Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l11/c8

Chapter 8

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ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὂν κατὰ πλείους λέγεται τρόπους, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι λεγόμενος, σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος.	Quoniam autem simpliciter ens secundum plures dicitur ↵ modos, quorum unus est qui secundum accidens dicitur, considerandum primo de sic ente.	Chapter 8. Since being in general has several senses, of which one is being by accident , we must consider first that which is in this sense.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία τῶν παραδεδομένων ἐπιστημῶν πραγματεύεται περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δῆλον (οὔτε γὰρ οἰκοδομικὴ σκοπεῖ τὸ συμβησόμενον τοῖς τῇ [20] οἰκίᾳ χρησομένοις, οἷον εἰ λυπηρῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον οἰκήσουσιν, οὔθ᾽ ὑφαντικὴ οὔτε σκυτοτομικὴ οὔτε ὀψοποιική, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἴδιον ἑκάστη τούτων σκοπεῖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μόνον, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος:	Quod quidem igitur nulla traditarum scientiarum negotiatur circa accidens, palam; neque enim edificativa considerat quod accidet utentibus domo, puta si ↵ triste aut contrarie habitabunt, neque textiva neque coriativa neque coquinaria. Quod autem secundum ipsam proprium unaqueque harum considerat scientiarum solum, hoc autem est proprius finis.	Evidently none of the traditional sciences busies itself about the accidental. For neither does architecture consider what will happen to those who are to use the house (e.g. whether they have a painful life in it or not), nor does weaving, or shoemaking, or the confectioner's art, do the like; but each of these sciences considers only what is peculiar to it, i.e. its proper end.
[οὐδὲ μουσικὸν καὶ γραμματικόν,] οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα μουσικὸν ὅτι γενόμενος γραμματικὸς ἅμα ἔσται τὰ [25] ἀμφότερα, πρότερον οὐκ ὤν, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ ὂν ἔστιν, ἐγένετο τοῦτο, ὥσθ᾽ ἅμα μουσικὸς ἐγένετο καὶ γραμματικός, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία ζητεῖ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν πλὴν ἡ σοφιστική: περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ αὕτη μόνη πραγματεύεται, διὸ Πλάτων οὐ κακῶς εἴρηκε φήσας τὸν σοφιστὴν [30] περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν διατρίβειν):	Neque in quantum musicum et gramaticum, neque existentem musicum quia factus gramaticus simul erit ↵ ambo prius non ens, quod autem non semper ens est factum est hoc, quare simul musicus factus est et gramaticus: hoc autem nulla quaerit confesse existentium scientiarum nisi sophistica; circa accidens enim haec sola negotiatur, propter quod Plato non male dixit dicens sophistam circa non ens versari. ↵	And as for the argument that when he who is musical becomes lettered he will be both at once, not having been both before; and that which is, not always having been, must have come to be; therefore he must have at once become musical and lettered _ ,-this none of the recognized sciences considers, but only sophistic; for this alone busies itself about the accidental, so that Plato is not far wrong when he says that the sophist spends his time on non-being.
ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν εἶναι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπιστήμην, φανερὸν ἔσται πειραθεῖσιν ἰδεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός. πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (ἀνάγκης δ᾽ οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ χρώμεθα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις), [35] τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἔτυχεν: οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ψῦχος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ [ὡς] ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται, συμβαίη δέ ποτ᾽ ἄν. [1065α] [1] ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὃ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, εἴρηται, διότι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τοιούτου, δῆλον: ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ [5] ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων ἐστίν.	Quod autem neque contingens est esse accidentis scientiam, manifestum erit temptantibus scire quid est accidens. Omne itaque dicimus esse hoc quidem semper et ex necessitate (necessitate autem non secundum violentiam dicta sed secundum quod utimur in hiis quae secundum demonstrationes), hoc autem ut ↵ in plus, hoc vero neque ut in plus neque semper et ex necessitate ƿ sed ut contingit, puta sub cane fiet utique frigus, sed hoc neque ↵ ut semper et ex necessitate neque in plus fit, accidet tamen aliquando utique. Est itaque accidens quod fit quidem, non semper autem neque ex necessitate neque ut in plus. Quid quidem igitur est accidens, dictum est. Quia autem non est scientia ↵ talis, palam. Scientia quidem enim omnis semper entis aut ut in plus, accidens autem in neutro horum est.	That a science of the accidental is not even possible will be evident if we try to see what the accidental really is. We say that everything either is always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of violence, but that which we appeal to in demonstrations), or is for the most part, or is neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances; e.g. there might be cold in the dogdays, but this occurs neither always and of necessity, nor for the most part [65a], though it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part. Now we have said what the accidental is, and it is obvious why there is no science of such a thing; for all science is of that which is always or for the most part, but the accidental is in neither of these classes.
ὅτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οἷαίπερ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὄντος, δῆλον: ἔσται γὰρ ἅπαντ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ γὰρ τόδε μὲν ἔστι τοῦδε ὄντος τόδε δὲ τοῦδε, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ [10] ἀνάγκης, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ οὗ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν αἴτιον ἕως τοῦ τελευταίου λεγομένου αἰτιατοῦ (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός), ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ὁποτέρως ἔτυχε καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ παντελῶς ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται. κἂν μὴ ὂν δὲ ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον τὸ [15] αἴτιον ὑποτεθῇ, ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται: πᾶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται. ἡ γὰρ αὔριον ἔκλειψις γενήσεται ἂν τόδε γένηται, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐὰν ἕτερόν τι, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἄλλο: καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μέχρι αὔριον ἀφαιρουμένου χρόνου ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὥστ᾽ [20] ἐπεὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ἅπαντ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο γενήσεται, ὥστε πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι.	Quod autem secundum accidens entis non sunt causae et principia talia qualia quidem secundum se entis, palam; erunt enim omnia ex necessitate. Si enim hoc quidem est huius entis hoc ↵ autem huius, hoc autem non ut contingit sed ex necessitate, ex necessitate erit et cuius hoc erat causa usque ad ultimum dictum causatum; hoc autem erat secundum accidens. Quare ex necessitate omnia erunt; et quod utcumque contingit et accidere et fieri et non: omnino ex generatis aufertur. Et si non ↵ existens sed quae fit causa supponatur, eadem accident; omne enim ex necessitate fiet. Si enim cras eclipsis fiet si hoc fuerit, hoc autem si alterum aliquid, et hoc si aliud; et hoc itaque modo a finito tempore eo quod a nunc usque cras ablato tem↵pore veniet quandoque ad existens. Quare siquidem hoc est, omnia ex necessitate quae post hoc fient, ut omnia ex necessitate fiant.	Evidently there are not causes and principles of the accidental, of the same kind as there are of the essential; for if there were, everything would be of necessity. If A is when B is, and B is when C is, and if C exists not by chance but of necessity, that also of which C was cause will exist of necessity, down to the last causatum as it is called (but this was supposed to be accidental). Therefore all things will be of necessity, and chance and the possibility of a thing's either occurring or not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events. And if the cause be supposed not to exist but to be coming to be, the same results will follow; everything will occur of necessity. For to-morrow's eclipse will occur if A occurs, and A if B occurs, and B if C occurs; and in this way if we subtract time from the limited time between now and to-morrow we shall come sometime to the already existing condition. Therefore since this exists, everything after this will occur of necessity, so that all things occur of necessity.
τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν συμπλοκῇ διανοίας καὶ πάθος ἐν ταύτῃ (διὸ περὶ μὲν τὸ οὕτως ὂν οὐ ζητοῦνται αἱ ἀρχαί, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν): τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ [25] ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ᾽ ἀόριστον, λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τοῦ τοιούτου δ᾽ ἄτακτα καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια.	Quod autem ut vere ens et secundum accidens: hoc quidem est in complexione mentis et passio in hac, propter quod circa sic quidem ens non quaeruntur principia, circa autem quod ↵ extra ens et separabile; hoc autem non necessarium sed infinitum, dico autem quod secundum accidens, talis autem inordinatae et infinitae causae.	As to that which is in the sense of being true or of being by accident, the former depends on a combination in thought and is an affection of thought (which is the reason why it is the principles, not of that which is in this sense, but of that which is outside and can exist apart, that are sought); and the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are unordered and indefinite.
τὸ δὲ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν, τύχη δέ ἐστιν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω [30] καὶ αἴτιον. ἡ τύχη δ᾽ αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις,	Quod autem gratia huius in hiis quae a natura fiunt et a ƿ mente est. Fortuna autem est quando aliquid horum fuerit secundum accidens. Sicut enim et ens est hoc quidem secundum se hoc autem secundum accidens, sic et causa. Fortuna autem ↵ causa secundum accidens in factis secundum electionem eorum quae gratia huius.	Adaptation to an end is found in events that happen by nature or as the result of thought. It is luck when one of these events happens by accident. For as a thing may exist, so it may be a cause, either by its own nature or by accident. Luck is an accidental cause at work in such events adapted to an end as are usually effected in accordance with purpose.
διὸ περὶ ταὐτὰ τύχη καὶ διάνοια: προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας.	Propter quod circa eadem fortuna et mens; electio enim non sine mente.	And so luck and thought are concerned with the same sphere; for purpose cannot exist without thought.
τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, διὸ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ [35] οὐδενός.	Causae autem infinitae a quibus utique fiet quod a fortuna; propter quod incerta humane cogitationi et causa secundum accidens, simpliciter autem nullius.	The causes from which lucky results might happen are indeterminate; and so luck is obscure to human calculation and is a cause by accident, but in the unqualified sense a cause of nothing.
ἀγαθὴ δὲ τύχη καὶ κακὴ ὅταν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἀποβῇ: εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία περὶ μέγεθος τούτων.	↵ bona autem fortuna et mala cum bonum aut maium euenerit; ↵ eutichia autem et infortunium circa magnitudinem horum.	It is good or bad luck when [65b] the result is good or evil; and prosperity or misfortune when the scale of the results is large.
[1065β] [1] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐθὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτό, οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ αἴτια: εἰ ἄρα τύχη ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρότερον νοῦς αἴτιος καὶ φύσις. [5]	Quoniam autem nullum secundum accidens prius hiis quae secundum se, neque igitur causa. Si igitur fortuna aut casus causa celi, prius intellectus causa et natura.	Since nothing accidental is prior to the essential, neither are accidental causes prior. If, then, luck or spontaneity is a cause of the material universe, reason and nature are causes before it.