| [CAP.5. DE DIVISIONE NOMINIS PER CONCRETUM ET ABSTRACTUM]
| [Chapter 5. On the division of names into concrete and abstract.]
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| Omissis autem aliis partibus orationis, de nominibus est dicendum, et primo de divisione nominis per concretum et abstractum est disserendum.
| But omitting the other parts of speech, we should talk about names, and first we should discuss the division of the name into concrete and abstract names.
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| Et est advertendum quod concretum et abstractum sunt nomina consimile principium secundum vocem habentia, sed non consimiliter terminantur, sicut patet quod 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'fortis' et 'fortitudo' , 'animal' et 'animalitas' a simili littera vel syllaba incipiunt, sed non terminantur in consimileim. Et semper vel frequenter abstractum plures habet syllabas quam concretum, sicut in praedictis exemplis apparet. Concretum etiam, ut frequenter, est adiectivum et abstractum substantivum.
| It should be noted that ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are names that have a similar beginning verbally, but not similar endings. E.g. it is clear that ‘just’ and ‘justice’, ‘strong’ and ‘strength’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ begin with a similar letter or syllable, but do not end in a similar way. The abstract name always or mostly has more syllables than the concrete name, as is apparent in the above examples. Also, in many cases the concrete name is an adjective and the abstract a substantive.
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| Nominum autem concretorum et abstractorum multi sunt modi. Quandoque enim concretum aliquam rem significat vel connotat sive importat seu dat intelligere, pro qua etiam supponit, quam abstractum nullo modo significat nec per consequens aliquo modo supponit pro eadem, sicut se habent 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'album' et 'albedo' et consimilia. Nam 'iustus' vere supponit pro homine quando dicitur 'iustus est virtuosus'; non enim potest supponere pro iustitia, quia iustitia quamvis sit virtus non tamen est virtuosa. Hoc nomen vero 'iustitia' supponit pro qualitate et non pro homine. Et propter hoc accidit quod praedicatio talis concreti de abstracto est impossibilis, quia semper concretum tale et abstractum pro distinctis rebus supponunt.
| Now there are many kinds of concrete and abstract names. Sometimes the concrete name signifies something, or connotes or conveys or gives the understanding of, and even supposits for something, which the abstract name in no way signifies nor as a consequence supposits for in any way. ‘Just’ and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and suchlike are related in this way. For ‘a just [person]’ truly supposits for a man when someone says ‘The just [person] is virtuous’, for it cannot supposit for justice, because justice, although it is a virtue, is nevertheless not virtuous. But the name ‘justice’ supposits for a quality and not for a man. And because of this it happens that the predication of such a concrete name of the abstract name is impossible. For such a concrete and the abstract always supposit for distinct things.
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| Sunt autem, ad praesens, tres species seu differentiae talium nominum inferiores. Prima est quando abstractum supponit pro accidente vel est de talibus 'albedo-album', 'calor-calidum', 'sciens-scientia', loquendo de creaturis. Et sic de aliis. Nam in omnibus talibus abstractum supponit pro accidente inhaerente subiecto et concretum supponit pro subiecto eiusdem. E converso autem accidit de talibus 'ignis-igneus', nam 'ignis' supponit pro subiecto et 'igneus', quod est concretum, pro accidente eiusdem. Dicimus enim quod calor est igneus et non ignis; similiter dicimus quod ista scientia est humana et non homo.
| There are, for the present, three inferior species or differentiae of such names. The first is when the abstract supposits for an accident or for such forms as ‘whiteness/white-thing’, ‘heat/hot-thing’, ‘knowing/knowledge’, speaking about created things, and so on. In all such cases, the abstract name supposits for an accident inhering in a subject, and the concrete name supposits for the subject of the same. But it happens the other way around in ‘fire/fiery’, for ‘fire’ supposits for the subject, and ‘fiery’, which is the concrete, for an accident of the same thing. For we say that heat is fiery, and not fire. Similarly, we say that knowledge is human and not a man.
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| Secunda differentia talium nominum est quando concretum supponit pro parte et abstractum pro toto vel e converso sicut in istis 'anima-animatum'; homo enim est animatus et non anima, et ita 'animatum' supponit pro homine et anima pro parte eius. Hic autem 'anima est humana' et 'anima non est homo', 'homo', quod est abstractum, supponit pro toto et humanum pro anima, quae est pars.
| The second differentia of such names is when the concrete name supposits for a part and the abstract for the whole, or conversely. For example, in ‘soul/en-souled’ . For man is en-souled and not a soul, and so ‘en-souled’ supposits for a man, and ‘soul’ for a part of him. But in ‘A soul is human’ and ‘A soul is not a man’, ‘man’, which is the abstract, supposits for the whole, and ‘human’ for the soul, which is a part.
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| Est autem advertendum quod quandoque idem concretum accipitur aequivoce, quia quandoque idem concretum est tam in prima quam in secunda differentia, sicut hoc nomen 'animatum' potest supponere pro toto, quia dicimus quod homo est animatus ; et potest supponere pro subiecto recipiente animain, quia dicimus quod corpus, quod est altera pars, est animatum. Et sicut est de isto nomine ita est de multis aliis, quod sic possunt aequivoce accipi.
| But notice that sometimes the same concrete name is taken equivocally, for sometimes the same concrete name is in the first differentia as well as the second. For example, the name ‘en-souled’ can supposit for a whole, because we say that a man is en-souled. It can also supposit for a subject that receives a soul, for we say that a body, which is the other part of the [body-soul] composite, is en-souled. And just as it is with this name, so it is with many others that can be taken equivocally in this way.
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| Tertia differentia talium nominum est quando concretum et abstractum supponunt pro distinctis rebus, quarum tamen neutra est subiectum nec pars alterius. Et hoc contingit fieri multis modis: nam tales res quandoque se habent sicut causa et effectus, sicut dicimus quod hoc opus est humanum et non homo; quandoque sicut signum et significatum, sicut dicimus quod differentia hominis est differentia essentialis, non quia est essentia, sed quia est signum alicuius partis essentiae; quandoque sicut locus et locatum, sicut dicimus quod iste est Anglicus et non Anglia. Multis etiam aliis modis contingit hoc fieri, quae discutienda ingeniosis dimitto.
| The third differentia of such names is when the concrete and the abstract name supposit for different things, of which neither is the subject or a part of the other. This can happen in many ways. For such things are sometimes related as cause and effect (such as when we say that this work is human, and not a man); sometimes as sign and signified (for example, such as when we say that the differentia of a man is an essential difference, not because it is an essence but because it is a sign of some part of the essence; sometimes as location and located (for example, we say that he is English, and not that he is England). This can also happen in many other way, which I leave to the ingenious to discuss.
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| Et sicut in primis duobus modis aliquod concretum supponit pro parte vel pro forma et abstractum pro toto vel subiecto, et aliquando accidit e converso, ita est in proposito. Nam quandoque concretum supponit pro effectu vel significato et abstractum pro causa vel signo, etaliquando e converso. Et sic est de ceteris contentis sub isto modo.
| And just as in the first two modes, some concrete name supposits for a part or for a form and the abstract name for the whole or the subject, also sometimes it happens conversely, so in the present case. For sometimes the concrete name supposits for the effect or the significate and the abstract name for the cause or the sign, and sometimes the other way around. So it is for the others contained under this mode.
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| Et sicut contingit idem nomen esse concretum primis duobus modis, sed tunc accipitur aequivoce, ita contingit idem concretum esse concretum primo modo et tertio, immo omnibus tribus modis potest esse concretum. Et ideo isti tres modi inferiores ad primum modum principalem non sic distinguuntur quod unus eorum universaliter negetur a reliquo, sed sic quod quilibet ab alio particulariter amovetur, quod sufficit ad distinctionem talium. Similiter etiam non est inconveniens quod idem nomen respectu diversorum sit concretum et abstractum.
| Just as it can happen that the same name is concrete in the first two modes, but then is understood equivocally, so it can happen that the same concrete name is concrete in the first mode and the third. Indeed, it can be concrete in all three modes. Therefore, these three modes, inferior to the first principal mode, are not distinguished in such a way that the one of them is denied universally of the other, but rather so that each of them is separated from the other in a particular way. This is sufficient for the distinction among such modes. Similarly, there is nothing inappropriate in the same name being concrete and abstract, with respect to diverse cases.
