Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l8

Chapter 1

Greek	Latin	English
	METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER OCTAVUS	Aristotle Metaphysics Book 8 (H)
[1042α] [3] ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.	ƿ Ex dictis itaque sillogizare oportet et colligentes capitu↵lum finem imponere.	Chapter 1. WE must reckon up the results arising from what has been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry.
εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι [5] τῶν οὐσιῶν ζητεῖται τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα.	Dictum est itaque quia substantiarum quaeruntur cause et principia et elementa.	We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our search.
οὐσίαι δὲ αἱ μὲν ὁμολογούμεναί εἰσιν ὑπὸ πάντων, [7] περὶ δὲ ἐνίων ἰδίᾳ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο: ὁμολογούμεναι μὲν αἱ φυσικαί, οἷον πῦρ γῆ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, ἔπειτα τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ [10] ζῷα καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τέλος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: ἰδίᾳ δέ τινες οὐσίας λέγουσιν εἶναι τά τ᾽ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά.	Substantiae vero hae quidem confesse sunt ab omnibus, sed de quibusdam singulariter quidam enuntiaverunt. Confesse quidem phisice, ut ignis, terra et aqua et alia simplicia corpora, deinde plante et ↵ partes earum, et animalia et partes animalium, et tandem celum et partes celi. Singulariter vero quidam substantias dicunt esse species * et mathematica.	And some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; second plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances.
ἄλλας δὲ δὴ συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν λόγων οὐσίας εἶναι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον: ἔτι ἄλλως τὸ γένος μᾶλλον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ καθόλου τῶν [15] καθ᾽ ἕκαστα: τῷ δὲ καθόλου καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι συνάπτουσιν (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον οὐσίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι).	Alias vero accidit ex rationibus substantias esse: quod quid erat esse et quod subi↵citur. Adhuc aliter genus magis speciebus et universale singularibus. Universali vero et generi et ydee copulantur; nam secundum eandem rationem substantiae videntur esse.	But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the various species, and the universal than the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία, τούτου δὲ λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός, διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ περὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διώρισται: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος, ὁ δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ [20] περὶ μέρους ἦν ἰδεῖν, ποῖα τῆς οὐσίας μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, καὶ εἰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ. ἔτι τοίνυν οὔτε τὸ καθόλου οὐσία οὔτε τὸ γένος: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕστερον σκεπτέον: παρὰ γὰρ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ταύτας λέγουσί τινες εἶναι. νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων οὐσιῶν [25] ἐπέλθωμεν. αὗται δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθηταί:	Quoniam autem quod quid erat esse substantia *, huius autem ratio diffinitio, propter hoc de diffinitione et de secundum se * diffmitum est. Quoniam autem diffinitio ratio est, ratio autem partes ↵ habet, necesse et de parte erat considerare quae substantiae * partes et quae non, et si hae diffinitioni opus sunt. Amplius etiam nec universale substantia nec genus. De ydeis vero et mathematicis posterius perscrutandum est. Nam praeter sensibiles substantias quidam dicunt eas esse. ƿ Nunc autem de confessis substantiis tractabimus. Hae vero ↵ sensibiles;	And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider also with respect to the notion of part , what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition. Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics; for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances. But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances,
αἱ δ᾽ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν. ἔστι δ᾽ οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι), ἄλλως δ᾽ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τόδε τι ὂν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν: τρίτον δὲ τὸ [30] ἐκ τούτων, οὗ γένεσις μόνου καὶ φθορά ἐστι, καὶ χωριστὸν ἁπλῶς: τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν αἱ δ᾽ οὔ.	sensibiles autem substantiae omnes materiam habent. Est autem substantia quod subicitur, aliter quidem materia *; materiam vero dico quae non hoc aliquid ens actu potestate est hoc aliquid. Aliter vero ratio et forma, quod hoc aliquid ens ratione separabile est. Tertium vero * quod est ex hiis, ↵ cuius solius generatio et corruptio, et separabile simpliciter; nam secundum rationem substantiarum hae quidem * ille vero non.	and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a this actually, is potentially a this ), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a this can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are separable and some are not.
ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον: ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, οἷον κατὰ τόπον τὸ νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν δ᾽ [35] ἄλλοθι, καὶ κατ᾽ αὔξησιν ὃ νῦν μὲν τηλικόνδε πάλιν δ᾽ ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον, καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν ὃ νῦν μὲν ὑγιὲς πάλιν δὲ κάμνον: [1042β] [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὃ νῦν μὲν ἐν γενέσει πάλιν δ᾽ ἐν φθορᾷ, καὶ νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι πάλιν δ᾽ ὑποκείμενον ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν.	Quia vero substantia est materia, palam. Nam in omnibus oppositis mutationibus est aliquid quod subicitur mutationibus, ut puta secundum locum quod nunc hic iterum alibi, et ↵ secundum augmentum quod nunc quidem est tantum * iterum minus aut maius, et secundum alterationem quod nunc quidem est sanum * iterum laborat. Similiter autem secundum substan↵tiam quod nunc quidem est in generatione * iterum in corruptione, et nunc quidem quod subicitur ut hoc aliquid iterum autem quod subicitur ut secundum privationem.	But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased; [42b] and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a this and again underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character.
