV Metaphysicae [N19], probando quod homo, ens homo et unus homo non differunt, quia non differunt in generatione et corruptione.	Moreover, a man and an existing man do not differ essentially, but being belongs to the understanding of an existing man. Therefore being is of the understanding of a man. And nothing is of the understanding of a man except his essence, therefore the being of a man is the essence of a man. That a man and an existing man do not differ essentially is clear, for when a man is generated, an existing man is generated, and when an existing man is generated a man is generated, therefore a man and an existing man do not differ. For the Philosopher argues in this way (IV Metaphysics), in proving that a man, the being of a man and one man are not different, because they do not differ in generation and corruption.
(4.14) Praeterea, Auctor De causis, propositione quarta [N20], [266] dicit quod "Primum rerum creatarum est esse," quod non esset nisi esse esset de essentia.	Moreover, the author of De causis (proposition four) says that ‘the first of created things is being’, which would not be the case unless being belonged to essence.
(4.15) Praeterea, si esse non esset de essentia, quaestio si est esset quaestio ponens in numerum, quia illa quaestio est ponens in numerum quae quaerit diversum de diverso, et in quaestione si est quaeritur esse de essentia. Si igitur esse et essentia diversa sint, quaestio si est esset quaestio ponens in numerum; quod est contra Philosophum, II Posteriorum [N21].	Moreover, if being did not belong to essence, the question whether something exists would be a question ‘putting in number’ [i.e. complex], because a question which seeks the diverse from the diverse is ‘putting in number’, and in the question whether something exists, being is asked about an essence. Therefore, if being and essence are diverse, the question of whether something exists would be a question ‘putting in number’, which contradicts the Philosopher.
[Opinio Avicennae, Alberti et Boethii]	[Opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius]
(4.20) Circa istam quaestionem in principali sunt duae opiniones oppositae. Quidam ponunt quod esse non est idem cum essentia, et quidam ponunt contrariam.	Concerning this question in the main argument, there are two opposed opinions. Certain persons suppose that being is not the same as essence, and certain suppose the contrary.
(4.21) De prima opinione fuit Avicenna, ut recitat Commentator, IV Metaphysicae, commento 3 [N22]. Dixit enim Avicenna quod in omni causato esse est aliquid additum essentiae, et in Primo ente esse non differt ab essentia. Et unum motivum Avicennae, ut recitat Commentator ibidem, fuit istud, quia vidit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum et in denominativo est duplex intentio, scilicet accidentis et subiecti; ideo dixit Avicenna quod esse est praedicatum accidentale; et similiter dixit Avicenna quod hoc nomen res significat naturam rei absolute et ens significat naturam rei sub actu essendi. Unde dixit quod esse et res dicunt duas intentiones in anima et significant aliud in omnibus linguis, et hoc quia, ut dixit, aliter esset hic nugatio res ens.	Of the first opinion was Avicenna, as the Commentator tells us (Metaphysics IV 3:22). For Avicenna said that in every effect, being is something added to essence, and in the First being, being does not differ from essence. And one motive of Avicenna, as the Commentator tells us in the same place, was that he saw that being is a denominative predicate, and in the denominative predicate there is a twofold intention, namely of accident and of subject; therefore Avicenna said that ‘being’ is an accidental predicate, and similarly Avicenna said that the name ‘thing’ signifies the nature of a thing absolutely , and ‘being’ signifies the nature of a thing under the actuality of being. Therefore he said that ‘being’ and ‘thing’ predicate two intentions in the soul and they signify different things in all languages. And this is because, as he said, otherwise ‘existing thing’ would be redundant.
Et istius opinionis fuit Albertus, ut patet IV Metaphysicae, tractatu primo [N23]. Dicit enim quod esse est dispositio accidentalis uniuscuiusque entis causati, et sustentatus fuit super rationem Avicennae praetactam. Et idem vult Boethius [N24], qui dicit quod in omnibus citra Prium aliud est quod est et quo est. Et similiter: [N25] "Omne ens citra Primum est ens per participationem," et sic nulli citra Primum inest esse essentialiter sed solum accidentaliter; esse igitur est accidens cuilibet enti causato.	And Albert was of that opinion, as is clear from Metaphysics IV, first tract. For he says that being is an accidental disposition of any caused being. And this was sustained over the reasoning of Avicenna touched upon above. And Boethius would have it the same, who says that in all things beyond the First, there is a difference between ‘that which is’ and ‘that from which it is’. And similarly ‘every being beyond the First is being by participation’. And so to nothing save the First does being inhere essentially, but only accidentally. Being therefore is an accident of any caused being.
[Contra opinionem Avicennae, Alberti et Boethii]	[Against the opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius]
(4.22) Contra: Quod esse non sit accidens. Probatio, nam omne accidens praesupponit esse sui subiecti. Si igitur esse esset accidens, esse praesupponit esse, et ita idem praesupponeret se ipsum. [267]	Against: that being is not an accident. Proof: because every accident presupposes the being of its subject. Therefore if being were an accident, being would presuppose being, and so one and the same thing would presuppose itself.
(4.23) Praeterea, substantia est per suum esse. Si igitur esse esset accidens, substantia esset per suum accidens, et ita substantia non esset ens per se, et praeter hoc esse per prius inest ipsi esse quam alicui alii. Si igitur esse esset accidens esse per prius competeret accidenti quam substantiae.	Moreover, substance exists through its own being. Therefore if being were an accident, a substance would exist through its accident, and so substance would not be a being per se, and beyond this, being inheres in being itself, by what is prior, rather than in anything else. Therefore, if being were an accident, being would belong, by what is prior, to an accident rather than to a substance.
(4.24) Praeterea, si esse sit accidens esset in aliquo genere accidentis. Sed non est dare quod sit in alio genere quam in genere actionis. Sed esse non est in genere actionis, quia actio praesupponit qualitates activas et passivas. Sed esse non praesupponit huiusmodi qualitates, quia sic aliquid posset agere antequam esset.	Moreover, if being is an accident, it would be in some genus of accident. But we cannot allow that it is in another genus other than the genus of action, and being is not in the genus of action, because action presupposes active and passive qualities. But being does not presuppose qualities of this sort, because in this way something could act before it existed.
(4.25) Praeterea, motiva Avicennae non valent. Primo cum dicit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum et ens et res significant diversas intentiones, dicit Commentator, commento quo prius [N26], quod Avicenna non distinxit inter nomina significantia diversas intentiones et nomina significantia eandem intentionem diversis modis; unde dicit quod ens et res significant eandem intentionem sed modis diversis et hoc excusat nugationem. Et cum dicit quod esse est praedicatum denominativum, igitur est praedicatum accidentale, dicendum quod esse non est praedicatum denominativum sed significat substantiam rei per modum informantis.	Moreover, the motives of Avicenna are not valid. First, when he says that being is a denominative predicate, and ‘being’ and ‘thing’ signify diverse intentions, the Commentator says (in the comment before) that Avicenna did not distinguish between names signifying diverse intentions and names signifying the same intention in diverse ways. Therefore he says that ‘being’ and ‘thing’ signify the same intention but in diverse ways, and this explains away the redundancy. And when he says that being is a denominative predicate, therefore it is an accidental predicate, it should be said that being is not a denominative predicate, but rather signifies the substance of a thing by the mode of informing.
[Opinio Thomae et Aegidii]	[The opinion of Thomas and Giles]
(4.26) Aliter dicunt quidam quod esse non est essentia rei sed tamen est egrediens a principiis essentialibus rei cuius est esse et est in eodem genere per reductionem cum re cuius est esse, sicut motus est eiusdem generis per reductionem cum termino ad quem. Unde esse substantiae est unus actus in genere substantiae per reductionem et nec est substantia nec accidens. Et hanc opinionem tenent Thomas et Aegidius [N27].	Otherwise, certain persons say that being is not the essence of a thing, but nonetheless proceeds from the essential principles of a thing of which it is the being, and is in the same genus by reduction with the thing of which it is the being, just as motion is of the same genus by reduction with a finishing point. Therefore the being of a substance is a single actuality in the genus of substance by reduction, and is neither substance nor accident. And Thomas and Giles hold this opinion.
