Ockham Summa III.2.4-7

Ockham Summa Logicae III.2 chapters 4-7

Latin English

CAP. 4. DE DIVISIONE PROPOSITIONUM REQUISITARUM AD DEMONSTRATIONEM. Of the division of propositions required for demonstration.

Dicturus autem de propositionibus requisitis ad demonstrationem, primo praemittam aliquas divisiones earum. Est autem primo sciendum quod propositionum requisitarum ad demonstrationem quaedam sunt partes demonstrationis, sicut duae praemissae et una conclusio, et quaedam non sunt partes demonstrationis. Now I will talk about propositions required for demonstration. First I will set out some of their divisions. And first you should know that of the propositions required for demonstration, some are parts of the demonstration (i.e. two premises and one conclusion) and some are not parts of the demonstration.

Et vocantur dignitates et maximae vel suppositiones, quae sub propria forma non ingrediuntur demonstrationem, virtute tamen illarum propositionum aliquo modo sciuntur praemissae demonstrationis. And those are called axioms [dignitates], and maxims [maximae] or suppositions [suppositiones]; which are not included in a demonstration under [their] proper form, and yet in virtue of these propositions the premises of a demonstration are known in some way.

Verbi gratia ista est una propositio prima, per experientiam praecise nota ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, quae non potest esse pars demonstrationis, saltem potissimae et universalis, virtute tamen istius tenent tales demonstrationes ‘omne calidum est calefactivum; omnis ignis est calidus; igitur omnis ignis est calefactivus; ‘omne calidum est calefactivum; omnis aer est calidus; igitur omnis aer est calefactivus’. For example: "every heat can heat" is a primary proposition, known precisely through experience, which cannot be part of a demonstration (at least of the highest sort and universal). Yet it is in virtue of this that demonstrations hold such as: "Every hot thing can heat, every fire is a hot thing; therefore every fire can heat"; "Every hot thing can heat, every [case] of air is a hot thing; therefore every [case] of air can heat."

Istae igitur sunt distinctae propositiones ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’ et ‘omne calidum est calefactivum’, et prima prior est et secunda posterior. Et tamen secunda non potest proprie demonstrari per primam et secunda intrat demonstrationem non prima, et tamen virtute primae tenent multae demonstrationes quas non potest ingredi. Therefore, these are distinct propositions: "Every heat can heat," and "Every hot thing can heat," and the first [is] prior and the second posterior. And yet the second cannot properly be demonstrated through the first, and the second enters into demonstration, but not the first. And yet, in virtue of the first many demonstrations hold which it cannot be included into.

Et sicut est de ista, ita est de multis aliis. Propositio autem requisita ad demonstrationem, non tamquam pars, subdividitur, quia quaedam est talis quod necesse est quemlibet docendum habere eam, cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘quidlibet est vel non est’, ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio’ et huiusmodi. Quaedam sunt tales quas non est necesse quemlibet docendum habere, sed necesse est aliquos artifices speciales eas habere, sicut est de istis ‘aliquid est mobile’, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’ etc. And just as it is for this [case], so for many others. Now a proposition required for demonstration but not as a part of the demonstration is subdivided, for one sort is such that it is necessary that whoever is to be taught, holds it, and of this sort are "each thing is or is not," “of any [subject] the affirmation or negation [is truly predicated]” and the like. Some are such that it is not necessary for whoever is to be taught to hold them, but it is necessary for some specialist workers to have them. For instance, "something can move" and "if equals be taken from equals, the remainders’ etc.

Propositio autem quae est pars demonstrationis subdividitur, quia quaedam est praemissa tantum, quae scilicet est indemonstrabilis; quaedam est conclusio tantum, quae scilicet est demonstrabilis, sed non potest esse principium demonstrandi aliam propositionem; quaedam est praemissa et conclusio, quia potest demonstrari per praemissas alias et potest esse principium demonstrandi aliam conclusionem. But a proposition which is part of a demonstration is subdivided, for one sort is a premiss only, namely an indemonstrable proposition; and another is conclusion only, namely a demonstrable proposition which cannot be a principle of demonstrating another proposition. And another sort is both premiss and conclusion, because it can be demonstrated through other premises and also be a principle for demonstrating another conclusion.

Alia divisio potest poni, quia propositionum requisitarum ad demonstrationem quaedam sunt principia, quaedam conclusiones. Principia dicuntur illae propositiones quae non sunt conclusiones et tamen requiruntur ad demonstrationem, sive sint partes demonstrationis sive non sint partes eius. Another division can be given, for of propositions required for demonstration some are principles and others conclusions. ‘Principles’ is the name of those propositions which are not conclusions and yet are required for demonstration (whether they are parts of the demonstration or not parts of it).

Et vocantur principia prima, quae subdividi possunt: quia quaedam principia prima sunt per se nota, quibus scilicet intellectus statim assentit ipsis terminis apprehensis, ita quod si sciatur quid significant termini, statim sciuntur. And these are also called first principles. They can be [further] subdivided, for some first principles are known per se, namely, those to which the intellect immediately assents upon apprehending their terms, so that if it is known what the terms signify, they are immediately known.

Quaedam autem principia prima non sunt per se nota sed tantum per experientiam, quia possunt dubitari, sed tamen per experientiam fiunt nota, sicut est de ista propositione ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, et de multis talibus, quae non possunt fieri notae nisi per experientiam, de quibus specialiter loquitur Aristoteles in I Metaphysicae et in II Posteriorum, in fine. But some are first principles that are known not per se, but only through experience, for they can be doubted, but nonetheless come to be known through experience. So it is with "Every heat can heat," and many other such [propositions] that cannot be known except through experience, of which Aristotle specifically discusses in Metaphysics I and in Posterior Analytics II at the end.

CAP. 5. DE PROPRIETATIBUS PROPOSITIONUM AD DEMONSTRATIONEM REQUISITARUM; ET QUOMODO EST EX INCORRUPTIBILIBUS. Chapter 5. On the properties of propositions required for demonstration, and how this is from indestructible things.

Istis praemissis videndum est de proprietatibus propositionum ad demonstrationem requisitarum. After these preliminaries, we must look at the properties of propositions required for demonstration.

Illarum autem proprietatum quaedam sunt communes omnibus propositionibus requisitis ad demonstrationem, quaedam sunt propriae conclusionibus, quaedam sunt propriae praemissis, quaedam sunt propriae principiis non ingredientibus demonstrationem. And of those properties, certain ones are common to all propositions required for demonstration, others are proper to conclusions, others are proper to premisses, and others are proper to principles not involved in demonstration.

Una proprietas communis omni propositioni requisitae ad demonstrationem est necessitas. One property common to every proposition required for demonstration is necessity.