καὶ ἀκολουθοῦσι δὴ ταύτῃ αἱ ἄλλαι μεταβολαί, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ἢ [5] μιᾷ ἢ δυοῖν αὕτη οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ: οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ὕλην ἔχει τοπικήν, τοῦτο καὶ γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν ἔχειν. τίς μὲν οὖν διαφορὰ τοῦ ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἴρηται.	Et hanc sequuntur aliae mutationes. Aliarum vero aut unam aut duas ↵ haec non sequitur; non enim necesse, si quid materiam habet localem, hoc et generabilem et corruptibilem habere. Quae enim differentia simpliciter fieri et non simpliciter, in phisicis dictum est.	And in this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction. The difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.

Chapter 2

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὡς ὑποκειμένη καὶ ὡς ὕλη οὐσία ὁμολογεῖται, [10] αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ δυνάμει, λοιπὸν τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν οὐσίαν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν.	Quoniam autem quae quidem ut subiecta et ut materia substantia confessa est, haec autem est quae potestate, reli↵quum eam quae ut actum substantiam sensibilium dicere quae est.	Chapter 2. Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality, of sensible things.
Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν τρεῖς διαφορὰς ἔοικεν οἰομένῳ εἶναι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα, τὴν ὕλην, ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, διαφέρειν δὲ ἢ ῥυσμῷ, ὅ ἐστι σχῆμα, ἢ τροπῇ, ὅ ἐστι θέσις, ἢ διαθιγῇ, ὅ [15] ἐστι τάξις):	Democritus quidem igitur tres differentias similis est exisƿtimanti esse; nam subiectum corpus, * materiam, unum et idem, differre autem aut rismo, quod est figura, aut tropi, ↵ quod est positio, aut dyatigi, quod est ordo.	Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e. order.
φαίνονται δὲ πολλαὶ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι, οἷον τὰ μὲν συνθέσει λέγεται τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ὅσα κράσει καθάπερ μελίκρατον, τὰ δὲ δεσμῷ οἷον φάκελος, τὰ δὲ κόλλῃ οἷον βιβλίον, τὰ δὲ γόμφῳ οἷον κιβώτιον, τὰ δὲ πλείοσι τούτων, τὰ δὲ θέσει οἷον οὐδὸς καὶ ὑπέρθυρον (ταῦτα γὰρ [20] τῷ κεῖσθαί πως διαφέρει), τὰ δὲ χρόνῳ οἷον δεῖπνον καὶ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τόπῳ οἷον τὰ πνεύματα: τὰ δὲ τοῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάθεσιν οἷον σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι, καὶ πυκνότητι καὶ ἀραιότητι, καὶ ξηρότητι καὶ ὑγρότητι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνίοις τούτων τὰ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις, καὶ ὅλως τὰ [25] μὲν ὑπεροχῇ τὰ δὲ ἐλλείψει.	Videntur autem multe differentie esse: ut alia quidem compositione dicuntur materiaei, sicut quaecumque * mixtura quemadmodum mellicratum, alia autem ligatione ut capitis ligatura, alia visco ut liber, alia clavo ut archa, alia in pluribus horum, alia positione ↵ ut liminare inferius et superius * (haec enim in poni aliqualiter differunt), alia tempore ut cena et prandium, alia loco ut spiritus, alia sensibilium passionibus ut duritie et mollitie, et spissitudine et raritate, et siccitate et humiditate. Et haec quidem ↵ horum quibusdam alia omnibus hiis, et omnino alia superhabundantia alia defectu.	But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter, e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e.g. bundle; and others by being glued together, e.g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e.g. a casket; and others in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e.g. threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of these qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται: οὐδὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ κρύσταλλον εἶναι τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. ἐνίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁρισθήσεται, τῷ τὰ μὲν μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεκρᾶσθαι, [30] τὰ δὲ δεδέσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπυκνῶσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς κεχρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ χεὶρ ἢ πούς.	Quare palam quia et le est totiens dicitur; limes enim inferior est quia ita ponitur, et esse sic ipsum poni significat, et cristallum esse sic inspissari. Quorundam vero esse et omnibus hiis diffinietur, per haec quidem misceri, haec ↵ autem contemperari, illa vero ligari, alia inspissari, alia autem aliis differentiis uti, * sicut manus aut pes.	Clearly, then, the word is has just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others use the other differentiae; e.g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition.
ληπτέα οὖν τὰ γένη τῶν διαφορῶν (αὗται γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται τοῦ εἶναι), οἷον τὰ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ μανῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα [35] ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψίς ἐστιν. εἰ δέ τι σχήματι ἢ λειότητι καὶ τραχύτητι, πάντα εὐθεῖ καὶ καμπύλῳ. τοῖς δὲ τὸ εἶναι τὸ μεμῖχθαι ἔσται, ἀντικειμένως δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.	Sumenda igitur sunt genera differentiarum (hae namque erunt principia essendi), ut quae * in magis et minus aut spisso et raro et ↵ aliis talibus; omnia namque haec superhabundantia et defectus sunt. Si quid autem figura aut levitate aut asperitate, omnia ↵ recto et curvo. Hiis autem esse erit misceri, opposite vero non esse.	We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect. And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved. And for [43a] other things their being will mean their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.
