Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c8

Chapter 8

Greek	Latin	English
τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει τινὸς τὶ ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν: οἷον εἰ ζῷον ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει, ἄμφω ζῷα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτο γένος καλῶ ὃ ἄμφω ἓν ταὐτὸ λέγεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχον διαφοράν, [1058α] [1] εἴτε ὡς ὕλη ὂν εἴτε ἄλλως. οὐ μόνον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἄμφω ζῷα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἑκατέρῳ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἵππον τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, διὸ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν ἕτερον ἀλλήλων [5] ἐστὶ τῷ εἴδει. ἔσται δὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὸ μὲν τοιονδὶ ζῷον τὸ δὲ τοιονδί, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἵππος τὸ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ἑτερότητα τοῦ γένους εἶναι. λέγω γὰρ γένους [8] διαφορὰν ἑτερότητα ἣ ἕτερον ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτό.	Diversum autem specie alicuius aliquid diversum est, ↵ et oportet hoc ambobus inesse; ut si animal diversum est specie, ambo * animalia. Necesse ergo in eodem genere esse diversa specie. Tale enim genus voco quod ambo unum et idem dicuntur, non secundum accidens habens differentiam, sive ut ↵ materia ens sive aliter. Non solum enim oportet commune existere, puta ambo animalia, sed et alterum utrilibet hoc ipsum animal, ut hoc quidem equum illud vero hominem. Propter quod hoc quod commune diversum ab invicem est ↵ specie. Erit itaque secundum se hoc quidem tale animal illud vero tale *, ut hoc quidem equus illud vero homo. Necesse ergo differentiam hanc diversitatem esse generis. Dico enim generis differentiam diversitatem quae diversum facit hoc ipsum.	Chapter 8. That which is other in species is other than something in something, and this must belong to both; e.g. if it is an animal other in species, both are animals. The things, then, which are other in species must be in the same genus. For by genus I mean that one identical thing which is predicated of both and is differentiated in no merely acci[58a]dental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise. For not only must the common nature attach to the different things, e.g. not only must both be animals, but this very animality must also be different for each (e.g. in the one case equinity, in the other humanity), and so this common nature is specifically different for each from what it is for the other. One, then, will be in virtue of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another, e.g. one a horse and the other a man. This difference, then, must be an otherness of the genus. For I give the name of difference in the genus an otherness which makes the genus itself other.
ἐναντίωσις τοίνυν ἔσται αὕτη (δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς): πάντα [10] γὰρ διαιρεῖται τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις,	ƿ Contrarietas igitur erit haec; palam autem et ex inductione. ↵ omnia enim dividuntur oppositis,	This, then, will be a contrariety (as can be shown also by induction). For all things are divided by opposites,
καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, δέδεικται: ἡ γὰρ ἐναντιότης ἦν διαφορὰ τελεία, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἡ εἴδει πᾶσα τινὸς τί, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ γένος ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν (διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία τῆς κατηγορίας ὅσα εἴδει διάφορα καὶ μὴ γένει, [15] ἕτερά τε ἀλλήλων μάλιστα—τελεία γὰρ ἡ διαφορά—καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις οὐ γίγνεται). ἡ ἄρα διαφορὰ ἐναντίωσίς ἐστιν. τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι τῷ εἴδει, τὸ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει ὄντα ἐναντίωσιν ἔχειν ἄτομα ὄντα (ταὐτὰ δὲ τῷ εἴδει ὅσα μὴ ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν ἄτομα ὄντα): ἐν γὰρ τῇ διαιρέσει καὶ [20] ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ γίγνονται ἐναντιώσεις πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν:	et quod contraria in eodem genere sunt, ostensum est. Nam contrarietas erat differentia perfecta. Differentia vero quae specie omnis alicuius aliquid *, quare hoc idemque et genus * in ambobus. Quare et in eadem coelementatione omnia * contraria cathegorie quaecumque * spe↵cie differentia et non genere, diversaque * ab invicem maxime; perfecta enim * difterentia, et simul * invicem non fit. Ergo differentia contrarietas est. Hoc enim est diversis esse specie: in eodem genere entia contrarietatem habere, entia individua. Eadem vero specie quaecumque non habent contrarietatem, ↵ individua entia. In divisione enim et in mediis fiunt contrarietates priusquam ad individua perveniatur.	and it has been proved that contraries are in the same genus. For contrariety was seen to be complete difference; and all difference in species is a difference from something in something; so that this is the same for both and is their genus. (Hence also all contraries which are different in species and not in genus are in the same line of predication, and other than one another in the highest degree – for the difference is complete – , and cannot be present along with one another.) The difference, then, is a contrariety. This, then, is what it is to be other in species – to have a contrariety, being in the same genus and being indivisible (and those things are the same in species which have no contrariety, being indivisible); we say being indivisible , for in the process of division contrarieties arise in the intermediate stages before we come to the indivisibles.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι πρὸς τὸ καλούμενον γένος οὔτε ταὐτὸν οὔτε ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει οὐθέν ἐστι τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν (προσηκόντως: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἀποφάσει δηλοῦται, τὸ δὲ γένος ὕλη οὗ λέγεται γένος—μὴ ὡς τὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ [25] ἐν τῇ φύσει), οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, ἀλλὰ διοίσει τῷ γένει ἐκείνων, εἴδει δὲ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει. ἐναντίωσιν γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν οὗ διαφέρει εἴδει: αὕτη δὲ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει οὖσι μόνοις.	Quare palam quia ad id quod vocatur genus nec idem nec diversum specie nihil est eorum quae conveniunt ut generis specierum. Nam materia negatione ostenditur, genus autem materia quod dicitur ↵ genus, non ut quod * Eraclitorum sed ut * in natura. Neque ad ea quae non in eodem genere, sed * different genere ab illis, specie vero ab eis quae in eodem genere. Contrarietatem enim necesse est esse differentiam, non differre specie; haec autem inest in eodem genere existentibus solis.	Evidently, therefore, with reference to that which is called the genus, none of the species-of-a-genus is either the same as it or other than it in species (and this is fitting; for the matter is indicated by negation, and the genus is the matter of that of which it is called the genus, not in the sense in which we speak of the genus or family of the Heraclidae, but in that in which the genus is an element in a thing's nature), nor is it so with reference to things which are not in the same genus, but it will differ in genus from them, and in species from things in the same genus. For a thing's difference from that from which it differs in species must be a contrariety; and this belongs only to things in the same genus.