Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c8

Chapter 8

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ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ [25] στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶν δ᾽ ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων.	Quicumque quidem igitur unum ipsum omne et unam esse quandam naturam ut materiam ponunt, et eam corpoream et magnitudinem habentem, palam quia multiphciter delinquunt. Corporum enim elementa ponunt solum, incorporeorum ↵ vero non, existentibus et incorporeis.	Chapter 8. Those, then, who say the universe is one and posit one kind of thing as matter, and as corporeal matter which has spatial magnitude, evidently go astray in many ways. For they posit the elements of bodies only, not of incorporeal things, though there are also incorporeal things.
καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐπιχειροῦντες τὰς αἰτίας λέγειν, καὶ περὶ πάντων φυσιολογοῦντες, τὸ τῆς κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀναιροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ τὴν οὐσίαν μηθενὸς αἰτίαν τιθέναι μηδὲ τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῷ ῥᾳδίως τῶν [30] ἁπλῶν σωμάτων λέγειν ἀρχὴν ὁτιοῦν πλὴν γῆς, οὐκ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν πῶς ποιοῦνται, λέγω δὲ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ συγκρίσει τὰ δὲ διακρίσει ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρότερον εἶναι καὶ ὕστερον διαφέρει πλεῖστον.	De generatione quoque et corruptione causam dicere conantes, et de omnibus phisice tractantes, motus causam auferunt. Amplius autem * substantiam nullius ponere causam nec * quod quid est, et ad haec facile esse quodcumque simplicium corporum principium ↵ excepta terra, non considerantes eam quae ex * invicem generationem aliqualiter faciunt; dico autem ignem et aquam et terram et aerem. Haec quidem enim congregatione illa vero disgregatione ex ad invicem fiunt; hoc autem ad prius esse ƿ ↵ et posterius plurimum differt.	And in trying to state the causes of generation and destruction, and in giving a physical account of all things, they do away with the cause of movement. Further, they err in not positing the substance, i.e. the essence, as the cause of anything, and besides this in lightly calling any of the simple bodies except earth the first principle, without inquiring how they are produced out of one anothers- I mean fire, water, earth, and air. For some things are produced out of each other by combination, others by separation, and this makes the greatest difference to their priority and posteriority.
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἂν [35] δόξειε στοιχειωδέστατον εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὗ γίγνονται συγκρίσει πρώτου, [989α] [1] τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἂν εἴη τῶν σωμάτων (διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι, μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένως ἂν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν: τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος ὁμολογεῖ τὸ στοιχεῖον εἶναι τὸ τῶν σωμάτων:	Aliqualiter enim utique vide↵bitur maxime elementale esse omnium ex quo primo fiunt congregatione, tale vero est quod minutissime partis et subtilissimum est corporum. Unde quicumque ponunt ignem principium, maxime confesse rationi huic dicunt. Tale vero et aliorum unusquisque confitetur elementum esse quod corporum.	For (1) in a way the property of being most elementary of all would seem to belong to the first thing [89a] from which they are produced by combination, and this property would belong to the most fine-grained and subtle of bodies. For this reason those who make fire the principle would be most in agreement with this argument. But each of the other thinkers agrees that the element of corporeal things is of this sort.
[5] οὐθεὶς γοῦν ἠξίωσε τῶν ἓν λεγόντων γῆν εἶναι στοιχεῖον, δηλονότι διὰ τὴν μεγαλομέρειαν, τῶν δὲ τριῶν ἕκαστον στοιχείων εἴληφέ τινα κριτήν, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ οἱ δ᾽ ὕδωρ οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα τοῦτ᾽ εἶναί φασιν: καίτοι διὰ τί ποτ᾽ οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πάντα [10] γὰρ εἶναί φασι γῆν, φησὶ δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος τὴν γῆν πρώτην γενέσθαι τῶν σωμάτων: οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτικὴν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν ὑπόληψιν): κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτ᾽ εἴ τις τούτων τι λέγει πλὴν πυρός, οὔτ᾽ εἴ τις ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον τοῦτο τίθησιν ὕδατος δὲ [15] λεπτότερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι:	↵ Nullus enim posteriorum et unum dicentium terram esse elementum voluit, palam quia propter magnitudinem partialitatis. Quodlibet autem trium elementorum iudicem quendam accepit; hii namque ignem illi vero aquam alii aerem hoc esse dicunt. Sed quare non et terram dicunt, quemadmodum homi↵num multi? Omnia namque terram esse dicunt. Dicit autem et Esiodus terram primam corporum factam esse; sic enim antiquam et popularem contingit esse existimationem. Secundum hanc igitur rationem nec si quis horum aliquid dicit praeter ignem, nec si quis aere quidem spissius hoc ponit aqua ↵ vero subtilius, non recte utique dicet.	At least none of those who named one element claimed that earth was the element, evidently because of the coarseness of its grain. (Of the other three elements each has found some judge on its side; for some maintain that fire, others that water, others that air is the element. Yet why, after all, do they not name earth also, as most men do? For people say all things are earth Hesiod says earth was produced first of corporeal things; so primitive and popular has the opinion been.) According to this argument, then, no one would be right who either says the first principle is any of the elements other than fire, or supposes it to be denser than air but rarer than water.
εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πεπεμμένον καὶ συγκεκριμένον ὕστερον τῇ γενέσει, τοὐναντίον ἂν εἴη τούτων, ὕδωρ μὲν ἀέρος πρότερον γῆ δὲ ὕδατος.	Si vero est quod generatione posterius * natura prius, et quod est digestum et concretum posterius generatione, horum utique erit contrarium: aqua quidem aere prior et terra aqua.	But (2) if that which is later in generation is prior in nature, and that which is concocted and compounded is later in generation, the contrary of what we have been saying must be true,-water must be prior to air, and earth to water.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μίαν τιθεμένων αἰτίαν οἵαν εἴπομεν, ἔστω ταῦτ᾽ εἰρημένα: τὸ δ᾽ [20] αὐτὸ κἂν εἴ τις ταῦτα πλείω τίθησιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τέτταρά φησιν εἶναι σώματα τὴν ὕλην. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν ταὐτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἴδια συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη. γιγνόμενά τε γὰρ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ὁρῶμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ διαμένοντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος (εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως περὶ αὐτῶν), [25] καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν κινουμένων αἰτίας, πότερον ἓν ἢ δύο θετέον, οὔτ᾽ ὀρθῶς οὔτε εὐλόγως οἰητέον εἰρῆσθαι παντελῶς.	De ponentibus quidem igitur unam causam qualem dixi↵mus sint haec dicta. Idem autem [Idem quoque] et si quis haec plura ponit, velut Empedocles quatuor dicit esse corpora materiam. Et enim huic haec quidem eadem illa vero propria accidere * necesse. Ex ad invicem enim generata cernimus quasi non semper igne et terra eodem corpore permanente (dictum est autem de eis ↵ in phisicis); et de moventium causa, utrum unum aut plura * ponendum, nec recte nec irrationabiliter putandum est ƿ omnino dictum esse.	So much, then, for those who posit one cause such as we mentioned; but the same is true if one supposes more of these, as Empedocles says matter of things is four bodies. For he too is confronted by consequences some of which are the same as have been mentioned, while others are peculiar to him. For we see these bodies produced from one another, which implies that the same body does not always remain fire or earth (we have spoken about this in our works on nature); and regarding the cause of movement and the question whether we must posit one or two, he must be thought to have spoken neither correctly nor altogether plausibly.
ὅλως τε ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν: οὐ γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν οὐδὲ ἐκ ψυχροῦ θερμὸν ἔσται. τὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἂν πάσχοι τἀναντία, καὶ τὶς εἴη ἂν μία φύσις ἡ γιγνομένη [30] πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὃ ἐκεῖνος οὔ φησιν.	Et ex toto alterationem auferri est necesse sic dicentibus; non enim ex calido frigidum nec ex frigido calidum erit. Quid enim haec patietur contraria, et quae est una natura quae fit ignis et aqua: quod ille non ait.	And in general, change of quality is necessarily done away with for those who speak thus, for on their view cold will not come from hot nor hot from cold. For if it did there would be something that accepted the contraries themselves, and there would be some one entity that became fire and water, which Empedocles denies.
Ἀναξαγόραν δ᾽ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι δύο λέγειν στοιχεῖα, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον, ὃν ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν, ἠκολούθησε μέντ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν.	↵ Anaxagoram vero si quis susceperit elementa duo dicere, suscipiat maxime secundum rationem, quam ille quidem non dearticulavit; secutus est enim * ex necessitate dicentes eam.	As regards Anaxagoras, if one were to suppose that he said there were two elements, the supposition would accord thoroughly with an argument which Anaxagoras himself did not state articulately, but which he must have accepted if any one had led him on to it.
