Authors/Anselm/cur deus homo/Liber 2

• 2.01 HOMINEM FACTUM ESSE IUSTUM UT BEATUS ESSET.
• 2.02 QUOD NON MORERETUR, SI NON PECCASSET.
• 2.03 QUOD CUM CORPORE, IN QUO VIVIT IN HAC VITA, RESURGAT.
• 2.04 QUOD DE HUMANA NATURA PERFICIET DEUS QUOD INCEPIT.
• 2.05 QUOD QUAMVIS HOC NECESSE SIT FIERI, TAMEN NON HOC FACIET COGENTE NECESSITATE; ET QUOD SIT NECESSITAS QUAE AUFERT GRATIAM AUT MINUIT, ET SIT NECESSITAS QUAE AUGET. /46/
• 2.06 QUOD SATISFACTIONEM PER QUAM SALVATUR HOMO, NON POSSIT FACERE NISI DEUS-HOMO.
• 2.07 QUOD NECESSE SIT EUNDEM IPSUM ESSE PERFECTUM DEUM ET PERFECTUM HOMINEM.
• 2.08 QUOD EX GENERE ADAE ET DE VIRGINE-FEMINA DEUM OPORTEAT ASSUMERE HOMINEM.
• 2.09 QUOD NECESSE SIT VERBUM SOLUM ET HOMINEM IN UNAM CONVENIRE PERSONAM.
• 2.10 QUOD IDEM HOMO NON EX DEBITO MORIATUR; ET QUOMODO POSSIT VEL NON POSSIT PECCARE; ET CUR ILLE VEL ANGELUS DE SUA IUSTITIA LAUDANDUS SIT, CUM PECCARE NON POSSINT.
• 2.11 QUOD MORIATUR EX SUA POTESTATE; ET QUOD MORTALITAS NON PERTINEAT AD PURAM HOMINIS NATURAM.
• 2.12 QUOD QUAMVIS INCOMMODORUM NOSTRORUM PARTICEPS SIT, MISER TAMEN NON SIT.
• 2.13 QUOD CUM ALIIS INFIRMITATIBUS NOSTRIS IGNORANTIAM NON HABEAS.
• 2.14 QUOMODO MORS EIUS PRAEVALEAT NUMERO ET MAGNITUDINI PECCATORUM OMNIUM.
• 2.15 QUOMODO DEFEAT MORS EADEM ETIAM PECCATA EUM PERIMENTIUM.
• 2.16 QUALITER DEUS DE MASSE PECCATRICE ASSUMPSIT HOMINEM SINE PECCATO; ET DE SALVATIONE ADAE ET EVAE.
• 2.17 QUOD IN DEO NON SIT NECESSITAS VEL IMPOSSIBILITAS; ET QUOD SIT NECESSITAS COGENS ET NECESSITAS NON COGENS.
• 2.18 QUOMODO VITA CHRISTI SOLVATUR DEO PRO PECCATIS HOMINUM; ET QUO MODO DEBUIT CHRISTUS ET NON DEBUIT PATI.
• 2.19 QUANTA RATIONE DE MORTE EIUS SEQUATUR HUMANA SALVATIO.
• 2.20 QUAM MAGNA ET QUAM IUSTA SIT MISERICORDIA DEI.
• 2.21 QUOD IMPOSSIBILE SIT DIABOLUM RECONCILIARI.
• 2.22 QUOD IN IIS QUAE DICTA SUNT, VETERIS ET NOVI TESTAMENTI VERITAS PROBATA SIT.

Latin	English
LIBER SECUNDUS	BOOK SECOND.
2.01 HOMINEM FACIUM ESSE IUSTUM UT BEATUS ESSET.	CHAPTER I. How man was made holy by God, so as to be happy in the enjoyment of God.
ANSELMUS. Rationalem naturam a deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet. Ideo namque rationalis est, ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum, et inter bonum et malum, et inter magis bonum et minus bonum. Alioquin frustra facta esset rationalis. Sed deus non fecit eam rationalem frustra. Quare ad hoc eam factam esse rationalem dubium non est. Simili ratione probatur quia ad hoc accepit potestatem discernendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum, ac amaret et eligeret bonum, atque magis bonum magis amaret et eligeret. Aliter namque frustra illi deus de,disset potestatem istam discernendi, quia in uanum discerneret, si secundum discretionem non amaret et vitaret. Sed non convenit ut deus tantam potestatem frustra dederit. Ad hoc itaque factam esse rationalem naturam certum est, ut summum bonum super omnia amaret et eligeret, non propter aliud, sed propter ipsum. Si enim propter aliud, non ipsum sed aliud amat. At hoc nisi iusta facere nequit. Ut igitur frustra non sit rationalis, simul ad hoc rationalis et iusta facta est. Quod si ad summum bonum eligendum et amandum iusta facta est, aut talis ad hoc facta est, ut aliquando assequeretur quod amaret et eligeret, aut non. Sed si ad hoc iusta non est facta, ut quod sic amat et eligit assequatur, frustra facta est talis, ut sic illud amet et eligat, nec ulla erit ratio cur illud assequi debeat aliquando. Quamdiu ergo amando et /98/ eligendo summum bonum iusta faciet, ad quod facta est, misera erit, quia indigens erit contra voluntatem, non habendo quod desiderat; quod nimis absurdum est. Quapropter rationalis natura iusta facta est, ut summo bono, id est deo, fruendo beata esset. Homo ergo qui rationalis natura est, factus est iustus ad hoc, ut deo fruendo beatus esset.	Anselm. It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser good. Otherwise it was made rational in vain. But God made it not rational in vain. Wherefore, doubtless, it was made rational for this end. In like manner is it proved that the intelligent creature received the power of discernment for this purpose, that he might hate and shun evil, and love and choose good, and especially the greater good. For else in vain would God have given him that power of discernment, since man’s discretion would be useless unless he loved and avoided according to it. But it does not befit God to give such power in vain. It is, therefore, established that rational nature was created for this end, viz., to love and choose the highest good supremely, for its own sake and nothing else; for if the highest good were chosen for any other reason, then something else and not itself would be the thing loved. But intelligent nature cannot fulfil this purpose without being holy. Therefore that it might not in vain be made rational, it was made, in order to fulfil this purpose, both rational and holy. Now, if it was made holy in order to choose and love the highest good, then it was made such in order to follow sometimes what it loved and chose, or else it was not. But if it were not made holy for this end, that it might follow what it loves and chooses, then in vain was it made to love and choose holiness; and there can be no reason why it should be ever bound to follow holiness. Therefore, as long as it will be holy in loving and choosing the supreme good, for which it was made, it will be miserable; because it will be impotent despite of its will, inasmuch as it does not have what it desires. But this is utterly absurd. Wherefore rational nature was made holy, in order to be happy in enjoying the supreme good, which is God. Therefore man, whose nature is rational, was made holy for this end, that he might be happy in enjoying God.
2.02 QUOD NON MORERETUR, SI NON PECCASSET.	CHAPTER II. How man would never have died, unless he had sinned.
Quod autem talis factus sit, ut necessitate non moreretur, hinc facile probatur quia, ut iam diximus, sapientiae et iustitiae dei repugnat, ut cogeret mortem pati sine culpa, quem iustum ad aeternam fecit beatitudinem. Sequitur ergo quia, si numquam peccasset, numquam moreretur.	Anselm. Moreover, it is easily proved that man was so made as not to be necessarily subject to death; for, as we have already said, it is inconsistent with God’s wisdom and justice to compel man to suffer death without fault, when he made him holy to enjoy eternal blessedness. It therefore follows that had man never sinned he never would have died.
2.03 QUOD CUM CORPORE, IN QUO VIVIT IN HAC VITA, RESURGAT.	CHAPTER III. How man will rise with the same body which he has in this world.
Unde aperte quandoque future resurrectio mortuorum probatur. Quippe si homo perfecte restaurandus est, talis debet restitui, qualis futurus erat, sinon peccasset.	Anselm. From this the future resurrection of the dead is clearly proved. For if man is to be perfectly restored, the restoration should make him such as he would have been had he never sinned.
BOSO. Aliter esse non potest.	Boso. It must be so.
ANSELMUS. Quemadmodum igitur, si non peccasset homo, cum eodem quod gerebat corpore in incorruptibilitatem transmutandus erat, ita oportet, ut cum restaurabitur, cum suo in quo vivit in hac vita corpore restauretur.	Anselm. Therefore, as man, had he not sinned, was to have been transferred with the same body to an immortal state, so when he shall be restored, it must properly be with his own body as he lived in this world.
BOSO. Quid respondebimus, si quis dicat quia hoc fieri oportet de illis in quibus humanum genus restaurabitur, de reprobis vero non est necesse?	Boso. But what shall we say to one who tells us that this is right enough with regard to those in whom humanity shall be perfectly restored, but is not necessary as respects the reprobate?
ANSELMUS. Nihil iustius aut convenientius intelligitur quam ut, sicut homo, si perseuerasset in iustitia, totus, id est anima et corpore, aeterne beatus esset, ita si perseuerat in iniustitia, totus similiter aeterne miser sit.	Anselm. We know of nothing more just or proper than this, that as man, had he continued in holiness, would have been perfectly happy for eternity, both in body and in soul; so, if he persevere in wickedness, he shall be likewise completely miserable forever.
BOSO. Breviter mihi de his satisfecisti. /99/	Boso. You have promptly satisfied me in these matters.
2.04 QUOD DE HUMANA NATURA PERFICIET DEUS QUOD INCEPIT.	CHAPTER IV. How God will complete, in respect to human nature, what he has begun.
ANSELMUS. Ex his est facile cognoscere quoniam aut hoc de humana perficiet deus natura quod incepit, aut in uanum fecit tam sublimem naturam ad tantum bonum. At si nihil pretiosius cognoscitur deus fecisse quam rationalem naturam ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationalem naturam penitus perire sinat.	Anselm. From these things, we can easily see that God will either complete what he has begun with regard to human nature, or else he has made to no end so lofty a nature, capable of so great good. Now if it be understood that God has made nothing more valuable than rational existence capable of enjoying him; it is altogether foreign from his character to suppose that he will suffer that rational existence utterly to perish.
BOSO. Non potest aliter putare cor rationale.	Boso. No reasonable being can think otherwise.
ANSELMUS. Necesse est ergo, ut de humana natura quod incepit perficiat. Hoc autem fieri, sicut diximus, nequit, nisi per integram peccati satisfactionem, quam nullus peccator facere potest.	Anselm. Therefore is it necessary for him to perfect in human nature what he has begun. But this, as we have already said, cannot be accomplished save by a complete expiation of sin, which no sinner can effect for himself.
BOSO. Intelligo iam necesse esse, ut deus faciat quod incepit, ne aliter quam deceat videatur a suo incepto deficere.	Boso. I now understand it to be necessary for God to complete what he has begun, lest there be an unseemly falling off from his design.
2.05 QUOD QUAMVIS HOC NECESSE SIT FIERI, TAMEN NON HOC FACIET COGENTE NECESSITATE; ET QUOD SIT NECESSITAS QUAE AUFERT GRATIAM AUT MINUIT, ET SIT NECESSITAS QUAE AUGET.	CHAPTER V. How, although the thing may be necessary, God may not do it by a compulsory necessity; and what is the nature of that necessity which removes or lessens gratitude, and what necessity increases it.
Sed si ita est, videtur quasi cogi deus necessitate vitandi indecentiam, ut salutem procuret humanam. Quomodo ergo negari poterit plus hoc propter se facere quam propter nos? Aut si ita est: quam gratiam illi debemus pro eo quod facit propter se? Quomodo etiam imputabimus nostram salutem eius gratiae, si nos saluat necessitate?	Boso. But if it be so, then God seems as it were compelled, for the sake of avoiding what is unbecoming , to secure the salvation of man. How, then, can it be denied that he does it more on his own account than on ours? But if it be so, what thanks do we owe him for what he does for himself? How shall we attribute our salvation to his grace, if he saves us from necessity?
ANSELMUS. Est necessitas quae benefacienti gratiam aulert aut minuit, et est necessitas qua maior beneficio gratia debetur. Cum enim aliquis ea necessitate /100/ cui subiacet, inuitus bene facit, aut nulla aut minor illi gratia debetur. Cum vero ipse sponte se necessitati benefaciendi subdit nec inuitus eam sustinet, tunc utique maiorem beneficii gratiam meretur. Non enim haec est dicenda necessitas, sed gratia, quia nullo cogente illam suscepit aut servat, sed gratis. Nam si quod hodie sponte promittis cras te daturum, eadem cras voluntate das, quamvis necesse sit te cras reddere promissum, si potes, aut mentiri: non tarnen minus tibi debet ille pro impenso beneficio cui das, quam si non promisisses, quoniam te debitorem ante tempus dationis illi facere non es cunctatus. Tale est, cum quis sanctae conversationis sponte vovet propositum. Quamvis namque servare illud ex necessitate post votum debeat, ne apostatae damnationem incurrat, et licet cogi possit servare, si nolit: si tamen non inuitus servat quod vovit, non minus sed magis gratus est deo, quam si non vovisset; quoniam non solum communem vitam, sed etiam eius licentiam sibi propter deum abnegavit, nec sancte vivere dicendus est necessitate, sed eadem qua vovit libertate.	Anselm. There is a necessity which takes away or lessens our gratitude to a benefactor, and there is also a necessity by which the favor deserves still greater thanks. For when one does a benefit from a necessity to which he is unwillingly subjected, less thanks are due him, or none at all. But when he freely places himself under the necessity of benefiting another, and sustains that necessity without reluctance, then he certainly deserves greater thanks for the favor. For this should not be called necessity but grace, inasmuch as he undertook or maintains it, not with any constraint, but freely. For if that which to‑day you promise of your own accord you will give to‑morrow, you do give to‑morrow with the same willingness; though it be necessary for you, if possible, to redeem your promise, or make yourself a liar; notwithstanding, the recipient of your favor is as much indebted for your precious gift as if you had not promised it, for you were not obliged to make yourself his debtor before the time of giving it: just so is it when one undertakes, by a vow, a design of holy living. For though after his vow he ought necessarily to perform, lest he suffer the judgment of an apostate, and, although he may be compelled to keep it even unwillingly, yet, if he keep his vow cheerfully, he is not less but more pleasing to God than if he had not vowed. For he has not only given up the life of the world, but also his personal liberty, for the sake of God; and he cannot be said to live a holy life of necessity, but with the same freedom with which he took the vow.
Quare multo magis, si deus facit bonum homini quod incepit, licet non deceat eum a bono incepto deficere, totum gratiae debemus imputare, quia hoc propter nos, non propter se nullius egens incepit. Non enim illum latuit quid homo facturus erat, cum illum fecit, et tamen bonitate sua illum creando sponte se ut perficeret inceptum bonum quasi obligavit. Denique deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid; et cum dicimus deum aliquid facere quasi necessitate vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quia hoc facit necessitate servandae honestatis. Quae scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a se ipso et non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas. Dicamus tamen quia necesse est, ut bonitas dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod incepit, quamvis totum sit gratia bonum quod facit.	Much more, therefore, do we owe all thanks to God for completing his intended favor to man; though, indeed, it would not be proper for him to fail in his good design, because wanting nothing in himself he begun it for our sake and not his own. For what man was about to do was not hidden from God at his creation; and yet by freely creating man, God as it were bound himself to complete the good which he had begun. In fine, God does nothing by necessity, since he is not compelled or restrained in anything. And when we say that God does anything to avoid dishonor, which he certainly does not fear, we must mean that God does this from the necessity of maintaining his honor; which necessity is after all no more than this, viz., the immutability of his honor, which belongs to him in himself, and is not derived from another; and therefore it is not properly called necessity. Yet we may say, although the whole work which God does for man is of grace, that it is necessary for God, on account of his unchangeable goodness, to complete the work which he has begun.
BOSO. Concedo. /101/	Boso. I grant it.
2.06 QUOD SATISFACTIONEM PER QUAM SALVATUR HOMO, NON POSSIT FACERE NISI DEUS-HOMO.	CHAPTER VI. How no being, except the God‑man, can make the atonement by which man is saved.
ANSELMUS. Hoc autem fieri nequit, nisi sit qui solvat deo pro peccato hominis aliquid maius quam omne quod praeter deum est.	Anselm. But this cannot be effected, except the price paid to God for the sin of man be something greater than all the universe besides God.
BOSO. Ita constat.	Boso. So it appears.
ANSELMUS. Illum quoque qui de suo poterit deo dare aliquid, quod superet omne quod sub deo est, maiorem esse necesse est quam omne quod non est deus.	Anselm. Moreover, it is necessary that he who can give God anything of his own which is more valuable than all things in the possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself.
BOSO. Nequeo negare.	Boso. I cannot deny it.
ANSELMUS. Nihil autem est supra omne quod deus non est, nisi deus.	Anselm. Therefore none but God can make this satisfaction.
