Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c7

Chapter 7

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὕτω τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς [20] ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δῆλον), ὥστ᾽ ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός.	↵ Quoniam autem ita contingit, et si non sic, ex nocte erit et “ simul omnium” et ex non ente, soluentur utique haec. Et est aliquid semper motum motu incessabili, hic autem qui circulo; et hoc non ratione solum sed opere palam. Quare sempiternum utique erit primum coelum.	Chapter 7. Since (1) this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and all things together and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal.
ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον, τοίνυν [25] ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.	Est igitur aliquid et quod movet **. Quoniam autem quod movetur et movens et ↵ medium, igitur est aliquid quod non motum movet, sempiternum et substantia et actus * ens.	There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.
κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν: κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν: ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα: [30] ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται,	Movet autem sic * appetibile et intelligibile; movent non mota. Horum autem prima ƿ eadem. Concupiscibile quidem enim * ipsum * apparens bonum, voluntabile autem primum ipsum existens bonum. Appetimus autem quia videtur magis quam videtur quia appetimus; prin↵cipium enim est intelligentia. Intellectus autem ab intelligibili movetur,	And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of thought,
νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν: καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό).	intelligibilis autem altera coelementatio secundum se; et huius substantia prima, et huius quae simplex et secundum actum. Est autem * unum et simplex non idem; unum enim metrum significat, simplex autem qualiter habens ipsum.	and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for one means a measure, but simple means that the thing itself has a certain nature.)
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ [35] τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ: καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον. [1072β] [1] ὅτι δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ: ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα <καὶ> τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ.	At vero et quod bonum et quod propter ipsum eligibile ↵ in eadem coelementatione; et est optimum semper aut propor↵tionale quod primum. Quia autem est quod cuius gratia in immobilibus, divisio ostendit. Est enim alicui quod cuius gratia, quorum hoc quidem est, illud vero non est.	But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best. [72b] That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ [5] ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ: ταύτην [10] δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν: καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.	Movet autem ut amatum, * moto vero alia movet. Si quidem igitur aliquid movetur, contingit aliter habere. Quare latio quae prima et ↵ actus est; secundum quod movetur hac autem contingit aliter habere, secundum locum, et si non secundum substantiam. Quoniam autem est aliquid movens ipsum immobile ens, ƿ actu ens, hoc non contingit aliter se habere nullatenus. Latio enim prima mutationum, huius autem quae * circulo; hac ↵ autem hoc movet. Ex necessitate igitur est ens; et * necessitas bene et sic principium. Nam necessarium totiens *: hoc quidem vi quia praeter impetum, illud vero rsine quo non bene, hoc autem non contingens aliter sed simpliciter. Ex tali igitur principio dependet coelum et natura.	The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses-that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way. On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature.
διαγωγὴ δ᾽ [15] ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο: ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον),	Deductio ↵ autem est qualis optima, paruo tempore nobis; sic enim semper illud est, nobis quidem enim impossibile.	And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be),
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.	Quoniam et delectatio actus * huius. Et propter hoc vigilatio, * sensus, intelligentia delectabilissimum. Spes vero et memorie propter haec. intelligentia autem quae secundum se eius * quod secundum ↵ se optimum, et quae maxime eius quod * maxime.	since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense.
αὑτὸν [20] δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ: νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, [25] ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν: εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.	Ipsum autem intelligit intellectus secundum transumptionem intelligibilis; intelligibilis enim fit attingens et intelligens, quare idem intellectus et intelligibile. Susceptivum enim intelligibilis et substantiae * intellectus; actuatur autem habens. Quare illud magis isto quod videtur intellectus divinum habere, et speculatio delectabilissimum et optimum. Si igitur sic bene * habet ƿ ut nos quandoque, deus semper, mirabile; si autem magis, ↵ adhuc mirabilius. Habet autem sic.	And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state.
καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς [30] καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.	Et vita autem utique existit; etenim intellectus actus * vita, illud autem ipse actus; actus autem quae secundum se illius * vita optima et sempiterna. Dicimus autem deum esse animal sempiternum optimum. Quare vita et duratio continua eterna existit deo; hoc enim ↵ * deus.	And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. [35] τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον: [1073α] [1] οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, [5] φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων:	Quicumque autem putant, ut Pytagorici et Speusippus, optimum et nobilissimum non in principio esse, quia et plantarum et animalium principia cause sunt, bonum vero et perfectum in hiis quae ex hiis, non recte existimant. Nam sperma ex alteris ↵ est prioribus * perfectis, et primum non est sperma sed perfec↵tum; ut priorem hominem dicat aliquis esse spermate, non eum qui ex hoc fit sed alterum ex quo sperma. Quod quidem igitur est substantia aliqua sempiterna et immobilis, separata a sensibilibus, manifestum ex dictis.	Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete [73a] being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a man,-not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes. It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things.
δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον: ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ [10] ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ᾽ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος): ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον: πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.	↵Ostensum est autem et quia magnitudinem nullam contingit habere hanc substantiam, verum sine parte et indivisibilis est. Movet enim per infinitum tempus, et non habet potentiam infinitam finitum. Quoniam autem omnis magnitudo aut infinita est aut finita, finitam quidem propter hoc utique non habebit magnitudinem, infinitam vero quia totaliter non est ↵ nulla infinita magnitudo. At vero et quia impassibilis et inalterabilis; omnes enim alii motus posteriores sunt eo qui est ƿ secundum locum. Haec quidem igitur manifesta quia hunc habent modum.	It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place. It is clear, then, why these things are as they are.