Authors/Anselm/cur deus homo/Liber 1

• 1.01 QUAESTIO DE QUA TOTUM OPUS PENDET.
• 1.02 QUOMODO ACCIPIENDA SINT QUAE DICENDA SUNT.
• 1.03 OBIECTIONES INFIDELIUM ET RESPONSIONES FIDELIUM.
• 1.04 QUOD HAE RESPONSIONES VIDEANTUR INFIDELIBUS SINE NECESSITATE ET QUASI QUAEDAM PICTURAE.
• 1.05 QUOD REDEMPTIO HOMINIS NON POTUIT FIERI PER ALIAM QUAM PER DEI PERSONAM.
• 1.06 QUALITER REPREHENDANT INFIDELES QUOD DICIMUS DEUM MORTE SUA NOS REDEMISSE ET SIC DILECTIONEM SUAM ERGA NOS OSTENDISSE ET PRO NOBIS EXPUGNARE DIABOLUM VENISSE.
• 1.07 QUOD NULLAM DIABOLUS HABEBAT IUSTITIAM ADVERSUS HOMINEM; ET QUARE VIDEATUR HABUISSE CUR DEUS HOC MODO HOMINEM LIBERARET.
• 1.08 QUOMODO LICET HUMILIA QUAE DICIMUS DE CHRISTO, NON PERTINEANT AD DIVINITATEM, TAMEN INCONVENIENS VIDEATUR INFIDELIBUS EA DE ILLO DICI SECUNDUM HOMINEM; ET UNDE ILLIS VIDEATUR IDEM HOMO NON SPONTE MORTUUS ESSE.
• 1.09 QUOD SPONTE MORTUUS SIT; ET QUID SIT: "FACTUS EST OBOEDIENS USQUE AD MORTEM", ET: "PROPTER QUOD ET DEUS ILLUM EXALTAVIT" ET: "NON VENI VOLUNTATEM MEAM FACERE" ET: "PROPRIO FILIO SUO NON PEPERCIT" DEUS, ET: "NON SICUT EGO VOLO, SED SICUT TU"./45/
• 1.10 ITEM DE EISDEM, QUOMODO ALITER RECTE INTELLIGI POSSUM.
• 1.11 QUID SIT PECCARE ET PRO PECCATO SATISFACERE.
• 1.12 UTRUM SOLA MISERICORDIA SINE OMNI DEBITI SOLUTIONE DECEAT DEUM PECCATUM DIMITTERE.
• 1.13 QUOD NIHIL MINUS SIT TOLERANDUM IN RERUM ORDINE, QUAM UT CREATURA CREATORI DEBITUM HONOREM AUFERAT ET NON SOLVAT QUOD AUFERT.
• 1.14 CUIUSMODI HONOR DEI SIT POENA PECCANTIS.
• 1.15 SI DEUS VEL AD MODICUM PATIATUR HONOREM SUUM VIOLARI.
• 1.16 RATIO QUOD NUMERUS ANGELORUM QUI CECIDERUNT RESTITUENDUS SIT DE HOMINIBUS.
• 1.17 QUOD ALII ANGELI PRO ILLIS NON POSSINT RESTITUI.
• 1.18 UTRUM PLURES FUTURI SINT SANCTI HOMINES QUAM SINT MALI ANGELI.
• 1.19 QUOD HOMO NON POSSIT SALVARI SINE PECCATI SATISFACTIONE.
• 1.20 QUOD SECUNDUM MENSURAM PECCATI OPORTEAT ESSE SATISFACTIONEM, NEC HOMO EAM PER SE FACERE POSSIT.
• 1.21 QUANTI PONDERIS SIT PECCATUM.
• 1.22 QUAM CONTUMELIAM FECIT HOMO DEO, CUM SE PERMISIT VINCI A DIABOLO, PRO QUA SATISFACERE NON POTEST.
• 1.23 QUID ABSTULIT DEO CUM PECCAVIT, QUOD REDDERE NEQUIT.
• 1.24 QUOD QUAMDIU NON REDDIT DEO QUOD DEBET, NON POSSIT ESSE BEATUS NEC EXCUSETUR IMPOTENTIA.
• 1.25 QUOD EX NECESSITATE PER CHRISTUM SALVETUR HOMO.

Latin	English
S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi opera omnia Vol.2, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, pp.39-XXX.	Works of St. Anselm, tr. by Sidney Norton Deane, [1903].
ANSELMUS: CUR DEUS HOMO
[COMMENDATIO OPERIS AD URBANEM PAPAM II]
/39/ Quamvis post apostolos sancti patres et doctores nostri multi tot et tanta de fidei nostrae ratione dicant ad confutandum insipientiam et fran, gendum duritiam infidelium, et ad pascendum eos qui iam corde fide mundato eiusdem fidei ratione, quam post eius certitudinem debemus esurire, delectantur, ut nec nostris nec futuris temporibus ullum illis parem in veritatis /40/ contemplatione speremus: nullum tamen reprehendendum arbitror, si fide stabilitus in rationis eius indagine se voluerit exercere. Nam et illi, quia "breues dies hominis sunt", non omnia quae possent, si diutius vixissent, dicere potuerunt; et veritatis ratio tam ample tamque profunda est, ut a mortalibus nequeat exhauriri; et dominus in ecclesia sua, cum qua se esse "usque ad consummationem saeculi" promittit, gratiae suae dona non desinit impertiri. Et ut alla taceam quibus sacra pagina nos ad investigandam rationem inuitat: ubi dicit: "nisi credideritis, non intelligetis", aperte nos monet intentionem ad intellectum extendere, cum docet qualiter ad illum debeamus proficere. Denique quoniam inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita capimits esse medium intelligo: quanto aliquis ad illum proficit, tanto eum propinquare speciei, ad quam omnes anhelamus, existimo.
Hac igitur ego consideratione, licet sim homo paruae nimis scientiae, confortatus, ad eorum quae credimus rationem intuendam, quantum superna gratia mihi dare dignatur, aliquantum conor assurgere; et cum aliquid quod prius non videbam reperio, id aliis libenter aperio, quatenus quid secure tenere debeam, alieno discam iudicio.
/41/ Quapropter, mi pater et domine, Christianis omnibus cum reuerentia amande et cum amore reuerende papa Urbane, quem dei providentia in sua ecclesia summum constituit pontificem: quoniam nulli rectius possum, uestrae sanctitatis praesento conspectui subditum opusculum, ut eius auctoritate quae ibi suscipienda sunt approbentur, et quae corrigenda sunt emendentur.
[PRAEFATIO]
/42/ Opus subditum propter quosdam qui, antequam perfectum et exquisi tum esset, primas partes eius me nesciente sibi transcribebant, festinantius quam mihi opportunum esset, ac ideo brevius quam vellem sum coactus, ut potui, consummare. Nam plura quae tacui inseruissem et addidissem, si in quiete et cungruo spatio illud mihi edere licuisset. In magna enim cordis tribulatione, quam unde et cur passus sim novit deus, illud in Anglia rogatus incepi et in Capuana provincia peregrinus perfeci. Quod secundum materiam de qua editum est, Cur deus homo nominavi et in duos libellos distinxi. Quorum prior quidem infidelium Christianam fidem, quia rationi putant illam repugnare, respuentium continet obiectiones et fidelium responsiones. Ac tandem remoto Christo, quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de illo, probat rationibus ne nessariis esse impossibile ullum hominem saluari sine illo. In secundo autem libro similiter quasi nihil sciatur de Christo, monstratur non minus aperta ratione et veritate naturam humanam ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate beata totus homo, id est in corpore et anima, frueretur; ac necesse /43/ esse ut hoc fiat de homine propter quod factus est, sed non nisi per hominem-deum; atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus fieri oportere.
Hanc praefatiunculam cum capitulis totius operis omnes qui librum hunc transcribere volent, ante eius principium ut praefigant postulo; quatenus in cuiuscumque menus venerit, quasi in eius fronte aspiciat, si quid in toto corpore sit quod non despiciat.
LIBER PRIMUS
1.01 QUAESTIO DE QUA TOTUM OPUS PENDET.	The question on which the whole work rests.
Saepe et studiosissime a multis rogatus sum et verbis et litteris, qua tenus cuiusdam de fide nostra quaestionis rationes, quas soleo respondere quaerentibus, memoriae scribendo commendem. Dicunt enim eas sibi placere et arbitrantur satisfacere. Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem ac cedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur, et ut sins, quantum possum, "parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti" se "rationem de ea quae in" nobis "est spe". Quam quaestionem solent /48/ et infideles nobis simplicitatem Christianam quasi fatuam deridentes obicere, et fideles multi in corde versare: qua scilicet ratione vel necessitate deus homo factus sit, et morte sua, sicut credimus et confitemur, mundo vitam reddiderit, cum hoc aut per aliam personam, sive angelicam sive huma nam, aut sola voluntate facere potuerit. De qua quaestione non solum litterati sed etiam illitterati multi quaerunt et rationem eius desiderant. Quoniam ergo de hac multi tractari postulant, et licet in quaerendo valde videatur difficilis, in sol ven do tamen omnibus est intelli gibilis et propter utilitatem et rationis pulchritudinem amabilis: quamvis a sanctis patribus inde quod sudicere de beat dictum sit, tamen de illa curabo quod deus mihi dignabitur aperire, petentibus ostendere. Et quoniam ea quae per interrogationem et responsio nem investigantur, multis et maxime tardioribus ingeniis magis patent et ideo plus placent, unum ex illis qui hoc flagitant, qui inter altos instantius ad hoc me sollicitat, accipiam mecum disputantem, ut Boso quaerat et Anselmus respondeat hoc modo.	I HAVE been often and most earnestly requested by many, both personally and by letter, that I would hand down in writing the proofs of a certain doctrine of our faith, which I am accustomed to give to inquirers; for they say that these proofs gratify them, and are considered sufficient. This they ask, not for the sake of attaining to faith by means of reason, but that they may be gladdened by understanding and meditating on those things which they believe; and that, as far as possible, they may be always ready to convince any one who demands of them a reason of that hope which is in us. And this question, both infidels are accustomed to bring up against us, ridiculing Christian simplicity as absurd; and many believers ponder it in their hearts; for what cause or necessity, in sooth, God became man, and by his own death, as we believe and affirm, restored life to the world; when he might have done this, by means of some other being, angelic or human, or merely by his will. Not only the learned, but also many unlearned persons interest themselves in this inquiry and seek for its solution. Therefore, since many desire to consider this subject, and, though it seem very difficult in the investigation, it is yet plain to all in the solution, and attractive for the value and beauty of the reasoning; although what ought to be sufficient has been said by the holy fathers and their successors, yet I will take pains to disclose to inquirers what God has seen fit to lay open to me. And since investigations, which are carried on by question and answer, are thus made more plain to many, and especially to less quick minds, and on that account are more gratifying, I will take to argue with me one of those persons who agitate this subject; one, who among the rest impels me more earnestly to it, so that in this way Boso may question and Anselm reply.
BOSO. Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi uidetur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere. Quapropter quoniam gratia dei praeveniente fidem nostrae redemptionis sic puto me tenere, ut etiam si nulla possum quod credo ratione comprehendere, nihil tamen sit quod ab eius firmitate me ualeat euellere, a te peto mihi aperiri quod, ut scis, plures mecum petunt: qua necessitate scilicet et ratione deus, cum sit omnipotens, humilitatem et infirmitatem humanae naturae pro eius restauratione assumpserit.	Boso. As the right order requires us to believe the deep things of Christian faith before we undertake to discuss them by reason; so to my mind it appears a neglect if, after we are established in the faith, we do not seek to understand what we believe. Therefore, since I thus consider myself to hold the faith of our redemption, by the prevenient grace of God, so that, even were I unable in any way to understand what I believe, still nothing could shake my constancy; I desire that you should discover to me, what, as you know, many besides myself ask, for what necessity and cause God, who is omnipotent, should have assumed the littleness and weakness of human nature for the sake of its renewal?
ANSELMUS. Quod quaeris a me supra me est, et idcirco "altiora" me tractare timeo, ne forte cum putaverit aut etiam viderit aliquis me non /49/ sibi satisfacere, plus existimet rei veritatem mihi deficere, quam intellectum meum ad eam capiendam non aufficere.	Anselm. You ask of me a thing which is above me, and therefore I tremble to take in hand subjects too lofty for me, lest, when some one may have thought or even seen that I do not satisfy him, he will rather believe that I am in error with regard to the substance of the truth, than that my intellect is not able to grasp it.
BOSO. Non hoc tantum timere debes quantum et reminisci quia saepe contingit in colloquendo de aliqua quaestione, ut deus aperiat quod prius latebat; et sperare de gratia dei quia, si ea quae gratis accepisti libenter impertiris, altiora ad quae nondum attigisti mereberis accipere.	Boso. You ought not so much to fear this, because you should call to mind, on the other hand, that it often happens in the discussion of some question that God opens what before lay concealed; and that you should hope for the grace of God, because if you liberally impart those things which you have freely received, you will be worthy to receive higher things to which you have not yet attained.
ANSELMUS. Est et aliud propter quod video aut vix aut nullatenus posse ad plenum inter nos de hac re nunc tractari, quoniam ad hoc est necessaria notitia potestatis et necessitatis et voluntatis et quarundam aliarum rerum, quae sic se habent, ut earum nulla possit plene sine aliis considerari. Et ideo tractatus earum opus suum postulat, non multum, ut puto, facile nec omnino inutile; nam earum ignorantia quaedam facit difficilia, quae per earum notitiam fiunt facilia.	Anselm. There is also another thing on account of which I think this subject can hardly, or not at all, be discussed between us comprehensively; since, for this purpose, there is required a knowledge of Power and Necessity and Will and certain other subjects which are so related to one another that none of them can be fully examined without the rest; and so the discussion of these topics requires a separate labor, which, though not very easy, in my opinion, is by no means useless; for ignorance of these subjects makes certain things difficult, which by acquaintance with them become easy.
BOSO. Sic breviter de his suis locis dicere poteris, ut et quod sufficiat ad praesens opus habeamus, et quod plus dicendum est in aliud tempus differamus.	Boso. You can speak so briefly with regard to these things, each in its place, that we may both have all that is requisite for the present object, and what remains to be said we can put off to another time.
ANSELMUS. Hoc quoque multum me retrahit a petitione tua, quia materia non solum pretiosa, sea, sicut est de specioso "forma prae filiis hominum", sic etiam est speciosa ratione super intellectus hominum. Unde timeo, ne, que madmodum ego soleo indignari pravis pictoribus, cum ipsum dominum in formi figura pingi video, ita mihi contingat, si tam decoram materiam incompto et contemptibili dictamine exarare praesumo.	Anselm. This also much disinclines me from your request, not only that the subject is important, but as it is of a form fair above the sons of men, so is it of a wisdom fair above the intellect of men. On this account, I fear, lest, as I am wont to be incensed against sorry artists, when I see our Lord himself painted in an unseemly figure; so also it may fall out with me if I should undertake to exhibit so rich a theme in rough and vulgar diction.
BOSO. Nec hoc te debet retrahere quia, sicut tu permittis, ut qui potest melius dicat, sic nulli praestituis, ut cui dictamen tnum non places, pulchrius non scribat. Verum ut omnes excusationes tuas excludam: quod postulo non facies doctis, sed mihi et hoc ipsum me cum petentibus.	Boso. Even this ought not to deter you, because, as you allow any one to talk better if he can, so you preclude none from writing more elegantly if your language does not please him. But, to cut you off from all excuses, you are not to fulfil this request of mine for the learned but for me, and those asking the same thing with me.
1.02 QUOMODO ACCIPIENDA SINT QUAE DICENDA SUNT.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam video importunitatem tuam et illorum qui hoc tecum ex caritate et religioso studio petunt, tentabo pro mea possibilitate, deo adiu uante et uestris orationibus, quas hoc postulantes saepe mihi petenti ad hoc ipsum promisistis, quod quaeritis non tam ostendere quarn tecum quaerere; sed eo pacto quo omnia quae dico volo accipi: Videlicet ut, si quid dixero quod maior non confirmet auctoritas -- quamvis illud ratione probare videar -- non alia certitudine accipiatur, nisi quia interim ita mihi videtur, donec deus mihi melius aliquo modo reuelet. Quod si aliquatenus quaestioni tuae satis facere potero, certum esse debebit quia et sapientior me plenius hoc facere poterit. Immo sciendum est, quidquid inde homo dicere possit, altiores tantae rei adhuc latere rationes.	Anselm. Since I observe your earnestness and that of those who desire this thing with you, out of love and pious zeal, I will try to the best of my ability with the assistance of God and your prayers, which, when making this request, you have often promised me, not so much to make plain what you inquire about, as to inquire with you. But I wish all that I say to be received with this understanding, that, if I shall have said anything which higher authority does not corroborate, though I appear to demonstrate it by argument, yet it is not to be received with any further confidence, than as so appearing to me for the time, until God in some way make a clearer revelation to me. But if I am in any measure able to set your inquiry at rest, it should be concluded that a wiser than I will be able to do this more fully; nay, we must understand that for all that a man can say or know still deeper grounds of so great a truth lie concealed.
1.03 OBIECTIONES INFIDELIUM ET RESPONSIONES FIDELIUM.
BOSO. Patere igitur ut verbis utar infidelium. Aequum enim est ut, cum nostrae fidei rationem studemus inquirere, ponam eorum obiectiones, qui nul latenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere. Quamvis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus: unum idemque tamen est quod quaerimus. Et si quid responderis cui auctoritas obsistere sacra videatur, liceat illam mihi obtendere, quatenus quomodo non obsistat aperias.	Boso. Suffer me, therefore, to make use of the words of infidels; for it is proper for us when we seek to investigate the reasonableness of our faith to propose the objections of those who are wholly unwilling to submit to the same faith, without the support of reason. For although they appeal to reason because they do not believe, but we, on the other hand, because we do believe; nevertheless, the thing sought is one and the same. And if you bring up anything in reply which sacred authority seems to oppose, let it be mine to urge this inconsistency until you disprove it.
ANSELMUS. Dic quod tibi videtur.	Anselm. Speak on according to your pleasure.
BOSO. Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in uterum mulieris de scendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum crevisse, et -- ut multa alia taceam quae deo non uidentur convenire -- lassitudinem, famem, sitim, verbera et inter latrones crucem mortemque sustinuisse.	Boso. Infidels ridiculing our simplicity charge upon us that we do injustice and dishonor to God when we affirm that he descended into the womb of a virgin, that he was born of woman, that he grew on the nourishment of milk and the food of men; and, passing over many other things which seem incompatible with Deity, that he endured fatigue, hunger, thirst, stripes and crucifixion among thieves.
ANSELMUS. Nos non facimus deo iniuriam ullam aut contumeliam, sed toto corde gratias agentes laudamus et praedicamus ineffabilem altitudinem mise ricordiae illius, quia quanto nos mirabilius et praeter opinionem de tantis et /51/ tam debitis malis in quibus eramus, ad tanta et tam indebita bona quae perdideramus, restituit, tanto maiorem dilectionem erga nos et pietatem mon stravit. Si enim diligenter considerarent quam convenienter hoc modo pro curata sit humana restauratio, non deriderent nostram simplicitatem, sed dei nobiscum laudarent sapientem benignitatem. Oportebat namque ut, sicut per hominis inoboedientiam mors in humanum genus intraverat, ita per hominis oboedientiam vita restitueretur. Et quemadmodum peccatum quod ruit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic nostrae iustitiae et salutis auctor nasceretur de femina. Et ut diabolus, qui per gustum ligni quem persuasit hominem vicerat, per passionem ligni quam intulit ab homine uinceretur. Sunt quoque multa alia quae studiose considerata, inenarrabilem quandam nostrae redemptionis hoc modo procuratae pulchritudinem ostendunt.	Anselm. We do no injustice or dishonor to God, but give him thanks with all the heart, praising and proclaiming the ineffable height of his compassion. For the more astonishing a thing it is and beyond expectation, that he has restored us from so great and deserved ills in which we were, to so great and unmerited blessings which we had forfeited; by so much the more has he shown his more exceeding love and tenderness towards us. For did they but carefully consider bow fitly in this way human redemption is secured, they would not ridicule our simplicity, but would rather join with us in praising the wise beneficence of God. For, as death came upon the human race by the disobedience of man, it was fitting that by man’s obedience life should be restored. And, as sin, the cause of our condemnation, had its origin from a woman, so ought the author of our righteousness and salvation to be born of a woman. And so also was it proper that the devil, who, being man’s tempter, had conquered him in eating of the tree, should be vanquished by man in the suffering of the tree which man bore. Many other things also, if we carefully examine them, give a certain indescribable beauty to our redemption as thus procured.
1.04 QUOD HAE RESPONSIONES VIDEANTUR INFIDELIBUS SINE NECESSITATE ET QUASI QUAEDAM PICTURAE.	CHAPTER IV. How these things appear not decisive to infidels, and merely like so many pictures.