ἀτόπου γὰρ ὄντος καὶ ἄλλως τοῦ φάσκειν μεμῖχθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν πάντα, [989β] [1] καὶ διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν ἄμικτα δεῖν προϋπάρχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι τῷ τυχόντι μίγνυσθαι τὸ τυχόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα χωρίζοιτ᾽ ἂν τῶν οὐσιῶν (τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν μῖξίς ἐστι καὶ χωρισμός), ὅμως εἴ τις ἀκολουθήσειε [5] συνδιαρθρῶν ἃ βούλεται λέγειν, ἴσως ἂν φανείη καινοπρεπεστέρως λέγων. ὅτε γὰρ οὐθὲν ἦν ἀποκεκριμένον, δῆλον ὡς οὐθὲν ἦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὅτι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἢ φαιὸν ἢ ἄλλο χρῶμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἄχρων ἦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης: εἶχε γὰρ ἄν τι τούτων [10] τῶν χρωμάτων: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄχυμον τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὁμοίων οὐθέν: οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τί. τῶν γὰρ ἐν μέρει τι λεγομένων εἰδῶν ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον μεμιγμένων γε πάντων: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἀπεκέκριτο, φησὶ δ᾽ [15] εἶναι μεμιγμένα πάντα πλὴν τοῦ νοῦ, τοῦτον δὲ ἀμιγῆ μόνον καὶ καθαρόν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς τό τε ἕν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγές) καὶ θάτερον, οἷον τίθεμεν τὸ ἀόριστον πρὶν ὁρισθῆναι καὶ μετασχεῖν εἴδους τινός, ὥστε λέγει μὲν οὔτ᾽ ὀρθῶς οὔτε σαφῶς, βούλεται μέντοι [20] τι παραπλήσιον τοῖς τε ὕστερον λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν φαινομένοις μᾶλλον.	Nam absurdo existente et aliter dicere permixta esse a principio omnia, et quia oportet accidere quod impermixta preexis↵tant et quia non aptum est cuilibet permisceri quodlibet. Ad haec autem quia passiones et accidentia separantur a substantiis; eorundem enim permixtio et separatio. Tamen si quis prosequitur dearticulans quae vult dicere, forsan apparebit mirabilius ↵ dicens. Quando namque nihil erat discretum, palam quia nihil erat verum dicere de substantia illa. Dico autem quia neque album neque nigrum aut fuscum aut alium colorem, sed non colorata erat ex necessitate; horum enim colorum aliquem ↵ haberet. Similiter autem et sine sapore eadem * hac ratione, nec aliud similium nihil; nec enim quale aliquid id possibile esse nec quantum nec quid. Aliqua enim dictarum in parte specierum inesset utique ei, sed hoc impossibile permixtis omnibus; iam enim discreta essent, dicit autem permixta esse omnia ↵ praeter intellectum, hunc autem impermixtum solum et purum. Ex hiis itaque accidit ei dicere principia ipsum * unum (hoc enim simplex et impermixtum) et alterum, quale ponimus indeterminatum antequam determinetur et quadam specie participet. Quare dicitur quidem nec recte nec plane, vult tamen aliquid simile posterius dicentibus et nunc apparentibus ↵ magis.	True, to say that in the beginning all things were mixed is absurd both on other grounds and because it follows that they must have existed before [89b] in an unmixed form, and because nature does not allow any chance thing to be mixed with any chance thing, and also because on this view modifications and accidents could be separated from substances (for the same things which are mixed can be separated); yet if one were to follow him up, piecing together what he means, he would perhaps be seen to be somewhat modern in his views. For when nothing was separated out, evidently nothing could be truly asserted of the substance that then existed. I mean, e.g. that it was neither white nor black, nor grey nor any other colour, but of necessity colourless; for if it had been coloured, it would have had one of these colours. And similarly, by this same argument, it was flavourless, nor had it any similar attribute; for it could not be either of any quality or of any size, nor could it be any definite kind of thing. For if it were, one of the particular forms would have belonged to it, and this is impossible, since all were mixed together; for the particular form would necessarily have been already separated out, but he all were mixed except reason, and this alone was unmixed and pure. From this it follows, then, that he must say the principles are the One (for this is simple and unmixed) and the Other, which is of such a nature as we suppose the indefinite to be before it is defined and partakes of some form. Therefore, while expressing himself neither rightly nor clearly, he means something like what the later thinkers say and what is now more clearly seen to be the case.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτοι μὲν τοῖς περὶ γένεσιν λόγοις καὶ φθορὰν καὶ κίνησιν οἰκεῖοι τυγχάνουσι μόνον (σχεδὸν γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητοῦσι μόνης):	Verum hii quidem * hiis qui circa generationem sermonibus et corruptionem et motum proprii sunt solum; fere namque circa talis substantiae principia et causas quaerunt solum.	But these thinkers are, after all, at home only in arguments about generation and destruction and movement; for it is practically only of this sort of substance that they seek the principles and the causes.
