Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c2

Chapter 2

Greek	Latin	English
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει: ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη.	Amplius hoc quidem manet, aliud vero contrarium non manet; est igitur aliquid tertium praeter contraria: materia.	Chapter 2. Further, something persists, but the contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, viz. the matter.
εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί [10] ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ <τὸ> τόδε, αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην [15] ἄμφω:	Si itaque transmutationes sunt quatuor, aut secundum quid aut ↵ secundum qualitatem aut secundum quantitatem aut ubi, et generatio quidem simplex et corruptio secundum hoc, et augmentum et detrimentum quae secundum quantitatem *, alteratio autem quae secundum passionem, latio autem quae secundum locum, * in contrarietates utique erunt eas quae secundum unumquodque transmutationes. Necesse * itaque transmutari materiam potentem ambo.	Now since changes are of four kinds-either in respect of the what or of the quality or of the quantity or of the place, and change in respect of thisness is simple generation and destruction, and change in quantity is increase and diminution, and change in respect of an affection is alteration, and change of place is motion, changes will be from given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states.
ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει [20] μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.	Quoniam autem duplex est ens, ↵ transmutatur omne ex potentia ente in actu ens, ut puta ex albo * potentia in actu album; similiter autem in augmento et detrimento. Quare non solum secundum accidens contingit fieri ex non ente, sed et ex ente fiunt omnia, potentia quidem ↵ ƿ ente, ex non ente vero actu.	And since that which is has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually, e.g. from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution. Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually.
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν: βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ "ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ": ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι:	Et hoc est Anaxagorae unum; dignius est enim quam “ simul omnia” — Et empedoclis mixtura et anaximandri et ut Democritus ait — “ nobis erant omnia potentia, actu vero minime”. Quare materiam utique erant tangentes.	And this is the One of Anaxagoras; for instead of all things were together -and the Mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus-it is better to say all things were together potentially but not actually . Therefore these thinkers seem to have had some notion of matter.
πάντα δ᾽ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, [25] ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν: καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί.	Omnia vero materiam habent quaecumque ↵ transmutantur, sed aliam; et sempiternorum quaecumque non generabilia mobilia autem latione, verum non generabilem habent, sed unde quo.	Now all things that change have matter, but different matter; and of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter-not matter for generation, however, but for motion [69b 26] from one place to another.
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις: τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου: οὐδ᾽ ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα [30] χρήματα: διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία, ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει.	Dubitabit autem utique aliquis ex quali [/quo] non ente est generatio; tripliciter enim non ens. Si itaque aliquid est potentia, at tamen non ex quocumque sed alterum ex altero. Neque ↵ sufficiens quia simul res omnes; differunt enim materia, quoniam quare infinita facta sunt sed non unum? Intellectus enim unus; quare si et materia una, illud factum est actu cuius materia erat potentia.	One might raise the question from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for non-being has three senses. If, then, one form of non-being exists potentially, still it is not by virtue of a potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come from different things; nor is it satisfactory to say that all things were together ; for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did an infinity of things come to be, and not one thing? For reason is one, so that if matter also were one, that must have come to be in actuality which the matter was in potency.
τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη. [35]	Tres vero sunt causae et tria principia: duo quidem contrarietas, cuius hoc quidem ratio et species illud vero privatio, tertium autem materia. 60 ↵	The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.