BOSO. Omnia haec pulchra et quasi quaedam picturae suscipienda sunt. Sed si non est aliquid solidum super quod sedeant, non videntur infidelibus sufficere, cur deum ea quae dicimus pati voluisse credere debeamus. Nam qui picturam uult facere, eligit aliquid solidum super quod pingat, ut maneat quod pingit. Nemo enim pingit in aqua vel in aere, quia nulla ibi manent picturae uestigia. Quapropter cum has convenientias quas dicis infidelibus /52/ quasi quasdam pictures rei gestae obtendimus, quoniam non rem gestam, sed figmentum arbitrantur esse quod credimus, quasi super nubem pingere nos existimant. Monstranda ergo prius est veritatis soliditas rationabilis, id est necessitas quae probes deum ad ea quae praedicamus debuisse aut potuisse humiliari; deinde ut ipsum quasi corpus veritatis plus niteat, istae conve nientiae quasi picturae corporis sunt exponendae.	Boso. These things must be admitted to be beautiful, and like so many pictures; but, if they have no solid foundation, they do not appear sufficient to infidels, as reasons why we ought to believe that God wished to suffer the things which we speak of. For when one wishes to make a picture, he selects something substantial to paint it upon, so that his picture may remain. For no one paints in water or in air, because no traces of the picture remain in them. Wherefore, when we hold up to infidels these harmonious proportions which you speak of as so many pictures of the real thing, since they do not think this belief of ours a reality, but only a fiction, they consider us, as it were, to be painting upon a cloud. Therefore the rational existence of the truth first be shown, I mean, the necessity, which proves that God ought to or could have condescended to those things which we affirm. Afterwards, to make the body of the truth, so to speak, shine forth more clearly, these harmonious proportions, like pictures of the body, must be described.
ANSELMUS. Nonne satis necessaria ratio videtur, cur deus ea quae dicimus facere debuerit: quia genus humanum, tam scilicet pretiosum opus eius, omnino perierat, nec decebat ut, quod deus de homine proposuerat, penitus annihilaretur, nec idem eius propositum ad effectum duci poterat, nisi genus hominum ab ipso creatore suo liberaretur?	Anselm. Does not the reason why God ought to do the things we speak of seem absolute enough when we consider that the human race, that work of his so very precious, was wholly ruined, and that it was not seemly that the purpose which God had made concerning man should fall to the ground; and, moreover, that this purpose could not be carried into effect unless the human race were delivered by their Creator himself?
1.05 QUOD REDEMPTIO HOMINIS NON POTUIT FIERI PER ALIAM QUAM PER DEI PERSONAM.	CHAPTER V. How the redemption of man could not be effected by any other being but God.
BOSO. Haec ipsa liberatio si per aliam quam per dei personam, sive per angelum sive per hominem, esse facta quolibet modo diceretur, mens hoc humana multo tolerabilius acciperet. Potuit enim deus hominem aliquem facere sine peccato, non de masse peccatrice, nec de alio homine, sed sicut fecit Adam, per quem hoc ipsum opus fieri potuisse videtur.	Boso. If this deliverance were said to be effected somehow by any other being than God (whether it were an angelic or a human being), the mind of man would receive it far more patiently. For God could have made some man without sin, not of a sinful substance, and not a descendant of any man, but just as he made Adam, and by this man it should seem that the work we speak of could have been done.
ANSELMUS. An non intelligis quia, quaecumque alla persona hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius seruus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod si esset, nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non pecasset: cum ipse, qui non nisi dei seruus et aequalis angelis bonds per omma futurus erat, seruus esset eius, qui deus non esset et cuius angeli serui non essent. /53/	Anselm. Do you not perceive that, if any other being should rescue man from eternal death, man would rightly be adjudged as the servant of that being? Now if this be so, he would in no wise be restored to that dignity which would have been his had he never sinned. For he, who was to be through eternity only the servant of God and an equal with the holy angels, would now be the servant of a being who was not God, and whom the angels did not serve.
1.06 QUALITER REPREHENDANT INFIDELES QUOD DICIMUS DEUM MORTE SUA NOS REDE MISSE ET SIC DILECTIONEM SUAM ERGA NOS OSTENDISSE ET PRO NOBIS EXPUGNARE DIABOLUM VENISSE.	CHAPTER VI. How infidels find fault with us for saying that God has redeemed us by his death, and thus has shown his love towards us, and that he came to overcome the devil for us.
BOSO. Hoc est quod valde mirantur, quia liberationem hanc redemptionem uocamus. In qua namque -- aiunt nobis -- captione, aut in quo carcere aut in cuius potestate tenebamini, unde vos deus non potuit liberare, nisi vos tot laboribus et ad ultimum sanguine suo redimeret? Quibus cum dicimus: re demit nos a peccatis et ab ire sue et de inferno et de potestate diaboli, quem, quia nos non poteramus, ipse pro nobis venit expugnare, et redemit nobis regnum caelorum, et quia haec omnia hoc modo fecit, ostendit quantum /54/ nos diligeret, respondent: Si dicitis quia facere deus haec omnia non potuit solo iussu, quem cuncta creasse iubendo dicitis, repugnatis vobismet ipsis, quia impotentem illum facitis. Aut si fatemini quia potuit, sed non voluit nisi hoc modo: quomodo sapientem illum potestis ostendere, quem sine ulla ratione tam indecentia velle pati asseritis? Omnia enim haec quae obtenditis, in eius voluntate consistunt. Ira namque dei non est aliud quam voluntas puniendi. Si ergo non uult punire peccata hominum, liber est homo a peccatis et ab ira dei et ab inferno et a potestate diaboli, quae omnia propter peccata patitur, et recipit ea quibus propter eadem peccata privatur. Nam in cuius potestate est infernus aut diabolus, aut cuius est regnum caelorum, nisi eius qui fecit omnia? Quaecumque itaque timetis aut desideratis, eius voluntati subiacent, cui nihil potest resistere. Quapropter si humanum genus saluare noluit, nisi quo modo dicitis, cum sola voluntate potuit: ut mitius dicam, videte quomodo eius sapientiae repugnatis. Nam si homo quod facile posset, cum gravi labore sine ratione faceret, non utique sapiens ab ullo iudicaretur. Quippe quod dicitis deum taliter ostendisse quantum vos diligeret, nulla ratione defenditur, si nullatenus aliter hominem potuisse saluare /55/ non monstratur. Nam si aliter non potuisset, tunc forsitan necesse esset, ut hoc modo dilectionem suam ostenderet. Nunc vero cum aliter posset sal vare hominem: quae ratio est, ut propter ostendendam dilectionem suam ea quae dicitis faciat et sustineat? An enim non ostendit bonis angelis quantum eos diligat, pro quibus talia non sustinet? Quod vero dicitis eum venisse expugnare pro vobis diabolum: quo sensu audetis proferre? Nonne dei omnipotentia regnat ubique? Quomodo ergo indigebat deus, ut ad vincendum diabolum de caelo descenderet? Haec nobis infideles obicere posse videntur.	Boso. This they greatly wonder at, because we call this redemption a release. For, say they, in what custody or imprisonment, or under whose power were you held, that God could not free you from it, without purchasing your redemption by so many sufferings, and finally by his own blood? And when we tell them that he freed us from our sins, and from his own wrath, and from hell, and from the power of the devil, whom he came to vanquish for us, because we were unable to do it, and that he purchased for us the kingdom of heaven; and that, by doing all these things, he manifested the greatness of his love towards us; they answer: If you say that God, who, as you believe, created the universe by a word, could not do all these things by a simple command, you contradict yourselves, for you make him powerless. Or, if you grant that he could have done these things in some other way, but did not wish to, how can you vindicate his wisdom, when you assert that he desired, without any reason, to suffer things so unbecoming? For these things which you bring up are all regulated by his will; for the wrath of God is nothing but his desire to punish. If, then, he does not desire to punish the sins of men, man is free from his sins, and from the wrath of God, and from hell, and from the power of the devil, all which things are the sufferings of sin; and, what he had lost by reason of these sins, he now regains. For, in whose power is hell, or the devil? Or, whose is the kingdom of heaven, if it be not his who created all things? Whatever things, therefore, you dread or hope for, all lie subject to his will, whom nothing can oppose. If, then, God were unwilling to save the human race in any other way than that you mention, when he could have done it by his simple will, observe, to say the least, how you disparage his wisdom. For, if a man without motive should do, by severe toil, a thing which he could have done in some easy way, no one would consider him a wise man. As to your statement that God has shown in this way how much he loved you, there is no argument to support this, unless it be proved that he could not otherwise have saved man. For, if he could not have done it otherwise, then it was, indeed, necessary for him to manifest his love in this way. But now, when he could have saved man differently, why is it that, for the sake of displaying his love, he does and suffers the things which you enumerate? For does he not show good angels how much he loves them, though he suffer no such things as these for them? As to what you say of his coming to vanquish the devil for you, with what meaning dare you allege this? Is not the omnipotence of God everywhere enthroned? How is it, then, that God must needs come down from heaven to vanquish the devil? These are the objections with which infidels think they can withstand us.
1.07 QUOD NULLAM DIABOLUS HABEBAT IUSTITIAM ADVERSUS HOMINEM; ET QUARE VIDEATUR HABUISSE CUR DEUS HOC MODO HOMINEM LIBERARET.	CHAPTER VII. How the devil had no justice on his side against man; and why it was, that he seemed to have had it, and why God could have freed man in this way.
Sed et illud quod dicere solemus, deum scilicet debuisse prius per iustitiam contra diabolum agere, ut liberaret hominem, quam per fortitudinem, ut cum diabolus eum, in quo nulla mortis erat causa et qui deus erat, occideret, iuste potestatem quam super peecatores habebat amitteret, alioquin /56/ iniustam violentiam fecisset illi, quoniam iuste possidebat hominem, quem non ipse violenter attraxerat, sed idem homo ad illum se sponte contulerat: non video quam vim habeas. Namque si diabolus aut homo suus esset aut al terius quam dei, aut in alla quam in dei potestate maneret, forsitan hoc recte diceretur. Cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi dei et neuter extra potestatem dei consistat: quam causam debuit agere deus cum quo, de quo, /57/ in suo, nisi ut seruum suum puniret, qui suo conseruo communem dominum deserere et ad se transire persuasisset, ac traditor fugitivum, fur furem cum furto domini sui suscepisset? Uterque namque fur erat, cum alter altero per suadente se ipsum domino suo furabatur. Quid enim iustius fieri posset, si hoc deus faceret? Aut si iudex omnium deus hominem sic possessum, de potestate tam iniuste possidentis vel ad puniendum illum aliter quam per diabolum vel ad parcendum illi eriperet: quae haec iniustitia esset? Quamvis enim homo iuste a diabolo torqueretur, ipse tamen illum iniuste torquebat. Homo namque meruerat ut puniretur, nec ab ullo convenientius quam ab illo, cui consenserat ut peccaret. Diaboli vero meritum nullum erat ut puniret; immo tanto hoc faciebat iniustius, quanto non ad hoc amore iustitiae trahebatur, sed instinctu malitiae impellebatur. Nam non hoc faciebat deo iubente, sed incomprehen sibili sapientia sua, qua etiam mala bene ordinat, permittente.	MOREOVER, I do not see the force of that argument, which we are wont to make use of, that God, in order to save men, was bound, as it were, to try a contest with the devil in justice, before he did in strength, so that, when the devil should put to death that being in whom there was nothing worthy of death, and who was God, he should justly lose his power over sinners; and that, if it were not so, God would have used undue force against the devil, since the devil had a rightful ownership of man, for the devil had not seized man with violence, but man had freely surrendered to him. It is true that this might well enough be said, if the devil or man belonged to any other being than God, or were in the power of any but God. But since neither the devil nor man belong to any but God, and neither can exist without the exertion of Divine power, what cause ought God to try with his own creature (de suo, in suo), or what should he do but punish his servant, who had seduced his fellow‑servant to desert their common Lord and come over to himself; who, a traitor, had taken to himself a fugitive; a thief, had taken to himself a fellow‑thief, with what he had stolen from his Lord. For when one was stolen from his Lord by the persuasions of the other, both were thieves. For what could be more just than for God to do this? Or, should God, the judge of all, snatch man, thus held, out of the power of him who holds him so unrighteously, either for the purpose of punishing him in some other way than by means of the devil, or of sparing him, what injustice would there be in this? For, though man deserved to be tormented by the devil, yet the devil tormented him unjustly. For man merited punishment, and there was no more suitable way for him to be punished than by that being to whom he had given his consent to sin. But the infliction of punishment was nothing meritorious in the devil; on the other hand, he was even more unrighteous in this, because he was not led to it by a love of justice, but urged on by a malicious impulse. For he did not do this at the command of God, but God’s inconceivable wisdom, which happily controls even wickedness, permitted it.
Et puto illos, qui diabolum aliquam opinantur habere in possidendo hominem iustitiam, ad hoc inde adduci, quia vident hominem diaboli uexationi iuste subiacere et deum hoc iuste permittere, et idcirco putant diabolum illam iuste inferre. Contingit enim idem aliquid diversis considerationibus esse iustum et iniustum, et ob hoc a non diligenter intuentibus totum iustum aut iniustum iudicari. Euentit enim ut aliquis innocentem iniuste percutiat, unde ipse iuste percuti mereatur. Si tamen percussus vindicare se non debet et percutit percutientem se, iniuste hoc facit. Haec igitur percussio ex parte percutientis est iniusta quia non debuit se vindicare; ex parte uero percussi iusta, quia iniuste percutiens iuste percuti meruit. Diverso igitur intuitu iusta et iniusta est eadem actio, quam contingere potest ab alio indicari iustam tantum, ab alio iniustam. Hoc itaque modo diabolus dicitur iuste uexare hominem, quia deus hoc iuste permittit et homo iuste patitur. Sed et hoc quod homo iuste dicitur pati, non sua iustitia pati iuste dicitur, sed quia iusto iudicio dei punitur. /58/	And, in my opinion, those who think that the devil has any right in holding man, are brought to this belief by seeing that man is justly exposed to the tormenting of the devil, and that God in justice permits this; and therefore they suppose that the devil rightly inflicts it. For the very same thing, from opposite points of view, is sometimes both just unjust, and hence, by those who do not carefully inspect the matter, is deemed wholly just or wholly unjust. Suppose, for example, that one strikes an innocent person unjustly, and hence justly deserves to beaten himself; if, however, the one who was beaten, though he ought not to avenge himself, yet does strike the person who beat him, then he does it unjustly. And hence this violence on the part of the man who returns the blow is unjust, because he ought not to avenge himself; but as far as he who received the blow is concerned, it is just, for since he gave a blow unjustly, he justly deserves to receive one in return. Therefore, from opposite views, the same action is both just and unjust, for it may chance that one person shall consider it only just, and another only unjust. So also the devil is said to torment men justly, because God in justice permits this, and man in justice suffers it. But when man is said to suffer justly, it is not meant that his just suffering is inflicted by the hand of justice itself, but that he is punished by the just judgment of God.
At si obtenditur "chirographum" illud "decreti, quod adversum nos" dicit apostolus fuisse et per mortem Christi deletum esse, et putat aliquis per illud significari, quia diabolus quasi sub cuiusdam pacti chirographo ab homine iuste ante Christi passionem peccatum, uelut usuram primi peccati quod per suasit homini et poenam peccati exigeret, ut per hoc iustitiam suam super hominem probare videatur: nequaquam ita intelligendum puto. Quippe chi rographum illud non est diaboli, quia dicitur chirographum "decreti". De cretum enim illud non erat diaboli, sed dei. Iusto namque dei iudicio de cretum erat et quasi chirographo confirmatum, ut homo qui sponte pecca verat, nec peccatum nec poenam peccati vitare per se posset. Est enim "spiritus uadens et non rediens", et "qui facit peccatum, seruus est peccati", nec qui peccat impunitus debet dimitti, nisi misericordia peccatori parcat et /59/ eum liberet ac reducat. Quamobrem per hoc chirographum nullam inveniri posse diaboli iustitiam in hominis uexatione credere debemus. Denique sicut in bono angelo nulla omnino est iniustitia, ita in malo nulla penitus est iustitia. Nihil igitur erat in diabolo, cur deus contra illum ad liberandum ho minem sua uti fortitudine non deberet.	But if that written decree is brought up, which the Apostle says was made against us, and cancelled by the death of Christ; and if any one thinks that it was intended by this decree that the devil, as if under the writing of a sort of compact, should justly demand sin and the punishment of sin, of man, before Christ suffered, as a debt for the first sin to which he tempted man, so that in this way he seems to prove his right over man, I do not by any means think that it is to be so understood. For that writing is not of the devil, because it is called the writing of a decree of the devil, but of God. For by the just judgment of God it was decreed, and, as it were, confirmed by writing, that, since man had sinned, he should not henceforth of himself have the power to avoid sin or the punishment of sin; for the spirit is out‑going and not returning (est enim spiritus vadens et non rediens); and he who sins ought not to escape with impunity, unless pity spare the sinner, and deliver and restore him. Wherefore we ought not to believe that, on account of this writing, there can be found any justice on the part of the devil in his tormenting man. In fine, as there is never any injustice in a good angel, so in an evil angel there can be no justice at all. There was no reason, therefore, as respects the devil, why God should not make use of as own power against him for the liberation of man.
1.08 QUOMODO LICET HUMILIA QUAE DICIMUS DE CHRISTO, NON PERTINEANT AD DIVINITATEM, TAMEN INCONVENIENS VIDEATUR INFIDELIBUS EA DE ILLO DICI SECUNDUM HOMINEM; ET UNDE ILLIS VIDEATUR IDEM HOMO NON SPONTE MORTUUS ESSE.	CHAPTER VIII. How, although the acts of Christ’s condescension which we speak of do not belong to his divinity, it yet seems improper to infidels that these things should be said of him even as a man; and why it appears to them that this man did not suffer death of his own will.
ANSELMUS. Sufficere nobis debet ad rationem voluntas dei cum aliquid facit, licet non videamus cur velit. Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis.	Anselm. The will of God ought to be a sufficient reason for us, when he does anything, though we cannot see why he does it. For the will of God is never irrational.
BOSO. Verum est, si constat deum id velle unde agitur. Nequaquam enim acquiescunt multi deum aliquid velle, si ratio repugnare videtur.	Boso. That is very true, if it be granted that God does wish the thing in question; but many will never allow that God does wish anything if it be inconsistent with reason.
ANSELMUS. Quid tibi videtur repugnare rationi, cum deum ea voluisse fatemur quae de eius incarnatione credimus?	Anselm. What do you find inconsistent with reason, in our confessing that God desired those things which make up our belief with regard to his incarnation?
BOSO. Ut breviter dicam: altissimum ad tam humilia inclinari, omnipoten tem aliquid facere cum tanto labore.	Boso. This in brief: that the Most High should stoop to things so lowly, that the Almighty should do a thing with such toil.
ANSELMUS. Qui hoc dicunt, non intelligunt quod credimus. Divinam enim naturam absque dubio asserimus impassibilem, nec ullatenus posse a sua celsitudine humiliari, nec in eo quod facere uult laborare. Sed dominum Christum Ihesum dicimus verum deum et verum hominem, unam personam in duabus naturis et duas naturas in una persona. Quapropter cum dicimus deum aliquid humile aut infirmum pati, non hoc intelligimus secundum sublimitatem impassibilis naturae, sed secundum infirmitatem humanae substantiae quam gerebat; et sic nostrae fidei nulla ratio obuiare cognoscitur. Sic enim nullam divinae substantiae significamus humilitatem, sed unam dei et hominis monstramus esse personam. Non ergo in incarnatione dei ulla eius humilitas intelligitur facta, sed natura hominis creditur exaltata. /60/	Anselm. They who speak thus do not understand our belief. For we affirm that the Divine nature is beyond doubt impassible, and that God cannot at all be brought down from his exaltation, nor toil in anything which he wishes to effect. But we say that the Lord Jesus Christ is very God and very man, one person in two natures, and two natures in one person. When, therefore, we speak of God as enduring any humiliation or infirmity, we do not refer to the majesty of that nature, which cannot suffer; but to the feebleness of the human constitution which he assumed. And so there remains no ground of objection against our faith. For in this way we intend no debasement of the Divine nature, but we teach that one person is both Divine and human. In the incarnation of God there is no lowering of the Deity; but the nature of man we believe to be exalted.
BOSO. Ita sit, nihil imputetur divinae naturae, quod secundum infirmitatem hominis de Christo dicitur. Verum quomodo iustum aut rationabile probari poterit, quia deus hominem illum, quem pater fillum snum dilectum in quo sibi bene complacuit, vocavit et quem filius se ipsum fecit, sic tractavit aut tractari permisit? Quae autem iustitia est hominem omnium iustissimum morti tradere pro peccatore? Quis homo, si innocentem damnaret ut nocentem li beraret, damnandus non iudicaretur? Ad idem enim res deduci videtur incon veniens, quod supra dictum est. Nam si aliter peccatores saluare non potuit quam iustum damnando: ubi est eius omnipotentia? Si vero potuit sed non uoluit: quomodo defendemus sapientiam eius atgue iustitiam?	Boso. Be it so; let nothing be referred to the Divine nature, which is spoken of Christ after the manner of human weakness; but how will it ever be made out a just or reasonable thing that God should treat or suffer to be treated in such a manner, that man whom the Father called his beloved Son in whom he was well pleased, and whom the Son made himself? For what justice is there in his suffering death for the sinner, who was the most just of all men? What man, if he condemned the innocent to free the guilty, would not himself be judged worthy of condemnation? And so the matter seems to return to the same incongruity which is mentioned above. For if he could not save sinners in any other way than by condemning the just, where is his omnipotence? If, however, he could, but did not wish to, how shall we sustain his wisdom and justice?