ὅσοι δὲ περὶ μὲν ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ποιοῦνται [25] τὴν θεωρίαν, τῶν δ᾽ ὄντων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθητὰ τιθέασι, δῆλον ὡς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν γενῶν ποιοῦνται τὴν [27] ἐπίσκεψιν: διὸ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἐνδιατρίψειε περὶ αὐτῶν, τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγουσιν εἰς τὴν τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν προκειμένων σκέψιν.	ƿ ↵ Quicumque vero de omnibus existentibus * faciunt theoriam, existentium autem haec quidem sensibilia illa vero insensibilia ponunt, palam quia de utrisque generibus perscrutationem faciunt. Propter quod magis utique immorabitur aliquis de eis, quid bene aut non bene dicunt ad presentem nobis propositorum perscrutationem.	But those who extend their vision to all things that exist, and of existing things suppose some to be perceptible and others not perceptible, evidently study both classes, which is all the more reason why one should devote some time to seeing what is good in their views and what bad from the standpoint of the inquiry we have now before us.
οἱ μὲν οὖν καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι ταῖς μὲν [30] ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐκτοπωτέροις χρῶνται τῶν φυσιολόγων (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι παρέλαβον αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν: τὰ γὰρ μαθηματικὰ τῶν ὄντων ἄνευ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἔξω τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν), διαλέγονται μέντοι καὶ πραγματεύονται περὶ φύσεως πάντα: γεννῶσί τε γὰρ τὸν οὐρανόν, [990α] [1] καὶ περὶ τὰ τούτου μέρη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα διατηροῦσι τὸ συμβαῖνον, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ αἴτια εἰς ταῦτα καταναλίσκουσιν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦντες τοῖς ἄλλοις φυσιολόγοις ὅτι τό γε ὂν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσον αἰσθητόν ἐστι καὶ περιείληφεν ὁ [5] καλούμενος οὐρανός. τὰς δ᾽ αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἱκανὰς λέγουσιν ἐπαναβῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνωτέρω τῶν ὄντων, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς περὶ φύσεως λόγοις ἁρμοττούσας.	↵ * Pytagorici quidem igitur * vocati principiis et elementis extranee a phisiologis sunt usi. Causa vero quia acceperunt ea ex non sensibilibus; nam mathematica existentium sine motu sunt, extra ea quae sunt circa astrologiam. Disputant tamen et ↵ tractant omnia de natura; generant enim celum, et quod circa huius partes et passiones et operationes accidit observant, et principia et causas in haec dispensant, quasi aliis phisiologis consentientes quia ens hoc est quodcumque sensibile est et ↵ comprehendit vocatum celum. Causas vero et principia, sicut diximus, dicunt sufficientia pertingere usque ad ea quae sunt entium superiora, et magis quam de natura rationibus convenientia.	The ‘Pythagoreans’ treat of principles and elements stranger than those of the physical philosophers (the reason is that they got the principles from non-sensible things, for the objects of mathematics, except those of astronomy, are of the class of things without movement); yet their discussions and investigations are all about nature; for they [90a] generate the heavens, and with regard to their parts and attributes and functions they observe the phenomena, and use up the principles and the causes in explaining these, which implies that they agree with the others, the physical philosophers, that the real is just all that [90a 4] which is perceptible and contained by the so-called ‘heavens’. But the causes and the principles which they mention are, as we said, sufficient to act as steps even up to the higher realms of reality, and are more suited to these than to theories about nature.