[Contra opinionem Thomae et Aegidii]	[Against the opinion of Thomas and Giles]
(4.27) Contra: Si esse sit in genere substantiae et non est in genere substantiae sicut aliquid imperfectum, igitur est in genere substantiae sicut aliqua perfectio. Esse igitur est aliquis actus in genere substantiae: Aut igitur est actus primus aut actus secundus. Si actus primus, tunc esse est substantia rei, quia forma rei est actus primus eius, et habetur propositum quod esse est de essentia. Nec est dare quod esse sit actus secundus, quia non est aliqua operatio, quia nec est intelligere nec sentire, et sic de aliis operationibus secundis.	Against. If being is in the genus of substance, it is not in the genus of substance as something imperfect, therefore it is in the genus of substance as some perfection. Therefore being is some actuality in the genus of substance: therefore either it is a first actuality, or a second actuality. If a first actuality, then being is the substance of a thing, because the form of a thing is its first actuality, and I have what was to be proved, that being is of essence. Nor can it be granted that being is a second actuality, because it is not some operation, because it is neither understanding nor feeling, and so on for other second operations.
(4.28) Praeterea, si esse sit in genere substantiae, aut igitur sicut simplex aut sicut compositum. Non sicut simplex, quia tunc vel esset materia vel forma. Non est materia, quia materia recipit esse et esse non recipit esse. Nec sicut forma, quia forma dat esse et esse non dat esse. Nec est in genere substantiae sicut compositum, quia sic esse esset compositum ex materia et forma, et esse Sortis esset compositum et non nisi ex materia Sortis et forma Sortis, et omne compositum ex materia Sortis et forma Sortis est Sortes; igitur esse Sortis esset Sortes, et hoc est propositum.	Moreover, if being is in the genus of substance: then either as something simple, or something composite. But not as something simple, for then it would be material or form. It is not material, because material receives being and being does not receive being. Nor as form, because form gives being and being does not give form. Nor is it in the genus of substance as something composite, because then being would be composed from material and form, and the being of Socrates would be composite, and [composed] from nothing except the material of Socrates and the form of Socrates, and everything composed from the material of Socrates and the form of Socrates is Socrates. Therefore the being of Socrates would be Socrates, and that was what was to be proved.
(4.29) Praeterea, esse praedicatur de Sorte et Platone: Aut igitur univoce, aut aequivoce aut denominative. Si univoce, igitur esse esset de essentia Sortis. Si aequivoce, haec esset distinguenda "Sortes est," quod non apparet verum. Si denominative, et in praedicatione denominativa praedicatur res unius generis de re alterius generis, tunc esse esset alterius generis quam Sortes et ita esse esset accidens, et hoc est prius improbatum [N28].	Moreover, being is predicated of Socrates and Plato. Therefore either univocally, or equivocally or denominatively. If univocally, then being would belong to essence. If equivocally, ‘Socrates exists’ would have distinct senses, which does not appear true. If denominatively, and in denominative predication a thing of one genus is predicated of a thing of another genus, then being would be of another genus than Socrates and being would be an accident, and this was disproved before.
(4.210) Praeterea, si esse Sortis sit res de genere substantiae et esse Sortis non est separatum a Sorte, si imponatur nomen ad significandum totum compositum ex materia et forma Sortis simul cum esse Sortis, illud nomen non significabit nisi rem de genere substantiae. Sit A illud nomen. Tunc A non significat nisi rem de genere substantiae, non enim significat aliquod aggregatum per accidens; sed non significat speciem nec genus; igitur est nomen individui de genere substantiae et esse est intrinsecum ipsi A, quia est pars significati eius; igitur esse est de essentia individui de genere substantiae et alicuius individui hominis, quia A non est individuum alterius speciei quam hominis.	Moreover, if the being of Socrates is something in the genus of substance, and the being of Socrates is not separate from Socrates, then if a name is imposed to signify the whole composite of material and form of Socrates together with the being of Socrates, that name will signify only a thing in the genus of substance. Let ‘A’ be that name. Then ‘A’ only signifies a thing in the genus of substance, for it does not signify some aggregate of accidents. But it does not signify a species or a genus. Therefore it is a name of an individual of the genus of substance, and being is intrinsic to A itself, because it is part of its significate. Therefore being is of the essence of an individual of the genus of substance and of some individual man, because A is not an individual of another species than man.
(4.211) Ad primum [N29] istorum posset dici et bene quod esse est actus, sed actus est duplex: Actus ut actus et actus ut habitus. Et actus ut actus adhuc est duplex, scilicet primus et secundus. Actus ut actus primus est esse; actus ut actus secundus est operari, ut considerare et calfacere. Similiter, potest distingui de actu ut habitus, quia quidam est primus et quidam secundus. Actus ut habitus primus est forma substantialis. Actus ut habitus secundus est forma accidentalis, ut scientia vel calor. Et sic posset dici quod non omnis actus primus est forma substantialis sed solum ille qui est actus ut habitus.	To the first of these it could be said, and well, that being is an actuality, but actuality is of two sorts. Actuality as actuality, and actuality as disposition. And actuality as actuality is also of two sorts, namely first and second. Actuality as first actuality is being. Actuality as second actuality is operation, e.g. consideration or heating. Similarly, it can be distinguished into actuality and disposition, because one is first and one is second. Actuality as disposition is first substantial form, such as knowledge or heat. And so it could be said that not every first actuality is substantial form but only that which is actuality as disposition.
[Diversae opiniones tenentes quod esse et essentia sunt idem]	[Diverse opinions holding that being and essence are the same]
(4.30) Alii ponunt quod esse et essentia sunt idem. Sed in modo ponendi dividuntur in tres sectas: [269]	Some suppose that being and essence are the same. But in their manner of putting this, they are divided into three groups
[Opinio Henrici Gandavensis]	[Opinion of Henry of Ghent]
Primo ponitur quod cum verum sit creaturam participare esse, "creaturam autem participare a Deo potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo intelligendo essentiam creaturae ut aliquid substratum et esse quo participat ut aliquid in ipso receptum," ut actus inhaerens, quemadmodum aer comparatur ad lumen. Et hic videntur sonare verba Boethii, libro De hebdomadibus, [N30] cum dicit "Quod est accepta essendi forma est atque subsistit." Isto modo intelligunt illi creaturam participare esse qui dicunt quod in creaturis essentia est aliud ab esse.	First, it is supposed that, while it is true that a creature participates in being, however “for a creature to participate from God can be understood in two ways: in one way by understanding the essence of a creature as some substratum and the being from which it participates as something received in it", as an inhering actuality, the way that air is compared to light. And here the words of Boethius seem to be in agreement [sonare] (De hebdomadibus) when he says ‘that which exists [est], exists and subsists by having accepted the form of being. In that way, those who say that essence is different from being in creatures, understand that creature participates [in] being.
Unde dicunt quod "creaturae se habent ad Deum sicut aer se habet ad solem illuminantem, ut sicut sol [N31] qui est lucens per suam naturam sive per suam essentiam non est aliud quam ipsa lux, sic Deus, qui habet esse per suam naturam, non est nisi esse; et sicut aer de se est obscurus et de sua natura non est particeps lucis nisi a sole illuminetur, participans per hoc lumen a sole, sic creatura de se non habet esse nisi a Deo illustretur et detur sibi esse quo participet.	Therefore they say that “creatures stand to God as air stands to illuminated light, so that, just as the sun which lightens by its nature or its essence is none other than light itself, so God, who has being by his nature, is nothing except being. And just as the air is of itself obscure and of its nature does not partake of light, unless illuminated by the sun, participating in light from the sun by means of this, so a creature of itself does not have being unless enlightened by God, and the being in which it shares is given to him.
Alio modo intelligitur essentiam participare esse intelligendo essentiam ut quid abstractum indifferens ad esse et non-esse, quae tamen essentia antequam sit in actu habet in Deo rationem idealem per quam constituitur in esse quidditativo. Fit autem in actu per hoc quod producitur a Deo ad similitudinem huius rationis exemplaris.	In other way, essence is understood to participate in being by understanding ‘essence’ as something abstract, indifferent to being and non-being. Nevertheless this essence, before it exists in actuality, has in God an ideal aspect by which it is established in quidditative being. But it is brought into actuality by being produced by God into a likeness of the exemplary aspect.
