Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l3/c2

Chapter 2

Greek	Latin	English
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ ὧν πρῶτον εἴπομεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν [20] αἰτίων. μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης πῶς ἂν εἴη μὴ ἐναντίας οὔσας τὰς ἀρχὰς γνωρίζειν;	Primum ergo de quibus in primis diximus, utrum unius ↵ aut plurium scientiarum sunt speculanda omnia genera causarum. Unius enim scientie quomodo erit non contraria existentia principia cognoscere?	Chapter 2. (1) First then with regard to what we mentioned first, does it belong to one or to more sciences to investigate all the kinds of causes? How could it belong to one science to recognize the principles if these are not contrary?
ἔτι δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων οὐχ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι: τίνα γὰρ τρόπον οἷόν τε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἢ τὴν τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν τέλος ἐστὶν [25] καὶ οὕτως αἴτιον ὅτι ἐκείνου ἕνεκα καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τἆλλα, τὸ δὲ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα πράξεώς τινός ἐστι τέλος, αἱ δὲ πράξεις πᾶσαι μετὰ κινήσεως; ὥστ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναί τι αὐτοαγαθόν. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐθὲν δείκνυται διὰ [30] ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐδεμία διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν μέμνηται οὐθεὶς οὐθενὸς τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζεν αὐτάς: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι [35] βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.	Amplius autem multis existentium non insunt omnibus omnia. Quo namque modo possibile est motus principium esse ƿ in immobilibus aut boni naturam, siquidem omne quod est bonum secundum se et propter suam naturam finis est et ita ↵ causa quod illius causa et fiunt et sunt cetera, finis autem et cuius causa actus cuiusdam est finis, sed actus omnes cum motu? Quare in immobilibus non continget hoc esse principium nec esse aliquid autoagathon. Unde et in mathematicis nihil per hanc ostenditur causam, nec est demonstratio nulla ↵ eo quod melius aut deterius; sed nec omnino nullus talium alicuius reminiscitur. Quapropter et sophistarum quidam, ut aristippus, ipsas preneglexit. In aliis enim artibus et illiberalibus, ut tectonica et coriaria, eo quod * melius vel deterius dici ↵ omnia, mathematicas vero nullam de bonis et malis rationem ↵ facere.	Further, there are many things to which not all the principles pertain. For how can a principle of change or the nature of the good exist for unchangeable things, since everything that in itself and by its own nature is good is an end, and a cause in the sense that for its sake the other things both come to be and are, and since an end or purpose is the end of some action, and all actions imply change? So in the case of unchangeable things this principle could not exist, nor could there be a good itself. This is why in mathematics nothing is proved by means of this kind of cause, nor is there any demonstration of this kind – because it is better, or worse; indeed no one even mentions anything of the kind. And so for this reason some of the Sophists, e.g. Aristippus, used to ridicule mathematics; for in the arts (he maintained), even in the industrial arts, e.g. in carpentry and cobbling, the reason always given is because it is better, or worse, but the mathematical sciences take no account of goods and evils.
[996β] [1] - ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν αἰτίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, τίνα τούτων φατέον εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην, ἢ τίνα μάλιστα τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ ζητουμένου ἐπιστήμονα τῶν ἐχόντων [5] αὐτάς;	At vero si causarum scientie sunt plures et altera alterius principii, quae earum est dicenda quae quaeritur? Aut quis maxime rem quaesitam est sciens eas habentium?	[96b] But if there are several sciences of the causes, and a different science for each different principle, which of these sciences should be said to be that which we seek, or which of the people who possess them has the most scientific knowledge of the object in question?
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον, ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ὁ λόγος.	Contingit ↵ enim eidem omnes modos causarum inesse, ut domus unde quidem motus ars et edificator, cuius vero causa opus, et materia terra et lapides, species vero ratio.	The same thing may have all the kinds of causes, e.g. the moving cause of a house is the art or the builder, the final cause is the function it fulfils, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the definition.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πάλαι διωρισμένων τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν ἔχει λόγον ἑκάστην [10] προσαγορεύειν: ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη καὶ ᾗ ὥσπερ δούλας οὐδ᾽ ἀντειπεῖν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας δίκαιον, ἡ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τἀγαθοῦ τοιαύτη (τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τἆλλα),	Igitur ex dudum determinatis quam decet vocare scientiarum sapientiam habet * rationem quamlibet appellari. In quantum enim senior quidem et princi↵palior, cui veluti seruientes non contradicere scientias alias iustum est, quae finis et boni talis est; huius enim causa sunt cetera.	To judge from our previous discussion of the question which of the sciences should be called Wisdom, there is reason for applying the name to each of them. For inasmuch as it is most architectonic and authoritative and the other sciences, like slavewomen, may not even contradict it, the science of the end and of the good is of the nature of Wisdom (for the other things are for the sake of the end).