BOSO. Verum est.	Boso. So it appears.
ANSELMUS. Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi deus.	Anselm. But none but a man ought to do this, other wise man does not make the satisfaction.
BOSO. Sic sequitur.	Boso. Nothing seems more just.
ANSELMUS. Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo. Alioquin non satisfacit homo.
BOSO. Non videtur aliquid iustius.
ANSELMUS. Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi deus nec debet nisi homo: necesse est ut eam faciat deus homo.	Anselm. If it be necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God‑man to make it.
BOSO. "Benedictus deus", iam magnum quiddam invenimus de hoc quod quaerimus. Prosequere igitur, ut incepisti. Spero enim quia deus nos adivuabit.	Boso. Now blessed be God! we have made a great discovery with regard to our question. Go on, therefore, as you have begun. For I hope that God will assist you.
2.07 QUOD NECESSE SIT EUNDUM IPSUM ESSE PERFECTUM DEUM ET PERFECTUM HOMINEM.	CHAPTER VII. How necessary it is for the same being to be perfect God and perfect man.
ANSELMUS. Investigandum nunc est quemodo esse possit deus-homo. Divina enim natura et humana non possum in invicem mutari, ut divina fiat humana aut humana divina; nec ita misceri ut quaedam tertia sit ex duabus, /102/ quae nec divina sit omnino nec humana. Denique si fieri posset ut altera in alteram converteretur, aut esset tantum deus et non homo, aut solum homo et non deus. Aut si miscerentur ita, ut fieret ex duabus corruptis quaedam tertia -- quemadmodum de duabus individuis animalibus diversarum specierum masculo et femina nascitur tertium, quod nec patris integram nec matris servat naturam, sed ex utraque tertiam mixtam -- nec homo esset nec deus. Non igitur potest fieri homo-deus quem quaerimus, ex divina et humana natura, aut conversione alterius in alteram, aut corruptiva commixtione utriusque in tertiam, quia haec fieri nequeunt; aut si fieri valerent, nihil ad hoc quod quaerimus valerent.	Anselm. Now must we inquire how God can become man.The Divine and human natures cannot alternate, so that the Divine should become human or the human Divine; nor can they be so commingled as that a third should be produced from the two which is neither wholly Divine nor wholly human. For, granting that it were possible for either to be changed into the other, it would in that case be only God and not man, or man only and not God. Or, if they were so commingled that a third nature sprung from the combination of the two (as from two animals, a male and a female of different species, a third is produced, which does not preserve entire the species of either parent, but has a mixed nature derived from both), it would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God‑man, whom we require to be of a nature both human and Divine, cannot be produced by a change from one into the other, nor by an imperfect commingling of both in a third; since these things cannot be, or, if they could be, would avail nothing to our purpose.
Si autem ita quolibet modo coniungi dicuntur hae duae naturae integrae, ut tamen alius sit homo, alius deus, et non idem sit deus qui et homo: impossibile est, ut ambo faciant quod fieri necesse est. Nam deus non faciet, quia non debebit; et homo non faciet, quia non poterit. Ut ergo hoc faciat deus-homo, necesse est eundem ipsum esse perfectum deun, et perfectum hominem, qui hanc satisfactionem facturus est; quoniam eam facere nec potest nisi verus deus, nec debet nisi uerus homo. Quoniam ergo servata integritate utriusque naturae necesse est inveniri deum-hominem, nonminus est necesse has duas naturas integras conveniri in unam personam -- quemadmodum corpus et anima rationalis conveninnt in unum hominem -- quoniam aliter fieri nequit, ut idem ipse sit perfectus deus et perfectus homo.	Moreover, if these two complete natures are said to be joined somehow, in such a way that one may be Divine while the other is human, and yet that which is God not be the same with that which is man, it is impossible for both to do the work necessary to be accomplished. For God will not do it, because he has no debt to pay; and man will not do it, because he cannot. Therefore, in order that the God‑man may perform this, it is necessary that the same being should perfect God and perfect man, in order to make this atonement. For he cannot and ought not to do it, unless he be very God and very man. Since, then, it is necessary that the God‑man preserve the completeness of each nature, it is no less necessary that these two natures be united entire in one person, just as a body and a reasonable soul exist together in every human being; for otherwise it is impossible that the same being should be very God and very man.
BOSO. Totum mihi placet quod dicis.	Boso. All that you say is satisfactory to me.
2.08 QUOD EX GENERE ADAE ET DE VIRGINE-FEMINA DEUM OPORTEAT ASSUMERE HOMINEM.	CHAPTER VIII. How it behoved God to take a man of the race of Adam, and born of a woman.
ANSELMUS. Restat nunc quaerere unde et quomodo assumet deus humanam naturam. Aut enim assumet eam de Adam, aut faciet nouum hominem, quemadmodum fecit Adam de nullo alio homine. Sed si nouum hominem facit non ex Adae genere, non pertinebit ad genus humanum quod natum est de Adam. Quare non debebit satisfacere pro eo, quia non erit de illo. /103/ Sicut enim rectum est, ut pro culpa hominis homo satisfaciat, ita necesse est, ut satisfaciens idem sit qui peccator aut eiusdem generis. Aliter namque nec Adam nec genus eius satisfaciet pro se. Ergo sicut de Adam et Eva peccatum in omnes homines propagatum est, ita mlllus nisi vel ipsi vel quide illis nascitur, pro peccato hominum satisfacere debet. Quoniam ergo illi nequeunt, necesse est, ut de illis sit qui hoc faciet.	Anselm. It now remains to inquire whence and how God shall assume human nature. For he will either take it from Adam, or else he will make a new man, as he made Adam originally. But, if he makes a new man, not of Adam’s race, then this man will not belong to the human family, which descended from Adam, and therefore ought not to make atonement for it, because he never belonged to it. For, as it is right for man to make atonement for the sin of man, it is also necessary that he who makes the atonement should be the very being who has sinned, or else one of the same race. Otherwise, neither Adam nor his race would make satisfaction for themselves. Therefore, as through Adam and Eve sin was propagated among all men, so none but themselves, or one born of them, ought to make atonement for the sin of men. And, since they cannot, one born of them must fulfil this work.
Amplius. Sicut Adam et totum genus eius per se stetisset sine sustentatione alterius creaturae, si non peccasset: ita oportet ut, si idem genus resurgit post casum, per se resurgat et releuetur. Nam per quemcumque in statum suum restituatur: per illum utique stabit, per quem statum suum recuperabit. Deus etiam quando humanam naturam primitus fecit in solo Adam, nec feminam, ut de utroque sexu multiplicarentur homines, facere voluit nisi de ipso, aperte monstravit se non nisi de Adam voluisse facere, quod de natura humana facturus erat. Quapropter si genus Adae per aliquem releuatur hominem qui non sit de eodem genere: non in illam dignitatem, quam habiturum erat, si non peccasset Adam, et ideo non integre restaurabitur et dei propositum deficere videbitur; quae duo inconvenientia sunt. Ergo necesse est ut de Adam assumatur homo, per quem restaurandum est genus Adae.	Moreover, as Adam and his whole race, had he not sinned, would have stood firm without the support of any other being, so, after the fall, the same race must rise and be exalted by means of itself. For, whoever restores the race to its place, it will certainly stand by that being who has made this restoration. Also, when God created human nature in Adam alone, and would only make woman out of man, that by the union of both sexes there might be increase, in this he showed plainly that he wished to produce all that he intended with regard to human nature from man alone. Wherefore, if the race of Adam be reinstated by any being not of the same race, it will not be restored to that dignity which it would have had, had not Adam sinned, and so will not be completely restored; and, besides, God will seem to have failed of his purpose, both which suppositions are incongruous: It is, therefore, necessary that the man by whom Adam’s race shall be restored be taken from Adam.
BOSO. Si rationem sequimur, sicut proposuimus, hoc inevitabiliter oportet esse.	Boso. If we follow reason, as we proposed to do, this is the necessary result.
ANSELMUS. Investigemus nunc utrum assumenda sit a deo natura hominis de patre et matre, sicut alii sunt homines, aut de viro sine femina, aut de femina sine viro. Nam quocumque modo ex his tribus modis sit: de Adam et de Eva erit, de quibus est omnis homo utriusque sexus; nec aliquis modus ex tribus istis facilior est deo quam alit, ut eo modo potius debeat assumi.	Anselm. Let us now examine the question, whether the human nature taken by God must be produced from a father and mother, as other men are, or from man alone, or from woman alone. For, in whichever of these three modes it be, it will be produced from Adam and Eve, for from these two is every person of either sex descended. And of these three modes, no one is easier for God than another, that it should be selected on this account.
BOSO. Bene procedis.	Boso. So far, it is well.
ANSELMUS. Verum non est opus multo labole, ut ostendatur quia mundius et honestius procreabitur homo ille de solo viro vel femina, quam de commixtione utriusque, sicut omnes alii filii hominum.	Anselm. It is no great toil to show that that man will be brought into existence in a nobler and purer manner, if produced from man alone, or woman alone, than if springing from the union of both, as do all other men.
BOSO. Sufficit. /104/	Boso. I agree with you.
ANSELMUS. Aut ergo de solo viro aut de sola femina assumendus est.	Anselm. Therefore must he be taken either from man alone, or woman alone.
BOSO. Aliunde non potest.	Boso. There is no other source.
ANSELMUS. Quatuor modis potest deus hominem facere. Videlicet aut de uiro et femina, sicut assiduus monstrat usus; aut nec de viro nec de femina, sicut creavit Adam; aut de viro sine femina, sicut fecit Euam; aut de femina sine viro, quod nondum fecit. Ut igitur hunc quoque modum probet suae subiacere potestati et ad hoc ipsum opus dilatum esse, nil convenientius, quam ut de femina sine viro assumat illum hominem quem quaerimus. Utrum autem de virgine aut de non-uirgine dignius hoc fiat, non est opus disputare, sed sine omni dubitatione asserendum est quia de virgine deum-hominem nasci oportet.	Anselm. In four ways can God create man, viz., either of man and woman, in the common way; or neither of man nor woman, as he created Adam; or of man without woman, as he made Eve; or of woman without man, which thus far he has never done. Wherefore, in order to show that this last mode also under his power, and was reserved for this very purpose, what more fitting than that he should take that man whose origin we are seeking from a woman without a man? Now whether it be more worthy that he be born of a virgin, or one not a virgin, we need not discuss, but must affirm, beyond all doubt, that the God‑man should be born of a virgin.
BOSO. Secundum placitum cordis mei loqueris.	Boso. Your speech gratifies my heart.
ANSELMUS. Estne hoc solidum quod diximus, aut uanum aliquid sicut nubes, quod dixisti nobis infideles obicerei	Anselm. Does what we have said appear sound, or is it unsubstantial as a cloud, as you have said infidels declare?
BOSO. Nihil solidius.	Boso. Nothing can be more sound.
ANSELMUS. Pinge igitur non super fictam uanitatem, sed super solidam ueritatem, et dic quia valde convenit ut, quemadmodum hominis peccatum et causa nostrae damnationis principium sumpsit a femina, ita medicina peccati et causa nostrae saluationis nascatur de femina. Ac ne mulieres desperent se pertinere ad sortem beatorum, quoniam de femina tantum malum processit, oportet ut ad reformandam spem earum de muliere tantum bonum procedat. Pinge et hoc: Si virgo erat quae cause fuit humano generi totius mali, multo magis decet, ut virgo sit quae cause erit totius boni. Hoc quoque pinge: Si mulier quam fecit deus de uiro sine femina, facta est de virgine, convenit valde ut vir quoque, qui fiet de femina sine viro, fiat de virgine. Sed de picturis quae pingi possum super hoc, quia deus-homo de virgine-muliere nasci debet, ista nunc sufficiant.	Anselm. Paint not, therefore, upon baseless emptiness, but upon solid truth, and tell how clearly fitting it is that, as man’s sin and the cause of our condemnation sprung from a woman, so the cure of sin and the source of our salvation should also be found in a woman. And that women may not despair of attaining the inheritance of the blessed, because that so dire an evil arose from woman, it is proper that from woman also so great a blessing should arise, that their hopes may be revived. Take also this view. If it was a virgin which brought all evil upon the race, it is much more appropriate that a virgin should be the occasion of all good. And this also. If woman, whom God made from man alone, was made of a virgin (de virgine), it is peculiarly fitting for that man also, who shall spring from a woman, to be born of a woman without man. Of the pictures which can be superadded to this, showing that the God‑man ought to be born of a virgin, we will say nothing. These are sufficient.
BOSO. Valde pulchrae et rationabiles sunt istae picturae. /105/	Boso. They are certainly very beautiful and reasonable.
2.09 QUOD NECESSE SIT VERBUM SOLUM ET HOMINEM IN UNAM CONVENIRE PERSONAM.	CHAPTER IX.How of necessity the Word only can unite in one person with man.
ANSELMUS. Nunc quoque quaerendum est in qua persona deus, qui est tres personae, hominem assumat. Plures enim personae nequeunt unum eundemque hominem assumere in unitatem personae. Quare in una tantum persona hoc fieri necesse est. Sed de hac unitate personae dei et hominis, et in qua persona dei hoc magis fieri oporteat, in epistola de incarnatione verti ad domnum papam Urbanum directa, quantum ad praesentem investigationem sufficere puto, locutus sum.	Anselm. Now must we inquire further, in what person God, who exists in three persons, shall take upon himself the nature of man. For a plurality of persons cannot take one and the same man into a unity of person. Wherefore in one person only can this be done. But, as respects this personal unity of God and man, and in which of the Divine persons this ought to be effected, I have expressed myself, as far as I think needful for the present inquiry, in a letter on the Incarnation of the Word, addressed to my lord, the Pope Urban.
BOSO. Breviter tamen hic tange, cur potius filii persona debeat incarnari, quam patris aut spiritus sancti.	Boso. Yet briefly glance at this matter, why the person of the Son should be incarnated rather than that of the Father or the Holy Spirit.
ANSELMUS. Si quaelibet alla persona incarnetur, erunt duo filii in trinitate, filiusscilicet dei, qui et ante incarnationem filius est, et ille qui per incarnationem filius ent virginis; et erit in personis, quae semper aequales esse debent, inaequalitas secundum dignitatem nativitatum. Digniorem namque nativitatem habebit natus ex deo quam natus ex virgine. Item si peter fuerit incarnatus, erunt duo nepotes in trinitate, quia peter erit nepos parentum virginis per hominem assumptum; et verbum, cum nihil habeas de homine, nepos tamen erit virginis, quia filii eius erit filius. Quae omnia inconvenientia sunt, nec in incarnatione verbi contingunt. Est et aliud cur magis conveniat incarnari filio quam allis personis: quia convenientius sonat fillum supplicare petri quam aliam personam alit. Item. Homo pro quo erat oraturus, et diabolus quem erat expugnaturus, ambo falsam similitudinem dei per propriam voluntatem praesumpserant. Unde quasi specialius adversus personam filii peccaverant, qui vera patris similitudo creditur. Illi itaque cui specialius fit iniuria, convenientius attribuitur culpae vindicta aut indulgentia. Quapropter cum nos ratio /106/ inevitabilis perduxerit ad hoc, ut necesse sit divinam et humanam naturam in unam convenire personam, nec hoc fieri possit in pluribus personis dei, et hoc convenientius fieri pateat in persona verbi quam in aliis: necesse est verbum deum et hominem in unam convenire personam.	Anselm. If one of the other persons be incarnated, there will be two sons in the Trinity, viz., the Son of God, who is the Son before the incarnation, and he also who, by the incarnation, will be the son of the virgin; and among the persons which ought always to be equal there will be an inequality as respects the dignity of birth. For the one born of God will have a nobler birth than he who is born of the virgin. Likewise, if the Father become incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity; for the Father, by assuming humanity, will be the grandson of the parents of the virgin, and the Word, though having nothing to do with man, will yet be the grandson of the virgin, since he will be the son of her son. But all these things are incongruous and do not pertain to the incarnation of the Word. And there is yet another reason which renders it more fitting for the Son to become incarnate than the other persons. It is, that for the Son to pray to the Father is more proper than for any other person of the Trinity to supplicate his fellow. Moreover, man, for whom he was to pray, and the devil, whom he was to vanquish, have both put on a false likeness to God by their own will. Wherefore they have sinned, as it were, especially against the person of the Son, who is believed to be the very image of God. Wherefore the punishment or pardon of guilt is with peculiar propriety ascribed to him upon whom chiefly the injury was inflicted. Since, therefore, infallible reason has brought us to this necessary conclusion, that the Divine and human natures must unite in one person, and that this is evidently more fitting in respect to the person of the Word than the other persons, we determine that God the Word must unite with man in one person.
