Ockham Summa I.1-4

Ockham Summa Logicae I chapters 1-4

Chapter 1 The definition of the term, and of its division in general
Chapter 2 On the division of the term, and that 'term' can be specifically understood in different ways.
Chapter 3 On the division of incomplex terms.
Chapter 4 On the division of terms into categorematic and syncategorematic, which is common to mental and spoken terms.

Latin English

Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI Chapter 1. Of the definition of the term, and of its division in general.

(i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse". All those who deal with logic mean to show that arguments are composed from propositions and propositions out of terms. Therefore, a term is nothing other than a neighbouring part of a proposition. For in defining a term Aristotle (Prior Analytics I) says 'I call a 'term', that into which a proposition is analysed, such as a predicate and what it is predicated of, either by putting together to say what is the case (esse), or by separating, to say what is not the case'.

(ii) Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum habendam oportet aliquas divisiones terminorum praecognoscere. But although every term is, or could be, part of a proposition, yet not all terms are of the same nature, and for that reason, in order to have a complete acquaintance with terms, we must gain a preliminary acquaintance with some of the divisions of terms.

(iii) Est autem sciendum quod sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermenias, triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta, tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus. Now it should be known that, according to Boethius on On Interpretation I, just as discourse is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived ([the last] only having being in the understanding) so the term is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived.

(iv) Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest. A written term is part of a proposition written down on some corporeal thing, which is seen by the corporeal eye, or can be seen.

(v) Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali. A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the corporeal ear.

(vi) Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, dicit nullius esse linguae, quia tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius. A conceived term is an intention or affection of the soul naturally signifying or co-signifying something [and] suited to be a part of a mental proposition and to supposit for the same thing. Whence these conceived terms and the propositions put together out of them are the "mental words" that the blessed Augustine (De Trinitate XV) says belongs to no language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.

(vii) Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret. Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but because utterances are imposed to signify those same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing, so that, with the utterance assigned to signify something signified by the concept in the mind, if that concept changed its significate, by that very fact the utterance itself would change its significate, without any new signification being imposed.

(viii) Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt "earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae". Sic etiam intendit Boethius quando dicit voces significare conceptus. Et universaliter omnes auctores, dicendo quod omnes voces significant passiones vel sunt notae earum, non aliud intendunt nisi quod voces sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae primario importantur, quamvis aliquae voces primario importent passiones animae seu conceptus, quae tamen secuiidario important alias animae intentiones, sicut inferius ostendetur. The Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul'. Thus also Boethius means the same thing, when he says that utterances signify concepts. And generally all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul - although some utterances primarily convey affections of the soul or concepts, which other intentions in the soul still convey secondarily, as will be shown below.

(ix) Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum. And just as what was said about utterances in respect of affections, or intentions, or concepts, is to be held, for now, in the same way proportionally, concerning things that are written down in respect of utterances.

(x) Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque. Now among these terms, some differences are found. One is that the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition. From which there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can change what it signifies by being interpreted, but a term that is conceived does not change its significance by interpretation.

(xi) Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo. Still, because of hair-splitters, it should be known that 'sign' is taken in two ways. In one way, for everything that, when apprehended, causes something else come into cognition, although it does not cause the mind to come to a primary cognition of it, just as is shown elsewhere, but to an actual one after its customary one. And in this way, an utterance does naturally signify, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, just as also a circle signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not talking about 'sign' here in such a general way.

(xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale. In another way 'sign' is taken for that which causes something come into cognition and is suited to stand for it, or to be added to such a thing in a proposition. Of such a sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, as an expression is. And taking the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is a natural sign of nothing.

CAP. 2. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI, ET QUOD DIVERSIMODE POTEST ACCIPI HOC NOMEN 'TERMINUS' IN SPECIALI Chapter 2. On the division of the term, and that 'term' can be specifically understood in different ways.

(i) Est autem sciendum quod hoc nomen 'terminus' tripliciter accipitur. Uno modo vocatur terminus omne illud quod potest esse copula vel extremum propositionis categoricae, subiectum delicet vel praedicatum, vel etiam determinatio extremi vel verbi. Et isto modo etiam una propositio potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse pars ropositionis. Haec enim vera est 'homo est animal: est propositio vera' in qua haec tota propositio 'homo est animal' est subiectum, et 'propositio vera' est praedicatum. You should know that the name ‘term’ is understood in three ways. In one way, everything is called a term that can be the copula or an extreme of a categorical proposition (that is, its subject or predicate), or also a determination of an extreme or of the verb [in such a proposition] . In this way, even a proposition can be a term, just as it can be part of a proposition. For ‘ “A man is an animal” is a true proposition’ is true. In it, the whole proposition ‘A man is an animal’ is subject, and ‘true proposition’ is the predicate.

(ii) Aliter accipitur hoc nomen 'terminus'secundum quod distinguitur contra orationem, et sic omne incomplexum vocatur terminus. Et sic de termino in praecedenti capitulo sum locutus. In another way, the name ‘term’ is understood according as it is contrasted with ‘expression’ [oratio]. In this way, every non-complex [word] is called a term. I was talking about ‘term’ in this way in the preceding chapter.

(iii) Tertio modo accipitur terminus praecise et magis stricte pro illo quod significative sumptum potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Et isto modo nullum verbum, nec coniunctio nec adverbium nec praepositio nec interiectio est terminus; multa etiam nomina non sunt termini, scilicet nomina syncategorematica, quia talia quamvis possint esse extrema propositionum si sumantur materialiter vel simpliciter, quando tamen sumuntur significative non possunt esse extrema propositionum. (3) In a third way, ‘term’ is taken precisely and more strictly for that which, taken significatively, can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. In this way no verb, nor conjunction, nor adverb, nor preposition nor interjection is a term. Many names also are not terms, namely syncategorematic names. For such [names], although they could be the extremes of propositions if they were taken materially or simply, nevertheless when they are taken significatively they cannot be the extremes of propositions.