ANSELMUS. Deus pater non, quemadmodum videris intelligere, hominem illum tractavit aut innocentem pro nocente morti tradidit. Non enim eum inuitum ad mortem ille coegit aut occidi permisit, sed idem ipse sponte sua mortem sustinuit, ut homines saluaret.	Anselm. God the Father did not treat that man as you seem to suppose, nor put to death the innocent for the guilty. For the Father did not compel him to suffer death, or even allow him to be slain, against his will, but of his own accord he endured death for the salvation of men.
BOSO. Etiam si non inuitum, quoniam voluntati patris consensit, quodam tamen modo illum coegisse videtur praecipiendo. Dicitur enim quia Christus "humiliavit se ipsum, factus oboediens" patri "usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et deus illum exaltavit"; et quia "didicit oboedientiam ex iis quae passus est"; et quia "proprio filio non pepercit" pater, "sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum". Et idem filius dicit: "Non veni voluntatem meam facere, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me". Et iturus ad passionem dicit: "Sicut mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio". Item: "Calicem quem dedit mihi pater, non bibam illum?" Et alibi: "Pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste; verumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu". Et: "Pater, si non potest hic calix transire, nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua". /61/ In his omnibus plus videtur Christus oboedientia cogente quam spontanea voluntate disponente mortem sustinuisse.	Boso. Though it were not against his will, since he agreed to the will of the Father; yet the Father seems to have bound him, as it were, by his injunction. For it is said that Christ “humbled himself, being made obedient to the Father even unto death, and that the death of the cross. For which cause God also hath highly exalted him;” and that “he learned obedience from the things which he suffered;” and that God spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all.” And likewise the Son says: “I came not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me.” And when about to suffer, he says; “As the Father hath given me commandment, so I do.” Again: “The cup which the Father hath given me, shall I not drink it? ” And, at another time : “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt.” And again: “Father, if this cup may not pass from me except I drink it, thy will be done.” In all these passages it would rather appear that Christ endured death by the constraint of obedience, than by the inclination of his own free will.
1.09 QUOD SPONTE MORTUUS SIT; ET QUID SIT: "FACTUS EST OBOEDIENS USQUE AD MORTEM" ET "PROPTER QUOD ET DEUS ILLUM EXALTAVIT" ET "NON VENI VOLUNTATEM MEAM FACERE" ET "PROPRIO ILLO SUO NON PEPERCIT" DEUS ET "NON SICUT EGO VOLO, SED SICUT TU".	CHAPTER IX. How it was of his own accord that he died, and what this means: “he was made obedient even unto death; ” and: “for which cause God hath highly exalted him;” and: “I came not to do my own will; ” and: “he spared not his own Son;” and: “not as I will, but as thou wilt.”
ANSELMUS. Ut mihi videtur, non bene discernis inter hoc quod fecit exigente oboedientia, et quod sibi factum, quia servavit oboedientiam, sustinuit non exigente oboedientia.	Anselm. It seems to me that you do not rightly understand the difference between what he did at the demand of obedience, and what he suffered, not demanded by obedience, but inflicted on him, because he kept his obedience perfect.
BOSO. Necesse habeo ut hoc apertius exponas.	Boso. I need to have you explain it more clearly.
ANSELMUS. Cur persecuti sunt eum ludaei usque ad mortem?	Anselm. Why did the Jews persecute him even unto death?
BOSO. Non ob aliud, nisi quia veritatem et iustitiam vivendo et loquendo indeclinabiliter tenebat.	Boso. For nothing else, but that, in word and in life, he invariably maintained truth and justice.
ANSELMUS. Hoc puto quia deus ab omni rationali creatura exigit, et hoc illa per oboedientiam deo debet.	Anselm. I believe that God demands this of every rational being, and every being owes this in obedience to God.
BOSO. Sic fateri nos oportet.	Boso. We ought to acknowledge this.
ANSELMUS. Hanc igitur oboedientiam debebat homo ille deo petri, et humanitas divinitati, et hanc ab illo exigebat pater.	Anselm. That man, therefore, owed this obedience to God the Father, humanity to Deity; and the Father claimed it from him.
BOSO. Hoc nulli dubium.	Boso. There is no doubt of this.
ANSELMUS. Ecce haloes quid fecit exigente oboedientia.	Anselm. Now you see what he did, under the demand of obedience.
BOSO. Verum est; et iam video quid sibi illatum, quia oboediendo per seueravit, sustinuit. Nam illata est illi mors, quia perstitit in oboedientia, et hanc sustinuit. Sed quomodo hoc oboedientia non exigat non intelligo.	Boso. Very true, and I see also what infliction he endured, because he stood firm in obedience. For death was inflicted on him for his perseverance in obedience and he endured it; but I do not understand how it is that obedience did not demand this.
ANSELMUS. Si homo numquam peccasset: deberet pati mortem, aut deus de beret hoc ab illo exigere?	Anselm. Ought man to suffer death, if he had never sinned, or should God demand this of him?
BOSO. Quemadmodum credimus, nec homo moreretur nec hoc ab illo exige retur, sed huius rei a te audire volo rationem.	Boso. It is on this account that we believe that man would not have been subject to death, and that God would not have exacted this of him; but I should like to hear the reason of the thing from you.
ANSELMUS. Rationalem creaturam iustam factam esse et ad hoc, ut deo fruendo beata esset, non negas.	Anselm. You acknowledge that the intelligent creature was made holy, and for this purpose, viz., to be happy in the enjoyment of God.
BOSO. Non.	Boso. Yes.
ANSELMUS. Deo autem nequaquam existimabis convenire, ut quam fecit iustam /62/ ad beatitudinem, miseram esse sine culpa cogat. Hominem enim inuitum mori miserum est.	Anselm. You surely will not think it proper for God to make his creature miserable without fault, when he had created him holy that he might enjoy a state of blessedness. For it would be a miserable thing for man to die against his will.
BOSO. Patet quia, si non peccasset homo, non deberet ab eo deus mortem exigere.	Boso. It is plain that, if man had not sinned, God ought not to compel him to die.
ANSELMUS. Non ergo coegit deus Christum mori, in quo nullum fuit peccatum; sed ipse sponte sustinuit mortem, non per oboedientiam deserendi vitam, sed propter oboedientiam servandi iustitiam, in qua tam fortiter perseueravit, ut inde mortem incurreret.	Anselm. God did not, therefore, compel Christ to die; but he suffered death of his own will, not yielding up his life as an act of obedience, but on account of his obedience in maintaining holiness; for he held out so firmly in this obedience that he met death on account of it.
Potest etiam dici quia praecepit illi peter mori, cum hoc praecepit unde incurrit mortem. Ita ergo, "sicut mandatum dedit" illi "pater", sic fecit, et "calicem, quem dedit", bibit, et "factus" est "oboediens" petri "usque ad mortem", et sic "didicit ex iis quae passus est oboedientiam", id est, quo usque servari debeat oboedientia. Verbum autem quod positum est, "didicit", duobus modis intelligi potest. Aut enim "didicit" dictum est pro: altos fecit discere, aut quia quod per scientiam non ignorabat, experimento didicit. Quod autem apostolus, cum dixisset: "humiliavit semetipsum, factus oboediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis", subdidit: "propter quod et deus illum exaltavit et donavit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen" -- cui simile est quod David dixit: "de torrente in uia bibit, propterea exaltavit caput" -- non ita dictum est, quasi nullatenus potuisset pervenire ad hanc exaltationem nisi per hanc mortis oboedientiam, et haec exaltatio non nisi in retributionem huius oboedientiae collate sit - prius enim quam pateretur, ipse dixit "omnia" sibi esse "tradita" "a patre", et omnia patris esse sua -- sed quoniam ipse cum patre sanctoque spiritu disposuerat se non aliter quam per mortem celsitudinem omnipotentiae suae mundo ostensurum. Quippe quod non nisi per illam mortem fieri dispositum est: cum per illam fit, non incongrue dicitur propter illam fieri.	It may, indeed be said, that the Father commanded him to die, when he enjoined that upon him on account of which he met death. It was in this sense, then, that “as the Father gave him the commandment, so he did, and the cup which He gave to him, he drank; and he was made obedient to the Father, even unto death;” and thus “he learned obedience from the things which he suffered,” that is, how far obedience should be maintained. Now the word “didicit,” which is used, can be understood in two ways. For either “didicit” is written for this: he caused others to learn; or it is used, because he did learn by experience what he had an understanding of before. Again, when the Apostle had said: “he humbled himself, being made obedient even unto death, and that the death of the cross,” he added: “wherefore God also hath exalted him and given him a name, which is above every name.” And this is similar to what David said: “he drank of the brook in the way, therefore did he lift up the head.” For it is not meant that he could not have attained his exaltation in any other way but by obedience unto death; nor is it meant that his exaltation was conferred on him, only as a reward of his obedience (for he himself said before he suffered, that all things had been committed to him by the Father, and that all things belonging to the Father were his); but the expression is used because he had agreed with the Father and the Holy Spirit, that there was no other way to reveal to the world the height of his omnipotence, than by his death. For if a thing do not take place, except on condition of something else, it is not improperly said to occur by reason of that thing.
Si enim intendimus facere aliquid, sed proponimus nos aliud prius fac turos, per quod illud fiat: cum iam factum est quod volumus praecedere, si /63/ fit quod intendimus, recte dicitur propterea fieri, quoniam factum est propter quod differebatur; quia non nisi per illud fieri dispositum erat. Nam si flu vium quem equo et navi transire possum, propono me non nisi navi tran siturum et idcirco differo transmeare, quia navis abest: cum iam praestoest navis, si transeo, recte de me dicitur: navis parata fuit, propterea transivit. Et non solum ita loquimur, quando per illud quod praecedere volumus, sed etiam quando non per illud, sed tantummodo post illud facerealiud aliquid statuimus. Si quis enim differt cibum sumere propterea, quia nondum ea die missae celebrationi affuit: peracto quod prius facere uolebat, non incongrue illi dicitur: iam sume cibum, propterea quia iam fecisti propter quod sumere differebas. Multo igitur minus inusitata est locutio, cum Christus dicitur exal tatus propterea, quia mortem sustinuit, per quam et post quam illam exalta tionem facere decrevit. Potest hoc et eo modo intelligi quo idem dominus legitur profecisse "sapientia" "et gratia apud deum", non quia ita erat, sed quia ille sic se habebat, ac si ita esset. Nam sic post mortem exaltatus est, quasi propter illam hoc fieret.	For if we intend to do a thing, but mean to do something else first by means of which it may be done; when the first thing which we wish to do is done, if the result is such as we intended, it is properly said to be on account of the other; since that is now done which caused the delay; for it had been determined that the first thing should not be done without the other. If, for instance, I propose to cross a river only in a boat, though I can cross it in a boat or on horseback, and suppose that I delay crossing because the boat is gone; but if afterwards I cross, when the boat has returned, it may be properly said of me: the boat was ready, and therefore he crossed. And we not only use this form of expression, when it is by means of a thing which we desire should take place first, but also when we intend to do something else, not by means of that thing, but only after it. For if one delays taking food because he has not to‑day attended the celebration of mass; when that has been done which he wished to do first, it is not improper to say to him: now take food, for you have now done that for which you delayed taking food. Far less, therefore, is the language strange, when Christ is said to be exalted on this account, because he endured death; for it was through this, and after this, that he determined to accomplish his exaltation. This may be understood also in the same way as that passage in which it is said that our Lord increased in wisdom, and in favor with God; not that this was really the case, but that he deported himself as if it were so. For he was exalted after his death, as if it were really on account of that.
Quod autem ipse ait: "non veni voluntatem meam facere, sed eius qui misit me", tale est quale est et illud: "mea doctrina non est mea". Nam quod quis non habet a se, sed a deo, hoc non tam suum quam dei dicere debet. Nullus vero homo a se habet veritatem quam docet, aut iustam voluntatem, sed a deo. Non ergo venit Christus voluntatem suam facere sed patris, quia iusta voluntas quam habebat, non erat ex humanitate, sed ex divinitate. "Proprio" vero "filio suo non pepercit" deus, "sed pro nobis tradidit illum", non est aliud quam: non liberavit eum. Nam multa in sacra scriptura huiusmodi inveniuntur. Ubi autem dicit: "pater, si possibile est, transeat a me calix iste; uerumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu"; et: "si non potest hic calix transire, nisi bibam illum, fiat voluntas tua": naturalem salutis per voluntatem suam significat appetitum, quo humana caro dolorem mortis fugiebat. Voluntatem vero "patris" dicit, non quoniam maluerit pater filii mortem quam vitam, sed quia humanum genus restaurari nolebat pater, nisi faceret homo aliquid tam magnum, sicut erat mors illa; quia non poscebat ratio quod alius facere non poterat, idcirco dicit filius illum velle mortem suam, quam ipse mauult pati, quam ut genus humanum non /64/ saluetur. Ac si diceret: Quoniam non uis aliter reconciliationem mundifieri, dico te hoc modo velle mortem meam. Fiat igitur haec voluntas tua, id est fiat mors mea, ut mundus tibi reconcilietur. Nam saepe aliquem velle dicimus aliquid, quia non uult aliud, quod si vellet, non fieret illud quod dicitur velle; ut cum dicimus illum velle lucernam extinguere, qui non uult claudere fenestram, per quam ventus intrat, qui lucernam extinguit. Sic igitur uoluit peter mortem filii, quia non aliter voluit mundum saluari, nisi homo tam magnum aliquid faceret, ut dixi. Quod filio volenti salutem hominum tantundem valuit -- quoniam alius hoc facere non valebat -- quantum si illi mori praeciperet. Unde ille "sicut mandatum dedit" illi "pater, sic" fecit, et "calicem quem dedit" ei "pater", bibit "oboediens usque ad mortem".	Moreover, that saying of his: “I came not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me,” is precisely like that other saying: “My doctrine is not mine ;” for what one does not have of himself, but of God, he ought not to call his own, but God’s. Now no one has the truth which he teaches, or a holy will, of himself, but of God. Christ, therefore, came not to do his own will, but that of the Father; for his holy will was not derived from his humanity, but from his divinity. For that sentence: “God spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all,” means nothing more than that he did not rescue him. For there are found in the Bible many things like this. Again, when he says: “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt;” and “If this cup may not pass from me, except I drink it, thy will be done;” he signifies by his own will the natural desire of safety, in accordance with which human nature shrank from the anguish of death. But he speaks of the will of the Father, not because the Father preferred the death of the Son to his life; but because the Father was not willing to rescue the human race, unless man were to do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ. Since reason did not demand of another what he could not do, therefore, the Son says that he desires his own death. For he preferred to suffer, rather than that the human race should be lost; as if he were to say to the Father: “Since thou dost not desire the reconciliation of the world to take place in any other way, in this respect, I see that thou desirest my death; let thy will, therefore, be done, that is, let my death take place, so that the world may be reconciled to thee.” For we often say that one desires a thing, because he does not choose something else, the choice of which would preclude the existence of that which he is said to desire; for instance, when we say that he who does not choose to close the window through which the draft is admitted which puts out the light, wishes the light to be extinguished. So the Father desired the death of the Son, because he was not willing that the world should be saved in any other way, except by man’s doing so great a thing as that which I have mentioned. And this, since none other could accomplish it, availed as much with the Son, who so earnestly desired the salvation of man, as if the Father had commanded him to die; and, therefore, “as the Father gave him commandment, so he did, and the cup which the Father gave to him he drank, being obedient even unto death.”
1.10 ITEM DE EISDEM, QUOMODO ALITER RECTE INTELLIGI POSSUM.	CHAPTER X Likewise on the same topics; and how otherwise they can be correctly explained.
Potest etiam recte intelligi, quia per illam piam voluntatem, qua voluit filius pro salute mundi mori, "dedit" illi "pater", non tamen cogendo, "mandatum" et "calicem" passionis, et "non pepercit" illi, "sed pro nobis tradidit illum" et mortem illius voluit; et quia ipse filius "oboediens" fuit "usque ad mortem", et "didicit ex iis quae passus est oboedientiam". Quemadmodum enim secundum humanitatem non habebat a se voluntatem iuste vivendi, sed a patre, ita et uoluntatem illam qua, ut tantum bonum faceret, mori voluit, non potuit habere nisi "a patre luminum", a quo est "omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum". Et sicut pater trahere dando voluntatem dicitur, ita non incongrue fit, si impellere asseritur. Sicut enim filius /65/ dicit de patre: "nemo venit ad me, nisi pater traxerit eum", ita dicere potuit: nisi impulerit eum. Similiter quoque proferre potuit: nemo currit ad mortem propter nomen meum, nisi pater impulerit aut traxerit eum. Quoniam namque voluntate quisque ad id quod indeclinabiliter uult, trahitur vel impellitur, non inconvenienter trahere aut impellere deus, cum talem dat voluntatem, affirmatur. In quo tractu vel impulsu nulla intelligitur violentiae necessitas, sed acceptae bonae voluntatis spontanea et amata tenacitas. Si ergo hoc modo negari nequit patrem voluntatem illam dando ad mortem fillum traxisse vel impulisse: quis non videat eadem ratione "mandatum" illi ut mortem sponte sustineret, et "calicem" quem non inuitus biberet, dedisse? Et si filius sibi non pepercisse, sed pro nobis spontanea uoluntate se ipsum tradidisse recte dicitur: quis neget recte dici quia "pater", a quo talem voluntatem habuit, illi "non pepercit, sed pro nobis tradidit illum" et mortem eius voluit? Hoc etiam modo indeclinabiliter et sponte servando acceptam a patre voluntatem filius "factus" est illi "oboediens usque ad mortem", et "didicit ex iis quae passus est oboedientiam", id est quam magna res facienda sit per oboedientiam. Nam tunc est simplex et vera oboedientia, cum rationalis natura non necessitate, sed sponte servat voluntatem a deo acceptam.	IT is also a fair interpretation that it was by that same holy will by which the son wished to die for the salvation of the world, that the Father gave him commandment (yet not by compulsion), and the cup of suffering, and spared him not, but gave him up for us and desired his death; and that the Son himself was obedient even unto death, and learned obedience from the things which he suffered. For as with regard to that will which led him to a holy life, he did not have it as a human being of himself, but of the Father; so also that will by which he desired to die for the accomplishment of so great good, he could not have had but from the Father of lights, from whom is every good and perfect gift. And as the Father is said to draw by imparting an inclination, so there is nothing improper in asserting that he moves man. For as the Son says of the Father: “No man cometh to me except the Father draw him,” he might as well have said, except he move him. In like manner, also, could he have declared: “No man layeth down his life for my sake, except the Father move or draw him.” For since a man is drawn or moved by his will to that which he invariably chooses, it is not improper to say that God draws or moves him when he gives him this will. And in this drawing or impelling it is not to be understood that there is any constraint, but a free and grateful clinging to the holy will which has been given. If then it cannot be denied that the Father drew or moved the Son to death by giving him that will; who does not see that, in the same manner, he gave him commandment to endure death of his own accord and to take the cup, which he freely drank. And if it is right to say that the Son spared not himself, but gave himself for us of his own will, who will deny that it is right to say that the Father, of whom he had this will, did not spare him but gave him up for us, and desired his death? In this way, also, by following the will received from the Father invariably, and of his own accord, the Son became obedient to Him, even unto death; and learned obedience from the things which he suffered; that is, be learned how great was the work to be accomplished by obedience. For this is real and sincere obedience when a rational being, not of compulsion, but freely, follows the will received from God.
Aliis quoque modis recte possumus patrem voluisse filii mortem intel ligere, quamvis isti possint sufficere. Nam sicut velle dicimus eum, qui facit ut alius velit, ita dicimus etiam illum velle, qui non facit ut alius velit, sed approbat quia uult. Ut cum videmus aliquem fortiter pati velle molestiam, ut perficiat quod bene uult: quamvis fateamur nos velle ut illam poenam sustineat, non tamen volumus aut amamus poenam eius, sed voluntatem. Illum quoque qui prohibere potest et non prohibet, solemus dicere quia uult quod non prohibet. Quoniam ergo patri filii voluntas placuit, nec prohibuit eum velle aut implere quod volebat: recte voluisse ut filius mortem tam pie, tam utiliter sustineret -- quamvis poenam eius non amaret -- affirmatur. Non /66/ autem potuisse calicem transire, nisi biberet illum, dixit, non quia non posses mortem vitare si vellet, sed quoniam -- sicut dictum est -- mundum erat aliter impossibile saluari; et ipse indeclinabiliter uolebat potius mortem pati, quam ut mundus non saluaretur. Idcirco autem illa verba dixit, ut doceret humanum genus aliter saluari non potuisse quam per mortem suam, non ut ostenderet se mortem nequaquam ualuisse vitare. Nam quaecumque de illo dicuntur iis quae dicta sunt similia, sic sunt exponenda, ut nulla necessitate, sed libera uoluntate mortuus credatur. Erat namque omnipotens; et de illo legitur quia "oblatus est, quoniam ipse voluit". Et ipse dicit: "Ego pono animam meam, ut iterum sumam eam. Nemo tollit eam a me, sed ego pono eam a me ipso. Potestatem habeo ponendi eam et potestatem habeo iterum su mendi eama. Quod ergo idem ipse sua potestate et sua voluntate facit, nullatenus ad hoc cogi recte dicitur.	In other ways, also, we can properly explain the Father’s desire that the Son should die, though these would appear sufficient. For as we say that he desires a thing who causes another to desire it; so, also, we say that he desires a thing who approves of the desire of another, though he does not cause that desire. Thus when we see a man who desires to endure pain with fortitude for the accomplishment of some good design; though we acknowledge that we wish to have him endure that pain, yet we do not choose, nor take pleasure in, his suffering, but in his choice. We are, also, accustomed to say that he who can prevent a thing but does not, desires the thing which he does not prevent. Since, therefore, the will of the Son pleased the Father, and he did not prevent him from choosing, or from fulfilling his choice, it is proper to say that he wished the Son to endure death so piously and for so great an object, though he was not pleased with his suffering. Moreover, he said that the cup must not pass from him, except he drank it, not because he could not have escaped death had he chosen to; but because, as has been said, the world could not otherwise be saved; and it was his fixed choice to suffer death, rather than that the world should not be saved. It was for this reason, also, that he used those words, viz., to teach the human race that there was no other salvation for them but by his death; and not to show that he had no power at all to avoid death. For whatsoever things are said of him, similar to these which have been mentioned, they are all to be explained in accordance with the belief that he died, not by compulsion, but of free choice. For he was omnipotent, and it is said of him, when he was offered up, that he desired it. And he says himself: “I lay down my life that I may take it again; no man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again.” A man cannot, therefore, be properly said to have been driven to a thing which he does of his own power and will.