Unde esse in actu creaturae est quaedam participatio divini esse. Et ideo essentia creaturae producta ad similitudinem ideae est ipsum esse participatum, et sic idem re sunt essentia creaturae et [N32] esse participatum." Et formetur ratio sic: Creatura dicitur esse in actu per hoc quod producitur ad similitudinem divini esse sive ideae in mente divina ; sed res per suam essentiam et non per additum est similitudo divini esse; igitur res per suam essentiam et non per additum est ens in actu.	Therefore the actual being of a creature is a certain participation in the divine being, and so the essence of a creature, produced into a likeness of an idea, is that shared being, and thus the essence of a creature, and shared being are the same in reality". And the reasoning may be put together as follows. A creature is said to be in actuality by being produced into a likeness of the divine being or of an idea in the divine mind. But a thing is a likeness of the divine being by its essence and not by something added, therefore a thing is a being in actuality by its essence and not by something added.
Et ponitur exemplum: "Si imago sigilli esset per se subsistens extra ceram in sua essentia per suam essentiam et non per additum esset similitudo sigilli." Unde isto secundo modo debet intelligi essentiam participare esse et non primo modo. Ista positio declaratur sic: Sicut res se habet ad veritatem, bonitatem et unitatem, sic se habet ad entitatem; sed res est bona et vera per hoc quod est similitudo divinae bonitatis et veritatis; igitur res habet esse per hoc quod producitur ad similitudinem divini esse. Ista positio est Henrici de Gandavo [N33].	And an example is given. “If an image of a seal were per se subsisting outside the wax in its essence, through its essence, and not by something added, it would be a likeness of the seal". Therefore essence ought to be understood as sharing being in this second way, and not in the first way. This position is clarifed as follows. Just as a thing stands to truth, goodness and unity, so it stands to being. But a thing is good and true true by being a likeness of the divine goodness and truth, therefore a thing has being by being produced into a likeness of the divine being. This is the position of Henry of Ghent.
(4.31) Ista positio ulterius confirmatur: Si substantia habeat esse in actu et esse non sit idem cum substantia rei, aut igitur est accidens aut alia substantia. Non est accidens, quia substantia non est per suum accidens et est per suum esse, igitur esse non accidit [270] substantiae. Nec est dare quod sit alia substantia, quia nec simplex nec composita. Non composita, ut patet; nec simplex, quia nec est materia nec forma.	This position is further confirmed as follows. If substance has being in actuality, and being is not the same as the substance of a thing, it is therefore either an accident or another substance. It is not an accident, because a substance does not exist by its accidents, and exists through its own being, therefore it is not an accident. Nor may we grant that it is another substance, because it is neither simple nor composite. It is not composite, as is clear. Nor simple, because it is neither material nor form.
(4.32) Pro ista etiam positione adducitur ratio Commentatoris superius facta. [N34]	The reasoning of the Commentator given above is cited in support of this position.
[Contra opinionem Henrici de Gandavo]	[Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent]
(4.33) Contra istam positionem: Si esse non sit aliud ab essentia et res sit constituta in esse quidditativo ab aeterno, ut ponit ista positio, actio Dei creantis non se extenderet ad aliquid cum rem produceret in esse.	Against this position. If being is nothing other than essence, and a thing has been established in quidditative being from eternity, as that position supposes, the action of a creating God would not extend itself to anything, since it would have produced the thing in being.
(4.34) Praeterea, secundum istam positionem non esset aliquid potentiale in rebus, quia ex quo esse dicit actum et quidlibet est idem cum suo esse, quidlibet esset actus et ita non esset potentiale [N35] in rebus.	Moreover, according to that position there would not be any potential in things, because from the fact that ‘being’ means ‘actual’, and because everything is the same as its essence, everything would be actual and so there would be no potentiality in things.
(4.35) Praeterea, ista positio non potest ponere essentiam participare esse, quia nihil participat se ipso, quia participare est partem capere; sed per istam positionem esse et essentia sunt idem.	Moreover, that position cannot suppose that essence participates in being, because nothing participates in itself, because to share is to take a part. But through that position being and essence are the same.
[Opinio tenens quod esse et essentia solum differunt in modo significandi]	[The opinion holding that being and essence differ only the mode of signifying]
(4.36) Aliter ponitur [N36] quod essentia et esse sunt idem et solum differunt in modo significandi, quia essentia significat rem absolute et esse significat rem quasi concernendo accidentia, et maxime significat rem per respectum ad agens, unde [naturam/natura] ut contrahit quemdam modum effective ab agente. Et per hoc substrahitur accidentibus; sic dicitur esse ens ab actu essendi.	Otherwise it can be supposed that essence and being are the same and they only differ in the mode of signifying. For ‘essence’ signifies a thing absolutely, and ‘being’ signifies a thing as concerning accidents, and particularly signifies a thing relative to an agent. Therefore [it signifies] a nature as it contracts a certain mode in effect from the agent. And through this it is subtracted from accidents. Thus being [esse] is called a being [ens] from the actuality of being.
[Contra istam opinionem]	[Against this opinion]
(4.37) Contra: Ista positio non est rationabilis, quia accidentia et respectus ad agens praesupponit esse in effectu. Natura autem non habet ordinem ad primam causam sicut ad causam agentem nisi quia accipit esse ab ea, non autem per hoc quod accipit quod sit essentia. Unde oportet praeintelligere distinctionem esse saltem secundum rationem ante omnem comparationem ad accidentia.	Against: this position is not reasonable, because being in effect presupposes accidents and a relation to an agent. And a nature does not have subordination to a first cause as agent cause unless it accepts being from it, but not by accepting that it is an essence. Therefore we must pre-acknowledge the distinction to be at least according to reason before any comparison to accidents.
(4.38) Praeterea, omnis relatio realis requirit mutationem realem a parte alterius termini, accipiendo mutationem pro quacumque ad [271]quisitione non habiti. Sed quantum ad ipsam essentiam rei [absolute/ absolutae ] [N37] non est aliqua mutatio: Esse enim est formalis ratio termini productionis seu creationis. Oportet igitur intelligere actionem terminari ad esse differens ab essentia.	Moreover, every real relation requires a real mutation on the part of the other term [of the relation], by accepting mutation for any acquisition that does not belong to the disposition. But regarding very essence of the thing there is absolutely no mutation. For being is the formal rationale of the terminus of production or of creation. Therefore we have to understand that the action is terminated by a being differing from essence.
[Opinio Godefridi de Fontibus]	[The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines]
(4.40) Aliter ponitur quod esse est idem quod essentia, ut esse substantiae est idem quod substantia et esse quantitatis idem cum quantitate. Hoc ponitur sic: Res habet triplex esse: Primo, in potentia Dei creantis; secundo, in potentia propinqua tam principiorum intrinsecorum quam extrinsecorum creatorum, sicut rosa habet esse in potentia materiae et in potentia activa agentis proximi; tertio, habet res esse in rerum natura extra intellectum, scilicet in se ipsa. Ulterius [ /dicitur esse] sciendum quod ista divisio entis in actum et potentiam non est divisio entis in materiam et formam, sed ista divisio dicit diversos modos essendi quae conveniunt toti rei, sicut dicimus hominem in actu et hominem in potentia, albedinem in actu et albedinem in potentia; sed dicitur in potentia respectu materiae et in actu respectu formae. Et quia potentia passiva dicit diminutam entitatem, ideo ens in potentia est ens secundum quid ut homo in potentia est homo secundum quid.	Alternatively, it is proposed that being is the same as essence, in the way that the being of substance is the same as substance, and the being of quantity is the same as quantity. This is given as follows. A thing has being in three ways. First, in the power of a creating God. Second, in proximate power both of intrinsic principles and of extrinsic created beings. For example, a rose has being in the potentiality of material, and in the active potentiality of a proximate agent. Third, a thing has being in reality outside the understanding, namely, in its own self. Furthermore it should be known that the division of being into actuality and potentiality is not a division of being into material and form, but the division means that there are diverse modes of being which belong to the whole reality. For example, we say ‘man in actuality’ and ‘man in potentiality’, ‘whiteness in actuality’ and ‘whiteness in potentiality’. But ‘in potentiality’ is meant in respect of material and ‘in actuality’ in respect of form. And because passive potentiality means a diminished being, thus ‘being in potentiality’ is being in a qualified sense, such as ‘man in potentiality’ is man in a qualified sense.
