Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4

Chapter 1

Greek	Latin	English
	METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER QUARTUS	Aristotle Metaphysics Book 4 (G)
[1003α] [21] ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό.	ƿ Est scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens in quantum est ↵ ens et quae huic insunt secundum se.	Chapter 1. THERE is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.
αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή: οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι [25] περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.	Haec autem nulli * in parte dictarum eadem; aliarum enim nulla intendit universaliter de ente in quantum est ens. Verum partem eius abscindentes aliquam circa * hanc speculantur * accidens, velut scientiarum ↵ mathematice.	Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ [30] στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ὄν: διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.	Quoniam autem principia et extremas quaerimus causas, palam quia naturae cuiusdam ipsas secundum se esse est necesse. Si ergo et entium elementa quaerentes haec quesierunt principia, necesse et entis elementa esse non secundum accidens ↵ sed in quantum * entia. Unde et nobis entis in quantum est ens prime cause sunt accipiende.	Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.

Chapter 2

Greek	Latin	English
τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ [35] ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, [1003β] [1] καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτοις, [5] οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ᾽ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ᾽ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς [10] ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας: διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν.	Ens autem multis quidem dicitur modis, sed ad unum et ad unam aliquam naturam et non equivoce. Sed quemadmodum salubre omne ad sanitatem, hoc quidem in conservatione, ↵ aliud vero in actione, aliud quia est signum sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile. Et medicinale ad medica↵tivam, hoc enim in habendo medicativam dicitur medicinale, ƿ illud vero in existendo bene natum ad ipsam, et aliud per esse opus medicative. Similiter autem et alia sumemus hiis dicta. ↵ ita vero et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne ad unum principium. Haec enim quia substantiae, entia dicuntur, illa vero quia passiones substantiae, alia quia via ad substantiam, aut corruptiones aut privationes aut qualitates, aut effectiva aut generativa substantiae, aut ad substantiam dictorum, aut horum ↵ cuiusdam negationes aut substantiae. Quapropter et non ens esse non ens dicimus.	Chapter 2. There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be, but all that is is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to be by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is [03b] capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing.
καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ᾽ ἓν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ [15] λέγονται καθ᾽ ἕν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ᾗ ὄντα.	Quemadmodum ergo et salubrium omnium una est scientia, ita hoc et in aliis. Non enim solum eorum quae secundum unum dictorum est unius scientie speculari, sed et dictorum ad unam naturam; et enim haec modo ↵ quodam secundum unum dicuntur.	As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion.
πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι᾽ ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.	Palam ergo quia et entia unius est speculari in quantum entia. Ubique vero proprie primi est scientia, et ex quo alia pendent et propter quod dicuntur. Ergo si hoc est substantia, substantiarum oportet principia et causas habere philosophum *.	It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being. But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.
ἅπαντος δὲ γένους καὶ αἴσθησις μία ἑνὸς [20] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον γραμματικὴ μία οὖσα πάσας θεωρεῖ τὰς φωνάς: διὸ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ὅσα εἴδη θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει, τά τε εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν.	↵ Omnis autem generis et sensus unus unius * et scientia; ut gramatica una ens omnes speculatur voces. Quapropter et entis in quantum ens quascumque species speculari unius est scientie genere, species autem specierum.	Now for each one class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, investigates all articulate sounds. Hence to investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science.
εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα [25] (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ἔργου μᾶλλον):	Si igitur ens et unum idem et una natura eo quod se ad invicem consequuntur sicut principium et causa, sed non ut ↵ una ratione ostensa (nil autem differt nec si similiter suscipiamus, sed et pre opere magis).	If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that-in fact this would even strengthen our case);
ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, [27] καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλούμενον τὸ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος (δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐ χωρίζεται οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ γενέσεως οὔτ᾽ [30] ἐπὶ φθορᾶς), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἓν παρὰ τὸ ὄν,	Idem enim * unus homo et homo, et ens homo et homo, et non diversum aliquid ostendit ƿ secundum dictionem repetitam * ‘est homo et homo et unus homo’; palam autem quia non separatur nec in generatione nec in corruptione. Similiter autem et in uno, quare palam quia ↵ additio in hiis idem ostendit, et nihil aliud unum praeter ens.	for one man and man are the same thing, and so are existent man and man, and the doubling of the words in one man and one existent man does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly one existent man adds nothing to existent man, and that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being;
ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι:	Amplius autem cuiusque substantia unum est non secundum accidens, similiter autem et quod quidem ens aliquid.	and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is:
ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος: περὶ ὧν τὸ τί ἐστι τῆς [35] αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει θεωρῆσαι, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται τἀναντία εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην: [1004α] [1] τεθεωρήσθω δ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἐναντίων.	Quare quotcumque unius sunt species, tot et entis. De quibus quod quid est eiusdem scientie genere speculari. Dico autem ut de ↵ eodem et simili et aliis talibus. Fere autem omnia reducuntur ↵ contraria in principium hoc; speculata sunt autem a nobis * haec in ecloga contrariorum.	All this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the essence of these is the work of a science which is generically one-I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same and the similar and the other concepts of this sort; and nearly all contraries may be referred [04a] to this origin; let us take them as having been investigated in the Selection of Contraries.
καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη φιλοσοφίας ἔστιν ὅσαι περ αἱ οὐσίαι: ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα πρώτην καὶ ἐχομένην αὐτῶν. ὑπάρχει [5] γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ ὂν [καὶ τὸ ἕν]: διὸ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀκολουθήσουσι τούτοις. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος ὥσπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς λεγόμενος: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει μέρη, καὶ πρώτη τις καὶ δευτέρα ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἄλλαι ἐφεξῆς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.	Et tot partes sunt philosophiae quot substantiae, quare * necessarium esse aliquam primam et habitam ipsis. Existunt enim statim genera habentia ens et ↵ unum; quapropter et scientie haec sequuntur. Est enim philosophus ut mathematicus dictus; et enim haec partes habet, et prima quaedam et secunda est scientia et aliae consequenter in mathematibus.	And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this. For being falls immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera. For the philosopher is like the mathematician, as that word is used; for mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within the sphere of mathematics.
ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς τἀντικείμενα [10] θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος—ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἢ <γὰρ> ἁπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο, ἤ τινι γένει: ἔνθα μὲν οὖν τῷ ἑνὶ ἡ διαφορὰ πρόσεστι παρὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει, ἀπουσία γὰρ [15] ἡ ἀπόφασις ἐκείνου ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῇ στερήσει καὶ ὑποκειμένη τις φύσις γίγνεται καθ᾽ ἧς λέγεται ἡ στέρησις)	Quoniam autem unius est opposita speculari, uni autem ↵ opponitur pluralitas, negationem autem et privationem unius est speculari propter utroque modo speculari unum cuius negatio aut privatio, aut * simpliciter dicta quia non inest illi aut alicui generi; hic quidem igitur uni differentia adest praeter quod * in negatione, illius enim absentia negatio est, ↵ in privatione vero et subiecta quaedam fit natura de qua dicitur privatio.	Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted):
[τῷ δ᾽ ἑνὶ πλῆθος ἀντίκειται]—ὥστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν, [20] τῆς εἰρημένης γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης: ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης: διαφορὰ γάρ τις ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἑτερότης.	Uni autem pluralitas opponitur, quare et opposita dictis, diversumque et dissimile et inequale et quaecumque alia dicuntur aut secundum eadem aut secundum pluralitatem et unum, est dicte cognoscere scientie. Quorum unum quidem ali↵ƿquid et contrarietas est; differentia enim quaedam contrarietas est, differentia autem diversitas.	-in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either from these or from plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above named. And contrariety is one of these concepts; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of otherness.
ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἓν λέγεται, καὶ ταῦτα πολλαχῶς μὲν λεχθήσεται, ὅμως δὲ μιᾶς ἅπαντά ἐστι γνωρίζειν: οὐ γὰρ εἰ πολλαχῶς, ἑτέρας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μήτε καθ᾽ ἓν μήτε [25] πρὸς ἓν οἱ λόγοι ἀναφέρονται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὅσα ἓν λέγεται πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὡσαύτως φατέον καὶ περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔχειν: ὥστε διελόμενον ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἀποδοτέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκάστῃ κατηγορίᾳ πῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο [30] λέγεται: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλους λεχθήσεται τοιούτους τρόπους.	Quare quoniam unum multipliciter dicitur, et haec multipliciter quidem dicentur, at tamen unius omnia cognoscere est; non enim si multipliciter, alte↵rius, sed si nec secundum unum nec ad unum rationes referuntur, alterius tunc. Quoniam vero omnia ad primum referuntur, ut quaecumque unum dicuntur ad primum unum, similiter dicendum est et de eodem et de diverso et contrariis se habere. Ergo divisum quotiens dicitur singulum, sic reddendum est ad ↵ primum in singulis predicamentis quomodo ad illud dicitur; haec enim in habendo illud, illa vero in faciendo, alia vero secundum alios dicentur tales modos.	Therefore, since there are many senses in which a thing is said to be one, these terms also will have many senses, but yet it belongs to one science to know them all; for a term belongs to different sciences not if it has different senses, but if it has not one meaning and its definitions cannot be referred to one central meaning. And since all things are referred to that which is primary, as for instance all things which are called one are referred to the primary one, we must say that this holds good also of the same and the other and of contraries in general; so that after distinguishing the various senses of each, we must then explain by reference to what is primary in the case of each of the predicates in question, saying how they are related to it; for some will be called what they are called because they possess it, others because they produce it, and others in other such ways.
φανερὸν οὖν [ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη] ὅτι μιᾶς περὶ τούτων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχειν (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἓν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν),	Palam ergo, quod in dubitationibus dictum est, quia unius est de hiis et de substantia sermonem habere; hoc autem erat unum eorum quae in dubitationibus.	It is evident, then, that it belongs to one science to be able to give an account of these concepts as well as of substance (this was one of the questions in our book of problems),
καὶ ἔστι τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ πάντων δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν. [1004β] [1] εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίς ἔσται ὁ ἐπισκεψόμενος εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης καθήμενος, ἢ εἰ ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον, ἢ τί ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. [5] ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ ἑνὸς ᾗ ἓν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ταῦτα καθ᾽ αὑτά ἐστι πάθη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἀριθμοὶ ἢ γραμμαὶ ἢ πῦρ, δῆλον ὡς ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τί ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότ᾽ αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι ὡς οὐ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρότερον ἡ οὐσία, [10] περὶ ἧς οὐθὲν ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐπεὶ ὥσπερ ἔστι καὶ ἀριθμοῦ ᾗ ἀριθμὸς ἴδια πάθη, οἷον περιττότης ἀρτιότης, συμμετρία ἰσότης, ὑπεροχὴ ἔλλειψις, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερεῷ καὶ ἀκινήτῳ καὶ κινουμένῳ ἀβαρεῖ τε καὶ βάρος [15] ἔχοντι ἔστιν ἕτερα ἴδια), οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι ᾗ ὂν ἔστι τινὰ ἴδια, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπισκέψασθαι τὸ ἀληθές.	Et philosophi est de omni↵bus posse speculari. Nam si non philosophi, quis erit qui investigabit si idem Socrates et Socrates sedens, aut si unum uni contrarium, aut quid est contrarium aut quotiens dicitur? Similiter autem et de aliis talibus. ↵ quoniam ergo unius in quantum est unum et entis in quantum est ens eaedem secundum se passiones sunt, sed non in quantum numeri aut lineae aut ignis, palam quia illius scientie et quid sunt * cognoscere et accidentia ipsis. Et non sic peccant qui de ipsis intendebant quasi non philosophantes, sed ↵ quia primum est substantia de qua nihil audiunt. Quoniam sicut sunt et numeri et in quantum numerus proprie passiones *, ut imparitas paritas, commensuratio equalitas, excedentia defectio, et haec * secundum se et ad invicem insunt numeris (similiter autem et solido et immobili et mobili et levi et gravi ↵ sunt alia propria), sic et enti in quantum est ens sunt quaedam ƿ propria, et ea sunt de quibus est philosophi perscrutari veritatem.	and that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to [04b] investigate all things. For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what contrariety is, or how many meanings it has? And similarly with all other such questions. Since, then, these are essential modifications of unity qua unity and of being qua being, not qua numbers or lines or fire, it is clear that it belongs to this science to investigate both the essence of these concepts and their properties. And those who study these properties err not by leaving the sphere of philosophy, but by forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other things. For number qua number has peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly the solid and the motionless and that which is in motion and the weightless and that which has weight have other peculiar properties. So too there are certain properties peculiar to being as such, and it is about these that the philosopher has to investigate the truth.
σημεῖον δέ: οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ: ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ [20] διαλέγονται περὶ ἁπάντων, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, διαλέγονται δὲ περὶ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταῦτα εἶναι οἰκεῖα. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ,	Signum autem: dialetici namque et sophiste eandem subinduunt figuram philosopho, quia sophistica apparens solum est sophia, et dialetici de omnibus disputant; omnibus autem com↵mune ens est. Disputant autem et de hiis, videlicet quia philosophiae sunt ipsa propria. Nam circa idem genus versatur et sophistica et dialetica cum philosophia,	-An indication of this may be mentioned: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists only in semblance, and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things; but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy.-For sophistic and dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy,
ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου [25] τῇ προαιρέσει: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ᾽ οὔ.	sed differt ab hac quidem modo potestatis, ab illa vero vite proheresi. Est autem ↵ dialetica temptativa de quibus philosophia est sciens. Et sophistica visa quidem, ens vero non.	but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not.
ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις, καὶ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰς ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, οἷον στάσις τοῦ ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους:	Amplius contrariorum altera coelementatio privatio, et omnia referuntur ad ens et non ens et ad unum et pluralitatem, ut status unius et motus pluralitatis.	Again, in the list of contraries one of the two columns is privative, and all contraries are reducible to being and non-being, and to unity and plurality, as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality.
δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ τὴν [30] οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι: πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δὲ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, οἱ δὲ φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος.	Entia vero et substantiam ↵ confitentur ex contrariis fere omnes componi. Omnes enim principia contraria dicunt; hii namque par et impar, illi vero calidum et frigidum, alii finem et infinitum, alii amorem et odium.	And nearly all thinkers agree that being and substance are composed of contraries; at least all name contraries as their first principles-some name odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit and the unlimited, some love and strife.
πάντα δὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναγόμενα φαίνεται εἰς τὸ ἓν καὶ πλῆθος (εἰλήφθω γὰρ ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡμῖν), [1005α] [1] αἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ καὶ παντελῶς αἱ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εἰς γένη ταῦτα πίπτουσιν.	Omnia vero et alia reducta videntur ad unum et pluralitatem. Sumatur enim ipsa reductio nobis. Principia vero et omnino ↵ quae * ab aliis ut in * genera haec cadunt.	And all the others as well are evidently reducible to unity and [05a] plurality (this reduction we must take for granted), and the principles stated by other thinkers fall entirely under these as their genera.
φανερὸν οὖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι. πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἓν [5] καὶ πλῆθος. ταῦτα δὲ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης, εἴτε καθ᾽ ἓν λέγεται εἴτε μή, ὥσπερ ἴσως ἔχει καὶ τἀληθές. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως εἰ καὶ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἕν, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον τἆλλα λεχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ὁμοίως, [καὶ διὰ τοῦτο] καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἓν καθόλου καὶ ταὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ [10] χωριστόν, ὥσπερ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἓν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς.	Palam igitur et ex hiis quia unius est scientie ens in quantum * ens speculari. Omnia namque aut contraria aut ex contrariis, principia vero contrariorum unum et pluralitas. Haec autem unius scientie, sive ↵ secundum unum dicuntur sive non, ut forsan habet veritas. At tamen et si multipliciter dicitur unum, ad primum alia dicuntur, et contraria similiter; et propter hoc et si non est ens aut unum universaliter et idem in omnibus aut separabile, ut forsan ↵ non est, sed haec quidem ad unum illa vero in eo quod consequenter.	It is obvious then from these considerations too that it belongs to one science to examine being qua being. For all things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries. And these belong to one science, whether they have or have not one single meaning. Probably the truth is that they have not; yet even if one has several meanings, the other meanings will be related to the primary meaning (and similarly in the case of the contraries), even if being or unity is not a universal and the same in every instance or is not separable from the particular instances (as in fact it probably is not; the unity is in some cases that of common reference, in some cases that of serial succession).
διὰ τοῦτο οὐ τοῦ γεωμέτρου θεωρῆσαι τί τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τέλειον ἢ ἓν ἢ ὂν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.	Et ideo non est geometre speculari quid contrarium aut perfectum aut unum aut ens aut idem aut diversum, nisi ex suppositione.	And for this reason it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or unity or being or the same or the other, but only to presuppose these concepts and reason from this starting-point.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ ᾗ ὄν, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι [15] οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρητική, τῶν τε εἰρημένων καὶ περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, καὶ γένους καὶ εἴδους, καὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.	Quod quidem igitur unius est scientie ens ƿ in quantum est ens speculari et quae insunt ei in quantum est ↵ ens, manifestum, et quia non solum substantiarum sed et existentium eadem est theorica, et de dictis et de priore et posteriore, et genere et specie, et toto et parte et aliis talibus.	Obviously then it is the work of one science to examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the same science will examine not only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and the concepts prior and posterior, genus and species , whole and part, and the others of this sort.