BOSO. Hoc solum, quia permittit deus illum sic tractari quamvis uolentem, non videtur tall petri de tall filio convenire.	Boso. But this simple fact, that God allows him to be so treated, even if he were willing, does not seem becoming for such a Father in respect to such a Son.
ANSELMUS. Immo maxime decet talem patrem tall filio consentire, si quid uult laudabiliter ad honorem dei et utiliter ad salutem hominum, quae aliter fieri non potuit.	Anselm. Yes, it is of all things most proper that such a Father should acquiesce with such a Son in his desire, if it be praiseworthy as relates to the honor of God, and useful for man’s salvation, which would not otherwise be effected.
BOSO. In hoc adhuc versamur, qualiter mors illa rationabilis et neces saria monstrari possit. Aliter namque nec ipse filius eam velle, nec peter cogere aut permittere debuisse videtur. Quaeritur enim cur deus aliter ho minem saluare non potuit; aut si potuit, cur hoc modo uoluit. Nam et in conveniens videtur esse deo hominem hoc modo saluasse, nec apparel quid mors ista valeat ad saluandum hominem. Mirum enim est, si deus sic delectatur aut eget sanguine innocentis, ut non nisi eo interfecto parcere velit aut possit nocenti. /67/	Boso. The question which still troubles us is, how the death of the Son can be proved reasonable and necessary. For otherwise, it does not seem that the Son ought to desire it, or the Father compel or permit it. For the question is, why God could not save man in some other way, and if so, why he wished to do it in this way? For it both seems unbecoming for God to have saved man in this way; and it is not clear how the death of the Son avails for the salvation of man. For it is a strange thing if God so delights in, or requires, the blood of the innocent, that he neither chooses, nor is able, to spare the guilty without the sacrifice of the innocent.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam accipis in hac quaestione personam eorum, qui credere nihil volunt nisi praemonstrata ratione, volo tecum pacisci, ut nullum vel minimum inconveniens in deo a nobis accipiatur, et nulla uel minima ratio, si maior non repugnat, reiciatur. Sicut enim in deo quamlibet paruum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas, ita quamlibet paruam rationem, si maiori non vincitur, comitatur necessitas.	Anselm. Since, in this inquiry, you take the place of those who are unwilling to believe anything not previously proved by reason, I wish to have it understood between us that we do not admit anything in the least unbecoming to be ascribed to the Deity, and that we do not reject the smallest reason if it be not opposed by a greater. For as it is impossible to attribute anything in the least unbecoming to God; so any reason, however small, if not overbalanced by a greater, has the force of necessity.
BOSO. Nihil in hac re accipio libentius, quam ut hoc pactum inter nos communiter seruetur.	Boso. In this matter, I accept nothing more willingly than that this agreement should be preserved between us in common.
ANSELMUS. De incarnatione tantum dei et de iis quae de illo assumpto homine credimus, quaestio est.	Anselm. The question concerns only the incarnation of God, and those things which we believe with regard to his taking human nature.
BOSO. Ita est.	Boso. It is so.
ANSELMUS. Ponamus ergo dei incarnationem et quae de illo dicimus homine numquam fuisse; et constet inter nos hominem esse factum ad beatitudinem, quae in hac vita haberi non potest, nec ad illam posse pervenire quemquam nisi dimissis peccatis, nec ullum hominem hanc uitam transire sine peccato, et alla quorum fides ad salutem aeternam necessaria est.	Anselm. Let us suppose, then, that the incarnation of God, and the things that we affirm of him as man, had never taken place; and be it agreed between us that man was made for happiness, which cannot be attained in this life, and that no being can ever arrive at happiness, save by freedom from sin, and that no man passes this life without sin. Let us take for granted, also, the other things, the belief of which is necessary for eternal salvation.
BOSO. Ita fiat, quia nihil in his impossibile aut inconveniens deo uidetur.	Boso. I grant it; for in these there is nothing which seems unbecoming or impossible for God.
ANSELMUS. Necessaria est igitur homini peccatorum remissio, ut ad beatitudi nem perveniat.	Anselm. Therefore, in order that man may attain happiness, remission of sin is necessary.
BOSO. Sic omnes tenemus. /68/	Boso. We all hold this.
1.11 QUID SIT PECCARE ET PRO PECCATO SATISFACERE.	CHAPTER XI. What it is to sin, and to make satisfaction for sin.
ANSELMUS. Quaerendum ergo est qua ratione deus dimittat peccata hominibus. Et ut hoc faciamus apertius, prius videamus quid sit peccare et quid pro peccato satisfacere.	Anselm. We must needs inquire, therefore, in what manner God puts away men’s sins; and, in order to do this more plainly, let us first consider what it is to sin, and what it is to make satisfaction for sin.
BOSO. Tuum est ostendere, et meum intendere.	Boso. It is yours to explain and mine to listen.
ANSELMUS. Si angelus et homo semper redderet deo quod debet, numquam peccaret.	Anselm. If man or angel always rendered to God his due, he would never sin.
BOSO. Nequeo contradicere.	Boso. I cannot deny that.
ANSELMUS. Non est itaque aliud peccare quam non reddere deo debitum.	Anselm. Therefore to sin is nothing else than not to render to God his due.
BOSO. Quod est debitum quod deo debemus?	Boso. What is the debt which we owe to God?
ANSELMUS. Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse uoluntati dei.	Anselm. Every wish of a rational creature should be subject to the will of God.
BOSO. Nihil verius.	Boso. Nothing is more true.
ANSELMUS. Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod soluendo nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat. Haec est iustitia sive rectitudo voluntatis, quae iustos facit sive rectos corde, id est voluntate. Hic est solus et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis exigit deus. Sola namque talis voluntas opera facit placita deo, cum potest operari; et cum non potest, ipsa sola per se places, quia nullum opus sine illa places. Hunc honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, aulert deo quod suum est, et deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit, manes in culpa. Nec sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris iniuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius violat non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat illi quem exhonoravit, restituit. Hoc quoque attendendum quia, cum aliquis quod iniuste abstulit solvit, hoc debet dare, quod ab illo non pos set exigi, si alienum non rapuisset. Sic ergo debet omnis qui peccat, honorem /69/ deo quem rapuit soluere; et haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere.	Anselm. This is the debt which man and angel owe to God, and no one who pays this debt commits sin; but every one who does not pay it sins. This is justice, or uprightness of will, which makes a being just or upright in heart, that is, in will; and this is the sole and complete debt of honor which we owe to God, and which God requires of us. For it is such a will only, when it can be exercised, that does works pleasing to God; and when this will cannot be exercised, it is pleasing of itself alone, since without it no work is acceptable. He who does not render this honor which is due to God, robs God of his own and dishonors him; and this is sin. Moreover, so long as he does not restore what he has taken away, he remains in fault; and it will not suffice merely to restore what has been taken away, but, considering the contempt offered, he ought to restore more than he took away. For as one who imperils another’s safety does not enough by merely restoring his safety, without making some compensation for the anguish incurred; so he who violates another’s honor does not enough by merely rendering honor again, but must, according to the extent of the injury done, make restoration in some way satisfactory to the person whom he has dishonored. We must also observe that when any one pays what he has unjustly taken away, he ought to give something which could not have been demanded of him, had he not stolen what belonged to another. So then, every one who sins ought to pay back the honor of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner owes to God.
BOSO. In his omnibus, quoniam rationem sequi proposuimus, quamvis aliquantulum me terreas, nihil habeo quod dicere possim contra.	Boso. Since we have determined to follow reason in all these things, I am unable to bring any objection against them, although you somewhat startle me.
1.12 UTRUM SOLA MISERICORDIA SINE OMNI DEBITI SOLUTIONE DECEAT DEUM PECCATUM DIMITTERE.	CHAPTER XII. Whether it were proper for God to put away sins by compassion alone, without any payment of debt.
ANSELMUS. Redeamus et videamus utrum sola misericordia, sine omni solutione ablati sibi honoris deceat deum peccatum dimittere.	Anselm. Let us return and consider whether it were proper for God to put away sins by compassion alone, without any payment of the honor taken from him.
BOSO. Non video cur non deceat.	Boso. I do not see why it is not proper.
ANSELMUS. Sic dimittere peccatum non est aliud quam non punire. Et quoniam recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione non est nisi punire: si non punitur, inordinatum dimittitur.	Anselm. To remit sin in this manner is nothing else than not to punish; and since it is not right to cancel sin without compensation or punishment; if it be not punished, then is it passed by undischarged.
BOSO. Rationabile est quod dicis.	Boso. What you say is reasonable.
ANSELMUS. Deum vero non decet aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere.	Anselm. It is not fitting for God to pass over anything in his kingdom undischarged.
BOSO. Si aliud volo dicere, timeo peccare.	Boso. If I wish to oppose this, I fear to sin.
ANSELMUS. Non ergo decet deum peccatum sic impunitum dimittere.	Anselm. It is, therefore, not proper for God thus to pass over sin unpunished.
BOSO. Ita sequitur.	Boso. Thus it follows.
ANSELMUS. Est et aliud quod sequitur, si peccatum sic impunitum dimittitur: quia similiter erit apud deum peccanti et non peccanti; quod deo non convenit.	Anselm. There is also another thing which follows if sin be passed by unpunished, viz., that with God there will be no difference between the guilty and the not guilty; and this is unbecoming to God.
BOSO. Non possum negare.	Boso. I cannot deny it.
ANSELMUS. Vide et hoc. Iustitiam hominum nemo nescit esse sub lege, ut secundum eius quantitatem mensura retributionis a deo recompensetur.	Anselm. Observe this also. Every one knows that justice to man is regulated by law, so that, according to the requirements of law, the measure of award is bestowed by God.
BOSO. Ita credimus.	Boso. This is our belief.
ANSELMUS. Si autem peccatum nec solvitur nec punitur, nulli legi subiacet.	Anselm. But if sin is neither paid for nor punished, it is subject to no law.
BOSO. Non possum aliter intelligere.	Boso. I cannot conceive it to be otherwise.
ANSELMUS. Liberior igitur est iniustitia, si sola misericordia dimittitur, quam iustitia; quod valde inconveniens videtur. Ad hoc etiam extenditur haec inconvenientia, ut iniustitiam deo similem facial; quia sicut deus nullius legi subiacet, ita et iniustitia.	Anselm. Injustice, therefore, if it is cancelled by compassion alone, is more free than justice, which seems very inconsistent. And to these is also added a further incongruity, viz., that it makes injustice like God. For as God is subject to no law, so neither is injustice.
BOSO. Resistere nequeo rationi tuae. Sed cum deus nobis praecipiat omnino dimittere peccantibus in nos, videtur repugnare, ut hoc nobis praecipiat quod ipsum facere non decet. /70/	Boso. I cannot withstand your reasoning. But when God commands us in every case to forgive those who trespass against us, it seems inconsistent to enjoin a thing upon us which it is not proper for him to do himself.
ANSELMUS. Nulla in hoc est repugnantia, quia deus hoc nobis praecipit, ut non praesumamus quod solius dei est. Ad nullum enim pertinet uindictam facere, nisi ad illum qui dominus est omnium. Nam cum terrenae potestates hoc recte faciunt, ipse facit, a quo ad hoc ipsum sunt ordinatae.	Anselm. There is no inconsistency in God’s commanding us not to take upon ourselves what belongs to Him alone. For to execute vengeance belongs to none but Him who is Lord of all; for when the powers of the world rightly accomplish this end, God himself does it who appointed them for the purpose.
BOSO. Removisti repugnantiam quam putabam inesse; sed est aliud ad quod tuum habere volo responsum. Nam cum deus sic sit liber ut nulli legi, nullius subiaceat iudicio, et ita sit benignus, ut nihil benignius cogitari queat, et nihil sit rectum aut decens nisi quod ipse uult: mirum videtur si dicimus quia nullatenus uult aut non ei licet suam iniuriam dimittere, a quo etiam de iis quas aliis facimus solemus indulgentiam petere.	Boso. You have obviated the difficulty which I thought to exist; but there is another to which I would like to have your answer. For since God is so free as to be subject to no law, and to the judgment of no one, and is so merciful as that nothing more merciful can be conceived; and nothing is right or fit save as he wills; it seems a strange thing for us to say that he is wholly unwilling or unable to put away an injury done to himself, when we are wont to apply to him for indulgence with regard to those offences which we commit against others.
ANSELMUS. Verum est quod dicis de libertate et voluntate et benignitate illius; sed sic eas debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati eius non videamur repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc quod espedit aut quod decet, nec benignitas dicenda est quae aliquid deo indecens operatur. Quod autem dicitur quia quod uult iustum est, et quod non uult non est iustum, non ita intelligendum est ut, si deus velit quodlibet inconveniens, iustum sit, quia ipse uult. Non enim sequitur: si deus uult mentiri, iustum esse mentiri; sed potius deum illum non esse. Nam nequaquam potest velle mentiri uoluntas, nisi in qua corrupta est veritas, immo quae deserendo ueritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur: si deus uult mentiri, non est aliud quam: si deus est talis natura quae velit mentiri; et idcirco non sequitur iustum esse mendacium. Nisi ita intelligatur, sicut cum de duobus impossibilibus dicimus: si hoc est, illud est; quia nec hoc nec illud est. Ut si quis dicat: si aqua est sicca, et ignis est humidus; neutrum enim verum est. Itaque de illis tantum uerum est dicere: si deus hoc uult, iustum est, quae deum velle non est inconveniens. Si enim deus uult ut pluat, iustum est ut pluat; et si uult ut homo aliquis occidatur, iustum est ut occidatur. Quapropter si non decet deum aliquid iniuste aut inordinate facere, non pertinet ad eius libertatem aut benignitatem aut voluntatem, peccantem qui non solvit deo quod abstulit impunitum dimittere. /71/	Anselm. What you say of God’s liberty and choice and compassion is true; but we ought so to interpret these things as that they may not seem to interfere with His dignity. For there is no liberty except as regards what is best or fitting; nor should that be called mercy which does anything improper for the Divine character. Moreover, when it is said that what God wishes is just, and that what He does not wish is unjust, we must not understand that if God wished anything improper it would be just, simply because he wished it. For if God wishes to lie, we must not conclude that it is right to lie, but rather that he is not God. For no will can ever wish to lie, unless truth in it is impaired, nay, unless the will itself be impaired by forsaking truth. When, then, it is said: “If God wishes to lie,” the meaning is simply this: “If the nature of God is such as that he wishes to lie;” and, therefore, it does not follow that falsehood is right, except it be understood in the same manner as when we speak of two impossible things: “If this be true, then that follows; because neither this nor that is true;” as if a man should say: “Supposing water to be dry, and fire to be moist;” for neither is the case. Therefore, with regard to these things, to speak the whole truth: If God desires a thing, it is right that he should desire that which involves no unfitness. For if God chooses that it should rain, it is right that it should rain; and if he desires that any man should die, then is it right that he should die. Wherefore, if it be not fitting for God to do anything unjustly, or out of course, it does not belong to his liberty or compassion or will to let the sinner go unpunished who makes no return to God of what the sinner has defrauded him.
BOSO. Omnia mihi aufers quae putabam tibi obici posse.	Boso. You remove from me every possible objection which I had thought of bringing against you.
ANSELMUS. Vide adhuc cur deum hoc facere non deceat.	Anselm. Yet observe why it is not fitting for God to do this.
BOSO. Libenter ausculto quidquid dicis.	Boso. I listen readily to whatever you say.
1.13 QUOD NIHIL MINUS SIT TOLERANDUM IN RERUM ORDINE, QUAM UT CREATURA CREATORI DEBITUM HONOREM AUFERAT ET NON SOLVAT QUOD AUFERT.	CHAPTER XIII. How nothing less was to be endured, in the order of things, than that the creature should take away the honor due the Creator and not restore what he takes away.
ANSELMUS. Nihil minus tolerandum in rerum ordine, quam ut creatura creatori debitum honorem auferat et non solvat quod aufert.	Anselm. In the order of things, there is nothing less to be endured than that the creature should take away the honor due the Creator, and not restore what he has taken away.
BOSO. Hoc nihil clarius.	Boso. Nothing is more plain than this.
ANSELMUS. Nihil autem iniustius toleratur, quam quo nihil est minus tolerandum.	Anselm. But there is no greater injustice suffered than that by which so great an evil must be endured.
BOSO. Nec hoc est obscurum.	Boso. This, also, is plain.
ANSELMUS. Puto ergo quia non dices deum debere tolerare quo nihil toleratur iniustius, ut creatura non reddat deo quod aulert.	Anselm. I think, therefore, that you will not say that God ought to endure a thing than which no greater injustice is suffered, viz., that the creature should not restore to God what he has taken away.
BOSO. Immo penitus negandum esse video.	Boso. No; I think it should be wholly denied.
ANSELMUS. Item. Si deo nihil maius aut melius, nihil iustius quam honorem illius servat in rerum dispositione summa iustitia, quae non est aliud quam ipse deus.	Anselm. Again, if there is nothing greater or better than God, there is nothing more just than supreme justice, which maintains God’s honor in the arrangement of things, and which is nothing else but God himself.
BOSO. Hoc quoque nil apertius.	Boso. There is nothing clearer than this.
ANSELMUS. Nihil ergo senat deus iustius quam suae dignitatis honorem.	Anselm. Therefore God maintains nothing with more justice than the honor of his own dignity.
BOSO. Concedere me oportet.	Boso. I must agree with you.
ANSELMUS. Videtur tibi quod eum integre serues, si sic auferri sibi permittit, ut nec solvatur nec ipse auferentem puniat?	Anselm. Does it seem to you that he wholly preserves it, if he allows himself to be so defrauded of it as that he should neither receive satisfaction nor punish the one defrauding him.
BOSO. Non audeo dicere.	Boso. I dare not say so.
ANSELMUS. Necesse est ergo, ut aut ablatus honor solvatur aut poena sequatur. Alioquin aut sibi deus ipsi iustus non erit aut ad utrumpue impo. tens erit; quod nefas est vel cogitare. /72/	Anselni. Therefore the honor taken away must be repaid, or punishment must follow; otherwise, either God will not be just to himself, or he will be weak in respect to both parties; and this it is impious even to think of.
1.14. CUIUSMODI HONOR DEI SIT POENA PECCANTIS.	CHAPTER XIV.How the honor of God exists in the punishment of the wicked.
BOSO. Nihil rationabilius dici posse intelligo. Sed volo a te audire, si poena peccantis sit illi honor, aut cuiusmodi honor sit. Si enim poena peccantis non est eius honor, cum peccator non solvit quod abstulit, sed punitur, sic perdit deus honorem saum ut non recuperet; quod iis quae dicta sunt repugnare videtur.	Boso. I think that nothing more reasonable can be said. Boso. But I wish to hear from you whether the punishment of the sinner is an honor to God, or how it is an honor. For if the punishment of the sinner is not for God’s honor when the sinner does not pay what he took away, but is punished, God loses his honor so that he cannot recover it. And this seems in contradiction to the things which have been said.
ANSELMUS. Deum impossibile est honorem suum perdere. Aut enim peccator sponte solvit quod debet, aut deus ab inuito accipit. Nam aut homo debitam subiectionem deo sive non peccando sive quod peccat soluendo, uoluntate spontanea exhibet, aut deus eum inuitum sibi torquendo subicit et sic se dominum eius esse ostendit, quod ipse homo voluntate fateri recusat. In quo considerandum quia, sicut homo peccando rapit quod dei est, ita deus puniendo aufert quod hominis est. Quippe non solum id suum alicuius esse dicitur quod iam possidet, sed quod in eius potestate est ut habeat. Quoniam ergo homo ita factus est, ut beatitudinem habere posset, si non peccaret: cum propter peccatum beatitudine et omni bono privatur, de suo quamvis inuitus solvit quod rapait; quia licet deus hoc ad usum sui commodi non transferat quod autert -- sicut homo pecuniam quam alii autert in suam convertit utilitatem -- hoc tamen quod aulert utitur ad suum honorem, per hoc guia aufert. Auferendo enim peccatorem et quae illius sunt, sibi subiecta esse probat.	Anselm. It is impossible for God to lose his honor; for either the sinner pays his debt of his own accord, or, if he refuse, God takes it from him. For either man renders due submission to God of his own will, by avoiding sin or making payment, or else God subjects him to himself by torments, even against man’s will, and thus shows that he is the Lord of man, though man refuses to acknowledge it of his own accord. And here we must observe that as man in sinning takes away what belongs to God, so God in punishing gets in return what pertains to man. For not only does that belong to a man which he has in present possession, but also that which it is in his power to have. Therefore, since man was so made as to be able to attain happiness by avoiding sin; if, on account of his sin, he is deprived of happiness and every good, he repays from his own inheritance what he has stolen, though he repay it against his will. For although God does not apply what he takes away to any object of his own, as man transfers the money which he has taken from another to his own use; yet what he takes away serves the purpose of his own honor, for this very reason, that it is taken away. For by this act he shows that the sinner and all that pertains to him are under his subjection.