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| (10) Sciendum est quod quandoque habemus concretum aequivaIenter, cui tamen nullum abstractum propter, penuriam nominum correspondet, sicut est de hoc nomine 'studiosus' quando accipitur pro virtuoso.
| It should be known that sometimes we have the equivalent of a concrete name, for which, however, there is no corresponding abstract name because of the poverty of names. This is the case for the name ‘zealous’, when it is taken for the virtuous.
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| [CAP. 6. QUOD NOMEN CONCRETUM ET ABSTRACTUM ALIQUANDO IDEM SIGNIFICANT]
| [Chapter 6: A concrete and an abstract name sometimes signify the same thing]
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| Praeter modum praedictum nominum concretorum et abstractorum sunt multi alii, quorum unus est quod nomen concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma. Sed ne in aequivoco procedatur, sciendum quod hoc nomen 'synonyma' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large.
| Beyond the mode of concrete and abstract names mentioned above, there are many others, of which one is that the concrete name and the abstract name are sometimes synonyms. But, in order not to proceed in an ambiguous way, it should be known that the name ‘synonyms’ is taken in two senses, namely narrowly and broadly.
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| Stricte dicuntur illa synonyma quibus omnes utentes intendunt simpliciter uti pro eodem, et sic non loquor hic de synonymis . Large dicuntur illa synonyma quae simpliciter idem significant omnibus modis, ita quod nihil aliquo modo significatur per unum quin eodem modo significetur per reliquum, quamvis non omnes utentes credant ipsa idem significare sed decepti aestiment aliquid significari per unum quod non significatur per reliquum, sicut si aliqui aestimarent quod hoc nomen 'Deus' importaret unum totum et 'deitas' partem eius. Isto secundo modo intendo uti in isto capitulo, et in multis aliis, hoc nomine 'synonyma'.
| Synonyms in the narrow sense are those which all users intend to use without qualification for the same thing, and I am not talking about synonyms in this way here. Synonyms in the broad sense are those which signify without qualification the same in all ways, so that nothing is signified in any way by one unless it is signified in the same way by the other, even though not all users believe them to signify the same but rather, being deceived, they esteem something to be signified by the one that is not signified by the other - for example, if some persons were to suppose that the name ‘God’ conveyed a whole and ‘deity’ a part of it. I intend to use the name ‘synonym’ in this second sense in this chapter and in many others.
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| Et dico quod concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma, sicut secundum intentionem Phi1osophi ista nomina sunt synonyma 'Deus' et 'deitas', 'homo' et 'humanitas', 'animal-animalitas', 'equus' et 'equinitas'. Et hinc est quod multa nomina habemus consimilia concretis talibus, non tamen abstractis consimilia. Quamvis enim frequenter ponant hoc nomen 'humanitas' et hoc nomen 'animalitas' et quandoque hoc nomen 'equinitas' quae , correspondent quasi abstracta istis nominibus 'homo', 'animal', 'equus', tamen raro vel numquam inveniuntur talia nomina 'bovinitas', 'asineitas', 'caprineitas', 'albedineitas', 'nigredineitas', 'coloreitas', 'dulcedineitas', quamvis istis nominibus 'bos', 'asinus', 'capra', 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'color', 'dulcedo' frequenter utamur.
| And I say that a concrete name and the abstract name corresponding to it are sometimes synonyms. For example, according to the Philosopher’s intention, ‘God’ and ‘deity’, ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’, ‘horse’ and ‘horsehood’. And hence it is that we have many names similar to these concrete names, but not many similar to the abstract names. For although authorities frequently use the name ‘humanity’ and the name ‘animality’, and sometimes the name ‘horsehood’ (which correspond as abstract names to the names ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘horse’), nevertheless names like ‘cowship’, ‘donkeyness’, ‘goathood’, ‘whitenesshood’, ‘blacknesshood’, ‘colorship’, ‘sweetnesshood’ are rarely or never found - even though we frequently use the names ‘cow’, ‘ass’, ‘goat’, ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’, ‘sweetness’, ‘color’.
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| Immo sicut apud antiquos philosophos ista nomina sunt synonyma 'calor-caliditas', 'frigus-frigiditas', ita ista erunt synonyma apud eos 'equus-equinitas', 'homo-huinanitas'. Nec in talibus curabant distinguere inter nomina concreta et abstracta quantum ad significationem, quamvis unum illorum haberet plures syllabas et formam abstractorum primo modo dictorum et aliud non, sed magis formam concretorum primo modo dictorum. Nec tali diversitate talium nominum utebantur nisi causa ornatus locutionis vel aliqua alia causa accidentali, sicut nec nominibus svnonymis.
| Indeed, just as among the ancient philosophers the names ‘heat/hotness’, ‘cold /coldness’ are synonyms, so ‘horse/horsehood’, ‘man/humanity’ were synonyms for them. Nor in such cases did they care to distinguish between concrete and abstract names with respect to their signification, even though the one had more syllables and the form of abstract names in the first of the above modes, and the other one did not but instead [had] more the [syntactical] form of concrete [names] in the first of the above modes. Nor did they employ a diversity of such names except as an ornament of speech, or for some other accidental reason, just as in the case of synonymous names.
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| Sub isto modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum, secundum intentionem Philosophi et Commentatoris, comprehenduntur omnia nomina substantiarum concreta et abstracta ficta ab eis, quae nec pro accidente nec pro parte nec pro toto illius quod importatur per nomen concretum secundum formam nec pro aliqua re disparata ab eo supponunt, cuiusmodi secundum eos sunt 'animalitas', 'equinitas' et huiusmodi. Non enim animalitas stat pro aliquo accidente animalis, nec pro parte nec pro aliquo toto cuius pars sit animal, nec pro re aliqua extrinseca totaliter ab animali distincta.
| Under this mode of concrete and abstract names (according to the intention of the Philosopher and the Commentator), are comprehended all names of substances and the abstract names contrived from them, which supposit neither for an accident nor for a part nor for the whole of that which is conveyed by a name concrete in form nor for anything disparate from it. Of which sort, according to those persons, are ‘animality’, ‘horsehood’, and suchlike. For ‘animality’ does not supposit for any accident of an animal, nor for a part of one, nor for any whole whose part is an animal, nor for any extrinsic thing totally distinct from an animal.
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| Sub eodem etiam modo continentur omnia nomina abstracta quae in genere quantitatis collocantur et omnia nomina quae sunt propriae passiones istorum quae in genere quantitatis continentur, et hoc secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, non autem secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quantitatem esse rem absolutam, distinctam realiter tam a substania quam a qualitate. Unde secundum primam opinionem 'quantum' et 'quantitas' sunt nomina synonyma, et similiter 'longum' et 'longitudo', 'latum' et 'latitudo', 'profundum' et 'profunditas', 'plura' et 'pluralitas', et sic de aliis.
| Under the same mode are also contained all abstract names gathered together in the category of quantity, and all names which are the proper attributes of things contained in the category of quantity. And this is according to the view of those who suppose that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, although not according to the view of those who maintain that quantity is an absolute thing really distinct from substance and from quality. Thus, according to the former view, ‘quantum’ [amount] and ‘quantity’ are synonymous, and likewise ‘long’ and ‘length’, ‘broad’ and ‘breadth’, ‘deep’ and ‘depth’, ‘plural’ and ‘plurality’, and so on.
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| Ad eundem etiam modum reducuntur omnia nomina concreta et abstracta quae ad figuram pertinent, secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod figura non est alia res a quantitate sive a substantia et qualitate, et sic de aliis speciebus qualitatis. Unde illi habent ponere quod 'figura' et 'figuratum', 'rectum' et 'rectitudo', 'curvum' et 'curvitas', 'cavum' et 'cavitas', 'simum' et 'simitas', 'angulare' et 'angulus', 'convexum' et 'convexitas' et huiusmodi sunt nomina synonyma. Et haec omnia intelligenda sunt si nullum illorum nominum includat aliquam dictionem aequivalenter quam aliud non includit.
| Also, all concrete and abstract names that pertain to shape are reduced to the same mode, according to the view of those who suppose that shape is not a different thing from quantity, or from substance and quality, and so also for the other species of quantity. Thus, they have to maintain that ‘figure’ and ‘figured’, ‘straight’ and ‘straightness’, ‘curved’ and ‘curvedness’‘, ‘hollow’ and ‘hollowness’, ‘snub’ and ‘snubness’ ‘angular’ and ‘angle’, ‘convex’ and ‘convexity’, and suchlike, are synonymous names. And all these are to be understood, if none of these names equivalently includes some word that the other one does not include.