Chapter 3

Greek	Latin	English
λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης περί τε [20] τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας.	Dicendum autem utrum unius aut diverse scientie de ↵ vocatis in mathematibus dignitatibus et de substantia.	Chapter 3. We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ σκέψις:	Palam autem quia unius est et eius quae est philosophi quae de hiis perscrutatio.	Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher;
ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ᾗ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος [25] ὄν: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ᾽ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις: ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ᾗ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ περὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία.	Omnibus enim insunt existentibus, sed non generi alicui seorsum separatim ab aliis. Et utuntur omnes, quia entis sunt in quantum est ens; unumquodque autem genus ↵ * ens. In tantum vero utuntur in quantum eis sufficiens est; hoc autem est quantum continet genus de quo demonstrationes * ferunt. Quare quoniam manifestum quod in quantum sunt entia insunt omnibus (hoc enim eis est commune), de ente * in quantum est ens cognoscentis et de hiis est speculatio.	for these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of being qua being and each genus has being. But men use them just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to which their demonstrations refer extends. Therefore since these truths clearly hold good for all things qua being (for this is what is common to them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the inquiry into these as well.
διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων [30] ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἢ μή, οὔτε γεωμέτρης οὔτ᾽ ἀριθμητικός,	Unde ↵ nullus particulariter intendentium nititur dicere de eis aliquid, si vera aut non, nec geometra nec arismeticus.	And for this reason no one who is conducting a special inquiry tries to say anything about their truth or falsity,-neither the geometer nor the arithmetician.
ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες: μόνοι γὰρ ᾤοντο περί τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω (ἓν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις), [35] τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη σκέψις: [1005β] [1] ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρώτη.	Sed phisicorum quidam, merito hoc facientes; soli namque putantur de tota natura intendere et de ente. Sed quoniam est adhuc phisico aliquis superior (unum enim aliquod genus est entis natura), ↵ * universalis et circa primam substantiam theorizantis et de hiis utique erit perscrutatio. Est autem sophia quaedam phisica, sed non prima.	Some natural philosophers indeed have done so, and their procedure was intelligible enough; for they thought that they alone were inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one kind of thinker who is above even the natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of being), the discussion of these truths also will belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with [05b] primary substance. Physics also is a kind of Wisdom, but it is not the first kind.
ὅσα δ᾽ ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν [4] τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν: δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων [5] ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.	Quaecumque vero conantur * dicentium quidam de veritate quo oportet modo recipere, propter ignorantiam analeticorum ↵ hoc faciunt. Oportet enim de hiis prescientes venire sed non audientes quaerere.	-And the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic; for they should know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος ᾗ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον:	Quod quidem igitur philosophi, et de omni substantia speculantis in quantum congruit, et de omnibus sillogisticis princiƿpiis est perscrutari, palam.	Evidently then it belongs to the philosopher, i.e. to him who is studying the nature of all substance, to inquire also into the principles of syllogism.
προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς βεβαιοτάτας ἀρχὰς [10] τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα τὰς πάντων βεβαιοτάτας. ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος.	Congruit autem maxime cognoscentem circa unumquodque genus habere dicere firmissima rei ↵ principia, quare et de entibus in quantum sunt entia omnium firmissima. Est autem hic philosophus ipse.	But he who knows best about each genus must be able to state the most certain principles of his subject, so that he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher,
βεβαιοτάτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον: γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην (περὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζουσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον. [15] ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις: ὃ δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὁτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἥκειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον:	Firmissimum autem omnium principium est circa quod mentiri impossibile est; notissimum enim esse tale est necesse (nam circa ea quae ignorant decipiuntur omnes), et non condicionale. Quod enim ↵ necessarium habere quodcumque entium intelligentem, hoc non condicio; quod autem cognoscere est necessarium quodcumque cognoscentem, et venire habentem est necesse. Quod quidem igitur tale principium omnium est firmissimum, palam.	and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. For a principle which every one must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all;
τίς δ᾽ ἔστιν αὕτη, μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ [20] ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ᾽ ἄν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας): αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν: ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ [25] τινὲς οἴονται λέγειν Ἡράκλειτον. οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, ἅ τις λέγει, ταῦτα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ τἀναντία (προσδιωρίσθω δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προτάσει τὰ εἰωθότα), ἐναντία δ᾽ ἐστὶ δόξα δόξῃ ἡ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα [30] ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό: ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἔχοι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὁ διεψευσμένος περὶ τούτου. διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν: φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων αὕτη πάντων. [35]	Quid vero sit illud, post haec dicamus. Idem enim simul inesse et non inesse eidem et secundum idem est impossibile; et quaecum↵quae alia determinaremus utique, sint determinata * ad logicas difficultates. Hoc autem omnium firmissimum est principiorum; habet enim dictam determinationem. Impossibile namque quemcumque idem existimare esse et non esse, * quemadmodum quidam putant dicere Eraclitum. Non enim est necesse, ↵ quae aliquis dicit, haec et existimare. Si vero non contingit simul inesse eidem contraria (addeterminata sint autem nobis et huic propositioni consueta), contraria vero * est opinio opinioni quae * contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul exis↵timare eundem esse et non esse idem; simul enim habebit contrarias opiniones qui de hoc est mentitus. Quapropter omnes demonstrantes in hanc reducunt ultimam opinionem; natura namque principium et aliarum dignitatum hoc omnium.	which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; we must presuppose, to guard against dialectical objections, any further qualifications which might be added. This, then, is the most certain of all principles, since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and if it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject (the usual qualifications must be presupposed in this premiss too), and if an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms.