BOSO. Sic est via qua me ducts, undique munita ratione, ut neque ad dexteram neque ad sinistram videam ab illa me posse declinare.	Boso. The way by which you lead me is so guarded by reason that I cannot deviate from it to the right or left.
ANSELMUS. Non ego te duco, sed ille de quo loquimur, sine quo nihil possumus, nos ducit ubicumque viam veritatis tenemus.	Anselm. It is not I who lead you, but he of whom we are speaking, without whose guidance we have no power to keep the way of truth.
2.10 QUOD IDEM HOMO NON EX DEBITO MORIATUR; ET QUOMODO POSSIT VEL NON POSSIT PECCARE; ET CUR ILLE vel ANGELUS DE SUA IUSTITIA LAUDANDUS SIT, CUM PECCARE NON POSSINT.	CHAPTER X. How this man dies not of debt; and in what sense he can or cannot sin; and how neither he nor an angel deserves praise for their holiness, if it is impossible for them to sin.
Utrum autem ille homo moriturus sit ex debito, sicut omnes alii homines ex debito moriantur, nunc investigare debemus. Sed si Adam moriturus non erat, si non pecasset: multo magis iste mortem pati non debebit, in quo peccatum esse non poterit, quia deus erit.	Anselm. We ought not to question whether this man was about to die as a debt, as all other men do. For, if Adam would not have died had he not committed sin, much less should this man suffer death, in whom there can be no sin, for he is God.
BOSO. In hoc volo te aliquantum morari. Sive enim dicatur posse sive non posse peccare, in utroque mihi non parue nascitur quaestio. Nam si peccare non posse dicitur, difficile credi debere videtur. Ut enim aliquantulum loquar non quasi de illo qui numquam fuerit, sicut hactenus fecimus, sed velut de eo quem et cuius facta novimus: quis neget illum multa potuisse facere quae peccata dicimus? Quippe -- ut alla taceam -- quomodo didicemus eum non potuisse mentiri, quod semper peccatum est? Cum enim dicat Iudaeis de patre: "si dixero quia non scio eum, ero similis vobis mendas", et inter haec verba dicat: "non scio eum": quis eum dices easdem tres nequivisse proferre dictiones sine aliis verbis, ut sic diceret: "non scio eum"? Quod si faceret, ut ipse ait, esset mendax, quod est esse peccatorem. Quare quoniam hoc potuit, peccare potuit.	Boso. Let me delay you a little on this point. For in either case it is no slight question with me whether it be said that he can sin or that he cannot. For if it be said that he cannot sin, it should seem hard to be believed. For to say a word concerning him, not as of one who never existed in the manner we have spoken hitherto, but as of one whom we know and whose deeds we know; who, I say, will deny that he could have done many things which we call sinful? For, to say nothing of other things, how shall we say that it was not possible for him to commit the sin of lying? For, when he says to the Jews, of his Father: “If I say that I know him not, I shall be a liar, like unto you,” and, in this sentence, makes use of the words : “I know him not,” who says that he could not have uttered these same four words, or expressing the same thing differently, have declared, “I know him not?” Now had he done so, he would have been a liar, as he himself says, and therefore a sinner. Therefore, since he could do this, he could sin.
ANSELMUS. Et hoc dicere potuit, et peccare non potuit.	Anselm. It is true that he could say this, and also that he could not sin.
BOSO. Hoc ostende. /107/	Boso. How is that?
ANSELMUS. Omnis potestas sequitur voluntatem. Cum enim dico quia possum loqui ud ambulare, subauditur: si volo. Si enim non subintelligitur voluntas,non est potestas sed necessitas. Nam cum dico quia nolens possum trahi aut vinci, non est haec mea potestas, sed necessitas et potestas alterius. Quippe non est aliud: possum trahi uel vinci, quam: alius me trahere vel vincere potest. Possumus itaque dicere de Christo quia potuit mentiri, si subauditur: si vellet. Et quoniam mentiri non potuit nolens nec potuit velle mentiri, non minus dici potest nequivisse mentiri. Sic itaque potuit et non potuit mentiri.	Anselm. All power follows the will. For, when I say that I can speak or walk, it is understood, if I choose. For, if the will be not implied as acting, there is no power, but only necessity. For, when I say that I can be dragged or bound unwillingly, this is not my power, but necessity and the power of another; since I am able to be dragged or bound in no other sense than this, that another can drag or bind me. So we can say of Christ, that he could lie, so long as we understand, if he chose to do so. And, since he could not lie unwillingly and could not wish to lie, none the less can it be said that he could not lie. So in this way it is both true that he could and could not lie.
BOSO. Nunc redeamus ad investigandum de illo quasi nondum sit, sicut incepimus. Dico igitur: Si peccare non poterit, quia, sicut dicis, non poterit velle, ex necessitate servabit iustitiam. Quare non ex libertate arbitrii iustus erit. Quae igitur gratia illi pro iustitia sua debebitur? Solemus namque dicere deum idcirco fecisse angelum et hominem tales qui peccare possent, quatenus, cum possent deserere iustitiam et ex libertate servarent arbitrii, gratiam et laudem mererentur, quae illis, si ex necessitate iusti essent, non deberentur.	Boso. Now let us return to our original inquiry with regard to that man, as if nothing were known of him. I say, then, if he were unable to sin, because, according to you, he could not wish to sin, he maintains holiness of necessity, and therefore he will not be holy from free will. What thanks, then, will he deserve for his holiness? For we are accustomed to say that God made man and angel capable of sinning on this account, that, when of their own free will they maintained holiness, though they might have abandoned it, they might deserve commendation and reward, which they would not have done had they been necessarily holy.
ANSELMUS. Nonne angeli qui modo peccare nequeunt laudandi sunt,	Anselm. Are not the angels worthy of praise, though unable to commit sin?
BOSO. Sunt utique, quia hoc quod modo non possum, meruerunt per hoc quod potuerunt et noluerunt.	Boso. Doubtless they are, because they deserved this present inability to sin from the fact that when they could sin they refused to do so.
ANSELMUS. Quid dicis de deo qui peccare non potest nec hoc meruit per potestatem peccandi qua non peccavit: nonne laudandus est pro iustitia sua?	Anselm. What say you with respect to God, who cannot sin, and yet has not deserved this, by refusing to sin when he had the power? Must not he be praised for his holiness?
BOSO. Hic volo ut respondeas pro me. Nam si dico eum non esse laudandum, scio me mentiri; si autem dico laudandum, timeo infirmare rationem quam dixi de angelis.	Boso. I should like to have you answer that question for me; for if I say that he deserves no praise, I know that I speak falsely. If, on the other hand, I say that he does deserve praise, I am afraid of invalidating my reasoning with respect to the angels.
ANSELMUS. Angeli non sunt laudandi de iustitia sua, quia peccare potuerunt, sed quia per hoc quodam modo a se habent quod peccare nequeunt; in quo aliquatenus similes sunt deo, qui a se habet quidquid habet. Dicitur enim dare aliquid, qui non aufert quando potest; et facere esse aliquid, qui cum possit id ipsum facere non esse, non facit. Sic itaque cum angelus /108/ potuit auferre sibi iustitiam et non abstulit, et facere se non esse iustum et non fecit, recte asseritur ipse sibi dedisse iustitiam, et se ipsum iustum fecisse. Hoc igitur modo habet a se iustitiam, quia creatura eam aliter a se habere nequit; et idcirco laudandus est de sue iustitia, nec necessitate sed libertate iustus est, quia improprie dicitur necessitas, ubi nec coactio ulla est nec prohibitio. Quapropter quoniam deus perfecte habet a se quidquid habet, ille maxime laudandus est de bonis quae habet et servat, non ulla necessitate, sed, sicut supra dixi, propria et aeterna immutabilitate. Sic ergo homo ille qui idem ipse deus erit, quoniam omne bonum quod ipse habebit, a se habebit, non necessitate sed libertate, et a se ipso iustus et idcirco laudandus erit. Quamvis enim natura humana a divina habeas quod habebit, idem tamen ipse a se ipso, quoniam duae naturae una persona erunt, habebit.	Anselm. The angels are not to be praised for their holiness because they could sin, but because it is owing to themselves, in a certain sense, that now they cannot sin. And in this respect are they in a measure like God, who has, from himself, whatever he possesses. For a person is said to give a thing, who does not take it away when he can; and to do a thing is but the same as not to prevent it, when that is in one’s power. When, therefore, the angel could depart from holiness and yet did not, and could make himself unholy yet did not, we say with propriety that he conferred virtue upon himself and made himself holy. In this sense, therefore, has he holiness of himself (for the creature cannot have it of himself in any other way), and, therefore, should be praised for his holiness, because he is not holy of necessity but freely; for that is improperly called necessity which involves neither compulsion nor restraint. Wherefore, since whatever God has he has perfectly of himself, he is most of all to be praised for the good things which he possesses and maintains not by any necessity, but, as before said, by his own infinite unchangeableness. Therefore, likewise, that man who will be also God since every good thing which he possesses comes from himself, will be holy not of necessity but voluntarily, and, therefore, will deserve praise. For, though human nature will have what it has from the Divine nature, yet it will likewise have it from itself, since the two natures will be united in one person.
BOSO. Satisfecisti mihi ex hoc, et aperte video quia et peccare non poterit, et tamen laudandus erit de iustitia sua.Sed nunc quaerendum existimo, cum deus talem possit facere hominem, cur non tales fecit angelos et duos primos homines, ut similiter et peccare non possent et de iustitia sue laudandi essent.	Boso. You have satisfied me on this point; and I see clearly that it is both true that he could not sin, and yet that he deserves praise for his holiness. But now I think the question arises, since God could make such a man, why he did not create angels and our first parents so as to be incapable of sin, and yet praiseworthy for their holiness?
ANSELMUS. Intelligis quid dices?	Anselm. Do you know what you are saying?
BOSO. Videor mihi intelligere, et idcirco quaero cur eos tales non fecit.	Boso. I think I understand, and it is therefore I ask why he did not make them so.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam nec debuit nec potuit fieri, ut unusquisque illorum esset idem ipse qui deus, sicut de homine isto dicimus. Et si quaeris cur non vel de tot quot sunt personae dei, vel saltem de uno hoc fecit, respondeo quia ratio tune fieri nullatenus hoc exigebat, sed omnino, quia deus nihil sine ratione facit, prohibebat.	Anselm. Because it was neither possible nor right for any one of them to be the same with God, as we say that man was. And if you ask why he did not bring the three persons, or at least the Word, into unity with men at that time, I answer: Because reason did not at all demand any such thing then, but wholly forbade it, for God does nothing without reason.
BOSO. Erubesco quia hoc quaesivi; dic quae dicturus eras.	Boso. I blush to have asked the question. Go on with what you have to say.
ANSELMUS. Dicamus igitur quia mori non debebit, quoniam non erit peccator.	Anselm. We must conclude, then, that he should not be subject to death, inasmuch as he will not be a sinner.
BOSO. Concedere me oportet. /109/	Boso. I must agree with you.
2.11 QUOD MORIATUR EX SUA POTESTATE; ET QUOD MORTALITAS NON PERTINEAT AD PURAM HOMINIS NATURAM.	CHAPTER XI. How Christ dies of his own power, and how mortality does not inhere in the essential nature of man.
ANSELMUS. Nunc autem restat indagare utrum possit mori secundum humanam naturam; nam secundum divinam semper incorruptibilis erit.	Anselm. Now, also, it remains to inquire whether, as man’s nature is, it is possible for that man to die?
BOSO. De hoc cur dubitare debemus, cum ipse verus homo futurus sit et omnis homo naturaliter mortalis sit?	Boso. We need hardly dispute with regard to this, since he will be really man, and every man is by nature mortal.
ANSELMUS. Non puto mortalitatem ad puram, sed ad corruptam hominis naturam pertinere. Quippe si numquam peccasset homo et immortalitas ipsius immutabiliter firmata esset, non tamen minus homo esset verus; et quando mortales in incorruptibilitatem resurgent, non minus erunt ueri homines. Nam si pertineret ad veritatem hurnanae naturae mortalitas, nequaquam posset homo esse, qui esset immortalis. Non ergo pertinet ad sinceritatem humanae naturae corruptibilitas sive incorruptibilitas, quoniam neutra facit aut destruit hominem, sed altera valet ad eius miseriam, altera ad beatitudinem. Sed quoniam nullus est homo qui non moriatur, idcirco mortale ponitur in hominis definitione a philosophis, qui non crediderunt totum hominem aliquando potuisse aut posse esse immortalem. Quare non sufficit ad monstrandum illum hominem debere mortalem esse hoc, quia verus homo erit.	Anselm. I do not think mortality inheres in the essential nature of man, but only as corrupted. Since, had man never sinned, and had his immortality been unchangeably confirmed, he would have been as really man; and, when the dying rise again, incorruptible, they will no less be really men. For, if mortality was an essential attribute of human nature, then he who was immortal could not be man. Wherefore, neither corruption nor incorruption belong essentially to human nature, for neither makes nor destroys a man; but happiness accrues to him from the one, and misery from the other. But since all men die, mortality is included in the definition of man, as given by philosophers, for they have never even believed in the possibility of man’s being immortal in all respects. And so it is not enough to prove that that man ought to be subject to death, for us to say that he will be in all respects a man.
BOSO. Quaere tu ergo aliam rationem, quia ego illam nescio, si tu nescis, qua ille probetur posse mori.	Boso. Seek then for some other reason, since I know of none, if you do not, by which we may prove that he can die.
ANSELMUS. Dubium non est quia sicut deus erit, ita omnipotens erit.	Anselm. We may not doubt that, as he will be God, he will possess omnipotence.
BOSO. Verum est. /110/	Boso. Certainly.
ANSELMUS. Si ergo voles, poterit animam suam ponere et iterum sumere.	Anselm. He can, then, if he chooses, lay down his life and take it again.
BOSO. Si hoc non potest, non videtur quod sit omnipotens.	Boso. If not, he would scarcely seem to be omnipotent.
ANSELMUS. Poterit igitur numquam mori si voles, et poterit mori et resurgere. Sive autem animam suam ponat nullo alio faciente, sive alius hoc faciat, ut eam ponat ipso permittente, quantum ad potestatem nihil differt.	Anselm. Therefore is he able to avoid death if he chooses, and also to die and rise again. Moreover, whether he lays down his life by the intervention of no other person, or another causes this, so that he lays it down by permitting it to be taken, it makes no difference as far as regards his power.
BOSO. Non est dubium.	Boso. There is no doubt about it.
ANSELMUS. Si igitur voluerit permittere, poterit occidi; et si noluerit, non poterit.	Anselm. If, then, he chooses to allow it, he could be slain; and if he were unwilling to allow it, he couId not be slain.
BOSO. Ad hoc nos indeclinabiliter perducit ratio.	Boso. To this we are unavoidably brought by reason.
ANSELMUS. Ratio quoque nos docuit quia oportet eum maius aliquid habere, quam quidquid sub deo est, quod sponte det et non ex debito deo.	Anselin. Reason has also taught us that the gift which he presents to God, not of debt but freely, ought to be something greater than anything in the possession of God.
BOSO. Ita est.	Boso. Yes.
ANSELMUS. Hoc autem "nec" sub illo nec extra illum inveniri potest.	Anselin. Now this can neither be found beneath him nor above him.
BOSO. Verum est.	Boso. Very true.
ANSELMUS. In ipso igitur inveniendum est.	Anselm. In himself, therefore, must it be found.
BOSO. Sic sequitur.	Boso. So it appears.
ANSELMUS. Aut igitur se ipsum aut aliquid de se debit.	Anselm. Therefore will he give himself, or something pertaining to himself.
BOSO. Non possum aliter intelligere.	Boso. I cannot see how it should be otherwise.
ANSELMUS. Quaerendum nunc est cuiusmodi esse debebit haec datio. Dare namque se non poterit deo aut aliquid de se, quasi non habenti ut suus sit, quoniam omnis creatura dei est.	Anselm. Now must we inquire what sort of a gift this should be? For he may not give himself to God, or anything of his, as if God did not have what was his own. For every creature belongs to God.
BOSO. Sic est.	Boso. This is so.
ANSELMUS. Sic ergo intelligenda est haec datio, quia aliquo modo ponet se ad honorem dei aut aliquid de se, quomodo debitor non erit.	Anselm. Therefore must this gift be understood in this way, that he somehow gives up himself, or something of his, to the honor of God, which he did not owe as a debtor.
BOSO. Ita sequitur ex supra dictis.	Boso. So it seems from what has been already said.
ANSELMUS. Si dicimus quia debit se ipsum ad oboediendum deo, ut perseueranter servando iustitiam subdat se voluntati eius, non erit hoc dare quod deus ab illo non exigat ex debito. Omnis enim rationalis creatura debet hanc oboedientiam deo.	Anselm. If we say that he will give himself to God by obedience, so as, by steadily maintaining holiness, to render himself subject to his will, this will not be giving a thing not demanded of him by God as his due. For every reasonable being owes his obedience to God.