Unde ista oratio 'legit: est verbum' congrua est et vera si hoc verbum 'legit' sumatur materialiter, si autem significative sumeretur non intelligibilis esset. Similiter est de talibus 'omnis: est nomen'; 'olim: est adverbium'; 'si: est coniunctio'; 'ab: est praepositio'. Et isto modo accipit Philosophus terminum quando definit terminum I Priorum. Wherefore the expression “Reads is a verb’ is congruous and true if the verb ‘reads’ were taken materially,but if it were taken significatively it would be unintelligible. It is similar for cases such as “‘every” is a name’, “‘once” is an adverb’, “‘if’ is a conjunction’, “‘from” is a preposition’. The Philosopher takes ‘term’ in this way when he defines the term in Prior Analytics I.

(iv) Non solum autem unum incomplexum potest esse terminus, sic accepto termino, sed etiam compositum ex duobus incomplexis, scilicet compositum ex adiectivo et substantivo; et etiam compositum ex participio et adverbio vel praepositione cum suo casuali potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. In ista enim propositione 'omnis homo albus est homo' nec 'homo' nec 'albus' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'homo albus'. Similiter hic 'currens velociter est homo' nec 'currens' nec 'velociter' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'currens velociter'. [ (4) Now not only can one non-complex thing be a term, taking ‘term’ in this way, but also a composite of two non-complexes , namely the composite of an adjective and a substantive, and even the composite of a participle and an adverb, or a preposition with its accompaniment – can also be a term, just as it can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. For in the proposition ‘Every white man is a man’, neither ‘man’ nor ‘white’ is the subject, but rather the whole ‘white man’. Similarly ‘someone running quickly is a man.’ Here neither ‘running’ nor ‘quickly’ is the subject, but rather the whole thing ‘running quickly’.

(v) Est autem sciendum quod non tantum nomen acceptum in recto potest esse terminus, sed etiam casus obliquus potest esse terminus, quia potest esse subiectum propositionis et etiam praedicatum. Verumtamen obliquus non potest esse subiectum respectu cuiuscumque verbi: non enim bene dicitur 'hominis videt asinum', quamvis bene dicatur 'hominis est asinus'. Quomodo autem et respectu quorum verborum potest obliquus esse subiectum et respectu quorum non, ad grammaticum pertinet, cuius est constructiones vocum considerare. (5) It should be known that not only can a name taken directly be a term, but also an oblique can also be a term, for it can be the subject of a proposition, and also a predicate. Yet an oblique cannot be a subject in respect of any verb. For ‘A man’s sees the ass’ is not well-said, although ‘A man’s is the ass’ is well-said. But [the question of] in what way and in respect of which verbs an oblique can be the subject, and with respect to which ones not - belongs to the grammarian, of whom it belongs to consider the constructions of words.

CAP. 3. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI INCOMPLEXI Chapter 3: on the division of incomplex terms.

(1) Visa aequivocatione istius nominis 'terminus' prosequendum est de divisionibus termini incomplexi. Unde non solum terminus incomplexus dividitur in terminum prolatum, scriptum et conceptum, sed etiam singula membra consimilibus divisionibus subdividuntur. Nam sicut vocum quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam sunt verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam participia, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones, et consimiliter est de scriptis, sic intentionum animae quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones. Having seen the equivocation in the name 'term', the divisions of the non-complex term is to be investigated. Hence the non-complex term is not only divided into the spoken, written and conceived term, but each branch is also subdivided by similar divisions. For, just as of utterances certain are names, certain are verbs, certain ones are of other parts of speech - since certain ones are pronouns, certain are participles, or adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions (and similarly for things that are written), so of intentions of the soul, certain are names, certain are verbs, certain are of other parts of speech. For certain ones are pronouns, certain are adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions.

(2) Utrum autem participiis vocalibus et scriptis correspondeant in mente quaedam intentiones a verbis distinctae potest esse dubium, eo quod non videtur magna necessitas talem pluralitatem ponere in mentalibus terminis. Nam verbum et participium verbi sumptum cum hoc verbo 'est' semper videntur in significando aequivalere. But there may be a doubt whether to spoken and written participles there correspond certain intentions in the mind, distinct from verbs, seeing that there does not seem to be a great necessity to suppose such a plurality of mental terms.

Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis vel aliam causam consimilem accidentalem, quia quidquid per omnia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo conceptuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet, ita videtur quod distinctio inter verba vocalia et participia non est propter necessitatem expressionis inventa, propter quod videtur quod non oportet participiis vocalibus distinctos conceptus in mente correspondere. Et de pronominibus posset esse consimilis dubitatio. For a verb and the participle of the verb taken with the verb 'is' always seem to be equivalent in signifying. Because of this, just as the multiplication of synonymous names is found not on account of the necessity of signification, but rather for the sake of decoration of speech or another similar accidental cause (for whatever is signified by [several] synonymous names could be sufficiently expressed by one of them, and therefore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of synonyms) so it seems the distinction between spoken verbs and participles is not found on account of the necessity of expression. Because of this, it seems that there do not have to be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to spoken participles. And of pronouns there could be a similar doubt.

(3) Est autem inter nomina vocalia et mentalia differentia, quia quamvis omnia accidentia grammaticalia quae conveniunt nominibus mentalibus etiam nominibus vocalibus sint convenientia, non tamen e converso, sed quaedam sunt communia tam istis quam illis, quaedam autem sunt propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis, quia quaecumque conveniunt vocalibus, et scriptis et e converso. Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names, because, although all the grammatical accidents appropriate to mental names are also appropriate to spoken names, yet it is not conversely so. Rather, certain [grammatical accidents] are common as much to the latter as to the former, others however are proper to spoken and written names. For whatever belong to the spoken also belong to the written, and conversely.)

(4) Accidentia communia nominibus vocalibus et mentalibus sunt casus et numerus. Sicut enim istae propositiones vocales `homo est animal', 'homo non est animalia' distincta habent praedicata quorum unum est numeri singularis et aliud pluralis, ita propositiones mentales quarum una mens ante omnem vocem dicit quod homo est animal et alia dicit quod homo non est animalia distincta habent praedicata quorum unum potest dici numeri singularis et aliud pluralis. Similiter sicut istae propositiones vocales 'homo est homo' et 'homo non est hominis' habent distincta praedicata variata per casus, sic proportionaliter dicendum est de propositionibus in mente correspondentibus. The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and number. For, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is an animal' [and] 'A man is not animals' have distinct predicates, of which one is singular and the other plural, so the mental propositions - by one of which the mind, before any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other of which it says that a man is not animals - have distinct predicates, one of which can be said to be in the singular number, and the other in the plural. Similarly, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is a man' and 'A man is not of a man' have distinct predicates, varied through case, so proportionally it is to be said of the corresponding propositions in the mind.