Chapter 4

Greek	Latin	English
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, [1006α] [1] καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως. χρῶνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βεβαιοτάτη [5] αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν.	Sunt autem quidam qui, ut diximus, dicebant contingere ↵ idem esse et non esse et existimare ita. Utuntur autem ratione ƿ hac multi eorum qui * de natura. Nos autem nunc accepimus quasi impossibili existente simul esse et non esse; et per hoc ↵ ostendimus quod firmissimum hoc principiorum omnium est.	Chapter 4. There are some who, as we said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, [06a] and say that people can judge this to be the case. And among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.
ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν: ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ: ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδ᾽ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν), [10] εἰ δέ τινων μὴ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, τίνα ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν.	Volunt autem et hoc demonstrare quidam propter ineruditionem; est enim ineruditio non cognoscere quorum oportet quaerere demonstrationem et quorum non oportet. Totaliter quidem enim omnium esse demonstrationem est impossibile; ↵ nam in infinitum procederet, ut nec ita foret demonstratio. Si vero quorundam non oportet demonstrationem quaerere, quod volunt magis esse tale principium non habent dicere.	Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀποδεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν: ἂν δὲ μηθέν, γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ᾗ μὴ ἔχει: ὅμοιος [15] γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ᾗ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεγκτικῶς ἀποδεῖξαι λέγω διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἀποδεικνύων μὲν ἂν δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰτίου ὄντος ἔλεγχος ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.	p; quaerere rationem ad nullius habentem rationem, in quantum ↵ non habet rationem. Similis enim plante talis in quantum talis iam est. Elenchice autem dico demonstrare differre et demonstrare, quia demonstrans quidem utique videbitur petere quod * in principio, sed nec tali existente causa elenchus utique erit et non demonstratio.	We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view is impossible, if our opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start no better than a vegetable. Now negative demonstration I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to be begging the question, but if another person is responsible for the assumption we shall have negative proof, not demonstration.
ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἢ εἶναί τι λέγειν [20] ἢ μὴ εἶναι (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖν), ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὔτ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλον. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο διδῷ, ἔσται ἀπόδειξις: ἤδη γάρ τι [25] ἔσται ὡρισμένον. ἀλλ᾽ αἴτιος οὐχ ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὑπομένων: ἀναιρῶν γὰρ λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον. ἔτι δὲ ὁ τοῦτο συγχωρήσας συγκεχώρηκέ τι ἀληθὲς εἶναι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως [ὥστε οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι].	Principium vero ad omnia talia non velle aut esse aliquid ↵ dicere aut non esse (hoc enim forsan utique quis opinabitur quod a principio petere), sed significare quidem aliquid et ipsi et alii; hoc enim necesse est, si dicat aliquid. Si enim non, cum tali non utique erit sermo; nec ipsi ad se ipsum nec ad alium. Si quis autem hoc dederit, erit demonstratio; iam ↵ enim aliquid erit diffinitum. Sed causa non demonstrans sed sustinens; interimens enim rationem sustinet rationem.	The starting-point for all such arguments is not the demand that our opponent shall say that something either is or is not (for this one might perhaps take to be a begging of the question), but that he shall say something which is significant both for himself and for another; for this is necessary, if he really is to say anything. For, if he means nothing, such a man will not be capable of reasoning, either with himself or with another. But if any one grants this, demonstration will be possible; for we shall already have something definite. The person responsible for the proof, however, is not he who demonstrates but he who listens; for while disowning reason he listens to reason.
		And again he who admits this has admitted that something is true apart from demonstration (so that not everything will be so and not so).
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ [30] ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι:	Primum quidem igitur manifestum quod hoc idem verum *, ↵ quod significat nomen ‘esse’ aut ‘non esse’ hoc *, quare non ƿ utique omne sic et non sic se habebit.	First then this at least is obviously true, that the word be or not be has a definite meaning, so that not everything will be so and not so.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει ἕν, ἔστω τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δίπουν.	Amplius si homo significat unum, sit hoc animal bipes.	Again, if man has one meaning, let this be two-footed animal;
λέγω δὲ τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν τοῦτο: εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἂν ᾖ τι ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, [1006β] [1] τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ ἕτερον ὄνομα: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ μὴ φαίη τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν σημαίνειν, πολλὰ δέ, ὧν ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς λόγος τὸ ζῷον δίπουν, εἶεν δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι πλείους, ὡρισμένοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν: [5] τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον: εἰ δὲ μή [τεθείη], ἀλλ᾽ ἄπειρα σημαίνειν φαίη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη λόγος: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἓν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνῄρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν: [10] οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, εἰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, τεθείη ἂν ὄνομα τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕν).	Dico autem * unum significare hoc: si hoc est homo, si sit aliquid homo, hoc est homini esse. Nil autem differt nec si plura quis dicat significare, solum autem * diffinita; ponetur enim utique in singulis ↵ rationibus alterum nomen. Dico autem ut si non dicat hominem unum significare sed multa, quorum unius quidem una * ratio animal bipes; sunt autem et aliae plures, sed diffinite numero; ponetur enim utique proprium nomen secundum ↵ unamquamque rationem. Si autem non ponatur, sed infinita significare dicat, palam quia non utique erit ratio; nam non unum significare nihil significare est. Non significantibus autem nominibus aufertur ad invicem disputare, secundum veritatem autem et ad se ipsum. Nihil enim contingit intelli↵gere nihil intelligentem unum; si autem contingit, ponatur huic rei nomen unum.	by having one meaning I understand this:-if man means X , then if A is a man X will be what being a man means for him. (It makes no difference even if one were to say a word has several meanings, if only they are limited in number; [06b] for to each definition there might be assigned a different word. For instance, we might say that man has not one meaning but several, one of which would have one definition, viz. two-footed animal, while there might be also several other definitions if only they were limited in number; for a peculiar name might be assigned to each of the definitions. If, however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; but if this is possible, one name might be assigned to this thing.)
ἔστω δή, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, σημαῖνόν τι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον ἕν:	Sit itaque, sicut a principio dictum est, significans aliquid * nomen et significans unum.	Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the name has a meaning and has one meaning;
οὐ δὴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι σημαίνειν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ εἶναι, εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὴ μόνον καθ᾽ ἑνὸς [15] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦμεν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, τὸ καθ᾽ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἐσήμαινεν, ὥστε ἓν ἅπαντα ἔσται: συνώνυμα γάρ).	Non itaque contingit homini esse significare quod quidem non esse homini, si homo significat non solum de uno sed et unum. Non enim hoc dignificamus ↵ unum significare quod * de uno, quoniam sic utique musicum et album et homo unum significarent, quare unum omnia erunt; synonima namque.	it is impossible, then, that being a man should mean precisely not being a man, if man not only signifies something about one subject but also has one significance (for we do not identify having one significance with signifying something about one subject, since on that assumption even musical and white and man would have had one significance, so that all things would have been one; for they would all have had the same significance).
καὶ οὐκ ἔσται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καθ᾽ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὃν ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωπον [20] καλοῦμεν, ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν: τὸ δ᾽ ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.	Et non erit esse et non esse idem nisi secundum equivocationem, ut si quem nos hominem voca↵mus, alii non hominem vocent. Dubitatum vero non hoc est, si contingit simul idem esse et non esse hominem scilicet nomen, sed * rem.	And it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as if one whom we call man , others were to call not-man; but the point in question is not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in fact.
δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπω [25] ι εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι: ἓν γὰρ ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ εἶναι ἕν, τὸ ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἷς: εἰ δὲ ἔσται ἕν, ἓν σημανεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι ἕτερον σημαίνει.	Si autem non significet alterum homo et non homo, palam quia non esse homini * ab esse homini, quare erit homini esse non homini esse; unum enim erunt. Hoc ↵ ƿ enim significat esse unum, ut uestimentum et indumentum, si ratio una. Si vero erunt unum, * unum significat homini esse et non homini. Sed ostensum est quod alterum significat.	Now if man and not-man mean nothing different, obviously not being a man will mean nothing different from being a man; so that being a man will be not being a man; for they will be one. For being one means this-being related as raiment and dress are, if their definition is one. And if being a man and being a not-man are to be one, they must mean one thing. But it was shown earlier that they mean different things.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν [30] (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ἄνθρωπος): εἰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι <τότε> τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον δίπουν (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὴ εἶναι [ἄνθρωπον]): οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον.	Necesse itaque, si quid est verum dicere quia homo, animal ↵ esse bipes; hoc enim erat quod significabat homo. Sed si hoc necesse, non contingit non esse hoc ipsum animal bipes; hoc enim significat necesse esse: impossibile non esse hominem. non igitur contingit simul verum esse dicere idem hominem ↵ esse et non esse hominem.	Therefore, if it is true to say of anything that it is a man, it must be a two-footed animal (for this was what man meant); and if this is necessary, it is impossible that the same thing should not at that time be a two-footed animal; for this is what being necessary means –that it is impossible for the thing not to be. It is, then, impossible that it should be at the same time true to say the same thing is a man and is not a man.
ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον:	Eadem autem ratio et in non esse hominem;	The same account holds good with regard to not being a man, [07a]
[1007α] [1] τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἕτερον σημαίνει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἕτερον: πολὺ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὥστε σημαίνειν ἕτερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ [5] τὸ λευκὸν φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν σημαίνειν, πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐροῦμεν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἓν πάντα ἔσται καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἀντικείμενα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν,	nam homini esse et non homini esse alterum significat, siquidem album esse et hominem esse alterum; multum enim opponitur illud magis, quare significat diversum. Si autem ↵ et album dixerit idem significare et unum, item idem dicemus quod et prius dictum est, quia unum omnia sunt et non solum opposita. Si autem hoc non contingit, contingit * quod dictum est,	for being a man and being a not-man mean different things, since even being white and being a man are different; for the former terms are much more different so that they must a fortiori mean different things. And if any one says that white means one and the same thing as man , again we shall say the same as what was said before, that it would follow that all things are one, and not only opposites. But if this is impossible, then what we have maintained will follow,
ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. ἐὰν δὲ προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται [10] τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τὸ πλῆθος: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐρομένου εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, ἀποκριτέον τὸ ἓν σημαῖνον καὶ οὐ προσθετέον ὅτι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέγα. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρά γ᾽ ὄντα τὰ [15] συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν: ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν. ὁμοίως τοίνυν εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ [17] οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ προσαποκριτέον τῷ ἐρομένῳ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα συμβέβηκε προσαποκριτέον, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν: ἐὰν [20] δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται.	si respondeatur interrogatum. Si autem apponatur inter↵rogante simpliciter et negationes, non respondetur interrogatum. Nihil enim prohibet esse idem et hominem et album et alia mille secundum pluralitatem. At tamen interrogante si verum est dicere hominem hoc esse aut non, respondendum est unum significans et non addendum quia et album * et ↵ magnum. Et enim impossibile * infinita entia accidentia permeare; aut igitur omnia permeentur aut nullum. Similiter ergo et si milies est idem homo et non homo, non est correspondendum interroganti si est homo, quia est simul et non homo, si non et alia quaecumque acciderunt sunt correspondenda, ↵ quaecumque sunt aut non sunt. Si autem hoc * fecerit, non disputat.	if our opponent will only answer our question. And if, when one asks the question simply, he adds the contradictories, he is not answering the question. For there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being both a man and white and countless other things: but still, if one asks whether it is or is not true to say that this is a man, our opponent must give an answer which means one thing, and not add that it is also white and large. For, besides other reasons, it is impossible to enumerate its accidental attributes, which are infinite in number; let him, then, enumerate either all or none. Similarly, therefore, even if the same thing is a thousand times a man and a not-man, he must not, in answering the question whether this is a man, add that it is also at the same time a not-man, unless he is bound to add also all the other accidents, all that the subject is or is not; and if he does this, he is not observing the rules of argument.
ὅλως δ᾽ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ [25] (καίτοι αὗται ἀποφάσεις τούτου): ἓν γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε, καὶ ἦν τοῦτό τινος οὐσία. τὸ δ᾽ οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ. εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο ἔσται, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς [30] λέγειν ὅτι οὐθενὸς ἔσται τοιοῦτος λόγος, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός: τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν.	Omnino vero destruunt qui hoc dicunt substantiam et quod ƿ quid erat esse. Omnia namque dicere accidere eis est necesse, et quod vere homini esse aut animali esse * non esse. Nam si erit <quid> quod vere * homini esse, hoc non erit non homini esse aut non esse homini (quamvis hae negationes * ↵ huius); unum enim erat quod significabat *, et erat hoc alicuius substantia. Significare vero substantiam est quia non * aliud aliquid esse ipsi. Si autem erit ipsi quod vere * homini esse quod vere * non homini esse aut quod vere non esse homini, aliud erit. Quare dicere eos est necesse quia nullius ↵ erit talis ratio, sed omnia secundum accidens. Hoc enim determinata est substantia et accidens; album enim accidit homini, quia est albus sed non quod vere album.	And in general those who say this do away with substance and essence. For they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no such thing as being essentially a man or an animal. For if there is to be any such thing as being essentially a man this will not be being a not-man or not being a man (yet these are negations of it); for there was one thing which it meant, and this was the substance of something. And denoting the substance of a thing means that the essence of the thing is nothing else. But if its being essentially a man is to be the same as either being essentially a not-man or essentially not being a man, then its essence will be something else. Therefore our opponents must say that there cannot be such a definition of anything, but that all attributes are accidental; for this is the distinction between substance and accident – white is accidental to man, because though he is white, whiteness is not his essence.
εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθ᾽ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ [35] τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν. [1007β] [1] ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω συμπλέκεται δυοῖν: τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ συμβεβηκότι συμβεβηκός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκε ταὐτῷ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν καὶ τοῦτο λευκὸν [5] ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ Σωκράτης μουσικὸς οὕτως, ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκεν ἑτέρῳ τινί. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνως λέγεται συμβεβηκότα, ὅσα οὕτως λέγεται ὡς τὸ λευκὸν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, οἷον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ λευκῷ [10] ἕτερόν τι συμβεβηκός: οὐ γὰρ γίγνεταί τι ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων. οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι ἔσται συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ μουσικόν: οὐθέν τε γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ ἅμα διώρισται ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκε τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει: ὅσα δ᾽ οὕτως, οὐ [15] συμβεβηκότι συμβέβηκε συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνως, ὥστ᾽ οὐ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεχθήσεται. ἔσται ἄρα τι καὶ ὣς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις.	Si vero omnia secundum accidens dicuntur, nullum erit primum universale; si autem semper accidens de subiecto aliquo significat ↵ predicationem, in infinitum igitur ire necesse est. Sed impossi↵bile; neque enim plura duobus complectitur. Accidens enim non accidenti accidens, nisi quia ambo eidem accidunt. Dico autem ut album musicum et hoc album, quia ambo homini ↵ accidunt. Sed non Socrates musicus ita, quia ambo accidunt alicui alterl quoniam igitur haec quidem ita illa vero illo modo dicuntur accidentia, quaecumque sic dicuntur ut album Socrati, non contingit infinita esse in superius, ut Socrati albo alterum aliquid accidens; non enim fit aliquid unum ex ↵ omnibus. Nec itaque albo aliquod aliud erit accidens, ut musicum. Nihil enim magis hoc illi quam illud huic accidit. Et ƿ simul determinatum est quia haec quidem ita accidunt haec ↵ autem ut musicum Socrati; quaecumque vero sic, non accidenti accidit * accidens, sed quaecumque illo modo, quare non omnia secundum accidens dicuntur. Erit igitur aliquid et ut substantiam significans. Si autem hoc, ostensum est quia impossibile simul predicari contradictiones.	But if all statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made, if the accidental always implies predication [07b] about a subject. The predication, then, must go on ad infinitum. But this is impossible; for not even more than two terms can be combined in accidental predication. For (1) an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. I mean, for instance, that the white is musical and the latter is white, only because both are accidental to man. But (2) Socrates is musical, not in this sense, that both terms are accidental to something else. Since then some predicates are accidental in this and some in that sense, (a) those which are accidental in the latter sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates, cannot form an infinite series in the upward direction; e.g. Socrates the white has not yet another accident; for no unity can be got out of such a sum. Nor again (b) will white have another term accidental to it, e.g. musical . For this is no more accidental to that than that is to this; and at the same time we have drawn the distinction, that while some predicates are accidental in this sense, others are so in the sense in which musical is accidental to Socrates; and the accident is an accident of an accident not in cases of the latter kind, but only in cases of the other kind, so that not all terms will be accidental. There must, then, even so be something which denotes substance. And if this is so, it has been shown that contradictories cannot be predicated at the same time.
ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς [20] ἅπαντα ἔσται ἕν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται,	Amplius si contradictiones simul de eodem vere sunt omnes, ↵ palam quod omnia erunt unum. Erit enim idem trieris et murus et homo, si de omni aliquid aut affirmare aut negare contingit;	Again, if all contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man, if of everything it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything
καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. εἰ γάρ τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης: ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ [25] ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής. καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ὂν λέγειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.	quemadmodum est necesse dicentibus rationem Protagore. Nam alicui si videtur non esse trieris homo, palam ↵ quia non est trieris; quare et est, si contradictio vera. Et fit itaque quod Anaxagore: simul res omnes esse; ut nihil vere unum sit. Indefinitum igitur videntur dicere, et putantes ens dicere de non ente dicunt; nam potestate ens et non endelichia ↵ indefinitum est.	(and this premiss must be accepted by those who share the views of Protagoras). For if any one thinks that the man is not a trireme, evidently he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme, if, as they say, contradictory statements are both true. And we thus get the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; so that nothing really exists. They seem, then, to be speaking of the indeterminate, and, while fancying themselves to be speaking of being, they are speaking about non-being; for it is that which exists potentially and not in complete reality that is indeterminate.
ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ [30] παντὸς <παντὸς> τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ἑκάστῳ ἡ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρου ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ ὀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ τριήρης. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάφασις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: [35] εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἡ κατάφασις, ἥ γε ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ αὐτοῦ. [1008α] [1] εἰ οὖν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρξει καὶ ἡ τῆς τριήρους: εἰ δ᾽ αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κατάφασις. ταῦτά τε οὖν συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον,	At vero dicenda est ipsis de omni affirmatio aut negatio. Inconveniens enim si unicuique sua quidem negatio inest, quae vero alterius quod non inest ei non inerit. Dico autem ut si verum est dicere hominem quia non homo, palam quod * et non trieris. Ergo si * affirmatio, necesse * et nega↵tionem; si autem non existat affirmatio, negatio inerit magis quam quae sua. Ergo si et illa inest, inerit et quae ipsius trieris; si autem haec, et affirmatio. Haec ergo contingunt hanc dicentibus rationem.	But they must predicate of every subject the affirmation or the negation of every attribute. For it is absurd if of each subject its own negation is to be predicable, while the negation of something else which cannot be predicated of it is not to be predicable of it; for instance, if it is true to say of a man that he is not a man, evidently it is also true to say that he is either a trireme or not a trireme. If, then, the affirmative can be predicated, the negative must be predicable too; and if the affirmative is not predicable, the negative, at least, will be [08a] more predicable than the negative of the subject itself. If, then, even the latter negative is predicable, the negative of trireme will be also predicable; and, if this is predicable, the affirmative will be so too. Those, then, who maintain this view are driven to this conclusion,
καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ [5] οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται: τοῖν γὰρ δυοῖν δύο ἀποφάσεις, εἰ δὲ μία ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐκείνη, καὶ αὕτη μία ἂν εἴη ἀντικειμένη.	Et quia non * necesse aut dicere aut negare. Nam si verum quia homo ↵ et non homo, palam quia nec homo nec non homo erit. Nam duorum due negationes; si autem una ex utrisque, illi et haec una utique erit opposita.	and to the further conclusion that it is not necessary either to assert or to deny. For if it is true that a thing is a man and a not-man, evidently also it will be neither a man nor a not-man. For to the two assertions there answer two negations, and if the former is treated as a single proposition compounded out of two, the latter also is a single proposition opposite to the former.
ἔτι ἤτοι περὶ ἅπαντα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας φάσεις καὶ [10] ἀποφάσεις ὁμοιοτρόπως, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τινας, περί τινας δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ περὶ πάσας, αὗται ἂν εἶεν ὁμολογούμεναι: εἰ δὲ περὶ πάσας, πάλιν ἤτοι καθ᾽ ὅσων τὸ φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσων ἀποφῆσαι καὶ φῆσαι, ἢ κατὰ μὲν ὧν φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι, καθ᾽ ὅσων δὲ ἀποφῆσαι [15] οὐ πάντων φῆσαι. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὕτως, εἴη ἄν τι παγίως οὐκ ὄν, καὶ αὕτη βεβαία δόξα, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι βέβαιόν τι καὶ γνώριμον, γνωριμωτέρα ἂν εἴη ἡ φάσις ἡ ἀντικειμένη:	ƿ Amplius aut circa omnia ita se habet, et est album et non album et ens et non ens, et circa alias dictiones et negationes looxa10 modo simili, aut non, sed circa quasdam quidem et circa quasdam non. Et si quidem non circa omnes, hae utique erunt confesse; si vero circa omnes, iterum aut de quibuscumque dicere et negare et de quibuscumque negare et dicere, aut de quibus quidem dicere et negare, sed de quibuscumque negare non de omnibus dicere. Et si sic, erit aliquid firmiter non ens, ↵ et haec erit firma opinio; et si ipsum non esse firmum aliquid sit et notum, notior utique * erit dictio quam opposita negatio.	Again, either the theory is true in all cases, and a thing is both white and not-white, and existent and non-existent, and all other assertions and negations are similarly compatible or the theory is true of some statements and not of others. And if not of all, the exceptions will be contradictories of which admittedly only one is true; but if of all, again either the negation will be true wherever the assertion is, and the assertion true wherever the negation is, or the negation will be true where the assertion is, but the assertion not always true where the negation is. And (a) in the latter case there will be something which fixedly is not, and this will be an indisputable belief; and if non-being is something indisputable and knowable, the opposite assertion will be more knowable.
εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα ἀποφῆσαι φάναι, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι [20] λευκὸν καὶ πάλιν ὅτι οὐ λευκόν, ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οὐ λέγει τε ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθέν (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγξαιτο ἢ βαδίσειεν;), καὶ πάντα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ταὐτὸν ἔσται καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸς καὶ τριήρης [25] καὶ αἱ ἀντιφάσεις αὐτῶν (εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάστου, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἕτερον ἑτέρου: εἰ γὰρ διοίσει, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται ἀληθὲς καὶ ἴδιον): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διαιροῦντα ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν,	Si vero * similiter et quaecumque * negare * dicere, necesse aut verum dividentem dicere, ut quod album et iterum quod ↵ non album, aut non. Et si quidem non verum dividentem dicere, non dicet haec et non est nihil; non entia autem quomodo utique pronuntiabunt aut ibunt? Et omnia utique erunt unum, ut et prius dictum est, et idem erit et homo et deus et trieris et ipsorum contradictiones. Si autem similiter ↵ de unoquoque, nihil differret * aliud ab alio; nam si differret, hoc erit verum et proprium. Similiter autem et si dividentem contingit verum esse, accidit quod dictum est.	But (b) if it is equally possible also to assert all that it is possible to deny, one must either be saying what is true when one separates the predicates (and says, for instance, that a thing is white, and again that it is not-white), or not. And if (i) it is not true to apply the predicates separately, our opponent is not saying what he professes to say, and also nothing at all exists; but how could non-existent things speak or walk, as he does? Also all things would on this view be one, as has been already said, and man and God and trireme and their contradictories will be the same. For if contradictories can be predicated alike of each subject, one thing will in no wise differ from another; for if it differ, this difference will be something true and peculiar to it. And (ii) if one may with truth apply the predicates separately, the above-mentioned result follows none the less,
πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ἀληθεύοιεν καὶ πάντες ἂν ψεύδοιντο, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὁμολογεῖ [30] ψεύδεσθαι. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ οὐθενός ἐστι πρὸς τοῦτον ἡ σκέψις: οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγει. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως: καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω, ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως: εἰ γὰρ μή, ἤδη ἄν τι εἴη ὡρισμένον.	Ad hoc autem quia omnes verum dicent et omnes mentientur, et ipse se ipsum falsum dicere confitetur. Simul autem ↵ palam quia de nullo est ad hunc perscrutatio; nihil enim dicit. Nec enim ita nec non ita dicit, sed ita et non ita; et iterum ƿ haec negat ambo, quia nec ita nec non ita; nam si non, iam utique erit aliquid determinatum.	and, further, it follows that all would then be right and all would be in error, and our opponent himself confesses himself to be in error. And at the same time our discussion with him is evidently about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says neither yes nor no, but yes and no; and again he denies both of these and says neither yes nor no; for otherwise there would already be something definite.
ἔτι εἰ ὅταν ἡ φάσις [35] ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ ἀπόφασις ψευδής, κἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ κατάφασις ψευδής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς. [1008β] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως φαῖεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κείμενον.	↵ Amplius si quando affirmatio vera est, negatio est falsa, et si haec vera, affirmatio falsa, non erit utique simul idem dicere ↵ et negare vere. Sed forsan dicet utique hoc esse quod a principio positum.	Again if when the assertion is true, the negation is false, and when this is true, the affirmation is false, it will not be possible to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same [08b] time. But perhaps they might say this was the very question at issue.
ἔτι ἆρα ὁ μὲν ἢ ἔχειν πως ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ μὴ ἔχειν διέψευσται, ὁ δὲ ἄμφω ἀληθεύει; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθεύει, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι τοιαύτη τῶν ὄντων ἡ [5] φύσις; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἢ ὁ ἐκείνως ὑπολαμβάνων, ἤδη πως ἔχοι ἂν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως ἅπαντες καὶ ψεύδονται καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὔτε φθέγξασθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔσται: ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτά τε καὶ [10] οὐ ταῦτα λέγει. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν γε φυτῶν;	Amplius igitur qui quidem aut habere aliqualiter existimans aut non habere mentitus est, qui autem ambo verum dicit? Nam si verum dicit, quid utique erit * quod dicitur ↵ quia talis est entium natura? Si vero non verum dicit, sed magis verum dicit qui illo modo existimat, iam aliqualiter se habebunt entia, et hoc verum utique erit, et non simul et non verum. Si autem similiter * omnes mentiuntur et vera dicunt, nec pronuntiandum nec dicendum est tali; similiter enim haec ↵ et non haec dicit. Si autem nihil suscipit sed similiter existimat et non existimat, quid utique differenter habebit a natis?	Again, is he in error who judges either that the thing is so or that it is not so, and is he right who judges both? If he is right, what can they mean by saying that the nature of existing things is of this kind? And if he is not right, but more right than he who judges in the other way, being will already be of a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time also not true. But if all are alike both wrong and right, one who is in this condition will not be able either to speak or to say anything intelligible; for he says at the same time both yes and no. And if he makes no judgement but thinks and does not think , indifferently, what difference will there be between him and a vegetable?
ὅθεν καὶ μάλιστα φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτω διάκειται οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν λεγόντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. διὰ τί γὰρ βαδίζει Μέγαράδε ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡσυχάζει, οἰόμενος [15] βαδίζειν δεῖν; οὐδ᾽ εὐθέως ἕωθεν πορεύεται εἰς φρέαρ ἢ εἰς φάραγγα, ἐὰν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται εὐλαβούμενος, ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως οἰόμενος μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν; δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ βέλτιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνθρωπον τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον [20] καὶ τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὐ γλυκὺ ἀνάγκη ὑπολαμβάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἅπαντα ζητεῖ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, ὅταν οἰηθεὶς βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ πιεῖν ὕδωρ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον εἶτα ζητῇ αὐτά: καίτοι ἔδει γε, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ὁμοίως καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐθεὶς ὃς οὐ [25] φαίνεται τὰ μὲν εὐλαβούμενος τὰ δ᾽ οὔ: ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἅπαντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον.	Unde et maxime manifestum est quia nullus ita disponitur nec aliorum nec dicentium hanc rationem. Quare namque uadit ↵ domum et non quiescit putans ire? Nequepstatim diluculo uadit * in puteum aut torrentem, si contingat, sed videtur * timens, tamquam non similiter putans non bonum esse incidere et bonum? Palam ergo quia hoc quidem melius existimat hoc autem non melius. Si autem hoc, et hoc quidem hominem ↵ illud autem non hominem, et hoc quidem dulce illud autem non dulce putare est necesse. Non enim ex equo omnia quaerit et existimat, quando putans melius esse aquam bibere et homiƿnem videre deinde ea quaerit; quamvis oportebat, si idem erat similiter homo et non homo. Sed quod dictum est: nullus qui non videtur haec quidem timens illa vero non. Quare, sicut ↵ videtur, omnes existimant habere simpliciter, si non circa omnia, sed circa melius et deterius.	-Thus, then, it is in the highest degree evident that neither any one of those who maintain this view nor any one else is really in this position. For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good? Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse. And if this is so, he must also judge one thing to be a man and another to be not-a-man, one thing to be sweet and another to be not-sweet. For he does not aim at and judge all things alike, when, thinking it desirable to drink water or to see a man, he proceeds to aim at these things; yet he ought, if the same thing were alike a man and not-a-man. But, as was said, there is no one who does not obviously avoid some things and not others. Therefore, as it seems, all men make unqualified judgements, if not about all things, still about what is better and worse.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι [28] ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ καὶ νοσώδει ὄντι ἢ ὑγιεινῷ τῆς ὑγιείας: [30] καὶ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διάκειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.	Si autem non scientes sed opinantes, multo magis curandum utique erit de veritate, quemadmodum infirmo existenti * quam sano de sanitate; et ↵ enim opinans ad scientem non salubriter disponitur ad veritatem.	And if this is not knowledge but opinion, they should be all the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should be more anxious about his health than one who is healthy; for he who has opinions is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned.
ἔτι εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα πάντα οὕτως ἔχει καὶ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τό γε μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως φήσαιμεν εἶναι τὰ δύο ἄρτια καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοίως διέψευσται ὁ τὰ [35] τέτταρα πέντε οἰόμενος καὶ ὁ χίλια. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὁμοίως, δῆλον ὅτι ἅτερος ἧττον, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον ἐγγύτερον, [1009α] [1] εἴη γε ἄν τι ἀληθὲς οὗ ἐγγύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον ἀληθές. κἂν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη γέ τι ἔστι βεβαιότερον καὶ ἀληθινώτερον, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ [5] ὁρίσαι.	Amplius si quam maxime omnia sic se habent et non sic, sed * magis et minus unum est in natura entium; non enim utique similiter dicemus esse duo paria et tria, nec similiter mentitus est qui quatuor pente opinatus est et qui mille. Si ↵ igitur non similiter, palam quia alter minus, quare magis verum dicit. Si ergo quod magis affinius, erit utique aliquid ↵ verum cuius affinius quod magis verum. Et utique si non est, sed iam aliquid est firmius et verius, et a ratione remoti utique erimus incondita et prohibente aliquid mente determinare. ↵	Again, however much all things may be so and not so , still there is a more and a less in the nature of things; for we should not say that two and three are equally even, nor is he who thinks four things are five equally wrong with him who thinks they are a thousand. If then they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and therefore more right. If then that which has more of any quality is [09a] nearer the norm, there must be some truth to which the more true is nearer. And even if there is not, still there is already something better founded and liker the truth, and we shall have got rid of the unqualified doctrine which would prevent us from determining anything in our thought.