ᾗ δὲ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ διωρίσθη εἶναι, ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη: πολλαχῶς γὰρ [15] ἐπισταμένων τὸ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον μὲν εἰδέναι φαμὲν τὸν τῷ εἶναι γνωρίζοντα τί τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν πόσον ἢ ποῖον ἢ τί ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἰδέναι ἕκαστον καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις [20] εἰσί, τότ᾽ οἰόμεθα ὑπάρχειν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν (οἷον τί ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνίζειν, ὅτι μέσης εὕρεσις: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων),	In quantum vero primarum causarum et maxime scibilis 95 diffmita est esse, quae substantiae utique erit talis. Multis enim modis idem scientibus magis quidem scire dicimus eum qui ↵ novit in ipso esse quid * res * quam in non esse, et horum eorundem alium alio magis, sed maxime qui quid est et non ƿ quantum aut quale aut quid facere aut pati est apta nata. Amplius autem et in aliis scire singula et quorum demonstra↵tiones sunt tunc putamus existere quando scimus quid est, ut tetragonizare quid est, quia medie inventio; similiter autem et in aliis.	But inasmuch as it was described as dealing with the first causes and that which is in the highest sense object of knowledge, the science of substance must be of the nature of Wisdom. For since men may know the same thing in many ways, we say that he who recognizes what a thing is by its being so and so knows more fully than he who recognizes it by its not being so and so, and in the former class itself one knows more fully than another, and he knows most fully who knows what a thing is, not he who knows its quantity or quality or what it can by nature do or have done to it. And further [96b 18]in all cases also we think that the knowledge of each even of the things of which demonstration is possible is present only when we know what the thing is, e.g. what squaring a rectangle is, viz. that it is the finding of a mean; and similarly in all other cases.
περὶ δὲ τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἕτερον καὶ ἀντικείμενον τῷ τέλει, ὥστ᾽ ἄλλης ἂν [25] δόξειεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ θεωρῆσαι τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ἕκαστον.	Circa generationes vero et actus et circa omnem transmutationem, quando cognoscimus principium motus; hoc ↵ autem alterum et oppositum fini. Quapropter videbitur alius esse scientie causarum harum singulas speculari.	And we know about becomings and actions and about every change when we know the source of the movement; and this is other than and opposed to the end. Therefore it would seem to belong to different sciences to investigate these causes severally.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἀρχῶν, πότερον μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ἢ πλειόνων, ἀμφισβητήσιμόν ἐστιν (λέγω [28] δὲ ἀποδεικτικὰς τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες δεικνύουσιν) οἷον ὅτι πᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, καὶ [30] ἀδύνατον ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται προτάσεις, πότερον μία τούτων ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἢ ἑτέρα, κἂν εἰ μὴ μία, ποτέραν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὴν ζητουμένην νῦν.	At vero et de principiis demonstrationis, utrum unius est scientie aut plurium, dubitatio est. Dico autem demonstrativas * comrnunes opiniones ex quibus omnes demonstrant. Ut quon↵iam omne necessarium aut dicere aut negare, et impossibile simul esse et non esse, et quaecumque aliae tales propositiones: utrum harum una scientia et substantiae aut alia, et si non una est, quam oportet appellare quae nunc est quaesita.	But (2), taking the starting-points of demonstration as well as the causes, it is a disputable question whether they are the object of one science or of more (by the starting-points of demonstration I mean the common beliefs, on which all men base their proofs); e.g. that everything must be either affirmed or denied, and that a thing cannot at the same time be and not be, and all other such premisses:-the question is whether the same science deals with them as with substance, or a different science, and if it is not one science, which of the two must be identified with that which we now seek.
μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὔλογον εἶναι: τί γὰρ μᾶλλον γεωμετρίας ἢ ὁποιασοῦν περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἐπαΐειν; [35] εἴπερ οὖν ὁμοίως μὲν ὁποιασοῦν ἐστίν, ἁπασῶν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, [997α] [1] ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γνωριζούσης τὰς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ γιγνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν.	Unius igitur esse non est rationabile; quid enim magis geometrie quam qua↵liscumque de hiis est proprium obaudire? Si igitur similiter ↵ quidem qualiscumque est, omnium vero non contingit, sicut nec aliarum ita nec ipsas substantias cognoscentis proprium est de ipsis cognoscere.	-It is not reasonable that these topics should be the object of one science; for why should it be peculiarly appropriate to geometry or to any other science to understand these matters? If then it belongs to every science [97a] alike, and cannot belong to all, it is not peculiar to the science which investigates substances, any more than to any other science, to know about these topics.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη; τί μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ νῦν γνωρίζομεν (χρῶνται γοῦν ὡς γιγνωσκομένοις [5] αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι): εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐστί, δεήσει τι γένος εἶναι ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη τὰ δ᾽ ἀξιώματ᾽ αὐτῶν (περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι), ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἔκ τινων εἶναι καὶ περί τι καὶ τινῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν: ὥστε συμβαίνει πάντων εἶναι γένος ἕν [10] τι τῶν δεικνυμένων, πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀποδεικτικαὶ χρῶνται τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν.	Simul autem et quomodo erit ipsorum scientia? Quid quidem enim et unumquodque horum existit ↵ ens et nunc novimus; utuntur igitur eis ut notis artes aliae. Si autem de eis demonstratio est, oportebit aliquod genus esse subiectum et haec quidem passiones illa vero dignitates eorum. Nam de omnibus esse demonstrationem est impossibile. Necesse enim ex aliquibus esse et circa aliquid et aliquorum ↵ demonstrationem. Quare accidit omnium esse genus unum aliquid monstratorum1; omnes enim demonstrative * dignitatibus utuntur.	-And, at the same time, in what way can there be a science of the first principles? For we are aware even now what each of them in fact is (at least even other sciences use them as familiar); but if there is a demonstrative science which deals with them, there will have to be an underlying kind, and some of them must be demonstrable attributes and others must be axioms (for it is impossible that there should be demonstration about all of them); for the demonstration must start from certain premisses and be about a certain subject and prove certain attributes. Therefore it follows that all attributes that are proved must belong to a single class; for all demonstrative sciences use the axioms.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἑτέρα ἡ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων, ποτέρα κυριωτέρα καὶ προτέρα πέφυκεν αὐτῶν; καθόλου γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ τὰ ἀξιώματά ἐστιν, εἴ τ᾽ ἐστὶ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίνος ἔσται περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλου τὸ [15] θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος;	ƿ At vero si alia quae substantiae et quae de hiis, quae earum principalior et prior est earum? Universaliter enim maxime omnium principia sunt dignitates. Et si non est philosophi, cuius erit alius de eis speculari veritatem et falsitatem?	But if the science of substance and the science which deals with the axioms are different, which of them is by nature more authoritative and prior? The axioms are most universal and are principles of all things. And if it is not the business of the philosopher, to whom else will it belong to inquire what is true and what is untrue about them?
ὅλως τε τῶν οὐσιῶν πότερον μία πασῶν ἐστὶν ἢ πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι; εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μία, ποίας οὐσίας θετέον τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην;	↵ Totaliterque substantiarum utrum una omnium est aut plures scientie? Si quidem ergo non una, cuius substantiae ponenda est scientia ista?	(3) In general, do all substances fall under one science or under more than one? If the latter, to what sort of substance is the present science to be assigned?
