Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c4

Chapter 4

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἔστι τις καὶ μεγίστη διαφορά,	Quoniam autem differre contingit ab invicem differentia plus et minus, est aliqua et maxima differentia,	Chapter 4. Since things which differ may differ from one another more or less, there is also a greatest difference,
καὶ ταύτην [5] λέγω ἐναντίωσιν. ὅτι δ᾽ ἡ μεγίστη ἐστὶ διαφορά, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένει διαφέροντα οὐκ ἔχει ὁδὸν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπέχει πλέον καὶ ἀσύμβλητα: τοῖς δ᾽ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσὶν ὡς ἐσχάτων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐσχάτων διάστημα μέγιστον, ὥστε [10] καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων.	et hanc dico contrarietatem. Quia vero maxima est differentia, palam ↵ ex inductione. Genere namque differentia non habent viam in invicem, sed distant magis et inconferibiliter. Differentibus ƿ vero specie generationes ex contrariis sunt ut ultimis, ultimo↵rum vero distantia maxima est; quare et quae * contrariorum.	and this I call contrariety. That contrariety is the greatest difference is made clear by induction. For things which differ in genus have no way to one another, but are too far distant and are not comparable; and for things that differ in species the extremes from which generation takes place are the contraries, and the distance between extremes – and therefore that between the contraries – is the greatest.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέγιστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει τέλειον. μέγιστόν τε γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ τέλειον οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν τι δυνατόν: τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά (ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα τῷ τέλος ἔχειν λέγεται τέλεια), τοῦ δὲ τέλους οὐθὲν ἔξω: ἔσχατον γὰρ ἐν παντὶ [15] καὶ περιέχει, διὸ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ τέλους, οὐδὲ προσδεῖται οὐδενὸς τὸ τέλειον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ διαφορὰ τέλειος, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον: πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένων τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ τελείως οὕτως ὡς ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίοις εἶναι ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς.	At vero maximum in unoquoque genere * perfectum. Maximum enim * cuius non est excessus, et perfectum cuius non est adhuc extra sumere aliquid possibile; finem enim habet perfecta differentia, sicut et alia eo quod finem habeant dicuntur perfecta. Nihil autem extra finem; ultimum enim ↵ in omni et continet. Propter quod nihil extra finem, nec eget aliquo quod perfectum *. Quod quidem igitur contrarietas est differentia perfecta, ex hiis palam. Multipliciter autem dictis contrariis, sequetur quod perfecte * sic ut utique et quod est contrariis esse extiterit ipsis.	But surely that which is greatest in each class is complete. For that is greatest which cannot be exceeded, and that is complete beyond which nothing can be found. For the complete difference marks the end of a series (just as the other things which are called complete are so called because they have attained an end), and beyond the end there is nothing; for in everything it is the extreme and includes all else, and therefore there is nothing beyond the end, and the complete needs nothing further. From this, then, it is clear that contrariety is complete difference; and as contraries are so called in several senses, their modes of completeness will answer to the various modes of contrariety which attach to the contraries.
τούτων δὲ ὄντων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται [20] ἑνὶ πλείω ἐναντία εἶναι (οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώτερον εἴη ἄν τι, οὔτε τοῦ ἑνὸς διαστήματος πλείω δυοῖν ἔσχατα),	Hiis autem entibus ↵ palam quod non contingit plura uni contraria esse; nec enim ultimo ulterius erit utique aliquid, nec distantie unius plura sunt quam duo ultima.	This being so, it is clear that one thing have more than one contrary (for neither can there be anything more extreme than the extreme, nor can there be more than two extremes for the one interval),
ὅλως τε εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἐναντιότης διαφορά, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ δυοῖν, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τέλειος.	Totaliter autem si est contrarietas differentia, differentia vero duorum, quare et perfecta.	and, to put the matter generally, this is clear if contrariety is a difference, and if difference, and therefore also the complete difference, must be between two things.
ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅρους ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ γὰρ πλεῖστον διαφέρει ἡ τέλειος [25] διαφορά (τῶν τε γὰρ γένει διαφερόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξωτέρω λαβεῖν καὶ τῶν εἴδει: δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω τοῦ γένους οὐκ ἔστι διαφορά, τούτων δ᾽ αὕτη μεγίστη), καὶ τὰ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει πλεῖστον διαφέροντα ἐναντία (μεγίστη γὰρ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ τέλειος), καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ πλεῖστον [30] διαφέροντα ἐναντία (ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς ἐναντίοις) καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν πλεῖστον διαφέροντα (καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἓν γένος ἡ μία): ἐν οἷς ἡ τελεία διαφορὰ μεγίστη.	Necesse autem et alios terminos esse veros contrariorum. ↵ Et enim plurimum differt perfecta differentia; genere namque differentibus non est magis extra accipere et hiis quae specie; ostensum est enim quia ad ea quae sunt extra genus non est differentia, horum autem haec * maxima. Et in eodem genere plurimum differentia contraria *; maxima namque differentia horum * quae perfecta. Et quae in eodem susceptivo plurimum ↵differentia; eadem enim est materia contrariis. Et quae * sub ƿ eadem potentia plurimum * differentia; et enim scientia circa unum genus quae una, in quibus perfecta differentia maxima.	And the other commonly accepted definitions of contraries are also necessarily true. For not only is (1) the complete difference the greatest difference (for we can get no difference beyond it of things differing either in genus or in species; for it has been shown that there is no difference between anything and the things outside its genus, and among the things which differ in species the complete difference is the greatest); but also (2) the things in the same genus which differ most are contrary (for the complete difference is the greatest difference between species of the same genus); and (3) the things in the same receptive material which differ most are contrary (for the matter is the same for contraries); and (4) of the things which fall under the same faculty the most different are contrary (for one science deals with one class of things, and in these the complete difference is the greatest).
πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἕξις καὶ στέρησίς ἐστιν: οὐ πᾶσα δὲ στέρησις (πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται ἡ στέρησις) [35] ἀλλ᾽ ἥτις ἂν τελεία ᾖ.	Prima vero contrarietas habitus et privatio est; sed non omnis privatio (multipliciter enim dicitur privatio) sed quaecum↵quae perfecta fuerit.	The primary contrariety is that between positive state and privation – not every privation, however (for privation has several meanings), but that which is complete.
τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἐναντία κατὰ ταῦτα λεχθήσεται, τὰ μὲν τῷ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ λήψεις εἶναι καὶ ἀποβολαὶ τούτων ἢ ἄλλων ἐναντίων.	Alia autem contraria secundum haec dicentur, haec quidem per habere illa vero per facere aut factiva esse, alia autem per acceptiones esse et abiectiones horum aut aliorum contrariorum.	And the other contraries must be called so with reference to these, some because they possess these, others because they produce or tend to produce them, others because they are acquisitions or losses of these or of other contraries.
εἰ δὴ ἀντίκειται μὲν ἀντίφασις καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἐναντιότης καὶ τὰ πρός τι, [1055β] [1] τούτων δὲ πρῶτον ἀντίφασις, ἀντιφάσεως δὲ μηδέν ἐστι μεταξύ, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων ἐνδέχεται, ὅτι μὲν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀντίφασις καὶ τἀναντία δῆλον:	Si igitur opponuntur contradictio et privatio et contrarietas et ad aliquid, horum autem ↵ primum contradictio, contradictionis autem nihil est medium, contrariorum autem contingit: quod quidem non idem contradictio et contraria, palam.	Now if the kinds of opposition are contradiction and priva[55b]tion and contrariety and relation, and of these the first is contradiction, and contradiction admits of no intermediate, while contraries admit of one, clearly contradiction and contrariety are not the same.
ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τίς ἐστιν: ἢ γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἔχειν, [5] ἢ ὃ ἂν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ, ἐστέρηται ἢ ὅλως ἢ πὼς ἀφορισθέν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὥσπερ διῄρηται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις), ὥστ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τις ἢ ἀδυναμία διορισθεῖσα ἢ συνειλημμένη τῷ δεκτικῷ: διὸ ἀντιφάσεως μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μεταξύ, στερήσεως δέ τινος ἔστιν: ἴσον [10] μὲν γὰρ ἢ οὐκ ἴσον πᾶν, ἴσον δ᾽ ἢ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, μόνον ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ τοῦ ἴσου.	Privatio vero contradictio quaedam est. Aut enim quod impossibile est totaliter habere, aut si quod aptum natum * habere non habeat, priva↵tum est aut totaliter aut aliqualiter determinatum *; multipliciter enim iam hoc dicimus, sicut divisum est a nobis in aliis. Ergo privatio quaedam est contradictio aut impotentia determinata aut concepta cum susceptivo. Quapropter contradictionis quidem non est medium, sed privationis alicuius est; equale namque aut non equale omne, equale vero aut inequale non ↵ omne, nisi solum in susceptivo equalitatis.	But privation is a kind of contradiction; for what suffers privation, either in general or in some determinate way, either that which is quite incapable of having some attribute or that which, being of such a nature as to have it, has it not; here we have already a variety of meanings, which have been distinguished elsewhere. Privation, therefore, is a contradiction or incapacity which is determinate or taken along with the receptive material. This is the reason why, while contradiction does not admit of an intermediate, privation sometimes does; for everything is equal or not equal, but not everything is equal or unequal, or if it is, it is only within the sphere of that which is receptive of equality.
εἰ δὴ αἱ γενέσεις τῇ ὕλῃ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, γίγνονται δὲ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ἕξεως ἢ ἐκ στερήσεώς τινος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐναντίωσις στέρησις ἂν εἴη πᾶσα,	Si itaque generationes ipsi materie ex contrariis, fiuntque aut ex specie et ex speciei habitu aut privatione aliqua * speciei et forme, palam quia contrarietas privatio quaedam utique erit omnis.	If, then, the comings-to-be which happen to the matter start from the contraries, and proceed either from the form and the possession of the form or from a privation of the form or shape, clearly all contrariety must be privation,
ἡ δὲ στέρησις [15] ἴσως οὐ πᾶσα ἐναντιότης (αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐστερῆσθαι τὸ ἐστερημένον): ἐξ ὧν γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαὶ ἐσχάτων, ἐναντία ταῦτα.	Privatio vero non omnis forsan contrarietas. Causa vero quia multipliciter ↵ contingit privari privatum; ex quibus enim permutationes extremis, contraria haec *.	but presumably not all privation is contrariety (the reason being that that has suffered privation may have suffered it in several ways); for it is only the extremes from which changes proceed that are contraries.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐναντίωσις ἔχει στέρησιν θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντα: ἀνισότης μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἀνομοιότης [20] δὲ ὁμοιότητος κακία δὲ ἀρετῆς,	Palam autem et per inductionem. ƿ Omnis enim contrarietas habet privationem alterius contrario↵rum, sed non similiter omnia; nam inequalitas equalitatis et dissimilitudo similitudinis et malitia virtutis.	And this is obvious also by induction. For every contrariety involves, as one of its terms, a privation, but not all cases are alike; inequality is the privation of equality and unlikeness of likeness, and on the other hand vice is the privation of virtue.
διαφέρει δὲ ὥσπερ εἴρηται: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ ἐστερημένον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐὰν ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔν τινι, οἷον ἂν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τινὶ ἢ τῷ κυρίῳ, ἢ πάντῃ: διὸ τῶν μὲν ἔστι μεταξύ, καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος οὔτε κακός, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ περιττὸν ἢ [25] ἄρτιον. ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὡρισμένον, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀεὶ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται κατὰ στέρησιν:	Differt autem ut dictum est: hoc quidem enim si solum sit privatum, hoc autem si est aut quando aut in quo, ut si in etate aliqua aut principali aut omni. Quapropter horum quidem est medium, et est neque bonus homo neque malus, ↵ aliorum vero non est, sed necesse esse aut parem aut imparem. amplius alia quidem habent subiectum determinatum, alia autem non. Quare palam quia semper alterum contrariorum dicitur secundum privationem.	But the cases differ in a way already described; in one case we mean simply that the thing has suffered privation, in another case that it has done so either at a certain time or in a certain part (e.g. at a certain age or in the dominant part), or throughout. This is why in some cases there is a mean (there are men who are neither good nor bad), and in others there is not (a number must be either odd or even). Further, some contraries have their subject defined, others have not. Therefore it is evident that one of the contraries is always privative;
ἀπόχρη δὲ κἂν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πολλά: τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγεται. [30]	Sufficit autem et si prima et genera contrariorum, puta unum et multa; alia namque ad haec reducuntur.	but it is enough if this is true of the first – i.e. the generic – contraries, e.g. the one and the many; for the others can be reduced to these.