(5) Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis sunt genus et figura. Talia enim accidentia nominibus propter necessitatem significationis non conveniunt. Unde et aliquando accidit quod duo nomina sunt synonyma et tamen sunt generum diversorum et aliquando diversarum figurarum,propter quod talem multiplicitatem non oportet naturalibus signis tribuere. Unde quaecumque pluralitas et varietas talium accidentium, quae potest competere nominibus synonymis, potest convenienter a mentalibus amoveri. Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender and form. For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the necessity of signification. Thus also it sometimes happens that two names are synonyms and still are of diverse genders and sometimes in different forms, on account of which we do not have to attribute such a multiplicity to natural signs. Hence any plurality and variety of such accidents which can belong to synonymous names can appropriately be set aside in the case of mental [terms].

(6) De comparatione autem, an conveniat solis nominibus ad placitum institutis, posset esse difficultas, quam tamen quia non est magnae utilitatis pertranseo. De qualitate posset esse consimilis difficultas, quam alias pertractabo in sua radice. (6) Now concerning comparison, there can be a difficulty about whether it belongs only to names assigned an interpretation. Which I pass over, nonetheless, because it is of no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality, which I shall treat of in detail elsewhere.

(7) Per praedicta autem potest studiosus evidenter perpendere quod quamvis aliquando ex sola variatione accidentium terminorum, scilicet casus, numeri et comparationis, propter tamen rem significatam, potest propositio una verificari et alia falsificari, hoc tamen numquam accidit propter genus et figuram. Quamvis enim frequenter ad congruitatem orationis habendam oportet aspicere ad genus, - haec enim est congrua 'homo est albus' et haec incongrua 'homo est alba', quod ex sola diversitate generis oritur -, tamen supposita congruitate nihil refert cuius generis vel cuius figurae sit subiectum vel praedicatum. Sed certe, cuius numeri vel casus sit subiectum vel praedicatum, ad sciendum an propositio sit vera vel falsa oportet aspicere. Haec enim est vera 'homo est animal' et haec falsa 'homo est animalia', et sic de aliis. Now, through what has been said above, the keen student can evidently consider that, although sometimes by variation alone of the accidents of the terms (namely, case, number and comparison), one proposition can be verified and another one falsified, on account of the thing signified, nevertheless this never happens with gender and declension. For, even though you often have to respect gender for the agreement of speech (for example, Homo est albus agrees, and Homo est alba does not, and this comes about from a diversity of gender alone), still, assuming agreement, it is of no consideration of what gender or declension is the subject or predicate. But certainly we have to make out which number or case the subject or predicate has, to know whether the proposition is true or false. For 'a man is an animal' is true, and 'A man is animals' is false, and so for other cases.

(8) Et sicut nominibus vocalibus et scriptis quaedam sunt accidentia propria, quaedam communia illis et mentalibus, consimiliter de verborum accidentibus est dicendum. Communia sunt modus, genus, numerus, tempus, persona. De modo patet, nam alia oratio mentalis comrespondet isti orationi vocali Socrates legit et isti alia utinam Socrates legeret . De enere patet, nam alia oratio mentalis correspondet isti orationi vocali 'Socrates amat' et isti 'Socrates amatur'. Verumtamen in mente non sunt nisi tria genera, nam deponentia et communia vocalia non sunt propter necessitatem significationis inventa, cum verba communia aequivaleant activis et passivis et deponentia neutris vel activis, et ideo non oportet talem plulalitatern in verbis mentalibus ponere. And just as there are certain accidents that are proper to spoken and written names, and certain that are common also to mental names, a similar thing is to be said about the accidents of verbs. The common ones are mood, kind [genus], number, tense, and person. Concerning mood it is clear. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates read' and another to 'Would that Socrates read!'. It is clear with kind, for one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates loved' and another one to 'Socrates is loved'. Nevertheless there are just three kinds in the mind, for spoken deponents and common verbs are not found on account of the necessity of signification, since common verbs are equivalent to active and passive ones, and deponent ones to middle ones and active ones. And for that reason we do not have to suppose such a plurality in mental verbs.

(9) De numero etiam patet, nam distinctae orationes mentales correspondent istis 'tu legis', 'vos legitis'. Idem patet de tempore, nam istis 'tu legis', 'tu legisti' distinctae orationes rnentales correspondent. Hoc idem patet de persona, ut istis 'tu legis', 'ego lego' aliae correspondent. Concerning number it is also clear, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'they read'. The same is clear with tense, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'You read [present]' [and] 'You read [past]'. The same is clear about person. For example, different [mental expressions] correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'I read'.

(10) Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones ex hoc convincitur quod omni orationi vocali correspondet alia mentalis in mente, et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis quae sunt propter necessitatem significationis impositae sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondenter sunt distinctae. But that we have to suppose such mental names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions can be proved from the fact that to every spoken expression there corresponds another mental one in the mind, and therefore, just as those parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed because of the necessity of signification are distinct, so also the corresponding parts of the mental proposition are distinct.

Propter quod sicut nomina vocalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones sunt necessariae diversis propositionibus et orationibus vocalibus, ita quod impossibile est omnia exprimere per nomina et verba solum quae possunt per illa et alias partes exprimi, sic etiam distinctae partes consimiles sunt necessariae mentalibus propositionibus. Because of this, just as spoken names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions are necessary for diverse spoken propositions and expressions - so that it is impossible to express alone everything by means of names and verbs that can be expressed through those, together with the other parts of speech – so, also, similar distinct parts are necessary for mental propositions.

(11) Accidentia autem propria verbis institutis sunt coniugatio et figura. Tamen quandoque verba diversaruim coniugationuim possunt esse synonyma et similiter verba diversae figurae. The accidents proper to instituted verbs are conjugation and 'form' [inflection]. Yet sometimes verbs in different conjugations can be synonymous, and similarly verbs of diverse form.

