Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c9

Chapter 9

Greek	Latin	English
τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας: δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ᾽ ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας.	↵ Quae autem circa intellectum habent quasdam dubitationes. Videtur quidem enim apparentium divinissimum; quomodo vero * habens tajis erit utique, habet quasdam difficulƿtates.	Chapter 9.The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character involves difficulties.
εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων: εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾽ ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ [20] οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη: διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.	Nam sive non intelligat, quid utique erit venerabile? Sed habet quemadmodum [ut] si dormiens *. Sive intelligat, huius vero aliud * principale, non enim est hoc quod est sua substantia intelligentia, sed potentia: non utique erit optima ↵ substantia; per intelligere enim honorabile ei inest.	For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.
ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι: καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο.	Amplius autem sive intellectus sit sua substantia sive intelligentia, quid intelligit? Aut enim se ipsum aut alterum aliquid; et si alterum aliquid, aut idem semper aut aliud.	Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of something different.
πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; [25] ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων;	Utrum ergo differt aliquid aut nihil *, intelligere bonum aut contingens? Aut et inconveniens * meditari de quibusdam?	Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think?
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει: εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον.	Palam ergo ↵ quod * divinissimum * et honoratissimum intelligit, et non transmutatur; in indignius enim * transmutatio, et motus quidam iam tale.	Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως:	Primum quidem igitur si non est intelligentia sed potentia, rationabile est laboriosam esse ei continuationem intelligentie.	First, then, if thought is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it.
ἔπειτα δῆλον [30] ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον,	Deinde palam quia aliud aliquid erit * ↵ dignius * quam intellectus, scilicet intellectum. Et enim intelligere et intelligentia inerit et indignissimum intelligenti. Quare * fugiendum hoc, et enim non videre quaedam dignius quam videre; non si sit optimum * intelligentia. Se ipsum ergo intelligit, siquidem est * potentissimum *, e	Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things),
καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. [35] φαίνεται δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ᾽ ἐν παρέργῳ.	t est intelligentia intelligentia intelligentia. Videtur autem semper alius scientia et sen↵sus et opinio et meditatio, ipsius autem in accessorio.	and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way.
ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ.	ƿ Amplius si aliud est intelligere et intelligi, secundum quid ei ipsum bene inest? Non enim idem esse intelligentie et ↵ intellecto.	Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For to be an act of thinking and to be an object of thought are not the same thing. [75a]
ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, [1075α] [1] ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ [5] νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.	Aut in quibusdam * scientia res. In factivis quidem sine materia, substantia enim et quod quid erat esse; in theoricis vero ratio res et intelligentia. Non altero igitur existente eo quod intelligitur et intellectu, quaecumque non ↵ materiam habent, idem erunt, et intelligentia eius quod intelligitur una.	We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.
ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον: μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου.	Adhuc autem restat dubitatio, si compositum est quod intelligitur; transmutabitur enim in partibus totius.	A further question is left-whether the object of the divine thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole.
ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς	Aut indivisibile omne quod non habet materiam, ut humanus intellectus.	We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible - as human thought,
ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι)— [10] οὕτως δ᾽ ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;	Aut quod quidem compositorum, habet in aliquo tempore; non enim habet ipsum bene in hoc aut in hoc, sed in ↵ toto quodam quod optimum, ens aliud aliquid. Sic autem * habet ipsa * sui ipsius intelligentia toto eterno.	or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.