Nulla enim propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est contingens vel impossibilis, sed quaelibet est necessaria. Quod enim conclusio sit necessaria, patet ex definitione demonstrationis, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire propositionem necessariam, igitur conclusio est necessaria. Sed necessarium, quamvis possit inferri ex contingentibus vel impossibilibus, non tamen potest sciri per contingentia vel impossibilia, igitur necessario praemissae, propter quas scitur conclusio, sunt necessariae. For no proposition required for demonstration is contingent or impossible, but every one is necessary. For that the conclusion is necessary, is clear from the definition of demonstration, for demonstration is a syllogism producing knowledge of necessary propositions. Therefore the conclusion is necessary. But the necessary, although it could be inferred from contingent or impossible [propositions], still cannot be known from contingent or impossible [propositions], therefore necessarily the premisses, on account of which the conclusion is known, are necessary.

Sed propositiones rectificantes demonstrationem sunt priores et notiores praemissis, igitur illae sunt necessariae, et ita patet quod omnes propositiones requisitae ad demonstrationem sunt necessariae, et sicut sunt necessariae ita sunt perpetuae et incorruptibiles. But propositions ensuring the correctness of demonstration are prior and better known than the premisses. Therefore they are necessary, and so it is clear that all propositions required for demonstration are necessary, and just as they are necessary, so they are perpetual and incorruptible.

Quod non est sic intelligendum quod propositiones illae sunt quaedam entia perpetua et incorruptibilia. This should not be understood as [meaning] that these propositions are sorts of perpetual and incorruptible beings.

Hoc enim falsum est. Solus enim Deus est perpetuus et incorruptibilis, nec aliquid aliud a Deo potest esse simpliciter perpetuum et incorruptibile quin per aliquam potentiam posset fieri non-ens. For this is false. For only God is perpetual and incorruptible. Nor can anything other than God be absolutely perpetual and incorruptible, but that it could by some power be made into a non-being.

Propter quod sciendum quod ‘necessarium’, ‘perpetuum’ et ‘incorruptibile’ dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo dicitur aliquid necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile quia per nullam potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse; et sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis. On account of this it should be known that ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ are taken in two senses. In one sense something is called ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ because through no power can it begin or cease to be. And thus God alone is perpetual, necessary and incorruptible.

Aliter dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio quae non potest esse falsa; quae scilicet est ita vera quod, si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum. Et isto modo demonstratio est necessariorum, perpetuorum et incorruptibilium, hoc est propositionum quae non possunt esse falsae sed tantum verae. Otherwise a proposition is called necessary, perpetual and incorruptible when it cannot be false; namely true in the sense that if it is formed, it is not false but true only. And in this way demonstration is of necessary, perpetual and incorruptible propositions, i.e. of propositions which cannot be false, but only true.

Ex quo patet quod quamvis repugnet dictis Aristotelis, tamen secundum veritatem nulla propositio de illis quae important praecise res corruptibiles, mere affirmativa et mere categorica et mere de praesenti, potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens. From which it is clear that although it is repugnant to what Aristotle says, still in truth no proposition of those things that convey precisely corruptible things, purely affirmative and purely categorical and purely present [tense], can be the principle or conclusion of demonstration, because any such [proposition] is contingent.

Si enim aliqua talis esset necessaria, hoc maxime videretur de tali ‘homo est animal rationale’. Sed haec est contingens, quia sequitur ‘homo est animal rationale, igitur homo est animal’, et ultra ‘igitur homo componitur ex corpore et anima sensitiva’. Sed haec est contingens, quia si nullus homo esset, ipsa esset falsa propter falsam implicationem, quia implicaretur aliquid componi ex corpore et anima, quod tunc foret falsum. For if any such were necessary, then especially would seem to be in the case such as ‘a man is a rational animal’. But this is contingent, because ‘a man is a rational animal, therefore [some] man is an animal’ follows, and furthermore ‘therefore [some] man is composed from a body and a sensitive soul’. But this is contingent, because if there were no man, that proposition would be false on account of a false implication, because it would be implied that something was composed from a body and soul, which would then be false.

Nec valet dicere quod ista aequivalet isti ‘si homo est, homo est animal rationale’, quia haec est condicionalis et non categorica. Et ita stat primum dictum, quod nulla talis mere categorica et mere de praesenti est necessaria. Nor is it valid to say that this is equivalent to ‘if a man exists, a man is a rational animal’, for this is conditional and not categorical. And thus holds the first thing we said, that no such purely categorical, and purely present tense proposition is necessary.

Et ideo dico quod nulla talis potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis. Hoc tamen non obstante dicendum est quod multae propositiones compositae ex talibus terminis possunt esse principia vel conclusiones demonstrationis, quia propositiones condicionales et de possibili et aequivalentes eis possunt esse necessariae. Haec enim simpliciter est necessaria ‘si homo est, animal est’; et ista ‘si homo ridet, animal ridet’; et ista ‘omnis homo potest ridere’, si subiectum stet pro his quae possunt esse. And therefore I say that no such [proposition] can be a principle or conclusion of demonstration. Notwithstanding this, it must be said that many propositions composed from such terms can be principles or conclusions of demonstration, for conditional propositions and those involving the possible and their equivalents can be necessary. For this is necessary simpliciter: "If it is a man, it is an animal," and this, "If a man laughs, an animal laughs," as well as this, "Every man can laugh," if the subject stands for those that can be.

Et eodem modo propositiones aequivalentes eis sunt necessariae. Et ex isto patet quomodo, non obstante quod genera et species et quaecumque universalia distincta a cognitione Dei sunt simpliciter corruptibilia sic quod possunt esse nihil, tamen de eis possunt fieri demonstrationes et scientiae, propter hoc quod, non obstante quod possunt simpliciter destrui, tamen de eis possunt formari propositiones necessariae, quae possunt sciri scientia proprie dicta. And in the same way propositions equivalent to these are necessary. And from this it is clear in what way, notwithstanding that genera and species and every universal distinct from the cognition of God are destructible simpliciter, so that they can be nothing, demonstrations and sciences can still be produced about them, because, even though they can be destroyed simpliciter, necessary propositions can still be formed about them, which can be known by knowledge properly so-called.

Ex isto etiam patet quomodo de contingentibus potest esse scientia; quia secundum quod veniunt in demonstrationem necessaria sunt, hoc est propositiones formatae de terminis importantibus talia contingentia quae veniunt in demonstrationem sunt necessariae, quae non sunt mere de praesenti et de inesse, categoricae et affirmativae, sed vel sunt negativae vel hypotheticae vel de possibili vel alio modo, vel aequivalentes eis. From this it is clear in what way there can be knowledge about contingent things. For according as they enter into demonstration they are necessary, i.e. propositions formed from terms conveying such contingent things that enter into demonstration are necessary, which are not about the present and assertoric, and are categorical and affirmative alone, but are either negative or hypothetical or about the possible or some other mode, or equivalent to these.

CAP. 6. QUID EST ESSE DE OMNI ET QUOMODO PRAEMISSAE ET CONCLUSIO DEMONSTRATIONIS POSSUNT ESSE DE OMNI?. Chapter 6. What is ‘being of all’, and in what way can premises and conclusions of demonstrations ‘be of all’?

Alia condicio tam praemissarum quam conclusionis demonstrationis est esse de omni, quia tam praemissa quam conclusio demonstrationis potest esse de omni. Another condition of both the premises and conclusion of a demonstration is ‘being of all’, for premises as well as conclusions of demonstrations can ‘be of all’.