1.15 SI DEUS vel AD MODICUM PATIATUR HONOREM SUUM VIOLARI.	CHAPTER XV.Whether God suffers his honor to be violated even in the least degree.
BOSO. Placet quod dicis. Sed est et aliud ad quod tuam responsionem postulo. Nam si deus ita sicut probas suum debet honorem servare: cur uel ad modicum patitur illum violari? Quod enim aliquo modo laedi sinitur, non integre nec perfecte custoditur.	Boso. What you say satisfies me. But there is still another point which I should like to have you answer. For if, as you make out, God ought to sustain his own honor, why does he allow it to be violated even in the least degree? For what is in any way made liable to injury is not entirely and perfectly preserved.
ANSELMUS. Dei honori nequit aliquid, quantum ad illum pertinet, addi uel minui. Idem namque ipse sibi est honor incorruptibilis et nullo modo mutabilis. Verum quando unaquaeque creatura suum et quasi sibi praeceptum /73/ ordinem sive naturaliter sive rationabiliter servat, deo oboedire et eum honorare dicitur, et hoc maxime rationalis natura, cui datum est intelligere quid debeat. Quae cum uult quod debet, deum honorat; non quia illi aliquid confert, sed quia sponte se eius uoluntati et dispositioni subdit, et in rerum universitate ordinem suum et eiusdem universitatis pulchritudinem, quantum in ipsa est, servat. Cum vero non uult quod debet, deum, quantum ad illam pertinet, inhonorat, quoniam non se sponte subdit illius dispositioni, et universitatis ordinem et pulchritudinem, quantum in se est, perturbat, licet potestatem aut dignitatem dei nullatenus laedat aut decoloret.	Anselm. Nothing can be added to or taken from the honor of God. For this honor which belongs to him is in no way subject to injury or change. But as the individual creature preserves, naturally or by reason, the condition belonging, and, as it were, allotted to him, he is said to obey and honor God; and to this, rational nature, which possesses intelligence, is especially bound. And when the being chooses what he ought, he honors God; not by bestowing anything upon him, but because he brings himself freely under God’s will and disposal, and maintains his own condition in the universe, and the beauty of the universe itself, as far as in him lies. But when he does not choose what he ought, he dishonors God, as far as the being himself is concerned, because he does not submit himself freely to God’s disposal. And he disturbs the order and beauty of the universe, as relates to himself, although he cannot injure nor tarnish the power and majesty of God.
Si enim ea quae caeli ambitu continentur, vellent non esse sub caelo aut elongari a caelo, nullatenus possent nisi sub caelo esse nec fugere caelum nisi appropinquando caelo. Nam et unde et quo et qua irent, sub caelo essent; et quanto magis a qualibet caeli parte elongarentur, tanto magis oppositae parti propinquarent. Ita quamvis homo vel malus angelus divinae voluntati et ordinationi subiacere nolit, non tamen eam fugere valet, quia si uult fugere de sub uoluntate iubente, currit sub voluntatem punientem; et si quaeris qua transit: non nisi sub voluntate permittente; et hoc ipsum quod peruerse uult aut agit, in universitatis praefatae ordinem et pulchritudinem summa sapientia convertit. Ipsa namque peruersitatis spontanea satisfactio vel a non satisfaciente poenae exactio -- excepto hoc quia deus de malis multis modis bona facit -- in eadem universitate suum tenent locum et ordinis pulchritudinem. Quas si divina sapientia, ubi peruersitas rectum ordinem perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa universitate quam deus debet ordinare, quaedam ex violate ordinis pulchritudine deformitas, et deus in sue dispositione videretur deficere. Quae duo quoniam sicut sunt /74/ inconvenientia, ita sunt impossibilia, necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur.	For if those things which are held together in the circuit of the heavens desire to be elsewhere than under the heavens, or to be further removed from the heavens, there is no place where they can be but under the heavens, nor can they fly from the heavens without also approaching them. For both whence and whither and in what way they go, they are still under the heavens; and if they are at a greater distance from one part of them, they are only so much nearer to the opposite part. And so, though man or evil angel refuse to submit to the Divine will and appointment, yet he cannot escape it; for if he wishes to fly from a will that commands, he falls into the power of a will that punishes. And if you ask whither he goes, it is only under the permission of that will; and even this wayward choice or action of his becomes subservient, under infinite wisdom, to the order and beauty of the universe before spoken of. For when it is understood that God brings good out of many forms of evil, then the satisfaction for sin freely given, or if this be not given, the exaction of punishment, hold their own place and orderly beauty in the same universe. For if Divine wisdom were not to insist upon things, when wickedness tries to disturb the right appointment, there would be, in the very universe which God ought to control, an unseemliness springing from the violation of the beauty of arrangement, and God would appear to be deficient in his management. And these two things are not only unfitting, but consequently impossible; so that satisfaction or punishment must needs follow every sin.
BOSO. Satisfecisti obiectioni meae.
ANSELMUS. Palam igitur est quia deum, quantum in ipso est, nullus potest ho- norare vel exhonorare; sed quantum in se est, hoc aliquis facere videtur, cum voluntatem suam voluntati eius subicit aut subtrahit.	Anselm. It is then plain that no one can honor or dishonor God, as he is in himself; but the creature, as far as he is concerned, appears to do this when he submits or opposes his will to the will of God.
BOSO. Nescio quid contra queam dicere.	Boso. I know of nothing which can be said against this.
1.16 RATIO QUOD NUMERUS ANGELORUM QUI CECIDERUNT RESTITUENDUS SIT DE HOMINIBUS.	CHAPTER XVI. The reason why the number of angels who fell must be made up from men.
ANSELMUS. Adhuc addam aliquid.	Anselm. Let me add something to it.
BOSO. Tamdiu dic, donec me taedeat audire.	Boso. Go on, until I am weary of listening.
ANSELMUS. Deum constat proposuisse, ut de humana natura quam fecit sine peccato, numerum angelorum qui ceciderant restitueret.	Anselm. It was proper that God should design to make up for the number of angels that fell, from human nature which he created without sin.
BOSO. Hoc credimus, sed vellem aliquam huius rei rationem habere.	Boso. This is a part of our belief, but still I should like to have some reason for it.
ANSELMUS. Fallis me. Non enim proposuimus tractare nisi de sola incarnatione dei, et tu mihi interseris alias quaestiones.	Anselm. You mistake me, for we intended to discuss only the incarnation of the Deity, and here you are bringing in other questions.
BOSO. Ne irascaris, "hilarem datorem diligit deus". Nam nemo magis probat se hilariter dare quod promittit, quam qui plus dat quam promittit. Dic ergo libenter quod quaero.	Boso. Be not angry with me; “for the Lord loveth a cheerful giver;” and no one shows better how cheerfully he gives what he promises, than he who gives more than he promises; therefore, tell me freely what I ask.
ANSELMUS. Rationalem naturam, quae dei contemplatione beata vel est uel futura est, in quodam rationabili et perfecto numero praescitam esse a deo, ita ut nec maiorem nec minorem illum esse deceat, non est dubitandum. /75/ Aut enim nescit deus in quo numero melius eam deceat constitui, quod falsum est; aut si scit, in eo illam constituet, quem ad hoc decentiorem intelliget. Quapropter aut angeli illi qui ceciderunt, facti erant ad hoc ut essent intra illum numerum; aut quia extra illum permanere non potuerunt, ex necessitate ceciderunt, quod absurdum est opinari.	Anselm. There is no question that intelligent nature , which finds its happiness, both now and forever, in the contemplation of God, was foreseen by him in a certain reasonable and complete number, so that there would be an unfitness in its being either less or greater. For either God did not know in what number it was best to create rational beings, which is false; or, if he did know, then he appointed such a number as he perceived was most fitting. Wherefore, either the angels who fell were made so as to be within that number; or, since they were out of that number, they could not continue to exist, and so fell of necessity. But this last is an absurd idea.
BOSO. Veritas est aperta quod dicis.	Boso. The truth which you set forth is plain.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam ergo de illo numero esse debuerunt: aut restaurandus est ex necessitate numerus eorum, aut in imperfecto remanebit numero rationalis natura, quae in numero perfecto praescita est; quod esse non potest.	Anselm. Therefore, since they ought to be of that number, either their number should of necessity be made up, or else rational nature, which was foreseen as perfect in number, will remain incomplete. But this cannot be.
BOSO. Restaurandi procul dubio sunt.	Boso. Doubtless, then, the number must be restored.
ANSELMUS. Necesse est ergo eos de humana, quoniam non est alia de qua possint, natura restaurari.	Anselm. But this restoration can only be made from human beings, since there is no other source.
1.17 QUOD ALII ANGELI PRO ILLIS NON POSSINT RESTITUI.	CHAPTER XVII.How other angels cannot take the place of those who fell.
BOSO. Cur non aut ipsi aut alii angeli pro illis possunt restitui?	Boso. Why could not they themselves be restored, or other angels substituted for them?
ANSELMUS. Cum videbis nostrae restaurationis difficultatem, intelliges eorum reconciliationis impossibilitatem. Alii autem angeli pro illis restitui non possunt ideo -- ut taceam quomodo hoc repugnare videatur primae creationis perfectioni -- quia non debent, nisi tales esse possint, quales illi fuissent, 5i non peccassent, cum illi nulla visa uindicta peccati perseuerassent; quod post illorum casum aliis, qui pro illis restituerentur, esset impossibile. Non enim pariter laudabiles sunt, si stant in veritate: et qui nullam novit peccati poenam, et qui eam semper aspicit aeternam. Nam nequaquam putandum est bonos angelos esse confirmatos casu malorum, sed suo merito. Sicut namque, si boni cum malis peccassent, simul damnati essent, ita iniusti, si cum iustis stetissent, pariter confirmati essent. Quippe si aliqui eorum non nisi aliorum casu confirmandi erant, aut nullus umquam confirmaretur, aut necesse erat aliquem casurum, qui ad alios confirmandos puniretur; quae utraque absurda sunt. 76/ Illo itaque modo confirmati sunt illi qui steterunt, quo pariter confirmati essent omnes, si stetissent. Quem modum ostendi, sicut potui, ubi tractavi cur deus diabolo perseverantiam non dedit.	Anselm. When you shall see the difficulty of our restoration, you will understand the impossibility of theirs. But other angels cannot be substituted for them on this account (to pass over its apparent inconsistency with the completeness of the first creation), because they ought to be such as the former angels would have been, had they never sinned. But the first angels in that case would have persevered without ever witnessing the punishment of sin; which, in respect to the others who were substituted for them after their fall, was impossible. For two beings who stand firm in truth are not equally deserving of praise, if one has never seen the punishment of sin, and the other forever witnesses its eternal reward. For it must not for a moment be supposed that good angels are upheld by the fall of evil angels, but by their own virtue. For, as they would have been condemned together, had the good sinned with the bad, so, had the unholy stood firm with the holy, they would have been likewise upheld. For, if, without the fall of a part, the rest could not be upheld, it would follow, either that none could ever be upheld, or else that it was necessary for some one to fall, in order by his punishment to uphold the rest; but either of these suppositions is absurd. Therefore, had all stood, all would have been upheld in the same manner as those who stood; and this manner I explained, as well as I could, when treating of the reason why God did not bestow perseverance upon the devil.
BOSO. Probasti malos angelos de humana natura restaurandos; et pates ex hac ratione quia non in minori numero erunt homines electi, quam sunt angeli reprobi. Sed utrum plures futuri sint, si potes ostende.	Boso. You have proved that the evil angels must be restored from the human race; and from this reasoning it appears that the number of men chosen will not be less than that of fallen angels. But show, if you can, whether it will be greater.
1.18 UTRUM PLURES FUTURI SINT SANCTI HOMINES QUAM SINT MALI ANGELI.	CHAPTER XVIII. Whether there will be more holy men than evil angels.
ANSELMUS. Si angeli, antequam quidam illorum caderent, erant in illo perfecto de quo diximus numero, non sunt homines facti nisi pro restauratione angelorum perditorum, et palam est quia non erunt plures illis. Si autem ille numerus non erat in illis omnibus angelis, complendum est de hominibus et quod periit et quod prius deerat, et erunt electi homines plures reprobis angelis; et sic dicemus quia non fuerunt homines facti tantum ad restaurandum numerum imminutum, sed etiam ad perficiendum nondum perfectum.	Anselm. If the angels, before any of them fell, existed in that perfect number of which we have spoken, then men were only made to supply the place of the lost angels; and it is plain that their number will not be greater. But if that number were not found in all the angels together, then both the loss and the original deficiency must be made up from men, and more men will be chosen than there were fallen angels. And so we shall say that men were made not only to restore the diminished number, but also to complete the imperfect number.
BOSO. Quid potius tenendum est: an angeli prius facti sint in numero perfecto, an non?	Boso. Which is the better theory, that angels were originally made perfect in number or that they were not?
ANSELMUS. Quod mihi videtur dicam.	Anselm. I will state my views.
BOSO. Non possum a te plus exigere.	Boso. I cannot ask more of you.
ANSELMUS. Si homo factus est post casum malorum angelorum, sicut quidam intelligunt in Genesi, non video posse me per hoc probare alterum horum determinate. Potest enim, ut puto, esse quod angeli prius fuerint in numero perfecto, et postea factus sit homo propter restaurandum imminutum eorum numerum; et potest esse quod non fuerint in numero perfecto, quia differebat; deus -- sicut adhuc differs -- illum implere numerum, facturus humanam naturam suo tempore; unde aut solummodo numerum nondum integrum perficeret, aut etiam, si minveretur, restitueret. Si autem tote creatura simul facta est, et dies illi in quibus Moyses istum mundum non simul esse factum /77/ uidetur dicere, aliter sunt intelligendi, quam sicut videmus istos dies in quibus vivimus: intelligere nequeo quomodo facti sint angeli in illo integro numero. Quippe si ita esset, videtur mihi quia ex necessitate aut aliqui angeli vel homines casuri erant, aut plures essent in illa caelesti civitate, quam illa perfecti numeri convenientia exigeret. Si ergo omnia simul facta sunt, sic videntur angeli et duo primi homines in numero imperfecto fuisse, ut de hominibus, si nullus angelus caderet, quod deerat solum perficeretur, et si aliquis periret, hoc quoque quod caderet restitueretur, et hominis natura, quae infirmior erat, quasi deum excusaret atque diabolum confunderet, si ille casum suum infirmitati suae imputaret, cum ipsa infirmior staret; ac si et eadem ipsa caderet, multo magis deum defenderet contra diabolum et contra se ipsam, cum ipsa facta ualde infirmior et mortalis in electis de tanta infirmitate tanto altius ascenderet, quam unde diabolus cecidisset, quanto boni angeli, quorum acqualitas ei debetur, profecerunt post ruinam malorum, quia perseueraverunt.	Anselm. If man was created after the fall of evil angels, as some understand the account in Genesis, I do not think that I can prove from this either of these suppositions positively. For it is possible, I think, that the angels should have been created perfect in number, and that afterwards man was created to complete their number when it had been lessened; and it is also possible that they were not perfect in number, because God deferred completing the number, as he does even now, determining in his own time to create man. Wherefore, either God would only complete that which was not yet perfect, or, if it were also diminished, He would restore it. But if the whole creation took place at once, and those days in which Moses appears to describe a successive creation are not to be understood like such days as ours, I cannot see how angels could have been created perfect in number. Since, if it were so, it seems to me that some, either men or angels, would fall immediately, else in heaven’s empire there would be more than the complete number required. If, therefore, all things were created at one and the same time, it should seem that angels, and the first two human beings, formed an incomplete number, so that, if no angel fell, the deficiency alone should be made up, but if any fell, the lost part should be restored; and that human nature, which had stood firm, though weaker than that of angels, might, as it were, justify God, and put the devil to silence, if he were to attribute his fall to weakness. And in case human nature fell, much more would it justify God against the devil, and even against itself, because, though made far weaker and of a mortal race, yet, in the elect, it would rise from its weakness to an estate exalted above that from which the devil was fallen, as far as good angels, to whom it should be equal, were advanced after the overthrow of the evil, because they persevered.
Ex iis rationibus potius mihi videtur quia in angelis non fuit ille perfectus numerus, quo civitas illa superna perficietur, quoniam si homo simul cum angelis factus non est, sic possibile est esse; et si simul facti sunt -- quod magis putant multi, quoniam legitur: "qui uivit in aeternum, creavit omnia simul" -- videtur necesse esse. Sed et si perfectio mundanae creaturae /78/ non tantum est intelligenda in numero individuorum quantum in numerona- turarum, necesse est humanam naturam aut ad complementum eiusdem perfectionis esse factam, aut illi superabundare, quod de minimi vermiculi natura dicere non audemus. Quare pro se ipsa ibi facta est, et non solum pro restaurandis individuis alterius naturae. Unde palam est quia, etiam si angelus nullus perisset, homines tamen in caelesti civitate suum locum habuissent. Sequitur itaque quia in angelis, antequam quidam illorum caderent, non erat ille perfectus numerus. Alioquin necesse erat, ut aut homines aut angeli aliqui caderent, quoniam extra numerum perfectum ibi nullus manere poterat.	From these reasons, I am rather inclined to the belief that there was not, originally, that complete number of angels necessary to perfect the celestial state; since, supposing that man and angels were not created at the same time, this is possible; and it would follow of necessity, if they were created at the same time, which is the opinion of the majority, because we read: “He, who liveth forever, created all things at once.” But if the perfection of the created universe is to be understood as consisting, not so much in the number of beings, as in the number of natures; it follows that human nature was either made to consummate this perfection, or that it was superfluous, which we should not dare affirm of the nature of the smallest reptile. Wherefore, then, it was made for itself, and not merely to restore the number of beings possessing another nature. From which it is plain that, even had no angel fallen, men would yet have had their place in the celestial kingdom. And hence it follows that there was not a perfect number of angels, even before a part fell; otherwise, of necessity some men or angels must fall, because it would be impossible that any should continue beyond the perfect number.
BOSO. Non nihil effecisti.	Boso. You have not labored in vain.
ANSELMUS. Est et alia ratio, ut mihi videtur, quae non parum suffragatur illi sententiae, quae angelos non esse factos in perfecto numero existimat.	Anselm. There is, also, as I think, another reason which supports, in no small degree, the opinion that angels were not created perfect in number.
BOSO. Dic illam.	Boso. Let us hear it.
ANSELMUS. Si angeli in illo numero perfecto facti sunt, et nullatenus facti sunt homines nisi pro restauratione perditorum angelorum: palam est quia, nisi angeli ab illa beatitudine cecidissent, homines ad illam non ascenderent.	Anselm. Had a perfect number of angels been created, and had man been made only to fill the place of the lost angels, it is plain that, had not some angels fallen from their happiness, man would never have, been exalted to it.
BOSO. Hoc constat.	Boso. We are agreed.
ANSELMUS. Si quis ergo dixerit quia tantum laetabuntur electi homines de angelorum perditione, quantum gaudebunt de sua assumptione, quoniam absque dubio haec non esset, nisi illa fuisset: quomodo poterunt ab hac peruersa gratulatione defendi? Aut quamodo dicemus angelos qui ceciderunt in homini bus restauratos, si illi sine hoc vitio permansuri erant, si non cecidissent, id est sine gratulatione de casu aliorum, isti vero sine illo esse non poterunt? Immo qualiter cum hoc uitio beati esse debebunt? Deinde qua audacia dicemus deum non velle aut non posse hanc restaurationem sine hoc vitio facere?	Anselm. But if any one shall ask: “Since the elect rejoice as much over the fall of angels as over their own exaltation, because the one can never take place without the other; how can they be justified in this unholy joy, or how shall we say that angels are restored by the substitution of men, if they (the angels) would have remained free from this fault, had they not fallen, viz., from rejoicing over the fall of others?” We reply: Cannot men be made free from this fault? nay, how ought they to be happy with this fault? With what temerity, then, do we say that God neither wishes nor is able to make this substitution without this fault!
BOSO. Nonne similiter est in gentibus quae ad fidem vocatae sunt, quia illam Iudaei reppulerunt?	Boso. Is not the case similar to that of the Gentiles who were called unto faith, because the Jews rejected it?
ANSELMUS. Non! Nam si Iudaei omnes credidissent, gentes tamen uocarentur, quia "in omni gente qui timet deum et operatur iustitiam, acceptus est illi". Sed quoniam Iudaei apostolos contempserunt, ea tunc fuit occasio, ut ad gentes illi converterentur. /79/	Anselm. No; for had the Jews all believed, yet the Gentiles would have been called; for “in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of him.” But since the Jews despised the apostles, this was the immediate occasion of their turning to the Gentiles.
