Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c13

Chapter 13

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ σκέψις ἐστί, πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. λέγεται δ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ τὸ καθόλου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖν δυοῖν εἴρηται (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ [5] ὑποκειμένου, ὅτι διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τι ὄν, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἢ ὡς ἡ ὕλη τῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ), δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἴτιόν τισιν εἶναι μάλιστα, καὶ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ καθόλου: διὸ ἐπέλθωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτου.	↵ Quoniam vero de substantia perscrutatio est, iterum redeamus. Dicitur autem sicut subiectum substantia esse et quod quid erat esse et quod ex hiis, et universale. De duobus quidem igitur dictum est; et enim de quid erat esse et de subiecto, ↵ quia dupliciter subicitur: aut hoc aliquid ens, ut animal passionibus, aut ut materia actui. Videtur autem et universale causa quibusdam esse maxime, et esse principium universale; unde et de hoc tractemus.	Chapter 13. Let us return to the subject of our inquiry, which is substance. As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these are called substance, so also is the universal. About two of these we have spoken; both about the essence and about the substratum, of which we have said that it underlies in two senses, either being a ‘this’ – which is the way in which an animal underlies its attributes – or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The universal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause, and a principle; therefore let us attack the discussion of this point also.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων. πρῶτον [10] μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ, ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν: τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε: ἑνὸς δ᾽ εἰ ἔσται, καὶ τἆλλα τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται: ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [15] ἕν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἕν.	↵Videtur enim impossibile esse substantiam esse quodcumque universaliter ↵ dictorum. Primum enim substantia quae uniuscuiusque propria uniuscuiusque, quae noninest alii, universale vero commune; hoc enim dicitur universale quod pluribus inesse natum est. Cuius ergo substantia erit? Aut enim omnium aut nullius. Omnium autem non est possibile; unius autem si erit, et alia hoc erunt. Quorum enim una substantia est et quod quid erat ↵ esse unum, et ipsa unum.	For it seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance? Either of all or of none; but it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is to be the substance of one, this one will be the others also; for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one.
ἔτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται ἀεί.	Amplius substantia dicitur quae non de subiecto, et universale de subiecto aliquo dicitur semper.	Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a subject, but the universal is predicable of some subject always.
ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα οὕτω μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις αὐτοῦ λόγος. διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ μὴ [20] πάντων λόγος ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον οὐσία τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τινός, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν: ἔσται γὰρ ἐκείνου οὐσία, οἷον τὸ ζῷον, ἐν ᾧ ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει.	Sed an sic quidem non contingit ut quod quid erat esse, in ipso autem inexistit, ut animal in homine et equo? Ergo palam quia est quaedam ipsius ratio. Differt autem nihil nec ƿ si non omnium ratio est eorum quae sunt in substantia; nihil ↵ enim minus substantia erit hoc alicuius, ut homo hominis in quo existit. Quare idem accidet iterum; erit enim substantia illius substantia, ut animal, in quo ut proprium existit.	But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this; e.g. ‘animal’ can be present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Then clearly it is a formula of the essence. And it makes no difference even if it is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for none the less the universal will be the substance of something, as ‘man’ is the substance of the individual man in whom it is present, so that the same result will follow once more; for the universal, e.g. ‘animal’, will be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ τόδε καὶ οὐσίαν, εἰ ἔστιν ἔκ τινων, [25] μὴ ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι μηδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ τόδε τι ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ ποιοῦ: πρότερον γὰρ ἔσται μὴ οὐσία τε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ τόδε. ὅπερ ἀδύνατον: οὔτε λόγῳ γὰρ οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε γενέσει οἷόν τε τὰ πάθη τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι πρότερα: ἔσται γὰρ καὶ χωριστά.	Amplius autem et impossibile et inconveniens hoc et substantiam, si est ex aliquibus, non ex substantiis esse nec ex eo ↵ quod hoc aliquid sed ex quali; prius enim erit non substantia et quale substantia et ipso hoc, quod est impossibile. Nec enim ratione nec tempore nec generatione passiones possibilie est priores esse substantia; erunt enim separabiles.	And further it is impossible and absurd that the ‘this’, i.e. the substance, if it consists of parts, should not consist of substances nor of what is a ‘this’, but of quality; for that which is not substance, i.e. the quality, will then be prior to substance and to the ‘this’. Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor in time nor in coming to be can the modifications be prior to the substance; for then they will also be separable from it.