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| Et non solum talia nomina concreta et abstracta sunt synonyma, sicut dicere habent sic opinantes, quin etiam, secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod relatio non est aliqua res distincta realiter a rebus absolutis, nomina concreta et abstracta relativa sunt nomina synonyma, sicut 'pater' et 'paternitas', 'simile' et 'similitudo', 'causa' et 'causalitas', 'potentia' et 'potentialitas, 'risibile' et 'risibilitas', 'aptum' et 'aptitudo', 'habile' et 'habilitas', 'capax' et 'capacitas', duplum et 'dupleitas', 'calefactivum' et 'calefactivitas', et sic de aliis.
| And not only such concrete and abstract names are synonyms, as those who hold such a view have to say, but also (according to the view of those who suppose that a relation is not something really distinct from absolute things) concrete and abstract relative names are synonymous. For example, ‘father’ and ‘fatherhood’, ‘like’ and ‘likeness’, ‘cause’ and ‘causality’, ‘potency’ and ‘potentiality’, ‘capable of laughter’ and ‘capability of laughter’, ‘capable’ and ‘capacity’, ‘double’ and ‘doubleness’, ‘calefactive’ and ‘calefactivity’, and so on.
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| Verumtamen possent sic opinantes de relatione salvare quod talia concreta et abstracta non essent nomina synoyma, ponendo quod abstractum supponeret pro duobus simul, ut similitudo supponat pro duobus similibus. Et ita haec esset falsa 'simile est similitudo', haec tamen vera 'similia sunt similitudo'.
| Nevertheless, those who have this opinion of relation could save the idea that concrete and abstract names were not synonymous names by supposing that the abstract supposited for two things at once. For example, that ‘similitude’ supposit for two similar things. And thus ‘a similar thing is a similitude’ would be false, and yet ‘Similar things are a similitude’ would be true.
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| Possent etiam omnes praedicti opinantes salvare quod nulla nomina talia concreta et abstracta sunt synonyma per unum modum de quo dicetur inferius. Et tunc possent dicere quod semper in talibus praedicatio concreti de abstracto falsa est. Qui autem tenent praedictas opiniones et modum dicendi inferius tenere nolunt[/volunt], si dicant consequenter, concedere debent in omnibus talibus praedicationem concreti de abstracto et e converso.
| All those who hold the opinions above could also keep the idea that no such concrete and abstract names are synonymous by one mode which will be mentioned below. And then they could say that in such cases the predication of the concrete of the abstract is always false. But those who hold the above views and do not wish to adopt the manner of speaking below, ought in all such cases - if they are speaking consistently – to concede in all such cases the predication of the concrete of the abstract, and conversely.
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| (10) Unde primi opinantes concedere habent tales praedicationes 'homo est humanitas', 'animal est animalitas', et per consequens habent concedere tales 'humanitas currit', 'animalitas est alba', et sic de consimilibus. Secundi etiam habent concedere tales propositiones 'substantia est quantitas', 'qualitas est quantitas', 'substantia est longitudo', 'qualitas est latitudo', et per consequens tales 'quantitas currit', 'longitudo disputat', 'latitudo loquitur', et sic de consimilibus. Tertii autem habent concedere tales propositiones ' substantia est figura', 'curvitas est substantia', 'figura est alba', 'figura comedit', et sic de consimilibus. Quarti etiam haberent concedere tales 'relatio est substantia', 'qualitas est relatio', 'homo est relatio', 'similitudo currit', 'paternitas est filiatio', 'similitudo est dupleitas', et sic de consimilibus.
| Thus, those who hold the first view have to concede such predications [as] ‘A man is a humanity’, ‘An animal is an animality’, and in consequence have to concede ‘A humanity runs’, ‘An animality is white’, and so on. The persons holding the second view also have to concede such propositions [as] ‘A substance is a quantity’, ‘A quality is a quantity’, ‘A substance is a length’, ‘A quality is a breadth’, and in consequence, ‘A quantity runs’, ‘A length argues’, ‘A breadth speaks’, and so on. The persons holding the third view have to concede ‘a substance is a figure’, ‘curvedness is a substance’, ‘a figure is white’, ‘a figure eats’ and so on. The persons holding the fourth view have to concede propositions such as ‘a relation is a substance’, ‘A quality is a relation’, ‘A man is a relation’, ‘A likeness runs’, ‘A fatherhood is a filiation’, ‘A likeness is a doubleness’, and so on.
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| (11) Qualiter autem concedentes radices priorum opinionum possent negare tales propositiones, ostendetur inferius . Per quem etiam modum possunt negari tales propositiones 'materia est privatio ', 'aer est tenebra', 'homo est caecitas', 'anima est peccatum originale', ‘anima est ignorantia’, ‘homo est negatio’, ‘corpus Christi est mors’, non obstante quod aliqui concederent quod 'privatio', 'tenebra', caecitas et huiusmodi non importarent aliquid a parte rei, distinctum quocumque modo a subiecto, puta ab homine, materia et huiusmodi.
| Now, how those persons who concede the assumptions of the prior opinions could deny such propositions will be shown later. In that way they could also deny such propositions as ‘Matter is a privation’, ‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A man is a blindness’, ‘A soul is original sin’, ‘A soul is an ignorance’, ‘A man is a negation’, ‘The body of Christ is a death’ - notwithstanding that some people would concede that ‘privation’, ‘shadow’, ‘blindness’ and the like would not convey anything on the side of reality distinct in any way from the subject – i.e., from a man, matter, and the like.
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| [CAP. 7. INQUIRIT PER RATIONEM UTRUM HUIUSMODI NOMINA CONCRETA ET ABSTRACTA 'HOMO' ET 'HUMANITAS' 'ANIMAL' ET 'ANIMALLTAS' ET HUIUSMODI SINT NOMINA SYNONYMA]
| [Chapter 7. We enquire by argument whether concrete and abstract names of this sort (‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ and the like) are synonymous names]
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| Quia dictum est esse de intentione AristoteIis et Commentatoris sui 'hominem' et 'humanitatem' esse nomina synonyma , aliquantulum a principali proposito disgrediendo, quomodo verum sit et quomodo non, et an secundum veritatem sint synonyma, declarare curabo. Unde dico quod Aristoteles opinabatur quod nulla res imaginabilis importatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin eodem modo importetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' et e converso. Cuius ratio est quia secundum eum nulla res est hic inferius nisi materia et forma vel compositum vel accidens; sed nullum istorum, sicut inductive patet, plus importatur per unum istorum nominum quam per reliquum. Et hoc supposito patet quod haec sit falsa 'anima intellectiva est humanitas'.
| Because we spoke about the intention of Aristotle and his Commentator, that ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are synonymous names, I will try (digressing a little from the main subject ) to clarify how it is true and how not, and whether they are in truth synonymous. Hence I say that Aristotle’s opinion was that no imaginable thing is conveyed by the name ‘man’, unless it is conveyed by the name ‘humanity’ in the same way, and conversely. The reason of this is that according to him no thing exists in the world below except material and form, or composite or accident. But none of these, as is clear by example [inductive] is more conveyed by one of these names than by the other. And assuming this, it is clear that ‘an intellective soul is a humanity’ is false.
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| Nec valet cavillatio aliquorum dicentium quod 'humanitas' significat tantum naturam specificam, 'homo' autem addit, ultra, differentiam individualem, quia hoc inferius ostendetur esse falsum et contra intentionem Aristotelis . Et ad principale propositum sufficiat nunc adducere unicam rationem.
| Nor are the cavils of those valid who say that ‘humanity’ signifies only a specific nature, but ‘man’ adds beyond that an individual difference, because this will be shown below to be false and against the intention of Aristotle. And to the main thesis it suffices now to cite a single line of argument.