BOSO. Nullo modo video quid contra haec dicere possim.	Boso. I see no way of opposing you.
ANSELMUS. Unde tibi videtur accidere singulis illa laetitia de alieno casu?	Anselm. Whence does that joy which one has over another’s fall seem to arise?
BOSO. Unde, nisi quia certus erit unusquisque quoniam, ubi erit nullatenus esset, nisi alius inde cecidisset?	Boso. Whence, to be sure, but from the fact that each individual will be certain that, had not another fallen, he would never have attained the place where he now is?
ANSELMUS. Si ergo nullus hanc certitudinem haberet, non esset unde ullus de alieno damno gauderet.	Anselm. If, then, no one had this certainty, there would be no cause for one to rejoice over the doom of another.
BOSO. Ita videtur.	Boso. So it appears.
ANSELMUS. Putasne illorum aliquem habiturum hanc certitudinem, si multo plures erunt quam qui ceciderunt?	Anselm. Think you that any one of them can have this certainty, if their number shall far exceed that of those who fell?
BOSO. Nequaquam possum opinari quod eam habeas aut habere debeat. Quomodo namque poterit quis scire, utrum pro restaurando quod imminutum erat, aut pro complendo quod nondum perfectum erat de illo numero constituendae civitatis, sit factus? Sed omnes certi erunt se factos esse ad perficiendam illam civitatem.	Boso. I certainly cannot think that any one would or ought to have it. For how can any one know whether he were created to restore the part diminished, or to make up that which was not yet complete in the number necessary to constitute the state? But all are sure that they were made with a view to the perfection of that kingdom.
ANSELMUS. Ergo si plures erunt quam reprobi angeli, nullus poterit aut de- bebit scire se non esse ibi assumptum nisi pro alieno casu.	Anselm. If, then, there shall be a larger number than that of the fallen angels, no one can or ought to know that he would not have attained this height but for another’s fall.
BOSO. Verum est.	Boso. That is true.
ANSELMUS. Non igitur habebit aliquis cur gaudere debeat de alterius perditione.	Anselm. No one, therefore, will have cause to rejoice over the perdition of another.
BOSO. Ita sequitur.	Boso. So it appears.
ANSELMUS. Cum itaque videamus quia, si plures erunt homines electi quam sint reprobi angeli, illa non sequatur inconvenientia, quam sequi est necesse, si plures non erunt; et cum impossibile sit ullum in illa civitate futurum inconveniens: videtur necesse esse, ut angeli non sint facti in illo perfecto numero, et plures futuri sint beati homines, quam sint miseri angeli.	Anselm. Since, then, we see that if there are more men elected than the number of fallen angels, the incongruity will not follow which must follow if there are not more men elected; and since it is impossible that there should be anything incongruous in that celestial state, it becomes a necessary fact that angels were not made perfect in number, and that there will be more happy men than doomed angels.
BOSO. Non video qua ratione hoc negari queat.	Boso. I see not how this can be denied.
ANSELMUS. Aliam adhuc eiusdem sententiae posse dici puto rationem.	Anselm. I think that another reason can be brought to support this opinion.
BOSO. Hanc quoque proferre debes.	Boso. You ought then to present it.
ANSELMUS. Credimus hanc mundi molem corpoream in melius renouandam, nec hoc futurum esse, donec impleatur numerus electorum hominum et illa beata perficiatur civitas, nec post eius perfectionem differendum. Unde colligi potest /80/ deum ab initio proposuisse, ut utrumque simul perficeret: quatenus et minor quae deum non sentiret natura ante maiorem quae deo frui deberet, nequaquam perficeretur, et in maioris perfectione mutata in melius suo quodam modo quasi congratularetur; immo omnis creatura de tam gloriosa et tam admirabili sui consummatione ipsi creatori et sibi et invicem quaeque suo modo aeterne congaudendo iucundaretur. Quatenus quod voluntas in rationali natura sponte facit, hoc etiam insensibilis creatura per dei dispositionem naturaliter exhiberet. Solemus namque in maiorum nostrorum exaltatione congaudere, ut cum in nataliciis sanctorum festiva exultatione iucundamur, de gloria illorum laetantes. Quam sententiam illud adivuare videtur quia, si Adam non peccasset, differret tamen deus illam civitatem perficere, donec completo ex hominibus quem expectabat numero, ipsi quoque homines in corporum -- ut ita dicam -- immortalem immortalitatem transmutarentur. Habebant enim in paradiso quandam immortalitatem, id est potestatem non moriendi; sed non erat immortalis haec potestas, quia poterat mori, ut scilicet ipsi non possent non mori.	Anselm. We believe that the material substance of the world must be renewed, and that this will not take place until the number of the elect is accomplished, and that happy kingdom made perfect, and that after its completion there will be no change. Whence it may be reasoned that God planned to perfect both at the same time, in order that the inferior nature, which knew not God, might not be perfected before the superior nature which ought to enjoy God; and that the inferior, being renewed at the same time with the superior, might, as it were, rejoice in its own way; yes, that every creature having so glorious and excellent a consummation, might delight in its Creator and in itself, in turn, rejoicing always after its own manner, so that what the will effects in the rational nature of its own accord, this also the irrational creature naturally shows by the arrangement of God. For we are wont to rejoice in the fame of our ancestors, as when on the birthdays of the saints we delight with festive triumph, rejoicing in their honor. And this opinion derives support from the fact that, had not Adam sinned, God might yet put off the completion of that state until the number of men which he designed should be made out, and men themselves be transferred, so to speak, to an immortal state of bodily existence. For they had in paradise a kind of immortality, that is, a power not to die, but since it was possible for them to die, this power was not immortal, as if, indeed, they had not been capable of death.
Quod si ita est, ut videlicet rationalem illam et beatam civitatem et hanc mundanam insensibilemque naturam deus ab initio proposuerit simul perficere, videtur quia aut illa civitas non erat completa in numero angelorum ante malorum ruinam, sed expectabat deus ut eam de hominibus com pleret, /81/ quando corpoream mundi naturam in melius mutaret; aut si perfecta erat in numero, non erat perfecta in confirmatione, et differenda erat eius confirmatio, etiam si nullus in ea peccasset, usque ad eandem mundi quam expectamus renouationem; aut si non dintius illa confirmatio differenda erat, acceleranda erat mundane renouatio, ut cum eadem confirmatione fieret. Sed quod mundum noviter factum statim deus renouare, et eas res quae post renouationem illam non erunt, in ipso initio, antequam appareret cur factae essent destruere instituerit, omni caret ratione. Sequitur igitur quia angeli non ita fuerunt in numero perfecto, ut eorum confirmatio diu non differretur, propterea quia mundi novi renouationem mox oporteret fieri; quod non convenit. Quod autem eandem confirmationem usque ad mundi futuram renouationem differre deus voluerit inconveniens uidetur, praesertim cum illam in aliquibus tam cito perfecerit, et cum intelligi possit quia in primis hominibus, quando peccaverunt, illam fecisset, si non peccassent, sicut fecit in perseuerantibus angelis. Quamvis enim nondum proveherentur ad illam aequalitatem angelorum, ad quam peruenturi erant homines, cum perfectus esset numerus de illis assumendus: in illa tamen iustitia in qua erant videtur quia, si uicissent, ut tentati non peccarent, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent; quemadmodum, quia victi peccaverunt, sic infirmati sunt, ut quantum in ipsis est, sine peccato esse non possint. Quis enim audeat dicere plus valere iniustitiam ad alligandum in seruitute hominem in prima suasione sibi consentientem, quam valeret iustitia ad confirmandum eum in libertate sibi in eadem prima tentatione adhaerentem? Nam quemadmodum, quoniam humana natura tote erat in primis parentibus, tota in illis victa est ut peccaret -- excepto illo solo homine, quem deus sicut sine semine viri de virgine facere, sic scivit a peccato Adae secernere -- ita in eisdem tote uicisset, si non peccassent. Restat ergo ut non complete in illo primo angelorum numero superna civitas, sed de hominibus complenda feisse dicatur. Quae si rata sunt, plures erunt electi homines, quam sint angeli reprobi.	But if God determined to bring to perfection, at one and the same time, that intelligent and happy state and this earthly and irrational nature; it follows that either that state was not complete in the number of angels before the destruction of the wicked, but God was waiting to complete it by men, when he should renovate the material nature of the world; or that, if that kingdom were perfect in number, it was not in confirmation, and its confirmation must be deferred, even had no one sinned, until that renewal of the world to which we look forward; or that, if that confirmation could not be deferred so long, the renewal of the world must be hastened that both events might take place at the same time. But that God should determine to renew the world immediately after it was made, and to destroy in the very beginning those things which after this renewal would not exist, before any reason appeared for their creation, is simply absurd. It therefore follows that, since angels were not complete in number, their confirmation will not be long deferred on this account, because the renewal of a world just created ought soon to take place, for this is not fitting. But that God should wish to put off their confirmation to the future renewing of the world seems improper, since he so quickly accomplished it in some, and since we know that in regard to our first parents, if they had not sinned as they did, he would have confirmed them, as well as the angels who persevered. For, although not yet advanced to that equality with angels to which men were to attain, when the number taken from among them was complete; yet, had they preserved their original holiness, so as not to have sinned though tempted, they would have been confirmed, with all their offspring, so as never more to sin; just as when they were conquered by sin, they were so weakened as to be unable, in themselves, to live afterwards without sinning. For who dares affirm that wickedness is more powerful to bind a man in servitude, after he has yielded to it at the first persuasion, than holiness to confirm him in liberty when he has adhered to it in the original trial? For as human nature, being included in the person of our first parents, was in them wholly won over to sin (with the single exception of that man whom God being able to create from a virgin was equally able to save from the sin of Adam), so had they not sinned, human nature would have wholly conquered. It therefore remains that the celestial state was not complete in its original number, but must be completed from among men.
BOSO. Rationabilia mihi valde videntur quae dicis.Sed quid dicemus quia legitur de deo: "constituit terminos populorum iuxta numerum filiorum Israel"? Quod quidam, quia pro "filiorum Israel" invenitur "angelorum dei", sic exponunt, ut secundum numerum bonorum angelorum assumendus intelligatur numerus hominum electorum. /82/	Boso. What you say seems very reasonable to me. But what shall we think of that which is said respecting God: “He hath appointed the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel;” which some, because for the expression “children of Israel” is found sometimes “angels of God,” explain in this way, that the number of elect men taken should be understood as equal to that of good angels?
ANSELMUS. Hoc non repugnat praedictae sententiae, si certum non est quod totidem angeli cecidissent quot remanserunt. Nam si plures sunt electi angeli quam reprobi: et necesse est ut reprobos electi homines restaurent, et potest fieri ut beatorum numero coaequentur; et sic plures erunt homines iusti quam angeli iniusti. Sed memento quo pacto incepi respondere quaestioni tuae: videlicet ut si quid dixero quod maior non confirmet auctoritas -- quamvis illud ratione probare videar -- non alia certitudine accipiatur, nisi quia interim ita mihi uidetur, donec deus mihi melius aliquo modo reuelet. Certus enim sum, si quid dico quod sacrae scripturae absque dubio contradicat, quia falsum est; nec illud tenere volo si cognovero. Sed si in illis rebus de quibus di versa sentiri possunt sine periculo, sicuti est istud unde nunc agimus -- si enim nescimus utrum plures homines eligendi sint quam sint angeli perditi an non, et alterum horum magis aestimamus quam alterum, nullum puto esse animae periculum -- si, inquam, in huiusmodi rebus sic exponimus divina dicta, ut diversis sententiis favere videantur, nec alicubi invenitur ubi quid indubitanter tenendum sit determinent, non arbitror reprehendi debere.	Anselm. This is not discordant with the previous opinion, if it be not certain that the number of angels who fell is the same as that of those who stood. For if there be more elect than evil angels, and elect men must needs be substituted for the evil angels, and it is possible for them to equal the number of the good angels, in that case there will be more holy men than evil angels. But remember with what condition I undertook to answer your inquiry, viz., that if I say anything not upheld by greater authority, though I appear to demonstrate it, yet it should be received with no further certainty than as my opinion for the present, until God makes some clearer revelation to me. For I am sure that, if I say anything which plainly opposes the Holy Scriptures, it is false; and if I am aware of it, I will no longer hold it. But if, with regard to subjects in which opposite opinions may be held without hazard, as that, for instance, which we now discuss; for if we know not whether there are to be more men elected than the number of the lost angels, and incline to either of these opinions rather than the other, I think the soul is not in danger; if, I say, in questions like this, we explain the Divine words so as to make them favor different sides, and there is nowhere found anything to decide, beyond doubt, the opinion that should be held, I think there is no censure to be given.
Illud autem quod dixisti: "constituit terminos populorum" seu gentium "iuxta numerum angelorum dei", quod in alia translatione legitur: "iuxta numerum filiorum Israel": quoniam ambae translationes aut idem significant aut diversa sine repugnantia, ita intelligendum est, ut et per angelos dei et per filios Israel significentur angeli boni tantummodo, aut soli homines electi, aut simul angeli et homines electi, tota scilicet illa civitas superna; aut per angelos dei sancti angeli tantum et per filios Israel soli iusti homines, aut soli angeli per filios Israel et iusti homines per angelos dei. Si boni angeli tantum designantur per utrumque, idem est quod si solum per angelos dei; si vero tota caelestis civitas, hic est sensus quia tam diu assumentur populi, id est multitudines electorum hominum, aut tam diu erunt /83/ in hoc saeculo populi, donec de hominibus praedestinatus numerus illius civitatis nondum perfectus compleatur.	As to the passage which you spoke of: “He hath determined the bounds of the people (or tribes) according to the number of the angels of God;” or as another translation has it: “according to the number of the children of Israel;” since both translations either mean the same thing, or are different, without contradicting each other, we may understand that good angels only are intended by both expressions, “angels of God,” and “children of Israel,” or that elect men only are meant, or that both angels and elect men are included, even the whole celestial kingdom. Or by angels of God may be understood holy angels only, and by children of Israel, holy men only; or, by children of Israel, angels only, and by angels of God, holy men. If good angels are intended in both expressions, it is the same as if only “angels of God” had been used; but if the whole heavenly kingdom were included, the meaning is, that a people, that is, the throng of elect men, is to be taken, or that there will be a people in this stage of existence, until the appointed number of that kingdom, not yet completed, shall be made up from among men.
Sed non video nunc, quomodo soli angeli aut simul et angeli et homines sancti per filios Israel intelligantur. Sanctos autem homines "filios Isreal" sicut "filios Abrahae" vocari non est alienum. Qui angeli quoque dei per hoc recte possunt vocari, quia vitam angelicam imitantur atque similitudo et aequalitas illis angelorum promittitur in caelo, et quia omnes iuste viventes angeli sunt dei; unde ipsi "confessores" aut "martyres" dicuntur. Qui enim confitetur et testatur ueritatem dei, nuntius, id est angelus eius est. Et si malus homo dicitur diabolus, sicut de Iuda dicit dominus, propter similitudinem malitiae: cur non et bonus homo dicetur angelus propter imitationem iustitiae? Quare possumus -- ut puto -- dicere deum constituisse "terminos populorum iuxta numerum" electorum hominum, quia tam diu erunt populi et erit hominum in hoc mundo procreatio, donec numerus eorundem electorum compleatur; et eo completo cessabit esse hominum generatio, quae fit in hac vita.	But I do not now see why angels only, or even angels and holy men together, are meant by the expression “children of Israel”; for it is not improper to call holy men “children of Israel,” as they are called “sons of Abraham.” And they can also properly be called “angels of God,” because they imitate the life of angels, and they are promised in heaven a likeness to and equality with angels, and all who live holy lives are angels of God. Therefore the confessors or martyrs are so called; for he who declares and bears witness to the truth, he is a messenger of God, that is, his angel. And if a wicked man is called a devil, as our Lord says of Judas, because they are alike in malice; why should not a good man be called an angel, because he follows holiness? Wherefore I think we may say that God hath appointed the bounds of the people according to the number of elect men, because men will exist and there will be a natural increase among them, until the number of elect men is accomplished; and when that occurs, the birth of men, which takes place in this life, will cease.
At si per angelos dei intelligimus sanctos angelos tantum, et per filios Israel solummodo iustos homines, duabus modis intelligi potest quia "constituit deus terminos populorum iuxta numerum angelorum dei": aut quia tantus populus, id est tot homines assumentur quot sunt sancti angeli dei; aut quia tam diu erunt populi, donec numerus angelorum dei compleatur ex hominibus; et uno solo modo exponi posse video "constituit terminos populorum iuxta numerum filiorum Israel", id est quia, sicut supra dictum est, tam diu erunt populi in hoc saeculo, donec numerus hominum sanctorum assumatur; et colligetur ex utraque translatione, quia tot assumentur homines quot remanserunt angeli. Unde tamen non sequetur, quamvis perditi angeli ex hominibus restaurandi sint, tot angelos cecidisse quot perseueraverunt. Quod tamen si dicitur, inveniendum erit quomodo ratae non sint suprapositae rationes, quae videntur ostendere non foisse in angelis, priusquam quidam illorum caderent, illum perfectum numerum, quem supra dixi, et plures homines /84/ electos futuros quam sint angeli mali.	But if by “angels of God” we only understand holy angels, and by “children of Israel ” only holy men; it may be explained in two ways: that “God hath appointed the bounds of the people according to the number of the angels of God,” viz., either that so great a people, that is, so many men, will be taken as there are holy angels of God, or that a people will continue to exist upon earth, until the number of angels is completed from among men. And I think there is no other possible method of explanation: “he hath appointed the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel,” that is, that there will continue to be a people in this stage of existence, as I said above, until the number of holy men is completed. And we infer from either translation that as many men will be taken as there were angels who remained steadfast. Yet, although lost angels must have their ranks filled by men, it does not follow that the number of lost angels was equal to that of those who persevered. But if any one affirms this, he will have to find means of invalidating the reasons given above, which prove, I think, that there was not among angels, before the fall, that perfect number before mentioned, and that there are more men to be saved than the number of evil angels.
BOSO. Non me paenitet quia coegi te, ut de angelis haec diceres. Nam non frustra hctum est. Nunc redi ad id unde digressi sumus.	Boso. I by no means regret that I urged you to these remarks about the angels, for it has not been for nought. Now let us return from our digression.
1.19 QUOD HOMO NON POSSIT SALVARI SINE PECCATI SATISFACTIONE.	CHAPTER XIX. How man cannot be saved without satisfaction for sin.
ANSELMUS. Constat deum proposuisse, ut de hominibus angelos qui ceciderant restauraret.	Anselm. It was fitting for God to fill the places of the fallen angels from among men.
BOSO. Certum est.	Boso. That is certain.
ANSELMUS. Tales ergo oportet esse homines in illa civitate superna qui pro angelis in illam assumentur, quales ibi futuri erant illi pro quibus ibidem erunt, id est quales nunc sunt boni angeli. Alioquin non erunt restaurati qui ceciderunt, et sequetur quia deus aut non poterit perficere bonum quod incepit, aut paenitebit eum tantum bonum incepisse; quae duo absurda sunt.	Anselm. Therefore there ought to be in the heavenly empire as many men taken as substitutes for the angels as would correspond with the number whose place they shall take, that is, as many as there are good angels now; otherwise they who fell will not be restored, and it will follow that God either could not accomplish the good which he begun, or he will repent of having undertaken it; either of which is absurd.
BOSO. Vere oportet ut aequales sint homines bonis angelis.	Boso. Truly it is fitting that men should be equal with good angels.
ANSELMUS. Angeli boni umquamne peccaverunt?	Anselm. Have good angels ever sinned?
BOSO. Non.	Boso. No.
ANSELMUS. Potesne cogitare quod homo, qui aliquando peccavit nec umquam deo pro peccato satisfecit, sed tantum impunitus dimittitur, aequalis sit angelo qui numquam peccavit?	Anselm. Can you think that man, who has sinned, and never made satisfaction to God for his sin, but only been suffered to go unpunished, may become the equal of an angel who has never sinned?
BOSO. Verba ista cogitare et dicere possum, sed sensum eorum ita cogitare nequeo, sicut falsitatem non possum intelligere veritatem esse.	Boso. These words I can both think of and utter, but can no more perceive their meaning than I can make truth out of falsehood.
ANSELMUS. Non ergo decet deum hominem peccantem sine satisfactione ad restaurationem angelorum assumere perditorum, quoniam veritas non patitur eum leuari ad aequalitatem beatorum. /85/	Anselm. Therefore it is not fitting that God should take sinful man without an atonement, in substitution for lost angels; for truth will not suffer man thus to be raised to an equality with holy beings.
BOSO. Sic ostendit ratio.	Boso. Reason shows this.
ANSELMUS. Considera etiam in solo homine, sine hoc quia debet angelis aequari, utrum eum taliter deus ad beatitudinem ullam, vel talem qualem habebat, antequam peccaret, debeat provehere.	Anselm. Consider, also, leaving out the question of equality with the angels, whether God ought, under such circumstances, to raise man to the same or a similar kind of happiness as that which he had before he sinned.