Chapter 5

Greek	Latin	English
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (πολλοὶ γὰρ [10] τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν: ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), καὶ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ (τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες: εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ [15] ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες).	Est autem et ab eadem opinione Protagore ratio, et necesse similiter ipsas ambas aut esse aut non esse. Nam si quae videntur omnia sunt vera et apparentia, necesse omnia simul vera * et falsa esse. Multi namque contraria * invicem 1009a10 existimant, et non eadem opinantes sibi ipsis mentiri putant; quare necesse idem esse et non esse. Et si hoc est, necesse putata esse omnia vera. Opposita namque * invicem opinantur mentientes et verum dicentes; ergo entia si sic se habent, ↵ verum dicunt omnes.	Chapter 5. From the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of Protagoras, and both doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. For on the one hand, if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs in which they conflict with one another, and think those mistaken who have not the same opinions as themselves; so that the same thing must both be and not be. And on the other hand, if this is so, all opinions must be true; for those who are mistaken and those who are right are opposed to one another in their opinions; if, then, reality is such as the view in question supposes, all will be right in their beliefs.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶ διανοίας ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι, δῆλον:	Quod quidem igitur ab eodem sunt intellectu utreque rationes, palam.	Evidently, then, both doctrines proceed from the same way of thinking.
ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς ἅπαντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται οἱ δὲ βίας. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπορῆσαι ὑπέλαβον οὕτως, τούτων εὐΐατος ἡ ἄγνοια (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν [20] λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ἀπάντησις αὐτῶν): ὅσοι δὲ λόγου χάριν λέγουσι, τούτων δ᾽ ἔλεγχος ἴασις τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.	Est autem non idem ƿ modus <intercessionis> ad omnes; hii namque persuasione egent illi vi. Quicumque enim ex dubitasse existimaverunt ita, ↵ horum * bene curabilis ignorantia; non enim ad orationem sed ad mentem * obviatio ipsorum. Quicumque vero orationis causa dicunt, horum arguitio * curatio et eius quae in voce orationis et eius quae in nominibus.	But the same method of discussion must not be used with all opponents; for some need persuasion, and others compulsion. Those who have been driven to this position by difficulties in their thinking can easily be cured of their ignorance; for it is not their expressed argument but their thought that one has to meet. But those who argue for the sake of argument can be cured only by refuting the argument as expressed in speech and in words.
ἐλήλυθε δὲ τοῖς διαποροῦσιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἅμα τὰς ἀντιφάσεις καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ὁρῶσιν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ [25] γιγνόμενα τἀναντία: εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, προϋπῆρχεν ὁμοίως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄμφω ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μεμῖχθαι πᾶν ἐν παντί φησι καὶ Δημόκριτος: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχειν μέρος, καίτοι τὸ μὲν ὂν τούτων εἶναι τὸ δὲ [30] μὴ ὄν.	Venit autem dubitantibus haec opinio ex sensibilibus, quae quidem * eius quod simul contradictiones et contraria exis↵tere videntibus ex eodem facta contraria. Ergo si non contingit fieri non ens, preextitit similiter res ambo ens, ut et Anaxagoras misceri omne in omni ait et Democritus; et enim hic inane et plenum similiter secundum quamcumque existere partem, ↵ quamvis hoc quidem horum esse ens illud vero non ens.	Those who really feel the difficulties have been led to this opinion by observation of the sensible world. (1) They think that contradictories or contraries are true at the same time, because they see contraries coming into existence out of the same thing. If, then, that which is not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before as both contraries alike, as Anaxagoras says all is mixed in all, and Democritus too; for he says the void and the full exist alike in every part, and yet one of these is being, and the other non-being.
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντας ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ὀρθῶς λέγουσι τρόπον δέ τινα ἀγνοοῦσιν: τὸ γὰρ ὂν λέγεται διχῶς, ὥστ᾽ ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὃν οὔ, καὶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ [ὄν]: δυνάμει [35] μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ.	Ad eos quidem igitur qui ex hiis existimant dicemus quia modo quodam recte dicunt et modo quodam ignorant. Ens enim dupliciter dicitur; est ergo quomodo contingit fieri aliquid ex non ente, est autem quomodo non, et simul idem esse ens ↵ et non ens, sed non secundum idem ens. Potestate namque contingit simul idem esse contraria, actu vero non.	To those, then, whose belief rests on these grounds, we shall say that in a sense they speak rightly and in a sense they err. For 'that which is' has two meanings, so that in some sense a thing can come to be out of that which is not, while in some sense it cannot, and the same thing can at the same time be in being and not in being – but not in the same respect. For the same thing can be potentially at the same time two contraries, but it cannot actually.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν.	Amplius autem dignificemus ipsos existimare et aliam substantiam esse entium cui nec motus existit nec corruptio nec generatio omnino.	And again we shall ask them to believe that among existing things there is also another kind of substance to which neither movement nor destruction nor generation at all belongs.
[1009β] [1] —ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον [5] ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ᾽ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οὔ:	↵ Similiter autem et quae * circa apparentia veritas quibusdam ex sensibilibus venit. Verum enim non pluralitate iudicari ƿ putant oportere nec paucitate, idem vero hiis quidem dulce gustantibus esse videtur illis vero amarum, quare si omnes laboraverint aut omnes desipuerint, duo autem vel tres sani sint ↵ aut intellectum habeant, hos quidem videri laborare et desipere alios vero non.	[09b] And (2) similarly some have inferred from observation of the sensible world the truth of appearances. For they think that the truth should not be determined by the large or small number of those who hold a belief, and that the same thing is thought sweet by some when they taste it, and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were well or sane, these would be thought ill and mad, and not the others.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τἀναντία [περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν. ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ [10] ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον: οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ ἄδηλον.	Amplius autem multis aliorum animalium contraria videri et nobis, et ipsi autem unicuique ad se ipsum non eadem secundum sensum semper videri. Quae igitur horum vera * aut falsa, non manifestum *; nihil enim magis haec quam ↵ illa vera, sed similiter. Propter quod Democritus ait aut nihil esse verum aut nobis non manifestum.	And again, they say that many of the other animals receive impressions contrary to ours; and that even to the senses of each individual, things do not always seem the same. Which, then, of these impressions are true and which are false is not obvious; for the one set is no more true than the other, but both are alike. And this is why Democritus, at any rate, says that either there is no truth or to us at least it is not evident.
ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί [15] φασιν:	Omnino vero propter existimare prudentiam quidem sensum, hunc autem esse alterationem, quod videtur secundum sensum ex necessitate verum esse dicunt.	And in general it is because these thinkers suppose knowledge to be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration, that they say that what appears to our senses must be true;
ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν: πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν. καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει [20] ὅτι ὅσσον <δ᾽> ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο. καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων, τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν [25] καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί: τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.	Ex hiis enim Empedo↵cles et Democritus et aliorum ut consequens dicere unusquisque talibus opinionibus facti sunt rei. Et enim Empedocles permutantes habitum permutare dicit * prudentiam: “Ad presens enim consilium augetur hominibus”. Et in aliis dicit quia ↵ “quantum alteri transformati sunt, tantum ipsis et semper sapere altera affuit”. Parmenides vero enuntiat eodem modo: “ut enim quandocumque habuerint membrorum complexionem multe flexionis, * intellectus hominibus adest; idem enim est quod quidem sapit, membrorum natura hominiƿ↵bus et omnibus et omni; quod enim plus est intelligentia”.	for it is for these reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus and, one may almost say, all the others have fallen victims to opinions of this sort. For Empedocles says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge; For wisdom increases in men according to what is before them. And elsewhere he says that: So far as their nature changed, so far to them always Came changed thoughts into mind. And Parmenides also expresses himself in the same way:For as at each time the much-bent limbs are composed, So is the mind of men; for in each and all men'Tis one thing thinks-the substance of their limbs: For that of which there is more is thought.
Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ [30] τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφότεραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.	Anaxagore quoque pronuntium recordatur ad quosdam sociorum, quia talia ipsis erunt entia qualia utique existimaverunt. Dicunt autem et Homerum videri hanc habentem opinionem, ↵ quia fecit hectorem, tamquam in extasi fuerit a * plaga, iacere aliud sapientem; tamquam sapientes quidem et desipientes, sed non eadem. Palam ergo quod, si utreque prudentie, et entia simul sic * et non sic se habent.	A saying of Anaxagoras to some of his friends is also related,– that things would be for them such as they supposed them to be. And they say that Homer also evidently had this opinion, because he made Hector, when he was unconscious from the blow, lie 'thinking other thoughts',– which implies that even those who are bereft of thought have thoughts, though not the same thoughts. Evidently, then, if both are forms of knowledge, the real things also are at the same time both so and not so.
ᾗ καὶ χαλεπώτατον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστιν: εἰ γὰρ οἱ μάλιστα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς ἑωρακότες—οὗτοι [35] δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ μάλιστα ζητοῦντες αὐτὸ καὶ φιλοῦντες—οὗτοι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς δόξας καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφαίνονται περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦντας; τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.	Qua et gravissimum accidens est. Nam si qui maxime contingens verum viderunt ↵ (hii autem sunt maxime quaerentes ipsum et amantes), hii tales habent opiniones et talia enuntiant de veritate, quomodo non est dignum respuere philosophari conantes? Nam volantia ↵ persequi erit utique veritatem inquirere.	And it is in this direction that the consequences are most difficult. For if those who have seen most of such truth as is possible for us (and these are those who seek and love it most)-if these have such opinions and express these views about the truth, is it not natural that beginners in philosophy should lose heart? For to seek the truth would be to follow flying game.
