Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c10

Chapter 10

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἐναντία (στέρησις γὰρ ἀδυναμία διωρισμένη), ἀνάγκη ἕτερον εἶναι τῷ γένει τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον.	Quoniam vero contraria * diversa specie, * corruptibile autem et incorruptibile contraria (privatio enim est impotentia determinata), necesse diversum esse genere corruptibile et incorruptibile.	Chapter 10. Since contraries are other in form, and the perishable and the imperishable are contraries (for privation is a determinate incapacity), the perishable and the imperishable must be different in kind.
νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰρήκαμεν τῶν καθόλου [30] ὀνομάτων, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν ἄφθαρτον καὶ φθαρτὸν ἕτερα εἶναι τῷ εἴδει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, καὶ ἅμα, ἐὰν ᾖ τῶν καθόλου, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν καὶ λευκὸς καὶ μέλας, καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: εἴη γὰρ ἄν, μὴ ἅμα, ὁ αὐτὸς [35] λευκὸς καὶ μέλας: καίτοι ἐναντίον τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι):	↵ Nunc ergo diximus de hiis universalibus nominibus, ut autem videbitur non necesse esse quodcumque incorruptibile et corruptibile diversa specie esse, quemadmodum neque album et nigrum, idem enim contingit esse, et simul, si fuerit universalium, quemadmodum homo erit utique et albus et niger, ↵ et singularium; erit enim, non simul, idem * albus et niger. * equidem album contrarium nigro.	Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every pale thing is different in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both pale and dark), and if it is an individual it can still be both; for the same man can be, though not at the same time, pale and dark. Yet pale is contrary to dark.
ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει ἐνίοις, οἷον καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον: [1059α] [1] οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι φθαρτὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἐστὶν οἷς ὑπάρχει: ἢ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν φθαρτὸν [5] καὶ ἄφθαρτον, εἰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ φθαρτόν. ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τὸ φθαρτὸν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φθαρτῶν. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου: τῶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἄμφω. ᾗ ἄρα καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ πρῶτον τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτον, [10] ἔχει ἀντίθεσιν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη γένει ἕτερα εἶναι.	ƿ Sed contrariorum haec quidem secundum accidens insunt quibusdam, ut quae nunc dicta sunt et alia multa, haec autem impossibile, quorum est et corruptibile et incorruptibile. ↵ nihil enim est corruptibile secundum accidens. Nam accidens contingit non existere, et corruptibile ex necessitate existentium est quibus inest; aut erit idem et unum corruptibile et incorrup↵tibile, si contingit non existere * ipsi corruptibile. Aut * substantiam igitur aut in substantia necesse est inesse corruptibile unicuique corruptibilium. Eadem vero ratio et de incorruptibili *; ex necessitate enim existentium ambo sunt. In quantum igitur et secundum quod primum hoc quidem corruptibile hoc autem incorruptibile, habet oppositionem, unde necesse ↵ genere esse diversa.	But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e.g. both those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are perishable and [59a] imperishable . For nothing is by accident perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being present, but perishableness is one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong; or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι εἴδη τοιαῦτα οἷα λέγουσί τινες: ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὲν φθαρτὸς ὁ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτος. καίτοι τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὰ λέγεται εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τοῖς τισὶ καὶ οὐχ ὁμώνυμα: τὰ δὲ γένει ἕτερα πλεῖον διέστηκεν ἢ τὰ εἴδει.	Palam igitur quod non contingit esse species tales quales dicunt quidam; erit enim homo hic quidem corruptibilis hic autem incorruptibilis. Equidem specie eadem dicuntur esse species ipsis quibusdam et non equivoca. Diversa vero genere plus distant quam quae specie.	Evidently, then, there cannot be Forms such as some maintain, for then one man would be perishable and another imperishable. Yet the Forms are said to be the same in form with the individuals and not merely to have the same name; but things which differ in kind are farther apart than those which differ in form.