(12) Per praedicta potest studiosus faciliter advertere quomodo proportionaliter de aliis partibus orationis et earum accidentibus est dicendum. (12) From what has been said, the keen student will easily recognize what there is to be said, proportionally, about the other parts of speech and their accidents.

(13) Nec miretur aliquis quod dico aliqua nomina et verba esse mentalia, sed prius legat Boethium super Perihermenias , et hoc ibidem inveniet. Et ideo quando Aristoteles tam nomen quam verbum definit per vocem, accipit ibi nomen et verbum magis stricte, scilicet pro nomine et verbo vocali. Nor should anyone wonder that I say that some names and verbs are mental, but let him first read Boethius on De interpretatione, and he will find it there. And for that reason, when Aristotle defines the name, just as the verb, through 'an utterance', he takes there 'name' and 'verb' strictly, i.e., for a spoken name and verb.

PARS I, CAP. 4. DE DIVISIONE TERMINORUM IN TERMINOS CATEGOREMATICOS ET SYNCATEGOREMATICOS, QUAE EST COMMUNIS TAM TERMINIS MENTALIBUS QUAM VOCALIBUS Chapter 4: On the division of terms into categorematic and syncategorematic, which is common to mental and spoken terms.

(i) Adhuc aliter dividitur terminus, tam vocalis quam mentalis, quia terminorum quidam sunt categorematici, quidam syncategorematici. Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen 'homo' significat omnes homines et hoc nomen 'animal' omnia animalia, et hoc nomen 'albedo' omnes albedines. And the term is divided in still another way, both the spoken and the mental one, for certain terms are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic terms have a definite and fixed signification, for instance, the name "man" signifies all men, and the name and the name ‘animal’ all animals, and the name "whiteness" all whitenesses.

(ii) Termini autem syncategorematici, cuiusmodi sunt tales 'omnis', 'nullus', 'aliquis', 'totus', 'praeter', 'tantum', 'inquantum' et huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata, immo sicut in algorismo cifra per se posita nihil significat, sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncategorema proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid significare sive facit ipsum pro aliquo vel aliquibus modo determinato supponere vel aliud officium circa categorema exercet. But syncategorematic terms, of which sort are such - "every", none", "some", "whole", "besides", "only", "insofar" and the like, do not have a definite and fixed signification, neither do they signify any things distinct from the things signified by categorematic terms. Indeed, just as in Arabic notation, zero given by itself signifies nothing, but when added to another digit causes the latter to signify, so a syncategorematic term does not signify anything, properly speaking, but rather when added to another [term] makes it signify something, or makes it supposit in a determinate way for some thing or things, or exercises some other function with respect to the categorematic term.

(iii) Unde hoc syncategorema 'omnis' non habet aliquod certum significatum, sed additum 'homini' facit ipsum stare seu supponere actualiter sive confuse et distributive pro omnibus hominibus; additum autem 'lapidi' facit ipsum stare pro omnibus lapidibus; et additum 'albedini' facit ipsum stare pro omnibus albedinibus. Thus, the syncategorematic term "every" does not have any fixed significate, but added to "man", makes it stand for or supposit actually - or ‘confusedly and distributively’, for all men. Added to "stone", however, it makes it stand for all stones. And added to "whiteness", it makes the latter stand for all whitenesses.

Et sicut est de isto syncategoremate 'omnis', ita proportionaliter de aliis est tenendum, quamvis distinctis sycategorematibus distincta officia conveniant, sicut de aliquibus inferius ostendetur. And just as for the syncategorematic term "every", so we have to hold the same thing proportionally for the others, although distinct offices belong to different syncategorematic terms, as will be shown for certain of them below

(4) Et si proterviatur quod haec dictio 'omnis' est significativa, ergo aliquid significat, dicendum est quod non ideo dicitur significativa quia aliquid determinate significat, sed quia facit aliud significare vel supponere vel stare pro aliquo, sicut declaratum est. Et sicut hoc nomen `omnis' nihil determinate et finite significat, secundum modum loquendi Boethii,sic est de omnibus syncategorematibus et universaliter de coniunctionibus et praepositionibus. If anyone quibbles that the word "every" is significative, therefore signifies something, it should be said that it is not called "significative" because it determinately signifies something, but rather because it makes another thing signify or supposit or stand for something, as was made clear. And just as the name "every" determinately and definitely signifies nothing, according to Boethius' manner of speaking, so it is for all syncategorematic terms and for conjunctions and prepositions generally.

(v) De quibusdam autem adverbiis aliter est, quia quaedam eorum determinate significant illa quae significant nomina categorematica, quamvis alio modo significandi important. But it is otherwise for certain adverbs, because some of them determinately signify things that categorematic names signify, although they convey [those things] by another mode of signifying.