(4.41) Si igitur consideremus rem ipsam secundum primum esse quod habet, sic manifestum est quod habet diminutam entitatem, quia solum dicitur esse isto modo quia sibi non repugnat produci in esse sive ad esse proprium quod in se habebit et ad realitatem sui generis. Unde esse isto modo non differt a potentia activa Dei creantis.	Therefore if were were to consider that thing according to the first being which it has, thus it is manifest that it has a diminished being, because it is only said to be in that way because it is not repugnant to it to be produced into being, or into the proper being that it will have in itself, and into the reality of its genus. Therefore being in this way does not differ from the active potential of the creating God.
(4.42) Si autem loquamur de re quantum ad secundum esse quod habebit, sic, licet habeat diminutam entitatem in comparatione ad esse quod habebit in se ipsa, in comparatione tamen ad esse quod habet in Deo potest dici perfectior entitas. Unde respectu huius entitatis potest esse scientia de re non ente in effectu. Unde res secundum istud esse non est res sui generis nisi secundum quid et in potentia. Unde res secundum istud esse non est res nisi in potentia, quatenus sua principia sunt in genere per reductionem. Unde istud esse non est aliud quam principia et esse principiorum propinquorum.	But if we speak of a thing in respect of the second being which it will have, thus, although it has a diminished being in comparison to the being which it will have in itself, still, in comparison to the being which it has in God, it can be called a more perfect entity. Therefore, in respect of this entity there can be knowledge of a thing not existing in effect. Therefore a thing according to that being is not a thing in a class of its own except in a qualified sense, and potentially. Therefore a thing according to that being is not a thing except potentially, to the extent that its principles are in a genus through reduction. Therefore that being is no other than the principles and being of proximate principles.
(4.43) Si autem loquatur de esse tertio modo secundum quod res habet esse in se ipsa in effectu, isto modo res est id quod est et esse rei non differt a re cuius est. Unde isto modo ponitur quod esse non est aliud quam natura ut est res sui generis, sicut esse quod res habet in potentia antequam sit in actu non est aliud quam esse principiorum talis rei secundum quod esse [rei/res] non est id quod est nec res alicuius generis nisi secundum quid. Sic esse in effectu rei non est aliud quam ipsa natura rei ut est res sui generis.	But if we speak of being in the third way according as a thing has being in itself ‘in effect’, [then] in that way a thing is that which it is, and the being of a thing does not differ from the thing to which it belongs. Therefore, in that way, it is proposed that being is no other than a nature as it is a thing in a class of its own, just as the being which a thing has potentially - before it exists actually - is no other than the being of principles of such a thing according as the being of a thing is not that which the thing is, nor is a thing of any genus except in a qualified sense. Thus the being ‘in effect’ of a thing is no other than the very nature of the thing as it is a thing in a class of its own.
Unde producere [272] rem ad esse est facere rem esse id quod est; similiter, quod sit res sui generis tantum; igitur habet aliquid de essentia quantum de esse, et e converso. Et sicut res habet esse sic habet quod sit res in genere. Unde secundum istam positionem quando res non habet esse in effectu tunc non est in aliquo genere; et haec est positio Magistri Godefridi [N38] quam credo esse veram.	Therefore to produce a thing into being is to make the thing be that which it is; similarly, that it may be a thing in a class of its own only, therefore it has something of essence insofar as it has being, and conversely. And just as a thing has being, so it has the fact that it is a thing in a genus. Therefore, according to that position, when a thing does not have being ‘in effect’, then it is not in any genus, and this is the position of Master Godfrey, which I believe is true.
(4.44) Circa istam positionem est intelligendum quod nihil est in genere reali actualiter nisi actu exsistat. Quod patet ex hoc: Philosophus, VI Metaphysicae in fine, [N39] dividit ens in ens verum extra animam et in ens diminutum quod solum habet esse in anima, et illud ens excludit a sua consideratione. Deinde dividit ens verum extra animam in decem praedicamenta, et sic quodlibet praedicamentum est verum ens extra animam, et nihil est actu in praedicamento nisi actualiter exsistat extra animam.	Concerning this position, it should be understood that nothing is actually in a real genus unless it actually exists. Which is clear from this: the Philosopher (Metaphysics VI at the end), divides being into true being outside the soul, and diminished being that only has being in the soul, and that being he excludes from his consideration. Next, he divides true being outside the soul into the ten categories, and thus every category is true being outside the soul, and nothing is actually in a category unless it actually exists outside the soul.
Et ideo Caesar non est actu in genere substantiae nec est actu homo sed fuit in genere substantiae et fuit homo. Hoc vult Commentator in De substantiis orbis in principio, [N40] et similiter I Physicorum, [N41] distinguens duplex genus transmutationis in entibus: Quaedam enim est transmutatio secundum quam si aliquid transmutetur nec amittit nomen nec definitionem, et huiusmodi transmutationes sunt alteratio, augmentatio et loci mutatio. Alia est transmutatio secundum quam si aliquid transmutetur amittit nomen et definitionem, cuiusmodi transmutatio est generatio et corruptio. Sortes igitur cum corrumpitur amittit definitionem hominis et nomen hominis ita quod Sorte corrupto nec est homo nec animal rationale.	And therefore Caesar is not actually in the genus of substance nor is actually a man; but he was in the genus of substance and was a man. The Commentator would have this in De substantiis orbis at the beginning, and similarly in his commentary on I Physics, distinguishing a two kinds of transmutation in beings. For some are transmutations according to which if something is transmutated it neither loses its name nor its definition, and alteration, augmentation and change of place are transmutations of this sort. Others are transmutations according to which if something is transmutated it loses its name and its definition, and generation and corruption are transmutations of this sort. Therefore Socrates, when he is corrupted, loses the definition of man and the name of man, so that Socrates corrupted neither is a man nor a rational animal.
(4.45) Ulterius sciendum quod esse in communi non est de essentia Sortis sed esse exsistere Sortis est idem quod essentia Sortis, ita quod proprium esse rei est idem realiter cum sua essentia, tamen esse proprium rei non est idem cum illa re, ut esse Sortis non est idem cum Sorte nec essentia Sortis est idem cum Sorte. Haec enim est falsa: "Sortes est essentia Sortis"; si enim Sortes et sua essentia essent idem, quidquid esset pars Sortis esset pars essentiae Sortis, et tunc pes Sortis esset pes essentiae Sortis et de essentia Sortis.	Furthermore, it should be known that being in general is not of the essence of Socrates, but the being of existence of Socrates is the same as the essence of Socrates, so that the proper being of a thing is the same really as its essence, but the proper being of a thing is not the same as that thing, so that the being of Socrates is not the same as Socrates, nor the essence of Socrates the same as Socrates. For ‘Socrates is the essence of Socrates’ is false – for if Socrates and his essence were the same, whatever were a part of Socrates would be a part of the essence of Socrates, and then the foot of Socrates would be a foot of the essence of Socrates, and belonging to the essence of Socrates.