[1010α] [1] —αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον: ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: [5] διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην).	Hiis autem opinionis causa quia de entibus quidem veritatem intendebant, entia autem putaverunt esse sensibilia solum; in hiis vero multa quae * indeterminati natura existit et quae ↵ * entis sic ut diximus. Propter quod decenter quidem dicunt, non vera autem dicunt (sic enim congruit magis dicere quam sicut Epicharmus ad Xenophanem).	[10a] But the reason why these thinkers held this opinion is that while they were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought, that which is was identical with the sensible world; in this, however, there is largely present the nature of the indeterminate-of that which exists in the peculiar sense which we have explained; and therefore, while they speak plausibly, they do not say what is true (for it is fitting to put the matter so rather than as Epicharmus put it against Xenophanes).
ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περί γε τὸ πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλλον οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. [10] ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι: αὐτὸς [15] γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ.	Amplius autem omnem videntes hanc motam naturam, de permutante autem nihil verum dicimus, circa vero omnino semper permutans non con↵tingere verum dicere. Nam ex hac existimatione pullulavit dictorum summa opinio quae est dicentium eraclizare et qualem cratylus habuit, qui tandem nihil opinatus est oportere dicere sed digitum movebat solum, et Eraclitum increpuit ƿ dicentem * bis in eodem flumine non est intrare; ipse enim ↵ existimavit nec semel.	And again, because they saw that all this world of nature is in movement and that about that which changes no true statement can be made, they said that of course, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing, nothing could truly be affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once.
ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλον ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἔχει τινὰ αὐτοῖς λόγον μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι,	Nos autem et ad hanc rationem dicemus quia permutans quando permutat habet quandam ipsis veram rationem non existimari esse,	But we shall say in answer to this argument also that while there is some justification for their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does not exist,
καίτοι ἔστι γε ἀμφισβητήσιμον: τό τε γὰρ ἀποβάλλον ἔχει τι τοῦ ἀποβαλλομένου, καὶ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἤδη ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι, ὅλως [20] τε εἰ φθείρεται, ὑπάρξει τι ὄν, καὶ εἰ γίγνεται, ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ γεννᾶται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον.	equidem est dubitabilissimum; abiciens enim habet aliquid eius quod abicitur, et eius quod fit iam necesse aliquid esse. Omninoque si corrumpitur, existet aliquid ens; ↵ et si fit, ex quo fit et a quo generatur necesse esse, et hoc non esse in infinitum.	yet it is after all disputable; for that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to be, something must already be. And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present something that exists; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot go on ad infinitum.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παρέντες ἐκεῖνα λέγωμεν, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτό ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον, [25] ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γιγνώσκομεν.	Sed haec praetermittentes illa dicamus, quia non idem est permutare secundum quantitatem et secundum qualitatem; secundum quantitatem quidem igitur sit non manens, sed secundum speciem omnia cognoscimus.	-But, leaving these arguments, let us insist on this, that it is not the same thing to change in quantity and in quality. Grant that in quantity a thing is not constant; still it is in respect of its form that we know each thing.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἄξιον ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὕτως ἔχοντα περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπεφήναντο: ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διατελεῖ [30] μόνος ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν, ὥστε δικαιότερον ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα τούτων ἀπεψηφίσαντο ἢ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων κατεψηφίσαντο.	↵ amplius autem dignum * increpare sic existimantes, quod sensibilium in minoribus numerum scientes * sic habentem de toto celo similiter enuntiaverunt. Nam circa nos sensibilis locus in generatione et corruptione perseuerat solus ens; sed ↵ iste ut * dicatur nulla pars est omnis, quare iustius utique propter illa haec reueriti fuissent quam propter haec de illis erraverunt.	-And again, it would be fair to criticize those who hold this view for asserting about the whole material universe what they saw only in a minority even of sensible things. For only that region of the sensible world which immediately surrounds us is always in process of destruction and generation; but this is-so to speak-not even a fraction of the whole, so that it would have been juster to acquit this part of the world because of the other part, than to condemn the other because of this.
ἔτι δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ταὐτὰ τοῖς πάλαι λεχθεῖσιν ἐροῦμεν: ὅτι [34] γὰρ ἔστιν ἀκίνητός τις φύσις δεικτέον αὐτοῖς καὶ πειστέον [35] αὐτούς.	Amplius autem palam quia et ad hos eadem olim dictis dicemus; quod enim est immobilis natura quaedam * ostendendum ipsis et credendum est eis.	And again, obviously we shall make to them also the same reply that we made long ago; we must show them and persuade them that there is something whose nature is changeless.
καίτοι γε συμβαίνει τοῖς ἅμα φάσκουσιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἠρεμεῖν μᾶλλον φάναι πάντα ἢ κινεῖσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι μεταβαλεῖ: ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν.	Equidem contingit ↵ simul dicentibus esse et non esse quiescere magis dicere omnia quam moveri; non enim est in quod aliquid permutetur, nam omnia insunt omnibus.	Indeed, those who say that things at the same time are and are not, should in consequence say that all things are at rest rather than that they are in movement; for there is nothing into which they can change, since all attributes belong already to all subjects.
[1010β] [1] —περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ <εἰ> ἡ αἴσθησις <μὴ> ψευδὴς τοῦ γε ἰδίου ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει.	↵ De veritate vero, quod non omne apparens verum; primum quidem quia neque sensus falsus proprii est, sed phantasia * non idem * sensui.	[10b] Regarding the nature of truth, we must maintain that not everything which appears is true; firstly, because even if sensation-at least of the object peculiar to the sense in question-is not false, still appearance is not the same as sensation.
εἶτ᾽ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποροῦσι, πότερον τηλικαῦτά ἐστι [5] τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ χρώματα τοιαῦτα οἷα τοῖς ἄπωθεν φαίνεται ἢ οἷα τοῖς ἐγγύθεν, καὶ πότερον οἷα τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἢ οἷα τοῖς κάμνουσιν, καὶ βαρύτερα πότερον ἃ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν, καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί [10] γε, φανερόν: οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον.	Deinde dignum mirari si hoc dubitant, utrum tante sunt magnitudines et colores tales quales a remotis ↵ videntur aut quales de prope, et utrum qualia sanis aut qualia laborantibus, et graviora utrum qualia debilibus aut qualia ƿ robustis, et vera utrum qualia dormientibus aut qualia vigilanti↵bus. Quod quidem enim non putant, palam; nullus ergo, si putaverit de nocte Athenis esse ens in Libia, uadit ad Odium.	Again, it is fair to express surprise at our opponents raising the question whether magnitudes are as great, and colours are of such a nature, as they appear to people at a distance, or as they appear to those close at hand, and whether they are such as they appear to the healthy or to the sick, and whether those things are heavy which appear so to the weak or those which appear so to the strong, and those things true which appear to the slee ing or to the waking. For obviously they do not think these to be open questions; no one, at least, if when he is in Libya he has fancied one night that he is in Athens, starts for the concert hall.
ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος.	Amplius autem de futuro, ut et Plato dicit, nequaquam similiter propria medici opinio et ignorantis, velut de futuro ↵ fore sanos aut non futuro.	And again with regard to the future, as Plato says, surely the opinion of the physician and that of the ignorant man are not equally weighty, for instance, on the question whether a man will get well or not.
ἔτι δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν [15] τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐχ ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἰδίου ἢ τοῦ πλησίον καὶ τοῦ αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν χρώματος ὄψις, οὐ γεῦσις, περὶ δὲ χυμοῦ γεῦσις, οὐκ ὄψις:	Amplius autem et in sensibus non similiter propria alieni et proprii aut propinqui et eius quod ipsius, sed de coloribus quidem visus, non gustus, de saporibus vero gustus, non visus;	-And again, among sensations themselves the sensation of a foreign object and that of the appropriate object, or that of a kindred object and that of the object of the sense in question, are not equally authoritative, but in the case of colour sight, not taste, has the authority, and in the case of flavour taste, not sight;
ὧν ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδέποτε φησιν ἅμα οὕτω καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ [20] χρόνῳ περί γε τὸ πάθος ἠμφισβήτησεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς οἶνος δόξειεν ἂν ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ γλυκύς: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τό γε γλυκύ, οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾖ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει [25] περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον γλυκὺ τοιοῦτον.	quorum unusquisque in eodem tempore circa idem numquam dicit simul ita et non ↵ ita habere. Sed nec in altero tempore circa passionem * dubitavit, sed circa id cui accidit passio. Dico autem puta idem quidem vinum videbitur utique, aut mutatum aut corpore mutato, quandoque quidem esse dulce quandoque autem non dulce. Sed non quod dulce, quale est quando fuerit, num↵quam mutavit, sed semper de ipso verum dicit, et est ex necessitate futurum dulce tale.	each of which senses never says at the same time of the same object that it simultaneously is so and not so. But not even at different times does one sense disagree about the quality, but only about that to which the quality belongs. I mean, for instance, that the same wine might seem, if either it or one's body changed, at one time sweet and at another time not sweet; but at least the sweet, such as it is when it exists, has never yet changed, but one is always right about it, and that which is to be sweet is of necessity of such and such a nature.
καίτοι τοῦτο ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἅπαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ οὐσίαν μὴ εἶναι μηθενός, οὕτω μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μηθέν: τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἴ τι ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐχ ἕξει οὕτω τε καὶ [30] οὐχ οὕτως.	Quamvis hoc hae rationes omnes destruant, quemadmodum et substantiam non esse nullius, ita nec ex necessitate nihil; necessarium enim non contingit aliter et aliter se habere, quare si quid est ex necessitate, non habebit ↵ ita et non ita.	Yet all these views destroy this necessity, leaving nothing to be of necessity, as they leave no essence of anything; for the necessary cannot be in this way and also in that, so that if anything is of necessity, it will not be both so and not so.
ὅλως τ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων: αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, [35] ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ᾽ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως: [1011α] [1] τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἧττον.	Totaliterque si est sensibile solum, nihil utique erit solum non existentibus * animatis; sensus enim non erit. Neque quidem igitur sensibilia esse neque sensiones forsan verum *; sentientis enim passio hoc est. Subiecta vero non ↵ esse quae sensum faciunt et sine sensu, impossibile. Non enim sensus suimet est, sed est aliquid alterum praeter sensum, quod ionai prius esse sensu est necesse; movens enim moto prius est ƿ natura, et utique si ad invicem dicuntur haec ipsa, nihil minus.	And, in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no faculty of sense. Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that [11a] which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case.