BOSO. Hoc negari nequit.	Boso. This cannot be denied.
ANSELMUS. Alio itaque modo oportet, ut det se ipsum deo aut aliquid de se.	Anselm. Therefore must it be in some other way that he gives himself, or something belonging to him, to God.
BOSO. Ad hoc nos impellit ratio. /111/	Boso. Reason urges us to this conclusion.
ANSELMUS. Videamus si forte hoc sit dare vitam suam, sive ponere animam suam, sive tradere se ipsum morti ad honorem dei. Hoc enim ex debito non exiget deus ab illo; quoniam namque non erit peccatum in illo, non debebit mori, sicut diximus.	Anselm. Let us see whether, perchance, this may be to give up his life or to lay down his life, or to deliver himself up to death for God’s honor. For God will not demand this of him as a debt; for, as no sin will be found, he ought not to die, as we have already said.
BOSO. Aliter nequeo intelligere.	Boso. Else I cannot understand it.
ANSELMUS. Consideremus adhuc utrum sic rationabiliter conveniat.	Anselm. But let us further observe whether this is according to reason.
BOSO. Dic tu, et ego libenter audiam.	Boso. Speak you, and I will listen with pleasure.
ANSELMUS. Si homo per suavitatem peccavit: an non convenit ut per asperitatem satisfaciat? Et si tam facile victus est a diabolo ut deum peccando exhonoraret, ut facilius non posses: nonne iustum est ut homo satisfaciens pro peccato tanta difficultate vincat diabolum ad honorem dei, ut maiori non possit? An non est dignum quatenus, gui se sic abstulit deo peccando, ut se plus auferre non posses, sic se det deo satisfaciendo, ut magis se non possit dare?	Anselm. If man sinned with ease, is it not fitting for him to atone with difficulty? And if he was overcome by the devil in the easiest manner possible, so as to dishonor God by sinning against him, is it not right that man, in making satisfaction for his sin, should honor God by conquering the devil with the greatest possible difficulty? Is it not proper that, since man has departed from God as far as possible in his sin, he should make to God the greatest possible satisfaction?
BOSO. Non est aliquid rationabilius.	Boso. Surely, there is nothing more reasonable.
ANSELMUS. Nihil autem asperius aut difficilius potest homo ad honorem dei sponte et non ex debito pati quam mortem, et nullatenus se ipsum potest homo dare magis deo, quam cum se morti tradit ad honorem illius.	Anselm. Now, nothing can be more severe or difficult for man to do for God’s honor, than to suffer death voluntarily when not bound by obligation; and man cannot give himself to God in any way more truly than by surrendering himself to death for God’s honor.
BOSO. Vera sunt omnia haec.	Boso. All these things are true.
ANSELMUS. Talem igitur oportet eum esse qui pro peccato hominis satisfacere volet, ut mori possit si velit.	Anselm. Therefore, he who wishes to make atonement for man’s sin should be one who can die if he chooses.
BOSO. Video plane illum hominem quem quaerimus, talem esse oportere qui nec ex necessitate moriatur, quia omnipotens erit, nec ex debito, quia numquam peccator erit, et mori possit ex libera voluntate, quia necessarium erit.	Boso. I think it is plain that the man whom we seek for should not only be one who is not necessarily subject to death on account of his omnipotence, and one who does not deserve death on account of his sin, but also one who can die of his own free will, for this will be necessary.
ANSELMUS. Sunt et alla multa cur eum valde conveniat hominum similitudinem et conversationem absque peccato habere, quae facilius et clarius per se patent in eius vita et operibus, quam velut ante experimentum sola ratione monstrari possint. Quis enim explicet quam necessarie, quam sapienter factum est, ut ille qui homines erat redempturus et de via mortis et perditionis ad viam vitae et beatitudinis aeternae docendo reducturus, cum hominibus conversaretur et in ipsa conversatione, cum eos doceret verbo qualiter vivere /112/ deberent, se ipsum exemplum praeberet? Exemplum autem se ipsum quomododaret infirmis et mortalibus, ut propter iniurias aut contumelias aut dolores aut mortem a iustititia non recederent, si ipsum haec omnia sentire non agnoscerent?	Anselm. There are also many other reasons why it is peculiarly fitting for that man to enter into the common intercourse of men, and maintain a likeness to them, only without sin. And these things are more easily and clearly manifest in his life and actions than they can possibly be shown to be by mere reason without experience. For who can say how necessary and wise a thing it was for him who was to redeem mankind, and lead them back by his teaching from the way of death and destruction into the path of life and eternal happiness, when he conversed with men, and when he taught them by personal intercourse, to set them an example himself of the way in which they ought to live? But how could he have given this example to weak and dying men, that they should not deviate from holiness because of injuries, or scorn, or tortures, or even death, had they not been able to recognise all these virtues in himself?
2.12 QUOD QUAMVIS INCOMMODORUM NOSTRORUM PARTICEPS SIT, MISER TAMEN NON SIT.	CHAPTER XII. How, though he share in our weakness, he is not therefore miserable.
BOSO. Omnia haec patenter ostendunt eum mortalem et incommodorum nostrorum esse participem oportere. Sed haec omnia miseriae nostrae sunt. Numquid ergo miser erit?	Boso. All these things plainly show that he ought to be mortal and to partake of our weaknesses. But all these things are our miseries. Will he then be miserable?
ANSELMUS. Nequaquam. Nam sicut ad beatitudinem non pertinet commodum quod habet quis contra voluntatem, ita non est miseria apprehendere sapienter nulla necessitate aliquod incommodum secundum voluntatem.	Anselm. No, indeed! For as no advantage which one has apart from his choice constitutes happiness, so there is no misery in choosing to bear a loss, when the choice is a wise one and made without compulsion.
BOSO. Concedendum est.	Boso. Certainly, this must be allowed.
2.13 QUOD CUM ALIIS INFIRMITATIBUS NOSTRIS IGNORANTIAM NON HABEAT.	CHAPTER XIII. How, along with our other weaknesses, he does not partake of our ignorance.
Verum in hac similitudine, quam habere debet cum hominibus, dic utrum ignorantiam quoque sicut alias infirmitates nostras habiturus sit.	Boso. But tell me whether, in this likeness to men which he ought to have, he will inherit also our ignorance, as he does our other infirmities?
ANSELMUS. Quid dubitas de deo utrum sit omnia sciens?	Anselm. Do you doubt the omnipotence of God?
BOSO. Quia quamvis sit immortalis futurus ex divina natura, mortalis tamen erit ex humana. Nam cur non similiter poterit homo ille esse uere ignorans, sicut vere mortalis erit?	Boso. No! but, although this man be immortal in respect to his Divine nature, yet will he be mortal in his human nature. For why will he not be like them in their ignorance, as he is in their mortality?
ANSELMUS. Illa hominis assumptio in unitatem personae dei non nisi sapienter a summa sapientia fiet, et ideo non assumes in homine quod nullo modo utile, sed valde noxium est ad opus quod idem homo facturus est. Ignorantia namque ad nihil illi utilis esset, sed ad multa noxia. Quomodo enim tot et tanta opera quae facturus est, faciet sine immense sapientia? Aut quomodo illi credent homines, si eum scient nescium? Si autem nescient: ad quid erit illi utilis illa ignorantia? Deinde si nihil amatur nisi quod cognoscitur: sicut nihil erit bond quod non amet, ita nullum bonum erit quod ignoret. Bonum autem nemo perfecte novit, nisi qui illud a malo scit discernere. /113/ Hanc quoque discretionem nullus scit facere, qui malum ignorat. Sicut igitur ille de quo loquimur, omne perfecte sciet bonum, ita nullum ignorabit malum. Omnem igitur habebit scientiam, quamvis eam publice in hominum conversatione non ostendat.	Anselm. That union of humanity with the Divine person will not be effected except in accordance with the highest wisdom; and, therefore, God will not take anything belonging to man which is only useless, but even a hindrance to the work which that man must accomplish. For ignorance is in no respect useful, but very prejudicial. How can he perform works, so many and so great, without the highest wisdom? Or, how will men believe him if they find him ignorant? And if he be ignorant, what will it avail him? If nothing is loved except as it is known, and there be no good thing which he does not love, then there can be no good thing of which be is ignorant. But no one perfectly understands good, save he who can distinguish it from evil; and no one can make this distinction who does not know what evil is. Therefore, as he of whom we are speaking perfectly comprehends what is good, so there can be no evil with which he is unacquainted. Therefore must he have all knowledge, though he do not openly show it in his intercourse with men.
BOSO. Hoc in maiori aetate ita videtur, sicut dicis; sed in infantia sicut non erit tempus congruum, ut in illo appareat sapientia, ita non erit opus et ideo nec congruum, ut illam habeat.	Boso. In his more mature years, this should seem to he as you say; but, in infancy, as it will not be a fit time to discover wisdom, so there will be no need, and therefore no propriety, in his having it.
ANSELMUS. Nonne dixi quia sapienter fiet illa incarnatio? Sapienter namque assumet deus mortalitatem, qua sapienter, quia valde utiliter, utetur. Ignorantiam vero non poterit assumere sapienter, quia numquam est utilis sed semper noxia, nisi forte cum per eam mala voluntas, quae numquam in illo erit, ab effectu restringitur. Nam etsi aliquando ad aliud non nocet, hoc solo tamen nocet, quia scientiae bonum aufert. Et ut breviter absolvam quod quaeris: ex quo ille homo erit, plenus deo semper ut se ipso erit. Unde numquam erit sine eius potentia et fortitudine et sapientia.	Anselm. Did not I say that the incarnation will be made in wisdom? But God will in wisdom assume that mortality, which he makes use of so widely, because for so great an object. But he could not wisely assume ignorance, for this is never useful, but always injurious, except when an evil will is deterred from acting, on account of it. But, in him an evil desire never existed. For if ignorance did no harm in any other respect, yet does it in this, that it takes away the good of knowing. And to answer your question in a word: that man, from the essential nature of his being, will be always full of God; and, therefore, will never want the power, the firmness or the wisdom of God.
BOSO. Quamvis hoc in Christo semper fuisse non dubitarem, ideo tamen quaesivi, ut de hoc quoque rationem audirem. Saepe namque aliquid esse certi sumus, et tamen hoc ratione probare nescimus.	Boso. Though wholly unable to doubt the truth of this with respect to Christ, yet, on this very account, have I asked for the reason of it. For we are often certain about a thing, and yet cannot prove it by reason.
2.14 QUOMODO MORS EIUS PRAEVALEAT NUMERO ET MAGNITUDINI PECCATORUM OMNIUM.	CHAPTER XIV. How his death outweighs the number and greatness of our sins.
Nunc rogo ut doceas me, quomodo mors eius praeualeat numero et magnitudini peccatorum omnium, cum unum quod putamus levissimum peccatumtam infinitum monstres, ut si numerus obtendatur infinitus mundorum, qui sic pleni sunt creaturis sicut est iste, nec possint senari quin redigantur in nihilum, nisi faciat aliquis aspectum unum contra voluntatem dei, non tamen fieri debeat.	Boso. Now I ask you to tell me how his death can outweigh the number and magnitude of our sins, when the least sin we can think of you have shown to be so monstrous that, were there an infinite number of worlds as full of created existence as this, they could not stand, but would fall back into nothing, sooner than one look should be made contrary to the just will of God.
ANSELMUS. Si esset praesens homo ille et quis esset scires, et diceretur tibi: nisi occideris hominem hunc, peribit mundus iste totus et quidquid deus non est: faceres hoc pro conservanda omni alia creatura?	Anselm. Were that man here before you, and you knew who he was, and it were told you that, if you did not kill him, the whole universe, except God, would perish, would you do it to preserve the rest of creation?
BOSO. Non facerem, etiam si infinitus mihi numerus mundorum obtenderetur. /114/	Boso. No! not even were an infinite number of worlds displayed before me.
ANSELMUS. Quid si iterum tibi diceretur: aut eum occides, aut omnia peccatamundi venient super te?	Anselm. But suppose you were told: “If you do not kill him, all the sins of the world will be heaped upon you.”
BOSO. Responderem me potius alla omnia velle peccata suscipere, non solum huius mundi quae fuerunt et quae future sunt, sed et quaecumque super haec cogitari possum, quam istud solum. Quod non solum de occisione eius, sed et de qualibet parue laesione quae illum tangeret, respondere me existimo debere.	Boso. I should answer, that I would far rather bear all other sins, not only those of this world, past and future, but also all others that can be conceived of, than this alone. And I think I ought to say this, not only with regard to killing him, but even as to the slightest injury which could be inflicted on him.
ANSELMUS. Recte existimas. Sed dic mihi cur ita cor tuum iudicat, ut plus horreat unum peccatum in laesione huius hominis, quam omnia alla quae cogitari possum, cum omnia quaecumque fiunt peccata contra illum sint.	Anselm. You judge correctly; but tell me why it is that your heart recoils from one injury inflicted upon him as more heinous than all other sins that can be thought of, inasmuch as all sins whatsoever are committed against him?
BOSO. Quoniam peccatum quod in persona eius fit, incomparabiliter superat omnia illa, quae extra personam illius cogitari possum.	Boso. A sin committed upon his person exceeds beyond comparison all the sins which can be thought of, that do not affect his person.
ANSELMUS. Quid dices ad hoc quia saepe libenter aliquis patitur quasdam in sua persona molestias, ne maiores patiatur in rebus suis?	Anselm. What say you to this, that one often suffers freely certain evils in his person, in order not to suffer greater ones in his property?
BOSO. Quia deus non eget hac patientia, cuius potestati cuncta subiacent, sicut tu supra cuidam meae interrogationi respondisti.	Boso. God has no need of such patience, for all things lie in subjection to his power, as you answered a certain question of mine above.
ANSELMUS. Bene respondes. Videmus ergo quia violationi vitae corporalis huius hominis nulla immensitas vel multitudo peccatorum extra personam dei comparari valet.	Anselm. You say well; and hence we see that no enormity or multitude of sins, apart from the Divine person, can for a moment be compared with a bodily injury inflicted upon that man.
BOSO. Apertissimum est.	Boso. This is most plain.
ANSELMUS. Quantum bonum tibi videtur, cuius interemptio tam male est?	Anselm. How great does this good seem to you, if the destruction of it is such an evil?
BOSO. Si omne bonum tam bonum est quam male est eius destructio, plus est bonum incomparabiliter, quam sint ea peccata male, quae sine aestimatione superat eius interemptio.	Boso. If its existence is as great a good as its destruction is an evil, then is it far more a good than those sins are evils which its destruction so far surpasses.
ANSELMUS. Verum dicis. Cogita etiam quia peccata tantum sunt odibilia quantum sunt male, et vita ista tantum amabilis quantum est bona. Unde sequitur quia vita haec plus est amabilis, quam sint peccata odibilia.	Anselm. Very true. Consider, also, that sins are as hateful as they are evil, and that life is only amiable in proportion as it is good. And, therefore, it follows that that life is more lovely than sins are odious.
BOSO. Non possum hoc non intelligere.	Boso. I cannot help seeing this.
ANSELMUS. Putasne tantum bonum tam amabile posse sufficere ad soluendum, quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi?	Anselm. And do you not think that so great a good in itself so lovely, can avail to pay what is due for the sins of the whole world?
BOSO. Immo plus potest in infinitum.	Boso. Yes! it has even infinite value.
ANSELMUS. Vides igitur quomodo vita haec vincat omnia peccata, si pro illis detur. /115/	Anselm. Do you see, then, how this life conquers all sins, if it be given for them?
BOSO. Aperte.	Boso. Plainly.
ANSELMUS. Si ergo dare vitam est mortem accipere: sicut datio huius uitae praeualet omnibus hominum peccatis, ita et acceptio mortis.	Anselm. If, then, to lay down life is the same as to suffer death, as the gift of his life surpasses all the sins of men, so will also the suffering of death.
BOSO. Ita esse de omnibus peccatis quae personam dei non tangunt constat.	Boso. This is properly so with regard to all sins not affecting the person of the Deity.
2.15 QUOMODO DELEAT MORS EADEM ETIAM PECCATA EUM PERIMENTIUM.	CHAPTER XV. How this death removes even the sins of his murderers.
Sed nunc video aliud quaerendum. Nam si tam malum est eum occidere quam bona est vita eius: quomodo potest mors eius superare et delere peccata eorum qui eum occiderunt? Aut si alicuius eorum peccatum delet: quomodo potest aliorum quoque hominum aliquod delere? Credimus enim quia et multi ex illis saluati sunt et innumerabiles alii saluantur.	Boso. But let me ask you one thing more. If it be as great an evil to slay him as his life is a good, how can his death overcome and destroy the sins of those who slew him? Or, if it destroys the sin of any one of them, how can it not also destroy any sin committed by other men? For we believe that many men will be saved, and a vast many will not be saved.