ἔτι τῷ Σωκράτει ἐνυπάρξει οὐσία οὐσίᾳ, [30] ὥστε δυοῖν ἔσται οὐσία. ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηδενὸς οὐσίαν μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον οὐκ εἶναί τι ζῷον παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐδέν. ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι [35] φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, [1039α] [1] ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.	Amplius Socrati inerit substantiae substantia; quare duorum erit substantia. Totaliter vero ↵ accidit, si est substantia homo et quaecumque ita dicuntur, nihil eorum quae in ratione esse nullius substantiam, neque sine ipsis existere nec in alio; dico autem ut non esse quoddam animal praeter aliqua, nec aliud eorum quae in rationibus nullum. Ex hiis itaque speculantibus palam quia ↵ nihil universaliter existentium est substantia, et quia nullum ↵ communiter praedicatorum significat hoc aliquid, sed tale.	Further, Socrates will contain a substance present in a substance, so that this will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man and such things are substance, that none of the elements in their formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no ‘animal’ exists apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart.If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates [39a] a ‘this’, but rather a ‘such’.
εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.	Sin autem, alia quoque multa accidunt et tertius homo.	If not, many difficulties follow and especially the ‘third man’.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε δῆλον. ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὰ γὰρ δύο [5] οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε: ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει), ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἕν, οὐκ ἔσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς: ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν ἐκ [10] δύο ἓν ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι: τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἕξει, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς σύνθεσις μονάδων, ὥσπερ λέγεται ὑπό τινων: ἢ γὰρ οὐχ ἓν ἡ δυὰς ἢ οὐκ ἔστι μονὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ.	Amplius autem est et ita manifestum. Impossibile enim substantiam ex substantiis esse inexistentibus sic ut actu. Duo namque sic actu numquam sunt unum actu, sed si potestate ↵ duo fuerint, erunt unum, ut quae dupla ex duobus dimidiis potestate; actus enim separat. Quare si substantia unum, non erit ex substantiis inexistentibus, et secundum hunc modum quem dicit Democritus recte. Impossibile enim esse ait ex ↵ duoƿbus unum aut ex unno duo fieri; magnitudines enim indivisibiles substantias faciunt. Similiter igitur manifestum quia et in numero habebit, si est numerus compositio unitatum, sicut dicitur a quibusdam; aut enim non unum dualitas aut non inest unitas in ipsa actu.	The conclusion is evident also from the following consideration. A substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in complete reality one, though if they are potentially two, they can be one (e.g. the double line consists of two halves – potentially; for the complete realization of the halves divides them from one another); therefore if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances present in it and present in this way, which Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of one; for he identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes. It is clear therefore that the same will hold good of number, if number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some; for two is either not one, or there is no unit present in it in complete reality.
ἔχει δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ [15] μήτε ἐκ τῶν καθόλου οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τόδε τι σημαίνειν, μήτ᾽ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνδέχεται ἐντελεχείᾳ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν σύνθετον, ἀσύνθετον ἂν εἴη οὐσία πᾶσα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ [20] μόνον οὐσίας εἶναι ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα: νῦν δ᾽ οὐδὲ ταύτης. οὐδενὸς ἄρ᾽ ἔσται ὁρισμός: ἢ τρόπον μέν τινα ἔσται τρόπον δέ τινα οὔ. δῆλον δ᾽ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον μᾶλλον.	↵ Habet autem quod accidit dubitationem. Si enim neque ex universalibus possibile est esse nec unam substantiam propter tale sed non hoc aliquid significare, nec ex substantiis contingit actu esse neque unam substantiam, incomposita utique erit substantia omnis. Quare nec ratio utique erit neque unius substantiae. At vero videtur omnibus et dictum est dudum: ↵ aut solum substantiae esse terminum aut maxime. Nunc autem neque huius. Nullius igitur erit diffinitio; aut modo quodam erit, modo autem quodam non. Manifestum autem erit quod dicitur ex posterioribus magis.	But our result involves a difficulty. If no substance can consist of universals because a universal indicates a ‘such’, not a ‘this’, and if no substance can be composed of substances existing in complete reality, every substance would be incomposite, so that there would not even be a formula of any substance. But it is thought by all and was stated long ago that it is either only, or primarily, substance that can defined; yet now it seems that not even substance can. There cannot, then, be a definition of anything; or in a sense there can be, and in a sense there cannot. And what we are saying will be plainer from what follows.