Latin	English
Pars I CAP. 1. DE DEFINITIONE TERMINI ET EIUS DIVISIONE IN GENERALI	Chapter 1. Of the definition of the term, and of its division in general.
(i) Omnes logicae tractatores intendunt astruere quod argumenta ex propositionibus et propositiones ex terminis componuntur. Unde terminus aliud non est quam pars propinqua propositionis. Definiens enim terminum Aristoteles, I Priorum, dicit: "Terminum voco in quem resolvitur propositio, ut praedicatum et de quo praedicatur, vel apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse".	All those who deal with logic mean to show that arguments are composed from propositions and propositions out of terms. Therefore, a term is nothing other than a neighbouring part of a proposition. For in defining a term Aristotle (Prior Analytics I) says 'I call a 'term', that into which a proposition is analysed, such as a predicate and what it is predicated of, either by putting together to say what is the case (esse), or by separating, to say what is not the case'.
(ii) Sed quamvis omnis terminus pars sit propositionis, vel esse possit, non omnes termini tamen eiusdem sunt naturae; et ideo ad perfectam notitiam terminorum habendam oportet aliquas divisiones terminorum praecognoscere.	But although every term is, or could be, part of a proposition, yet not all terms are of the same nature, and for that reason, in order to have a complete acquaintance with terms, we must gain a preliminary acquaintance with some of the divisions of terms.
(iii) Est autem sciendum quod sicut secundum Boethium, in I Perihermenias, triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta, tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus.	Now it should be known that, according to Boethius on On Interpretation I, just as discourse is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived ([the last] only having being in the understanding) so the term is threefold, namely, written, spoken and conceived.
(iv) Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest.	A written term is part of a proposition written down on some corporeal thing, which is seen by the corporeal eye, or can be seen.
(v) Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et natae audiri aure corporali.	A spoken term is part of a proposition spoken by the mouth and suited to be heard by the corporeal ear.
(vi) Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nata esse pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, dicit nullius esse linguae, quia tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius.	A conceived term is an intention or affection of the soul naturally signifying or co-signifying something [and] suited to be a part of a mental proposition and to supposit for the same thing. Whence these conceived terms and the propositions put together out of them are the "mental words" that the blessed Augustine (De Trinitate XV) says belongs to no language because they remain only in the mind and cannot be uttered outwardly, although utterances are pronounced outwardly as if signs subordinated to them.
(vii) Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces semper significent ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter significat aliquid et secundario vox significat illud idem, in quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquid significatum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus ille mutaret significatum suum eo ipso ipsa vox, sine nova institutione, suum significatum permutaret.	Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but because utterances are imposed to signify those same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing, so that, with the utterance assigned to signify something signified by the concept in the mind, if that concept changed its significate, by that very fact the utterance itself would change its significate, without any new signification being imposed.
(viii) Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod voces sunt "earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae". Sic etiam intendit Boethius quando dicit voces significare conceptus. Et universaliter omnes auctores, dicendo quod omnes voces significant passiones vel sunt notae earum, non aliud intendunt nisi quod voces sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae primario importantur, quamvis aliquae voces primario importent passiones animae seu conceptus, quae tamen secuiidario important alias animae intentiones, sicut inferius ostendetur.	The Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul'. Thus also Boethius means the same thing, when he says that utterances signify concepts. And generally all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul - although some utterances primarily convey affections of the soul or concepts, which other intentions in the soul still convey secondarily, as will be shown below.
(ix) Et sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu intentionum seu conceptuum, eodem modo proportionaliter, quantum ad hoc, tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto respectu vocum.	And just as what was said about utterances in respect of affections, or intentions, or concepts, is to be held, for now, in the same way proportionally, concerning things that are written down in respect of utterances.
(x) Inter istos autem terminos aliquae differentiae reperiuntur. Una est quod conceptus seu passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat, terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque.	Now among these terms, some differences are found. One is that the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition. From which there follows another difference, namely that a spoken or written term can change what it signifies by being interpreted, but a term that is conceived does not change its significance by interpretation.
(xi) Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud facit in cognitionem venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sicut etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Sed tam generaliter non loquor hic de signo.	Still, because of hair-splitters, it should be known that 'sign' is taken in two ways. In one way, for everything that, when apprehended, causes something else come into cognition, although it does not cause the mind to come to a primary cognition of it, just as is shown elsewhere, but to an actual one after its customary one. And in this way, an utterance does naturally signify, just as any effect naturally signifies at least its cause, just as also a circle signifies wine in the tavern. But I am not talking about 'sign' here in such a general way.
(xii) Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel tali addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio. Et sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signum' vox nullius est signum naturale.	In another way 'sign' is taken for that which causes something come into cognition and is suited to stand for it, or to be added to such a thing in a proposition. Of such a sort are syncategoremata and verbs and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification – or which is suited to be put together out of such things, as an expression is. And taking the word 'sign' in this way, an utterance is a natural sign of nothing.
CAP. 2. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI, ET QUOD DIVERSIMODE POTEST ACCIPI HOC NOMEN 'TERMINUS' IN SPECIALI	Chapter 2. On the division of the term, and that 'term' can be specifically understood in different ways.