BOSO. Dic tu quod cogitas, et ego considerabo prout potero.	Boso. Tell your opinion, and I will attend to it as well as I can.
ANSELMUS. Ponamus divitem aliquem in menu tenere margaritam pretiosam quam nulla umquam pollutio tetigit, et quam nullus possit alius amovere de menu eius nisi ipso permittente, et eam disponat recondere in thesaurum suum, ubi sint carissima et pretiosissima quae possidet.	Anselm. Suppose a rich man possessed a choice pearl which had never been defiled, and which could not be taken from his hands without his permission; and that he determined to commit it to the treasury of his dearest and most valuable possessions.
BOSO. Cogito hoc, velut ante nos sit.	Boso. I accept your supposition.
ANSELMUS. Quid si ipse permittat eandem margaritam ab aliquo inuido excuti de manu sua in caenum, cum prohibere possit, ac postea eam de caeno sumens pollutam et non lotam in aliquem suum mundum et carum locum, deinceps illam sic servaturus, recondat? Putabisne illum sapientem?	Anselm. What if he should allow it to be struck from his hand and cast in the mire, though he might have prevented it; and afterwards taking it all soiled by the mire and unwashed, should commit it again to his beautiful and loved casket; will you consider him a wise man?
BOSO. Quomodo hoc possum? Nam nonne melius esset satis, ut margari- tam suam mundam teneret et servaret quam pollutam?	Boso. How can I? for would it not be far better to keep and preserve his pearl pure, than to have it polluted?
ANSELMUS. Nonne similiter faceret deus, qui hominem angelis sociandum sine peccato quasi in menu sue tenebat in paradiso et permisit, ut accensus inuidia diabolus eum in lutum peccati quamvis consentientem deiceret -- si enim prohibere vellet diabolum, non posses tentare hominem -- nonne, inquam, similiter faceret, si hominem peccati sorde maculatum sine omni lauatione, id est absque omni satisfactione, talem semper mansurum saltem in paradisum, de quo eiectus fuerat, reduceret?	Anselm. Would not God be acting like this, who held man in paradise, as it were in his own hand, without sin, and destined to the society of angels, and allowed the devil, inflamed with envy, to cast him into the mire of sin, though truly with man’s consent? For, had God chosen to restrain the devil, the devil could not have tempted man. Now I say, would not God be acting like this, should he restore man, stained with the defilement of sin, unwashed, that is, without any satisfaction, and always to remain so; should He restore him at once to paradise, from which he had been thrust out?
BOSO. Similitudinem si deus hoc faceret, negare non audeo, et idcirco eum hoc facere posse non annuo. Videretur enim aut quod proposuerat peragere non potuisse, aut bond propositi eum paenituisse; quae in deum cadere nequeunt.	Boso. I dare not deny the aptness of your comparison, were God to do this, and therefore do not admit that he can do this. For it should seem either that he could not accomplish what he designed, or else that he repented of his good intent, neither of which things is possible with God.
ANSELMUS. Tene igitur certissime quia sine satisfactione, id est sine debiti solutione spontanea, nec deus potest peccatum impunitum dimittere, nec peccator ad beatitudinem, vel talem qualem habebat, antequam peccaret, pervenire. Non enim hoc modo repararetur homo, vel talis qualis fuerat ante peccatum.	Anselm. Therefore, consider it settled that, without satisfaction, that is, without voluntary payment of the debt, God can neither pass by the sin unpunished, nor can the sinner attain that happiness, or happiness like that, which he had before he sinned; for man cannot in this way be restored, or become such as he was before he sinned.
BOSO. Rationibus tuis omnino contradicere non possum. /86/ Sed quid est quod dicimus deo: "dimitte nobis debita nostra", et omnis gens orat deum quem credit, ut dimittat sibi peccata? Si enim solvimus quod debemus: cur oramus ut dimittat? Numquid deus iniustus est, ut iterum exigat quod solutum est? Si autem non solvimus: cur frustra oramus ut facial, quod, quia non convenit, facere non potest?	Boso. I am wholly unable to refute your reasoning. But what say you to this: that we pray God, “put away our sins from us,” and every nation prays the God of its faith to put away its sins. For, if we pay our debt, why do we pray God to put it away? Is not God unjust to demand what has already been paid? But if we do not make payment, why do we supplicate in vain that he will do what he cannot do, because it is unbecoming?
ANSELMUS. Qui non solvit, frustra dicit: "dimitte". Qui autem solvit, supplicat, quoniam hoc ipsum pertinet ad solutionem ut supplicet. Nam deus nulli quicquam debet, sed omnis creatura illi debet; et ideo non expedit homini ut agat cum deo, quemadmodum par cum part. Sed de hoc non opus est tibi nunc respondere. Cum enim cognosces cur Christus est mortuus, forsitan per te videbis quod quaeris.	Anselm. He who does not pay says in vain: “Pardon”; but he who pays makes supplication, because prayer is properly connected with the payment; for God owes no man anything, but every creature owes God; and, therefore, it does not become man to treat with God as with an equal. But of this it is not now needful for me to answer you. For when you think why Christ died, I think you will see yourself the answer to your question.
BOSO. Sufficit ergo nunc mihi quod de hac quaestione respondes. Quod autem nullus homo ad beatitudinem pervenire queat cum peccato aut solvi a peccato, nisi solvat quod rapuit peccando, sic aperte monstrasti ut, etiam si velim, non possim dubitare.	Boso. Your reply with regard to this matter suffices me for the present. And, moreover, you have so clearly shown that no man can attain happiness in sin, or be freed from sin without satisfaction for the trespass, that, even were I so disposed, I could not doubt it.
1.20 QUOD SECUNDUM MENSURAM PECCATI OPORTEAT ESSE SATISFACTIONEM, NEC HOMO EAM PER SE FACERE POSSIT.	CHAPTER XX. That satisfaction ought to be proportionate to guilt; and that man is of himself unable to accomplish this.
ANSELMUS. Hoc quoque non dubitabis, ut puto, quia secundum mensuram peccati oportet satisfactionem esse.	Anselm. Neither, I think, will you doubt this, that satisfaction should be proportionate to guilt.
BOSO. Aliter aliquatenus inordinatum maneret peccatum, quod esse non potest, si deus nihil relinquit inordinatum in regno quo. Sed hoc est prae. stitutum quia quamlibet paruum inconveniens impossibile est in deo.	Boso. Otherwise sin would remain in a manner exempt from control (inordinatum), which cannot be, for God leaves nothing uncontrolled in his kingdom. But this is determined, that even the smallest unfitness is impossible with God.
ANSELMUS. Dic ergo: quid solues deo pro peccato tuo?	Anselm. Tell me, then, what payment you make God for your sin?
BOSO. Paenitentiam, cor contritum et humiliatum, abstinentias et multimodos labores corporis, et misericordiam dandi et dimittendi, et oboedientiam.	Boso. Repentance, a broken and contrite heart, self‑denial, various bodily sufferings, pity in giving and forgiving, and obedience.
ANSELMUS. Quid in omnibus his das deo?	Anselm. What do you give to God in all these?
BOSO. An non honoro deum, quando propter timorem eius et amorem in cordis contritione laetitiam temporalem abicio, in abstinentiis et laboribus delectationes /87/ et quietem huius vitae calco, in dando et dimittendo quae mea sunt largior, in oboedientia me ipsum illi subicio?	Boso. Do I not honor God, when, for his love and fear, in heartfelt contrition I give up worldly joy, and despise, amid abstinence and toils, the delights and ease of this life, and submit obediently to him, freely bestowing my possessions in giving to and releasing others?
ANSELMUS. Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, etiam si non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito quod debes pro peccato. Omnia autem ista debes deo quae dicis. Tantus namque debet esse in hac mortali uita amor, et -- adquod pertinet oratio -- desiderium perveniendi ad id ad quod factus es, et dolor quia nondum ibi es, et timor ne non pervenias, ut nullam laetitiam sentire debeas, nisi de iis quae tibi aut auxillum aut spem dant perveniendi. Non enim mereris habere quod non, secundum quod est, amas et desideras, et de quo, quia nondum haloes et adhuc utrum habiturus sis an non in tanto es periculo, non doles. Ad quod etiam pertinet quietem et delectationes mundanas, quae animum ab illa vera quiete et delectatione reuocant, fugere, nisi quantum ad intentionem illuc perveniendi cognoscis aufficere. Dationem uero ita considerare debes te facere ex debito, sicut intelligis quia quod das non a te haloes, sed ab illo, cuius seruus es tu et ille cui das. Et natura te docet, ut conseruo tuo, id est homo homini, facias, quod tibi ab illo vis fieri; et quia qui non uult dare quod habet, non debet accipere quod non habet. De dimissione vero breviter dico quia nullatenus pertinet ad te vindicta, sicut supra diximus; quoniam nec tu tuus es, nec ille tuus aut suus qui tibi fecit iniuriam, sed unius domini serui facti ab illo de nihilo estis; et si de conseruo tuo te uindicas, iudicium quod proprium domini et iudicis omnium est, super illum superbe praesumis. In oboedientia vero quid das deo quod non debes, cui inbenti totum quod es et quod haloes et quod poses debes?	Anselm. When you render anything to God which you owe him, irrespective of your past sin, you should not reckon this as the debt which you owe for sin. But you owe God every one of those things which you have mentioned. For, in this mortal state, there should be such love and such desire of attaining the true end of your being, which is the meaning of prayer, and such grief that you have not yet reached this object, and such fear lest you fail of it, that you should find joy in nothing which does not help you or give encouragement of your success. For you do not deserve to have a thing which you do not love and desire for its own sake, and the want of which at present, together with the great danger of never getting it, causes you no grief. This also requires one to avoid ease and worldly pleasures such as seduce the mind from real rest and pleasure, except so far as you think suffices for the accomplishment of that object. But you ought to view the gifts which you bestow as a part of your debt, since you know that what you give comes not from yourself, but from him whose servant both you are and he also to whom you give. And nature herself teaches you to do to your fellow servant, man to man, as you would be done by; and that he who will not bestow what he has ought not to receive what he has not. Of forgiveness, indeed, I speak briefly, for, as we said above, vengeance in no sense belongs to you, since you are not your own, nor is he who injures you yours or his, but you are both the servants of one Lord, made by him out of nothing. And if you avenge yourself upon your fellow servant, you proudly assume judgment over him when it is the peculiar right of God, the judge of all. But what do you give to God by your obedience, which is not owed him already, since he demands from you all that you are and have and can become?
BOSO. Nihil iam audeo in omnibus his dicere me dare deo quod non debeo.	Boso. Truly I dare not say that in all these things I pay any portion of my debt to God.
ANSELMUS. Quid ergo solues deo pro peccato tuo?	Anselm. How then do you pay God for your transgression?
BOSO. Si me ipsum et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debeo ne peccem, nihil habeo quod pro peccato reddam.	Boso. If in justice I owe God myself and all my powers, even when I do not sin, I have nothing left to render to him for my sin.
ANSELMUS. Quid ergo erit de te? Quomodo poteris saluus eue?	Anselm. What will become of you then? How will you be saved?
BOSO. Si rationes tuas considero, non video quamodo. Si autem ad fidem meam recurro: in fide Christiana, "quae per dilectionem operatur", spero /88/ me posse saluari, et quia legimus: "si iniustus conversus fuerit ab iniustitia et fecerit iustitiam", omnes iniustitias eius tradi oblivioni.	Boso. Merely looking at your arguments, I see no way of escape. But, turning to my belief, I hope through Christian faith, “which works by love,” that I may be saved, and the more, since we read that if the sinner turns from his iniquity and does what is right, all his transgressions shall be forgotten.
ANSELMUS. Hoc non dicitur nisi illis, qui aut expectaverunt Christum antequam veniret, aut credunt in eum postquam venit. Sed Christum et Christianam fidem quasi numquam fuisset posuimus, quando sola ratione, utrum adventus eius ad saluationem hominum esset necessarius, quaerere proposuimus.	Anselm. This is only said of those who either looked for Christ before his coming, or who believe in him since he has appeared. But we set aside Christ and his religion as if they did not exist, when we proposed to inquire whether his coming were necessary to man’s salvation.
BOSO. Ita fecimus.	Boso. We did so.
ANSELMUS. Sola igitur ratione procedamus.	Anselm. Let us then proceed by reason simply.
BOSO. Quamvis me in angustias quasdam ducas, desidero tamen multum ut, sicut incepisti, progrediaris.	Boso. Though you bring me into straits, yet I very much wish you to proceed as you have begun.
1.21 QUANTI PONDERIS SIT PECCATUM.	CHAPTER XXI. How great a burden sin is.
ANSELMUS. Ponamus omnia illa quae modo posuisti te pro peccato posse soluere, te non debere, et videamus utrum possint sufficere ad satisfactionem unius tam parui peccati, sicuti est unus aspectus contra voluntatem dei.	Anselm. Suppose that you did not owe any of those things which you have brought up as possible payment for your sin, let us inquire whether they can satisfy for a sin so small as one look contrary to the will of God.
BOSO. Nisi quia audio te hoc ponere in quaestionem, putarem me hoc peccatum una sola compunctione delere.	Boso. Did I not hear you question the thing, I should suppose that a single repentant feeling on my part would blot out this sin.
ANSELMUS. Nondum considerasti, quanti ponderis sit peccatum.	Anselm. You have not as yet estimated the great burden of sin.
BOSO. Nunc ostende mihi.	Boso. Show it me then.
ANSELMUS. Si videres te in conspectu dei, et aliquis tibi diceret: aspice illuc; et deus econtra: nullatenus volo ut aspicias: quaere tu ipse in corde tuo quid sit in omnibus quae sunt, pro quo contra uoluntatem dei deberes illum aspectum facere.	Anselm. If you should find yourself in the sight of God, and one said to you: “Look thither;” and God, on the other hand, should say: “It is not my will that you should look;” ask your own heart what there is in all existing things which would make it right for you to give that look contrary to the will of God.
BOSO. Nihil invenio propter quod hoc debeam, nisi forte sim in ea necessitate positus, ut sit necesse me aut hoc aut maius facere peccatum.	Boso. I can find no motive which would make it right; unless, indeed I am so situated as to make it necessary for me eithcr to do this, or some greater sin.
ANSELMUS. Remove hanc necessitatem et de solo hoc peccato considera, si possis illud facere pro te ipso redimendo.	Anselm. Put away all such necessity, and ask with regard to this sin only whether you can do it even for your own salvation.
BOSO. Aperte video quia non possum. /89/	Boso. I see plainly that I cannot.
ANSELMUS. Ne te diutius protraham: quid si necesse esset aut totum mundum et quidquid deus non est perire et in nihilum redigi, aut te facere tam paruam rem contra voluntatem dei?	Anselm. Not to detain you too long; what if it were necessary either that the whole universe, except God himself, should perish and fall back into nothing, or else that you should do so small a thing against the will of God?
BOSO. Cum considero actionem ipsam, levissimum quiddam video esse; sed cum intueor quid sit contra voluntatem dei, gravissimum quiddam et nulli damno comparabile intelligo. Sed solemus aliquando facere contra uoluntatem alicuius non reprehensibiliter, ut res eius seruentur, quod postea illi places contra cuius voluntatem facimus.	Boso. When I consider the action itself, it appears very slight; but when I view it as contrary to the will of God, I know of nothing so grievous, and of no loss that will compare with it; but sometimes we oppose another’s will without blame in order to preserve his property, so that afterwards he is glad that we opposed him.
ANSELMUS. Hoc fit homini qui aliquando non intelligit quid sibi sit utile, aut non potest quod perdit restaurare; sed deus nullo indiget et omnia si perirent posses, sicut ea fecit, restituere.	Anselm. This is in the case of man, who often does not know what is useful for him, or cannot make up his loss; but God is in want of nothing, and, should all things perish, can restore them as easily as he created them.
BOSO. Fateri me necesse est quia pro conservanda tota creatura nihil deberem facere contra voluntatem dei.	Boso. I must confess that I ought not to oppose the will of God even to preserve the whole creation.
ANSELMUS. Quid si plures essent mundi pleni creaturis, sicut iste est?	Anselm. What if there were more worlds as full of beings as this?
BOSO. Si infinito numero multiplicarentur et similiter mihi obtenderentur, id ipsum responderem.	Boso. Were they increased to an infinite extent, and held before me in like manner, my reply would be the same.
ANSELMUS. Nihil rectius poses.Sed considera etiam, si contingeret, ut contra voluntatem dei illum aspectum faceres, quid posses pro hoc peccato soluere.	Anselm. You cannot answer more correctly, but consider, also, should it happen that you gave the look contrary to God’s will, what payment you can make for this sin?
BOSO. Non habeo aliquid maius quam quod supra dixi.	Boso. I can only repeat what I said before.
ANSELMUS. Sic graviter peccamus, quotienscumque scienter aliquid quamlibet paruum contra voluntatem dei facimus, quoniam semper sumus in conspectu eius, et semper ipse praecipit nobis ne peccemus.	Anselm. So heinous is our sin whenever we knowingly oppose the will of God even in the slightest thing; since we are always in his sight, and he always enjoins it upon us not to sin.
BOSO. Ut audio, nimis periculose vivimus.
ANSELMUS. Patet quia secundum quantitatem peccati exigit deus satisfactionem.
BOSO. Non possum negare.	Boso. I cannot deny it.
ANSELMUS. Non ergo satisfacis, si non reddis aliquid maius, quam sit id pro quo peccatum facere non debueras.	Anselm. Therefore you make no satisfaction unless you restore something greater than the amount of that obligation, which should restrain you from committing the sin.
BOSO. Et rationem video sic exigere, et omnino esse impossibile.	Boso. Reason seems to demand this, and to make the contrary wholly impossible.
ANSELMUS. Nec deus ullum obligatum aliquatenus debito peccati assumere potest ad beatitudinem, quia non debet.	Anselm. Even God cannot raise to happiness any being bound at all by the debt of sin, because He ought not to.
BOSO. Nimis est gravis haec sententia. /90/	Boso. This decision is most weighty.
1.22 QUAM CONTUMELIAM FECIT HOMO DEO, CUM SE PERMISIT VINCI A DIABOLO, PRO QUA SATISFACERE NON POTEST.	CHAPTER XXII.What contempt man brought upon God, when he allowed himself to be conquered by the devil; for which he can make no satisfaction.
ANSELMUS. Audi adhuc aliud, cur non minus sit difficile hominem reconciliari dio.	Anselm. Listen to an additional reason which makes it no less difficult for man to be reconciled to God.
BOSO. Nisi fides me consolaretur, hoc solum me cogeret desperare.	Boso. This alone would drive me to despair, were it not for the consolation of faith.
ANSELMUS. Audi tamen.	Anselm. But listen.
BOSO. Dic.	Boso. Say on.
ANSELMUS. Homo in paradiso sine peccato factus quasi positus est pro deo inter deum et diabolum, ut vinceret diabolum non consentiendo suadenti peccatum, ad excusationem et honorem dei et ad confusionem diaboli, cum ille infirmior in terra non peccaret eodem diabolo suadente, qui fortior peccavit in caelo nullo suadente. Et cum hoc facile posses efficere, nulla vi coactus sola se suasione sponte vinci permisit ad voluntatem diaboli et contra voluntatem et honorem dei.	Anselm. Man being made holy was placed in paradise, as it were in the place of God, between God and the devil, to conquer the devil by not yielding to his temptation, and so to vindicate the honor of God and put the devil to shame, because that man, though weaker and dwelling upon earth, should not sin though tempted by the devil, while the devil, though stronger and in heaven, sinned without any to tempt him. And when man could have easily effected this, he, without compulsion and of his own accord, allowed himself to be brought over to the will of the devil, contrary to the will and honor of God.
BOSO. Ad quid vis tendere?	Boso. To what would you bring me?
ANSELMUS. Iudica tu ipse, si non est contra honorem dei, ut homo reconcilietur illi cum calumnia huius contumeliae deo irrogatae, nisi prius honoraverit deum vincendo diabolum, sicut illum inhonoravit uictus a diabolo. Victoria vero talis debet esse, ut sicut fortis ac potestate immortalis consensit facile diabolo ut peccaret, unde iuste incurrit poenam mortalitatis, ita infirmus et mortalis, qualem ipse se fecit, per mortis difficultatem vincat diabolum ut nullo modo peccet. Quod facere non potest, quamdiu ex uulnere primi peccati concipitur et nascitur in peccato.	Anselm. Decide for yourself if it be not contrary to the honor of God for man to be reconciled to Him, with this calumnious reproach still heaped upon God; unless man first shall have honored God by overcoming the devil, as he dishonored him in yielding to the devil. Now the victory ought to be of this kind, that, as in strength and immortal vigor, he freely yielded to the devil to sin, and on this account justly incurred the penalty of death; so, in his weakness and mortality, which he had brought upon himself, he should conquer the devil by the pain of death, while wholly avoiding sin. But this cannot be done, so long as from the deadly effect of the first transgression, man is conceived and born in sin.
BOSO. Iterum dico quia et ratio probat quod dicis, et impossibile est.	Boso. Again I say that the thing is impossible, and reason approves what you say.
1.23 QUID ABSTULIT DEO CUM PECCAVIT, QUOD REDDERE NEQUIT.	CHAPTER XXIII.What man took from God by his sin, which he has no power to repay.
ANSELMUS. Adhuc accipe unum sine quo iuste non reconciliatur homo, nec minus impossibile. /91/	Anselm. Let me mention one thing more, without which man’s reconciliation cannot be justly effected, and the impossibility is the same.