(4.46) Sed tu dices: Quid igitur significat hoc nomen 'essentia' sive iste terminus 'essentia Sortis' ? Aut significat materiam aut formam aut compositum. Non materiam, quia tunc forma non esset pars essentiae; nec significat formam, quia tunc materia non esset pars essentiae; igitur significat compositum ex materia et forma. Igitur isti termini 'Sortes' et 'essentia Sortis' significant idem, et sic [273] erit haec vera: "Sortes est essentia Sortis"; dicendum quod hoc nomen 'ens' et hoc nomen 'essentia' significant idem; et hoc nomen 'homo' et 'essentia hominis' significant idem sed alio et alio modo, quoniam per naturam ut significatur hoc nomine 'essentia' solum comprehenduntur illa quae ad naturam rei pertinent.	But you will say: ‘What then signifies the name ‘essence’ or the term ‘essence of Socrates’? Either it signifies material or form or a composite. Not material, because then form would not be part of the essence. Nor does it signify form, because then material would not be part of the essence. Therefore it signifies a composite of material and form. Therefore the terms ‘Socrates’ and ‘essence of Socrates’ signify the same, and so ‘Socrates is the essence of Socrates’ will be true. It should be said that the name ‘a being’ and the name ‘essence’ signify the same, and the name ‘a man’ and ‘essence of man’ signify the same, but in one way and another, since those things which are pertinent to the nature of a thing are only comprehended by a ‘nature’ as signified by the name ‘essence’.
Nec ex modo significandi dantur intelligi alia quae ad naturam rei non pertinent, immo potius ratione modi significandi talia excluduntur sic quod de illa non praedicantur. Sed hoc nomine 'homo' et hoc nomine 'ens' ex principali significato solum importantur illa quae ad naturam rei pertinent, sed ex modo significandi dantur alia intelligi quae non pertinent ad naturam rei vel saltem ex modo significandi talia non excluduntur. Et propter diversitatem modorum significandi est haec falsa "Sortes est essentia Sortis," non obstante quod Sortes et essentia Sortis idem significent.	Nor from the mode of signifying are there given to be understood other things which are not pertinent to the nature of a thing. Indeed, such things are excluded rather by reason of the mode of signifying, so that they are not predicated of it [the nature]. But those things which are pertinent to the nature of a thing are only conveyed by the name ‘man’ and by the name ‘a being’ from [their] principal significate. However, other things are given to be understood from the mode of signifying which are not pertinent to the nature of a thing. (Or at least such things are not excluded from the mode of signifying). And because of the diversity of modes of signifying ‘Socrates is the essence of Socrates’ is false, notwithstanding that ‘Socrate’ and ‘the essence of Socrates’ signify the same.
(4.47) Consequenter est intelligendum quod haec est falsa: Essentia est esse ut dicunt omnes ponentes essentiam et esse non differre. Ista tamen satis posset concedi 'Essentia est esse'; alia tamen diversitas est inter essentiam et esse pro quo dicitur. Intelligendum quod in rebus est triplex differentia, scilicet differentia realis, differentia secundum rationem et differentia secundum intentionem.	Consequently, it should be understood that ‘essence is being’ is false, as it is meant by all those who propose that essence and being are not different. ‘Essence is being’ could nevertheless be conceded in sense [satis]; but another diversity is between essence and the being for which it is predicated. It should be understood that in things there is a threefold difference, namely real difference, difference according to reason, and difference according to intention.
Ista differunt realiter quae sunt diversae res praeter operationem animae et constituunt aliquod prius utroque istorum; et sic differunt homo et albus. Et alia differunt secundum rationem tantum; et isto modo idem differt a se, quia intellectus utitur uno ut duobus. Isto etiam modo differunt definitio et definitum, ut animal rationale et homo. Et quae sic differunt neutrum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius nec etiam altero non intellecto. Sed differentia secundum intentionem est quando aliqua differunt magis quam secundum rationem et minus quam secundum rem.	Things which are diverse things beyond the operation of the soul differ in reality, and they constitute something prior to both of those. And so a man and a white thing are different. And others differ according to reason only, and in that way the same thing differs from itself, because the understanding uses one thing as two things. Also in this way the definition and the defined are different, e.g. ‘rational animal’ and ‘man’. And things which differ in this way can be understood neither under the opposite of the other nor even under the other not understood [?]. But difference according to intention is when some things differ more than according to reason, but less than according to reality.
Unde differentia secundum intentionem est media inter differentiam realem et differentiam secundum rationem. Isto modo in simplicibus differunt genus et differentia, et neutrum est de per se intellectu alterius in talibus, et similiter unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius. Potest enim genus intelligi sub opposito unius differentiae, quia potest intelligi sub differentia opposita. Et dicitur quod isto modo differunt essentia et esse.	Therefore difference according to intention is midway between real difference and difference according to reason. In this way, in simple things, genus and differentia are different, and neither is of the per se understanding of the other in such cases, and similarly one can be understood under the opposite of the other. For a genus can be understood under the opposite of one differentia, because it can be understood under the differentia of the opposite. And it is said that in this way essence and being are different.
[Instantiae]	[Objections]
(4.50) Contra istam positionem arguitur: Simplicius dicit in Praedicamentis [N42] quod quantum ad genus substantiae non refert utrum res sit in intellectu vel in effectu; igitur sive res habeat esse in actu sive non, ita quod solum habeat esse in intellectu, non minus erit in genere substantiae.	Against this position it is argued as follows. Simplicius says in the Categories that as far as genus of a substance is concerned, it does not matter whether a thing is in the understanding or in effect; therefore whether the thing has actual being or not, so that, though it have being in the understanding only, nonetheless it will be in the genus of substance.
[274] (4.51) Praeterea, hoc nomen 'homo' significat praeter omnem differentiam temporis, igitur hoc nomen 'homo' indifferenter abstrahitur ab omnibus suppositis cuiuslibet differentiae temporis; sed a quibus aliquid indifferenter abstrahitur de illis indifferenter dicitur; igitur sicut haec est vera "Gualterus est homo" sic et ista "Caesar est homo."	Moreover, the name ‘man’ signifies beyond any differentia of time, therefore the name ‘man’ is indifferently abstracted from all supposita of every differentia of time. But whatever is indifferently abstracted from things, it is indifferently predicated of those things, therefore just as ‘Walter is a man’ is true, so is ‘Caesar is a man’
(4.52) Ad primum [N43] istorum dicendum quod nos possumus loqui de genere dupliciter: Uno modo quantum ad intentionem generis quae convenit rei ut concipitur, et sic habet veritatem dictum Simplicii. Alio modo possimus loqui de genere quantum ad naturam substratam intentioni generis, et sic quantum ad genus substantiae multum refert utrum res sit in intellectu vel in effectu.	To the first of these it should be said that we can speak of ‘genus’ in two ways. In one way, in respect of the intention of the genus, which belongs to the thing as it is conceived, and in this way what Simplicius says has truth. In another way we can speak of ‘genus’ in respect of the nature underlying the intention of the genus, and thus, in respect of genus of substance. it matters a lot whether the thing is in the understanding or ‘in effect’.
Unde breviter genus est duplex, scilicet genus reale et genus logicum. In genere reali nihil est nisi quod actualiter exsistit extra animam; de nullo enim est verum dicere quod est homo vel quod est substantia nisi de eo quod actualiter exsistet; tamen in genere logico potest aliquid esse quod non exsistit actualiter. Unde nulla rosa exsistente, rosa est in genere logico sed non in genere reali. Et tunc est haec concedenda "Rosa est species substantiae," sed non sequitur "Rosa est substantia."	Therefore, briefly, ‘genus’ has two senses, namely real genus and logical genus. In real genus, there is nothing except what actually exists outside the soul. For of nothing is it true to say that it is a man or that it is a substance, unless [we say it] of what actually exists. Yet in logical genus there can be something that does not actually exist. Therefore, when no rose exists, rose is in the logical genus, but not in real genus. And then ‘A rose is the species of substance’ should be conceded, but ‘A rose is a substance’ does not follow.
(4.53) Contra: Rosa exsistente, in ista "Rosa est substantia" praedicatur genus de specie; igitur ista propositio est per se, et quae per se insit de necessitate insit; igitur haec est necessaria, et per consequens est vera, nulla rosa exsistente; dicendum quod haec est per se "Rosa est substantia," et tamen non est necessaria; et haec propositio "Quae per se insit de necessitate insit" habet intelligi de illis quae sic sunt per se sicut sunt praemissae in demonstratione potissima.	Against. When a rose exists, in ‘A rose is a substance’, genus is predicated of species, therefore that proposition is per se, and what per se inheres, inheres of necessity. Therefore [the proposition] is necessary, and in consequence is true, when no rose exists. It should be said that ‘a rose is a substance’ is per se, and yet it is not necessary, and the proposition “what per se inheres, inheres of necessity" has to be understood of those [propositions] which are per se in this way, just as the premisses in the highest sort of demonstration are [per se].