ἐκ τίνος μέντοι τρόπου κίνησις ἔσται πέρατος καὶ ἀπείρου μόνων ὑποκειμένων καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου, οὐθὲν [10] λέγουσιν, ἢ πῶς δυνατὸν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν ἢ τὰ τῶν φερομένων ἔργα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν.	Ex quo tamen modo motus inerit fini et infinito solum ↵ suppositis et pari et impari, non dicunt, aut quomodo possibile sine motu et transmutatione generationem et corruptionem esse aut eorum quae feruntur opera circa celum.	They do not tell us at all, however, how there can be movement if limit and unlimited and odd and even are the only things assumed, or how without movement and change there can be generation and destruction, or the bodies that move through the heavens can do what they do.
ἔτι δὲ εἴτε δοίη τις αὐτοῖς ἐκ τούτων εἶναι μέγεθος εἴτε δειχθείη τοῦτο, ὅμως τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τὰ μὲν κοῦφα τὰ δὲ βάρος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων; ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ὑποτίθενται [15] καὶ λέγουσιν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λέγουσι σωμάτων ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν: διὸ περὶ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν εἰρήκασιν, ἅτε οὐθὲν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἶμαι λέγοντες ἴδιον.	Amplius autem sive quis det eis ex hiis esse magnitudinem sive hoc ostendatur, tamen quomodo erunt haec corporum levia ↵ illa vero gravitatem habentia? Ex quibus enim supponunt et dicunt, nihil magis de mathematicis dicunt corporibus quam de sensibilibus; unde de igne aut terra aut aliis huiusmodi corporibus nihil dixerunt, sicut nihil de sensibilibus existimo dicentes proprium.	Further, if one either granted them that spatial magnitude consists of these elements, or this were proved, still how would some bodies be light and others have weight? To judge from what they assume and maintain they are speaking no more of mathematical bodies than of perceptible; hence they have said nothing whatever about fire or earth or the other bodies of this sort, I suppose because they have nothing to say which applies peculiarly to perceptible things.
ἔτι δὲ πῶς δεῖ λαβεῖν αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πάθη καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν [20] τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὄντων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ νῦν, ἀριθμὸν δ᾽ ἄλλον μηθένα εἶναι παρὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξ οὗ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος; ὅταν γὰρ ἐν τῳδὶ μὲν τῷ μέρει δόξα καὶ καιρὸς αὐτοῖς ᾖ, μικρὸν δὲ ἄνωθεν ἢ κάτωθεν ἀδικία καὶ κρίσις ἢ μῖξις, ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγωσιν ὅτι [25] τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἀριθμός ἐστι, συμβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἤδη πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν συνισταμένων μεγεθῶν διὰ τὸ τὰ πάθη ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς τόποις ἑκάστοις, πότερον οὗτος ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἀριθμός, ὁ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὃν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ἢ παρὰ τοῦτον ἄλλος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ [30] Πλάτων ἕτερον εἶναί φησιν: καίτοι κἀκεῖνος ἀριθμοὺς οἴεται καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν νοητοὺς αἰτίους τούτους δὲ αἰσθητούς.	Amplius autem quomodo oportet accipere causas quidem ↵ esse numeri passiones et numerum circa celum existentium et factorum et ab initio et nunc, numerum vero alium nullum ƿ esse praeter numerum hunc ex quo constitit mundus? Nam cum in hac parte opinio et tempus sit eis, parum vero desuper aut subtus iniustitia et discretio aut permixtio, * demonstrationem autem dicant quia horum unumquodque numerus est, accidit ↵ autem secundum hunc locum iam pluralitatem esse constitutarum magnitudinum, quia passiones hae sequuntur singula loca: utrum idem est hic numerus qui in celo est, quem oportet accipere quia horum unumquodque est, aut praeter hunc alius? Plato namque alium ait esse; existimat etiam quidem et ille ↵ numeros * haec esse et horum causas, sed illos quidem intellectuales causas hos vero sensibiles.	Further, how are we to combine the beliefs that the attributes of number, and number itself, are causes of what exists and happens in the heavens both from the beginning and now, and that there is no other number than this number out of which the world is composed? When in one particular region they place opinion and opportunity, and, a little above or below, injustice and decision or mixture, and allege, as proof, that each of these is a number, and that there happens to be already in this place a plurality of the extended bodies composed of numbers, because these attributes of number attach to the various places, - this being so, is this number, which we must suppose each of these abstractions to be, the same number which is exhibited in the material universe, or is it another than this? Plato says it is different; yet even he thinks that both these bodies and their causes are numbers, but that the intelligible numbers are causes, while the others are sensible.