Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c5

Chapter 5

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πῶς ἀντίκειται τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πολλά, καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ.	↵ Quoniam autem unum uni contrarium est, dubitabit aliquis quomodo opponuntur unum et multa, et equale magno et parvo.	Chapter 5. Since one thing has one contrary, we might raise the question how the one is opposed to the many, and the equal to the great and the small.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πότερον ἀεὶ ἐν ἀντιθέσει λέγομεν, οἷον πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, καὶ πότερον λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκόν (πότερον δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἢ λευκὸν οὐ λέγομεν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξ [35] ὑποθέσεως καὶ ζητοῦντες οἷον πότερον ἦλθε Κλέων ἢ Σωκράτης—ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν οὐδενὶ γένει τοῦτο: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν: τὰ γὰρ ἀντικείμενα μόνα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ καὶ ἐνταῦθα χρῆται ἐν τῷ πότερος ἦλθεν: [1056α] [1] εἰ γὰρ ἅμα ἐνεδέχετο, γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα: εἰ δέ, καὶ οὕτως ὁμοίως ἐμπίπτει εἰς ἀντίθεσιν, εἰς τὸ ἓν ἢ πολλά, οἷον πότερον ἀμφότεροι ἦλθον ἢ ἅτερος):	‘Utrum’ enim semper in oppositione dicimus, ut utrum album aut nigrum, et utrum album aut non album. ↵ utrum vero homo aut album non dicimus, nisi ex suppositione, et quaerentes puta utrum venit cleon aut Socrates — Sed non ƿ necesse in neque uno genere hoc. Sed et hoc inde venit; nam opposita sola non contingit simul existere, quo et hic utitur in eo quod uter venit; si enim simul contingeret, ridicu↵losa foret interrogatio. Si vero, et ita similiter incidet in oppositionem, in id quod unum aut multa, ut utrum ambo venerunt aut alter.	For if we used the word whether only in an antithesis such as whether it is white or black , or whether it is white or not white (we do not ask whether it is a man or white ), unless we are proceeding on a prior assumption and asking something such as whether it was Cleon or Socrates that came as this is not a necessary disjunction in any class of things; yet even this is an extension from the case of opposites; for opposites alone cannot be present together; and we assume this incompatibility here too in asking which of the two [56a] came; for if they might both have come, the question would have been absurd; but if they might, even so this falls just as much into an antithesis, that of the one or many , i.e. whether both came or one of the two.
εἰ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἀεὶ τοῦ ποτέρου ἡ ζήτησις, λέγεται δὲ πότερον μεῖζον [5] ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἴσον, τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀντίθεσις πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ ἴσου; οὔτε γὰρ θατέρῳ μόνῳ ἐναντίον οὔτ᾽ ἀμφοῖν: τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τῷ μείζονι ἢ τῷ ἐλάττονι;	Si itaque in oppositis semper est ipsius ‘utrum’ interrogatio, dicitur autem utrum maius aut minus aut equale, ali↵qua est oppositio ad haec equalis. Non enim alteri soli contrarium nec ambobus; quid enim magis aut maiori aut minori?	If, then, the question whether is always concerned with opposites, and we can ask whether it is greater or less or equal , what is the opposition of the equal to the other two? It is not contrary either to one alone or to both; for why should it be contrary to the greater rather than to the less?
ἔτι τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἐναντίον τὸ ἴσον, ὥστε πλείοσιν ἔσται ἢ ἑνί. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον σημαίνει τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν, εἴη μὲν ἂν ἀντικείμενον ἀμφοῖν	Amplius inequali contrarium est equale. Quare in pluribus erit aut uno. Si vero inequale significat idem simul amborum, erit quidem utique oppositum ambobus.	Further, the equal is contrary to the unequal. Therefore if it is contrary to the greater and the less, it will be contrary to more things than one. But if the unequal means the same as both the greater and the less together, the equal will be opposite to both
[10] (καὶ ἡ ἀπορία βοηθεῖ τοῖς φάσκουσι τὸ ἄνισον δυάδα εἶναι),	Et dubitatio iuvat dicen↵tes inequale dualitatem esse.	(and the difficulty supports those who say the unequal is a two ),
ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἓν δυοῖν ἐναντίον: ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.	Sed accidit unum duobus contrarium, quod est impossibile.	but it follows that one thing is contrary to two others, which is impossible.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἴσον μεταξὺ φαίνεται μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, ἐναντίωσις δὲ μεταξὺ οὐδεμία οὔτε φαίνεται οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δυνατόν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τελεία μεταξύ τινος οὖσα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον [15] ἔχει ἀεὶ ἑαυτῆς τι μεταξύ. λείπεται δὴ ἢ ὡς ἀπόφασιν ἀντικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς στέρησιν.	Amplius equale quidem medium videtur esse magni et parui. Contrariatio autem intermedia neque videtur nec ex diffinitione possibile ; non enim utique erit perfecta mediatio alicuius existens, sed magis habet semper ↵ suimet aliquod medium.	Again, the equal is evidently intermediate between the great and the small, but no contrariety is either observed to be intermediate, or, from its definition, can be so; for it would not be complete if it were intermediate between any two things, but rather it always has something intermediate between its own terms.