Est autem de omni, non quando praedicatum competit alicui contento sub subiecto et alicui non, nec quando uno tempore competit subiecto et alio non competit sibi, sed quando praedicatum omni contento sub subiecto et omni tempore competit subiecto. Now ‘being of all’ is not when the predicate belongs to something contained under the subject but not to something else, nor is it when it belongs to the subject at one time but not at another. Rather, it is when the predicate belongs to everything contained under the subject and with the subject at every time.

Unde differentia est inter ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur Aristoteles in I Posteriorum et inter ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur in I Priorum. Nam ad ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur in libro Posteriorum requiritur quod praedicatum vere competat subiecto universaliter sumpto et pro omni tempore. Hence there is a difference between the "of all" of which Aristotle speaks in Posterior Analytics I and the "of all" of which he speaks in Prior Analytics I. For it is required for the "of all" that he speaks of in the Posterior Analytics that the predicate truly belong to the subject taken universally, and for every time.

Ad ‘de omni’ autem de quo loquitur in libro Priorum non requiritur nisi quod per talem propositionem denotetur praedicatum praedicari de subiecto universaliter sumpto, sive vere praedicetur de eo sive non. For the "of all" spoken of in the Prior Analytics it is only required that through such a proposition it is denoted that the predicated is predicated of the subject taken universally, whether it be truly predicated of it or not.

Unde haec est de omni ‘omnis homo est asinus’, non obstante quod sit falsa, quia est universalis. Hence this is ‘of all’, "Every man is a donkey," for it is universal even if it is false.

CAP. 7. QUOMODO PROPOSITIONES REQUISITAE AD DEMONSTRATIONEM DICUNTUR PER SE?. In what way are propositions required for demonstration called per se?

Non solum autem quaelibet propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est necessaria vel de omni, sed etiam quaelibet est per se vera. Ut autem sciatur quae propositio est per se vera et quae non, videnda est multiplicitas et aequivocatio huius termini ‘per se’. Now not only is every proposition required for a demonstration necessary or ‘of all’, but also every one is true per se. And in order that it be known what proposition is true per se and what one is not, we should look at the multiplicity and equivocation of the term per se.

Est autem sciendum, secundum Lincolniensem, quod distinctio est inter modos dicendi per se et modum essendi per se et modum causandi per se. Aliquid enim esse per se tripliciter dicitur, eo quod ‘per se’ vel excludit omnem causam, et sic solus Deus est per se, hoc est, solus Deus non habet causam per quam sit; vel excludit causam materialem, et sic intelligentiae carentes materia sunt per se, hoc est, non habent materiam in qua forma earum subsistat; vel excludit subiectum, et sic substantia est per se, hoc est, substantia non habet subiectum in quo subsistat. It should be known, according to Grosseteste, that there is a distinction between the modes of saying something per se and the way of being per se, and the way of causing per se. For anything is said to be per se in three ways, in that "per se" either excludes all causes, and thus only God is per se, i.e., God alone does not have a cause through which he is; or it excludes a material cause, and thus intelligences lacking matter are per se, i.e., they do not have matter in which their form subsists; or it excludes the subject, and thus substance is per se, i.e., a substance does not have a subject in which it may subsist.

Et si quaeratur, quare tot modis dicitur aliquid esse per se, dicendum quod causa huius non potest assignari nisi voluntarius usus loquentium. Alius est modus causandi per se, quando scilicet aliquid est causa per se alicuius, sicut interfectio est causa per se quare iste intereat. And if it is asked why anything is said to be per se in so many ways, it should be replied that the cause of this cannot be assigned to anything other than the voluntary usage of the speakers. There is another mode of per se, namely when something is a cause of something per se, as the killing is the cause per se why this person perishes.

Et potest iste modus non tantum competere causae efficienti sed etiam causae finali. And this mode can belong not only to an efficient cause, but also with a final cause.

Praeter istos modos ‘per se’ sunt aliqui alii modi dicendi per se, scilicet quando aliquid praedicatur per se de altero. Et sunt duo modi, quorum unus est quando praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, alius quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Beyond these ways, are some other modes of saying per se, namely, when something is predicated per se of another. And there are two ways: of which one is when the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, the other when the subject is given in the definition of the predicate.

Circa istos autem modos est primo advertendum quod iste terminus ‘per se’, secundum quod praedicatur de propositione, dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large. Large dicitur propositio per se quando subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati vel e converso et per se superius ad unum definit reliquum vel definitur per reliquum. Et isto modo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, et ista ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, et ista ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, et ceterae huiusmodi. But concerning these ways it should first be noted that the term per se, according as it is predicated of a proposition, is taken in two ways, namely strictly and broadly. A proposition is called per se broadly when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or conversely, and [something?] per se higher than one thing defines another or is defined by the other. And in this way this is per se, "Every man is an animal", and "Every man is rational," and "Every man is capable of laughter," and others of this sort.

Aliter accipitur ‘per se’ stricte. In the other way, per se is taken strictly.

Et sic, cum prioribus condicionibus, ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod ipsa sit simpliciter necessaria, ita quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsa. Et sic accepto ‘per se’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui ponit quod generatio et corruptio rerum est perpetua, multae propositiones categoricae et de inesse et de praesenti sint per se, tamen secundum veritatem tales de terminis importantibus praecise res corruptibiles sive creatas non sunt per se, quia non sunt necessariae, sicut dictum est. And so, with the prior conditions, for a proposition to be per se in this way it is required that it be necessary simpliciter, so that it cannot be, never could have been, and never can be false. And taking "per se" in this sense, although according to the opinion of Aristotle (who assumes that generation and destruction of realities is perpetual) many categorical propositions concerning inherence and the present are per se, still according to the truth, such propositions from terms precisely conveying destructible or created realities are not per se, for they are not necessary, as was said.

Unde sic accepto ‘per se’, haec non est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, quia potest esse falsa, puta posito quod nullus homo sit. Verumtamen propositiones de possibili et eis aequivalentes, compositae ex talibus terminis, sunt per se. Hence, taking "per se" in this sense, the proposition Every man is an animal," is not per se, " for it can be false - for instance, if it is assumed that no man exists. But still propositions concerning possible things, and propositions equivalent to them, composed from such terms, are per se.

Unde ista est per se ‘omnis homo potest esse animal’, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Viso igitur quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod sit necessaria, est ulterius sciendum quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, strictissime sumpto hoc termino ‘per se’, requiritur quod sit praedicatio propria et directa. Hence "Every man can be an animal,"is per se, when the subject is taken to stand for what can be. Therefore, now that we have seen that if a proposition is to be per se it is required that it be necessary, it should be known next that for a proposition to be per se, taking the term "per se" in the strictest sense, it is required that it be a proper and direct predication.

Per quod excluduntur propositiones ubi praedicantur inferiora de superioribus particulariter sumptis et subiecta de suis passionibus et una passio de alia passione. Through this are excluded those propositions where the lower are predicated of the higher taken as particulars, and subjects are predicated of their attributes, and one attribute is predicated of another attribute.