[1043α] [1] φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἕκαστον, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ζητητέον τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τούτων ἕκαστον. οὐσία μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ συνδυαζόμενον, ὅμως [5] δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν ἑκάστῳ: καὶ ὡς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ τῆς ὕλης κατηγορούμενον αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁρισμοῖς μάλιστα. οἷον εἰ οὐδὸν δέοι ὁρίσασθαι, ξύλον ἢ λίθον ὡδὶ κείμενον ἐροῦμεν, καὶ οἰκίαν πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα ὡδὶ κείμενα (ἢ ἔτι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἔστιν), εἰ δὲ κρύσταλλον, [10] ὕδωρ πεπηγὸς ἢ πεπυκνωμένον ὡδί: συμφωνία δὲ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος μῖξις τοιαδί: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Palam itaque ex hiis quia si substantia causa essendi unumƿquodque, quod in hiis * quaerendum quae est causa essendi horum unumquodque. Substantia quidem igitur nihil horum nec combinatum, at tamen proportionale in quolibet. Et ut ↵ in substantiis quod de materia predicatur ipse actus, et in aliis diffinitionibus maxime. Ut si limen inferius oporteat diffiniri, lignum aut lapidem ita positum dicemus, et domum lateres et ligna sic posita (aut adhuc et quod cuius causa in quibusdam est). Si vero cristallum, aquam congelatam aut in↵spissatam ita; simphonia autem acuti et gravis commixtio talis; eodem quoque modo et in aliis.	It is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause of each thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say wood or stone in such and such a position , and a house we should define as bricks and timbers in such and such a position ,(or a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if we had to define ice we should say water frozen or solidified in such and such a way , and harmony is such and such a blending of high and low ; and similarly in all other cases.
φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄλλη ἄλλης ὕλης καὶ ὁ λόγος: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν δ᾽ ἡ μῖξις τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰρημένων.	Palam itaque ex hiis quia actus alius alterius materiae et ratio; aliorum enim compositio, aliorum mixtio, aliorum aliud quid dictorum.	Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named.
διὸ τῶν ὁριζομένων οἱ μὲν [15] λέγοντες τί ἐστιν οἰκία, ὅτι λίθοι πλίνθοι ξύλα, τὴν δυνάμει οἰκίαν λέγουσιν, ὕλη γὰρ ταῦτα: οἱ δὲ ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον προτιθέντες, τὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄμφω ταῦτα συντιθέντες τὴν τρίτην καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαν (ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν διαφορῶν [20] λόγος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἶναι, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων τῆς ὕλης μᾶλλον): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἵους Ἀρχύτας ἀπεδέχετο ὅρους: τοῦ συνάμφω γάρ εἰσιν. οἷον τί ἐστι νηνεμία; ἠρεμία ἐν πλήθει ἀέρος: ὕλη μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ οὐσία ἡ ἠρεμία. τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμαλότης θαλάττης: [25] τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλη ἡ θάλαττα, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ ὁμαλότης.	Propter quod diffinientium hii quidem dicen↵tes quid est domus, quia lapides, lateres, ligna, potestate domum dicunt; materia namque haec. Illi vero vas protectivum pecuniarum et corporum aut aliquid aliud tale addentes, actum dicunt. Alii ambo ea componentes tertiam et eam quae ex hiis substantiam. Videtur enim quae quidem per differentias ratio speciei et actus esse, quae vero est ex inexistentibus materiae ↵ magis. Similiter autem et quos architas approbavit terminos; simul utriusque enim sunt. Ut quid est serenitas? Quies in aeris pluralitate; aer quidem materia, actus et substantia quies. Quid est tranquillitas? Maris equitas; subiectum quidem ut ↵ materia mare, actus autem et forma equitas.	And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings , or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. E.g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality or shape is smoothness.
φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τίς ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δ᾽ ὡς μορφὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων.	Palam itaque ex dictis quae sit sensibilis substantia et quomodo; haec quidem enim ut materia, illa vero ut forma quia actus, tertia autem quae ex hiis.	It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two.

Chapter 3

Greek	Latin	English
δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐνίοτε λανθάνει πότερον σημαίνει [30] τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον ἡ οἰκία πότερον σημεῖον τοῦ κοινοῦ ὅτι σκέπασμα ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων ὡδὶ κειμένων, ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὅτι σκέπασμα, καὶ γραμμὴ πότερον δυὰς ἐν μήκει ἢ [ὅτι] δυάς, καὶ ζῷον πότερον ψυχὴ ἐν [35] σώματι ἢ ψυχή: αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος.	ƿ Oportet autem non ignorare quia aliquando latet utrum ↵ significet nomen compositam substantiam aut actum et formam. Ut domus utrum signum communis * quia tegumentum ex lateribus et iapidibus sic positis, aut actus et speciei quia tegumentum; et linea utrum dualitas in longitudine aut quia ↵ dualitas, et animal utrum * anima in corpore aut anima; haec namque substantia et actus corporis alicuius.	Chapter 3. We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether house is a sign for the composite thing, a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus , or for the actuality or form, a covering , and whether a line is twoness in length or twoness , and whether an animal is soul in a body or a soul _ ; for soul is the substance or actuality of some body.
