Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l11/c12

Chapter 12

Greek	Latin	English
εἰ οὖν αἱ κατηγορίαι διῄρηνται οὐσίᾳ, ποιότητι, τόπῳ, τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τῷ πρός τι, τῷ ποσῷ, ἀνάγκη τρεῖς [10] εἶναι κινήσεις, ποιοῦ ποσοῦ τόπου:	ƿ Si igitur predicamenta divisa sunt substantia, qualitate, ioco, facere aut pati, ad aliquid, quanto, necesse tres esse ↵ motus: qualis, quanti, loci.	Chapter 12. If the categories are classified as substance, quality, place, acting or being acted on, relation, quantity, there must be three kinds of movement-of quality, of quantity, of place.
κατ᾽ οὐσίαν δ᾽ οὔ, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν εἶναι οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον,	Secundum substantiam autem non, propter nullum esse substantiae contrarium.	There is no movement in respect of substance (because there is nothing contrary to substance),
οὐδὲ τοῦ πρός τι (ἔστι γὰρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος μὴ ἀληθεύεσθαι θάτερον μηδὲν μεταβάλλον, ὥστε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ κίνησις αὐτῶν),	Neque ad aliquid; est enim altero nihil permutato verificari alterum nihil permutatum. Quare secundum accidens motus ipsorum.	nor of relation (for it is possible that if one of two things in relation changes, the relative term which was true of the other thing ceases to be true, though this other does not change at all,-so that their movement is accidental),
οὐδὲ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος, ἢ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι [15] κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδὲ γενέσεως γένεσις, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως μεταβολῆς μεταβολή. διχῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται κινήσεως εἶναι κίνησιν, ἢ ὡς ὑποκειμένου (οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος κινεῖται ὅτι ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν μεταβάλλει, ὥστε οὕτω καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ τόπον ἀλλάττει ἢ αὔξεται: τοῦτο [20] δὲ ἀδύνατον: οὐ γὰρ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τι ἡ μεταβολή), ἢ τῷ ἕτερόν τι ὑποκείμενον ἐκ μεταβολῆς μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸν πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή, καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ [25] ὡσαύτως: πλὴν αἱ μὲν εἰς ἀντικείμενα ὡδί, ἡ δ᾽ ὡδί, ἡ κίνησις. ἅμα οὖν μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ταύτης τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἄλλην. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἂν νοσήσῃ, μεταβεβληκὸς ἔσται εἰς ὁποιανοῦν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν) καὶ ἔτι εἰς μὴ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀεί: κἀκείνη ἔκ τινος εἴς [30] τι ἄλλο ἔσται: ὥσθ᾽ ἡ ἀντικειμένη ἔσται, ὑγίανσις, ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι, οἷον ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως εἰς λήθην μεταβάλλει ὅτι ᾧ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο μεταβάλλει, ὁτὲ μὲν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὁτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄγνοιαν.	Neque facientis et patientis aut moventis et moti, quia non est motus motus ↵ neque generationis generatio, neque totaliter permutatio permutationis. Dupliciter enim contingit motus esse motum. Aut ut subiecti, velut homo movetur quia ex albo in nigrum permutatur, quare sic et motus aut calefit aut infrigidatur aut locum permutat aut augetur. Hoc autem impossibile; non enim ↵ subiectorum aliquid permutatio. Aut eo quod alterum aliquod subiectum ex permutatione permutetur in aliam speciem, velut homo ex langore in sanitatem. Sed neque hoc possibile nisi secundum accidens. Omnis enim motus ex alio in aliud est permutatio; et generatio et corruptio eodem modo, verumptamen ↵ quae quidem ex oppositis sic aut sic non motus. Simul igitur permutat ex sanitate in egritudinem, et ex hac ipsa permutatione in aliam. Palam autem quia si languerit permutatus erit in qualiacumque; contingit enim quiescere. Et adhuc in non contingentem semper, et illa ex aliquo in aliquid aliud erit. ↵ quare opposita, sanatio. Sed per accidere, velut ex reminiscentia in oblivionem permutatur quia cui existit illud permutatur, quandoque quidem in scientiam, quandoque autem in sanitatem.	nor of agent and patient, or mover and moved, because there is no movement of movement nor generation of generation, nor, in general, change of change. For there might be movement of movement in two senses; (1) movement might be the subject moved, as a man is moved because he changes from pale to dark,-so that on this showing movement, too, may be either heated or cooled or change its place or increase. But this is impossible; for change is not a subject. Or (2) some other subject might change from change into some other form of existence (e.g. a man from disease into health). But this also is not possible except incidentally. For every movement is change from something into something. (And so are generation and destruction; only, these are changes into things opposed in certain ways while the other, movement, is into things opposed in another way.) A thing changes, then, at the same time from health into illness, and from this change itself into another. Clearly, then, if it has become ill, it will have changed into whatever may be the other change concerned (though it may be at rest), and, further, into a determinate change each time; and that new change will be from something definite into some other definite thing; therefore it will be the opposite change, that of growing well. We answer that this happens only incidentally; e.g. there is a change from the process of recollection to that of forgetting, only because that to which the process attaches is changing, now into a state of knowledge, now into one of ignorance.