Propter quod tales, quamvis sint necessariae, non sunt per se, strictissime sumpto ‘per se’. Cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘aliquod animal est homo’ vel ‘aliquod animal potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est homo vel potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est susceptibile disciplinae’ et huiusmodi, quamvis essent necessariae. Because of this, such propositions, though they are necessary, are not per se, taking "per se" in the strictest sense. And of this sort are such as "Some animal is a man," or "Some animal can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is a man or can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is capable of being taught" and the like, even though they are necessary.

Ulterius sciendum est quod aliquid potest cadere in definitione alterius vel in recto vel in obliquo, et secundum hoc potest praedicari vel in recto vel in obliquo. Istis visis dicendum est quod sola illa propositio est per se quae est necessaria, in qua praedicatum definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, vel subiectum definit praedicatum vel aliquid per se superius ad praedicatum. Next it should be known that something can fall in the definition of another either directly or obliquely, and accordingly it can be predicated directly or obliquely. Having looked at these things, it should be said that a proposition is only per se necessary, in which the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject, or the subject defines the predicate or something per se higher than the predicate.

Et hoc intelligit Lincolniensis quando dicit: ‘‘Dicitur per se alterum de altero cum quidditas unius essentialiter et non per accidens a quidditate alterius egreditur. Non enim intendit quod praedicatum realiter egrediatur a subiecto vel e converso, illo modo quo effectus efficitur realiter a sua causa, cum subiectum et praedicatum sint termini, quorum neuter est causa alterius. And Grosseteste means [intelligit] this when he says "one thing is predicated per se of another when the quiddity of one essentially, and not accidentally, proceeds from the quiddity of the other," For he does not mean that the predicate really proceeds from the subject, or conversely, in the way in which an effect is really brought about by its cause, since the subject and predicate are terms, of which neither is the cause of the other.

Sed ‘egredi’ hic a quidditate alterius vocat declarare et importare sive significare aliquid quod significatur per reliquum. Est igitur, breviter, intentio Lincolniensis, et etiam Aristotelis quod quando praedicatum per se definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, sive sicut definitio sive sicut pars definitionis vel e converso, tunc est propositio per se. But he says "proceeds from the quiddity of the other" to explain and convey or signify something that is signified through the other. It is, therefore, briefly, the meaning of Grosseteste, and also of Aristotle, that when the predicate defines the subject per se, or something per se higher than the subject, either as a definition or as a part of the definition or conversely, then the proposition is per se.

Et est primus modus quando praedicatum definit subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum. Propter quod tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est animal rationale’, ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex corpore et anima’, quia in omnibus istis praedicatum definit subiectum. And the first way is when the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject. Because of this, such propositions, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a rational animal," "Every man is an animal," "Every man is rational," "Every man is composed of body and soul," for in all these the predicate defines the subject.

Similiter tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est corpus’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex materia et forma’, ‘omnis homo habet materiam’, quia quamvis ista praedicata non definirent istud subiectum, definirent tamen per se superius ad subiectum, et ideo essent per se. Similarly, such propositions as these, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a body," "Every man is a substance," "Every man is composed of matter and form " "Every man has matter." For although these predicates do not define this subject, still they define something per se higher than the subject, and therefore they would be per se.

Secundus autem modus est quando subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum definit praedicatum vel per se inferius ad praedicatum. Unde ista est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, quia in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius ‘risibilis’ ponitur ‘homo’. But the second way occurs when the subject or something per se higher than the subject defines the predicate or something per se lower than the predicate. Hence this would be per se, if it were necessary: "Every man is capable of laughter," for "man" is placed in the definition expressing the nominal essence of "something capable of laughter."

Similiter haec est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’, quia in definitione praedicati ponitur ‘substantia’ vel ‘corpus’, quod est per se superius ad hominem; et quia ‘homo’ definit hoc praedicatum ‘esse susceptibile talium contrariorum’, demonstratis aliquibus quae non possunt competere nisi homini, et illud est per se inferius ad hoc commune ‘susceptibile contrariorum’, ideo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’. Similarly this is per se, if it is necessary: "Every man is susceptible of contraries" for "substance" or "body," which is per se higher than man, is given in the definition of the predicate. And it is also per se since "man" defines the predicate, "being susceptible of such contraries," some contraries being indicated that cannot belong except to man, and "susceptible of such contraries" is per se lower than this general term, "susceptible of contraries," therefore the proposition "Every man is susceptible of contraries” is per se.

Ex praedictis claret quod omnes tales sunt per se ‘omnis homo potest dealbari’, ‘omnis materia potest suscipere formam’, ‘omnis creatura potest a Deo creari’, ‘Deus est creativus’, ‘calor est calefactivus’, et ceterae huiusmodi. From the abovementioned it is clear that all such as these are per se: "Every man can become pale," "All matter can be susceptible of form " "Every creature can be created by God" "God is capable of creating," "Heat is capable of heating," and others of this sort.

Oportet autem scire quod ista quae dicta sunt, intelligenda sunt de propositionibus affirmativis, nam aliquae negativae sunt per se, in quibus tamen praedicatum non definit subiectum nec e converso. But you have to know that what has been said is to be understood concerning affirmative propositions, for some negative propositions are per se, in which, nonetheless, the predicate does not define the subject nor vice versa.

Est autem sciendum quod omnis negativa necessaria, in qua terminus subiectus et praedicatus sunt mere absoluti et non relativi nec connotativi, est per se. Unde haec est per se ‘omnis homo non est asinus’ et haec similiter ‘omnis homo non est albedo’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis haec non sit per se ‘omnis homo non est quantitas’. Now it should be known that every necessary negative proposition in which the subject term and predicate are purely absolute and not relative, nor connotative is per se. Hence, the proposition "Every man is not a donkey" is per se, and similarly "Every man is not a whiteness," though, in Aristotle's opinion, "Every man is not a quantity" is not per se.

Similiter, quando aliqua talis negativa est per se, illud quod per se tamquam proprium praedicatur de uno illorum affirmative, per se praedicatur negative de reliquo. Unde si haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’ et haec sit per se et primo vera ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, haec erit per se ‘nullus asinus est risibilis’. Similarly, when some such negative proposition is per se, that which is per se predicated as a property and affirmatively of one of these is also predicated per se negatively of the other. Hence if "no man is a donkey," is per se, and "every man can laugh" is per se and a first truth, then "no donkey can laugh”will be per se.