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ζῷον, οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς ἕν.	Erit autem utique et in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum sed quasi ad unum.	Animal might even be applied to both, not as something definable by one formula, but as related to a single thing.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πρὸς μέν τι ἄλλο διαφέρει, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐδέν: [1043β] [1] τὸ γὰρ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχει. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται: οὕτω δὲ τινὶ μὲν τινὶ δ᾽ οὔ.	Sed * haec * ad aliquid aliud quidem differunt *, ↵ ad questionem vero substantiae sensibilis nihil; nam quod quid erat esse speciei et actui existit. Nam anima et anime esse idem, homini vero esse et homo non idem, nisi et anima homo dicatur; sic autem alicui quidem, alicui vero non.	But this question, while important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry into sensible substance; [43b] for the essence certainly attaches to the form and the actuality. For soul and to be soul are the same, but to be man and man are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, and on another it is not.
οὐ φαίνεται [5] δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως, οὐδ᾽ ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σύνθεσις οὐδ᾽ ἡ μῖξις ἐκ τούτων ὧν ἐστὶ σύνθεσις ἢ μῖξις. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθέν, οἷον εἰ ὁ οὐδὸς θέσει, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐδοῦ ἡ θέσις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον [10] οὗτος ἐξ ἐκείνης. οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν, ἀλλά τι δεῖ εἶναι ὃ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθ᾽ ὕλη, οὔτε δὲ στοιχεῖον οὔτ᾽ ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ οὐσία: ὃ ἐξαιροῦντες [13] τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ᾽ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο, αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν.	↵ Non videtur itaque quaerentibus sillaba ex elementis ens et compositione, nec domus lateres et compositio. Et hoc recte; non enim compositio et mixtio ex hiis quorum est compositio aut mixtio. Similiter autem nec aliorum nil; ut limes positione, ↵ non ex limine positio sed magis hoc ex illa. Nec itaque homo est animal et bipes, sed aliquid oportet esse quod praeter haec est, si haec materiae: neque autem elementum nec * ex elementis, sed substantia; quod auferentes materiam dicunt. Si ergo hoc causa ipsius esse, et substantia hoc, ipsam utique substantiam non dicent.	If we examine we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition. And this is right; for the juxtaposition or mixing does not consist of those things of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing. And the same is true in all other cases; e.g. if the threshold is characterized by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor is man animal + biped, but there must be something besides these, if these are matter,-something which is neither an element in the whole nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate, and state only the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the thing _ s being, and if the cause of its being is its substance, they will not be stating the substance itself.
(ἀνάγκη δὴ ταύτην ἢ [15] ἀΐδιον εἶναι ἢ φθαρτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι τὸ εἶδος οὐθεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖται τόδε, γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων.	↵ Necessarium itaque hanc aut sempiternam esse aut corruptibilem sine corrumpi et factam esse sine fieri. Monstratum ƿ autem est et declaratum in aliis quia speciem nullus facit nec generatur, sed efficitur hoc, fit autem quod * ex hiis.	(This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to be without ever being in course of coming to be. But it has been proved and explained elsewhere that no one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made, i.e. the complex of form and matter that is generated.
εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον:	Si autem sunt corruptibilium substantiae separabiles, nondum * palam.	Whether the substances of destructible things can exist apart, is not yet at all clear;
πλὴν ὅτι γ᾽ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται [20] δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος.	At tamen quia quorundam non contingit, palam: quaecumque ↵ non possibile est praeter ipsa aliqua esse, ut domum aut uas.	except that obviously this is impossible in some cases-in the case of things which cannot exist apart from the individual instances, e.g. house or utensil.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ᾽ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν: τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν.)	Forsan quidem igitur nec substantiae sunt neque aliquid ipsa haec nec aliquid aliorum quaecumque non natura constituta sunt; naturam enim solam utique quis ponet eorum quae in corruptibilibus substantiam.	Perhaps, indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature, are substances at all; for one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things.)
ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν [25] ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾽ οἷον καττίτερος: ὥστ᾽ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ [30] ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾖ: ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν.	Quare dubitatio quam antistenici et sic indocti dubitaverunt habet tempus quoddam: quia non est ipsum quid est diffinire ↵ (terminum enim rationem esse longam), sed quale quidem aliquid est contingit et docere; sicut * argentum quid quidem est non, quia autem quale stagnum. Quare substantiae est quidem cuius contingit esse terminum et rationem, puta composite, sive sensibilis fuerit sive intellectualis; ^primorum autem ↵ ex quibus haec non est, siquidem aliquid de aliquo significat ratio diffinitiva et oportet hoc quidem ut materiam esse illud vero ut formam.	Therefore the difficulty which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness. They said that the what cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a long rigmarole ) but of what sort a thing, e.g. silver, is, they thought it possible actually to explain, not saying what it is, but that it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τινες λέγουσι μονάδων: ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις: [35] διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι), καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον.	↵Palam autem et quia, si sint aliqualiter numeri substantiae, sic sunt et non ut quidam dicunt unitatum. Nam diffinitio numerus quidam; divisibilisque enim et in indivisibilia (non ↵ enim infinite rationes), et numerus autem tale.	It is also obvious that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units. For a definition is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλάχιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προστεθῇ, [1044α] [1] οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος.	Et quemadmodum nec a numero ablato aliquo aut addito ex quibus numerus est, non adhuc idem numerus est sed alter, quamvis minimum auferatur aut addatur, sic nec diffinitio nec quod quid ↵ erat esse non adhuc erit ablato aliquo aut addito.	And (2) as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken [44a] away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added.
καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δεῖ εἶναί τι ᾧ εἷς, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν τίνι εἷς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἷς (ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ οἷον σωρός, ἢ [5] εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν): καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς εἷς ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔχουσι λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συμβαίνει: τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ λόγου, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἓν οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς λέγουσί τινες οἷον μονάς τις οὖσα ἢ στιγμή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελέχεια καὶ φύσις τις ἑκάστη.	Et numerum ƿ oportet esse aliquid quo unus, quod nunc non habent dicere quo unus, siquidem est unus; aut enim non est sed ut aceruus, ↵ aut siquidem est, dicendum quid quod est faciens unum ex multis. Et diffinitio una est, similiter autem neque hanc habent dicere. Et hoc merito accidit; eiusdem enim rationis, et substantia unum ita, sed non, ut dicunt quidam, ut unitas quaedam existens aut punctum, sed endelichia et natura quaedam unaque↵quae.	And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this is a natural result; for the same reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense which we have explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit or point; each is a complete reality and a definite nature.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ [10] ἀριθμὸς ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδ᾽ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.	Et quemadmodum nec numerus habet magis aut minus, nec quae secundum speciem * substantia, sed siquidem, quae cum materia.	And (4) as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter.
περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν λεγομένων οὐσιῶν, πῶς τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πῶς ἀδύνατον, καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀναγωγῆς, ἔστω μέχρι τούτων διωρισμένον. [15]	De generatione quidem igitur et corruptione dictarum substantiarum, quomodo contingit et quomodo impossibile, et de reductione ad numerum, sit usque ad haec determinatum.	Let this, then, suffice for an account of the generation and destruction of so-called substances in what sense it is possible and in what sense impossible _ and of the reduction of things to number.

Chapter 4

Greek	Latin	English
περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου ἢ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡς πρώτων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅμως ἔστι τις οἰκεία ἑκάστου, οἷον φλέγματος [ἐστι πρώτη ὕλη] τὰ γλυκέα ἢ λιπαρά, χολῆς δὲ τὰ πικρὰ ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα: ἴσως δὲ [20] ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.	↵ De materiali autem substantia oportet non latere quia et si ex eodem omnia primo aut eisdem ut primis et eadem materia ut principium hiis quae fiunt, est tamen aliqua propria cuiuslibet, ut flegmatis est prima materia dulcia aut crassa, ↵ colere vero * amara aut alia quaedam; forsan autem haec ex eodem.	Chapter 4. Regarding material substance we must not forget that even if all things come from the same first cause or have the same things for their first causes, and if the same matter serves as starting-point for their generation, yet there is a matter proper to each, e.g. for phlegm the sweet or the fat, and for bile the bitter, or something else; though perhaps these come from the same original matter.
γίγνονται δὲ πλείους ὗλαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅταν θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ, οἷον φλέγμα ἐκ λιπαροῦ καὶ γλυκέος εἰ τὸ λιπαρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος, ἐκ δὲ χολῆς τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην τὴν χολήν. διχῶς γὰρ τόδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦδε, ἢ ὅτι πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅτι ἀναλυθέντος εἰς τὴν [25] ἀρχήν.	Fiunt autem plures materiae eiusdem, quando alterius altera fuerit, ut flegma ex crasso et dulci, si crassum ex dulci; ex colera vero * per resolvi coleram in primam materiam. Dupliciter enim hoc ex hoc, aut quia previum erit ↵ aut quia ex resoluto in principium.	And there come to be several matters for the same thing, when the one matter is matter for the other; e.g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet; and it comes from bile by analysis of the bile into its ultimate matter. For one thing comes from another in two senses, either because it will be found at a later stage, or because it is produced if the other is analysed into its original constituents.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν, οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλίνη. ἐνίων δ᾽ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρων ὄντων, οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει πρίονα ἐξ ἐρίου ἢ ξύλου. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα [30] τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται ἐξ ἄλλης ὕλης ποιῆσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ὡς κινοῦσα ἡ αὐτή: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρα καὶ τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ τὸ γεγονός.	Contingit autem una materia existente fieri diversa propter moventem causam, ut puta ex ligno et archa et lectus. Quorundam vero altera materia ex necessitate alteris existentibus, ut serra non utique fiet ex ligno, nec in movente causa * hoc; non enim faciet serram ↵ ex lana aut ligno. Si ergo idem contingit ex alia materia ƿ facere, palam quia ars et principium quod est ut movens idem; nam si et materia altera et movens, et quod factum est.	When the matter is one, different things may be produced owing to difference in the moving cause; e.g. from wood may be made both a chest and a bed. But some different things must have their matter different; e.g. a saw could not be made of wood, nor is this in the power of the moving cause; for it could not make a saw of wool or of wood. But if, as a matter of fact, the same thing can be made of different material, clearly the art, i.e. the moving principle, is the same; for if both the matter and the moving cause were different, the product would be so too.