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| Unde sic arguo. Sicut se habent ad invicem 'homo' et 'humanitas', sic se habent 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas'. Hanc enim ponunt adversarii consimiliter fingentes tale abstractum de hoc nomine 'Socrates' sicut de hoc nomine 'homo'. Sed 'Socrates' nullam rem, nec distinctam formaliter nec realiter, significat quin significetur per hoc nomen 'Socrateitas', secundum sic fingentes, nec e converso; ergo 'homo' non significat aliquam rem quae non significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas', nec e converso.
| Therefore I argue as follows. Just as ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ stand to one another, so ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’. For the adversaries similarly suppose this, in making up an abstract name of this sort of ‘Socrates’, just as for the name ‘man’. But ‘Socrates’ signifies no thing, nor anything distinct, formally or in reality, unless it is signified by the name ‘Socrates’, according to those contriving this, nor conversely. Therefore ‘man’ does not signify any thing which is not signified by the name ‘humanity’, nor conversely.
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| Probatio assumpti: quia si alterum istorum nominum 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas' significat aliquid quod non significatur per reliquum, vel est natura specifica, et manifestum est quod illa aequaliter significatur per utrumque vel per neutrum; vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel accidens, quae omnia sic dicentes negant; vel est differentia individualis illa quam ponunt, quod dici non potest ab eis.
| Proof of the assumption. For if either of the names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’ signifies something that is not signified by the other, either this is a specific nature, and it is manifest that it is equally signified by both or by neither; or it is material or form or a composite or an accident, which all those saying those deny. Or it is an individual differentia that they are proposing, which cannot be said by them.
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| Nam, secundum eos, Socrates addit ultra naturam specificam differentiam individualem et similiter socrateitas addit ultra naturam specificam differentiam individualem, quia aliter Socrateitas nullo modo differret ab humanitate, et per consequens, secundum modum eorum arguendi, sicut humanitas est in Platone ita socrateitas esset in Platone.
| For, according to them, Socrates adds beyond a nature, a specific individual differentia, and similarly Socrateity adds, beyond a nature, a specific individual differentia, for otherwise Socrateity would in no way differ from humanity, and as a consequence, according to their manner of arguing, just as humanity is in Plato, so Socrateity would be in Plato.
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| Relinquitur igitur quod nihil a parte rei possunt ponere significari per hoc nomen Socrates quin eodem modo significetur per hoc nomen 'Socrateitas', nec e converso, et per consequens 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas' nullo modo distinguuntur a parte rei.
| Therefore it remains that nothing on the side of reality can be given to be signified by the name ‘Socrates’, unless it is signified in the same way by the name ‘Socrateity’, nor conversely, and as a consequence ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’ are in no way distinguished on the side of reality.
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| Et per consequens oportet eos concedere quod haec est vera 'Socrates est Sorteitas' , ex qua sequitur quod Socrates est haec humanitas demonstrando sorteitatem. Et per consequens 'Socrates est humanitas' , ab inferiori ad superius [sine distributione] a parte praedicati, et sequitur 'Socrates est humanitas, igitur homo est humanitas'. Et si hoc, nihil significatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' nec e converso.
| And in consequence they must concede that ‘Socrates is Socrateity’ is true, from which it follows that Socrates is this humanity (pointing to Socrateity). And as a consequence, ‘Socrates is humanity’, by argument from inferior to superior [without distribution] on the side of the predicate, and ‘Socrates is humanity, therefore a man is humanity’ follows. And if so, nothing is signified by the name ‘man’ unless signified by the name ‘humanity’, nor conversely.
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| Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod, secundum viam Aristotelis, nihil significatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' et e converso. Et hoc dico esse de intentione eius, et ideo vel concederet istam de virtute sermonis 'homo est humanitas' vel negaret eam solum propter aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter inclusum in altero istorum nominum, sicut inferius ostendetur.
| From all of these things it follows that, according to the way of Aristotle, nothing is signified by the name ‘man’ unless it is signified by the name ‘humanity’, and conversely. And I say that this is his intention, and so he would concede the literal truth of ‘a man is humanity’, or he would deny it only on account of some syncategorema equivalently included in one of those names, as will be shown below.
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| Sed quamvis haec fuerit intentio Aristotelis, tamen secundum veritatem theologorum non est sic dicendum. Non enim ista nomina sunt synonyma 'homo' et 'humanitas', quamvis concederetur quod neutrum istorum aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter includeret. Immo ista nomina possunt pro distinctis rebus supponere et aliquam rem significat vel consignificat unum nomen quam reliquum nomen nullo modo significat.
| But although this was the intention of Aristotle, still, according to the truth of theologians, it should not be said this way. For the names ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are not synonymous, although it was conceded that neither of those equivalently included some syncategorematic element. Indeed, these names can supposit for distinct things, and one name signifies or co-signifies some thing which the other name in no way signifies.
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| Nam hoc nomen 'homo' vere supponit pro Filio Dei, et ideo Filium Dei significat vel aliquo modo importat, hoc autem nomen 'humanitas' non supponit pro Filio Dei nec aliquo modo Filium Dei significat, non plus quam hoc nomen 'albedo'. Propter quod ista est concedenda 'Filius Dei est homo', haec autem falsa est `Filius Dei est humanitas'. Et ita, cum non quidlibet quod per unum istorum importatur, eodem modo importetur per reliquum, non sunt synonyma.
| For the name ‘man’ truly supposits for the son of God, and therefore signifies the son of God, or conveys him in some way. But the name ‘humanity’ does not supposit for the son of God, nor does it signify the son of God in some way, any more than the name ‘whiteness’. Because of this the proposition ‘the son of God is a man’ is to be conceded, but ‘the son of God is humanity’ is false. And so, since not everything that is conveyed by one is conveyed in the same way by the other, they are not synonymous.
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| Qualiter autem ista nomina non omnino idem significant, videri faciliter potest si definitiones exprimentes quid nominis eorum inspiciantur. Hoc enim nomen' humanitas' nihil significat nisi naturam unam compositam ex corpore et anima intellectiva, non connotando quod ista natura sustentetur ab aliquo supposito, puta a persona divina nec quod non sustentetur, et ideo semper pro illa natura supponit. Propter quod numquam potest supponere pro Filio Dei, cum Filius Dei non possit esse illa natura.
| And how these names do not entirely signify the same can easily be seen if their nominal definitions are examined. For the name ‘humanity’ signifies nothing except a single nature composed from body and intellective soul, not by connoting that this nature is sustained by some suppositum, for example by the divine person, nor that it is not sustained, and therefore it always supposits for that nature. Because of this, it can never supposit for the son of God, since the son of God could not be that nature.
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| Hoc autem nomen 'homo' significat illam naturam, dando intelligere illam naturam esse per se subsistentem et non sustentatam ab alio supposito vel esse sustentatam ab alio. Unde definitione exprimente quid nominis posset sic definiri, homo est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, a nullo supposito sustentata, vel est aliquod suppositum talem naturam compositam ex corpore et anima intellectiva sustentans. De quolibet enim homine ista descriptio pro altera parte verificatur. Nam haec est vera 'Socrates est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, non sustentata ab alio supposito, quamvis haec sit falsa de virtute sermonis 'Socrates est suppositum sustentans talem naturam'.
| But the name ‘man’ signifies that nature, by giving to understand that nature to be per se subsistent, and not sustained by another suppositum, or sustained by another. Therefore the nominal definition could be defined thus: ‘a man is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, sustained by no suppositum, or is some suppositum sustaining such a nature composed from body and intellective soul’. For that description is verified of any man for in one way or another [pro altera parte]. For ‘Socrates is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, not sustained by another suppositum’ although ‘Socrates is a suppositum sustaining such a nature’ is literally false.
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| Quod enim haec sit falsa, patet: quia si Socrates sit suppositum sustentans talem naturam, quaero, pro quo supponit hoc nomen 'Socrates' ? Si pro illa natura, igitur illa natura est sustentans talem naturam; quod falsum est, quia ipsa non sustentat se ipsam. Si supponit pro aliquo alio ab illa natura, hoc est impossibile, quia vel supponit pro parte illius naturae, vel pro aliqua substantia disparata ab illa natura, vel pro uno composito ex illa natura et aliquo alio; quorum quodlibet est de se falsum, et ex dicendis inferius satis apparebit falsitas ipsius. Et si dicatur quod Socrates supponit pro uno composito ex natura et differentia individuali, quod compositum sustentat naturam, hoc non valet, quia sicut inferius ostendetur, nullum est tale compositum.
| For it is clear that it is false, for if Socrates is a suppositum sustaining such a nature, I ask what the name ‘Socrates’ supposits for? If for that nature, then that nature is sustaining such a nature. Which is false, because that [nature] does not sustain itself. If it supposits for something other than that nature, that is impossible, because it either supposits for part of that nature, or from some substance disparate from that nature, or from a single thing composed from that nature and something else – of which any of them is of itself false, and from what are to be said below the falsity of that will become apparent enough. And if it is said that ‘Socrates’ supposits for a single thing composed out of nature and individual differentia, and that this composite sustains the nature, this is not valid, for just as will be shown below, there is no such composite.