Chapter 6

Greek	Latin	English
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἀποροῦσι καὶ τῶν ταῦτα πεπεισμένων καὶ τῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους μόνον λεγόντων: ζητοῦσι γὰρ [5] τίς ὁ κρινῶν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ ὅλως τὸν περὶ ἕκαστα κρινοῦντα ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὅμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν, δύνανται δ᾽ αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό: πάντων γὰρ λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι οὗτοι: ἀρχὴν γὰρ ζητοῦσι, καὶ ταύτην [10] δι᾽ ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε πεπεισμένοι οὐκ εἰσί, φανεροί εἰσιν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἐστίν: λόγον γὰρ ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος: ἀποδείξεως γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ῥᾳδίως ἂν τοῦτο πεισθεῖεν (ἔστι γὰρ οὐ χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν):	Sunt autem quidam qui dubitant haec persuasorum et has rationes solum dicentium; quaerunt enim quis est qui iudi↵cat sanum et omnino circa singula recte iudicantem. Tales vero dubitationes similes sunt dubitationi utrum dormimus nunc aut vigilamus. Possunt autem omnes dubitationes tales idem. Omnium enim rationem hii dignificant esse; principium enim quaerunt, et hoc per demonstrationem accipere, quoniamque ↵ quod non persuasi sunt, manifesti sunt in actibus. Sed quod quidem diximus, hoc * ipsorum passio est: rationem enim quaerunt quorum non est ratio; demonstrationis enim principium non est demonstratio. Hii quidem igitur facile utique hoc credent; est enim non difficile sumere.	Chapter 6. There are, both among those who have these convictions and among those who merely profess these views, some who raise a difficulty by asking, who is to be the judge of the healthy man, and in general who is likely to judge rightly on each class of questions. But such inquiries are like puzzling over the question whether we are now asleep or awake. And all such questions have the same meaning. These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything; for they seek a starting-point, and they seek to get this by demonstration, while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration. These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth, for it is not difficult to grasp;
[15] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν βίαν μόνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον ζητοῦσιν: ἐναντία γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, εὐθὺς ἐναντία λέγοντες.	In sermone autem ↵ vim solum quaerentes impossibile quaerunt; contraria namque dicere dignificant, statim contraria dicentes.	but those who seek merely compulsion in argument seek what is impossible; for they demand to be allowed to contradict themselves – a claim which contradicts itself from the very first.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι πάντα πρός τι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά ἐστι καὶ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές: τὸ γὰρ φαινόμενον τινί ἐστι φαινόμενον: ὥστε ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ [20] φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι. διὸ καὶ φυλακτέον τοῖς τὴν βίαν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ζητοῦσιν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ τὸ φαινόμενον ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται καὶ ᾗ καὶ ὥς. ἂν δ᾽ ὑπέχωσι μὲν λόγον, μὴ οὕτω δ᾽ [25] ὑπέχωσι, συμβήσεται αὑτοῖς τἀναντία ταχὺ λέγειν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὄψιν μέλι φαίνεσθαι τῇ δὲ γεύσει μή, καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δυοῖν ὄντοιν μὴ ταὐτὰ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ ὄψει, ἂν ὦσιν ἀνόμοιαι: ἐπεὶ πρός γε τοὺς διὰ τὰς πάλαι εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὸ φαινόμενον φάσκοντας [30] ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάνθ᾽ ὁμοίως εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ: οὔτε γὰρ ἅπασι ταὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι οὔτε ταὐτῷ ἀεὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁφὴ δύο λέγει ἐν τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων ἡ δ᾽ ὄψις ἕν): ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι τῇ αὐτῇ γε καὶ [35] κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθήσει καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές. [1011β] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τοῖς μὴ δι᾽ ἀπορίαν ἀλλὰ λόγου χάριν λέγουσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἀληθές.	Si autem non omnia sunt ad aliquid, sed quaedam sunt et ipsa secundum se, non utique erit omne quod apparet *; nam quod apparet alicui apparet. Quare qui dicit omnia quae appa↵rent esse vera, omnia quae sunt facit ad aliquid. Propter quod et * observandum vim in sermone quaerentibus, simul autem et sustinere sermonem dignificantibus; quod non quod apparet est, sed quod apparet cui apparet et quando apparet et in quantum et ut. Si autem sustineant quidem sermonem, non sic autem sustineant, accidet ipsis contraria cito ↵ dicere. Contingit enim eidem secundum visum quidem mel apparere, gustu vero non, et oculis duobus existentibus non eadem utrique visui, si sint dissimiles. Quoniam ad * dicentes ƿ ↵ propter olim dictas causas quod apparet verum esse, et propter hoc omnia similiter esse falsa et vera; neque enim omnibus eadem apparere contingit neque ipsi semper eadem, sed multotiens contraria secundum idem tempus (tactus enim duo dicit in digitorum variatione, visus autem unum): — Sed non quid ↵ eidem et secundum idem sensui et similiter et in eodem tempore; quare hoc utique erit verum. Sed forsan propter hoc * necesse dicere hiis qui non propter dubitationem sed orationis causa dicentibus: quod hoc non est verum sed huic verum.	-But if not all things are relative, but some are self-existent, not everything that appears will be true; for that which appears is apparent to some one; so that he who says all things that appear are true, makes all things relative. And, therefore, those who ask for an irresistible argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the sense to which, and under the conditions under which it appears. And if they give an account of their view, but do not give it in this way, they will soon find themselves contradicting themselves. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each, if their sight is unlike. For to those who for the reasons named some time ago say that what appears is true, and therefore that all things are alike false and true, for things do not appear either the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight says there is one) – to these we shall say yes, but not to the same sense and in the same part of it and under the same conditions and at the same time, so that what appears will be with these [11b] qualifications true. But perhaps for this reason those who argue thus not because they feel a difficulty but for the sake of argument, should say that this is not true, but true for this man.
καὶ ὥσπερ δὴ πρότερον εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη πρός τι ποιεῖν [5] ἅπαντα καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν, ὥστ᾽ οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ᾽ ἔσται οὐθὲν μηθενὸς προδοξάσαντος. εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ ἔσται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅπαντα πρὸς δόξαν.	↵ Et sicut prius dictum est, necesse ad aliquid facere omnia et ad opinionem et sensum; quare nec factum est nec erit nihil nullo preopinante. Si vero factum est aut erit, palam quia non erunt omnia ad opinionem.	And as has been said before, they must make everything relative-relative to opinion and perception, so that nothing either has come to be or will be without some one's first thinking so. But if things have come to be or will be, evidently not all things will be relative to opinion.
ἔτι εἰ ἕν, πρὸς ἓν ἢ πρὸς ὡρισμένον: καὶ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ ἴσον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὸ διπλάσιόν γε τὸ ἴσον. πρὸς δὴ τὸ δοξάζον [10] εἰ ταὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος τὸ δοξάζον ἀλλὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. εἰ δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔσται πρὸς τὸ δοξάζον, πρὸς ἄπειρα ἔσται τῷ εἴδει τὸ δοξάζον.	Amplius si unum, ad unum aut ad determinatum; et si idem et dimidium et equale, sed ionbio non ad duplum equale. Ad opinans itaque si idem est homo et opinatum, non est homo opinans sed opinatum. Si vero unumquodque fuerit ad opinans, * infinita erit specie opinans.	-Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number of things; and if the same thing is both half and equal, it is not to the double that the equal is correlative. If, then, in relation to that which thinks, man and that which is thought are the same, man will not be that which thinks, but only that which is thought. And if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη δόξα πασῶν τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς ἅμα τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, καὶ τί συμβαίνει τοῖς οὕτω [15] λέγουσι, καὶ διὰ τί οὕτω λέγουσι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω:	Quod quidem igitur firmissima * opinio omnium non esse ↵ simul veras oppositas dictiones, et quid accidit ita dicentibus, et quare ita dicunt, tot sint dicta.	Let this, then, suffice to show (1) that the most indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true, and (2) what consequences follow from the assertion that they are, and (3) why people do assert this.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἅμα ἀληθεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων θάτερον στέρησίς ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον, οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις: ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν ἀπό [20] τινος ὡρισμένου γένους: εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ἅμα καταφάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς, ἀδύνατον καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ἅμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πῇ ἄμφω ἢ θάτερον μὲν πῇ θάτερον δὲ ἁπλῶς.	Quoniam autem impossibile est contradictionem esse simul veram de eodem, palam quia nec contraria simul inesse eidem contingit. Contrariorum enim alterum est privatio non minus; substantiae autem privatio ↵ * negatio est ab aliquo determinato genere. Si igitur impossibile est simul affirmare et negare vere, impossibile * et contraria simul inesse, sed aut quo ambo, vel alterum quo, alterum vero simpliciter.	Now since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. For of contraries, one is a privation no less than it is a contrary-and a privation of the essential nature; and privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus. If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification.