BOSO. Tot iam proposuisti nobis quae facere debemus, ut quidquid superaddas non me magis terrere possit.	Boso. You have already presented so many obligations which we ought to fulfil, that nothing which you can add will alarm me more.
ANSELMUS. Audi tamen.	Anselm. Yet listen.
BOSO. Audio.	Boso. I will.
ANSELMUS. Quid abstulit homo deo, cum vinci se permisit a diabolo?	Anselm. What did man take from God, when he allowed himself to be overcome by the devil?
BOSO. Dic tu, ut incepisti, quia ego nescio quid super haec male quae ostendisti potuit addere.	Boso. Go on to mention, as you have begun, the evil things which can be added to those already shown for I am ignorant of them.
ANSELMUS. Nonne abstulit deo, quidquid de humana natura facere proposuerat?	Anselm. Did not man take from God whatever He had purposed to do for human nature?
BOSO. Non potest negari.	Boso. There is no denying that.
ANSELMUS. Intende in districtam iustitiam, et iudica secundum illam, utrum ad aequalitatem peccati homo satisfaciat deo, nisi id ipsum quod permittendo se vinci a diabolo deo abstulit, diabolum vincendo restituat; ut quemadmodum per hoc quod victus est, rapuit diabolus quod dei erat et deus perdidit, ita per hoc quod vincat, perdat diabolus et deus recuperet.	Anselm. Listen to the voice of strict justice; and judge according to that whether man makes to God a real satisfaction for his sin, unless, by overcoming the devil, man restore to God what he took from God in allowing himself to be conquered by the devil; so that, as by this conquest over man the devil took what belonged to God, and God was the loser, so in man’s victory the devil may be despoiled, and God recover his right.
BOSO. Nec districtius nec iustius potest aliquid cogitari.	Boso. Surely nothing can be more exactly or justly conceived.
ANSELMUS. Putasne summam iustitiam hanc iustitiam posse violare?	Anselm. Think you that supreme justice can violate this justice?
BOSO. Non audeo cogitare.	Boso. I dare not think it.
ANSELMUS. Nullatenus ergo debet aut potest accipere homo a deo quod deusilli dare proposuit, si non reddit deo totum quod illi abstulit; ut sicut per illum deus perdidit, ita per illum recuperet. Quod non aliter fieri valet nisiut, quemadmodum per victum tote humana corrupta et quasi fermentata est peccato, cum quo nullum deus assumit ad perficiendam illam civitatem caelestem, ita per vincentem iustificentur a peccato tot homines quot illum numerum completuri erant, ad quem complendum factus est homo. Sed hoc facere nullatenus potest peccator homo, quia peccator peccatorem iustificare nequit.	Anselm. Therefore man cannot and ought not by any means to receive from God what God designed to give him, unless he return to God everything which he took from him; so that, as by man God suffered loss, by man, also, He might recover His loss. But this cannot be effected except in this way: that, as in the fall of man all human nature was corrupted, and, as it were, tainted with sin, and God will not choose one of such a race to fill up the number in his heavenly kingdom; so, by man’s victory, as many men may be justified from sin as are needed to complete the number which man was made to fill. But a sinful man can by no means do this, for a sinner cannot justify a sinner.
BOSO. Et nihil iustius et nihil impossibilius. Sed ex his omnibus uidetur misericordia dei et spes hominis perire, quantum ad beatitudinem spectat, ad quam factus est homo. /92/	Boso. There is nothing more just or necessary; but, from all these things, the compassion of God and the hope of man seems to fail, as far as regards that happiness for which man was made.
1.24 QUOD QUAMDIU NON REDDIT DEO QUOD DEBET, NON POSSIT ESSE BEATUS NEC EXCUSETUR IMPOTENTIA.	CHAPTER XXIV.How, as long as man does not restore what he owes God, he cannot be happy, nor is he excused by want of power.
ANSELMUS. Expecta adhuc parum.	Anselm. Yet wait a little.
BOSO. Quid habes amplius?	Boso. Have you anything further?
ANSELMUS. Si homo dicitur iniustus, qui homini non reddit quod debet: multo magis iniustus est, qui deo quod debet non reddit.	Anselm. If a man is called unjust who does not pay his fellow‑man a debt, much more is he unjust who does not restore what he owes God.
BOSO. Si potest et non reddit, vere iniustus est. Si vero non potest: quomodo iniustus est?	Boso. If he can pay and yet does not, he is certainly unjust. But if he be not able, wherein is he unjust?
ANSELMUS. Forsitan si nulla est in illo causa impotentiae, aliquatenus excusari potest. Sed si in ipsa impotentia culpa est: sicut non levigat peccatum, ita non excusat non reddentem debitum. Nam si quis ininngat opus aliquod seruo suo, et praecipiat illi ne se deiciat in faveam quam illi monstrat, unde nullatenus exire possit, et seruus ille contemnens mandatum et monitionem domini sui sponte se in monstratam mittat foveam, ut nullatenus possit opus ininnctum edicere: putasne illi aliquatenus impotentiam istam ad excusationem valere, cur opus in inactum non faciat?	Anselm. Indeed, if the origin of his inability were not in himself, there might be some excuse for him. But if in this very impotence lies the fault, as it does not lessen the sin, neither does it excuse him from paying what is due. Suppose one should assign his slave a certain piece of work, and should command him not to throw himself into a ditch, which he points out to him and from which he could not extricate himself; and suppose that the slave, despising his master’s command and warning, throws himself into the ditch before pointed out, so as to be utterly unable to accomplish the work assigned; think you that his inability will at all excuse him for not doing his appointed work?
BOSO. Nullo modo, sed potius ad augmentum culpae, quoniam ipse impotentiam illam sibi fecit. Dupliciter namque peccavit, quia et quod iussus est facere non fecit, et quod praeceptum est ne faceret fecit.	Boso. By no means, but will rather increase his crime, since he brought his inability upon himself. For doubly hath he sinned, in not doing what he was commanded to do and in doing what he was forewarned not to do.
ANSELMUS. Ita homo, qui se sponte obligavit illo debito qund soluere non potest, et sua culpa deiecit se in hanc impotentiam, ut nec illud possit soluere quod debebat ante peccatum, id est ne peccaret, nec hoc quod debet, quia peccavit, inexcusabilis est. Ipsa namque impotentia culpa est, quia non debet eam habere, immo debet eam non habere. Nam sicut culpa est non habere quod habere debet, ita culpa est habere quod debet non habere. Sicut igitur culpa est homini non habere postestatem illam, quam accepit ut posset cavere peccatum, sic culpa est illi habere impotentiam, qua nec iustitiam tenere et peccatum cavere, nec quod pro peccato debet reddere potest. Sponte namque fecit, unde perdidit illam potestatem et devenit in hanc impotentiam. Idem enim est non habere potestatem quam debet habere, et habere impotentiam quam debet non habere. Quapropter impotentia reddendi /93/ deo quod debet, quae facit ut non reddat, non excusat hominem, sinon reddit; quoniam effectum peccati non excusat peccatum quod facit.	Anselm. Just so inexcusable is man, who has voluntarily brought upon himself a debt which he cannot pay, and by his own fault disabled himself, so that he can neither escape his previous obligation not to sin, nor pay the debt which be has incurred by sin. For his very inability is guilt, because he ought not to have it; nay, he ought to be free from it; for as it is a crime not to have what he ought, it is also a crime to have what he ought not. Therefore, as it is a crime in man not to have that power which he received to avoid sin, it is also a crime to have that inability by which he can neither do right and avoid sin, nor restore the debt which he owes on account of his sin. For it is by his own free action that he loses that power, and falls into this inability. For not to have the power which one ought to have, is the same thing as to have the inability which one ought not to have. Therefore man’s inability to restore what he owes to God, an inability brought upon himself for that very purpose, does not excuse man from paying; for the result of sin cannot excuse the sin itself.
BOSO. Et grave nimis est, et ita esse necesse est.	Boso. This argument is exceedingly weighty, and must be true.
ANSELMUS. Iniustus ergo est homo, qui non reddit deo quod debet.	Anselm. Man, then, is unjust in not paying what he owes to God.
BOSO. Nimis est verum. Nam iniustus est, quia non reddit, et iniustus est,quia reddere nequit.	Boso. This is very true; for he is unjust, both in not paying, and in not being able to pay.
ANSELMUS. Nullus autem iniustus admittetur ad beatitudinem, quoniam quemadmodum beatitudo est sufficientia in qua nulla est indigentia, sic nulli convenit, nisi in quo ita pura est iustitia, ut nulla in eo sit iniustitia.	Anselm. But no unjust person shall be admitted to happiness; for as that happiness is complete in which there is nothing wanting, so it can belong to no one who is not so pure as to have no injustice found in him.
BOSO. Non audeo aliter credere.	Boso. I dare not think otherwise.
ANSELMUS. Qui ergo non solvit deo quod debet, non poterit esse beatus.	Anselm. He, then, who does not pay God what he owes can never be happy.
BOSO. Nec hoc consequi negare possum.	Boso. I cannot deny that this is so.
ANSELMUS. Quod si vis dicere: misericors deus dimittit supplicanti quod debet, idcirco quia reddere nequit: non potest dici dimittere, nisi aut hoc quod homo sponte reddere debet nec potest, id est quod recompensari possit peccato, quod fieri non deberet pro conservatione omnis rei quae deus non est; aut hoc quod puniendo ablaturus erat inuito, sicut supra dixi, id est beatitudinem. Sed si dimittit quod sponte reddere debet homo, ideo quia reddere non potest, quid est aliud quam: dimittit deus quod habere non potest? Sed derisio est, ut talis misericordia deo attribuatur. At si dimittit quod inuito erat ablaturus, propter impotentiam reddendi quod sponte reddere debet: relaxat deus poenam et facit beatum hominem propter peccatum, quia habet quod debet non habere. Nam ipsam impotentiam debet non habere, et idcirco, quamdiu illam habet sine satisfactione, peccatum est illi. Verum huiusmodi misericordia dei nimis est contraria iustitiae illius, quae non nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum. Quapropter quemadmodum deum sibi esse contrarium, ita hoc modo illum esse misericordem impossibile est.	Anselm. But if you choose to say that a merciful God remits to the suppliant his debt, because he cannot pay; God must be said to dispense with one of two things, viz., either this which man ought voluntarily to render but cannot, that is, an equivalent for his sin, a thing which ought not to be given up even to save the whole universe besides God; or else this, which, as I have before said, God was about to take away from man by punishment, even against man’s will, viz., happiness. But if God gives up what man ought freely to render, for the reason that man cannot repay it, what is this but saying that God gives up what he is unable to obtain? But it is mockery to ascribe such compassion to God. But if God gives up what he was about to take from unwilling man, because man is unable to restore what he ought to restore freely, He abates the punishment and makes man happy on account of his sin, because he has what he ought not to have. For he ought not to have this inability, and therefore as long as he has it without atonement it is his sin. And truly such compassion on the part of God is wholly contrary to the Divine justice, which allows nothing but punishment as the recompense of sin. Therefore, as God cannot be inconsistent with himself, his compassion cannot be of this nature.
BOSO. Aliam misericordiam dei video esse quaerendam quam istam.	Boso. I think, then, we must look for another mercy than this.
ANSELMUS. Verum esto: dimittit deus ei, qui non solvit quod debet, idcirco, quoniam non potest. /94/	Anselm. But suppose it were true that God pardons the man who does not pay his debt because he cannot.
BOSO. Ita vellem.	Boso. I could wish it were so.
ANSELMUS. At quamdiu non reddet, aut voles reddere aut non voles. Sed si voles quod non poterit, indigens erit. Si vero non voles, iniustus erit.	Anselm. But while man does not make payment, he either wishes to restore, or else he does not wish to. Now, if he wishes to do what he cannot, he will be needy, and if he does not wish to, he will be unjust.
BOSO. Hoc nihil clarius.	Boso. Nothing can be plainer.
ANSELMUS. Sive autem indigens sive iniustus sit, beatus non erit.	Anselm. But whether needy or unjust, he will not be happy.
BOSO. Et hoc apertum.	Boso. This also is plain.
ANSELMUS. Quamdiu ergo non reddet, beatus esse non poterit.	Anselm. So long, then, as he does not restore, he will not be happy.
BOSO. Si rationem sequitur deus iustitiae, non est qua euadat miser homuncio, et misericordia dei perire videtur.	Boso. If God follows the method of justice, there is no escape for the miserable wretch, and God’s compassion seems to fail.
ANSELMUS. Rationem postulasti, rationem accipe. Misericordem deum esse non nego, qui "homines et iumenta" saluat, "quemadmodum" multiplicavit "misericordiam" suam. Nos autem loquimur de illa ultima misericordia, qua post hanc vitam beatum facit hominem. Hanc beatitudinem nulli dari debere nisi illi, cui penitus dimissa sunt peccata, nec hanc dimissionem fieri nisi debito reddito, quod debetur pro peccato secundum magnitudinem peccati, supra positis rationibus puto me sufficienter ostendisse. Quibus si quid tibi videtur posse rationibus obici, dicere debes.	Anselm. You have demanded an explanation; now hear it. I do not deny that God is merciful, who preserveth man and beast, according to the multitude of his mercies. But we are speaking of that exceeding pity by which he makes man happy after this life. And I think that I have amply proved, by the reasons given above, that happiness ought not to be bestowed upon any one whose sins have not been wholly put away; and that this remission ought not to take place, save by the payment of the debt incurred by sin, according to the extent of sin. And if you think that any objections can be brought against these proofs, you ought to mention them.
BOSO. Ego utique nullam tuarum rationum aliquatenus infirmari posse uideo.	Boso. I see not how your reasons can be at all invalidated.
ANSELMUS. Neque ego, si bene considerentur, existimo. Verumtamen, si uel una de omnibus quas posui inexpugnabili veritate roboratur, sufficere debet. Sive namque uno sive pluribus argumentis veritas inexpugnabiliter monstretur, aequaliter ab omni dubitatione defenditur.	Anselm. Nor do I, if rightly understood. But even if one of the whole number be confirmed by impregnable truth, that should be sufficient. For truth is equally secured against all doubt, if it be demonstrably proved by one argument as by many.
BOSO. Ecce ita est.	Boso. Surely this is so.
1.25 QUOD EX NECESSITATE PER CHRISTUM SALVETUR HOMO.	CHAPTER XXV. How man’s salvation by Christ is necessarily possible.
Quomodo ergo saluus erit homo, si ipse nec solvit quod debet, nec saluari, si non solvit, debet? Aut qua fronte asseremus deum in misericordia divitem supra intellectum humanum, hanc misericordiam facere non posse? /95/	Boso. But how, then, shall man be saved, if he neither pays what he owes, and ought not to be saved without paying? Or, with what face shall we declare that God, who is rich in mercy above human conception, cannot exercise this compassion?
ANSELMUS. Hoc debes ab illis nunc exigere, qui Christum non esse credunt necessarium ad illam salutem hominis, quorum vice loqueris, ut dicant qualiter homo saluari possit sine Christo. Quod si non possunt ullo modo, desinant nos irridere, et accedant et iungant se nobis, qui non dubitamus hominem per Christum posse saluari, aut desperent hoc ullo modo fieri posse. Quodsi horrent, credant nobiscum in Christum, ut possint saluari.	Anselm. This is the question which you ought to ask of those in whose behalf you are speaking, who have no faith in the need of Christ for man’s salvation, and you should also request them to tell how man can be saved without Christ. But, if they are utterly unable to do it, let them cease from mocking us, and let them hasten to unite themselves with us, who do not doubt that man can be saved through Christ; else let them despair of being saved at all. And if this terrifies them, let them believe in Christ as we do, that they may be saved.
BOSO. A te quaeram, sicut incepi, ut ostendas mihi qua ratione saluetur homo per Christum.	Boso. Let me ask you, as I have begun, to show me how a man is saved by Christ.
ANSELMUS. Nonne sufficienter probatur per Christum hominem posse saluari, cum etiam infideles non negent hominem ullo modo fieri posse beatum, et satis ostensum sit quia, si ponimus Christum non esse, nullo modo potest inveniri salus hominis? Aut enim per Christum, aut alio aliquo, aut nullomodo poterit homo saluus esse. Quapropter si falsum est quia nullo aut alio aliquo modo potest hoc esse, necesse est fieri per Christum.	Anselm. Is it not sufficiently proved that man can be saved by Christ, when even infidels do not deny that man can be happy somehow, and it has been sufficiently shown that, leaving Christ out of view, no salvation can be found for man? For, either by Christ or by some one else can man be saved, or else not at all. If, then, it is false that man cannot be saved all, or that he can be saved in any other way, his salvation must necessarily be by Christ.
BOSO. Si quis videns rationem, quia alio modo non potest esse, et non intelligens qua ratione per Christum esse valeat, asserere velit quia nec per Christum nec ullo modo queat hoc esse: quid huic respondebimus?	Boso. But what reply will you make to a person who perceives that man cannot be saved in any other way, and yet, not understanding how he can be saved by Christ, sees fit to declare that there cannot be any salvation either by Christ or in any other way?
ANSELMUS. Quid respondendum est illi, qui idcirco astruit esse impossibile quod necesse est esse, quia nescit quamodo sit?	Anselm. What reply ought to be made to one who ascribes impossibility to a necessary truth, because he does not understand how it can be?
BOSO. Quia insipiens est.	Boso. That he is a fool.
ANSELMUS. Ergo contemnendum est quod dicit.	Anselm. Then what he says must be despised.
BOSO. Verum est. Sed hoc ipsum est illi ostendendum, qua ratione sit quod putat impossibile.	Boso. Very true; but we ought to show him in what way the thing is true which he holds to be impossible.
ANSELMUS. An non intelligis ex iis quae supra diximus, quia necesse est aliquos homines ad beatitudinem pervenire? Nam si deo inconveniens est hominem cum aliqua macula perducere ad hoc, ad quod illum sine omni macula fecit, ne aut boni incepti paenitere aut propositum implere non posse videatur: multo magis propter eandem inconvenientiam impossibile est nullum hominem ad hoc provehi ad quod factus est. Quapropter aut extra fidem Christianam invenienda est peccati satisfactio, qualem supra esse debere /96/ ostendimus -- quod ratio nulla potest ostendere -- aut indubitanter in illa esse credenda est. Quod enim necessaria ratione veraciter esse colligitur, id in nullam deduci debet dubitationem, etiam si ratio quomodo sit non percipitur.	Anselm. Do you not perceive, from what we have said above, that it is necessary for some men to attain to felicity? For, if it is unfitting for God to elevate man with any stain upon him, to that for which he made him free from all stain, lest it should seem that God had repented of his good intent, or was unable to accomplish his designs; far more is it impossible, on account of the same unfitness, that no man should be exalted to that state for which he was made. Therefore, a satisfaction such as we have above proved necessary for sin, must be found apart from the Christian faith, which no reason can show; or else we must accept the Christian doctrine. For what is clearly made out by absolute reasoning ought by no means to be questioned, even though the method of it be not understood.
BOSO. Verum est quod dicis.	Boso. What you say is true.
ANSELMUS. Quid ergo quaeris amplius?	Anselm. Why, then, do you question further?
BOSO. Non ad hoc veni ut auferas mihi fidei dubitationem, sed ut ostendas mihi certitudinis meae rationem. Quapropter sicut me rationabiliter deduxisti ad hoc, ut videam peccatorem hominem hoc debere deo pro peccato quod et reddere nequit, et nisi reddiderit saluari non valet: ita me volo perducas illuc, ut rationabili necessitate intelligam esse oportere omnia illa, quae nobis fides catholica de Christo credere praecipit, si saluari volumus; et quomodo ualeant ad salutem hominis; et qualiter deus misericordia salues hominem, cum peccatum non dimittat illi, nisi reddiderit quod propter illud debet. Et ut certiores sint argumentationes tuae, sic a longe incipe, ut eas super firmum fundamentum constituas.	Boso. I come not for this purpose, to have you remove doubts from my faith, but to have you show me the reason for my confidence. Therefore, as you have brought me thus far by your reasoning, so that I perceive that man as a sinner owes God for his sin what he is unable to pay, and cannot be saved without paying; I wish you would go further with me, and enable me to understand, by force of reasoning, the fitness of all those things which the Catholic faith enjoins upon us with regard to Christ, if we hope to be saved; and how they avail for the salvation of man, and how God saves man by compassion; when he never remits his sin, unless man shall have rendered what was due on account of his sin. And, to make your reasoning the clearer, begin at the beginning, so as to rest it upon a strong foundation.
ANSELMUS. Adinvet me nunc deus, quia tu nullatenus mihi parcis nec consideras imbecillitatem scientiae meae, cui tam magnum opus iniungis. Tentabo tamen, quandoquidem incepi, non in me sed in deo confidens, et faciam quod ipso adivuante potero. Sed ne fastidium haec uolenti legere nimis longa continuatione generetur, a dictis dicenda alio exordio distinguamus. /97/	Anselm. Now God help me, for you do not spare me in the least, nor consider the weakness of my skill, when you enjoin so great a work upon me. Yet I will attempt it, as I have begun, not trusting in myself but in God, and will do what I can with his help. But let us separate the things which remain to be said from those which have been said, by a new introduction, lest by their unbroken length, these things become tedious to one who wishes to read them.