Si autem tale praedicatum praedicetur de uno illorum non tamquam proprium sibi, non oportet quod de alio praedicetur negative, neque per se neque vere. Unde quamvis haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’, non oportet propter hoc quod haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’ quia haec est per se ‘omnis asinus est susceptibilis contrariorum’. But if such a predicate is predicated of one of these not as its property, it does not have to be predicated of the other negatively either per se or even truly. Hence even though "no man is a donkey" is per se, it is not necessary that "no man is susceptible of contraries" be per se, because "every donkey is susceptible of contraries" is per se

Latin	English
CAP. 4. DE DIVISIONE PROPOSITIONUM REQUISITARUM AD DEMONSTRATIONEM.	Of the division of propositions required for demonstration.
Dicturus autem de propositionibus requisitis ad demonstrationem, primo praemittam aliquas divisiones earum. Est autem primo sciendum quod propositionum requisitarum ad demonstrationem quaedam sunt partes demonstrationis, sicut duae praemissae et una conclusio, et quaedam non sunt partes demonstrationis.	Now I will talk about propositions required for demonstration. First I will set out some of their divisions. And first you should know that of the propositions required for demonstration, some are parts of the demonstration (i.e. two premises and one conclusion) and some are not parts of the demonstration.
Et vocantur dignitates et maximae vel suppositiones, quae sub propria forma non ingrediuntur demonstrationem, virtute tamen illarum propositionum aliquo modo sciuntur praemissae demonstrationis.	And those are called axioms [dignitates], and maxims [maximae] or suppositions [suppositiones]; which are not included in a demonstration under [their] proper form, and yet in virtue of these propositions the premises of a demonstration are known in some way.
Verbi gratia ista est una propositio prima, per experientiam praecise nota ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, quae non potest esse pars demonstrationis, saltem potissimae et universalis, virtute tamen istius tenent tales demonstrationes ‘omne calidum est calefactivum; omnis ignis est calidus; igitur omnis ignis est calefactivus; ‘omne calidum est calefactivum; omnis aer est calidus; igitur omnis aer est calefactivus’.	For example: "every heat can heat" is a primary proposition, known precisely through experience, which cannot be part of a demonstration (at least of the highest sort and universal). Yet it is in virtue of this that demonstrations hold such as: "Every hot thing can heat, every fire is a hot thing; therefore every fire can heat"; "Every hot thing can heat, every [case] of air is a hot thing; therefore every [case] of air can heat."
Istae igitur sunt distinctae propositiones ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’ et ‘omne calidum est calefactivum’, et prima prior est et secunda posterior. Et tamen secunda non potest proprie demonstrari per primam et secunda intrat demonstrationem non prima, et tamen virtute primae tenent multae demonstrationes quas non potest ingredi.	Therefore, these are distinct propositions: "Every heat can heat," and "Every hot thing can heat," and the first [is] prior and the second posterior. And yet the second cannot properly be demonstrated through the first, and the second enters into demonstration, but not the first. And yet, in virtue of the first many demonstrations hold which it cannot be included into.
Et sicut est de ista, ita est de multis aliis. Propositio autem requisita ad demonstrationem, non tamquam pars, subdividitur, quia quaedam est talis quod necesse est quemlibet docendum habere eam, cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘quidlibet est vel non est’, ‘de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio’ et huiusmodi. Quaedam sunt tales quas non est necesse quemlibet docendum habere, sed necesse est aliquos artifices speciales eas habere, sicut est de istis ‘aliquid est mobile’, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’ etc.	And just as it is for this [case], so for many others. Now a proposition required for demonstration but not as a part of the demonstration is subdivided, for one sort is such that it is necessary that whoever is to be taught, holds it, and of this sort are "each thing is or is not," “of any [subject] the affirmation or negation [is truly predicated]” and the like. Some are such that it is not necessary for whoever is to be taught to hold them, but it is necessary for some specialist workers to have them. For instance, "something can move" and "if equals be taken from equals, the remainders’ etc.
Propositio autem quae est pars demonstrationis subdividitur, quia quaedam est praemissa tantum, quae scilicet est indemonstrabilis; quaedam est conclusio tantum, quae scilicet est demonstrabilis, sed non potest esse principium demonstrandi aliam propositionem; quaedam est praemissa et conclusio, quia potest demonstrari per praemissas alias et potest esse principium demonstrandi aliam conclusionem.	But a proposition which is part of a demonstration is subdivided, for one sort is a premiss only, namely an indemonstrable proposition; and another is conclusion only, namely a demonstrable proposition which cannot be a principle of demonstrating another proposition. And another sort is both premiss and conclusion, because it can be demonstrated through other premises and also be a principle for demonstrating another conclusion.
Alia divisio potest poni, quia propositionum requisitarum ad demonstrationem quaedam sunt principia, quaedam conclusiones. Principia dicuntur illae propositiones quae non sunt conclusiones et tamen requiruntur ad demonstrationem, sive sint partes demonstrationis sive non sint partes eius.	Another division can be given, for of propositions required for demonstration some are principles and others conclusions. ‘Principles’ is the name of those propositions which are not conclusions and yet are required for demonstration (whether they are parts of the demonstration or not parts of it).
Et vocantur principia prima, quae subdividi possunt: quia quaedam principia prima sunt per se nota, quibus scilicet intellectus statim assentit ipsis terminis apprehensis, ita quod si sciatur quid significant termini, statim sciuntur.	And these are also called first principles. They can be [further] subdivided, for some first principles are known per se, namely, those to which the intellect immediately assents upon apprehending their terms, so that if it is known what the terms signify, they are immediately known.
Quaedam autem principia prima non sunt per se nota sed tantum per experientiam, quia possunt dubitari, sed tamen per experientiam fiunt nota, sicut est de ista propositione ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, et de multis talibus, quae non possunt fieri notae nisi per experientiam, de quibus specialiter loquitur Aristoteles in I Metaphysicae et in II Posteriorum, in fine.	But some are first principles that are known not per se, but only through experience, for they can be doubted, but nonetheless come to be known through experience. So it is with "Every heat can heat," and many other such [propositions] that cannot be known except through experience, of which Aristotle specifically discusses in Metaphysics I and in Posterior Analytics II at the end.
CAP. 5. DE PROPRIETATIBUS PROPOSITIONUM AD DEMONSTRATIONEM REQUISITARUM; ET QUOMODO EST EX INCORRUPTIBILIBUS.	Chapter 5. On the properties of propositions required for demonstration, and how this is from indestructible things.
Istis praemissis videndum est de proprietatibus propositionum ad demonstrationem requisitarum.	After these preliminaries, we must look at the properties of propositions required for demonstration.
Illarum autem proprietatum quaedam sunt communes omnibus propositionibus requisitis ad demonstrationem, quaedam sunt propriae conclusionibus, quaedam sunt propriae praemissis, quaedam sunt propriae principiis non ingredientibus demonstrationem.	And of those properties, certain ones are common to all propositions required for demonstration, others are proper to conclusions, others are proper to premisses, and others are proper to principles not involved in demonstration.
Una proprietas communis omni propositioni requisitae ad demonstrationem est necessitas.	One property common to every proposition required for demonstration is necessity.
