Authors/Aristotle/physics/liber4

Greek	English
	Book IV
Ὁμοίως δ' ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τόπου τὸν φυσικὸν ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ ἀπείρου γνωρίζειν, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἐστιν.	Chapter 1 208a27 The physicist must have a knowledge of Place, too, as well as of the infinite-namely, whether there is such a thing or not, and the manner of its existence and what it is
τά τε γὰρ ὄντα πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναί που (τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι· ποῦ γάρ ἐστι τραγέλαφος ἢ σφίγξ;)	208a29 -both because all suppose that things which exist are somewhere (the non-existent is nowhere--where is the goat-stag or the sphinx?),
καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἡ κοινὴ μάλιστα καὶ κυριωτάτη κατὰ τόπον ἐστίν, ἣν καλοῦμεν φοράν.	208a31 and because 'motion' in its most general and primary sense is change of place, which we call 'locomotion'.
ἔχει δὲ πολλὰς ἀπορίας τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται θεωροῦσιν ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων. ἔτι δ' οὐδ' ἔχομεν οὐδὲν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε προηπορημένον οὔτε προηυπορημένον περὶ (208b.) αὐτοῦ.	208a32 The question, what is place? presents many difficulties. An examination of all the relevant facts seems to lead to divergent conclusions. Moreover, we have inherited nothing from previous thinkers, whether in the way of a statement of difficulties or of a solution.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ τόπος, δοκεῖ δῆλον εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀντιμεταστάσεως· ὅπου γὰρ ἔστι νῦν ὕδωρ, ἐνταῦθα ἐξελθόντος ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου πάλιν ἀὴρ ἔνεστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἄλλο τι τῶν σωμάτων κατέχει· τοῦτο δὴ τῶν ἐγγιγνομένων καὶ μεταβαλλόντων ἕτερον πάντων εἶναι δοκεῖ· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἀὴρ ἔστι νῦν, ὕδωρ ἐν τούτῳ πρότερον ἦν, ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἦν ὁ τόπος τι καὶ ἡ χώρα ἕτερον ἀμφοῖν, εἰς ἣν καὶ ἐξ ἧς μετέβαλον.	208b1 The existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement. Where water now is, there in turn, when the water has gone out as from a vessel, air is present. When therefore another body occupies this same place, the place is thought to be different from all the bodies which come to be in it and replace one another. What now contains air formerly contained water, so that clearly the place or space into which and out of which they passed was something different from both.
ἔτι δὲ αἱ φοραὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἁπλῶν, οἷον πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ μόνον δηλοῦσιν ὅτι ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν. φέρεται γὰρ ἕκαστον εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ τόπον μὴ κωλυόμενον, τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τόπου μέρη καὶ εἴδη, τό τε ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἓξ διαστάσεων. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ μόνον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερόν· ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν, ὅπως ἂν στραφῶμεν, γίγνεται (διὸ καὶ ταὐτὸ πολλάκις δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ πρόσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν), ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει διώρισται χωρὶς ἕκαστον. οὐ γὰρ ὅ τι ἔτυχέν ἐστι τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλ' ὅπου φέρεται τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάτω οὐχ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ' ὅπου τὰ ἔχοντα βάρος καὶ τὰ γεηρά, ὡς οὐ τῇ θέσει διαφέροντα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά· οὐκ ὄντα γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ὅμως κατὰ τὴν θέσιν τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριστερὰ ὡς τὰ μόνον λεγόμενα διὰ θέσιν, οὐκ ἔχοντα φύσει τούτων ἕκαστον.	208b8 Further, the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies-namely, fire, earth, and the like-show not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain influence. Each is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. Now these are regions or kinds of place-up and down and the rest of the six directions. Nor do such distinctions (up and down and right and left, &c.) hold only in relation to us. To us they are not always the same but change with the direction in which we are turned: that is why the same thing may be both right and left, up and down, before and behind. But in nature each is distinct, taken apart by itself. It is not every chance direction which is 'up', but where fire and what is light are carried; similarly, too, 'down' is not any chance direction but where what has weight and what is made of earth are carried-the implication being that these places do not differ merely in relative position, but also as possessing distinct potencies. This is made plain also by the objects studied by mathematics. Though they have no real place, they nevertheless, in respect of their position relatively to us, have a right and left as attributes ascribed to them only in consequence of their relative position, not having by nature these various characteristics.
ἔτι οἱ τὸ κενὸν φάσκοντες εἶναι τόπον λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν τόπος ἂν εἴη ἐστερημένος σώματος.	208b25 Again, the theory that the void exists involves the existence of place: for one would define void as place bereft of body.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος παρὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ, διὰ τούτων ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι·	These considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in place.
δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν ποιήσας πρῶτον τὸ χάος. λέγει γοῦν	208b29 Hesiod too might be held to have given a correct account of it when he made chaos first. At least he says:
"πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος," ὡς δέον πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι χώραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πάντα εἶναί που καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάντων· οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο δ' (209a.) ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόλλυται ὁ τόπος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φθειρομένων.	'First of all things came chaos to being, then broad-breasted earth,' implying that things need to have space first, because he thought, with most people, that everything is somewhere and in place. If this is its nature, the potency of place must be a marvellous thing, and take precedence of all other things. For that without which nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first; for place does not pass out of existence when the things in it are annihilated.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γε ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστι, πότερον ὄγκος τις σώματος ἤ τις ἑτέρα φύσις· ζητητέον γὰρ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ πρῶτον.	209a2 True, but even if we suppose its existence settled, the question of its nature presents difficulty-whether it is some sort of 'bulk' of body or some entity other than that, for we must first determine its genus.
διαστήματα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τρία, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, οἷς ὁρίζεται σῶμα πᾶν. ἀδύνατον δὲ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν τόπον· ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δύο σώματα.	(1) Now it has three dimensions, length, breadth, depth, the dimensions by which all body also is bounded. But the place cannot be body; for if it were there would be two bodies in the same place.
ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστι σώματος τόπος καὶ χώρα, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπιφανείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περάτων· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει λόγος· ὅπου γὰρ ἦν πρότερον τὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπίπεδα, ἔσται πάλιν τὰ τοῦ ἀέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδεμίαν διαφορὰν ἔχομεν στιγμῆς καὶ τόπου στιγμῆς, ὥστ' εἰ μηδὲ ταύτης ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός, οὐδ' ἐστί τι παρ' ἕκαστον τούτων ὁ τόπος.	209a7 (2) Further, if body has a place and space, clearly so too have surface and the other limits of body; for the same statement will apply to them: where the bounding planes of the water were, there in turn will be those of the air. But when we come to a point we cannot make a distinction between it and its place. Hence if the place of a point is not different from the point, no more will that of any of the others be different, and place will not be something different from each of them.
τί γὰρ ἄν ποτε καὶ θείημεν εἶναι τὸν τόπον; οὔτε γὰρ στοιχεῖον οὔτ' ἐκ στοιχείων οἷόν τε εἶναι τοιαύτην ἔχοντα φύσιν, οὔτε τῶν σω ματικῶν οὔτε τῶν ἀσωμάτων· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, σῶμα δ' οὐδέν· ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν στοιχεῖα σώματα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν οὐδὲν γίγνεται μέγεθος.	209a13 (3) What in the world then are we to suppose place to be? If it has the sort of nature described, it cannot be an element or composed of elements, whether these be corporeal or incorporeal: for while it has size, it has not body. But the elements of sensible bodies are bodies, while nothing that has size results from a combination of intelligible elements.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τίνος ἄν τις θείη τοῖς οὖσιν αἴτιον εἶναι τὸν τόπον; οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει αἰτία τῶν τεττάρων· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ὕλη τῶν ὄντων (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ συνέστηκεν) οὔτε ὡς εἶδος καὶ λόγος τῶν πραγμάτων οὔθ' ὡς τέλος, οὔτε κινεῖ τὰ ὄντα.	209a18 (4) Also we may ask: of what in things is space the cause? None of the four modes of causation can be ascribed to it. It is neither in the sense of the matter of existents (for nothing is composed of it), nor as the form and definition of things, nor as end, nor does it move existents.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰ ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ποὺ ἔσται. ἡ γὰρ Ζήνωνος ἀπορία ζητεῖ τινὰ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦ τόπου τόπος ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον.	209a23 (5) Further, too, if it is itself an existent, where will it be? Zeno's difficulty demands an explanation: for if everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum.
ἔτι ὥσπερ ἅπαν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ἅπαντι σῶμα· πῶς οὖν ἐροῦμεν περὶ τῶν αὐξανομένων; ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τούτων συναύξεσθαι αὐτοῖς τὸν τόπον, εἰ μήτ' ἐλάττων μήτε μείζων ὁ τόπος ἑκάστου.	209a26 (6) Again, just as every body is in place, so, too, every place has a body in it. What then shall we say about growing things? It follows from these premisses that their place must grow with them, if their place is neither less nor greater than they are.
διὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐ μόνον τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον.	By asking these questions, then, we must raise the whole problem about place-not only as to what it is, but even whether there is such a thing.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, καὶ τόπος ὁ μὲν κοινός, ἐν ᾧ ἅπαντα τὰ σώματά ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἴδιος, ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ (λέγω δὲ οἷον σὺ νῦν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὗτος δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ὅτι ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ, (209b.) ὃς περιέχει οὐδὲν πλέον ἢ σέ),	Chapter 2 209a31 We may distinguish generally between predicating B of A because it (A) is itself, and because it is something else; and particularly between place which is common and in which all bodies are, and the special place occupied primarily by each. (I mean, for instance, that you are now in the heavens because you are in the air and it is in the heavens; and you are in the air because you are on the earth; and similarly on the earth because you are in this place which contains no more than you).
εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ τόπος τὸ πρῶτον περιέχον ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, πέρας τι ἂν εἴη, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἑκάστου ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ᾧ ὁρίζεται τὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἡ τοῦ μεγέθους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἑκάστου πέρας.	Now if place is what primarily contains each body, it would be a limit, so that the place would be the form or shape of each body by which the magnitude or the matter of the magnitude is defined: for this is the limit of each body.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν σκοποῦσιν ὁ τόπος τὸ ἑκάστου εἶδός ἐστιν·	If, then, we look at the question in this way the place of a thing is its form.
ᾗ δὲ δοκεῖ ὁ τόπος εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τοῦ μεγέθους, ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ ὡρισμένον, οἷον ὑπὸ ἐπιπέδου καὶ πέρατος, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον· ὅταν γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ πέρας καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς σφαίρας, λείπεται οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ὕλην.	209b6 But, if we regard the place as the extension of the magnitude, it is the matter. For this is different from the magnitude: it is what is contained and defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. Matter or the indeterminate is of this nature; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are taken away, nothing but the matter is left.
διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταὐτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· τὸ γὰρ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο. λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, τί δ' ἐστίν, οὗτος μόνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν.	This is why Plato in the Timaeus says that matter and space are the same; for the 'participant' and space are identical. (It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there of the 'participant' is different from what he says in his so-called 'unwritten teaching'. Nevertheless, he did identify place and space.) I mention Plato because, while all hold place to be something, he alone tried to say what it is.
εἰκότως δ' ἐκ τούτων σκοπουμένοις δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι χαλεπὸν γνωρίσαι τί ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, εἴπερ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν ἐστίν, εἴτε ἡ ὕλη εἴτε τὸ εἶδος· ἄλλως τε γὰρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἔχει θέαν, καὶ χω ρὶς ἀλλήλων οὐ ῥᾴδιον γνωρίζειν.	209b17 In view of these facts we should naturally expect to find difficulty in determining what place is, if indeed it is one of these two things, matter or form. They demand a very close scrutiny, especially as it is not easy to recognize them apart.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε ἀδύνα τον ὁποτερονοῦν τούτων εἶναι τὸν τόπον, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐ χωρίζεται τοῦ πράγματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον ἐνδέχεται· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἀὴρ ἦν, ἐν τούτῳ πάλιν ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν, γίγνεται, ἀντιμεθισταμένων ἀλλήλοις τοῦ τε ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων ὁμοίως, ὥστε οὔτε μόριον οὔθ' ἕξις ἀλλὰ χωριστὸς ὁ τόπος ἑκάστου ἐστί. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ τοιοῦτό τι εἶναι ὁ τόπος οἷον τὸ ἀγγεῖον (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός)· τὸ δ' ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν.	209b21 But it is at any rate not difficult to see that place cannot be either of them. The form and the matter are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be separated. As we pointed out, where air was, water in turn comes to be, the one replacing the other; and similarly with other bodies. Hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable from it. For place is supposed to be something like a vessel-the vessel being a transportable place. But the vessel is no part of the thing.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν χωριστὸς [ἐστι] τοῦ πράγματος, ταύτῃ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος· ᾗ δὲ περιέχει, ταύτῃ δ' ἕτερος τῆς ὕλης.	209b32 In so far then as it is separable from the thing, it is not the form: qua containing, it is different from the matter.
δοκεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ ὄν που αὐτό τε εἶναί τι καὶ ἕτερόν τι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ. (Πλάτωνι μέντοι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ παρεκβάντας εἰπεῖν, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί, εἴπερ τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ὁ τόπος, εἴτε τοῦ μεγάλου (210a.) καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεθεκτικοῦ εἴτε τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφεν.)	209b34 Also it is held that what is anywhere is both itself something and that there is a different thing outside it. (Plato of course, if we may digress, ought to tell us why the form and the numbers are not in place, if 'what participates' is place-whether what participates is the Great and the Small or the matter, as he called it in writing in the Timaeus.)
ἔτι πῶς ἂν φέροιτο εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ τόπον, εἰ ὁ τόπος ἡ ὕλη ἢ τὸ εἶδος; ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὗ μὴ κίνησις μηδὲ τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἐστί, τόπον εἶναι. ὥστε ζητητέος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ τόπος.	210a2 Further, how could a body be carried to its own place, if place was the matter or the form? It is impossible that what has no reference to motion or the distinction of up and down can be place. So place must be looked for among things which have these characteristics.
εἰ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ τόπος (δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἢ μορφὴ ἢ ὕλη), ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἅμα τῷ πράγματι καὶ κινεῖται καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀλλ' οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ὥστε τοῦ τόπου ἔσται τόπος.	If the place is in the thing (it must be if it is either shape or matter) place will have a place: for both the form and the indeterminate undergo change and motion along with the thing, and are not always in the same place, but are where the thing is. Hence the place will have a place.
ἔτι ὅταν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ γένηται, ἀπόλωλεν ὁ τόπος· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὸ γενόμενον σῶμα· τίς οὖν ἡ φθορά;	210a9 Further, when water is produced from air, the place has been destroyed, for the resulting body is not in the same place. What sort of destruction then is that?
ἐξ ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται.	This concludes my statement of the reasons why space must be something, and again of the difficulties that may be raised about its essential nature.
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ληπτέον ποσαχῶς ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγεται.	Chapter 3 210a14 The next step we must take is to see in how many senses one thing is said to be 'in' another.
ἕνα μὲν δὴ τρόπον ὡς ὁ δάκτυλος ἐν τῇ χειρὶ καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ.	(1) As the finger is 'in' the hand and generally the part 'in' the whole.
ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον.	(2) As the whole is 'in' the parts: for there is no whole over and above the parts.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ ὅλως εἶδος ἐν γένει.	(3) As man is 'in' animal and generally species 'in' genus.
ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ εἴδει καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος τοῦ εἴδους ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.	(4) As the genus is 'in' the species and generally the part of the specific form 'in' the definition of the specific form.
ἔτι ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ.	(5) As health is 'in' the hot and the cold and generally the form 'in' the matter.
ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ.	(6) As the affairs of Greece centre 'in' the king, and generally events centre 'in' their primary motive agent.
ἔτι ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ τέλει· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.	(7) As the existence of a thing centres 'in its good and generally 'in' its end, i.e. in 'that for the sake of which' it exists.
πάντων δὲ κυριώτατον τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τόπῳ.	(8) In the strictest sense of all, as a thing is 'in' a vessel, and generally 'in' place.
ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, ἆρα καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ.	210a24 One might raise the question whether a thing can be in itself, or whether nothing can be in itself-everything being either nowhere or in something else.
διχῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἤτοι καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ καθ' ἕτερον.	210a26 The question is ambiguous; we may mean the thing qua itself or qua something else.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ᾖ μόρια τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἐν αὑτῷ· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη, οἷον λευκὸς ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκή, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ὅτι τὸ λογιστικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀμφορεὺς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν αὑτῷ, οὐδ' ὁ οἶνος· ὁ δὲ τοῦ οἴνου ἀμφορεὺς ἔσται· ὅ τε γὰρ καὶ ἐν ᾧ, ἀμφότερα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μόρια.	When there are parts of a whole-the one that in which a thing is, the other the thing which is in it-the whole will be described as being in itself. For a thing is described in terms of its parts, as well as in terms of the thing as a whole, e.g. a man is said to be white because the visible surface of him is white, or to be scientific because his thinking faculty has been trained. The jar then will not be in itself and the wine will not be in itself. But the jar of wine will: for the contents and the container are both parts of the same whole.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν αὑτῷ εἶναι, πρώτως δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι (ἡ (210b.) ἐπιφάνεια γὰρ ἐν σώματι), ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ·	210a33 In this sense then, but not primarily, a thing can be in itself, namely, as 'white' is in body (for the visible surface is in body), and science is in the mind.
κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ αἱ προσηγορίαι μέρη ὄντα, ὥς γε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ (ὁ δὲ ἀμφορεὺς καὶ ὁ οἶνος χωρὶς μὲν ὄντα οὐ μέρη, ἅμα δέ· διὸ ὅταν ᾖ μέρη, ἔσται αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ)· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκέτι κατ' ἄλλο. καὶ ἕτερά γε τῷ εἴδει ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλην φύσιν ἔχει ἑκάτερον καὶ δύναμιν, ἥ τ' ἐπιφάνεια καὶ τὸ λευκόν.	It is from these, which are 'parts' (in the sense at least of being 'in' the man), that the man is called white, &c. But the jar and the wine in separation are not parts of a whole, though together they are. So when there are parts, a thing will be in itself, as 'white' is in man because it is in body, and in body because it resides in the visible surface. We cannot go further and say that it is in surface in virtue of something other than itself. (Yet it is not in itself: though these are in a way the same thing,) they differ in essence, each having a special nature and capacity, 'surface' and 'white'.
οὔτε δὴ ἐπακτικῶς σκοποῦσιν οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατ' οὐδένα τῶν διορισμῶν,	210b8 Thus if we look at the matter inductively we do not find anything to be 'in' itself in any of the senses that have been distinguished;
τῷ τε λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον· δεήσει γὰρ ἀμφότερα ἑκάτερον ὑπάρ χειν, οἷον τὸν ἀμφορέα ἀγγεῖόν τε καὶ οἶνον εἶναι καὶ τὸν οἶνον οἶνόν τε καὶ ἀμφορέα, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν αὑτῷ εἶναι. ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶεν, ὁ μὲν ἀμφορεὺς δέξεται τὸν οἶνον οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸς οἶνος ἀλλ' ᾗ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ δ' οἶνος ἐνέσται ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸς ἀμφορεὺς ἀλλ' ᾗ ἐκεῖνος. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶναι ὅτι ἕτερον, δῆλον· ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ.	210b9 and it can be seen by argument that it is impossible. For each of two things will have to be both, e.g. the jar will have to be both vessel and wine, and the wine both wine and jar, if it is possible for a thing to be in itself; so that, however true it might be that they were in each other, the jar will receive the wine in virtue not of its being wine but of the wine's being wine, and the wine will be in the jar in virtue not of its being a jar but of the jar's being a jar. Now that they are different in respect of their essence is evident; for 'that in which something is' and 'that which is in it' would be differently defined.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ ἔσται· αὐτός τε γὰρ ἐν αὑτῷ ὁ ἀμφορεὺς ἔσται, εἰ οὗ ἡ φύσις δεκτική, τοῦτ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν αὑτῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι ἐκεῖνο οὗ δεκτικόν, οἷον, εἰ οἴνου, ὁ οἶνος.	210b18 Nor is it possible for a thing to be in itself even incidentally: for two things would at the same time in the same thing. The jar would be in itself-if a thing whose nature it is to receive can be in itself; and that which it receives, namely (if wine) wine, will be in it.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον ἐν αὑτῷ τι εἶναι πρώτως, δῆλον·	Obviously then a thing cannot be in itself primarily.
ὃ δὲ Ζήνων ἠπόρει, ὅτι εἰ ὁ τόπος ἐστί τι, ἔν τινι ἔσται, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς ὡς ἕξις, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἐν σώματι ὡς πάθος. ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι.	210b22 Zeno's problem-that if Place is something it must be in something-is not difficult to solve. There is nothing to prevent the first place from being 'in' something else-not indeed in that as 'in' place, but as health is 'in' the hot as a positive determination of it or as the hot is 'in' body as an affection. So we escape the infinite regress.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ πρώτως ὅ τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον. ἐκείνου γάρ τι ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνόντος, καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή.	210b27 Another thing is plain: since the vessel is no part of what is in it (what contains in the strict sense is different from what is contained), place could not be either the matter or the form of the thing contained, but must different-for the latter, both the matter and the shape, are parts of what is contained.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔστω διηπορημένα.	This then may serve as a critical statement of the difficulties involved.
Τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος, ὧδ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν.	Chapter 4 210b32 What then after all is place? The answer to this question may be elucidated as follows.
λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅσα δοκεῖ ἀληθῶς καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ.ἀξιοῦμεν δὴ τὸν τόπον εἶναι	Let us take for granted about it the various characteristics which are supposed correctly to belong to it essentially. We assume then-
(1) πρῶτον μὲν (211a.) περιέχον ἐκεῖνο οὗ τόπος ἐστί,	(1) Place is what contains that of which it is the place.
(2)καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ πράγματος,	(2) Place is no part of the thing.
(3) ἔτι τὸν πρῶτον μήτ' ἐλάττω μήτε μείζω,	(3) The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing.
(4) ἔτι ἀπολείπεσθαι ἑκάστου καὶ χωριστὸν εἶναι,	(4) Place can be left behind by the thing and is separable. In addition:
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πάντα τόπον ἔχειν τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ φέρεσθαι φύσει καὶ μένειν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ ἄνω ἢ κάτω.	(5) All place admits of the distinction of up and down, and each of the bodies is naturally carried to its appropriate place and rests there, and this makes the place either up or down.
ὑποκειμένων δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ θεωρητέον.	Having laid these foundations, we must complete the theory.
δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τὴν σκέψιν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι ὅπως τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀποδοθήσεται, ὥστε τά τε ἀπορούμενα λύεσθαι, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν τῷ τόπῳ ὑπάρχοντα ἔσται, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τῆς δυσκολίας αἴτιον καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπορημά των ἔσται φανερόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν κάλλιστα δεικνύοιτο ἕκαστον.	211a7 We ought to try to make our investigation such as will render an account of place, and will not only solve the difficulties connected with it, but will also show that the attributes supposed to belong to it do really belong to it, and further will make clear the cause of the trouble and of the difficulties about it. Such is the most satisfactory kind of exposition.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατανοῆσαι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐζητεῖτο ὁ τόπος, εἰ μὴ κίνησις ἦν ἡ κατὰ τόπον· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν μάλιστ' οἰόμεθα ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἐν κινήσει. ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν φορά, τὸ δὲ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ αὐξήσει καὶ φθίσει μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὃ πρότερον ἦν ἐνταῦθα, πάλιν μεθέστηκεν εἰς ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον.	211a13 First then we must understand that place would not have been thought of, if there had not been a special kind of motion, namely that with respect to place. It is chiefly for this reason that we suppose the heaven also to be in place, because it is in constant movement. Of this kind of change there are two species-locomotion on the one hand and, on the other, increase and diminution. For these too involve variation of place: what was then in this place has now in turn changed to what is larger or smaller.
ἔστι δὲ κινούμενον τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐνδεχόμενον κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὑτό, οἷον τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ ἧλος, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλ' αἰεὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἡ λευκότης καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτω μεταβέβληκε τὸν τόπον, ὅτι ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχουσι μεταβάλλει.	211a17 Again, when we say a thing is 'moved', the predicate either (1) belongs to it actually, in virtue of its own nature, or (2) in virtue of something conjoined with it. In the latter case it may be either (a) something which by its own nature is capable of being moved, e.g. the parts of the body or the nail in the ship, or (b) something which is not in itself capable of being moved, but is always moved through its conjunction with something else, as 'whiteness' or 'science'. These have changed their place only because the subjects to which they belong do so.
ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγομεν εἶναι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, διότι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι δὲ οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτοῦ καὶ περιέχον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φαμὲν εἶναι (εἰ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ ἀὴρ τόπος, οὐκ ἂν ἴσος εἴη ἑκάστου ὁ τόπος καὶ ἕκαστον, δοκεῖ δέ γε ἴσος εἶναι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ πρῶτος ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν)·	211a23 We say that a thing is in the world, in the sense of in place, because it is in the air, and the air is in the world; and when we say it is in the air, we do not mean it is in every part of the air, but that it is in the air because of the outer surface of the air which surrounds it; for if all the air were its place, the place of a thing would not be equal to the thing-which it is supposed to be, and which the primary place in which a thing is actually is.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν μὴ διῃρημένον ᾖ τὸ περιέχον ἀλλὰ συνεχές, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ λέγεται εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ· ὅταν δὲ διῃρημένον ᾖ καὶ ἁπτόμενον, ἐν πρώτῳ ἐστὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ὃ οὔτε ἐστὶ μέρος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτε μεῖζον τοῦ διαστήματος ἀλλ' ἴσον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν ἁπτομένων.	211a29 When what surrounds, then, is not separate from the thing, but is in continuity with it, the thing is said to be in what surrounds it, not in the sense of in place, but as a part in a whole. But when the thing is separate and in contact, it is immediately 'in' the inner surface of the surrounding body, and this surface is neither a part of what is in it nor yet greater than its extension, but equal to it; for the extremities of things which touch are coincident.
καὶ συνεχὲς μὲν ὂν οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου, διῃρημένον δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· καὶ ἐάν τε κινῆται τὸ περιέχον ἐάν τε μή, (211b.) οὐδὲν ἧττον.	211a34 Further, if one body is in continuity with another, it is not moved in that but with that. On the other hand it is moved in that if it is separate. It makes no difference whether what contains is moved or not.