(i) Est autem sciendum quod hoc nomen 'terminus' tripliciter accipitur. Uno modo vocatur terminus omne illud quod potest esse copula vel extremum propositionis categoricae, subiectum delicet vel praedicatum, vel etiam determinatio extremi vel verbi. Et isto modo etiam una propositio potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse pars ropositionis. Haec enim vera est 'homo est animal: est propositio vera' in qua haec tota propositio 'homo est animal' est subiectum, et 'propositio vera' est praedicatum.	You should know that the name ‘term’ is understood in three ways. In one way, everything is called a term that can be the copula or an extreme of a categorical proposition (that is, its subject or predicate), or also a determination of an extreme or of the verb [in such a proposition] . In this way, even a proposition can be a term, just as it can be part of a proposition. For ‘ “A man is an animal” is a true proposition’ is true. In it, the whole proposition ‘A man is an animal’ is subject, and ‘true proposition’ is the predicate.
(ii) Aliter accipitur hoc nomen 'terminus'secundum quod distinguitur contra orationem, et sic omne incomplexum vocatur terminus. Et sic de termino in praecedenti capitulo sum locutus.	In another way, the name ‘term’ is understood according as it is contrasted with ‘expression’ [oratio]. In this way, every non-complex [word] is called a term. I was talking about ‘term’ in this way in the preceding chapter.
(iii) Tertio modo accipitur terminus praecise et magis stricte pro illo quod significative sumptum potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Et isto modo nullum verbum, nec coniunctio nec adverbium nec praepositio nec interiectio est terminus; multa etiam nomina non sunt termini, scilicet nomina syncategorematica, quia talia quamvis possint esse extrema propositionum si sumantur materialiter vel simpliciter, quando tamen sumuntur significative non possunt esse extrema propositionum.	(3) In a third way, ‘term’ is taken precisely and more strictly for that which, taken significatively, can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. In this way no verb, nor conjunction, nor adverb, nor preposition nor interjection is a term. Many names also are not terms, namely syncategorematic names. For such [names], although they could be the extremes of propositions if they were taken materially or simply, nevertheless when they are taken significatively they cannot be the extremes of propositions.
Unde ista oratio 'legit: est verbum' congrua est et vera si hoc verbum 'legit' sumatur materialiter, si autem significative sumeretur non intelligibilis esset. Similiter est de talibus 'omnis: est nomen'; 'olim: est adverbium'; 'si: est coniunctio'; 'ab: est praepositio'. Et isto modo accipit Philosophus terminum quando definit terminum I Priorum.	Wherefore the expression “Reads is a verb’ is congruous and true if the verb ‘reads’ were taken materially,but if it were taken significatively it would be unintelligible. It is similar for cases such as “‘every” is a name’, “‘once” is an adverb’, “‘if’ is a conjunction’, “‘from” is a preposition’. The Philosopher takes ‘term’ in this way when he defines the term in Prior Analytics I.
(iv) Non solum autem unum incomplexum potest esse terminus, sic accepto termino, sed etiam compositum ex duobus incomplexis, scilicet compositum ex adiectivo et substantivo; et etiam compositum ex participio et adverbio vel praepositione cum suo casuali potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. In ista enim propositione 'omnis homo albus est homo' nec 'homo' nec 'albus' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'homo albus'. Similiter hic 'currens velociter est homo' nec 'currens' nec 'velociter' est subiectum, sed hoc totum 'currens velociter'. [	(4) Now not only can one non-complex thing be a term, taking ‘term’ in this way, but also a composite of two non-complexes , namely the composite of an adjective and a substantive, and even the composite of a participle and an adverb, or a preposition with its accompaniment – can also be a term, just as it can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. For in the proposition ‘Every white man is a man’, neither ‘man’ nor ‘white’ is the subject, but rather the whole ‘white man’. Similarly ‘someone running quickly is a man.’ Here neither ‘running’ nor ‘quickly’ is the subject, but rather the whole thing ‘running quickly’.
(v) Est autem sciendum quod non tantum nomen acceptum in recto potest esse terminus, sed etiam casus obliquus potest esse terminus, quia potest esse subiectum propositionis et etiam praedicatum. Verumtamen obliquus non potest esse subiectum respectu cuiuscumque verbi: non enim bene dicitur 'hominis videt asinum', quamvis bene dicatur 'hominis est asinus'. Quomodo autem et respectu quorum verborum potest obliquus esse subiectum et respectu quorum non, ad grammaticum pertinet, cuius est constructiones vocum considerare.	(5) It should be known that not only can a name taken directly be a term, but also an oblique can also be a term, for it can be the subject of a proposition, and also a predicate. Yet an oblique cannot be a subject in respect of any verb. For ‘A man’s sees the ass’ is not well-said, although ‘A man’s is the ass’ is well-said. But [the question of] in what way and in respect of which verbs an oblique can be the subject, and with respect to which ones not - belongs to the grammarian, of whom it belongs to consider the constructions of words.
CAP. 3. DE DIVISIONE TERMINI INCOMPLEXI	Chapter 3: on the division of incomplex terms.
(1) Visa aequivocatione istius nominis 'terminus' prosequendum est de divisionibus termini incomplexi. Unde non solum terminus incomplexus dividitur in terminum prolatum, scriptum et conceptum, sed etiam singula membra consimilibus divisionibus subdividuntur. Nam sicut vocum quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam sunt verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam participia, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones, et consimiliter est de scriptis, sic intentionum animae quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam verba, quaedam sunt aliarum partium, quia quaedam sunt pronomina, quaedam adverbia, quaedam coniunctiones, quaedam praepositiones.	Having seen the equivocation in the name 'term', the divisions of the non-complex term is to be investigated. Hence the non-complex term is not only divided into the spoken, written and conceived term, but each branch is also subdivided by similar divisions. For, just as of utterances certain are names, certain are verbs, certain ones are of other parts of speech - since certain ones are pronouns, certain are participles, or adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions (and similarly for things that are written), so of intentions of the soul, certain are names, certain are verbs, certain are of other parts of speech. For certain ones are pronouns, certain are adverbs, or conjunctions, or prepositions.
(2) Utrum autem participiis vocalibus et scriptis correspondeant in mente quaedam intentiones a verbis distinctae potest esse dubium, eo quod non videtur magna necessitas talem pluralitatem ponere in mentalibus terminis. Nam verbum et participium verbi sumptum cum hoc verbo 'est' semper videntur in significando aequivalere.	But there may be a doubt whether to spoken and written participles there correspond certain intentions in the mind, distinct from verbs, seeing that there does not seem to be a great necessity to suppose such a plurality of mental terms.
Propter quod sicut nominum synonymorum multiplicatio non est propter necessitatem significationis inventa, sed propter ornatum sermonis vel aliam causam consimilem accidentalem, quia quidquid per omnia synonyma significatur posset per unum illorum exprimi sufficienter, et ideo multitudo conceptuum tali pluralitati synonymorum non correspondet, ita videtur quod distinctio inter verba vocalia et participia non est propter necessitatem expressionis inventa, propter quod videtur quod non oportet participiis vocalibus distinctos conceptus in mente correspondere. Et de pronominibus posset esse consimilis dubitatio.	For a verb and the participle of the verb taken with the verb 'is' always seem to be equivalent in signifying. Because of this, just as the multiplication of synonymous names is found not on account of the necessity of signification, but rather for the sake of decoration of speech or another similar accidental cause (for whatever is signified by [several] synonymous names could be sufficiently expressed by one of them, and therefore a multitude of concepts does not correspond to such a plurality of synonyms) so it seems the distinction between spoken verbs and participles is not found on account of the necessity of expression. Because of this, it seems that there do not have to be distinct concepts in the mind corresponding to spoken participles. And of pronouns there could be a similar doubt.