Nulla enim propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est contingens vel impossibilis, sed quaelibet est necessaria. Quod enim conclusio sit necessaria, patet ex definitione demonstrationis, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire propositionem necessariam, igitur conclusio est necessaria. Sed necessarium, quamvis possit inferri ex contingentibus vel impossibilibus, non tamen potest sciri per contingentia vel impossibilia, igitur necessario praemissae, propter quas scitur conclusio, sunt necessariae.	For no proposition required for demonstration is contingent or impossible, but every one is necessary. For that the conclusion is necessary, is clear from the definition of demonstration, for demonstration is a syllogism producing knowledge of necessary propositions. Therefore the conclusion is necessary. But the necessary, although it could be inferred from contingent or impossible [propositions], still cannot be known from contingent or impossible [propositions], therefore necessarily the premisses, on account of which the conclusion is known, are necessary.
Sed propositiones rectificantes demonstrationem sunt priores et notiores praemissis, igitur illae sunt necessariae, et ita patet quod omnes propositiones requisitae ad demonstrationem sunt necessariae, et sicut sunt necessariae ita sunt perpetuae et incorruptibiles.	But propositions ensuring the correctness of demonstration are prior and better known than the premisses. Therefore they are necessary, and so it is clear that all propositions required for demonstration are necessary, and just as they are necessary, so they are perpetual and incorruptible.
Quod non est sic intelligendum quod propositiones illae sunt quaedam entia perpetua et incorruptibilia.	This should not be understood as [meaning] that these propositions are sorts of perpetual and incorruptible beings.
Hoc enim falsum est. Solus enim Deus est perpetuus et incorruptibilis, nec aliquid aliud a Deo potest esse simpliciter perpetuum et incorruptibile quin per aliquam potentiam posset fieri non-ens.	For this is false. For only God is perpetual and incorruptible. Nor can anything other than God be absolutely perpetual and incorruptible, but that it could by some power be made into a non-being.
Propter quod sciendum quod ‘necessarium’, ‘perpetuum’ et ‘incorruptibile’ dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo dicitur aliquid necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile quia per nullam potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse; et sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis.	On account of this it should be known that ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ are taken in two senses. In one sense something is called ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ because through no power can it begin or cease to be. And thus God alone is perpetual, necessary and incorruptible.
Aliter dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio quae non potest esse falsa; quae scilicet est ita vera quod, si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum. Et isto modo demonstratio est necessariorum, perpetuorum et incorruptibilium, hoc est propositionum quae non possunt esse falsae sed tantum verae.	Otherwise a proposition is called necessary, perpetual and incorruptible when it cannot be false; namely true in the sense that if it is formed, it is not false but true only. And in this way demonstration is of necessary, perpetual and incorruptible propositions, i.e. of propositions which cannot be false, but only true.
Ex quo patet quod quamvis repugnet dictis Aristotelis, tamen secundum veritatem nulla propositio de illis quae important praecise res corruptibiles, mere affirmativa et mere categorica et mere de praesenti, potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens.	From which it is clear that although it is repugnant to what Aristotle says, still in truth no proposition of those things that convey precisely corruptible things, purely affirmative and purely categorical and purely present [tense], can be the principle or conclusion of demonstration, because any such [proposition] is contingent.
Si enim aliqua talis esset necessaria, hoc maxime videretur de tali ‘homo est animal rationale’. Sed haec est contingens, quia sequitur ‘homo est animal rationale, igitur homo est animal’, et ultra ‘igitur homo componitur ex corpore et anima sensitiva’. Sed haec est contingens, quia si nullus homo esset, ipsa esset falsa propter falsam implicationem, quia implicaretur aliquid componi ex corpore et anima, quod tunc foret falsum.	For if any such were necessary, then especially would seem to be in the case such as ‘a man is a rational animal’. But this is contingent, because ‘a man is a rational animal, therefore [some] man is an animal’ follows, and furthermore ‘therefore [some] man is composed from a body and a sensitive soul’. But this is contingent, because if there were no man, that proposition would be false on account of a false implication, because it would be implied that something was composed from a body and soul, which would then be false.
Nec valet dicere quod ista aequivalet isti ‘si homo est, homo est animal rationale’, quia haec est condicionalis et non categorica. Et ita stat primum dictum, quod nulla talis mere categorica et mere de praesenti est necessaria.	Nor is it valid to say that this is equivalent to ‘if a man exists, a man is a rational animal’, for this is conditional and not categorical. And thus holds the first thing we said, that no such purely categorical, and purely present tense proposition is necessary.
Et ideo dico quod nulla talis potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis. Hoc tamen non obstante dicendum est quod multae propositiones compositae ex talibus terminis possunt esse principia vel conclusiones demonstrationis, quia propositiones condicionales et de possibili et aequivalentes eis possunt esse necessariae. Haec enim simpliciter est necessaria ‘si homo est, animal est’; et ista ‘si homo ridet, animal ridet’; et ista ‘omnis homo potest ridere’, si subiectum stet pro his quae possunt esse.	And therefore I say that no such [proposition] can be a principle or conclusion of demonstration. Notwithstanding this, it must be said that many propositions composed from such terms can be principles or conclusions of demonstration, for conditional propositions and those involving the possible and their equivalents can be necessary. For this is necessary simpliciter: "If it is a man, it is an animal," and this, "If a man laughs, an animal laughs," as well as this, "Every man can laugh," if the subject stands for those that can be.
Et eodem modo propositiones aequivalentes eis sunt necessariae. Et ex isto patet quomodo, non obstante quod genera et species et quaecumque universalia distincta a cognitione Dei sunt simpliciter corruptibilia sic quod possunt esse nihil, tamen de eis possunt fieri demonstrationes et scientiae, propter hoc quod, non obstante quod possunt simpliciter destrui, tamen de eis possunt formari propositiones necessariae, quae possunt sciri scientia proprie dicta.	And in the same way propositions equivalent to these are necessary. And from this it is clear in what way, notwithstanding that genera and species and every universal distinct from the cognition of God are destructible simpliciter, so that they can be nothing, demonstrations and sciences can still be produced about them, because, even though they can be destroyed simpliciter, necessary propositions can still be formed about them, which can be known by knowledge properly so-called.
Ex isto etiam patet quomodo de contingentibus potest esse scientia; quia secundum quod veniunt in demonstrationem necessaria sunt, hoc est propositiones formatae de terminis importantibus talia contingentia quae veniunt in demonstrationem sunt necessariae, quae non sunt mere de praesenti et de inesse, categoricae et affirmativae, sed vel sunt negativae vel hypotheticae vel de possibili vel alio modo, vel aequivalentes eis.	From this it is clear in what way there can be knowledge about contingent things. For according as they enter into demonstration they are necessary, i.e. propositions formed from terms conveying such contingent things that enter into demonstration are necessary, which are not about the present and assertoric, and are categorical and affirmative alone, but are either negative or hypothetical or about the possible or some other mode, or equivalent to these.
CAP. 6. QUID EST ESSE DE OMNI ET QUOMODO PRAEMISSAE ET CONCLUSIO DEMONSTRATIONIS POSSUNT ESSE DE OMNI?.	Chapter 6. What is ‘being of all’, and in what way can premises and conclusions of demonstrations ‘be of all’?
Alia condicio tam praemissarum quam conclusionis demonstrationis est esse de omni, quia tam praemissa quam conclusio demonstrationis potest esse de omni.	Another condition of both the premises and conclusion of a demonstration is ‘being of all’, for premises as well as conclusions of demonstrations can ‘be of all’.
Est autem de omni, non quando praedicatum competit alicui contento sub subiecto et alicui non, nec quando uno tempore competit subiecto et alio non competit sibi, sed quando praedicatum omni contento sub subiecto et omni tempore competit subiecto.	Now ‘being of all’ is not when the predicate belongs to something contained under the subject but not to something else, nor is it when it belongs to the subject at one time but not at another. Rather, it is when the predicate belongs to everything contained under the subject and with the subject at every time.