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| Similiter, hoc dato non evaditur ratio, nam si Socrates sustentat naturam, oportet quod aliquam naturam individuam sustentet. Sed nullam naturam individuam sustentat, quia quaelibet natura individua includit talem differentiam, secundum istos, et ita unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali sustentaret unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali, quod est absurdum.
| Similarly, the reasoning is not evaded with this granted, for if Socrates sustains a nature, he has to sustain some individual nature. But he sustains no individual differentia, for every individual nature sustains includes such a differentia, according to those persons, and so a single composite from nature and individual differentia would sustain a single composite out of nature and individual differentia, which is absurd.
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| Nec valet dicere quod subiectum in ista 'Socrates sustentat naturam humanam' supponit pro uno composito ex natura singulari et negatione dependentiae ad aliud suppositum; tum quia tunc Socrates esset compositus ex affirmatione et negatione, quod est absurdum, cum nihil reale substantiale possit componi ex talibus, tum quia nullum tale compositum potest sustentare naturam, cum natura non possit ad tale compositum dependere.
| Nor is it valid to say that the subject in ‘Socrates sustains a human nature’ supposits for one thing composed from a singular nature and from the negation of dependency on another suppositum, both because (i) Socrates would then be composed from affirmation and negation, which is absurd, since no real substantial thing could be composed from such things, and (ii) because no such composite can sustain a nature, since a nature could not depend on such a composite.
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| Relinquitur igitur quod haec est falsa de virtute sermonis 'Socrates est suppositum sustentans naturam humanam'; haec tamen est vera 'Socrates est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, a nullo sustentata', et propter hoc est homo. Haec autem 'Filius Dei est homo' non est vera quia Filius Dei sit talis natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, sed quia Filius Dei est suppositum sustentans talem naturam et terminans dependentiam eius.
| Therefore it remains that ‘Socrates is a suppositum sustaining a human nature’ is literally false. But ‘Socrates is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, sustained by no [suppositum]’ is true – and because of this, he is a man. But ‘the son of God is a man’ is not true because the son of God is such a nature composed from body and intellective soul, but rather because the son of God is a suppositum sustaining such a nature and terminating its dependency.
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| Ex praedictis possunt elici diversae conclusiones. Una, quod quamvis haec concederetur 'homo est humanitas', haec tamen est falsa 'omnis homo est humanitas', immo haec esset vera 'aliquis homo non est humanitas'. Si enim neutrum istorum nominum 'homo', 'humanitas' includeret aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter, haec esset concedenda 'homo est humanitas', quia hic homo esset humanitas, demonstrando Socratem, quia non posset dari quod subiectum et praedicatum pro distinctis supponerent sed pro eadem re; et per consequens propositio esset vera si nullum syncategorema nec aliqua determinatio aequivalenter includeretur.
| From what has been said, diverse conclusions can be drawn. One, that although ‘a man is humanity’ were conceded, nevertheless ‘every man is a humanity’ is false. Indeed, ‘some man is not a humanity’ would be true. For if neither of the names ‘man’, ‘humanity’ included some syncategorematic term equivalently, ‘a man is humanity’ would be conceded, because this man would be a humanity (pointing to Socrates), because it could not be allowed that the subject and predicate supposited for distinct things, but for the same thing, and as a consequence the proposition would be true if no syncategorematic term nor some determination were equivalently included.
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| Hoc tamen concesso haec esset falsa 'omnis homo est humanitas', quia haberet unam singularem falsam, scilicet istam 'hic homo est humanitas', demonstrando Filium Dei. Et ita istae duae starent simul pro diversis singularibus 'homo est humanitas', 'homo non est humanitas'. Et qui vellet istud concedere, deberet consequenter dicere quod aliquando abstractum praedicatur de concreto et e converso.
| Nevertheless, with this conceded, ‘every man is a humanity’ would be false, because it would have one singular false, namely ‘this man is a humanity’ – pointing to the son of God. And so the two propositions ‘a man is a humanity’ and ‘a man is not a humanity’ would be consistent together, for diverse singulars. And one who wished to concede this, ought consequently to say that sometimes an abstract is predicated of a concrete, and conversely.
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| Et non tantum hoc, immo deberet dicere quod abstractum affirmatur et negatur vere de concreto particulariter sumpto et e converso, quamvis non universaliter sumpto nisi forte successive. Oporteret etiam concedere quod tale concretum de eodem vere affirmatur et negatur successive. Unde haec nunc est vera 'haec humanitas est homo', demonstrando humanitatem quae est Socrates, secundum istam opinionem.
| And not only this, but indeed they ought to say that an abstract name is affirmed and denied truly of a concrete name, taken in a particular way, and conversely, although not taken in a universal way (unless perhaps successively). Also they would have to concede that such a concrete name is affirmed and denied of the same thing successively. Therefore ‘this humanity is a man’ is now true – pointing to a humanity which is Socrates – according to this opinion.
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| Et si ista humanitas assumeretur a Verbo vel ab alia persona divina, haec esset falsa 'haec humanitas est homo', et hoc quia hoc nomen 'homo' numquam supponit pro illa re, scilicet pro illa humanitate nisi quando non est unita. Et ideo quia aliquando potest esse unita et aliquando non unita, ideo aliquando supponit pro ea et aliquando non.
| And if this humanity were assumed by the Word, or by another divine person, the proposition ‘this humanity is a man’ would be false, and this is because the name ‘man’ never supposits for that thing (namely for that humanity) except when it is not thus united. And therefore because it can sometimes be united and sometimes not united, therefore it sometimes supposits for it, sometimes not.
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| Et ideo aliquando concretum praedicatur de abstracto et aliquando non, et similiter e converso. Alia conclusio potest colligi ex praedictis, videlicet quod omnis propositio composita ex tali concreto et abstracto, vel aliquo aequivalenti tali concreto, per quam ratione verbi vel alicuius determinationis additae denotantur illa pro quibus stant subiectum et praedicatum esse distincta, falsa est si sit universalis; et hoc dum aliqua natura talis non est assumpta.
| And therefore sometimes a concrete name is predicated of an abstract name and sometimes not – and similarly conversely. Another conclusion can be gathered from what was said above, namely that every proposition composed from such a concrete and such an abstract name, or from something equivalent to such a concrete name, through which (by reason of the verb or of some added determination) what the subject and predicate stand for are denoted to be distinct, is false if it is universal. And this is as long as some such nature is not assumed.
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| Cuius ratio est quia talia concreta et abstracta non supponunt pro distinctis rebus nisi ratione personae divinae sustentantis naturam humanam in Christo. Hoc patet, quia si sic, oporteret quod unum supponeret pro parte et aliud pro toto, vel illa duo pro duabus partibus, vel pro duabus substantiis totaliter distinctis, vel unum pro substantia et aliud pro accidente; quorum quodlibet manifestum est esse falsum. Non igitur supponunt pro distinctis rebus nisi quando unum illorum supponit pro persona divina. Ex quo sequitur quod propositio denotans illa esse distincta falsa est.
| The reason of this is that such concrete and abstract names do not supposit for distinct things, except because of the divine person sustaining human nature in Christ. This is clear, because if so, it would have to be that on would supposit for a part, the other for the whole, or those two for two parts, or for two substances totally distinct, or one for a substance and the other for an accident – any of which is manifestly false. Therefore they do not supposit for distinct things unless when one of them supposits for the divine person. From this, it follows that a proposition denoting those to be distinct, is false.
