Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l11/c1

Chapter 1

Greek	Latin	English
	METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER UNDECIMUS	Chapter 1. Aristotle Metaphysics Book 11 (K) 1 (See also B, chapters 2, 3). [59a 18]
[1059α] [18] ὅτι μὲν ἡ σοφία περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐν οἷς διηπόρηται πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων [20] εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν:	ƿ Quod quidem sapientia circa principia scientia est, palam ↵ ex primis in quibus dubitatum est ad dicta ab aliis de principiis.	THAT Wisdom is a science of first principles is evident from the introductory chapters, in which we have raised objections to the statements of others about the first principles;
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πότερον μίαν ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ πολλάς: εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν, μία γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ἐναντίαι: εἰ δὲ μὴ μία, ποίας δεῖ θεῖναι ταύτας;	Dubitabit autem utique quis utrum unam existimare esse oportet sapientiam scientiam aut multas. Si quidem enim unam, una autem est semper contrariorum, principia autem non contraria. Si autem non una, quales oportet ponere has?	but one might ask the question whether Wisdom is to be conceived as one science or as several. If as one, it may be objected that one science always deals with contraries, but the first principles are not contrary. If it is not one, what sort of sciences are those with which it is to be identified?
ἔτι τὰς ἀποδεικτικὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ [25] μιᾶς, τί μᾶλλον ταύτης ἢ ὁποιασοῦν; εἰ δὲ πλειόνων, ποίας δεῖ ταύτας τιθέναι;	Adhuc demonstrativa principia speculari unius aut plurium? ↵ si quidem enim unius, quid magis huius quam cuiuscumque? si autem plurium, quales oportet has ponere?	Further, is it the business of one science, or of more than one, to examine the first principles of demonstration? If of one, why of this rather than of any other? If of more, what sort of sciences must these be said to be?
ἔτι πότερον πασῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ἢ οὔ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ πασῶν, ποίων χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι: εἰ δὲ πασῶν μία, ἄδηλον πῶς ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι.	Adhuc utrum omnium substantiarum aut non? Si quidem enim non omnium, qualium difficile assignare. Si autem omnium una, non manifestum quomodo contingit plurium eandem scientiam esse.	Further, does Wisdom investigate all substances or not? If not all, it is hard to say which; but if, being one, it investigates them all, it is doubtful how the same science can embrace several subject-matters.
ἔτι πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον ἢ καὶ τὰ [30] συμβεβηκότα [ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν]; εἰ γὰρ περί γε τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, περὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν: εἰ δ᾽ ἑτέρα, τίς ἑκατέρα καὶ ποτέρα σοφία; ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδεικτική, σοφία ἡ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα: ᾗ δὲ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν.	↵ Adhuc utrum circa substantias solum aut et circa accidentia demonstratio est? Si enim circa accidentia demonstratio est, circa substantias non est. Si autem altera, quae utraque et utra sapientia? Demonstrativa quidem enim sapientia quae circa accidentia, haec autem circa prima quae substantiarum.	Further, does it deal with substances only or also with their attributes? If in the case of attributes demonstration is possible, in that of substances it is not. But if the two sciences are different, what is each of them and which is Wisdom? If we think of it as demonstrative, the science of the attributes is Wisdom, but if as dealing with what is primary, the science of substances claims the tide.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημένας αἰτίας [35] τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην θετέον: οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ ταῖς οὖσιν ἐν κινήσει: καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον κινεῖ—τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ τέλος—τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κινῆσαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις):	Sed neque ƿ circa dictas in phisicis causas quesitam scientiam ponendum. ↵ neque enim circa quod cuius gratia, tale enim bonum; hoc autem in operabilibus existit et existentibus in motu, et hoc primum movet (tale enim finis), primum autem movens non est in immobilibus.	But again the science we are looking for must not be supposed to deal with the causes which have been mentioned in the Physics. For (A) it does not deal with the final cause (for that is the nature of the good, and this is found in the field of action and movement; and it is the first mover-for that is the nature of the end-but in the case of things unmovable there is nothing that moved them first), and (B)
ὅλως δ᾽ ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερόν ποτε περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ, περὶ δέ τινας ἑτέρας. [1059β] [1] εἰ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλας, ἢ περὶ τὰ εἴδη εἴη ἂν ἢ περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον	Totaliter autem dubitationem habet utrum quidem circa sensibiles substantias est quesita nunc scientia aut non, circa quas ↵ autem alteras. Si enim circa alias, aut circa species aut, si sint, circa mathematica. Species quidem enim quod non sunt, palam.	in general it is hard to say whether perchance the science we are now looking for deals with perceptible substances or not with them, but with cer[59b]tain others. If with others, it must deal either with the Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now (a) evidently the Forms do not exist.