Unde differentia est inter ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur Aristoteles in I Posteriorum et inter ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur in I Priorum. Nam ad ‘de omni’ de quo loquitur in libro Posteriorum requiritur quod praedicatum vere competat subiecto universaliter sumpto et pro omni tempore.	Hence there is a difference between the "of all" of which Aristotle speaks in Posterior Analytics I and the "of all" of which he speaks in Prior Analytics I. For it is required for the "of all" that he speaks of in the Posterior Analytics that the predicate truly belong to the subject taken universally, and for every time.
Ad ‘de omni’ autem de quo loquitur in libro Priorum non requiritur nisi quod per talem propositionem denotetur praedicatum praedicari de subiecto universaliter sumpto, sive vere praedicetur de eo sive non.	For the "of all" spoken of in the Prior Analytics it is only required that through such a proposition it is denoted that the predicated is predicated of the subject taken universally, whether it be truly predicated of it or not.
Unde haec est de omni ‘omnis homo est asinus’, non obstante quod sit falsa, quia est universalis.	Hence this is ‘of all’, "Every man is a donkey," for it is universal even if it is false.
CAP. 7. QUOMODO PROPOSITIONES REQUISITAE AD DEMONSTRATIONEM DICUNTUR PER SE?.	In what way are propositions required for demonstration called per se?
Non solum autem quaelibet propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est necessaria vel de omni, sed etiam quaelibet est per se vera. Ut autem sciatur quae propositio est per se vera et quae non, videnda est multiplicitas et aequivocatio huius termini ‘per se’.	Now not only is every proposition required for a demonstration necessary or ‘of all’, but also every one is true per se. And in order that it be known what proposition is true per se and what one is not, we should look at the multiplicity and equivocation of the term per se.
Est autem sciendum, secundum Lincolniensem, quod distinctio est inter modos dicendi per se et modum essendi per se et modum causandi per se. Aliquid enim esse per se tripliciter dicitur, eo quod ‘per se’ vel excludit omnem causam, et sic solus Deus est per se, hoc est, solus Deus non habet causam per quam sit; vel excludit causam materialem, et sic intelligentiae carentes materia sunt per se, hoc est, non habent materiam in qua forma earum subsistat; vel excludit subiectum, et sic substantia est per se, hoc est, substantia non habet subiectum in quo subsistat.	It should be known, according to Grosseteste, that there is a distinction between the modes of saying something per se and the way of being per se, and the way of causing per se. For anything is said to be per se in three ways, in that "per se" either excludes all causes, and thus only God is per se, i.e., God alone does not have a cause through which he is; or it excludes a material cause, and thus intelligences lacking matter are per se, i.e., they do not have matter in which their form subsists; or it excludes the subject, and thus substance is per se, i.e., a substance does not have a subject in which it may subsist.
Et si quaeratur, quare tot modis dicitur aliquid esse per se, dicendum quod causa huius non potest assignari nisi voluntarius usus loquentium. Alius est modus causandi per se, quando scilicet aliquid est causa per se alicuius, sicut interfectio est causa per se quare iste intereat.	And if it is asked why anything is said to be per se in so many ways, it should be replied that the cause of this cannot be assigned to anything other than the voluntary usage of the speakers. There is another mode of per se, namely when something is a cause of something per se, as the killing is the cause per se why this person perishes.
Et potest iste modus non tantum competere causae efficienti sed etiam causae finali.	And this mode can belong not only to an efficient cause, but also with a final cause.
Praeter istos modos ‘per se’ sunt aliqui alii modi dicendi per se, scilicet quando aliquid praedicatur per se de altero. Et sunt duo modi, quorum unus est quando praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, alius quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati.	Beyond these ways, are some other modes of saying per se, namely, when something is predicated per se of another. And there are two ways: of which one is when the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, the other when the subject is given in the definition of the predicate.
Circa istos autem modos est primo advertendum quod iste terminus ‘per se’, secundum quod praedicatur de propositione, dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large. Large dicitur propositio per se quando subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati vel e converso et per se superius ad unum definit reliquum vel definitur per reliquum. Et isto modo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, et ista ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, et ista ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, et ceterae huiusmodi.	But concerning these ways it should first be noted that the term per se, according as it is predicated of a proposition, is taken in two ways, namely strictly and broadly. A proposition is called per se broadly when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or conversely, and [something?] per se higher than one thing defines another or is defined by the other. And in this way this is per se, "Every man is an animal", and "Every man is rational," and "Every man is capable of laughter," and others of this sort.
Aliter accipitur ‘per se’ stricte.	In the other way, per se is taken strictly.
Et sic, cum prioribus condicionibus, ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod ipsa sit simpliciter necessaria, ita quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsa. Et sic accepto ‘per se’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui ponit quod generatio et corruptio rerum est perpetua, multae propositiones categoricae et de inesse et de praesenti sint per se, tamen secundum veritatem tales de terminis importantibus praecise res corruptibiles sive creatas non sunt per se, quia non sunt necessariae, sicut dictum est.	And so, with the prior conditions, for a proposition to be per se in this way it is required that it be necessary simpliciter, so that it cannot be, never could have been, and never can be false. And taking "per se" in this sense, although according to the opinion of Aristotle (who assumes that generation and destruction of realities is perpetual) many categorical propositions concerning inherence and the present are per se, still according to the truth, such propositions from terms precisely conveying destructible or created realities are not per se, for they are not necessary, as was said.
Unde sic accepto ‘per se’, haec non est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, quia potest esse falsa, puta posito quod nullus homo sit. Verumtamen propositiones de possibili et eis aequivalentes, compositae ex talibus terminis, sunt per se.	Hence, taking "per se" in this sense, the proposition Every man is an animal," is not per se, " for it can be false - for instance, if it is assumed that no man exists. But still propositions concerning possible things, and propositions equivalent to them, composed from such terms, are per se.
Unde ista est per se ‘omnis homo potest esse animal’, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Viso igitur quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod sit necessaria, est ulterius sciendum quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, strictissime sumpto hoc termino ‘per se’, requiritur quod sit praedicatio propria et directa.	Hence "Every man can be an animal,"is per se, when the subject is taken to stand for what can be. Therefore, now that we have seen that if a proposition is to be per se it is required that it be necessary, it should be known next that for a proposition to be per se, taking the term "per se" in the strictest sense, it is required that it be a proper and direct predication.
Per quod excluduntur propositiones ubi praedicantur inferiora de superioribus particulariter sumptis et subiecta de suis passionibus et una passio de alia passione.	Through this are excluded those propositions where the lower are predicated of the higher taken as particulars, and subjects are predicated of their attributes, and one attribute is predicated of another attribute.
