Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c10

Chapter 10

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν.	Perscrutandum autem est qualiter * habet totius natura bonum et optimum, utrum separatum quid et ipsum secundum se, aut ordinem.	Chapter 10. We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good, and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts.
ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον [15] οὗτος: οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.	Aut utroque modo sicut exercitus? Et enim ↵ in ordine ipsum bene et dux exercitus, et magis iste; non enim iste propter ordinem sed ille propter hunc est.	Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him.
πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά: καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις [20] ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ [25] ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον.	Omnia vero coordinata sunt aliqualiter, sed non similiter, et natatilia et volatilia et plante; et non sic se habent ut non sit alteri ad alterum nihil, sed est aliquid. Ad unum quidem enim omnia coordinata sunt. Sed quemadmodum in domo liberis ƿ non licet quod contingit facere, sed omnia aut plurima ordi↵nata sunt, seruis vero et bestiis parvum * quod ad commune, multum vero quod contingit; tale namque cuiusque principium ipsorum natura est. Dico autem puta ad discerni quidem necesse omnibus venire, et alia sic sunt quibus communicant omnia ad totum.	And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike,-both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them, while the slaves and the animals do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole.
ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.	↵Quaecumque vero impossibilia accidunt aut absurda aliter dicentibus, et qualia gratiosius dicentes, et in quibus minime dubitationes, oportet non latere.	We must not fail to observe how many impossible or paradoxical results confront those who hold different views from our own, and what are the views of the subtler thinkers, and which views are attended by fewest difficulties.
πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς [30] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν:	Omnes enim ex contrariis faciunt omnia. Neque autem quod omnia nec quod ex contrariis recte, nec in quibuscumque contraria existunt, quomodo ex contrariis erunt, non dicunt;	All make all things out of contraries. But neither all things nor out of contraries is right; nor do these thinkers tell us how all the things in which the contraries are present can be made out of the contraries;
ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον.	impassibilia namque sunt con↵traria ad invicem. Nobis autem solvitur hoc rationabiliter eo quod tertium aliquid sit. Alii vero * alterum * contrariorum materiam faciunt, quemadmodum qui inequale equali aut uni multa. Solvitur autem et hoc eodem modo; materia enim quae una nulli est contrarium.	for contraries are not affected by one another. Now for us this difficulty is solved naturally by the fact that there is a third element. These thinkers however make one of the two contraries matter; this is done for instance by those who make the unequal matter for the equal, or the many matter for the one. But this also is refuted in the same way; for the one matter which underlies any pair of contraries is contrary to nothing.
ἔτι [35] ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων.	Amplius omnia pravi participa↵tione * extra unum; nam prauum ipsum alterum elementorum.	Further, all things, except the one, will, on the view we are criticizing, partake of evil; for the bad itself is one of the two elements.
οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν: καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή.	Alii autem nec principia bonum et malum; quamvis in omnibus maxime quod bonum * principium.	But the other school does not treat the good and the bad even as principles; yet in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle.
[38] οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος.	Alii vero hoc quidem recte quia principium, sed quomodo quod bonum principium non dicunt, utrum ut finis aut ut movens aut ut species. ↵	The school we first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the good is a principle they do not say-whether as end or as mover or as form. [75b]
[1075β] [1] ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη: μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν [5] καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.	inconvenienter autem et Empedocles. Amicitiam enim facit bonum, haec autem * principium et ut movens (congregat enim) et ut materia (pars enim mixture). Si itaque et eidem accidit ut materiam et principium esse et ut movens *, sed esse ↵ ƿ non idem. Secundum utrum igitur amicitia? Inconveniens autem et incorruptibilem esse litem; hoc ipsum autem est mali natura.	Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; the nature of his evil is just strife.
Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ. ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν: [10] ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις.	Anaxagoras autem ut movens quod bonum principium ; intellectus enim movet. Sed gratia alicuius movet, ↵ quare alterum , excepto ut nos dicimus; nam medicativa est quodammodo sanitas. Inconveniens autem et contrarium non facere bono et intellectui.	Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his reason moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health. It is paradoxical also not to suppose a contrary to the good, i.e. to reason.
καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ [15] μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν πάντα ποιοῦσιν.	Omnes autem contraria dicentes non utuntur contrariis, nisi figuret aliquis. Et quare haec quidem corruptibilia haec vero incorruptibilia, nullus dicit; omnia namque entia faciunt ex eisdem principiis. Amplius alii ↵ quidem ex non ente faciunt entia; alii autem, ut non hoc cogantur, unum omnia faciunt.	But all who speak of the contraries make no use of the contraries, unless we bring their views into shape. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one tells us; for they make all existing things out of the same principles. Further, some make existing things out of the nonexistent; and others to avoid the necessity of this make all things one.
ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει.	Amplius propter quid semper erit generatio et quae est causa generationis, nullus dicit.	Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?-this no one tells us.
καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα: διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ [20] μετέχει;	Et duo principia facientibus aliud necesse principium principalius esse, et hiis qui species quia aliud principium principalius; propter quid enim participavit ↵ aut participat?	And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms; for why did things come to participate, or why do they participate, in the Forms?
καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ᾽ οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν.	Et aliis quidem necesse sapientie et honoratissime scienlie aliquid esse contrarium, nobis autem non. Non enim est contrarium primo nihil. Nam omnia contraria materiam habent, et haec potentia est; contraria autem ignorantia ad contrarium; primo vero contrarium nihil.	And all other thinkers are confronted by the necessary consequence that there is something contrary to Wisdom, i.e. to the highest knowledge; but we are not. For there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary.
εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ [25] αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν.	Amplius si non ↵ erunt praeter sensibilia alia, non erit principium et ordo et generatio et celestia, sed semper principii principium, ut theoloƿgis et phisicis omnibus.	Again, if besides sensible things no others exist, there will be no first principle, no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have a principle before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural philosophers.
εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται τὰ εἴδη: ἢ <οἱ> ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια: εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε.	Si autem erunt species aut numeri, nullius cause; sin autem, non quid motus.	But if the Forms or the numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not that, at least not of movement.
ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει [30] συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος.	Adhuc quomodo erit ex non magnitudinibus magnitudo et continuum? Non enim numerus facit continuum, nec ut movens nec ut species. ↵	Further, how is extension, i.e. a continuum, to be produced out of unextended parts? For number will not, either as mover or as form, produce a continuum.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ᾽ ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν: ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται πῶς.	At vero nullum erit contrariorum quod et factivum et motivum, continget enim utique non esse. At vero posterius quidem ipsum facere potentia. Non ergo sempiterna sunt entia. Sed sunt. Interimendum igitur est horum aliquid. Et hoc dictum est ut.	But again there cannot be any contrary that is also essentially a productive or moving principle; for it would be possible for it not to be. Or at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world, then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then, must be denied. And we have said how this must be done.
ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ [35] ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς: οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ.	Adhuc quo numeri unum aut anima et corpus ↵ et totaliter species et res, nihil dicit nullus; nec contingit dicere, si non ut nos dicat quod movens facit.	Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one.
οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, [1076α] [1] ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω."	Dicentes autem numerum primum mathematicum et sic semper aliam habitam substantiam et principia cuiuslibet alia, inconnexam ↵ universi substantiam faciunt (nihil enim alia alii confert ens aut non ens) et principia multa. Entia vero non volunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum. Unus ergo princeps.	And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give [76a] different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or nonexistence), and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly. The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.