ἔτι εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, εἰ ἔσται μεταβολῆς μεταβολὴ καὶ γενέσεως γένεσις. ἀνάγκη [35] δὴ καὶ τὴν προτέραν, εἰ ἡ ὑστέρα: οἷον εἰ ἡ ἁπλῆ γένεσις ἐγίγνετό ποτε, καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐγίγνετο: [1068β] [1] ὥστε οὔπω ἦν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλά τι γιγνόμενον [ἢ] γιγνόμενον ἤδη. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐγίγνετό ποτε, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἦν πω τότε γιγνόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστι τι πρῶτον, οὐκ [5] ἔσται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον. οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὖν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οἷόν τε οὔτε μεταβάλλειν οὐδέν.	ƿAdhuc in infinitum ibit, si erit permutationis permutatio et ↵ generationis generatio. Necesse igitur et priorem, si posterior; ↵ puta si simplex generatio fiebat aliquando, et quod fit fiebat; quare nondum erat quod fiebat simpliciter, sed aliquid fiens simpliciter aut factum. Si itaque et hoc fiebat aliquando, quare nondum erat tunc genitum. Quoniam autem infinitorum non ↵ est primum, non erit primum, quare neque habitum. Neque fieri igitur neque moveri possibile est neque permutari nullum.	Further, the process will go on to infinity, if there is to be change of change and coming to be of coming to be. What is true of the later, then, must be true of the earlier; e.g. if the simple coming to be was once coming to be, that which [68b] comes to be something was also once coming to be; therefore that which simply comes to be something was not yet in existence, but something which was coming to be coming to be something was already in existence. And this was once coming to be, so that at that time it was not yet coming to be something else. Now since of an infinite number of terms there is not a first, the first in this series will not exist, and therefore no following term exist. Nothing, then, can either come term wi to be or move or change.
ἔτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ κίνησις ἡ ἐναντία καὶ ἠρέμησις, καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ὥστε τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὅταν γένηται γιγνόμενον, τότε φθείρεται: οὔτε γὰρ εὐθὺς γιγνόμενον οὔθ᾽ ὕστερον: εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ [10] τὸ φθειρόμενον.	Adhuc eiusdem motus contrarius et quies et generatio et corruptio. Quare quod fit, cum fiat fiens, tunc corrumpitur; neque ↵ enim confestim factum neque posterius; esse enim oportet quod corrumpitur.	Further, that which is capable of a movement is also capable of the contrary movement and rest, and that which comes to be also ceases to be. Therefore that which is coming to be is ceasing to be when it has come to be coming to be; for it cannot cease to be as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor after it has come to be; for that which is ceasing to be must be.
ἔτι δεῖ ὕλην ὑπεῖναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ καὶ μεταβάλλοντι. τίς οὖν ἔσται ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλλοιωτὸν σῶμα ἢ ψυχή—οὕτω τί τὸ γιγνόμενον κίνησις ἢ γένεσις; καὶ ἔτι τί εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται; δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τοῦδε ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν. πῶς οὖν; οὐ γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις τῆς [15] μαθήσεως, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ γένεσις γενέσεως.	Adhuc oportet materiam subesse ei quod fit et permutato. Quae igitur erit? Quemadmodum alterabile corpus aut anima aliquid, sic aliquid quod fit motus et generatio, et aliquid in quod moventur. Oportet enim esse aliquid eum qui huius ex hoc in hoc motum, non motum. Qualiter igitur? ↵ neque enim erit disciplina disciplinationis, quare neque generatio generationis.	Further, there must be a matter underlying that which comes to be and changes. What will this be, then,-what is it that becomes movement or becoming, as body or soul is that which suffers alteration? And; again, what is it that they move into? For it must be the movement or becoming of something from something into something. How, then, can this condition be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning, and therefore no becoming of becoming.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ οὐσίας οὔτε τοῦ πρός τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καὶ τόπον κίνησιν εἶναι (τούτων γὰρ ἑκάστῳ ἐναντίωσις ἔστιν), λέγω δὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ ποιόν) ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικόν, καθ᾽ ὃ [20] λέγεται πάσχειν ἢ ἀπαθὲς εἶναι.	Quoniam autem neque substantiae neque eius quod ad aliquid neque eius quod facere et pati, relinquitur secundum quale et quantum et ubi motum esse; horum enim unicuique contrarietas est. Dico autem quale non quod in substantia (et enim diffe↵rentia quale), sed quod passivum, secundum quod dicitur pati aut impassibile esse.	Since there is not movement either of substance or of relation or of activity and passivity, it remains that movement is in respect of quality and quantity and place; for each of these admits of contrariety. By quality I mean not that which is in the substance (for even the differentia is a quality), but the passive quality, in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on.