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| Ex quo sequitur quod omnes tales propositiones de virtute sermonis, hoc est secundum proprietatem sermonis, falsae sunt 'omnis homo habet humanitatem', 'omnis humanitas est in homine', 'omne animal habet animalitatem' et huiusmodi. Et hoc, quia cum nihil habeat se nec aliquid sit in se, et per tales propositiones denotatur quod illud pro quo supponit subiectum habet illud pro quo supponit praedicatum, vel illud pro quo supponit subiectum est in illo pro quo supponit praedicatum, et hoc est falsum, cum subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem, manifestum est quod tales propositiones sunt falsae.
| From this, it follows that all such propositions as ‘every man has humanity’, ‘every humanity is in man’, ‘every animal has animality’ and suchlike are literally (i.e. in propriety of speech) false. And this is because, since nothing has itself, nor is anything in itself - and because it is denoted by such propositions that what the subject supposits for has what the predicate supposits for, or that what the subject supposits for is in what the predicate supposits for (which is false, since the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing) - it is manifest that such propositions are false.
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| Unde sicut secundum Anselmum, Monologion, cap.16, non proprie dicitur quod summa natura, scilicet Deus, habet iustitiam, sed proprie dicitur quod summa natura est iustitia, ita non proprie dicitur quod iste homo, demonstrando Sortem, habet humanitatem, sed proprie dicitur quod est humanitas.
| Therefore, just as (according to Anselm, Monologion c. 16) is is not proper to say that the highest nature, namely God, has justice, but rather it is proper to say that the highest nature is justice, so it is not proper to say that this man – pointing to Socrates – has humanity, but it is proper to say that ‘this is humanity’.
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| Et ideo sicut tales propositiones recipiuntur et usitantur a Sanctis 'Deus habet iustitiam', 'Deus habet sapientiam, bonitatem, intelligentiam', 'in Deo est sapientia' et huiusmodi, quae tamen secundum proprietatem sermonis verae non sunt, secundum Anselmum, ita tales conceduntur 'homo habet humanitatem', 'humanitas est in Sorte' et huiusmodi, quae tamen secundum proprietatem sermonis verae non sunt.
| And therefore such propositions as ‘God has justice’, ‘God has wisdom, goodness and understanding’, ‘in God there is wisdom’ and suchlike, are received and used by holy men. Nevertheless, according to propriety of speech they are not true, according to Anselm, thus such propositions as ‘a man has humanity’, ‘humanity is in Socrates’ and suchlike, are conceded, which nevertheless are not true according to propriety of speech.
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| Ex isto sequitur ulterius quod tales propositiones de virtute sermonis falsae sunt 'humanitas subsistit in supposito proprio', 'humanitas dependet a supposito proprio', 'proprium suppositum terminat dependentiam naturae', sed magis posset concedi quod humanitas est suppositum.
| From this, it follows further that such propositions as ‘a humanity subsists in a proper suppositum’, ‘a humanity depends on a proper suppositum’, ‘a proper suppositum terminates the dependency of a nature’ are literally false. But it could more be conceded that a humanity is a suppositum.
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| Unde sciendum quod nisi aliquod syncategorema impediat istam praedicationem ‘humanitas est suppositum', debet concedi absolute. Verumtamen humanitas non esset suppositum, hoc concesso, nisi quando non esset unita. Si enim esset unita, statim desineret esse suppositum. Et ideo hoc nomen 'suppositum' connotat quod non sit unita, ut haec sit definitio exprimens quid nominis 'suppositum', vel aequivalens ei: suppositum est res completa, una et non plures, a nullo supposito sustentata.
| Therefore it should be known that unless some syncategorema prevents the predication ‘humanity is a suppositum’, it ought to be conceded absolutely. Yet humanity would not be a suppositum, with this conceded, unless when it were not united. For if it were united, it would immediately cease to be a suppositum. And therefore the name ‘suppositum’ connotes that it is not united, as this is the nominal definition of the name ‘suppositum’, or equivalent to it. A suppositum is a perfect thing, one and not several, not sustained by any suppositum.
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| Ita quod loco istius nominis 'suppositum' licitum sit ponere totam istam orationem et e converso, quando sumuntur significative. Quo facto facile est videre quae propositiones debent negari et quae concedi.
| So that in place of the name ‘suppositum’, it is permissible to put that whole expression, and conversely, when they are taken significatively. With this done, it is easy to see which propositions ought to be denied, and which conceded.
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| [CAP. 8. DE NOMINIBUS ABSTRACTIS QUAE AEQUIVALENTER ALIQUA SYNCATEGOREMATA VEL ALIQUAS DETERMINATIONES ADVERBIALES COINCLUDUNT]
| [Chapter 8. Of abstract names which equivalently include dome syncategoremata or some adverbial determinations]
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| Pertractatis quibusdam quae principali proposito impertinentia videbantur, necessaria tamen, ad intentum redeundo de alio modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum tractabitur, ex quo aliqua quae praedicta sunt patefieri possunt.
| Now that we have dealt with certain matters that did not seem pertinent to our main thesis, but necessary nevertheless, we shall return to our intention and deal with another mode of concrete and abstract names, of which some things said above can be made clear.
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| Sunt enim quaedam nomina abstracta, vel esse possunt ad placitum instituentium, quae aequivalenter aliqua syncategoremata vel aliquas determinationes adverbiales, vel alias, includant, ita quod abstractum in significando aequivaleat concreto vel alteri termino sumpto cum aliquo syncategoremate vel aliqua alia dictione vel dictionibus.
| For there are certain abstract names, or there can be at the pleasure of those instituting names, which equivalently include some syncategoremata or some adverbial determinations or some other determinations, so that the abstract name is equivalent in signifying to the concrete name, or to another term taken with some syncategorema or some other expression or expressions.
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| Possunt enim utentes, si voluerint, uti una dictione loco plurium, sicut loco istius totius 'omnis homo' possem uti hac dictione a et loco istius totius 'tantum homo' possem uti hoc vocabulo b, et sic de aliis. Et si ita esset, possibile esset quod concretum et abstractum non supponerent pro distinctis rebus nec significarent distinctas res, et tamen quod praedicatio unius de altero esset falsa et quod aliquid praedicaretur de uno et non de alio. Si enim istud abstractum 'humanitas' aequivaleret in significando isti toti 'hoino secundum quod homo' vel 'homo in quantum homo', haec esset vera 'homo currit' et haec falsa 'humanitas currit', sicut ista est falsa 'homo in quantum homo currit'.
| For users can, if they wished, use one expression in place of several. For example, in place of the whole expression ‘every man’, I could use the word ‘a’, and in place of the whole expression ‘only man’, I could use the consonant ‘b’, and so on. And if it were so, it would be possible that a concrete name and the abstract name would not supposit for distinct things nor signify distinct things, and it would be possible that the predication of one of the other would be false, and that something would be predicated of one and not the other. For if that abstract name ‘humanity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole ‘man according as he is a man’ or ‘man insofar as he is a man’, ‘A man runs’ would be true, and ‘A humanity runs’ [would be] false, just as ‘A man insofar as he is a man runs’ is false.
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| Similiter si hoc nomen 'humanitas' aequivaleret isti toti 'homo necessario', ita quod haec dictio 'humanitas' poneretur loco istius totius 'homo necessario', haec esset falsa 'humanitas est homo' sicut haec est falsa 'homo necessario est homo', nam nullus homo necessario est homo, sed contingenter tantum; et eodem modo haec esset falsa 'humanitas est alba' sicut ista est falsa 'homo necessario est albus'.
| Similarly, if the name ‘humanity’ were equivalent to the whole expression ‘man necessarily’, so that the word ‘humanity’ were put in place of the whole ‘man necessarily’, ‘a humanity is a man’ would be false, just as ‘a man necessarily is a man’ is false. For no man is necessarily a man, but contingently only. And in the same way, ‘A humanity is white’ would be false, just as ‘A man necessarily is white’ is false.
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| Et per talem modum potest salvari ubicumque placet quod concretum et abstractum non significant distinctas res nec pro distinctis rebus supponunt, et tamen praedicatio unius de alio est simpliciter falsa, et quod aliquid praedicatur de uno quod non praedicatur de reliquo. Et sic possent aliqui dicere quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et tamen quod quaelibet talis est falsa 'substantia est quantitas, 'qualitas est quantitas'.
| In this way, whenever you like, you can keep it so that a concrete name and the corresponding abstract name do not signify distinct things nor supposit for distinct things, and nevertheless the predication of one of the other is absolutely false, and [you can keep it] that something is predicated of the one that is not predicated of the other. So some persons could say that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and that still each of ‘A substance is a quantity’, ‘A quality is a quantity’ is false.