θατέρου μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ μικροῦ;): ἀμφοῖν ἄρα ἀπόφασις στερητική, διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὸ πότερον λέγεται, πρὸς δὲ θάτερον οὔ (οἷον πότερον μεῖζον ἢ ἴσον, ἢ πότερον ἴσον ἢ [20] ἔλαττον), ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τρία.	Restat igitur aut ut negationem opponi aut ut privationem. Alterius quidem itaque non contingit; quid enim magis magni aut parvi? Amborum igitur negatio privativa . Quapropter ad ambo \jtrum’ dicitur, ad alterum vero non (ut utrum maius aut equale, aut utrum equale aut minus), sed semper tria.	It remains, then, that it is opposed either as negation or as privation. It cannot be the negation or privation of one of the two; for why of the great rather than of the small? It is, then, the privative negation of both. This is why whether is said with reference to both, not to one of the two (e.g. whether it is greater or equal or whether it is equal or less ); there are always three cases.
οὐ στέρησις δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἴσον ὃ μὴ μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνα. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μήτε μέγα μήτε μικρόν, πεφυκὸς δὲ ἢ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν εἶναι: καὶ ἀντίκειται ἀμφοῖν ὡς ἀπόφασις στερητική,	Non ↵ privatio autem ex necessitate; non enim omne equale quod ƿ non maius aut minus, sed in quibus aptum natum est esse. Est itaque equale quod neque * magnum neque parvum, aptum natum magnum aut parvum esse. Et opponitur ambobus ut negatio privativa.	But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything which is not greater or less is equal, but only the things which are of such a nature as to have these attributes. The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small but is naturally fitted to be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation
διὸ καὶ μεταξύ ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ μήτε [25] ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντίκειται ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνώνυμον: πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται ἑκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν τὸ δεκτικόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μήτε λευκὸν μήτε μέλαν. ἓν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὡρισμένα πως ἐφ᾽ ὧν λέγεται στερητικῶς ἡ ἀπόφασις αὕτη: ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ φαιὸν ἢ [30] ὠχρὸν εἶναι ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι ἄλλο.	Quapropter et medium est. Et quod neque ↵ malum neque bonum opponitur ambobus, sed innominatum; multipliciter enim dicitur utrumque et non est unum susceptivum. Sed magis quod neque album neque nigrum. Unum vero non hoc dicitur, sed determinati aliqualiter colores in quibus ↵ dicitur privative negatio haec; nam necesse aut pallidum aut rubeum esse aut tale aliquid aliud.	(and therefore is also intermediate). And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but has no name; for each of these has several meanings and the recipient subject is not one; but that which is neither white nor black has more claim to unity. Yet even this has not one name, though the colours of which this negation is privatively predicated are in a way limited; for they must be either grey or yellow or something else of the kind.
ὥστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶσιν οἱ νομίζοντες ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι πάντα, ὥστε ἔσεσθαι ὑποδήματος καὶ χειρὸς μεταξὺ τὸ μήτε ὑπόδημα μήτε χεῖρα, ἔπειπερ καὶ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὡς πάντων ἐσομένου τινὸς μεταξύ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη [35] δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικειμένων συναπόφασίς ἐστιν ὧν ἔστι μεταξύ τι καὶ διάστημά τι πέφυκεν εἶναι: [1056β] [1] τῶν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι διαφορά: ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ γένει ὧν αἱ συναποφάσεις, ὥστ᾽ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον.	Quare non recte increpant opinantes similiter dici omnia, ut sit * calcei et manus medium quod neque calceus neque manus, quoniam quidem et quod neque bonum neque malum boni et mali, tamquam ↵ omnium futuro aliquo medio. Non * necesse autem hoc accidere. Haec quidem enim oppositorum connegatio est quo ↵rum est medium ahquod et distantia aliqua * nata est esse, horum autem non est differentia; nam in alio genere quorum connegationes, quare non unum quod subicitur.	Therefore it is an incorrect criticism that is passed by those who think that all such phrases are used in the same way, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand would be intermediate between a shoe and a hand, since that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between the good and the bad – as if there must be an intermediate in all cases. But this does not necessarily follow. For the one phrase is a joint denial of opposites between which there is an intermediate and a certain natural [56b] interval; but between the other two there is no difference ; for the things, the denials of which are combined, belong to different classes, so that the substratum is not one.