τὸ δὲ μίαν πασῶν οὐκ εὔλογον: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδεικτικὴ μία περὶ πάντων εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων, εἴπερ πᾶσα ἀποδεικτικὴ περί [20] τι ὑποκείμενον θεωρεῖ τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν δοξῶν. περὶ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν. περί τε γὰρ ὃ μιᾶς καὶ ἐξ ὧν μιᾶς, εἴτε τῆς αὐτῆς εἴτε ἄλλης, ὥστε καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, εἴθ᾽ αὗται θεωροῦσιν εἴτ᾽ [25] ἐκ τούτων μία.	Unam vero omnium non est rationabile. Et enim demonstrativa una de omnibus erit utique * accidentibus, siquidem omnis demonstrativa circa aliquod subiectum ↵ speculatur per se accidentia ex communibus opinionibus. Circa idem igitur genus accidentia per se eiusdem est speculari ex eisdem opinionibus. Nam circa ipsum quia unius et ex quibus unius, sive eiusdem sive alius; quare et accidentia deinde hae speculabuntur aut ex hiis una.	-On the other hand, it is not reasonable that one science should deal with all. For then there would be one demonstrative science dealing with all attributes. For ever demonstrative science investigates with regard to some subject its essential attributes, starting from the common beliefs. Therefore to investigate the essential attributes of one class of things, starting from one set of beliefs, is the business of one science. For the subject belongs to one science, and the premisses belong to one, whether to the same or to another; so that the attributes do so too, whether they are investigated by these sciences or by one compounded out of them.
ἔτι δὲ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον ἡ θεωρία ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ταύταις; λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν οὐσία τίς ἐστι καὶ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἐπίπεδα, πότερον τῆς αὐτῆς ταῦτα γνωρίζειν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος περὶ ὧν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ [30] δεικνύουσιν, ἢ ἄλλης.	↵ Amplius autem utrum circa substantias solum theoria est aut et circa ipsis accidentia? Dico autem ut si solidum quaedam substantia est et lineae et superficies, utrum eiusdem scientie est ea cognoscere et accidentia circa unumquodque genus de quibus mathematice ostendunt, aut alius.	(5) Further, does our investigation deal with substances alone or also with their attributes? I mean for instance, if the solid is a substance and so are lines and planes, is it the business of the same science to know these and to know the attributes of each of these classes (the attributes about which the mathematical sciences offer proofs), or of a different science?
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αὐτῆς, ἀποδεικτική τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας, οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι:	Nam si eiusdem, demonstra↵tiva quaedam erit et quae est substantiae; non autem videtur eius quod quid est demonstratio esse.	If of the same, the science of substance also must be a demonstrative science, but it is thought that there is no demonstration of the essence of things.
εἰ δ᾽ ἑτέρας, τίς ἔσται ἡ θεωροῦσα περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα; τοῦτο γὰρ ἀποδοῦναι παγχάλεπον.	Si vero diverse, quae erit speculans circa substantiam accidentia? Hoc enim reddere est valde difficile.	And if of another, what will be the science that investigates the attributes of substance? This is a very difficult question.
ἔτι δὲ πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας μόνας εἶναι [35] φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείω γένη τετύχηκεν ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, [997β] [1] οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, περὶ ἃ τὰς μαθηματικὰς εἶναί φασιν ἐπιστήμας;	Amplius autem utrum sensibiles substantiae sole esse sint dicende aut praeter eas aliae? Et utrum unice aut plura genera ↵ substantiarum sunt, ut dicentes species et intermedia, circa quae mathematicas dicunt esse scientias?	(4) Further, must we say that sensible substances alone exist, or that there are others besides these? And are substances of one kind or are there in fact several kinds of [97b] substances, as those say who assert the existence both of the Forms and of the intermediates, with which they say the mathematical sciences deal?
