Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c10

Chapter 10

Greek	Latin	English
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μὲν κατὰ [35] τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τἀναντία, [1051β] [1] τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὂν] ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος,	Quoniam autem ens dicitur et non ens hoc quidem secundum figuras cathegoriarum, illud vero secundum poten↵tiam aut actum horum aut contraria, hoc autem * maxime ↵ proprie aut * verum aut falsum.	Chapter 10. The terms being and non-being are employed firstly with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference to the potency or actuality of these or their non-[51b]potency or nonactuality, and thirdly in the sense of true and false.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως [5] ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ᾽ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.	Hoc autem in rebus est componi aut dividi, unde verus est divisum putans dividi et compositum componi, mentitur autem econtrario habens res * ↵ quandocumque est aut non est. Quare quod verum dicitur aut falsum, hoc * perscrutandum * quid dicimus. Non enim propter nos existimare te vere album esse es tu albus, sed propter te esse album nos hoc dicentes verum dicimus.	This depends, on the side of the objects, on their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error. This being so, when is what is called truth or falsity present, and when is it not? We must consider what we mean by these terms. It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.
εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, [10] τὰ δ᾽ ἀεὶ διῄρηται καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται τἀναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναί ἐστι τὸ συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἓν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι: περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἡ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὁτὲ [15] μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὁτὲ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι: περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὁτὲ δὲ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.	Si igitur haec quidem semper componuntur et impossibilia dividi, haec vero semper divisa sunt et impossibilia componi, haec ↵ autem contingunt contraria, esse quidem est componi et unum esse, et non esse non componi sed plura esse: circa contingentia quidem igitur eadem fit falsa et vera opinio et oratio eadem et contingit quandoque veram esse et contingit quandoque esse ↵ falsam; circa impossibilia vero aliter se habere non fit * aliquando verum et aliquando falsum, sed semper haec vera et falsa.	If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated, and others are always separated and cannot be combined, while others are capable either of combination or of separation, being is being combined and one, and not being is being not combined but more than one. Regarding contingent facts, then, the same opinion or the same statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible for it to be at one time correct and at another erroneous; but regarding things that cannot be otherwise opinions are not at one time true and at another false, but the same opinions are always true or always false.
περὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ [20] ἐὰν διῃρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον [21] τὴν διάμετρον: οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι,	Circa incomposita vero quid esse aut non esse, et verum et falsum? Non enim est compositum, ut sit quidem quando componitur et non sit quando divisum fuerit, sicut album ↵ lignum aut incommensurabilem dyametrum; nec verum et falsum similiter adhuc existet et in illis. Aut sicut nec verum in ƿ hiis idem, sic nec esse.	But with regard to incomposites, what is being or not being, and truth or falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, so as to be when it is compounded, and not to be if it is separated, like that the wood is white or that the diagonal is incommensurable ; nor will truth and falsity be still present in the same way as in the previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these cases, so also being is not the same;
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις [25] καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ᾽ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετὰς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι:	Sed est * verum quidem * aut falsum: * attingere quidem et representare verum (non enim idem ↵ affirmatio et representatio), ignorare autem non attingere. Decipi enim circa quod quid est non est sed aut secundum accidens; similiter autem et circa compositas substantias, non enim est decipi.	but (a) truth or falsity is as follows – contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact. For it is not possible to be in error regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about them).
καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, [30] ἔκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο: ὅσα δή ἐστιν ὅπερ εἶναί τι καὶ ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή: ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μή):	Et omnes sunt actu, non potentia; generarentur enim utique et corrumperentur. Nunc autem ens ipsum ↵ non generatur nec corrumpitur; ex aliquo enim utique generaretur. Quaecumque igitur sunt quod vere esse aliquid et actu, circa haec non est decipi sed aut intelligere aut non.	And they all exist actually, not potentially; for otherwise they would have come to be and ceased to be; but, as it is, being itself does not come to be (nor cease to be); for if it had done so it would have had to come out of something. About the things, then, which are essences and actualities, it is not possible to be in error, but only to know them or not to know them. But we do inquire what they are, viz. whether they are of such and such a nature or not.
τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἓν μέν ἐστιν, εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ [35] δ᾽ εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος: τὸ δὲ ἕν, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν: [1052α] [1] τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα: τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἵα ἡ τυφλότης: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.	Sed quod quid est quaeritur de ipsis, si talia sunt aut non. Esse vero ut verum et non esse ut falsum: unum quidem est si componitur, ↵ verum, hoc autem si non componitur, falsum. Unum autem, ↵ si vere ens, sic est, si vero non ita, non est. Verum autem intelligere ipsa; falsum vero non est, nec deceptio, sed ignorantia. Non qualis caecitas; caecitas enim est ut utique si intellectivum omnino non habeat aliquis.	(b) As regards the being that answers to truth and the non-being that answers to falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute are really combined, and falsity if they are not combined; in the other case, if the object is existent it exists in a particular way, and if it does [52a] not exist in this way does not exist at all. And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance-and not an ignorance which is like blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων [5] οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπάτη κατὰ τὸ ποτέ, εἴ τις ὑπολαμβάνει ἀκίνητα. οἷον τὸ τρίγωνον εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλειν οἴεται, οὐκ οἰήσεται ποτὲ μὲν δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν ποτὲ δὲ οὔ (μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἄν), ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν τὶ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον ἄρτιον ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον εἶναι μηθένα, ἢ τινὰς μὲν τινὰς δ᾽ οὔ: ἀριθμῷ δὲ περὶ ἕνα οὐδὲ [10] τοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δὲ οὒ οἰήσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται ὡς ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος.	↵ Palam etiam et quia de immobilibus non est deceptio secundum quando, si quis putet immobilia. Ut trigonum si non permutari putat, non opinabitur quandoque duos rectos habere quandoque non; permutaretur enim utique. Sed aliquid quidem aliquid vero non; ut parem numerum primum esse nullum, aut aliquos quidem aliquos autem non. Numero vero circa ↵ unum nec hoc; non enim est: aliquem quidem aliquem vero non putabit, sed verum dicet aut mentietur ut semper sic se habente.	It is evident also that about unchangeable things there can be no error in respect of time, if we assume them to be unchangeable. E.g. if we suppose that the triangle does not change, we shall not suppose that at one time its angles are equal to two right angles while at another time they are not (for that would imply change). It is possible, however, to suppose that one member of such a class has a certain attribute and another has not; e.g. while we may suppose that no even number is prime, we may suppose that some are and some are not. But regarding a numerically single number not even this form of error is possible; for we cannot in this case suppose that one instance has an attribute and another has not, but whether our judgement be true or false, it is implied that the fact is eternal.