ANSELMUS. Hanc quaestionem solvit apostolus qui dixit, quia "si cognovissent, numquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent". Tantum namque differunt scienter factum peccatum et quod per ignorantiam fit, ut malum quod numquam facere possent pro nimietate sua, si cognosceretur, veniale sit, quia ignoranter factum est. Deum enim occidere nullus homo umquam scienter saltem velle posset, et ideo qui illum occiderunt ignoranter, non in illud infinitum peccatum, cui nulla alia comparari peccata possunt, proruerunt. Nam non consideravimus eius magnitudinem ad videndum, quam bona esset vita illa, secundum hoc quod ignoranter factum est, sed quasi scienter fieret, quod necumquam fecit aliquis nec facere potuit.	Anselm. The Apostle answers the question when he says: “Had they known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” For a sin knowingly committed and a sin done ignorantly are so different that an evil which they could never do, were its full extent known, may be pardonable when done in ignorance. For no man could ever, knowingly at least, slay the Lord; and, therefore, those who did it in ignorance did not rush into that transcendental crime with which none others can be compared. For this crime, the magnitude of which we have been considering as equal to the worth of his life, we have not looked at as having been ignorantly done, but knowingly; a thing which no man ever did or could do.
BOSO. Rationabiliter interemptores Christi ad veniam peccati sui pertingere potuisse monstrasti.	Boso. You have reasonably shown that the murderers of Christ can obtain pardon for their sin.
ANSELMUS. Quid iam quaeris amplius? Ecce vides quomodo rationabilis necessitas ostendat ex hominibus perficiendam esse supernam civitatem, nec hoc /116/ posse fieri nisi per remissionem peccatorum, quam homo nullus habere potest nisi per hominem, qui idem ipse sit deus atque morte sue homines peccatores deo reconciliet. Aperte igitur invenimus Christum, quem deum et hominem confitemur et mortuum propter nos. Hoc autem absque omni dubietate cognito: cuncta quae ipse dicit certa esse, quoniam deus mentiri nequit, et sapienter esse facta quae fecit, dubitandum non est, quamvis non eorum ratio intelligatur a nobis.	Anselm. What more do you ask? For now you, see how reason of necessity shows that the celestial state must be made up from men, and that this can only be by the forgiveness of sins, which man can never have but by man, who must be at the same time Divine, and reconcile sinners to God by his own death. Therefore have we clearly found that Christ, whom we confess to be both God and man, died for us; and, when this is known beyond all doubt, all things which he says of himself must be acknowledged as true, for God cannot lie, and all he does must be received as wisely done, though we do not understand the reason of it.
BOSO. Verum est quod dicis, nec aliquatenus quod dixit esse verum, aut quod fecit rationabiliter esse factum dubito. Sed hoc postulo ut, quod quasi non debere aut non posse fieri videtur infidelibus in fide Christiana, hoc mihi qua ratione fieri debeat aut possit aperias; non ut me in fide confirmes, sed ut confirmatum veritatis ipsius intellectu laetifices.	Boso. What you say is true; and I do not for a moment doubt that his words are true, and all that he does reasonable. But I ask this in order that you may disclose to me, in their true rationality, those things in Christian faith which seem to infidels improper or impossible; and this, not to strengthen me in the faith, but to gratify one already confirmed by the knowledge of the truth itself.
2.16 QUALITER DEUS DE MASSA PECCATRICE ASSUMPSIT HOMINEM SINE PECCATO; ET DE SALVATIONE ADAE ET EVAE.	CHAPTER XVI. How God took that man from a sinful substance, and yet without sin; and of the salvation of Adam and Eve.
Quapropter sicut eorum quae supra dicta sunt, rationem aperuisti, sic peto ut eorum quae sum adhuc quaesiturus, rationem ostendas. Primum scilicet qualiter de massa peccatrice, id est de humano genere, quod totum infectum erat peccato, hominem sine peccato quasi azimum de fermentato deus assumpsit. Nam licet ipsa hominis eiusdem conceptio munda sit et absque carnalis delectationis peccato, uirgo tamen ipsa unde assumptus est, "in iniquitatibus" concepta est, "et in peccatis concepit" eam "mater" eius, et cum originali peccato nata est, quoniam et ipsa in Adam peccavit, "in quo omnes peccaveraut". /117/	Boso. As, therefore, you have disclosed the reason of those things mentioned above, I beg you will also explain what I am now about to ask. First, then, how does God, from a sinful substance, that is, of human species, which was wholly tainted by sin, take, a man without sin, as an unleavened lump from that which is leavened? For, though the conception of this man be pure, and free from the sin of fleshly gratification, yet the virgin herself, from whom he sprang, was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did her mother bear her, since she herself sinned in Adam, in whom all men sinned.
ANSELMUS. Postquam constat hominem illum deum et peccatorum esse reconciliatorem, dubium non est eum omnino sine peccato esse. Hoc autem esse non valet, nisi absque peccato de massa peccatrice sit assumptus. Qua vero ratione sapientia dei hoc fecit, si non possumus intelligere, non debemus mirari, sed cum veneratione tolerare aliquid esse in secretis tantae rei quod ignoremus. Quippe mirabilius deus restauravit humanam naturam quam instauravit. Aequaliter enim utrumque deo facile est; sed homo antequam esset non peccavit, ut fieri non deberet; postquam vero factus est, peccando meruit ut, quod et ad quod factus erat, perderet, quamvis non perdiderit omnino quod factus erat, ut esset qui puniretur aut cui deus misereretur. Neutrum enim horum fieri posset, si in nihilum redactus esset. Tanto ergo mirabilius deus illum restituit quam instituit, quanto hoc de peccatore contra meritum, illud non de peccatore nec contra meritum fecit. Quantum etiam est deum et hominem sic in unum convenire, ut servata integritate utriusque naturae idem sit homo qui deus? Quis ergo praesumat vel cogitare quod humanus intellectus valeat penetrare, quam sapienter, quam mirabiliter tam inscrutabile opus factum sit?	Anselm. Since it is fitting for that man to be God, and also the restorer of sinners, we doubt not that he is wholly without sin; yet will this avail nothing, unless he be taken without sin and yet of a sinful substance. But if we cannot comprehend in what manner the wisdom of God effects this, we should be surprised, but with reverence should allow of a thing of so great magnitude to remain hidden from us. For the restoring of human nature by God is more wonderful than its creation; for either was equally easy for God; but before man was made he had not sinned so that he ought not to be denied existence But after man was made he deserved, by his sin, to lose his existence together with its design; though he never has wholly lost this, viz., that he should be one capable of being punished, or of receiving God’s compassion. For neither of these things could take effect if he were annihilated. Therefore God’s restoring man is more wonderful than his creating man, inasmuch as it is done for the sinner contrary to his deserts; while the act of creation was not for the sinner, and was not in opposition to man’s deserts. How great a thing it is, also, for God and man to unite in one person, that, while the perfection of each nature is preserved, the same being may be both God and man! Who, then, will dare to think that the human mind can discover how wisely, how wonderfully, so incomprehensible a work has been accomplished?
BOSO. Assentior quia nullus homo potest in hac vita tantum secretum penitus aperire, nec peto ut facias quod nullus homo facere potest, sed tantum quantum potes. Plus enim persuadebis altiores in hac re rationes latere, si aliquam te videre monstraveris, quam si te nullam in ea rationem intelligere nihil dicendo probaveris.	Boso. I allow that no man can wholly discover so great a mystery in this life, and I do not desire you to do what no man can do, but only to explain it according to your ability. For you will sooner convince me that deeper reasons lie concealed in this matter, by showing some one that you know of, than if, by saying nothing, you make it appear that you do not understand any reason.
ANSELMUS. Video me ab importunitate tua non posse liberari. Sed si aliquatenus potero quod postulas ostendere, gratias agamus deo. Si uero non /118/ potero, sufficiant ea quae supra probata sunt. Cum enim constat deum hominem fieri oportere, dubium non est sapientiam et potentiam illi non deesse, ut hoc sine peccato fiat.	Anselm. I see that I cannot escape your importunity; but if I have any power to explain what you wish, let us thank God for it. But if not, let the things above said suffice. For, since it is agreed that God ought to become man, no doubt He will not lack the wisdom or the power to effect this without sin.
BOSO. Sic libenter accipio.	Boso. This I readily allow.
ANSELMUS. Oportuit utique ut illa redemptio quam Christus fecit, prodesset non solum illis qui eo tempore fuerunt, sed etiam aliis. Sit enim rex aliquis, cui totus populus suae cuiusdam civitatis sic peccavit, excepto uno solo, qui tamen de illorum est genere, ut nullus eorum facere possit unde mortis damnationem euadat. Ille autem qui solus est innocens, tantam apud regem habet gratiam ut possit, et tantam dilectionem erga reos ut velit omnes qui suo credent consilio reconciliare quodam seruitio valde ipsi regi placituro, quod facturus est die secundum voluntatem regis statuto. Et quoniam non omnes possunt qui reconciliandi sunt ad diem illam convenire, concedit rex propter magnitudinem illius seruitii, ut quicumque vel ante vel post diem illam confessi fuerint se velle per illud opus quod ea die fiet, veniam impetrare et ad pactum ibi constitutum accedere, ab omni culpa sint absoluti praeterita; et si contigerit ut post hanc veniam iterum peccent, si digne satisfacere et corrigi deinceps voluerint, per eiusdem pacti efficaciam iterum veniam recipiant. Sic tamen ut nullus palatium eius ingrediatur, donec factum sit hoc unde culpae relaxantur. Secundum hanc similitudinem, quoniam non potuerunt omnes homines qui saluandi erant praesentes esse, quando redemptionem illam Christus fecit, tanta fuit vis in eius morte, ut etiam in absentes vel loco vel tempore eius protendatur effectus. Quod autem non solis praesentibus prodesse debeat hinc facile cognoscitur, quia non tot praesentes eius morti esse potuerunt, quot ad supernae civitatis constructionem necessarii sunt, etiam si omnes qui eiusdem mortis tempore ubicumque erant, ad illam redemptionem /119/ admitterentur. Plures enim sunt daemones, quam de quibus restaurandus est numerus eorum, ea die viverent homines.	Anselm. It was certainly proper that that atonement which Christ made should benefit not only those who lived at that time but also others. For, suppose there were a king against whom all the people of his provinces had rebelled, with but a single exception of those belonging to their race, and that all the rest were irretrievably under condemnation. And suppose that he who alone is blameless had so great favor with the king, and so deep love for us, as to be both able and willing to save all those who trusted in his guidance; and this because of a certain very pleasing service which he was about to do for the king, according to his desire; and, inasmuch as those who are to be pardoned cannot all assemble upon that day, the king grants, on account of the greatness of the service performed, that whoever, either before or after the day appointed, acknowledged that he wished to obtain pardon by the work that day accomplished, and to subscribe to the condition there laid down, should be freed from all past guilt; and, if they sinned after this pardon, and yet wished to render atonement and to be set right again by the efficacy of this plan, they should again be pardoned, only provided that no one enter his mansion until this thing be accomplished by which his sins are removed. In like manner, since all who are to be saved cannot be present at the sacrifice of Christ, yet such virtue is there in his death that its power is extended even to those far remote in place or time. But that it ought to benefit not merely those present is plainly evident, because there could not be so many living at the time of his death as are necessary to complete the heavenly state, even if all who were upon the earth at that time were admitted to the benefits of redemption. For the number of evil angels which must be made up from men is greater than the number of men at that time living.
Nec credendum est, ex quo factos est homo, ullum tempus fuisse quo mundus iste cum creaturis, quae factae sunt ad usus hominum, sic vacuus fuisset, ut nullus esset in illo ex humano genere ad hoc pertinens, propter quod factus est homo. Videtur enim inconveniens quod deus veluno momento permiserit humanum genus et ea quae fecit propter usu meorum, de quibus superna civitas perficienda est, quasi frustra extitisse. Nam aliquatenus in uanum esse viderentur, quamdiu non ad hoc propter quod maxime facta essent, viderentur subsistere.	Nor may we believe that, since man was created, there was ever a time when the world, with the creatures made for the use of man, was so unprofitable as to contain no human being who had gained the object for which he was made. For it seems unfitting that God should even for a moment allow the human race, made to complete the heavenly state, and those creatures which he made for their use, to exist in vain.
BOSO. Congruenti ratione et cui nihil repugnare videtur, monstras nullum umquam foisse tempus, ex quo factus est homo, absque aliquo qui ad eam pertineret, sine qua uane factus esset omnis homo, reconciliationem. Quod non solum conveniens sed etiam necessarium esse possumus concludere. Si enim convenientius et rationabilius est hoc, quam aliquando nullum fuisse, de quo intentio dei qua hominem fecit perficeretur, nec est aliquid quod huic obuiet rationi, necesse est semper aliquem ad praedictam reconciliationem pertinentem fuisse. Unde Adam et Eva ad illam pertinuisse redemptionem dubitandum non est, quamvis hoc auctoritas divina aperte non pronuntiet.	Boso. You show by correct reasoning, such as nothing can oppose, that there never was a time since man was created when there has not been some one who was gaining that reconciliation without which every man was made in vain. So that we rest upon this as not only proper but also necessary. For if this is more fit and reasonable than that at any time there should be no one found fulfilling the design for which God made man, and there is no further objection that can be made to this view, then it is necessary that there always be some person partaking of this promised pardon. And, therefore, we must not doubt that Adam and Eve obtained part in that forgiveness, though Divine authority makes no mention of this.
ANSELMUS. Incredibile quoque videtur, quando deus illos fecit et proposuit immutabiliter facere de illis omnes homines, quos ad caelestem civitatem assumpturus erat, quod illos duos ab hoc excluserit proposito.	Anselm. It is also incredible that God created them, and unchangeably determined to make all men from them, as many as were needed for the celestial state, and yet should exclude these two from this design.
BOSO. Immo illos maxime ad hoc fecisse credi debet, ut essent de illis propter quos facti sunt.	Boso. Nay, undoubtedly we ought to believe that God made them for this purpose, viz., to belong to the number of those for whose sake they were created.
ANSELMUS. Bene consideras. Nulla tamen anima ante mortem Christi paradisum caelestem ingredi potuit, sicut supra dixi de regis palatio.	Anselm. You understand it well. But no soul, before the death of Christ, could enter the heavenly kingdom, as I said above, with regard to the palace of the king.
BOSO. Sic tenemus.	Boso. So we believe.
ANSELMUS. Virgo autem illa de qua homo ille assumptus est, de quo loquimur, fuit de illis qui ante nativitatem eius per eum mundati sunt a peccatis, etin eius ipsa munditia de illa assumptus est.	Anselm. Moreover, the virgin, from whom that man was taken of whom we are speaking, was of the number of those who were cleansed from their sins before his birth, and he was born of her in her purity.
BOSO. Placeret mihi multum quod dicis, nisi cum ipse debeat a se ipso habere munditiam a peccato, videretur eam habere a matre, et non per se mundus esse, sed per illam.	Boso. What you say would satisfy me, were it not that he ought to be pure of himself, whereas he appears to have his purity from his mother and not from himself.
ANSELMUS. Non ita est; sed quoniam matris munditia per quam mundus est, non fuit nisi ab illo, in se quoque ner se ipsum et a se mundus fuit. /120/	Anselm. Not so. But as the mother’s purity, which he partakes, was only derived from him, he also was pure by and of himself.
BOSO. Bene est de hoc. Verum adhuc aliud mihi videtur quaerendum. Diximus enim supra quia non necessitate moriturus erat, et nunc videmus quia mater eius per eius mortem futuram munda fuit, quod nisi illa fuisset, ipse de illa esse non potuisset. Quomodo ergo non necessitate mortuus est, qui non, nisi quia moriturus erat, potuit esse? Nam si moriturus non esset, virgo de qua assumptus est munda non fuisset, quoniam hoc nequaquam valuit esse nisi veram eius mortem credendo, nec ille de illa potuit aliter assumi. Quare sinon mortuus est ex necessitate, postquam assumptus est de virgine, potuit non esse de virgine assumptus, postquam est assumptus; quod non est possibile.	Boso. Thus far it is well. But there is yet another matter that needs to be looked into. For we have said before that his death was not to be a matter of necessity; yet now we see that his mother was purified by the power of his death, when without this he could not have been born of her. How, then, was not his death necessary, when he could not have been, except in view of future death? For if he were not to die, the virgin of whom he was born could not be pure, since this could only be effected by true faith in his death, and, if she were not pure, he could not be born of her. If, therefore, his death be not a necessary consequence of his being born of the virgin, he never could have been born of her at all; but this is an absurdity.
ANSELMUS. Si bene quae supra dicta sunt considerasses, hanc quaestionem in illis, ut puto, solutam intellexisses.	Anselm. If you had carefully noted the remarks made above, you would easily have discovered in them, I think, the answer to your question.