Propter quod tales, quamvis sint necessariae, non sunt per se, strictissime sumpto ‘per se’. Cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘aliquod animal est homo’ vel ‘aliquod animal potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est homo vel potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est susceptibile disciplinae’ et huiusmodi, quamvis essent necessariae.	Because of this, such propositions, though they are necessary, are not per se, taking "per se" in the strictest sense. And of this sort are such as "Some animal is a man," or "Some animal can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is a man or can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is capable of being taught" and the like, even though they are necessary.
Ulterius sciendum est quod aliquid potest cadere in definitione alterius vel in recto vel in obliquo, et secundum hoc potest praedicari vel in recto vel in obliquo. Istis visis dicendum est quod sola illa propositio est per se quae est necessaria, in qua praedicatum definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, vel subiectum definit praedicatum vel aliquid per se superius ad praedicatum.	Next it should be known that something can fall in the definition of another either directly or obliquely, and accordingly it can be predicated directly or obliquely. Having looked at these things, it should be said that a proposition is only per se necessary, in which the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject, or the subject defines the predicate or something per se higher than the predicate.
Et hoc intelligit Lincolniensis quando dicit: ‘‘Dicitur per se alterum de altero cum quidditas unius essentialiter et non per accidens a quidditate alterius egreditur. Non enim intendit quod praedicatum realiter egrediatur a subiecto vel e converso, illo modo quo effectus efficitur realiter a sua causa, cum subiectum et praedicatum sint termini, quorum neuter est causa alterius.	And Grosseteste means [intelligit] this when he says "one thing is predicated per se of another when the quiddity of one essentially, and not accidentally, proceeds from the quiddity of the other," For he does not mean that the predicate really proceeds from the subject, or conversely, in the way in which an effect is really brought about by its cause, since the subject and predicate are terms, of which neither is the cause of the other.
Sed ‘egredi’ hic a quidditate alterius vocat declarare et importare sive significare aliquid quod significatur per reliquum. Est igitur, breviter, intentio Lincolniensis, et etiam Aristotelis quod quando praedicatum per se definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, sive sicut definitio sive sicut pars definitionis vel e converso, tunc est propositio per se.	But he says "proceeds from the quiddity of the other" to explain and convey or signify something that is signified through the other. It is, therefore, briefly, the meaning of Grosseteste, and also of Aristotle, that when the predicate defines the subject per se, or something per se higher than the subject, either as a definition or as a part of the definition or conversely, then the proposition is per se.
Et est primus modus quando praedicatum definit subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum. Propter quod tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est animal rationale’, ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex corpore et anima’, quia in omnibus istis praedicatum definit subiectum.	And the first way is when the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject. Because of this, such propositions, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a rational animal," "Every man is an animal," "Every man is rational," "Every man is composed of body and soul," for in all these the predicate defines the subject.
Similiter tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est corpus’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex materia et forma’, ‘omnis homo habet materiam’, quia quamvis ista praedicata non definirent istud subiectum, definirent tamen per se superius ad subiectum, et ideo essent per se.	Similarly, such propositions as these, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a body," "Every man is a substance," "Every man is composed of matter and form " "Every man has matter." For although these predicates do not define this subject, still they define something per se higher than the subject, and therefore they would be per se.
Secundus autem modus est quando subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum definit praedicatum vel per se inferius ad praedicatum. Unde ista est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, quia in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius ‘risibilis’ ponitur ‘homo’.	But the second way occurs when the subject or something per se higher than the subject defines the predicate or something per se lower than the predicate. Hence this would be per se, if it were necessary: "Every man is capable of laughter," for "man" is placed in the definition expressing the nominal essence of "something capable of laughter."
Similiter haec est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’, quia in definitione praedicati ponitur ‘substantia’ vel ‘corpus’, quod est per se superius ad hominem; et quia ‘homo’ definit hoc praedicatum ‘esse susceptibile talium contrariorum’, demonstratis aliquibus quae non possunt competere nisi homini, et illud est per se inferius ad hoc commune ‘susceptibile contrariorum’, ideo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’.	Similarly this is per se, if it is necessary: "Every man is susceptible of contraries" for "substance" or "body," which is per se higher than man, is given in the definition of the predicate. And it is also per se since "man" defines the predicate, "being susceptible of such contraries," some contraries being indicated that cannot belong except to man, and "susceptible of such contraries" is per se lower than this general term, "susceptible of contraries," therefore the proposition "Every man is susceptible of contraries” is per se.
Ex praedictis claret quod omnes tales sunt per se ‘omnis homo potest dealbari’, ‘omnis materia potest suscipere formam’, ‘omnis creatura potest a Deo creari’, ‘Deus est creativus’, ‘calor est calefactivus’, et ceterae huiusmodi.	From the abovementioned it is clear that all such as these are per se: "Every man can become pale," "All matter can be susceptible of form " "Every creature can be created by God" "God is capable of creating," "Heat is capable of heating," and others of this sort.
Oportet autem scire quod ista quae dicta sunt, intelligenda sunt de propositionibus affirmativis, nam aliquae negativae sunt per se, in quibus tamen praedicatum non definit subiectum nec e converso.	But you have to know that what has been said is to be understood concerning affirmative propositions, for some negative propositions are per se, in which, nonetheless, the predicate does not define the subject nor vice versa.
Est autem sciendum quod omnis negativa necessaria, in qua terminus subiectus et praedicatus sunt mere absoluti et non relativi nec connotativi, est per se. Unde haec est per se ‘omnis homo non est asinus’ et haec similiter ‘omnis homo non est albedo’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis haec non sit per se ‘omnis homo non est quantitas’.	Now it should be known that every necessary negative proposition in which the subject term and predicate are purely absolute and not relative, nor connotative is per se. Hence, the proposition "Every man is not a donkey" is per se, and similarly "Every man is not a whiteness," though, in Aristotle's opinion, "Every man is not a quantity" is not per se.
Similiter, quando aliqua talis negativa est per se, illud quod per se tamquam proprium praedicatur de uno illorum affirmative, per se praedicatur negative de reliquo. Unde si haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’ et haec sit per se et primo vera ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, haec erit per se ‘nullus asinus est risibilis’.	Similarly, when some such negative proposition is per se, that which is per se predicated as a property and affirmatively of one of these is also predicated per se negatively of the other. Hence if "no man is a donkey," is per se, and "every man can laugh" is per se and a first truth, then "no donkey can laugh”will be per se.
Si autem tale praedicatum praedicetur de uno illorum non tamquam proprium sibi, non oportet quod de alio praedicetur negative, neque per se neque vere. Unde quamvis haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’, non oportet propter hoc quod haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’ quia haec est per se ‘omnis asinus est susceptibilis contrariorum’.	But if such a predicate is predicated of one of these not as its property, it does not have to be predicated of the other negatively either per se or even truly. Hence even though "no man is a donkey" is per se, it is not necessary that "no man is susceptible of contraries" be per se, because "every donkey is susceptible of contraries" is per se

THE LOGIC MUSEUM Copyright (translation and introduction) (C) E.D.Buckner 2010.