ὅταν δή τις ζητῇ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς [35] ὕλη; ἆρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ᾽ ὡς κινοῦν; ἆρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ᾽ ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ᾽ ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.	Quando itaque aliquis quesierit quid * causa, quoniam pluribus modis dicuntur cause, omnes oportet dicere causas contingentes. Ut hominis quae causa ut materia? Equidem men↵strua. Quid autem ut movens? Equidem sperma. Quid ut species? Quod quid erat esse. Quid ut cuius causa? Finis. Forsan ↵ autem haec ambo idem.	When one inquires into the cause of something, one should, since causes are spoken of in several senses, state all the possible causes. what is the material cause of man? Shall we say the menstrual fluid ? What is moving cause? Shall we say the seed ? The formal cause? His essence. The final cause? His end. But perhaps the [44b] latter two are the same.
[1044β] [1] ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἄμφω τὸ αὐτό. δεῖ δὲ τὰ ἐγγύτατα αἴτια λέγειν. τίς ἡ ὕλη; μὴ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴδιον.	Oportet autem proximas causas dicere. Quae materia? Non ignem aut terram sed propriam.	-It is the proximate causes we must state. What is the material cause? We must name not fire or earth, but the matter peculiar to the thing.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς φυσικὰς οὐσίας καὶ γενητὰς ἀνάγκη οὕτω μετιέναι εἴ τις μέτεισιν ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἄρα [5] αἴτιά τε ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ δεῖ τὰ αἴτια γνωρίζειν:	Circa naturales quidem igitur substantias et generabiles necesse sic versari si quis recte versatur, si profecto hae * ↵ cause et tot et oportet causas cognoscere.	Regarding the substances that are natural and generable, if the causes are really these and of this number and we have to learn the causes, we must inquire thus, if we are to inquire rightly.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δὲ οὐσιῶν ἄλλος λόγος. ἴσως γὰρ ἔνια οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην, ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ τόπον κινητήν.	In naturalibus quu dem sempiternis autem substantiis alia ratio. Forsan enim quaedam non habent materiam, aut non talem sed solum secundum locum mobilem.	But in the case of natural but eternal substances another account must be given. For perhaps some have no matter, or not matter of this sort but only such as can be moved in respect of place.
οὐδ᾽ ὅσα δὴ φύσει μέν, μὴ οὐσίαι δέ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἡ οὐσία. οἷον τί [10] αἴτιον ἐκλείψεως, τίς ὕλη; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ σελήνη τὸ πάσχον. τί δ᾽ αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν καὶ φθεῖραν τὸ φῶς; ἡ γῆ. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δ᾽ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος. οἷον τί ἔκλειψις; στέρησις φωτός. ἐὰν δὲ προστεθῇ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν [15] μέσῳ γιγνομένης, ὁ σὺν τῷ αἰτίῳ λόγος οὗτος. ὕπνου δ᾽ ἄδηλον τί τὸ πρῶτον πάσχον. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον; ναί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τί, καὶ τί πρῶτον; καρδία ἢ ἄλλο τι. εἶτα ὑπὸ τίνος; εἶτα τί τὸ πάθος, τὸ ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ τοῦ ὅλου; ὅτι ἀκινησία τοιαδί; ναί, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη τῷ τί πάσχειν [20] τὸ πρῶτον;	Nec quaecumque itaque natura quidem, non substantia vero, non est hiis materia, sed quod subicitur substantia. Puta quae causa eclipsis? * quae materia? Non enim ↵ est, sed luna quod patitur. Quae causa ut movens et corrumpens lumen? Terra. Quod autem cuius gratia forsan non est. Quod vero ut species ratio, sed non manifesta, si non cum causa fuerit ratio. Ut quid eclipsis? Privatio luminis. Si vero addatur 4a terra in medio obiecta\ quae cum causa ratio haec. ↵ sompni vero non manifestum quid primum patiens. Sed quod animal? Etiam. Verum hoc secundum quid, et quid primum? Cor aut aliud aliquid. Deinde a quo? Deinde quid passio quae illius et non totius? Quia immobilitas talis? Vtique, sed haec per aliquid pati quod primum. ↵	Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature but are not substances; their substratum is the substance. E.g what is the cause of eclipse? What is its matter? There is none; the moon is that which suffers eclipse. What is the moving cause which extinguished the light? The earth. The final cause perhaps does not exist. The formal principle is the definitory formula, but this is obscure if it does not include the cause. E.g. what is eclipse? Deprivation of light. But if we add by the earth s coming in between _ , this is the formula which includes the cause. In the case of sleep it is not clear what it is that proximately has this affection. Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes, but the animal in virtue of what, i.e. what is the proximate subject? The heart or some other part. Next, by what is it produced? Next, what is the affection-that of the proximate subject, not of the whole animal? Shall we say that it is immobility of such and such a kind? Yes, but to what process in the proximate subject is this due?

Chapter 5

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη (οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, εἰ ἔκ τινος καὶ τὶ πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται), οὐ πάντα [25] ἂν τἀναντία γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ μέλανος ἀνθρώπου καὶ λευκὸν ἐκ μέλανος: οὐδὲ παντὸς ὕλη ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσων γένεσις ἔστι καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα: ὅσα δ᾽ ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἔστιν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων ὕλη.	Quoniam vero quaedam sine generatione et corruptione sunt et non sunt, ut puncta, siquidem sunt, et totaliter species ƿ * (non enim album fit sed lignum album, * aut ex aliquo et ↵ aliquid omne quod fit fit), non omnia utique contraria fient ex * invicem, sed aliter albus homo ex nigro homine et album ex nigro. Nec omnis materia est sed quorum generatio est et transmutatio in * invicem. Quaecumque autem sine transmutari sunt aut non, non est horum materia.	Chapter 5. Since some things are and are not, without coming to be and ceasing to be, e.g. points, if they can be said to be, and in general forms (for it is not white comes to be, but the wood comes to be white, if everything that comes to be comes from something and comes to be something), not all contraries can come from one another, but it is in different senses that a pale man comes from a dark man, and pale comes from dark. Nor has everything matter, but only those things which come to be and change into one another. Those things which, without ever being in course of changing, are or are not, have no matter.
ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν πῶς πρὸς τἀναντία ἡ [30] ὕλη ἡ ἑκάστου ἔχει. οἷον εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ὑγιεινόν, ἐναντίον δὲ νόσος ὑγιείᾳ, ἆρα ἄμφω δυνάμει; καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει οἶνος καὶ ὄξος; ἢ τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν τὴν παρὰ φύσιν;	↵ Habet autem dubitationem quomodo ad contraria materia uniuscuiusque habet. Ut si corpus potentia sanum, contrarium vero infirmitas sanitatis, tunc ambo potentia?	There is difficulty in the question how the matter of each thing is related to its contrary states. E.g. if the body is potentially healthy, and disease is contrary to health, is it potentially both healthy and diseased?
ἀπορία δέ τις ἔστι καὶ διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος οὐχ [35] ὕλη τοῦ ὄξους οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος (καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος) καὶ ὁ ζῶν δυνάμει νεκρός. ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ φθοραί, [1045α] [1] ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν νεκροῦ δύναμις καὶ ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὄξους: γίγνεται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἡμέρας νύξ. καὶ ὅσα δὴ οὕτω μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, εἰς τὴν ὕλην δεῖ ἐπανελθεῖν, οἷον εἰ [5] ἐκ νεκροῦ ζῷον, εἰς τὴν ὕλην πρῶτον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω ζῷον: καὶ τὸ ὄξος εἰς ὕδωρ, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως οἶνος.	Et aqua potentia vinum et acetum? Aut huius quidem secundum habitum et secundum speciem materia, illius vero secundum privationem et corruptionem praeter naturam. Dubitatio autem quaedam est ↵ et quare vinum non materia aceti nec potentia acetum (quamuis fiat ex ipso acetum) et vivens potentia mortuus. Aut ↵ non, sed secundum accidens corruptiones. Animalis vero materia haec secundum corruptionem mortui potentia et materia, et aqua aceti; fit enim ex hiis ut ex die nox. Et quaecumque itaque sic transmutantur ad invicem, ad materiam oportet redire; ↵ ut si ex mortuo animal, in materiam primo, deinde sic animal; et acetum in aquam, deinde sic vinum.	And is water potentially wine and vinegar? We answer that it is the matter of one in virtue of its positive state and its form, and of the other in virtue of the privation of its positive state and the corruption of it contrary to its nature. It is also hard to say why wine is not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potentially vinegar (though vinegar is produced from it), and why a living man is not said to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the corruptions in question are [45a] accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that is itself in virtue of its corruption the potency and matter of a corpse, and it is water that is the matter of vinegar. For the corpse comes from the animal, and vinegar from wine, as night from day. And all the things which change thus into one another must go back to their matter; e.g. if from a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse first goes back to its matter, and only then becomes an animal; and vinegar first goes back to water, and only then becomes wine.

Chapter 6

Greek	Latin	English
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρημένης περί τε τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι; πάντων γὰρ ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἔστιν οἷον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν [10] ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μόρια, ἔστι τι αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἁφὴ αἰτία τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ γλισχρότης ἤ τι πάθος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ ἓν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ διὰ τί [15] ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά, οἷον τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν,	De dubitatione vero dicta * circa diffinitiones et numeros: quae causa essendi unum? Omnium enim quaecumque ↵ plures partes habent et non est ut aceruus quod totum sed est aliquid totum praeter partes, est aliqua causa. Quoniam et in corporibus hiis quidem tactus causa est unum essendi, aliis vero viscositas aut aliqua passio altera talis. Diffinitio vero ratio * est una non coniunctione quemadmodum Ylias sed per unius esse. Quid igitur est quod facit unum hominem, et propƿter quid unum sed non multa, puta animalque et bipes?	Chapter 6. To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause of their unity? In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.-What then, is it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, e.g. animal + biped,
ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, αὐτό τι ζῷον καὶ αὐτὸ δίπουν; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ἔσονται κατὰ μέθεξιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ᾽ [19] ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, ζῴου καὶ δίποδος, καὶ ὅλως δὴ οὐκ ἂν [20] εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἀλλὰ πλείω, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν;	Ali↵terque et si est, ut aiunt quidam, ipsum aliquid animal et ipsum bipes. Quare namque non illa ipsa homo est, et erunt secundum participationem homines non hominis neque unius sed duorum, scilicet animalis et bipedis, et totaliter utique non erit ↵ homo unum sed plura, animal et bipes?	especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in-one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὕτω μὲν μετιοῦσιν ὡς εἰώθασιν ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν: εἰ δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή, καὶ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐκέτι ἀπορία δόξειεν ἂν [25] εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον.	Palam itaque quia sic quidem acceptantibus ut consueverunt diffinire et dicere, non contingit reddere et soluere dubitationem. Si autem est, ut dicimus, hoc quidem materia illud vero forma, et hoc quidem potentia illud vero actu, non adhuc dubitatio utique videbitur esse quod quaeritur.	Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty.
ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία ἡ αὐτὴ κἂν εἰ ὁ ὅρος εἴη ἱματίου στρογγύλος χαλκός: εἴη γὰρ ἂν σημεῖον τοὔνομα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ τὸν χαλκόν. οὐκέτι δὴ ἀπορία φαίνεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή. [30] τί οὖν τούτου αἴτιον, τοῦ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, παρὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν, ἐν ὅσοις ἔστι γένεσις; οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον ἕτερον τοῦ τὴν δυνάμει σφαῖραν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σφαῖραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ.	Est enim haec ↵ dubitatio eadem et si terminus vestimenti sit rotundum es; sit enim utique signum nomen hoc rationis, quare * quod quaeritur est: quid causa est unum essendi rotundum et es? Non adhuc itaque dubitatio videtur, quia hoc quidem materia illud vero forma. Quid igitur huius causa, eius scilicet quod ↵ potentia ens actu sit, praeter faciens, in quibuscumque generatio? Nulla namque est causa altera eius quod potestate speram actu esse speram, sed hoc erat quod quid erat esse utrique.	For this difficulty is the same as would arise if round bronze were the definition of cloak ; for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of round and bronze ? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What, then, causes this-that which was potentially to be actually-except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere _ s becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either.
ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἡ μὲν νοητὴ ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητή, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν [35] ὕλη τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ κύκλος σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον.	Est autem materiae alia intellectualis alia sensibilis, et semper rationis hoc quidem materia illud vero actus est, ut circulus ↵ figura superficialis.	Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g. the circle is a plane figure .
ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην μήτε νοητὴν μήτε αἰσθητήν, εὐθὺς ὅπερ ἕν τί [εἶναί] ἐστιν ἕκαστον, [1045β] [1] ὥσπερ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι, τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ ἕν—, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εὐθὺς ἕν τί ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ ὄν τι—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον τοῦ [5] ἓν εἶναι οὐθενὶ τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄν τι εἶναι: εὐθὺς γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ὄν τι καὶ ἕν τι, οὐχ ὡς ἐν γένει τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ ἑνί, οὐδ᾽ ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.	Quaecumque vero non habent materiam, nec intellectualem nec sensibilem, statim quod quidem unum ali* ↵ quid esse est unumquodque quemadmodum et quod * ens aliquid: quod hoc, quod quale *, quod quantum. Quapropter et non inest in diffinitionibus nec ens nec unum. Et quod quid erat esse statim unum aliquid est sicut et ens aliquid. Quapropter non est aliqua alia causa unum essendi nulli horum ↵ neque essendi ens aliquid; statim enim unumquodque est ƿ ens aliquid et unum aliquid, non ut in genere ente et uno, nec ut separabilibus existentibus praeter singularia.	But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its [45b] nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being-individual substance, quality, or quantity (and so neither existent nor one is present in their definitions), and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being-and so none of these has any reason outside itself, for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in the genus being or one nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν οἱ μὲν μέθεξιν λέγουσι, καὶ αἴτιον τί τῆς μεθέξεως καὶ τί τὸ μετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν: οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν [10] [ψυχῆς], ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων φησὶν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ψυχῆς: οἱ δὲ σύνθεσιν ἢ σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.	Propter hanc vero dubitationem hii quidem participationem dicunt, et causam aliquam participationis et quid est participare ↵ dubitant; hii autem coexistentiam anime, sicut Licofron ait esse scientiam eius quod est scire et anime; alii vero compositionem aut coniunctionem anime cum corpore vivere.	Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of participation , and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate; and others speak of communion , as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul; and others say life is a composition or connexion of soul with body.
καίτοι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ πάντων: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἔσται ἢ συνουσία ἢ σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνθεσις ψυχῆς καὶ ὑγιείας, καὶ τὸ τὸν χαλκὸν εἶναι τρίγωνον [15] σύνθεσις χαλκοῦ καὶ τριγώνου, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι σύνθεσις ἐπιφανείας καὶ λευκότητος.	Et quidem eadem ratio in omnibus. Et enim sanum esse erit aut coexistentia aut colligatio aut coniunctio anime et sanitatis, ↵ et es esse trigonum compositio eris et trigoni, et album esse compositio superficiei et albedinis.	Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being healthy, too, will on this showing be either a communion or a connexion or a composition of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a composition of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a composition of surface and whiteness.
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἑνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ [20] ἑνὸς τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι: ἓν γάρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστιν, ὥστε αἴτιον οὐθὲν ἄλλο πλὴν εἴ τι ὡς κινῆσαν ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην, πάντα ἁπλῶς ὅπερ ἕν τι.	Causa vero quia potentie et actus quaerunt unum faciens et differentiam. Est autem, ut dictum est, et ultima materia et forma idem et ↵ potentia, hoc autem actu. Quare simile est quaerere unius quae causa et unum essendi; unum enim aliquid unumquodque, et quod potentia et quod actu unum aliqualiter est. Quare causa nulla alia nisi id quod ut movens ex potentia ad actum. Quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter quod vere entia aliquid.	The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing _ s being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities.