Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c9

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Chapter 9

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ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας [5] δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταὐτόν ἐστι δυνατὸν τἀναντία, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα: ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, [10] καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει: τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον: [15] ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων. Quod autem et melior et honorabilior studiosa potentia actus, ex hiis est palam. Quaecumque enim secundum posse dicuntur, idem est potens contraria, ut rquod dicitur posse1 conualescere idem est et languens, et simul; eadem enim potentia convalescendi et laborandi, et quiescendi et movendi, et edificandi et destruendi, et edificari et corruendi. Posse quidem igitur contraria simul existit; contraria ƿ vero impossibile est * existere, ut sanum esse et laborare. Quare necesse horum alterum esse bonum, posse vero similiter utrumque aut neutrum. Actus ergo melior est. Chapter 9. That the actuality is also better and more valuable than the good potency is evident from the following argument. Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries, e.g. that of which we say that it can be well is the same as that which can be ill, and has both potencies at once; for the same potency is a potency of health and illness, of rest and motion, of building and throwing down, of being built and being thrown down. The capacity for contraries, then, is present at the same time; but contraries cannot be present at the same time, and the actualities also cannot be present at the same time, e.g. health and illness. Therefore, while the good must be one of them, the capacity is both alike, or neither; the actuality, then, is better.
ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χεῖρον τῆς δυνάμεως: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταὐτὸ ἄμφω τἀναντία. Necesse autem et in malis finem et actum esse deteriorem potentia; quod enim potens: idem ambo contraria. Also in the case of bad things the end or actuality must be worse than the potency; for that which can is both contraries alike.
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα: ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως. Palam ergo quia non est aliquid quod malum praeter res *; posterius enim ipsi nature malum quam potentia. Clearly, then, the bad does not exist apart from bad things; for the bad is in its nature posterior to the potency.
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς [20] καὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἁμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορὰ τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν). Non ergo nec in eis quae * a principio et sempiternis nihil est neque malum neque peccatum neque corruptum; et enim corruptio * malorum. And therefore we may also say that in the things which are from the beginning, i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad, nothing defective, nothing perverted (for perversion is something bad).
εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ: διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν: νῦν δ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ [25] περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον διὰ τί. ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου διὰ τί; ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς [30] ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὑρίσκεται: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια: ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν (ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν). Inveniuntur autem et dyagramata actu; nam dividentes inveniunt. Si vero essent divisa, manifesta utique essent; nunc autem insunt potentia. Propter quid duo recti trigonum? quia qui circa unum punctum anguli * equales duobus rectis. Si ergo educeretur quae iuxta costam, videnti utique statim esset palam. Propter quid in semicirculo rectus universaliter? Quia si * equales tres, * quae bases due et quae ex medio superstans recta, videnti palam ei qui illud scivit. Quare palam quia potentia entia ad actum reducta inveniuntur. Causa vero quia intelligentia est actus. Quare ex actu potentia, et propter ƿ hoc facientes cognoscunt; posterius enim generatione qui secundum numerum actus. It is an activity also that geometrical constructions are discovered; for we find them by dividing. If the figures had been already divided, the constructions would have been obvious; but as it is they are present only potentially. Why are the angles of the triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, then, the line parallel to the side had been already drawn upwards, the reason would have been evident to any one as soon as he saw the figure. Why is the angle in a semicircle in all cases a right angle? If three lines are equal the two which form the base, and the perpendicular from the centre-the conclusion is evident at a glance to one who knows the former proposition. Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions are discovered by being brought to actuality; the reason is that the geometer's thinking is an actuality; so that the potency proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions that people come to know them (though the single actuality is later in generation than the corresponding potency).

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