[ἔτι ὅταν μὴ διῃρημένον ᾖ, ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ λέγεται, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἡ ὄψις ἢ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ χείρ, ὅταν δὲ διῃρημένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ κάδῳ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεραμίῳ ὁ οἶνος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χεὶρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ κάδῳ.]	211b1 Again, when it is not separate it is described as a part in a whole, as the pupil in the eye or the hand in the body: when it is separate, as the water in the cask or the wine in the jar. For the hand is moved with the body and the water in the cask.
ἤδη τοίνυν φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων τί ἐστιν ὁ τόπος. σχεδὸν γὰρ τέτταρά ἐστιν ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν τόπον ἕν τι εἶναι· ἢ γὰρ μορφὴ ἢ ὕλη ἢ διάστημά τι τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἢ τὰ ἔσχατα εἰ μὴ ἔστι μηδὲν διάστημα παρὰ τὸ τοῦ ἐγγιγνομένου σώματος μέγεθος.	211b5 It will now be plain from these considerations what place is. There are just four things of which place must be one-the shape, or the matter, or some sort of extension between the bounding surfaces of the containing body, or this boundary itself if it contains no extension over and above the bulk of the body which comes to be in it.
τούτων δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰ τρία εἶναι, φανερόν·	211b9 Three of these it obviously cannot be:
ἀλλὰ διὰ μὲν τὸ περιέχειν δοκεῖ ἡ μορφὴ εἶναι· ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τοῦ περιεχομένου.	211b10 (1) The shape is supposed to be place because it surrounds, for the extremities of what contains and of what is contained are coincident.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄμφω πέρατα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ τόπος τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος.	211b12 Both the shape and the place, it is true, are boundaries. But not of the same thing: the form is the boundary of the thing, the place is the boundary of the body which contains it.
διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν πολλάκις μένοντος τοῦ περιέχοντος τὸ περιεχόμενον καὶ διῃρημένον, οἷον ἐξ ἀγγείου ὕδωρ, τὸ μεταξὺ εἶναί τι δοκεῖ διάστημα, ὡς ὄν τι παρὰ τὸ σῶμα τὸ μεθιστάμενον.	211b14 (2) The extension between the extremities is thought to be something, because what is contained and separate may often be changed while the container remains the same (as water may be poured from a vessel)-the assumption being that the extension is something over and above the body displaced.
τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν ἐμπίπτει σῶμα τῶν μεθισταμένων καὶ ἅπτεσθαι πεφυκότων.	211b18 But there is no such extension. One of the bodies which change places and are naturally capable of being in contact with the container falls in whichever it may chance to be.
εἰ δ' ἦν τι [τὸ] διάστημα <καθ' αὑ>τὸ πεφυκὸς <εἶναι> καὶ μένον, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄπειροι ἂν ἦσαν τόποι (μεθισταμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τὰ μόρια πάντα ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὅπερ ἅπαν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ ἀγγείῳ)·	If there were an extension which were such as to exist independently and be permanent, there would be an infinity of places in the same thing. For when the water and the air change places, all the portions of the two together will play the same part in the whole which was previously played by all the water in the vessel;
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὁ τόπος ἔσται μεταβάλλων· ὥστ' ἔσται τοῦ τόπου τ' ἄλλος τόπος, καὶ πολλοὶ τόποι ἅμα ἔσονται. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἄλλος ὁ τόπος τοῦ μορίου, ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, ὅταν ὅλον τὸ ἀγγεῖον μεθίστηται, ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτός· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀντιμεθίσταται ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ὕδατος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ᾧ γίγνονται τόπῳ, ὃς μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου ὅς ἐστι τόπος ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.	211b23 at the same time the place too will be undergoing change; so that there will be another place which is the place of the place, and many places will be coincident. There is not a different place of the part, in which it is moved, when the whole vessel changes its place: it is always the same: for it is in the (proximate) place where they are that the air and the water (or the parts of the water) succeed each other, not in that place in which they come to be, which is part of the place which is the place of the whole world.
καὶ ἡ ὕλη δὲ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τόπος, εἴ γε ἐν ἠρεμοῦντί τις σκοποίη καὶ μὴ κεχωρισμένῳ ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἀλλοιοῦται, ἔστι τι ὃ νῦν μὲν λευκὸν πάλαι δὲ μέλαν, καὶ νῦν μὲν σκληρὸν πάλαι δὲ μαλακόν (διό φαμεν εἶναί τι τὴν ὕλην), οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος διὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ φαντασίας, πλὴν ἐκεῖνο μὲν διότι ὃ ἦν ἀήρ, τοῦτο νῦν ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ τόπος ὅτι οὗ ἦν ἀήρ, ἐνταῦθ' ἔστι νῦν ὕδωρ.	211b29 (3) The matter, too, might seem to be place, at least if we consider it in what is at rest and is thus separate but in continuity. For just as in change of quality there is something which was formerly black and is now white, or formerly soft and now hard-this is just why we say that the matter exists-so place, because it presents a similar phenomenon, is thought to exist-only in the one case we say so because what was air is now water, in the other because where air formerly was there a is now water.
ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη, (212a.) ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, οὔτε χωριστὴ τοῦ πράγματος οὔτε περιέχει, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἄμφω.	211b36 But the matter, as we said before, is neither separable from the thing nor contains it, whereas place has both characteristics.
εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲν τῶν τριῶν ὁ τόπος ἐστίν, μήτε τὸ εἶδος μήτε ἡ ὕλη μήτε διάστημά τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ μεθισταμένου, ἀνάγκη τὸν τόπον εἶναι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τεττά ρων, τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος σώματος <καθ' ὃ συνάπτει τῷ περιεχομένῳ>. λέγω δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον σῶμα τὸ κινητὸν κατὰ φοράν.	212a2 Well, then, if place is none of the three-neither the form nor the matter nor an extension which is always there, different from, and over and above, the extension of the thing which is displaced-place necessarily is the one of the four which is left, namely, the boundary of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body. (By the contained body is meant what can be moved by way of locomotion.)
δοκεῖ δὲ μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ χαλεπὸν ληφθῆναι ὁ τόπος διά τε τὸ παρεμφαίνεσθαι τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν μορφήν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐν ἠρεμοῦντι τῷ περιέχοντι γίγνεσθαι τὴν μετάστασιν τοῦ φερομένου· ἐνδέχεσθαι γὰρ φαί νεται εἶναι διάστημα μεταξὺ ἄλλο τι τῶν κινουμένων μεγεθῶν. συμβάλλεται δέ τι καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ δοκῶν ἀσώματος εἶναι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰ πέρατα τοῦ ἀγγείου εἶναι ὁ τόπος,	212a7 Place is thought to be something important and hard to grasp, both because the matter and the shape present themselves along with it, and because the displacement of the body that is moved takes place in a stationary container, for it seems possible that there should be an interval which is other than the bodies which are moved. The air, too, which is thought to be incorporeal, contributes something to the belief: it is not only the boundaries of the vessel which seem to be place,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ ὡς κενὸν <ὄν>. ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτως καὶ ὁ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακί νητον. διὸ ὅταν μὲν ἐν κινουμένῳ κινῆται καὶ μεταβάλλῃ τὸ ἐντός, οἷον ἐν ποταμῷ πλοῖον, ὡς ἀγγείῳ χρῆται μᾶλλον ἢ τόπῳ τῷ περιέχοντι. βούλεται δ' ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος· διὸ ὁ πᾶς μᾶλλον ποταμὸς τόπος, ὅτι ἀκίνητος ὁ πᾶς.	212a14 but also what is between them, regarded as empty. Just, in fact, as the vessel is transportable place, so place is a non-portable vessel. So when what is within a thing which is moved, is moved and changes its place, as a boat on a river, what contains plays the part of a vessel rather than that of place. Place on the other hand is rather what is motionless: so it is rather the whole river that is place, because as a whole it is motionless.
ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.	212a20 Hence we conclude that the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέσον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῆς κύκλῳ φορᾶς δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω μάλιστα πᾶσι κυρίως, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ μένει, τοῦ δὲ κύκλῳ τὸ ἔσχατον ὡσαύτως ἔχον μένει. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον τὸ ἄνω φερόμενόν ἐστι φύσει, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ τὸ κάτω, τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὸ μέσον περιέχον πέρας κάτω ἐστίν, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον ἄνω, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔσχατον·	212a21 This explains why the middle of the heaven and the surface which faces us of the rotating system are held to be 'up' and 'down' in the strict and fullest sense for all men: for the one is always at rest, while the inner side of the rotating body remains always coincident with itself. Hence since the light is what is naturally carried up, and the heavy what is carried down, the boundary which contains in the direction of the middle of the universe, and the middle itself, are down, and that which contains in the direction of the outermost part of the universe, and the outermost part itself, are up.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἐπίπεδόν τι εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἀγγεῖον ὁ τόπος καὶ περιέχον.	212a28 For this reason, too, place is thought to be a kind of surface, and as it were a vessel, i.e. a container of the thing.
ἔτι ἅμα τῷ πράγματι ὁ τόπος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ πεπερασμένῳ τὰ πέρατα.	212a29 Further, place is coincident with the thing, for boundaries are coincident with the bounded.
Ὧι μὲν οὖν σώματι ἔστι τι ἐκτὸς σῶμα περιέχον αὐτό, τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ, ᾧ δὲ μή, οὔ.	Chapter 5 212a31 If then a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place, and if not, not.
διὸ κἂν ὕδωρ γένηται τοιοῦτο, τὰ μὲν μόρια κινήσεται αὐτοῦ (περιέχεται γὰρ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων), τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἔστι μὲν ὡς κινήσεται ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον, ἅμα τὸν τόπον οὐ μεταβάλλει, κύκλῳ (212b.) δὲ κινεῖται—τῶν μορίων γὰρ οὗτος ὁ τόπος—καὶ ἄνω μὲν καὶ κάτω οὔ, κύκλῳ δ' ἔνια· τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὅσα ἔχει πύκνωσιν καὶ μάνωσιν.	212a32 That is why, even if there were to be water which had not a container, the parts of it, on the one hand, will be moved (for one part is contained in another), while, on the other hand, the whole will be moved in one sense, but not in another. For as a whole it does not simultaneously change its place, though it will be moved in a circle: for this place is the place of its parts. (Some things are moved, not up and down, but in a circle; others up and down, such things namely as admit of condensation and rarefaction.)