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| Si enim hoc nomen 'quantitas' aequivaleret isti toti in significando, vel alicui consimili, 'necessario quantum quamdiu manet in rerum natura', haec esset falsa - etiam tenendo illam opinionem - 'substantia est quantitas' sicut ista est falsa 'substantia necessario est quanta quamdiu manet in rerum natura'. Et sicut dicitur de ista, ita posset dici de multis aliis, tam in divinis quam in creaturis.
| For if the name ‘quantity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole expression ‘necessarily a quantum as long as it remains in rerum natura, or something similar, ‘a substance is a quantity’ would be false, even holding the opinion [above], just as ‘A substance necessarily is a quantum as long as it remains in reality’ is false. And just as it is said about this example, so it could be said about many other cases, both in the divine persons and in the case of creatures.
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| Per aliquem enim talem modum posset salvari quod essentia divina et intellectus et voluntas nullo modo distinguuntur in Deo, et tamen haec esset vera 'Deus intelligit per intellectum' et haec falsa 'Deus intelligit per voluntatem'. Similiter posset dici quod anima nullo modo distinguitur ab intellectu et voluntate, et tamen haec esset vera 'intellectus intelligit' et non ista 'voluntas intelligit'. Et ita de multis aliis.
| For by some such means one could keep it so that the divine essence and understanding and will are in no way distinguished in God, and yet ‘God understands by understanding’ would be true and ‘God understands by will’ false. Similarly, it could be said that the soul is in no way distinguished from the understanding and the will, and yet ‘The understanding understands’ would be true and not ‘The will understands’. And so for many other cases.
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| Unde in talibus magis reputo difficultatem vocalem, dependentem ex logica, quam realem. Propter quod nescientes logicam quaternos innumeros circa talia inutiliter replent, facientes difficultatem ubi nulla est, et deserentes difficultatem quam investigare deberent.
| Therefore in such cases I judge more a verbal difficulty depending on logic rather than a real one. Because of this, persons ignorant of logic have uselessly filled up innumerable tomes on such matters, making a difficulty where there is none, and abandoning a difficulty which they ought to investigate.
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| Est autem advertendum quod quamvis in vulgari locutione abstracta talia, aequivalentia multis dictionibus talibus in significando, raro vel numquam locum habeant, in dictis tamen philosophorum et Sanctorum frequenter inveniuntur abstracta usitata sic accipi. Unde sic accipit Avicenna, V Metaphysicae, dicens: "Equinitas non est aliud nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim ex se nec est unum nec multa, nec exsistens in his sensibilibus nec in anima".
| But it should be observed that although in common speech such abstract name, equivalent in signifying to many such expressions, rarely or never have a place, nevertheless in the sayings of the philosophers and saints, familiar abstract [terms] are frequently found to be taken in this way. Therefore, Avicenna (Metaphysics V) takes ‘horsehood’ in this way, saying “Horsehood is nothing other than just horsehood, for from itself it is neither one nor many, neither existing in these perceptibles nor in the soul.”
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| Nihil enim aliud intelligebat nisi quod equus non definitur nec per unum nec per multa, nec per esse in anima nec per esse in re extra, ita quod nullum istorum ponitur in definitione eius. Et ita volebat quod hoc nomen 'equinitas', secundum quod tunc utebatur eo, aequivaleret in significando multis dictionibus, sive simul proferantur sive mediante verbo et copula.
| He was understanding nothing else than that ‘horse’ is not defined either by ‘one’ or by ‘many’, nor by ‘being in the soul’ or by ‘being in external reality’, so that none of these expressions is given in its definition. And so he was wishing that the name ‘horsehood’, according as he was then using it, would be equivalent in signifying to many words, whether they are uttered together, or with a verb and copula between.
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| Unde non intendebat quod equinitas esset aliqua res et tamen quod illa res realiter non esset una nec plures, nec in effectu extra animam nec in anima,- hoc enim impossibile est et absurdum - , sed intendebat quod nihil tale ponitur in definitione eius. Et quod haec sit intentio sua satis patet intuenti verba eius. Unde dicit: "Cum ipsum", supple universale, "fuerit homo vel equus, haec intentio est alia praeter intentionem universalitatis quae est humanitas vel equinitas. Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis, nec universalitas continetur in definitione equinitatis. Equinitas enim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitate".
| Thus, he did not mean that horsehood would be some thing, and nevertheless that this thing would not really be one or many, neither actually outside the soul nor in the soul, for this is impossible and absurd. But rather he meant that no such thing is given in its definition. And that this is his meaning is clear enough to anyone who looks at his words. Therefore he says, ‘Since this’ (add “universal”) ‘was man or horse, this intention is something else, beyond the intention of universality, which is humanity or horsehood. For the definition of horsehood is beyond the definition of universality. Neither is universality contained in the definition of horsehood. For horsehood has a definition that does not need universality’.
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| Ex istis et aliis verbis suis, quae propter brevitatem omitto, satis patet quod non plus intendit nisi quod nihil tale ponitur in definitione equi vel equinitatis. Et ita vult quod in illis verbis hoc nomen 'equinitas' aequivaleat in significando pluribus dictionibus. Aliter enim non sequeretur ista 'unum et multa et huiusmodi non ponuntur in definitione equinitatis, igitur equinitas non est una', sicut non sequitur 'album non ponitur in definitione hominis, igitur homo non est albus'.
| From these and other words of his, which I omit for the sake of brevity, it is quite clear that he means no more than that no such thing occurs in the definition of ‘horse’ or ‘horsehood’. And so he wishes that in those words given above, that the name ‘horsehood’ is equivalent in signifying to many words. For otherwise “One and many and suchlike do not occur in the definition of horsehood; therefore, horsehood is not one” would not follow: just as “White does not occur in the definition of man; therefore, a man is not white” does not follow:
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| Per praedicta posset prohiberi, secundum unam opinionem, talis modus arguendi, qui secundum vocem videtur syllogisticus 'omnis res absoluta est substantia vel qualitas; quantitas est res absoluta; ergo quantitas est substantia vel qualitas', sicut iste modus arguendi 'omne b est a; c est b; igitur c est a' prohiberi potest ipsis vocabulis alio modo institutis.
| From what has been said above, the following manner of arguing (which in verbal form appears syllogistical) could, according to one opinion, be prevented. “Every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality”, just as the mode of arguing: “Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A” can be prevented when these letters are instituted in another way.
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| Si enim b significet idem quod homo, et a idem quod animal, et c idem quod hoc totum 'tantum risibile', ita quod semper loco istius totius 'tantum risibile' sit licitum ponere hoc vocabulum c et e converso, tunc sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo est animal; tantum risibile est homo; igitur tantum risibile est animal', ita non sequitur 'omne b est a; c est b; ergo c est a. Et ita per modum istum nominum abstractorum possunt salvari multa dicta auctorum, quae tamen de virtute sermonis videntur esse falsa.
| For if ‘B’ signified the same as ‘man’, and ‘A’ the same as ‘animal’, and ‘C’ the same as the whole expression ‘only capable of laughter’ - so that it is always allowable to put the letter ‘C’ in place of the expression ‘only capable of laughter’, and conversely - then, just as “Every man is an animal; only a thing capable of laughter is a man; therefore, only a thing capable of laughter is an animal” does not follow, so “Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A” does not follow. And so by means of this mode of [analyzing] abstract names, many sayings of the authorities can be preserved, although they seem literally to be false.
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| Non solum autem potest abstractum sic aequivalere multis dictionibus in significando, sed hoc etiam potest convenire concretis et aliis dictionibus. Sic enim concedunt in logica eruditi quod hoc signum 'totus' includit suum distribuibile, ut aequivaleat isti 'quaelibet pars', quando sumitur syncategorematice.
| But not only can an abstract term be equivalent in this way to many words in signifying, but also this can also belong to concrete terms and to other expressions. For in this way those skilled in logic concede that the sign ‘whole’ includes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to saying ‘any part’ when it is taken syncategorematically.