Praemissae in demonstratione potissima sunt sic per se quod in eis praedicatur convertibile de convertibili, ut passio de definitione vel definitio de definito; et omnes tales propositiones sunt necessariae. Unde haec est necessaria "Rosa est substantia B" — sit B differentia rosae — et haec est vera sive rosa sit sive non. Nec sequitur "Rosa est substantia B, igitur rosa est substantia," quia in antecedente praedicatur convertibile de convertibili et in consequente non; et ideo consequentia non valet sicut nec ista "Homo albus est homo albus, igitur homo albus est homo."	The premisses in the highest sort of demonstration are per se so that in them a convertible is predicated of a convertible, as an attribute of a definition, or a definition of the thing defined, and all such propositions are necessary. Therefore ‘a rose is a b substance’ is true ( let b be the differentia of rose) – and it is true whether a rose exists or not. Nor does ‘a rose is a b substance, therefore a rose is a substance’ follow, because in the antecedent a convertible is predicated of a convertible, and not in the consequent. And therefore the consequence is not valid, just as ‘a white man is a white man, therefore a white man is a man’ is not valid.
(4.54) Tu dices: Omnis propositio est necessaria in qua praedicatur genus de specie, aliter foret haec contingens "Homo est animal"; et per consequens haec est necessaria "Rosa est substantia"; dicendum quod non oportet semper propositionem esse necessariam, nec etiam veram in qua praedicatur genus de specie per verbum de praesenti. Sed si ista species necessario habeat esse, tunc semper erit propositio vera in qua praedicatur genus de specie, et [275] ideo posito quod haec sit necessaria "Homo est" erit haec necessaria "Homo est animal," et aliter non. Unde quod omnis propositio sit necessaria in qua praedicatur genus de specie, hoc habet intelligi in illis ubi species necessario habet esse, in aliis autem non.	You will say “every proposition is necessary in which genus is predicated of species, otherwise “a man is an animal’ would be contingent, and as a consequence ‘a rose is a substance’ is necessary". It should be said that it does not always have to be that a proposition is necessary, nor even true, in which genus is predicated of species by means of a verb of the present tense. But if that species necessarily has being, then a proposition in which genus is predicated of species will always be true, and therefore, given that ‘a man is’ is necessary, ‘a man is an animal’ will be necessary, and otherwise not. Therefore that “every proposition in which genus is predicated of species is necessary", has to be understood in those propositions where the species necessarily has being. But in other propositions, this is not so.
(4.55) Ad aliud: [N44] Quod haec propositio "Nomen significat praeter omnem differentiam temporis" potest intelligi dupliciter: Uno modo quod ipsum nomen nec in suo significato nec ex modo significandi aliquam differentiam temporis includat; et hoc est verum: Per hoc enim distinguitur nomen a verbo. Alio modo quod rem significatam per nomen non consignificatur aliqua differentia temporis; et hoc est falsum, quia rem significatam per hominem necessario consignificatur differentia temporis praesentis tamquam propria mensura talis rei. Nulla tamen differentia temporis est de essentia rei significatae per hominem.	To the other, that the proposition ‘a name signifies beyond any differentia of time’ can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the name neither in its significate nor from the mode of signifying involves any differentia of time. And this is true, for by means of this a name is distinguished from a verb. In another way, that some differentia of time does not co-signify what is signified by a name. And this is false, because the differentia of present time, as a proper measure of such a thing, co-signifies what is signified by ‘man’. Yet no differentia of time belongs to the essence of what is signified by ‘man’.
	[To the main arguments]
(4.601) Ad primum principale: Dicendum quod quaestio quid est et quaestio an est differunt. Utraque tamen quaerit de eadem re sed diversimode. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod sint diversae quaestiones, nam quaestio an est quaerit de essentia rei secundum quod res est in se ipsa extra animam sed quaestio quid est quaerit essentiam rei absolute.	To the first main argument. It should be said that the question of what something is and the question whether it exists are different. Nevertheless, both ask about the same thing, but in different ways. And this is sufficient for them to be different questions, for the question whether something exists is about the essence of a thing according as the thing is outside the soul in itself. But the question what something is, is about the essence of the thing absolutely.
(4.602) Vel aliter: Quod quaestio quid est non quaerit exsistentiam rei sed quaerit quod quid rei vel quidditatem rei sive definitionem. Sed quaestio an est quaerit exsistentiam rei. Modo exsistentia rei et definitio rei non sunt idem: Haec enim est falsa: "Animal rationale est existentia hominis" sicut ista "Homo est exsistentia hominis." Et ideo concedo quod bene quaeritur an nigredo sit sed non bene quaeritur an nigredo sit nigredo, quia sicut dictum est nigredo et esse nigredinis non sunt idem, etsi essentia nigredinis et esse nigredinis sint idem. Sed sicut bene quaeritur an nigredo sit, ita bene quaeritur an nigredo habeat exsistentiam.	Or in another way, that the question ‘what something is’ does not ask about the existence of a thing, but asks about the ‘what a thing is’ or quiddity or definition of a thing. But the question whether something exists is a question about the existence of a thing. But the existence of a thing and the definition of a thing are not the same. For ‘a rational animal is the existence of a man’ is false, just as ‘a man is the existence of a man’ is. And therefore I concede that it is valid to ask whether blackness exists, but it is not valid to ask whether blackness is blackness, because, as we said, blackness and the being of blackness are not the same, even if the essence of blackness and the being of blackness are the same. But just as it is valid to ask whether blackness exists, so it is valid to ask whether blackness has existence.
(4.603) Et ad confirmationem argumenti: Cum dicitur quod a generante non habet res quod sit idem quod est, ut a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes sed a generante habet quod sit; igitur etc; dicendum quod quia a generante non habet Sortes quod sit Sortes et a generante habet esse, ideo Sortes non est suum esse. Verumtamen sicut a generante habet Sortes esse ita a generante habet essentiam et a generante habet quod sit res alicuius generis.	And for the confirmation of the argument: when it is said that from the one generating, the thing does not acquire its being the same as itself (for example, from the one generating, Socrates does not acquire the fact that he is Socrates, but Socrates acquires the fact that he exists, therefore etc.). It should be said that because Socrates does not acquire from the one generating the fact that he is Socrates, and [because] he has being from the one generating, therefore Socrates is not his being. But nevertheless just as Socrates has being from the one generating, so he has essence from the one generating, and from the one generating he gets the fact that he is a thing of some genus.
(4.604) Ad aliud: Concedo quod actio agentis terminatur ad aliquid absolutum et quod actio agentis terminatur ad essentiam quantum ad illud quod est, [ /quoniam actio agentis terminatur ad [276] essentiam quantum ad illud quod est], quoniam actio agentis terminatur ad compositum ex materia et forma. Unde esse non est solum unum respectum sed dicit compositum ex materia et forma, et hoc dico si accipiatur esse rei compositae.	To the other. I concede that the action of an agent is terminated in something absolute, and that the action of the agent is terminated in essence as far as by that which is, since the action of an agent is terminated in the composite of material and form. Therefore, being is not only one relation, but means a composite of material and form, and I say this if the being of a composite thing is understood.
(4.605) Ad aliud: Cum dicitur quod subiectum transmutationis differt ab utroque terminorum, et essentia est aliquando sub esse aliquando sub non-esse, igitur etc; dicendum quod illud quod est subiectum in transmutatione differt ab utroque terminorum. Sed haec est falsa imaginatio quae ponit essentiam esse subiectum in transmutatione a non-esse in esse, quia subiectum cuiuslibet transmutationis est aliquid exsistens in actu nunc sub uno termino transmutationis et iam sub alio. Sed essentia non est aliquid exsistens nunc manens sub non-esse et iam sub esse, quia tunc idem simul esset sub esse et sub non-esse.	To the other, when it is said that the subject of transmutation differs from both of the terms, and that essence is sometimes subordinated to being, sometimes subordinated to non-being, therefore etc., it should be said that the subject of transmutation differs from both of the terms. But it is a false imagination which supposes that essence is the subject of transmutation from non-being to being, because the subject of any transmutation is something existing in actuality, now under one term of transmutation and now under another. But essence is not something existing now remaining subordinated to non-being and now subordinated to being, because then the same thing would be at the same time being subordinated to being and subordinated to non-being.