(3) Est autem inter nomina vocalia et mentalia differentia, quia quamvis omnia accidentia grammaticalia quae conveniunt nominibus mentalibus etiam nominibus vocalibus sint convenientia, non tamen e converso, sed quaedam sunt communia tam istis quam illis, quaedam autem sunt propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis, quia quaecumque conveniunt vocalibus, et scriptis et e converso.	Now there is a difference between mental and spoken names, because, although all the grammatical accidents appropriate to mental names are also appropriate to spoken names, yet it is not conversely so. Rather, certain [grammatical accidents] are common as much to the latter as to the former, others however are proper to spoken and written names. For whatever belong to the spoken also belong to the written, and conversely.)
(4) Accidentia communia nominibus vocalibus et mentalibus sunt casus et numerus. Sicut enim istae propositiones vocales `homo est animal', 'homo non est animalia' distincta habent praedicata quorum unum est numeri singularis et aliud pluralis, ita propositiones mentales quarum una mens ante omnem vocem dicit quod homo est animal et alia dicit quod homo non est animalia distincta habent praedicata quorum unum potest dici numeri singularis et aliud pluralis. Similiter sicut istae propositiones vocales 'homo est homo' et 'homo non est hominis' habent distincta praedicata variata per casus, sic proportionaliter dicendum est de propositionibus in mente correspondentibus.	The accidents common to spoken and mental names are case and number. For, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is an animal' [and] 'A man is not animals' have distinct predicates, of which one is singular and the other plural, so the mental propositions - by one of which the mind, before any utterance, says that a man is an animal, and by the other of which it says that a man is not animals - have distinct predicates, one of which can be said to be in the singular number, and the other in the plural. Similarly, just as the spoken propositions 'A man is a man' and 'A man is not of a man' have distinct predicates, varied through case, so proportionally it is to be said of the corresponding propositions in the mind.
(5) Accidentia autem propria nominibus vocalibus et scriptis sunt genus et figura. Talia enim accidentia nominibus propter necessitatem significationis non conveniunt. Unde et aliquando accidit quod duo nomina sunt synonyma et tamen sunt generum diversorum et aliquando diversarum figurarum,propter quod talem multiplicitatem non oportet naturalibus signis tribuere. Unde quaecumque pluralitas et varietas talium accidentium, quae potest competere nominibus synonymis, potest convenienter a mentalibus amoveri.	Now the accidents proper to spoken and written names are gender and form. For such accidents do not belong to names on account of the necessity of signification. Thus also it sometimes happens that two names are synonyms and still are of diverse genders and sometimes in different forms, on account of which we do not have to attribute such a multiplicity to natural signs. Hence any plurality and variety of such accidents which can belong to synonymous names can appropriately be set aside in the case of mental [terms].
(6) De comparatione autem, an conveniat solis nominibus ad placitum institutis, posset esse difficultas, quam tamen quia non est magnae utilitatis pertranseo. De qualitate posset esse consimilis difficultas, quam alias pertractabo in sua radice.	(6) Now concerning comparison, there can be a difficulty about whether it belongs only to names assigned an interpretation. Which I pass over, nonetheless, because it is of no great use. A similar difficulty could arise over quality, which I shall treat of in detail elsewhere.
(7) Per praedicta autem potest studiosus evidenter perpendere quod quamvis aliquando ex sola variatione accidentium terminorum, scilicet casus, numeri et comparationis, propter tamen rem significatam, potest propositio una verificari et alia falsificari, hoc tamen numquam accidit propter genus et figuram. Quamvis enim frequenter ad congruitatem orationis habendam oportet aspicere ad genus, - haec enim est congrua 'homo est albus' et haec incongrua 'homo est alba', quod ex sola diversitate generis oritur -, tamen supposita congruitate nihil refert cuius generis vel cuius figurae sit subiectum vel praedicatum. Sed certe, cuius numeri vel casus sit subiectum vel praedicatum, ad sciendum an propositio sit vera vel falsa oportet aspicere. Haec enim est vera 'homo est animal' et haec falsa 'homo est animalia', et sic de aliis.	Now, through what has been said above, the keen student can evidently consider that, although sometimes by variation alone of the accidents of the terms (namely, case, number and comparison), one proposition can be verified and another one falsified, on account of the thing signified, nevertheless this never happens with gender and declension. For, even though you often have to respect gender for the agreement of speech (for example, Homo est albus agrees, and Homo est alba does not, and this comes about from a diversity of gender alone), still, assuming agreement, it is of no consideration of what gender or declension is the subject or predicate. But certainly we have to make out which number or case the subject or predicate has, to know whether the proposition is true or false. For 'a man is an animal' is true, and 'A man is animals' is false, and so for other cases.
(8) Et sicut nominibus vocalibus et scriptis quaedam sunt accidentia propria, quaedam communia illis et mentalibus, consimiliter de verborum accidentibus est dicendum. Communia sunt modus, genus, numerus, tempus, persona. De modo patet, nam alia oratio mentalis comrespondet isti orationi vocali Socrates legit et isti alia utinam Socrates legeret . De enere patet, nam alia oratio mentalis correspondet isti orationi vocali 'Socrates amat' et isti 'Socrates amatur'. Verumtamen in mente non sunt nisi tria genera, nam deponentia et communia vocalia non sunt propter necessitatem significationis inventa, cum verba communia aequivaleant activis et passivis et deponentia neutris vel activis, et ideo non oportet talem plulalitatern in verbis mentalibus ponere.	And just as there are certain accidents that are proper to spoken and written names, and certain that are common also to mental names, a similar thing is to be said about the accidents of verbs. The common ones are mood, kind [genus], number, tense, and person. Concerning mood it is clear. For one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates read' and another to 'Would that Socrates read!'. It is clear with kind, for one mental expression corresponds to the spoken expression 'Socrates loved' and another one to 'Socrates is loved'. Nevertheless there are just three kinds in the mind, for spoken deponents and common verbs are not found on account of the necessity of signification, since common verbs are equivalent to active and passive ones, and deponent ones to middle ones and active ones. And for that reason we do not have to suppose such a plurality in mental verbs.