ὡς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἴδη αἴτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις περὶ [5] αὐτῶν:	Quomodo ergo dicimus species causasque et substantias secundum se, dictum est in priƿ↵mis de ipsis sermonibus.	-The sense in which we say the Forms are both causes and self-dependent substances has been explained in our first remarks about them;
πολλαχῇ δὲ ἐχόντων δυσκολίαν, οὐθενὸς ἧττον ἄτοπον τὸ φάναι μὲν εἶναί τινας φύσεις παρὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταύτας δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς φάναι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πλὴν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὰ δὲ φθαρτά. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπόν φασιν εἶναι καὶ ἵππον καὶ ὑγίειαν, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδέν, παραπλήσιον [10] ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεοὺς μὲν εἶναι φάσκουσιν ἀνθρωποειδεῖς δέ: οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίουν ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἀϊδίους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι τὰ εἴδη ἄλλ᾽ ἢ αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια.	Multis autem modis habentibus difficultatem, nullo minus absurdum dicere quidem aliquas esse naturas praeter eas quae sunt in celo, has autem easdem dicere sensibilibus nisi quia haec quidem sempiterna illa vero corruptibilia. Nam per se hominem dicunt esse et equum et sanitatem, ↵ aliud autem nihil, simile facientes deos esse dicentibus et humane speciei esse. Nihil enim aliud illi fecerunt quam homines sempiternos, nec hii species nisi sensibiles sempiternas.	while the theory presents difficulties in many ways, the most paradoxical thing of all is the statement that there are certain things besides those in the material universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except that they are eternal while the latter are perishable. For they say there is a man-himself and a horse-itself and health-itself, with no further qualification,-a procedure like that of the people who said there are gods, but in human form. For they were positing nothing but eternal men, nor are the Platonists making the Forms anything other than eternal sensible things.
ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρά τ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ [15] τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν: ὥστ᾽ ἐπείπερ ἡ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. καίτοι πῶς δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τούτοις; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκίνητον εὔλογον εἶναι, κινούμενον δὲ [20] καὶ παντελῶς ἀδύνατον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἡ ὀπτικὴ πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἁρμονική: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας: εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ μεταξὺ καὶ αἰσθήσεις, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ζῷα ἔσονται μεταξὺ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν.	Amplius autem si quis praeter species et sensibilia * intermedia ponat, multas habebit dubitationes. Palam enim quia simili↵ter lineae * praeter ipsas et sensibiles erunt et unumquodque aliorum generum. Igitur quoniam astrologia harum una est, erit quoddam celum praeter sensibile celum et sol et luna et alia similiter celestia. Et quomodo hiis credere oportet? Neque enim ↵ immobile rationabile * esse, mobile vero omnino impossibile. — Similiter autem et de quibus perspectiva tractat et in mathematicis armonica; et enim haec impossibile * esse praeter sensibilia propter easdem causas. Nam si sunt sensibilia intermedia et sensus, palam quia et animalia erunt intermedia ipsorum ↵ et corruptibilium.	Further, if we are to posit besides the Forms and the sensibles the intermediates between them, we shall have many difficulties. For clearly on the same principle there will be lines besides the lines-themselves and the sensible lines, and so with each of the other classes of things; so that since astronomy is one of these mathematical sciences there will also be a heaven besides the sensible heaven, and a sun and a moon (and so with the other heavenly bodies) besides the sensible. Yet how are we to believe in these things? It is not reasonable even to suppose such a body immovable, but to suppose it moving is quite impossible.-And similarly with the things of which optics and mathematical harmonics treat; for these also cannot exist apart from the sensible things, for the same reasons. For if there are sensible things and sensations intermediate between Form and individual, evidently there will also be animals intermediate between animals-themselves and the perishable animals.
[25] ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ ποῖα τῶν ὄντων δεῖ ζητεῖν ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας. εἰ γὰρ τούτῳ διοίσει τῆς γεωδαισίας ἡ γεωμετρία μόνον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτων ἐστὶν ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθητῶν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ παρ᾽ ἰατρικὴν ἔσται τις ἐπιστήμη καὶ παρ᾽ ἑκάστην τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ αὐτῆς τε ἰατρικῆς [30] καὶ τῆσδε τῆς ἰατρικῆς: καίτοι πῶς τοῦτο δυνατόν; καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιείν᾽ ἄττα εἴη παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιεινόν.	— Dubitabit autem aliquis et circa quae existentium quaerere oportet has scientias. Nam si in hoc differt geometria a geodesia solum, quia haec quidem horum est quae sentimus illa vero non sensibilium, palam quia et praeter medicinalem et alia erit scientia (et praeter unamquamque aliarum) ↵ inter ipsam medicinalem et hanc medicinalem. Sed quomodo hoc possibile? Et enim rsalubria quaedam utique erunt praeter sensibilia et autosanum.	-We might also raise the question, with reference to which kind of existing things we must look for these sciences of intermediates. If geometry is to differ from mensuration only in this, that the latter deals with things that we perceive, and the former with things that are not perceptible, evidently there will also be a science other than medicine, intermediate between medical-science-itself and this individual medical science, and so with each of the other sciences. Yet how is this possible? There would have to be also healthy things besides the perceptible healthy things and the healthy-itself.
ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὡς ἡ γεωδαισία τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν: ἐφθείρετο γὰρ ἂν φθειρομένων.	Simul autem nec hoc verum quia geodesia sensibilium est magnitudinum et corruptibilium; corrupta enim utique esset corruptis.	And at the same time not even this is true, that mensuration deals with perceptible and perishable magnitudes; for then it would have perished when they perished.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἂν εἴη μεγεθῶν [35] οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε. [998α] [1] οὔτε γὰρ αἱ αἰσθηταὶ γραμμαὶ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης (οὐθὲν γὰρ εὐθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ στρογγύλον: ἅπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας), οὔθ᾽ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ [5] ἕλικες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅμοιαι περὶ ὧν ἡ ἀστρολογία ποιεῖται τοὺς λόγους, οὔτε τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ἄστροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν.	ƿ At vero nec sensibilium erit magnitudinum nec * circa ↵ caelum hoc astrologia. Nec enim sensibiles lineae tales sunt quales ↵ dicit geometer. Nihil enim rectum sensibilium ita nec rotundum; tangit enim regulam non secundum punctum circulus, sed ut Protagoras ait geometras redarguens. Nec motus nec revolutiones celi similes de quibus astrologia facit sermones, ↵ nec astris puncta naturam habent eandem.	But on the other hand astronomy cannot be dealing with perceptible magnitudes nor with this heaven above us. For neither are perceptible lines such lines as the [98a]geometer speaks of (for no perceptible thing is straight or round in the way in which he defines straight and round ; for a hoop touches a straight edge not at a point, but as Protagoras used to say it did, in his refutation of the geometers), nor are the movements and spiral orbits in the heavens like those of which astronomy treats, nor have geometrical points the same nature as the actual stars.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν εἶναι μὲν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λεγόμενα τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτοις: οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα πάντα [10] μὲν πλείονος λόγου διελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωρῆσαι.	— Sunt autem aliqui qui dicunt esse quidem intermedia haec * dicta * infra species et sensibilia, non tamen sine sensibilibus sed in hiis. Quibus accidentia impossibilia omnia quidem pluris est orationis per↵transire, sufficit autem et talia speculari.	-Now there are some who say that these so-called intermediates between the Forms and the perceptible things exist, not apart from the perceptible things, however, but in these; the impossible results of this view would take too long to enumerate, but it is enough to consider even such points as the following:
οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτω μόνον, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι (τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστιν),	Non enim in talibus congruum est habere sic solum, sed palam quia et species convenit in sensibilibus esse; eiusdem enim rationis utraque haec sunt.	-It is not reasonable that this should be so only in the case of these intermediates, but clearly the Forms also might be in the perceptible things; for both statements are parts of the same theory.
ἔτι δὲ δύο στερεὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τόπῳ,	Amplius autem duo solida in eodem necesse est esse loco,	Further, it follows from this theory that there are two solids in the same place,
καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἀκίνητα [15] ἐν κινουμένοις γε ὄντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς.	et non esse immobilia in motis existentia sensibilibus. ↵	and that the intermediates are not immovable, since they are in the moving perceptible things.
ὅλως δὲ τίνος ἕνεκ᾽ ἄν τις θείη εἶναι μὲν αὐτά, εἶναι δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς; ταὐτὰ γὰρ συμβήσεται ἄτοπα τοῖς προειρημένοις: ἔσται γὰρ οὐρανός τις παρὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, πλήν γ᾽ οὐ χωρὶς ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ: ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδυνατώτερον. [20]	Totaliter autem cuius causa quis ponet utique esse quidem ipsa, esse autem in sensibilibus? Eadem enim contingent inconvenientia eis quae predicta sunt; erit enim celum aliquod preter celum, tamen non extra sed in eodem loco, quod magis est impossibile.	And in general to what purpose would one suppose them to exist indeed, but to exist in perceptible things? For the same paradoxical results will follow which we have already mentioned; there will be a heaven besides the heaven, only it will be not apart but in the same place; which is still more impossible.