(4.606) Ad aliud: Dicendum quod essentia nec de se est necesse esse nec de se est impossibile esse, sed de se est possibile esse. Et cum dicitur quod nihil est per id quod potest esse et non-esse; dicendum quod hoc est falsum; aliquid enim est per illud formaliter quod tamen de se non est necesse esse.	To the other, it should be said that essence is neither of itself a necessary being, nor of itself an impossible being, but it is of itself a possible being. And when it is said that nothing exists by the fact that it can be or not be, it should be said that this is false, for something formally exists by means of what,nonetheless, is not of itself a necessary being.
(4.607) Ad aliud: Quod esse est idem cum essentia et quod essentia de se est determinata ad esse. Verumtamen ly de in proposito potest denotare circumstantiam causae formalis vel circumstantiam causae efficientis. Si denotet circumstantiam causae formalis sic est haec vera: "Essentia de se est determinata ad esse, quia essentia per se ipsam formaliter habet esse." Si autem denotet circumstantiam causae efficientis, sic nulla creatura de se est determinata ad esse.	To the other, [I reply] that being is the same as essence and that essence of itself is determined to being. Nevertheless the word ‘of’ in the proposal can denote a circumstance of the formal cause, or a circumstance of the efficient cause. If it denotes a circumstance of the formal cause then ‘essence of itself is determined to being, because essence per se formally has being’ is true. But if it denotes a circumstance of the efficient cause, no creature of itself is determined to being in this way.
Unde sequitur: Quaelibet creatura formaliter habet esse ex se, et hoc probat ratio Commentatoris, IV Metaphysicae [N50a]; sed quaelibet creatura effective habet esse ab alio. Unde non omne quod de se formaliter habet esse est ex se necesse esse. Sed omne quod de se effective habet esse est ex se necesse esse.	Therefore ‘every creature formally has being from itself’ follows, and the argument of the Commentator proves this (Metaphysics IV), but every creature effectively has being from another. Therefore not everything that has being formally of itself is from itself a necessary being. But everything that of itself effectively has being is from itself a necessary being.
(4.608) Ad aliud: Cum dicitur quod illud quod est ex se possibile esse non potest habere esse per agens nisi agens sibi aliquid imprimat; dicendum quod aliquid esse possibile respectu esse potest inteliigi dupliciter: Vel sic quod sit potentia receptiva alicuius actus, sicut est subiectum in transmutatione; et omne quod sic est possibile respectu esse ad hoc quod sibi adquiratur esse oportet quod agens aliquid sibi imprimat. Alio modo dicitur aliquid possibile esse [277] quia potest esse terminus productionis alicuius agentis, et sic est Antichristus unum possibile esse.	To the other. When it is said that what is from itself a possible being cannot have being from an agent, unless the agent impresses something to it, it should be said that for something to be possible in respect of being can be understood in two ways. Either so that it is a receptive potentiality of some actuality, as the subject of transmutation is; and in order that everything that is thus possible in respect of being, acquires being for itself, it has to be such that the agent impresses something to it. In another way something is called a possible being because it can be the terminus of production of some agent: and so the Antichrist is one possible being.
Et ad hoc quod tale possibile esse producatur ad actum non oportet quod agens aliquid sibi imprimat, quia tale non dicitur possibile esse respectu alicuius formae imprimendae sed solum dicitur possibile esse in comparatione ad agens, ut scilicet quia potest esse terminus productionis alicuius agentis.	And for it to be the case that such a possible being is produced to actuality, it does not have to be that the agent impresses something to it, because such a thing is not called ‘possible being’ in respect of some form impressed, but is only called ‘possible being’ in comparison to the agent, so that, in other words, it can be the terminus of production of some agent.
Unde breviter: In omni transmutatione naturali est potentia duplex praesupposita: Una potentia quae est receptiva formae in fine transmutationis et ista dicitur esse potentia subiectiva; et alia est potentia quae propter hoc dicitur esse potentia, quia potest esse terminus alicuius agentis. Primo modo dicitur materia esse potentia; secundo modo totum compositum dicitur esse potentia, ut tota aqua, si ex aere debeat generari aqua, quia totum compositum terminat actionem agentis.	Therefore (briefly) in every natural transmutation there are two sorts of potentiality presupposed. One potentiality which is receptive of form in the end of transmutation, and this is called ‘subjective potential being’. And the other is potentiality which because of this is called ‘potential being’, because it can be the terminus of some agency. In the first way material is said to be potentiality. In the second way the whole composite is said to be potentiality, as ‘the whole water’, if water ought to be generated from air, because the whole composite terminates the action of the agent.
(4.609) Ad aliud: Quod in omni citra Primum aliud est quod est et quo est effective. Unde nihil citra Primum est ex se effective, tamen non in omni citra Primum est aliud quod est et quo est formaliter, nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.	To the other, that in all things in all things save the First, ‘that which is’ is other than ‘that from which it is’. Therefore nothing save the First is from itself effectively, yet not in everything save the First is ‘that which is’ other than ‘that from which it is’ formally, unless by the reason of understanding.
(4.6010) Ad aliud: Quod quidlibet citra Primum recedit a simplicitate Primi, non tamen in quolibet citra Primum est compositio ex materia et forma, nec etiam ex essentia et esse; sed ex essentia et modo essendi sive modo intelligendi. Sed in Primo essentia et modus essendi seu intelligendi non differunt. Credo tamen quod in quolibet citra ens quod est communissimum est aliqualis compositio, et hoc tam in Deo quam in creatura, et qualiter hoc sit videbitur postea.[N54]	To the other, [I reply] that everything save the First falls short of the simplicity of the First, yet it is not the case that there is composition from material and form in all things save the First, nor even composition from essence and being, but [the composition is] from essence and the mode of being or mode of understanding. But in the First, essence and the mode of being or understanding are not different. Still, I believe that in anything save a being that is the most common there is some composition, and this both in God and in a creature, and how this is will be seen later.
(4.6011) Ad aliud: Quod aliquid est ens per participationem et tamen est ens per essentiam; nec repugnant ista sicut nec repugnant quod aliquid sit ens de se formaliter et tamen quod sit ens effective ab alio.	To the other, [I reply] that something is a being through participation and still is a being through essence, nor are those repugnant, just as it is not repugnant that something is a being of itself formally, and nevertheless that it is a being effectively from another.
(4.6012) Ad aliud: Quod esse in effectu non potest demonstrari de re. Nec sequitur "potest quaeri, igitur potest demonstrari." Sed sequitur "Hoc est quaeribile, igitur vel est demonstrabile vel est ratio per quam aliquid potest demonstrari." Unde sciendum quod sunt duae quaestiones simplices et duae compositae. Quaestiones simplices sunt an est et quid est; quaestiones compositae sunt quia est et propter quid est.	To the other, [I reply] that being in effect cannot be demonstrated of a thing. Nor does ‘it can be asked, therefore it can be demonstrated’ follow. But ‘this is askable, therefore it is either demonstrable or is the reason through which something can be demonstrated’ follows. Therefore it should be known that there are two simple questions, and two composite ones. Simple questions are ‘whether something exists and what something is. Composite questions are whether something is [something] and why it is [something].
Et quaestiones compositae possunt terminari et certificari per demonstrationem sed quaestiones simplices non; immo illae quaestiones sunt rationes terminandi alia per demonstrationem, [278] quia quid est et si est sunt quaestiones praesuppositae. Sicut enim nullus potest terminare quaestionem quid est per demonstrationem, cum quidditas rei non possit demonstrari de re, sic nec quaestionem si est.	And composite questions can be terminated and certified by demonstration, but simple questions not. Rather, those questions are reasons for terminating others by demonstration, because what something is and whether it exists are questions that are presupposed. For just as nothing can terminate the question of what something is by demonstration, since the quiddity of the thing cannot be demonstrated of a thing, so neither the question of whether it exists.
(4.6013) Ad aliud: Quod idem uno modo praesupponit se ipsum alio modo, quia aliquid uno modo est notius se ipso alio modo, ut res significata per istam "Omne animal rationale est risibile" ut sic significatur est notior re significata per istam "Omnis homo est risibilis" ut sic significatur, et tamen eadem res significatur per utramque. Sic etsi esse et quid rei sint eadem, tamen quid rei praesupponit esse tamquam prius notum.	To the other, [I reply] that the same thing in one way presupposes itself in another way, because something in one way is better known than itself in another way, such as the thing signified by ‘every rational animal is capable of laughter’ is signified in this way is better known than the thing signified by ‘every man is capable of laughter’, and yet the same thing is signified by both. Thus even if being and the nominal essence of the thing are the same, still the nominal essence of the thing presupposes being as something known before.
(4.6014) Ad aliud: Quod haec propositio est neganda: Quod nihil potest intelligi esse sub opposito suae essentiae quia esse potest intelligi sub opposito esse. Bene enim contingit intelligere et vere quod esse Sortis non est. Unde argumentum non plus probat quod esse et esse non sunt idem. Unde non sequitur: Essentia potest intelligi sub opposito esse, igitur essentia et esse differunt.	To the other, [I reply] that the proposition that “nothing can be understood to be under the opposite of its essence" should be denied, because being can be understood under the opposite of being. For it is rightly possible to understand, and truly, that the being of Socrates does not exist. Therefore the argument does not prove [more?] that being and being are not the same. Therefore “essence can be understood under the opposite of being, therefore essence and being are different" does not follow.
(4.6015) Ad aliud: Quod esse se habet ad ens sicut vivere ad viventem. [Quantum/ quanto] ad hoc quod sicut vivere significatur per modum actus sic et esse; vel potest dici quod vivere et vivens significant eandem rem et sic esse et ens. Unde vivere essentialiter inest viventi. Verumtamen vivere uno modo est actus primus et sic est essentia viventis; vel alio modo est actus secundus et sic accidens viventi et vivere comparatur ad viventem sicut esse ad ens secundum quod vivere est actus primus viventis.	To the other, that ‘being’ stands to ‘a being ‘ just as ‘living’ stands to ‘a living [thing]’: insofar as ‘living’ is signified by a mode of actuality, so also ‘being’ [is signified in this way]. Or it can be said that ‘living’and ‘a living [thing]’ signify the same thing, and so ‘being’ and ‘a being’. Therefore ‘living’ inheres essentially in the living. But nevertheless ‘living’ in one way is a first actuality and so is the essence of the living [thing], or in another way is the second actuality, and so accidental to a living thing, and living is compared to the living thing just as being to a being, according as living is the first actuality of a living thing.
(4.6016) Ad ultimum: Quod non sequitur quod haec sit necessaria "Sortes est," quia esse hic praedicatum est esse in communi, et dictum est prius quod esse in communi non est de essentia Sortis. Posito tamen quod esset de eius essentia non propter hoc sequitur quod haec foret necessaria; sicut non sequitur quod etsi aliquid sit res alicuius generis quod propter hoc de necessitate sit res illius generis.	To the last, [I reply] that it does not follow that ‘Socrates exists’ is necessary, because the ‘being’ predicated here is being in general, and it was said earlier that being in general does not belong to the essence of Socrates. Still, given that it did belong to its essence, it does not follow because of this that [the proposition] would be necessary, just as it does not follow that even if something is a thing of some genus that because of this it is a thing of that genus of necessity.

Notes

[N2] Algazel, Metaph., tr. i, cap. 'De accidentibus' (ed. J. T. Muckle, 1933) 25, lin. 17-20.
[N3] Algazel, Metaph., tr. i, cap. 'De accidentibus' (ed. J. T. Muckle, 1933) 25, lin. 20-23.
[N4] idem/quaestio add. G
[N5] Aristot., Physica, I, c. 7, tt. 59-60 (igoa 9-21).
[N6] Avicenna. Metaph., VI, c. i (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 91va).
[N7] Boethius, De hebdomadibus (PL 64, 1311C) "Diversum est esse et id quod est, ipsum vero esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit"
[N8] Ibid.
[N9] Ibid.
[N10] Auctoritas non invenitur in cap. 'De accidentibus,' ubi haec materia tractatur.
[N11] Aristot., De anima, II, c. 2 (413a 22).
[N12] Aristot., Metaph., II, c. 1. t. 4 (993b 28-29).
[N13] Averroes, In De substantia orbis, c. 2 (ed. Iuntina, IX, Venetiis, 1550, f. 4va).
[N14] Potius Avicenna, Metaph., IX, c. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1508, f. 104rb).
[N15] Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552, f. 32r).
[N16] Scilicet opinio S. Thomae et Aegidii, infra, n. 4.26; opinionis/demonstrata unde add. C, differentia non add. G
[N17] possit/posset G
[N18] Aristot., Anal. Poster., II, c. 7 (92b 3-26).
[N19] Aristot., Metaph., IV, c. 2, t. 3 (1003b 26-27).
[N20] Liber de causis 4 (ed. O. Bardenhewer, 166, v. 19-20; ed. A. Pattin 54).
[N21] Aristot., Anal. Poster., II, c. 1 (89b 23-35).
[N22] Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552. f. 32r).
[N23] Albertus Magnus, Metaph., IV, tr. 1, cc. 4-5 (Opera omnia, tom. XVI, pars 1 (Ed. B. Geyer, 1960), 165-167.
[N24] Boethius, De hebdomadibus (PL 64, 1311C).
[N25] Ibid.
[N26] Cf. hic supra, nota 22.
[N27] Thomas Aquinas, In Aristot. Metaphysicam Commentarium, IV, lect. 2 n. 558; Aegidius Romanus, Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia, de mensura Angelorum, et de cognitione Angelorum (Venetiis, 1503), qq. 9-11.
[N28] Supra, nn. 4.22-4.25.
[N30] Boethius, De Hebdomadibus (PL 64, 1311B).
[N31] sol om. G
[N32] et/ipsum add. (interl.) C
[N33] Henr. Gandav., Quodl. I, q. 9 (ed. Parisiis. 1518; f. nv).
[N34] Cf. hic supra, nota 22.
[N35] potentiale/ponere genus G
[N36] Sigerus de Brabantia, "Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum?" (ed. M. Grabmann, Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle. t. I, Romae, 1924. 133-138).
[N37] absolutae/aliter G
[N38] Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodl. IV, q. 2 (lectio brevis) (ed. M. De Wulf - A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, Les Philosophes Belges, II, 323S.).
[N39] Aristot.. Metaph., VI, c. 3, t. 8 (1027b 25-34).
[N40] Averroes, In Aristot. De substantiis orbis, c. 1 (ed. Iuntina, IX, Venetiis, 1550. f. 3r).
[N41] Averroes, In Aristot. Physicam, I, com. 63 (ed. Iuntina, IV, 1550, f. 18v).
[N42] Simplicius, In Aristot. Praedicamenta, com. 10 (Venezia, Bibl. Naz. Marciana, ms. lat. VI. 152, f. isva ).
[N43] Supra, n. 4.50; cf. Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodl. IV, q. 2 (lectio brevis) (ed. M. De Wulf - A. Pelzer, Louvain, 1904, Les Philosophes Belges, II, 324-325)
[N50a] Averroes, In Aristot. Metaph., IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII, Venetiis, 1552. i 32r)
[N54] Haec positio non invenitur in his Quaestionibus.

THE LOGIC MUSEUM Copyright (introduction and translation only) (C) E.D.Buckner 2011.

4.01	Arguments that being and essence are not the same.
4.1	Arguments that being and essence are the same.
4.20	The opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius.
4.22	Against the opinion of Avicenna, Albert and Boethius
4.26	The opinion of Thomas and Giles
4.27	Against the opinion of Thomas and Giles
4.30	Opinion of Henry of Ghent
4.33	Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent
4.36	Opinion holding that being and essence differ only the mode of signifying
4.37	Against this opinion
4.40	The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines
4.50	Objections
4.601	Replies to the main arguments