τὸ δὲ ἀκίνητον τό τε ὅλως ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι καὶ τὸ μόλις ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ ἢ βραδέως ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν κινεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον <μὴ κινούμενον> δὲ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς: ὃ καλῶ ἠρεμεῖν τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον: ἐναντίον γὰρ ἠρεμία [25] κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ.	Immobile autem et quod totaliter impossibile moveri, et quod vix in tempore multo tarde incipiens, et quod natum quidem moveri non potens autem quando natum est et ubi et ut; quod voco quiescere immobilium solum. Contrarium enim ↵ quies motui; quare privatio utique erit susceptivi. ƿ	The immobile is either that which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is moved with difficulty in a long time or begins slowly, or that which is of a nature to be moved and can be moved but is not moved when and where and as it would naturally be moved. This alone among immobiles I describe as being at rest; for rest is contrary to movement, so that it must be a privation in that which is receptive of movement.
ἅμα κατὰ τόπον ὅσα ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ πρώτῳ, καὶ χωρὶς ὅσα ἐν ἄλλῳ: ἅπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα: μεταξὺ δ᾽ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν τὸ συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον. [30] ἐναντίον κατὰ τόπον τὸ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν ἀπέχον πλεῖστον: ἑξῆς δὲ οὗ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος, θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀφορισθέντος, μηθὲν μεταξύ ἐστι τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει καὶ οὗ ἐφεξῆς ἐστίν, οἷον γραμμαὶ γραμμῆς ἢ μονάδες μονάδος ἢ οἰκίας οἰκία (ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐθὲν κωλύει μεταξὺ [35] εἶναι). τὸ γὰρ ἑξῆς τινὸς ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἓν ἑξῆς τῶν δύο οὐδ᾽ ἡ νουμηνία τῆς δευτέρας. [1069α] [1] ἐχόμενον δὲ ὃ ἂν ἑξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἀντίφασις, ἀντιφάσεως δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ [5] μεταξύ. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ὅπερ ἐχόμενόν τι. λέγω δὲ συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἷς ἅπτονται καὶ συνέχονται,	Simul secundum locum quaecumque in uno loco primo, et seorsum quaecumque in alio. Tangi autem quorum ultima simul. Intermedium autem in quod natum est prius pervenire quod permutatur quam in quod ultimum permutatur secundum naturam continve permutans. Contrarium secundum locum quod ↵ secundum rectam plurimum distans. Consequenter autem quo post principium ente, positione aut specie aut aliter qualiter determinato, nihil intermedium est eorum quae in eodem genere et cuius consequenter est, ut lineae lineae aut unitates unitatis aut domus domus; aliud autem nihil prohibet intermedium esse. Quod enim consequenter alicuius consequenter et posterius ↵ aliquid; non enim unum consequenter duorum neque noua ↵ luna secunde. Habitum autem quodcumque consequenter ens tangit. Quoniam autem omnis permutatio in oppositis, haec autem contraria et contradictio, contradictionis autem nullum intermedium, palam quod in contrariis intermedium. Conti↵nuum autem quod quidem habitum aliquid. Dico autem continuum cum idem fuerit et unum utriusque terminus quibus tangunt et continentur.	Things which are in one proximate place are together in place, and things which are in different places are apart: things whose extremes are together touch: that at which a changing thing, if it changes continuously according to its nature, naturally arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing, is between. That which is most distant in a straight line is contrary in place. That is successive which is after the beginning (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing of the same class between it and that which it succeeds, e.g. lines in the case of a line, units in that of a unit, or a house in that of a house. (There is nothing to prevent a thing of some other class from being between.) For the successive succeeds something and is something later; one does not succeed two , nor the first day of [69a] the month the second. That which, being successive, touches, is contiguous. (Since all change is between opposites, and these are either contraries or contradictories, and there is no middle term for contradictories, clearly that which is between is between contraries.) The continuous is a species of the contiguous. I call two things continuous when the limits of each, with which they touch and by which they are kept together, become one and the same,
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ συνεχὲς ἐν τούτοις ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν. καὶ ὅτι πρῶτον τὸ ἐφεξῆς, δῆλον (τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς οὐχ ἅπτεται, [10] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐφεξῆς: καὶ εἰ συνεχές, ἅπτεται, εἰ δ᾽ ἅπτεται, οὔπω συνεχές: ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἁφή, οὐκ ἔστι σύμφυσις ἐν τούτοις): ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι στιγμὴ μονάδι ταὐτόν: ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, ταῖς δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς: καὶ τῶν μὲν μεταξύ τι τῶν δ᾽ οὔ.	Quare palam quod continuum in hiis ex quibus unum aliquid natum est fieri secundum contactum. Et quia primum quod consequenter, palam. Quod enim conse↵quenter non tangit, hoc autem consequenter; et si continuum, tangit, si autem tangit, nondum continuum; in quibus autem non est tactus, non est connascentia in hiis. Quare non est punctum unitati idem; hiis quidem enim inest tangi, hiis autem non, sed ad consequenter; et horum quidem intermedium aliquid, horum autem non.	so that plainly the continuous is found in the things out of which a unity naturally arises in virtue of their contact. And plainly the successive is the first of these concepts (for the successive does not necessarily touch, but that which touches is successive; and if a thing is continuous, it touches, but if it touches, it is not necessarily continuous; and in things in which there is no touching, there is no organic unity); therefore a point is not the same as a unit; for contact belongs to points, but not to units, which have only succession; and there is something between two of the former, but not between two of the latter.