BOSO. Non video quomodo.	Boso. I see not how.
ANSELMUS. Nonne quando quaesivimus utrum ille mentiri potuerit, monstravimus in mentiendo duas esse potestates, unam videlicet volendi mentiri, alteram mentiendi; et quoniam cum mentiendi potestatem haberet, hoc a se ipso habuit ut non posses velle mentiri, idcirco de sue iustitia qua veritatem servavit eum laudandum esse?	Anselm. Did we not find, when considering the question whether he would lie, that there were two senses of the word power in regard to it, the one referring to his disposition, the other to the act itself; and that, though having the power to lie, he was so constituted by nature as not to wish to lie, and, therefore, deserved praise for his holiness in maintaining the truth?
BOSO. Ita est.	Boso. It is so.
ANSELMUS. Similiter est in senando vitam potestas volendi servare et potestas servandi. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum idem deus-homo potuerit servare vitam suam, ut numquam moreretur, dubitandum non est quia semper habuit potestatem servandi, quamvis nequiverit velle servare ut numquam moreretur; et quoniam hoc a se ipso habuit, ut scilicet velle non posses, non necessitate sed libera potestate animam suam posuit.	Anselm. In like manner, with regard to the preservation of his life, there is the power of preserving and the power of wishing to preserve it. And when the question is asked whether the same God‑man could preserve his life, so as never to die, we must not doubt that he always had the power to preserve his life, though he could not wish to do so for the purpose of escaping death. And since this disposition, which forever prevents him from wishing this, arises from himself, he lays down his life not of necessity, but of free authority.
BOSO. Non omnino similes fuerunt in illo istae potestates, mentiendi uidelicet et servandi vitam. Ibi enim sequitur quia, si vellet, posses mentiri; hic vero videtur quia, si non mori vellet, non magis hoc posses, quam posses non esse quod erat. Nam ad hoc erat homo ut moreretur, et propter huius futurae mortis fidem de virgine potuit assumi, sicut supra dixisti.	Boso. But those powers were not in all respects similar, the power to lie and the power to preserve his life. For, if he wished to lie, he would of course be able to; but, if he wished to avoid the other, he could no more do it than he could avoid being what he is. For he became man for this purpose, and it was on the faith of his coming death that he could receive birth from a virgin, as you said above.
ANSELMUS. Quemadmodum putas illum non potuisse non mori aut necessitate /121/ mortuum esse, quia non potuit non esse quod erat, ita poses asserere illum non potuisse velle non mori aut necessitate mori voluisse, quoniam quod erat non esse non potuit. Non enim magis ipse factus est homo ad hoc ut moreretur, quam ut vellet mori. Quapropter sicut non debes dicere quia non potuit velle non mori aut necessitate voluit mori, sic non est dicendum quia non potuit non mori aut necessitate mortuus est.	Anselm. As you think that he could not lie, or that his death was necessary, because be could not avoid being what he was, so you can assert that he could not wish to avoid death, or that he wished to die of necessity, because he could not change the constitution of his being; for he did not become man in order that he should die, any more than for this purpose, that he should wish to die. Wherefore, as you ought not to say that he could not help wishing to die, or that it was of necessity that he wished to die, it is equally improper to say that he could not avoid death, or that he died of necessity.
BOSO. Immo quoniam eidem subiacent rationi, scilicet et mori et velle mori, utrumque videtur in illo necessitate fuisse.	Boso. Yes, since dying and wishing to die are included in the same mode of reasoning, both would seem to fall under a like necessity.
ANSELMUS. Quis se sponte voluit hominem facere, ut eadem immutabili uoluntate moreretur, et per huius fidem certitudinis virgo munda fieret, de qua homo ille assumeretur?	Anselm. Who freely wished to become man, that by the same unchanging desire he should suffer death, and that the virgin from whom that man should be born might be pure, through confidence in the certainty of this?
BOSO. Deus, filius dei.	Boso. God, the Son of God.
ANSELMUS. Nonne supra monstratum est quia dei voluntas nulla cogitur necessitate, sed ipsa se spontanea sua servat immutabilitate, quando aliquid dicitur necessitate facere?	Anselm. Was it not above shown, that no desire of God is at all constrained; but that it freely maintains itself in his own unchangeableness, as often as it is said that he does anything necessarily?
BOSO. Vere monstratum est. Sed videmus econtra quia, quod deus immutabiliter uult, non potest non esse, sed necesse est esse. Quapropter si deus voluit, ut homo ille moreretur, non potuit non mori.	Boso. It has been clearly shown. But we see, on the other hand, that what God unchangeably wishes cannot avoid being so, but takes place of necessity. Wherefore, if God wished that man to die, he could but die.
ANSELMUS. Ex eo quia filius dei assumpsit hominem ea voluntate ut moreretur, probes eundem hominem non potuisse non mori.	Anselm. Because the Son of God took the nature of man with this desire, viz., that he should suffer death, you prove it necessary that this man should not be able to avoid death.
BOSO. Ita intelligo.	Boso. So I perceive.
ANSELMUS. An non similiter apparuit ex iis quae dicta sunt, fillum dei et assumptum hominem unam esse personam, ut idem sit deus et homo, filius dei et filius virginis?	Anselm. Has it not in like manner appeared from the things which we have spoken that the Son of God and the man whose person he took were so united that the same being should be both God and man, the Son of God and the son of the virgin?
BOSO. Sic est.	Boso. It is so.
ANSELMUS. Idem igitur homo sue voluntate non potuit non mori et mortuus est.	Anselm. Therefore the same man could possibly both die and avoid death.
BOSO. Negare nequeo.	Boso. I cannot deny it.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam ergo voluntas dei nulla necessitate facit aliquid, sed sua potestate, et voluntas illius fuit voluntas dei, nulla necessitate mortuus est, sed sola sua potestate.	Anselm. Since, then, the will of God does nothing by any necessity, but of his own power, and the will of that man was the same as the will of God, he died not necessarily, but only of his own power.
BOSO. Argumentationibus tuis obuiare nequeo. Nam nec propositiones quas praemittis, nec consequentias quas infers, ullatenus infirmare ualeo. /122/ Sed tamen hoc mihi semper occurrit quod dixi, quia si uellet non mori, non magis hoc posses, quam non esse quod erat. Vere namque moriturus erat, quoniam si vere non fuisset moriturus, non fuisset vera fides futurae mortis eius, per quam et illa virgo de qua natus est, et multi alii mundati sunt a peccato. Nam si vera non fuisset, nihil prodesse potuisset. Quapropter si potuit non mori, potuit facere non esse verum quod verum erat.	Boso. To your arguments I cannot object; for neither your propositions nor your inferences can I invalidate in the least. But yet this thing which I have mentioned always recurs to my mind: that, if he wished to avoid death, he could no more do it than he could escape existence. For it must have been fixed that he was to die, for had it not been true that he was about to die, faith in his coming death would not have existed, by which the virgin who gave him birth and many others also were cleansed from their sin. Wherefore, if he could avoid death, he could make untrue what was true.
ANSELMUS. Quare verum erat, antequam moreretur, quia moriturus erat?	Anselm. Why was it true, before he died, that he was certainly to die?
BOSO. Quoniam hoc ipse sponte voluit et immutabili voluntate.	Boso. Because this was his free and unchangeable desire.
ANSELMUS. Si ergo, sicut dicis, idcirco non potuit non mori, quia vere moriturus erat, et ideo vere erat moriturus, quia hoc ipse sponte et immutabiliter voluit: sequitur illum non ob aliud non potuisse non mori, nisi quia immutabili voluntate voluit mori.	Anselm. If, then, as you say, he could not avoid death because he was certainly to die, and was on this account certainly to die because it was his free and unchangeable desire, it is clear that his inability to avoid death is nothing else but his fixed choice to die.
BOSO. Ita est. Sed quaecumque fuerit causa, verum est tamen quia non potuit non mori et necesse fuit illum mori.	Boso. This is so; but whatever be the reason, it still remains certain that he could not avoid death, but that it was a necessary thing for him to die.
ANSELMUS. Nimis haeres in nihilo, et ut dici soles, quaeris nodum in scirpo.	Anselm. You make a great ado about nothing, or, as the saying is, you stumble at a straw.
BOSO. An es oblitus quid excusationibus tuis obiecerim in huius disputationis nostrae principio, quia videlicet quod postulabam non faceres doctis, sed mihi et hoc ipsum mecum petentibus? Sustine igitur ut pro tarditate et hebetudine nostri quaeram ingenii, quatenus mihi et illis etiam in puerilibus quaestionibus, sicut incepisti, satisfacias.	Boso. Are you not forgetting my reply to the excuses you made at the beginning of our discussion, viz., that you should explain the subject, not as to learned men, but to me and my fellow inquirers? Suffer me, then, to question you as my slowness and dullness require, so that, as you have begun thus far, you may go on to settle all our childish doubts.
2.17 QUOD IN DEO NON SIT NECESSITAS VEL IMPOSSIBILITAS; ET QUOD SIT NECESSITAS COGENS ET NECESSITAS NON COGENS.	CHAPTER XVII.How he did not die of necessity, though he could not be born, except as destined to suffer death.
ANSELMUS. Iam diximus quia deus improprie dicitur aliquid non posse aut necessitate facere. Omnis quippe necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati; illius autem voluntas nulli subditur necessitati aut impossibilitati. Nihil enim est necessarium aut impossibile, nisi quia ipse ita uult; ipsum vero aut velle aut nolle aliquid propter necessitatem aut impossibilitatem alienum est a veritate. Quare quoniam omnia quae uult, et non nisi quae /123/ uult facit: sicut nulla necessitas sive impossibilitas praecedit eius velle aut nolle, ita nec eius facere aut non facere, quamvis multa velit immutabiliteret faciat. Et sicut cum deus facit aliquid, postquam factum est, iam non potest non esse factum, sed semper verum est factum esse; nec tamen recte dicitur impossibile deo esse, ut faciat quod praeteritum est non esse praeteritum -- nihil enim ibi operatur necessitas non faciendi aut impossibilitas faciendi, sed dei sola uoluntas, qui veritatem semper, quoniam ipse veritas est, immutabilem, sicuti est, uult esse -- ita si proponit se aliquid immutabiliter facturum, quamvis quod proponit, antequam fiat, non possit non esse futurum, non tamen ulla est in eo faciendi necessitas aut non faciendi impossibilitas, quoniam sola in eo operatur voluntas. Quotiens namque dicitur deus non posse, nulla negatur in illo potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et fortitudo. Non enim aliud intelligitur, nisi quia nulla res potest efficere, ut ille agat quod negatur posse.	Anselm. We have already said that it is improper to affirm of God that he does anything, or that he cannot do it, of necessity. For all necessity and impossibility is under his control. But his choice is subject to no necessity nor impossibility. For nothing is necessary or impossible save as He wishes it. Nay, the very choosing or refusing anything as a necessity or an impossibility is contrary to truth. Since, then, he does what he chooses and nothing else, as no necessity or impossibility exists before his choice or refusal, so neither do they interfere with his acting or not acting, though it be true that his choice and action are immutable. And as, when God does a thing, since it has been done it cannot be undone, but must remain an actual fact; still, we are not correct in saying that it is impossible for God to prevent a past action from being what it is. For there is no necessity or impossibility in the case whatever but the simple will of God, which chooses that truth should be eternally the same, for he himself is truth. Also, if he has a fixed determination to do anything, though his design must be destined to an accomplishment before it comes to pass, yet there is no coercion as far as he is concerned, either to do it or not to do it, for his will is the sole agent in the case. For when we say that God cannot do a thing, we do not deny his power; on the contrary, we imply that he has invincible authority and strength. For we mean simply this, that nothing can compel God to do the thing which is said to be impossible for him.
Nam usitata est huiusmodi multum locutio, ut dicatur res aliqua posse,non quia in illa, sed quoniam in alia re est potestas; et non posse, non quoniam in illa, sed quia in alia re est impotentia. Dicimus namgue: iste homo potest vinci, pro: aliquis potest eum uincere; et: ille non potest vinci, pro: nullus illum vincere potest. Non enim est potestas posse vinci, sed impotentia; nec vinci non posse impotentia est, sed potestas. Nec dicimus deum necessitate facere aliquid, eo quod in illo sit ulla necessitas, sed quoniam est in alio, sicut dixi de impotentia, quando dicitur non posse. Omnis quippe necessitas est aut coactio aut prohibitio; quae duae necessitates convertuntur invicem contrarie, sicut necesse et impossibile. Quidquid namque cogitur esse prohibetur non esse, et quod CogitUt non esse prohibetur esse; quemadmodum quod necesse est esse impossibile est non esse, et quod necesse est non esse impossibile est esse, et conversim. Cum autem dicimus aliquid necesse esse aut non esse in deo, non intelligitur quod sit in illo necessitas aut cogens aut prohibens, sed significatur quia in omnibus aliis <rebus est> necessita prohibens eas facere et cogens non facere contra hoc quod de deo dicitur. Nam cum dicimus quia necesse est deum semper verum dicere, et necesse est eum numquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud nisi quia tanta est in illo /124/ constantia servandi veritatem, ut necesse sit nullam rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat aut ut mentiatur.	We often use an expression of this kind, that a thing can be when the power is not in itself, but in something else; and that it cannot be when the weakness does not pertain to the thing itself, but to something else. Thus we say “Such a man can be bound,” instead of saying, “Somebody can bind him,” and, “He cannot be bound,” instead of, “Nobody can bind him.” For to be able to be overcome is not power but weakness, and not to be able to be overcome is not weakness but power. Nor do we say that God does anything by necessity, because there is any such thing pertaining to him, but because it exists in something else, precisely as I said with regard to the affirmation that he cannot do anything. For necessity is always either compulsion or restraint; and these two kinds of necessity operate variously by turn, so that the same thing is both necessary and impossible. For whatever is obliged to exist is also prevented from non‑existence; and that which is compelled not to exist is prevented from existence. So that whatever exists from necessity cannot avoid existence, and it is impossible for a thing to exist which is under a necessity of nonexistence, and vice versa. But when we say with regard to God, that anything is necessary or not necessary, we do not mean that, as far as he is concerned, there is any necessity either coercive or prohibitory, but we mean that there is a necessity in everything else, restraining or driving them in a particular way. Whereas we say the very opposite of God. For, when we affirm that it is necessary for God to utter truth, and never to lie, we only mean that such is his unwavering disposition to maintain the truth that of necessity nothing can avail to make him deviate from the truth, or utter a lie.
Quapropter cum dicimus quia homo ille, qui secundum unitatem personae, sicut supra dictum est, idem ipse est qui filius dei, deus, non potuit non mori, aut velle non mori, postquam de virgine natus est: non significatur in illo ulla impotentia servandi aut volendi servare vitam suam immortalem, sed immutabilitas voluntatis eius, qua se sponte fecit ad hoc hominem, ut in eadem voluntate perseuerans moreretur, et quia nulla res potuit illam voluntatem mutare. Plus enim esset impotentia quam potentia, si posset velle mentiri aut fallere aut mutare voluntatem, quam prius immutabilem esse voluit. Et si, quemadmodum supra dixi, cum aliquis sponte se proponit facturum bonum aliquod et eadem voluntate postea perficit quod proposuit, quamvis cogi possit, si nolit promissum soluere, non tamen est dicendus necessitate facere quod facit, sed ea qua proposuit libera voluntate -- nonenim necessitate aut impotentia fieri vel non fieri dici debet aliquid, ubi neque necessitas neque impotentia quicquam operantur sed uoluntas -- si, inquam, ita est in homine, multo magis necessitas aut impotentia nequaquam nominandae sunt in deo, qui nihil nisi quod uult facit, et cuius voluntatem nulla vis cogere aut prohibere valet. Ad hoc enim valuit in Christo diversitas naturarum et unitas personae, ut quod opus erat fieri ad hominum restaurationem, si humana non posset natura, faceret divina, et si divinae minime conveniret, exhiberet humana; et non alius atque alius sed idem ipse esset, qui utrumque perfecte existens, per humanam solueret quod illa debebat, et per divinam posset quod expediebat. Denique virgo, quae perfidem munda facta est ut de illa posset assumi, nequaquam credidit illum moriturum, nisi quia vellet, quemadmodum per prophetam qui de illo dixit: "oblatus est, quia ipse voluit", didicerat. Quapropter quoniam uera fuit fides /125/ eius, necesse erat ita futurum esse, sicut credidit. Quod si te iterum perturbat quia dico: necesse erat: memento quia veritas fidei virginis non fuit causa ut ille sponte moreretur, sed quia hoc futurum erat, vera fuit fides. Quamobrem si dicitur: necesse erat ut voluntate sola moreretur, quia vera fuit fides sive prophetia quae de hoc praecesserant: non est aliud quam si dicas necesse fuisse ita futurum esse, quoniam sic futurum erat. Huiusmodi autem necessitas non cogit rem esse, sed esse rei facit necessitatem esse.	When, then, we say that that man (who, by the union of persons, is also God, the Son of God) could not avoid death, or the choice of death, after he was born of the virgin, we do not imply that there was in him any weakness with regard to preserving or choosing to preserve his life, but we refer to the unchangeableness of his purpose, by which he freely became man for this design, viz., that by persevering in his wish he should suffer death. And this desire nothing could shake. For it would be rather weakness than power if he could wish to lie, or deceive, or change his disposition, when before he had chosen that it should remain unchanged. And, as I said before, when one has freely determined to do some good action, and afterwards goes on to complete it, though, if unwilling to pay his vow, he could be compelled to do so, yet we must not say that he does it of necessity, but with the same freedom with which he made the resolution. For we ought not to say that anything is done, or not done, by necessity or weakness, when free choice is the only agent in the case. And, if this is so with regard to man, much less can we speak of necessity or weakness in reference to God; for he does nothing except according to his choice, and his will no force can drive or restrain. For this end was accomplished by the united natures of Christ, viz., that the Divine nature should perform that part of the work needful for man’s restoration which the human nature could not do; and that in the human should be manifested what was inappropriate to the Divine. Finally, the virgin herself, who was made pure by faith in him, so that he might be born of her, even she, I say, never believed that he was to die, save of his own choice. For she knew the words of the prophet, who said of him: “He was offered of his own will.” Therefore, since her faith was well founded, it must necessarily turn out as she believed. And, if it perplexes you to have me say that it is necessary, remember that the reality of the virgin’s faith was not the cause of his dying by his own free will; but, because this was destined to take place, therefore her faith was real. If, then, it be said that it was necessary for him to die of his single choice, because the antecedent faith and prophecy were true, this is no more than saying that it must be because it was to be. But such a necessity as this does not compel a thing to be, but only implies a necessity of its existence.
Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est ut sit res; et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit. Praecedens et eliciens necessitas est, cum dicitur caelum volui, quia necesse est ut voluatur; sequens vero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris. Cum enim hoc dico, significo nihil facere posse, ut dum loqueris non loquaris, non quod aliquid te cogat ad loquendum. Nam violentia naturalis conditionis cogit caelum uolui, te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui. Sed ubicumque est praecedens necessitas, est et sequens; non autem ubi sequens, ibi statim et praecedens. Possumus namque dicere: necesse est caelum uolui, quia voluitur; sed non similiter est verum idcirco te loqui, quia necesse est ut loquaris. Ista sequens necessitas currit per omnia tempora hoc modo: Quidquid fuit, necesse est fuisse. Quidquid est, necesse est esse et necesse est futurum fuisse. Quidquid futurum est, necesse est futurum esse. Haec est illa necessitas quae, ubi tractat ARISTOTELES de propositionibus singularibus etfuturis, videtur utrumlibet destruere et omnia esse ex necessitate astruere. Hac sequenti et nihil efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera fuit fides vel prophetia de Christo, quia ex voluntate non ex necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit ut sic esset. Hac homo factus est; hac fecit et passus est quidquid fecit et passus est; hac voluit quaecumque voluit. Ideo enim necessitate fuerunt, quia futura erant; et futura erant, quia fuerunt; et fuerunt, quia fuerunt. Et si vis omnium quae fecit et quae passus est veram scire necessitatem, scito omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas. Quare si non fuerunt, nisi quia ipse voluit: si non uoluisset, non fuissent. Sic itaque "nemo" tulit "animam" eius ab /126/ illo, sed ipse posuit eam et "iterum" sumpsit "eam", quia "potestatem" habuit "ponendi animam suam et iterum sumendi eam", sicut ipse dicit.	There is an antecedent necessity which is the cause of a thing, and there is also a subsequent necessity arising from the thing itself. Thus, when the heavens are said to revolve, it is an antecedent and efficient necessity, for they must revolve. But when I say that you speak of necessity, because you are speaking, this is nothing but a subsequent and inoperative necessity. For I only mean that it is impossible for you to speak and not to speak at the same time, and not that some one compels you to speak. For the force of its own nature makes the heaven revolve; but no necessity obliges you to speak. But wherever there is an antecedent necessity, there is also a subsequent one; but not vice versa. For we can say that the heaven revolves of necessity, because it revolves; but it is not likewise true that, because you speak, you do it of necessity. This subsequent necessity pertains to everything, so that we say: Whatever has been, necessarily has been. Whatever is, must be. Whatever is to be, of necessity will be. This is that necessity which Aristotle treats of (“de propositionibus singularibus et futuris“), and which seems to destroy any alternative and to ascribe a necessity to all things. By this subsequent and imperative necessity, was it necessary (since the belief and prophecy concerning Christ were true, that he would die of his own free will), that it should be so. For this he became man; for this he did and suffered all things undertaken by him; for this he chose as he did. For therefore were they necessary, because they were to be, and they were to be because they were, and they were because they were; and, if you wish to know the real necessity of all things which he did and suffered, know that they were of necessity, because he wished them to be. But no necessity preceded his will. Wherefore if they were not save by his will, then, had he not willed they would not have existed. So then, no one took his life from him, but he laid it down of himself and took it again; for he had power to lay it down and to take it again, as he himself said.
BOSO. Satisfecisti mihi illum non posse probari ulla necessitate mortem subisse, nec me paenitet, ut hoc faceres, importunum tibi extitisse.	Boso. You have satisfied me that it cannot be proved that he was subjected to death by any necessity ; and I cannot regret my importunity in urging you to make this explanation.
ANSELMUS. Ostendimus, ut puto, certam rationem quamodo deus assumpserit hominem sine peccato de massa peccatrice, sed nequaquam negandum existimo aliam esse praeter istam quam diximus, excepto hoc quia deus facere potest, quod hominis ratio comprehendere non potest. Verum quoniam et ista mihi videtur posse sufficere, et si aliam nunc inquirere vellem, necesse esset investigare quid sit originale peccatum et quomodo a primis parentibus in universum genus humanum praeter illum de quo agimus hominem diffundatur, et incidere in quasdam alias quaestiones quae suum postulant tractatum: ea quam diximus ratione contenti, quae de incepto restant opere prosequamur.	Anselm. I think we have shown with sufficient clearness how it was that God took a man without sin from a sinful substance; but I would on no account deny that there is no other explanation than this which we have given, for God can certainly do what human reason cannot grasp. But since this appears adequate, and since in search of other arguments we should involve ourselves in such questions as that of original sin, and how it was transmitted by our first parents to all mankind, except this man of whom we are speaking; and since, also, we should be drawn into various other questions, each demanding its own separate consideration; let us be satisfied with this account of the matter, and go on to complete our intended work.
BOSO. Ut vis; sed eo pacto ut tu aliquando auxiliante deo illam aliam rationem, quam nunc inquirere vitas, quasi debitum exsolvas.	Boso. As you choose; but with this condition that, by the help of God, you will sometime give this other explanation, which you owe me, as it were, but which now you avoid discussing.
ANSELMUS. Quoniam voluntatem hanc scio me gerere, quod petis non denego; sed quia de futuris incertus sum, promittere non audeo, sed dei dispositioni committo.	Anselm. Inasmuch as I entertain this desire myself, I will not refuse you; but because of the uncertainty of future events, I dare not promise you, but commend it to the will of God.
2.18 QUOMODO VITA CHRISTI SOLVATUR DEO PRO PECCATIS HOMINUM; ET QUOMODO DEBUIT CHRISTUS ET NON DEBUIT PATI.
Sed dic nunc quid tibi de quaestione, quam in principio proposuisti, propter quam aliae multae se ingesserunt, persoluendum uideatur.	Anselm. But say now, what remains to be unravelled with regard to the question which you proposed in the first place, and which involves many others with it?
BOSO. Summa quaestionis fuit cur deus homo factus sit, ut per mortem suam saluaret hominem, cum hoc alio modo facere potuisse videretur. Adquod tu multis et necessariis rationibus respondens ostendisti restaurationem humanae naturae non debuisse remanere, nec potuisse fieri, nisi solueret homo quod deo pro peccato debebat. Quod debitum tantum erat, ut illud /127/ soluere, cum non deberet nisi homo, non posses nisi deus, ita ut idem esset homo qui deus. Unde necesse erat, ut deus hominem assumeret in unitatem personae, quatenus qui in natura soluere debebat et non poterat, in persona esset qui posses. Deinde quia de virgine et a persona filii dei esset assumendus homo ille qui deus esset, et quomodo sine peccato de massa peccatrice assumi potuerit monstrasti. Vitam autem huius hominis tam sublimem, tam pretiosam apertissime probasti, ut sufficere possit ad soluendum quod pro peccatis totius mundi debetur, et plus in infinitum. Restat ergo nunc ostendere quomodo illa solvatur deo pro peccatis hominum.	Boso. The substance of the inquiry was this, why God became man, for the purpose of saving men by his death, when he could have done it in some other way. And you, by numerous and positive reasons, have shown that the restoring of mankind ought not to take place, and could not, without man paid the debt which he owed God for his sin. And this debt was so great that, while none but man must solve the debt, none but God was able to do it; so that he who does it must be both God and man. And hence arises a necessity that God should take man into unity with his own person; so that he who in his own nature was bound to pay the debt, but could not, might be able to do it in the person of God. In fine, you have shown that that man, who was also God, must be formed from the virgin, and from the person of the Son of God, and that he could be taken without sin, though from a sinful substance. Moreover, you have clearly shown the life of this man to have been so excellent and so glorious as to make ample satisfaction for the sins of the whole world, and even infinitely more. It now, therefore, remains to be shown how that payment is made to God for the sins of men.
ANSELMUS. Si propter iustitiam se permisit occidi: nonne ad honorem dei vitam suam dedit?	Anselm. If he allowed himself to be slain for the sake of justice, he did not give his life for the honor of God?
BOSO. Si possum intelligere quod non dubito, quamvis non videam quomodo rationabiliter hoc fecerit, cum et iustitiam indeclinabiliter et vitam suam aeternaliter servare potuerit, fatebor illum tale quid sponte dedisse deo ad honorem illius, cui quidquid deus non est comparari non potest, et quod pro omnibus omnium hominum debitis recompensari potest.	Boso. It should seem so, but I cannot understand, although I do not doubt it, how he could do this reasonably. If I saw how he could be perfectly holy, and yet forever preserve his life, I would acknowledge that he freely gave, for the honor of God, such a gift as surpasses all things else but God himself, and is able to atone for all the sins of men.
ANSELMUS. An non intelligis quia, cum iniurias et contumelias et mortem crucis cum latronibus sibi, sicut supra diximus, propter iustitiam quam oboedienter servabat, illatas benigna patientia sustinuit, exemplum dedit hominibus, quatenus propter nulla incommode quae sentire possum, a iustitia quam deo debent declinent, quod minime dedisset, si secundum potentiam suam mortem pro tali causa illa tam declinasset?	Anselm. Do you not perceive that when he bore with gentle patience the insults put upon him, violence and even crucifixion among thieves that he might maintain strict holiness; by this he set men an example that they should never turn aside from the holiness due to God on account of personal sacrifice? But how could he have done this, had he, as he might have done, avoided the death brought upon him for such a reason?
BOSO. Videtur quod nulla hoc exemplum ipse necessitate dederit, quoniammulti ante adventum eius et Iohannes Baptista post adventum, ante mortem eius, fortiter mortem pro veritate sustinentes illud sufficienter dedisse noscuntur.	Boso. But surely there was no need of this, for many persons before his coming, and John the Baptist after his coming but before his death, had sufficiently enforced this example by nobly dying for the sake of the truth.
ANSELMUS. Nullus umquam homo moriendo praeter illum deo dedit quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, aut solvit quod non debebat. Ille vero sponte petri obtulit quod nulla necessitate umquam amissurus erat, et solvit pro peccatoribus quod pro se non debebat. Quapropter ille multo magis dedit exemplum, ut unusquisque quod aliquando incunctanter amissurus est, pro se ipso reddere deo cum ratio postulat non dubitet, qui cum nullatenus aut pro se indigeret aut cogeretur pro aliis, quibus nihil nisi poenam /128/ debebat, tam pretiosam vitam, immo se ipsum, tantam scilicet personam tanta uoluntate dedit.	Anselm. No man except this one ever gave to God what he was not obliged to lose, or paid a debt he did not owe. But he freely offered to the Father what there was no need of his ever losing, and paid for sinners what he owed not for himself. Therefore he set a much nobler example, that each one should not hesitate to give to God, for himself, what he must at any rate lose before long, since it was the voice of reason; for he, when not in want of anything for himself and not compelled by others, who deserved nothing of him but punishment, gave so precious a life, even the life of so illustrious a personage, with such willingness.
BOSO. Multum propinquas desiderio meo. Sed sustine ut quaeram quiddam, quod quamvis fatuum forsitan putes quaerere, non tamen in promptu mihi est quid respondeam, si a me quaeratur. Dicis quia, quando mortuus est, dedit quod non debebat. Sed nemo negabit melius illum fecisse, quando hoc exemplum taliter dedit, et magis hoc placere deo, quam si non hoc fecisset, aut dicet eum non debuisse facere quod melius esse et quod magis deo placere intellexit. Quomodo ergo asseremus eum non debuisse deo quod fecit, id est quod melius esse et magis placere deo cognovit, praesertim cum creatura debeat deo totum quod est et quod scit et potest?	Boso. You very nearly meet my wishes; but suffer me to make one inquiry, which you may think foolish, but which, nevertheless, I find no easy thing to answer. You say that when he died he gave what he did not owe. But no one will deny that it was better for him, or that so doing he pleased God more than if he had not done it. Nor will any one say that he was not bound to do what was best to be done, and what he knew would be more pleasing to God. How then can we affirm that he did not owe God the thing which he did, that is, the thing which he knew to be best and most pleasing to God, and especially since every creature owes God all that he is and all that he knows and all that he is capable of?
ANSELMUS. Quamvis creatura nihil habeat a se, quando tamen concedit illi deus aliquid licite facere et non facere, dat illi ita suum esse utrumque, ut licet alterum sit melius, neutrum tamen exigatur determinate, sed sive faciat quod melius est, sive alterum, debere facere dicatur quod facit; et si facit quod melius est, praemium habeat, quia sponte dat quod suum est. Nam cum virginitas melior sit coniugio, neutrum tamen ab homine determinate exigitur, sed qui coningio uti et qui virginitatem servare mauult, quod facit debere facere dicitur. Nemo enim virginitatem sive coniugium dicit eligi nondebere; sed dicimus quia quod mauult homo, antequam aliquid horum statuat, hoc facere debet, et si virginitatem servat, pro spontaneo munere quod offert deo praemium exspectat. Cum ergo dicis creaturam debere deo quod melius scit et potest: si intelligis ex debito et non subaudis: si deus iubet, non est semper verum. Siquidem, ut dixi, non debet homo virginitatem ex debito, sed si mauult, debet uti coniugio.	Anselm. Though the creature has nothing of himself, yet when God grants him the liberty of doing or not doing a thing, he leaves the alternative with him, so that, though one is better than the other, yet neither is positively demanded. And, whichever he does, it may be said that he ought to do it; and if he takes the better choice, he deserves a reward; because he renders freely what is his own. For, though celibacy be better than marriage, yet neither is absolutely enjoined upon man; so that both he who chooses marriage and he who prefers celibacy, may be said to do as they ought. For no one says that either celibacy or marriage ought not to be chosen; but we say that what a man esteems best before taking action upon any of these things, this he ought to do. And if a man preserves his celibacy as a free gift offered to God, he looks for a reward. When you say that the creature owes God what he knows to be the better choice, and what he is able to do, if you mean that he owes it as a debt, without implying any command on the part of God, it is not always true. Thus, as I have already said, a man is not bound to celibacy as a debt, but ought to marry if he prefers it.