Chapter 7

Greek	Latin	English
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν. [25] δῆλον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὁρισαμένοις τί τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥστε καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται: ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τὸ ὂν λέγεται μὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν.	At vero nec medium contradictionis nihil esse contingit, sed necessarium aut dicere aut negare unum de uno quodƿcumque. Palam autem primum quidem diffmientibus quid ↵ verum et * falsum. Dicere namque ens non esse aut hoc esse falsum *, ens autem esse et non ens non esse verum *; quare et dicens * esse aut non verum dicet aut mentietur; sed neque ens dicit non esse aut esse neque non ens,	Chapter 7. But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. This is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.
ἔτι [30] ἤτοι μεταξὺ ἔσται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὥσπερ τὸ φαιὸν μέλανος καὶ λευκοῦ, ἢ ὡς τὸ μηδέτερον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου. εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι (ἐκ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ εἰς ἀγαθὸν μεταβάλλει ἢ ἐκ τούτου εἰς μὴ ἀγαθόν), νῦν δ᾽ ἀεὶ φαίνεται (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μεταβολὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα [35] καὶ μεταξύ): εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι μεταξύ, καὶ οὕτως εἴη ἄν τις εἰς λευκὸν οὐκ ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ γένεσις, νῦν δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾶται.	Amplius aut ↵ medium erit contradictionis quemadmodum pallidum albi et nigri, aut quemadmodum neutrum hominis et equi. Si quidem igitur sic, non permutabitur (nam ex non bono in * bonum permutatur aut ex hoc in non bonum); nunc autem semper videtur. Non est enim permutatio nisi in contraria et media. ↵ Si autem est medium, ** et sic utique erit aliqua in album 1012a1 non ex non albo generatio; nunc autem non videtur.	Again, the intermediate between the contradictories will be so either in the way in which grey is between black and white, or as that which is neither man nor horse is between man and horse. (a) If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into the extremes (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good), but as a matter of fact when there is an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes. For there is no change except to opposites and to their intermediates. (b) But if it is really intermediate, in this way too there would have to be a change to white, which was not from not-white; but as it [12a] is, this is never seen.
[1012α] [1] ἔτι πᾶν τὸ διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν ἡ διάνοια ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν—τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον—ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ ἢ ψεύδηται: ὅταν μὲν ὡδὶ συνθῇ φᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει, [5] ὅταν δὲ ὡδί, ψεύδεται.	Amplius omne intellectuale et intelligibile mens aut affirmat aut negat. Hoc autem ex diffinitione palam, cum verum dicit aut mentitur. Quando quidem sic componit dicens aut negans, verum dicit, quando autem * sic, mentitur.	Again, every object of understanding or reason the understanding either affirms or denies – this is obvious from the definition – whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects in one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true, and when it does so in another way, what is false.
ἔτι παρὰ πάσας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις, εἰ μὴ λόγου ἕνεκα λέγεται: ὥστε καὶ οὔτε ἀληθεύσει [7] τις οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθεύσει, καὶ παρὰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται, ὥστε καὶ παρὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν μεταβολή τις ἔσται.	Amplius ↵ praeter omnes oportet esse contradictiones, nisi orationis causa dicatur. Quare et nec verum dicet aliquis nec non verum dicet, et praeter ens et non ens erit, quare et praeter generationem et corruptionem transmutatio quaedam erit.	-Again, there must be an intermediate between all contradictories, if one is not arguing merely for the sake of argument; so that it will be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor untrue, and there will be a middle between that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between generation and destruction.
ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις γένεσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπιφέρει, [10] καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔσται, οἷον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε περιττὸς οὔτε οὐ περιττὸς ἀριθμός: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δὲ δῆλον.	Amplius in quibuscumque generibus negatio contrarium infert, et in hiis erit, ↵ ut in numeris neque impar neque non impar numerus. Sed impossibile; ex diffinitione vero palam.	Again, in all classes in which the negation of an attribute involves the assertion of its contrary, even in these there will be an intermediate; for instance, in the sphere of numbers there will be number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is obvious from the definition.
ἔτι εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡμιόλια τὰ ὄντα ἔσται ἀλλὰ πλείω. πάλιν γὰρ ἔσται ἀποφῆσαι τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τι: ἡ [15] γὰρ οὐσία ἐστί τις αὐτοῦ ἄλλη.	Amplius in infinitum vadet; et non solum emyolia quae sunt erunt sed plura. Iterum enim est hoc negare ad dictionem et negationem, et hoc erit aliquid; nam substantia est quaedam ipsius alia.	Again, the process will go on ad infinitum, and the number of realities will be not only half as great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation, and this new term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something different.
ἔτι ὅταν ἐρομένου εἰ λευκόν ἐστιν εἴπῃ ὅτι οὔ, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀποπέφηκεν ἢ τὸ εἶναι: ἀπόφασις δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.	Amplius ↵ quando interrogante si est album dicit quia non *, nihil aliud negavit quam ipsum esse; negatio vero est quod non esse.	Again, when a man, on being asked whether a thing is white, says no, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not being is a negation.
ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἐνίοις αὕτη ἡ δόξα ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλαι τῶν παραδόξων: ὅταν γὰρ λύειν μὴ δύνωνται λόγους ἐριστικούς, ἐνδόντες τῷ λόγῳ σύμφασιν ἀληθὲς [20] εἶναι τὸ συλλογισθέν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάντων ζητεῖν λόγον.	Venit autem quibusdam haec opinio sicut et aliae inopinabiƿlium; quando enim soluere non possunt orationes contentiosas, ↵ annuentes orationi confirmant verum esse quod est sillogizatum. Hii quidem igitur propter talem causam dicunt, illi vero propter omnium rationem inquirere.	Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical arguments, they give in to the argument and agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some express this view; others do so because they demand a reason for everything.
ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας τούτους ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ. ὁρισμὸς δὲ γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ σημαίνειν τι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτούς: ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὗ τὸ ὄνομα σημεῖον ὁρισμὸς ἔσται.	Principium autem ad hos omnes ex diffinitione. Diffinitio vero fit ex ipsos significare aliquid necessarium esse; ratio namque cuius nomen est signum diffinitio fit.	And the starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something; for the form of words of which the word is a sign will be its definition.
ἔοικε δ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου [25] λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου, εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, πάντα ψευδῆ: ὅταν γὰρ μιχθῇ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μῖγμα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀληθές.	↵ Videtur autem Eracliti quidem oratio, dicens omnia esse et non esse, omnia vera facere; quae vero est Anaxagore, esse aliquid medium contradictionis, quare omnia falsa. Nam quando miscentur, nec bonum nec non bonum est mixtum, quare nihil dicere verum.	-While the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.

Chapter 8

Greek	Latin	English
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ μοναχῶς [30] λεγόμενα καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν ὥσπερ τινὲς λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐθὲν φάσκοντες ἀληθὲς εἶναι (οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύειν φασὶν οὕτως ἅπαντα εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι), οἱ δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ. σχεδὸν γὰρ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου: ὁ γὰρ λέγων [35] ὅτι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν λόγων ἑκάτερον τούτων, [1012β] [1] ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι.	Determinatis autem hiis palam quod * uno modo ↵ dicta et de omnibus impossibile est esse sicut quidam dicunt. Hii quidem nihil dicentes verum esse; nihil enim prohibere dicunt sic omnia esse sicut dyametrum commensurabilem esse. Illi vero omnia vera. Fere namque ipsis rationes eaedem * Era↵clito; nam qui dicit quia omnia sunt vera et omnia falsa, ↵ et seorsum rdicit rationem utramque horum1, quare si sunt impossibilia illa, et haec * impossibile esse.	Chapter 8. In view of these distinctions it is obvious that the one-sided theories which some people express about all things cannot be valid-on the one hand the theory that nothing is true (for, say they, there is nothing to prevent every statement from being like the statement 'the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'), on the other hand the theory that everything is true. These views are practically the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true and all are false also makes each of [12b] these statements separately, so that since they are impossible, the double statement must be impossible too.
ἔτι δὲ φανερῶς ἀντιφάσεις εἰσὶν ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι—οὐδὲ δὴ ψευδεῖς πάσας: καίτοι δόξειέ γ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.	Amplius autem evidenter contradictiones sunt quas non est possibile simul esse veras, nec itaque falsas omnes; et quidem utique putabitur ↵ magis contingere ex dictis.	Again, there are obviously contradictories which cannot be at the same time true-nor on the other hand can all statements be false; yet this would seem more possible in the light of what has been said.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αἰτεῖσθαι δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, οὐχὶ εἶναί τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι, ὥστε ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ διαλεκτέον λαβόντας τί σημαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ἄλλο τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ <ὃ> ἀποφάναι ; ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον [10] πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως θάτερον εἶναι μόριον ἀληθές.	Sed ad omnes tales orationes oportet quaerere, quemadmodum in superioribus sermonibus dictum est, non esse aliquid aut non esse sed significare aliquid, quare ex diffinitione disputandum accipientes quid significat ƿ verum aut falsum. Si autem nihil aliud quam verum dicere aut negare falsum est, impossibile omnia falsa esse; est enim ↵ necesse contradictionis partem aiteram esse veram.	-But against all such views we must postulate, as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible that all statements should be false; for one side of the contradiction must be true.
ἔτι εἰ πᾶν ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ εἶναι: θάτερον γὰρ μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ψεῦδός ἐστιν.	Amplius si omne aut dicere aut negare est necesse, utraque falsa esse impossibile est; altera namque pars contradictionis est falsa.	Again, if it is necessary with regard to everything either to assert or to deny it, it is impossible that both should be false; for it is one side of the contradiction that is false.
συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς [15] ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐξαιρῶνται ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐναντίον ὡς οὐκ ἀληθὴς μόνος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ ὡς οὐ ψευδής, [20] οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπείρους συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτεῖσθαι λόγους ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς: ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται.	Accidit itaque et quod famatum est de omnibus talibus orationibus: ipsas se ipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit ↵ orationis sue contrariam veram facit, quare suam non veram; contraria enim non dicit ipsam esse veram. Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse se ipsum. Si autem excipiant, hic quidem contrariam quod non vera sola est, ille vero suam propriam quod non falsa, nihil minus * infinitas accidit ipsis petere oratio↵nes veras et falsas. Nam qui dicit veram orationem veram verus est, hoc autem in infinitum vadet.	Therefore all such views are also exposed to the often expressed objection, that they destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is true makes even the statement contrary to his own true, and therefore his own not true (for the contrary statement denies that it is true), while he who says everything is false makes himself also false.-And if the former person excepts the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while the latter excepts his own as being not false, none the less they are driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite number of statements; for that which says the true statement is true is true, and this process will go on to infinity.
φανερὸν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.	Palam autem quia nec qui omnia quiescere dicunt vera dicunt nec qui omnia moveri.	Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest are not right, nor are those who say all things are in movement.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ [25] ψευδῆ ἔσται, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον (ὁ γὰρ λέγων ποτὲ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται):	Nam si quiescunt omnia, * semper haec vera et falsa erunt, videtur autem hoc transmutatum; ↵ nam qui dicit aliquando ipse * non erat et iterum non erit.	For if all things are at rest, the same statements will always be true and the same always false,-but this obviously changes; for he who makes a statement, himself at one time was not and again will not be.
εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές: πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ: ἀλλὰ δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον.	Si vero omnia moventur, nihil erit verum; ergo omnia falsa. Sed ostensum est quia impossibile est.	And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true; everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible.
ἔτι ἀνάγκη τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλειν: ἔκ τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή.	Amplius ens permutari est necesse; nam ex aliquo in aliquid est permutatio.	Again, it must be that which is that changes; for change is from something to something.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἠρεμεῖ [30] ἢ κινεῖται ποτέ, ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθέν: ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.	At vero nec omnia quiescunt aut moventur aliquando, semper ↵ autem nihil; est enim aliquid quod semper movet quae moventur, et primum movens immobile * ipsum.	But again it is not the case that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing for ever; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover is itself unmoved.