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| Unde ista 'totus Socrates est minor Sorte' aequivalet isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte'. Similiter, hoc signum 'quidlibet' includit suum distribuibile, ut aequivaleat isti 'omne ens'; aliter enim haec non esset intelligibilis 'quidlibet est homo vel non homo'. Sic etiam est de multis verbis, nam cum dicitur 'curro' subintelligitur pronomen primae personae, et ita hoc verbum 'curro' aequivalet sibi ipsi et pronomini. Et ita est de multis aliis, quod maxime necessarium est scire propter mentem auctorum habendam.
| Therefore, ‘The whole of Socrates is less than Socrates’ is equivalent to ‘any part of Socrates is less than Socrates’. Similarly, the sign ‘anything’ includes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to ‘every being’. For otherwise ‘anything is a man or a non-man’ would not be intelligible. So it is also for many verbs. For when one says ‘I run’ [curro in Latin], the first-person pronoun is implicit. So the verb curro is equivalent to itself and the pronoun. And so it is in many other cases that it is particularly necessary to know because of the meaning of the authorities.
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| (10) Non solum autem aliquando una dictio aequivalet multis dictionibus in significando, sed etiam addita alteri totum resultans aequivalet composito ex pluribus, inter quae illud cui additur aliquando mutatur vel secundum casum vel secundum modum vel tempus; aliquando autem illud simpliciter in resolvendo et ultimate explicando quod importatur per illam orationem auferendum est. Unde quando dicitur 'totus Sortes est minor Sorte', si 'totus' syncategorematice accipiatur aequivalet isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte', ubi loco istius recti 'Socrates' ponitur iste obliquus 'Sortis', et loco istius dictionis 'totus' ponuntur istae duae dictiones 'quaelibet pars'. Ita dicerent aliqui quod ista propositio 'generatio formae est in instanti' aequivalet isti 'una pars formae non producitur ante aliam, sed omnes simul', ubi haec copula 'est' ablata est.
| Not only is one expression sometimes equivalent in signifying to many words, but also, when added to something else, the whole resulting expression is equivalent to a composite of several expressions. Among these, what is added is sometimes changed, either in case or in mood or tense. But sometimes it has to be absolutely removed by resolving and finally explicating what is conveyed by that expression. Therefore, when ‘The whole Socrates is less than Socrates’ is said, if ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, the proposition is equivalent to ‘Any part of Socrates is less than Socrates’, where in place of the nominative ‘Socrates’ the oblique form ‘of Socrates’ is given, and in place of the word ‘whole’ the two words ‘any part’ are given. Thus some persons would say that the proposition ‘generation of a form is in an instant’ is equivalent to ‘one part of a form is not produced before another, but rather all at once’, where the copula ‘is’ is removed.
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| (11) Sic possent aliqui dicere quod ista 'quantitas est res absoluta' aequivalet isti 'distantia partium et extensio, etsi non esset substantia nec qualitas, esset res absoluta si esset in rerum natura'. Et si ita esset, manifestum esset quod iste discursus non valeret 'omnis res absoluta est substantia vel qualitas; quantitas est res absoluta; ergo quantitas est substantia vel qualitas'.
| Thus some persons could say that “quantity is an absolute thing’ is equivalent to ‘distance between parts, and extension, if it were not a substance or a quality, would be an absolute thing, if it were in reality”. And if it were so, it would be manifest that the discourse “every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality” would not be valid.
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| (12) Et si dicatur quod per istam viam possem impedire quemcumque syllogismum, dicendo in aliquo terminorum aliquod tale aequivalenter includi dicendum quod ad sciendum an aliquis discursus valeat, oportet praesupponere significata vocabulorum, et secundum hoc iudicandum est de discursu an sit bonus vel non. Et quia de multis terminis est certum quod secundum usum omnium nihil tale includunt aequivalenter, ideo simpliciter iuxta regulas traditas est concedendum quod syllogismus valet vel non valet.
| And if it is said that by this means I could prevent any syllogism by saying that some such [syncategorema] is included in one of the terms, it must be said that, in order to know when an argument is valid, you have to presuppose the significates of the words, and according to this it is to be judged whether the discourse is good or not. And because for many terms it is certain that, according to everyone’s usage, nothing like that is equivalently included, therefore it has to be absolutely conceded that the syllogism is valid or not valid, in accordance with the traditional rules.
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| (13) De omni tamen discursu proposito posset logicus iudicare an valeat, resolvendo terminos in suas definitiones exprimentes quid nominis, quo facto potest per regulas certas evidenter cognoscere quid de eo est dicendum.Ad praedictum autem modum nominum abstractorum possent reduci omnia abstracta privativa et negativa et etiam omnia verbalia et multa alia, de quibus inferius perscrutabitur.
| Yet for any proposed discourse, the logician could judge whether it is valid by resolving the terms into their nominal definitions. When this is done, he can recognize plainly by particular rules what is to be said about it. All privative and negative abstract terms could be reduced to the mode of abstract names mentioned above, and also all verbal names and many others, which will be examined below.
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| (14) Et per talem modum faciliter possent negari omnes tales propositiones 'materia est privatio', 'aer est tenebra', 'anima est peccatum' et huiusmodi. Per istum etiam modum possunt salvari tales 'Deus non facit peccatum', 'Deus non est auctor mali', et huiusmodi. Et qualiter tales consequentiae non valent 'hoc est malum; Deus facit hoc; igitur Deus facit malum', in tractatu de fallaciis ostendetur.
| And by such a mode of abstract names, all propositions such as ‘Matter is a privation’, ‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A soul is a sin’ and suchlike, could easily be denied. By means of this mode too, propositions such as ‘God does not make a sin’, ‘God is not the author of evil’ and suchlike, can be kept. It will be shown in the tract on fallacies how inferences such as “This is an evil; God makes this; therefore, God makes an evil” are not valid.
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| [CAP. 9. DE NOMINIBUS CONCRETIS ET ABSTRACTIS QUORUM ABSTRACTA NON SUPPONUNT NISI PRO MULTIS SIMUL SUMPTIS ET CONCRETA PRO UNO SOLO VERIFICARI POSSUNT]
| [Chapter 9. Of concrete and abstract names where the abstract names do not supposit except for many items taken together, and the concrete names can be verified for one item alone]
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| Restat adhuc de alio modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum disserere. Unde quaedam sunt abstracta quae non supponunt nisi pro multis simul sumptis, concreta autem pro uno solo verificari possunt, sicut se habent 'populus' et 'popularis', 'plebs' et 'plebeius'. Quilibet enim homo quamvis possit esse plebeius et popularis, nullus tamen homo populus vel plebs esse potest.
| It remains to discuss another mode of concrete and abstract names. Therefore, there are certain abstract names that do not supposit except for many items taken together, although the concrete forms can be verified for one item alone. For example, ‘people’ and ‘popular’, ‘plebs’and ‘plebeian’ are related in this way. For although any man could be plebeian and popular, nevertheless no man can be the plebs or the people.
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| Inter nomina talia illi qui ponunt numerum non esse aliam rem a rebus numeratis computare debent omnia nomina abstracta et concreta numerorum, si concreta et abstracta inter talia reperiantur. Unde secundum talem opinionem debet concedi quod homines sunt numerus et multa animalia sunt numerus et quod anguli sunt ternarius, quaternarius et sic de aliis, nisi forte velint talem praedicationem negare, dicendo quod tales termini in significando aequivalent multis dictionibus, modo quo dictum est in praecedenti capitulo de multis dictionibus, saltem secundum usum auctorum.
| Among such names, those who maintain that number is not a thing other than the numbered things ought to include all the abstract and concrete names of numbers, if any concrete and abstract forms are found among such names. Therefore, according to such an opinion, it ought to be conceded that men are a number, and many animals are a number, and that angles are ternary or quaternary, and so on. Unless perhaps they wanted to deny such a predication, by saying that such terms are equivalent in signifying to many expressions, in the way stated in the preceding chapter about ‘many expressions’, at least, according to the usage of the writers.
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| Et de concretis et abstractis ista sufficiant, quamvis forte alii modi nominum concretorum et abstractorum possent assignari. Nec aliquis me reprehendat si in hoc opere aliqua praetermitto, quia non promitto me omnia velle discutere et nihil perscrutandum studiosis relinquere, sed aliqua brevia ad utilitatem simplicium velle percurrere.
| And may these observations about concrete and abstract names be sufficient, even though perhaps other modes of concrete and abstract names could be assigned. And may no one blame me if I pass over some things in this work, because I do not promise to want to discuss all things, and leave nothing for the diligent to investigate, but rather to run through some brief matters for the utility of simple persons.
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