(9) De numero etiam patet, nam distinctae orationes mentales correspondent istis 'tu legis', 'vos legitis'. Idem patet de tempore, nam istis 'tu legis', 'tu legisti' distinctae orationes rnentales correspondent. Hoc idem patet de persona, ut istis 'tu legis', 'ego lego' aliae correspondent.	Concerning number it is also clear, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'they read'. The same is clear with tense, for distinct mental expressions correspond to 'You read [present]' [and] 'You read [past]'. The same is clear about person. For example, different [mental expressions] correspond to 'he reads' [and] 'I read'.
(10) Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones ex hoc convincitur quod omni orationi vocali correspondet alia mentalis in mente, et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis quae sunt propter necessitatem significationis impositae sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondenter sunt distinctae.	But that we have to suppose such mental names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions can be proved from the fact that to every spoken expression there corresponds another mental one in the mind, and therefore, just as those parts of the spoken proposition that are imposed because of the necessity of signification are distinct, so also the corresponding parts of the mental proposition are distinct.
Propter quod sicut nomina vocalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones sunt necessariae diversis propositionibus et orationibus vocalibus, ita quod impossibile est omnia exprimere per nomina et verba solum quae possunt per illa et alias partes exprimi, sic etiam distinctae partes consimiles sunt necessariae mentalibus propositionibus.	Because of this, just as spoken names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions are necessary for diverse spoken propositions and expressions - so that it is impossible to express alone everything by means of names and verbs that can be expressed through those, together with the other parts of speech – so, also, similar distinct parts are necessary for mental propositions.
(11) Accidentia autem propria verbis institutis sunt coniugatio et figura. Tamen quandoque verba diversaruim coniugationuim possunt esse synonyma et similiter verba diversae figurae.	The accidents proper to instituted verbs are conjugation and 'form' [inflection]. Yet sometimes verbs in different conjugations can be synonymous, and similarly verbs of diverse form.
(12) Per praedicta potest studiosus faciliter advertere quomodo proportionaliter de aliis partibus orationis et earum accidentibus est dicendum.	(12) From what has been said, the keen student will easily recognize what there is to be said, proportionally, about the other parts of speech and their accidents.
(13) Nec miretur aliquis quod dico aliqua nomina et verba esse mentalia, sed prius legat Boethium super Perihermenias , et hoc ibidem inveniet. Et ideo quando Aristoteles tam nomen quam verbum definit per vocem, accipit ibi nomen et verbum magis stricte, scilicet pro nomine et verbo vocali.	Nor should anyone wonder that I say that some names and verbs are mental, but let him first read Boethius on De interpretatione, and he will find it there. And for that reason, when Aristotle defines the name, just as the verb, through 'an utterance', he takes there 'name' and 'verb' strictly, i.e., for a spoken name and verb.
PARS I, CAP. 4. DE DIVISIONE TERMINORUM IN TERMINOS CATEGOREMATICOS ET SYNCATEGOREMATICOS, QUAE EST COMMUNIS TAM TERMINIS MENTALIBUS QUAM VOCALIBUS	Chapter 4: On the division of terms into categorematic and syncategorematic, which is common to mental and spoken terms.
(i) Adhuc aliter dividitur terminus, tam vocalis quam mentalis, quia terminorum quidam sunt categorematici, quidam syncategorematici. Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomen 'homo' significat omnes homines et hoc nomen 'animal' omnia animalia, et hoc nomen 'albedo' omnes albedines.	And the term is divided in still another way, both the spoken and the mental one, for certain terms are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic terms have a definite and fixed signification, for instance, the name "man" signifies all men, and the name and the name ‘animal’ all animals, and the name "whiteness" all whitenesses.
(ii) Termini autem syncategorematici, cuiusmodi sunt tales 'omnis', 'nullus', 'aliquis', 'totus', 'praeter', 'tantum', 'inquantum' et huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata, immo sicut in algorismo cifra per se posita nihil significat, sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncategorema proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum aliquid significare sive facit ipsum pro aliquo vel aliquibus modo determinato supponere vel aliud officium circa categorema exercet.	But syncategorematic terms, of which sort are such - "every", none", "some", "whole", "besides", "only", "insofar" and the like, do not have a definite and fixed signification, neither do they signify any things distinct from the things signified by categorematic terms. Indeed, just as in Arabic notation, zero given by itself signifies nothing, but when added to another digit causes the latter to signify, so a syncategorematic term does not signify anything, properly speaking, but rather when added to another [term] makes it signify something, or makes it supposit in a determinate way for some thing or things, or exercises some other function with respect to the categorematic term.
(iii) Unde hoc syncategorema 'omnis' non habet aliquod certum significatum, sed additum 'homini' facit ipsum stare seu supponere actualiter sive confuse et distributive pro omnibus hominibus; additum autem 'lapidi' facit ipsum stare pro omnibus lapidibus; et additum 'albedini' facit ipsum stare pro omnibus albedinibus.	Thus, the syncategorematic term "every" does not have any fixed significate, but added to "man", makes it stand for or supposit actually - or ‘confusedly and distributively’, for all men. Added to "stone", however, it makes it stand for all stones. And added to "whiteness", it makes the latter stand for all whitenesses.
Et sicut est de isto syncategoremate 'omnis', ita proportionaliter de aliis est tenendum, quamvis distinctis sycategorematibus distincta officia conveniant, sicut de aliquibus inferius ostendetur.	And just as for the syncategorematic term "every", so we have to hold the same thing proportionally for the others, although distinct offices belong to different syncategorematic terms, as will be shown for certain of them below
(4) Et si proterviatur quod haec dictio 'omnis' est significativa, ergo aliquid significat, dicendum est quod non ideo dicitur significativa quia aliquid determinate significat, sed quia facit aliud significare vel supponere vel stare pro aliquo, sicut declaratum est. Et sicut hoc nomen `omnis' nihil determinate et finite significat, secundum modum loquendi Boethii,sic est de omnibus syncategorematibus et universaliter de coniunctionibus et praepositionibus.	If anyone quibbles that the word "every" is significative, therefore signifies something, it should be said that it is not called "significative" because it determinately signifies something, but rather because it makes another thing signify or supposit or stand for something, as was made clear. And just as the name "every" determinately and definitely signifies nothing, according to Boethius' manner of speaking, so it is for all syncategorematic terms and for conjunctions and prepositions generally.
(v) De quibusdam autem adverbiis aliter est, quia quaedam eorum determinate significant illa quae significant nomina categorematica, quamvis alio modo significandi important.	But it is otherwise for certain adverbs, because some of them determinately signify things that categorematic names signify, although they convey [those things] by another mode of signifying.

THE LOGIC MUSEUM Copyright (translation and introduction) (C) E.D.Buckner 2010.