Quod si te movet verbum quod est 'debere', nec potes illud intelligere sine aliquo debito: scito quia sicut contingit 'posse' et 'non posse' et 'necessitatem' aliquando dici, non quia sunt in rebus ubi dicuntur, sed quoniam sunt in alio: ita et 'debere'. Quippe cum dicimus debere pauperes a divitibus eleemosynam accipere, non est aliud quam divites debere pauperibus eleemosynam impendere. Hoc namque debitum non est exigendum a paupere, /129/ sed a divite. Deus quoque dicitur omnibus debere praeesse, non quia ille in hoc aliquo modo sit debitor, sed quoniam omnia debent illi subesse; et debere facere quod uult, quoniam quod uult debet esse. Ita quando uult aliqua creatura facere quod suum est facere et non facere, dicitur debere facere, quia quod ipsa uult debet esse. Dominus itaque Ihesus cum mortem, sicut diximus, sustinere voluit, quoniam soum erat et pati et non pati, debuit facere quod fecit, quia quod voluit fieri debuit; et non debuit facere, quia non ex debito. Nempe quoniam ipse idem est deus et homo, secundum humanam quidem naturam, ex quo homo fun', sic accepit a divina natura, quae alla est ab humana, esse suum quidquid habebat, ut nihil deberet dare nisi quod volebat; secundum personam vero sic a se ipso habebat quod habebat, et sic perfecte sibi sufficiens erat, ut nec alii quicquam retribuere deberet, nec ut sibi retribueretur dare indigeret.	And if you are unable to understand the use of this word “debere,” when no debt is implied, let me inform you that we use the word “debere“ precisely as we sometimes do the words “posse, ” and “non posse, ” and also “necessitas,” when the ability, etc., is not in the things themselves, but in something else. When, for instance, we say that the poor ought to receive alms from the rich, we mean that the rich ought to bestow alms upon the poor. For this is a debt not owed by the poor but by the rich. We also say that God ought to be exalted over all, not because there is any obligation resting upon him, but because all things ought to be subject to him. And he wishes that all creatures should be what they ought; for what God wishes to be ought to be. And, in like manner, when any creature wishes to do a thing that is left entirely at his own disposal, we say that he ought to do it, for what he wishes to be ought to be. So our Lord Jesus, when he wished, as we have said, to suffer death, ought to have done precisely what he did; because he ought to be what he wished, and was not bound to do anything as a debt. As he is both God and man, in connection with his human nature, which made him a man, he must also have received from the Divine nature that control over himself which freed him from all obligation, except to do as he chose. In like manner, as one person of the Trinity, he must have had whatever he possessed of his own right, so as to be complete in himself, and could not have been under obligations to another, nor have need of giving anything in order to be repaid himself.
BOSO. Aperte nunc video quia nulla ratione se ipsum morti ex debito, sicut ratio mea videbatur monstrare, dedit ad honorem dei, et tamen facere debuit quod fecit.	Boso. Now I see clearly that he did not give himself up to die for the honor of God, as a debt; for this my own reason proves, and yet he ought to have done what he did.
ANSELMUS. Honor utique ille totius est trinitatis. Quare quoniam idem ipse est deus, filius dei, ad honorem suum se ipsum sibi sicut petri et spiritui sancto obtulit, id est humanitatem suam divinitati suae, quae una eademque trium personarum est. Ut tamen in eadem ipsa ueritate manentes apertius loquamur quod volumus, dicamus, sicut usus habet, quia filius sponte se ipsum petri obtulit. Hoc namque modo aptissime dicitur quia et in una persona totus deus, cui secundum hominem se obtulit, intelligitur, et per nomen patris et filii immense quaedam in cordibus audientium, cum patrem filius hoc modo postulare pro nobis dicitur, pietas sentitur.	Anselm. That honor certainly belongs to the whole Trinity; and, since he is very God, the Son of God, he offered himself for his own honor, as well as for that of the Father and the Holy Spirit; that is, he gave his humanity to his divinity, which is one person of the Triune God. But, though we express our idea more definitely by clinging to the precise truth, yet we may say, according to our custom, that the Son freely gave himself to the Father. For thus we plainly affirm that in speaking of one person we understand the whole Deity, to whom as man he offered himself. And, by the names of Father and Son, a wondrous depth of devotion is excited in the hearts of the hearers, when it is said that the Son supplicates the Father on our behalf.
BOSO. Hoc libentissime accipio.	Boso. This I readily acknowledge.
2.19 QUANTA RATIONE DE MORTE EIUS SEQUATUR HUMANA SALVATIO.	CHAPTER XIX.How human salvation follows upon his death.
ANSELMUS. Intueamur nunc, prout possumus, quanta inde ratione sequatur humana saluatio. /130/	Anselm. Let us now observe, if we can, how the salvation of men rests on this.
BOSO. Ad hoc tendit cor meum. Nam quamvis hoc mihi videar intelligere,ipsam tamen rationis contextionem a te volo fieri.	Boso. This is the very wish of my heart. For, although I think I understand you, yet I wish to get from you the close chain of argument.
ANSELMUS. Quantum autem sit quod filius sponte dedit, non est opus exponere.	Anselm. There is no need of explaining how precious was the gift which the Son freely gave.
BOSO. Sufficienter patet.	Boso. That is clear enough already.
ANSELMUS. Eum autem qui tantum donum sponte dat deo, sine retributione debere esse non iudicabis.	Anselm. But you surely will not think that he deserves no reward, who freely gave so great a gift to God.
BOSO. Immo necesse esse video, ut pater filio retribuat. Alioquin aut iniustus videretur esse si nollet, aut impotens si non posset; quae a deo aliena sunt.	Boso. I see that it is necessary for the Father to reward the Son; else he is either unjust in not wishing to do it, or weak in not being able to do it; but neither of these things can be attributed to God.
ANSELMUS. Qui retribuit alicui: aut dat quod ille non habet, aut dimittit quod ab illo potest exigi. Prius autem quam tantam rem filius faceret, omnia quae patris erant sua erant; nec umquam debuit quod illi dimitti possit. Quid ergo retribuetur nullius rei egenti, et cui non est quod dari aut dimitti possit?	Anselm. He who rewards another either gives him something which he does not have, or else remits some rightful claim upon him. But anterior to the great offering of the Son, all things belonging to the Father were his, nor did he ever owe anything which could be forgiven him. How then can a reward be bestowed on one who needs nothing, and to whom no gift or release can be made?
BOSO. Ex una parte video retribuendi necessitatem, et ex altera impossibilitatem; quia et necesse est deum reddere quod debet, et non est quod reddat.	Boso. I see on the one hand a necessity for a reward, and on the other it appears impossible; for God must necessarily render payment for what he owes, and yet there is no one to receive it.
ANSELMUS. Si tanta et tam debita merces nec illi nec alii redditur, in uanumfilius tantam rem fecisse videbitur.	Anselm. But if a reward so large and so deserved is not given to him or any one else, then it will almost appear as if the Son had done this great work in vain.
BOSO. Hoc nefas est aestimare.	Boso. Such a supposition is impious.
ANSELMUS. Necesse est ergo ut alicui alii reddatur, quia illi non potest.	Anselm. The reward then must be bestowed upon some one else, for it cannot be upon him.
BOSO. Inevitabiliter sequitur.	Boso. This is necessarily so.
ANSELMUS. Si voluerit filius quod sibi debetur alii dare: poteritne pater iureillum prohibere, aut illi cui dabit negare?	Anselm. Had the Son wished to give some one else what was due to him, could the Father rightfully prevent it, or refuse to give it to the other person?
BOSO. Immo et iustum et necessarium intelligo, ut cui voluerit dare filius,a patre reddatur; quia et filio quod suum est dare licet, et pater quoddebet non nisi alii reddere potest.	Boso. No! but I think it would be both just and necessary that the gift should be given by the Father to whomsoever the Son wished; because the Son should be allowed to give away what is his own, and the Father cannot bestow it at all except upon some other person.
ANSELMUS. Quibus convenientius fructum et retributionem suae mortis attribuetquam illis, propter quos saluandos, sicut ratio veritatis nos docuit, hominem se fecit, et quibus, ut diximus, moriendo exemplum moriendi propter iustitiam dedit? Frustra quippe imitatores eius erunt, si meriti eius participes non erunt. Aut quos iustius faciet haeredes debiti quo ipse non eget, et exundantiae suae plenitudinis, quam parentes et fratres suos, quos aspicit tot /131/ et tantis debitis obligatos egestate tabescere in profundo miseriarum, ut eisdimittatur quod pro peccatis debent, et detur quo propter peccata carent?	Anselm. Upon whom would he more properly bestow the reward accruing from his death, than upon those for whose salvation, as right reason teaches, he became man; and for whose sake, as we have already said, he left an example of suffering death to preserve holiness? For surely in vain will men imitate him, if they be not also partakers of his reward. Or whom could he more justly make heirs of the inheritance, which he does not need, and of the superfluity of his possessions, than his parents and brethren? What more proper than that, when he beholds so many of them weighed down by so heavy a debt, and wasting through poverty, in the depth of their miseries, he should remit the debt incurred by their sins, and give them what their transgressions had forfeited?
BOSO. Nihil rationabilius, nihil dulcius, nihil desiderabilius mundus audire potest. Ego quidem tantam fiduciam ex hoc concipio, ut iam dicere non possim quanto gaudio exultet cor meum. Videtur enim mihi quod nullum hominem reiciat deus ad se sub hoc nomine accedentem.	Boso. The universe can hear of nothing more reasonable, more sweet, more desirable. And I receive such confidence from this that I cannot describe the joy with which my heart exults. For it seems to me that God can reject none who come to him in his name.
ANSELMUS. Ita est, si accedit sicut oportet. Quemadmodum autem sit ad tantae gratiae participationem accedendum et quomodo sub illa uivendum, nos ubique sacra scriptura docet, quae super solidam ueritatem, quam deo adivuante aliquatenus perspeximus, velut super firmum fundamentum fundata est.	Anselm. Certainly not, if he come aright. And the Scriptures, which rest on solid truth as on a firm foundation, and which, by the help of God, we have somewhat examined, ‑‑ the Scriptures, I say, show us how to approach in order to share such favor, and how we ought to live under it.
BOSO. Vere quidquid super fundamentum hoc aedificatur, super firmam petram fundatur.	Boso. And whatever is built on this foundation is founded on an immovable rock.
ANSELMUS. Puto me iam aliquantulum tuae satisfecisse quaestioni, quamvis hoc melior me facere plenius possit, et maiores atque plures quam meum aut mortale ingenium comprehendere valeat huius rei sint rationes. Palam etiam est quia deus, ut hoc faceret quod diximus, nullatenus indigebat, sed ita veritas immutabilis exigebat. Licet enim hoc quod homo ille fecit, deus dicatur fecisse propter unitatem personae, deus tamen non egebat ut de caelo descenderet ad vincendum diabolum, neque ut per iustitiam ageret contra illum ad liberandum hominem; sed ab homine deus exigebat ut diabolum vinceret, et qui per peccatum deum offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret. Siquidem diabolo nec deus aliquid debebat nisi poenam, nec homo nisi vicem, ut ab illo uictus illum revinceret; sed quidquid ab illo exigebatur, hoc deo debebat non diabolo.	Anselm. I think I have nearly enough answered your inquiry, though I might do it still more fully, and there are doubtless many reasons which are beyond me and which mortal ken does not reach. It is also plain that God had no need of doing the thing spoken of, but eternal truth demanded it. For though God is said to have done what that man did, on account of the personal union made; yet God was in no need of descending from heaven to conquer the devil, nor of contending against him in holiness to free mankind. But God demanded that man should conquer the devil, so that he who had offended by sin should atone by holiness. As God owed nothing to the devil but punishment, so man must only make amends by conquering the devil as man had already been conquered by him. But whatever was demanded of man, he owed to God and not to the devil.
2.20 QUAM MAGNA ET QUAM IUSTA SIT MISERICORDIA DEI.	CHAPTER XX. How great and how just is God’s compassion.
Misericordiam vero dei quaae tibi perire videbatur, cum iustitiam dei et peccatum hominis considerabamus, tam magnam tamque concordem iustitiae invenimus, ut nec maior nec iustior cogitari possit. Nempe quid misericordius /132/ intelligi valet, quam cum peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato et unde se redimat non habenti deus pater dicit: accipe unigenitum meum et da pro te; et ipse filius: tolle me et redime te, Quasi enim hoc dicunt, quando nos ad Christianam fidem vocant et trahunt. Quid etiam iustius quam ut ille cui datur pretium maius omni debito, si debito datur affectu dimittat omne debitum?	NOW we have found the compassion of God which appeared lost to you when we were considering God’s holiness and man’s sin; we have found it, I say, so great and so consistent with his holiness, as to be incomparably above anything that can be conceived. For what compassion can excel these words of the Father, addressed to the sinner doomed to eternal torments and having no way of escape: “Take my only begotten Son and make him an offering for yourself;” or these words of the Son: “Take me, and ransom your souls.” For these are the voices they utter, when inviting and leading us to faith in the Gospel. Or can anything be more just than for him to remit all debt since he has earned a reward greater than all debt, if given with the love which he deserves.
2.21 QUOD IMPOSSIBILE SIT DIABOLUM RECONCILIARI.	CHAPTER XXI.How it is impossible for the devil to be reconciled.
Diaboli vero reconciliationem de qua quaesivisti, impossibilem intelliges, si diligenter humanam consideres. Sicut enim homo non potuit reconciliari nisi per hominem-deum qui mori posset, per cuius iustitiam deo restitueretur quod per peccatum hominis perdiderat: ita angeli damnati non possunt saluari nisi per angelum-deum, qui mori possit et qui per suam iustitiam deo reparet quod aliorum peccata abstulerunt. Et sicut homo per alium hominem, qui non esset eiusdem generis, quamvis eiusdem esset naturae, non debuit releuari: ita nullus angelus per alium angelum saluari debet, quamvis omnes sint unius naturae, quoniam non sunt eiusdem generis sicut homines. Non enim sic sunt omnes angeli de uno angelo, quemadmodum omnes homines de uno homine. Hoc quoque removet eorum restaurationem, quia sicut ceciderunt nullo alio nocente ut caderent, ita nullo alio adivuante surgere debent. Quod est illis impossibile. Aliter enim in dignitatem quam habituri erant non possunt restitui, quoniam sine alieno auxilio per potestatem suam quam acceperant, stetissent in veritate, si non peccassent. Quapropter si quis opinatur saluatoris nostri redemptionem usque ad illos aliquando debere extendi, rationabiliter conuincitur quia irrationabiliter decipitur. Quod nondico, quasi pretium mortis eius omnibus hominum et angelorum peccatis sua magnitudine non praeualeat, sed quoniam perditorum angelorum releuationi immutabilis ratio repugnat. /133/	IF you carefully consider the scheme of human salvation, you will perceive the reconciliation of the devil, of which you made inquiry, to be impossible. For, as man could not be reconciled but by the death of the God‑man, by whose holiness the loss occasioned by man’s sin should be made up; so fallen angels cannot be saved but by the death of a God‑angel who by his holiness may repair the evil occasioned by the sins of his companions. And as man must not be restored by a man of a different race, though of the same nature, so no angel ought to be saved by any other angel, though all were of the same nature, for they are not like men, all of the same race. For all angels were not sprung from one, as all men were. And there is another objection to their restoration, viz , that, as they fell with none to plot their fall, so they must rise with none to aid them; but this is impossible. But otherwise they cannot be restored to their original dignity. For, had they not sinned, they would have been confirmed in virtue without any foreign aid, simply by the power given to them from the first. And, therefore, if any one thinks that the redemption of our Lord ought to be extended even to the fallen angels, he is convinced by reason, for by reason he has been deceived. And I do not say this as if to deny that the virtue of his death far exceeds all the sins of men and angels, but because infallible reason rejects the reconciliation of the fallen angels.
2.22 QUOD IN IIS QUAE DICTA SUNT, VETERIS ET NOVI TESTAMENTI VERITAS PROBATA SIT.	CHAPTER XXII. How the truth of the Old and New Testament is shown in the things which have been said.
BOSO. Rationabilia et quibus nihil contradici possit quae dicis, omnia mihividentur; et per unius quaestionis quam proposuimus solutionem, quidquid in nouo ueterique testamento continetur, probatum intelligo. Cum enim sic probes deum fieri hominem ex necessitate, ut etiam si removeantur pauca quae de nostris libris posuisti, ut quod de tribus dei personis et de Adam tetigisti, non solum ludaeis sed etiam paganis sola ratione satisfacias, et ipse idem deus-homo nouum condat testamentum et uetus approbet: sicut ipsum veracem esse necesse est confiteri, ita nihil quod in illis continetur verum esse potest aliquis diffiteri.	Boso. All things which you have said seem to me reasonable and incontrovertible. And by the solution of the single question proposed do I see the truth of all that is contained in the Old and New Testament. For, in proving that God became man by necessity, leaving out what was taken from the Bible, viz., the remarks on the persons of the Trinity, and on Adam, you convince both Jews and Pagans by the mere force of reason. And the God‑man himself originates the New Testament and approves the Old. And, as we must acknowledge him to be true, so no one can dissent from anything contained in these books.
ANSELMUS. Si quid diximus quod corrigendum sit, non renuo correctionem, si rationabiliter fit. Si autem veritatis testimonio roboratur, quod nos rationabiliter invenisse existimamus, deo non nobis attribuire debemus, qui est benedictus in saecula amen.	Anselm. If we have said anything that needs correction, I am willing to make the correction if it be a reasonable one. But, if the conclusions which we have arrived at by reason seem confirmed by the testimony of the truth, then ought we to attribute it, not to ourselves, but to God, who is blessed forever. Amen.