(ὅμως δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει, κἂν εἶναί τις αὐτὰ θῇ, διὰ τί ποτ᾽ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, [5] οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἔστιν εἴδη: λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι τὰ μαθηματικὰ μὲν μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασι καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἷον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τε καὶ τὰ δεῦρο, τρίτος δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ ἵππος παρ᾽ αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον:	At tamen dubitationem habet, et si esse quis ipsas ponat, propter quid quidem non quemadmodum in mathematicis sic habet ↵ et in aliis quorum sunt species. Dico autem quia mathematica quidem intermedia specierum ponunt et sensibilium velut tertia quaedam praeter species et quae hic, tertius autem homo non est neque equus praeter auton et singulares.	(But it is hard to say, even if one suppose them to exist, why in the world the same is not true of the other things of which there are Forms, as of the objects of mathematics. I mean that these thinkers place the objects of mathematics between the Forms and perceptible things, as a kind of third set of things apart both from the Forms and from the things in this world; but there is not a third man or horse besides the ideal and the individuals.
εἰ δ᾽ αὖ μὴ ἔστιν ὡς λέγουσι, [10] περὶ ποῖα θετέον πραγματεύεσθαι τὸν μαθηματικόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ τὰ δεῦρο: τούτων γὰρ οὐθέν ἐστιν οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ζητοῦσι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν): οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἡ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη (χωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐθέν): ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν: φθαρταὶ γάρ.	Si autem iterum non est ut dicunt, circa qualia ponendum negotiari mathematicum? ↵ Non enim utique circa ea quae hic; horum enim nullum est quale mathematice quaerunt scientiarum. Neque etiam circa mathematica quesita nunc est scientia; separabile enim ipsorum nullum. Sed neque sensibilium substantiarum; corruptibiles enim.	If on the other hand it is not as they say, with what sort of things must the mathematician be supposed to deal? Certainly not with the things in this world; for none of these is the sort of thing which the mathematical sciences demand.) Nor (b) does the science which we are now seeking treat of the objects of mathematics; for none of them can exist separately. But again it does not deal with perceptible substances; for they are perishable.
ὅλως δ᾽ ἀπορήσειέ [15] τις ἂν ποίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὸ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλης. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ πᾶσαν εἶναι πραγματείαν, οὐδὲ μὴν τῆς σκοπούσης περὶ ἀποδείξεώς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης: περὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ [20] γένος τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖται. λείπεται τοίνυν τὴν προκειμένην φιλοσοφίαν περὶ αὐτῶν τὴν σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι.	Totaliter autem dubitabit utique quis cuius est scientie dubi↵tare de mathematicarum materia. Neque enim phisice, propter circa habentia in ipsis principium motus et quietis naturalis omne esse negotium. Neque etiam intendentis de demonstratione et scientia; circa hoc ipsum genus enim inquisitionem ↵ ƿ facit. Relinquitur igitur propositam philosophiam de ipsis considerationem facere.	In general one might raise the question, to what kind of science it belongs to discuss the difficulties about the matter of the objects of mathematics. Neither to physics (because the whole inquiry of the physicist is about the things that have in themselves a principle. of movement and rest), nor yet to the science which inquires into demonstration and science; for this is just the subject which it investigates. It remains then that it is the philosophy which we have set before ourselves that treats of those subjects.
διαπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις εἰ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰ καλούμενα ὑπό τινων στοιχεῖα: ταῦτα δὲ πάντες ἐνυπάρχοντα τοῖς συνθέτοις τιθέασιν. μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἂν δόξειε [25] τῶν καθόλου δεῖν εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην: πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν οὕτω τῶν πρώτων γενῶν.	Dubitabit autem utique quis si oportet quaerere quesitam scientiam circa principia vocata ab aliquibus elementa; haec autem omnes inexistentia compositis ponunt. Magis autem uti↵quae videbitur universalium oportere esse quesitam scientiam. Omnis enim ratio et omnis scientia universalium et non extremorum. Quare erit utique sic primorum generum,	One might discuss the question whether the science we are seeking should be said to deal with the principles which are by some called elements; all men suppose these to be present in composite things. But it might be thought that the science we seek should treat rather of universals; for every definition and every science is of universals and not of infimae species, so that as far as this goes it would deal with the highest genera.
ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν: ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ὑποληφθείη περιέχειν τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖς ἐοικέναι διὰ [30] τὸ εἶναι πρῶτα τῇ φύσει: φθαρέντων γὰρ αὐτῶν συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ λοιπά: πᾶν γὰρ ὂν καὶ ἕν. ᾗ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν εἰ θήσει τις αὐτὰ γένη, διαφορὰ δ᾽ οὐδεμία τοῦ γένους μετέχει, ταύτῃ δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν δόξειε δεῖν αὐτὰ τιθέναι γένη οὐδ᾽ ἀρχάς.	haec autem fient utique ens et unum; haec enim maxime utique existimabun↵tur continere entia omnia et maxime principia videri quia sunt prima natura. Corruptis enim ipsis cointerimuntur reliqua; omnia enim ens et unum. Secundum quod autem differentias ipsis necesse participare, si ponat quis ipsa genera, differentia autem nulla genere participat, sic non utique videbitur oportere ipsa poni genera neque principia.	These would turn out to be being and unity; for these might most of all be supposed to contain all things that are, and to be most like principles because they are by nature; for if they perish all other things are destroyed with them; for everything is and is one. But inasmuch as, if one is to suppose them to be genera, they must be predicable of their differentiae, and no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae, in this way it would seem that we should not make them genera nor principles.
ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μᾶλλον [35] ἀρχὴ τὸ ἁπλούστερον τοῦ ἧττον τοιούτου, τὰ δ᾽ ἔσχατα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἁπλούστερα τῶν γενῶν (ἄτομα γάρ, τὰ γένη δ᾽ εἰς εἴδη πλείω καὶ διαφέροντα διαιρεῖται), μᾶλλον ἂν ἀρχὴ δόξειεν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν. ᾗ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ εἴδη, τὰ γένη ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔοικε μᾶλλον: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν. [1060α] [1] τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχοντα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερα.	↵ Adhuc autem si magis principium quod simplicius eo quod minus tale, ultima autem eorum quae ex genere simpliciora generibus (indivisibilia enim, genera autem in plura et differentia dividuntur), magis utique principium videbuntur esse species generibus. Qua autem cointerimuntur generibus species, genera ↵ principiis assimilantur magis; principium enim quod cointerimit. Quae quidem igitur dubitationem habent, haec et talia sunt altera.	Further, if the simpler is more of a principle than the less simple, and the ultimate members of the genus are simpler than the genera (for they are indivisible, but the genera are divided into many and differing species), the species might seem to be the principles, rather than the genera. But inasmuch as the species are involved in the destruction of the genera, the genera are more like principles; for that which involves another in its destruction is a principle of [60a] it. These and others of the kind are the subjects that involve difficulties. (See also B, chapters 4-6).