ὥσπερ δ' ἐλέχθη, τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐν τόπῳ κατὰ δύναμιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν. διὸ ὅταν μὲν συνεχὲς ᾖ τὸ ὁμοιομερές, κατὰ δύναμιν ἐν τόπῳ τὰ μέρη, ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ μὲν ἅπτηται δ' ὥσπερ σωρός, κατ' ἐνέργειαν.	212b3 As was explained, some things are potentially in place, others actually. So, when you have a homogeneous substance which is continuous, the parts are potentially in place: when the parts are separated, but in contact, like a heap, they are actually in place.
καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά (οἷον πᾶν σῶμα ἢ κατὰ φορὰν ἢ κατ' αὔξησιν κινητὸν καθ' αὑτό που, ὁ δ' οὐρανός, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὔ που ὅλος οὐδ' ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἐστίν, εἴ γε μηδὲν αὐτὸν περιέχει σῶμα· ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ κινεῖται, ταύτῃ καὶ τόπος ἔστι τοῖς μορίοις·	212b7 Again, (1) some things are per se in place, namely every body which is movable either by way of locomotion or by way of increase is per se somewhere, but the heaven, as has been said, is not anywhere as a whole, nor in any place, if at least, as we must suppose, no body contains it. On the line on which it is moved, its parts have place: for each is contiguous the next.
ἕτερον γὰρ ἑτέρου ἐχόμενον τῶν μορίων ἐστίν)· τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ οὐρανός· τὰ γὰρ μόρια ἐν τόπῳ πως πάντα· ἐπὶ τῷ κύκλῳ γὰρ περιέχει ἄλλο ἄλλο.	But (2) other things are in place indirectly, through something conjoined with them, as the soul and the heaven. The latter is, in a way, in place, for all its parts are: for on the orb one part contains another.
διὸ κινεῖται μὲν κύκλῳ τὸ ἄνω, τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὔ που. τὸ γάρ που αὐτό τέ ἐστί τι, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλο τι δεῖ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ, ὃ περιέχει· παρὰ δὲ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ὅλον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ παντός, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πάντα· ὁ γὰρ οὐρανὸς τὸ πᾶν ἴσως. ἔστι δ' ὁ τόπος οὐχ ὁ οὐρανός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τι τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ ἁπτόμενον τοῦ κινητοῦ σώματος [πέρας ἠρεμοῦν]. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, οὗτος δ' ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι, ὁ δ' αἰθὴρ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ δ' οὐρανὸς οὐκέτι ἐν ἄλλῳ.	212b13 That is why the upper part is moved in a circle, while the All is not anywhere. For what is somewhere is itself something, and there must be alongside it some other thing wherein it is and which contains it. But alongside the All or the Whole there is nothing outside the All, and for this reason all things are in the heaven; for the heaven, we may say, is the All. Yet their place is not the same as the heaven. It is part of it, the innermost part of it, which is in contact with the movable body; and for this reason the earth is in water, and this in the air, and the air in the aether, and the aether in heaven, but we cannot go on and say that the heaven is in anything else.
φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀπορίαι πᾶσαι λύοιντ' ἂν οὕτω λεγομένου τοῦ τόπου.	212b22 It is clear, too, from these considerations that all the problems which were raised about place will be solved when it is explained in this way:
οὔτε γὰρ συναύξεσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸν τόπον,	(1) There is no necessity that the place should grow with the body in it,
οὔτε στιγμῆς εἶναι τόπον,	(2) Nor that a point should have a place,
οὔτε δύο σώματα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ,	(3) Nor that two bodies should be in the same place,
οὔτε διάστημά τι εἶναι σωματικόν (σῶμα γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τόπου τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διάστημα σώματος).	(4) Nor that place should be a corporeal interval: for what is between the boundaries of the place is any body which may chance to be there, not an interval in body.
καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος καὶ πού, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πέρας ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινητὸν σῶμα.	Further, (5) place is also somewhere, not in the sense of being in a place, but as the limit is in the limited; for not everything that is is in place, but only movable body.
καὶ φέρεται δὴ εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ τόπον ἕκαστον εὐλόγως (ὃ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἁπτόμενον μὴ βίᾳ, συγγενές· καὶ συμπεφυκότα μὲν ἀπαθῆ, ἁπτόμενα δὲ παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλλήλων)·	212b29 Also (6) it is reasonable that each kind of body should be carried to its own place. For a body which is next in the series and in contact (not by compulsion) is akin, and bodies which are united do not affect each other, while those which are in contact interact on each other.
καὶ μένει δὴ φύσει πᾶν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ τόπῳ οὐκ ἀλόγως· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μέρος, τὸ δὲ ἐν [τῷ] τόπῳ ὡς διαιρετὸν μέρος πρὸς ὅλον ἐστίν, οἷον ὅταν ὕδατος κινήσῃ τις (213a.) μόριον ἢ ἀέρος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ ἔχει πρὸς ὕδωρ· οἷον ὕλη γάρ, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ὕλη ἀέρος, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ οἷον ἐνέργειά τις ἐκείνου· τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ δυνάμει ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ δυνάμει ὕδωρ ἄλλον τρόπον.	212b33 Nor (7) is it without reason that each should remain naturally in its proper place. For this part has the same relation to its place, as a separable part to its whole, as when one moves a part of water or air: so, too, air is related to water, for the one is like matter, the other form-water is the matter of air, air as it were the actuality of water, for water is potentially air, while air is potentially water, though in another way.
διοριστέον δὲ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀσαφῶς δὲ νῦν ῥηθὲν τότ' ἔσται σαφέστερον. εἰ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ [ἡ] ὕλη καὶ ἐντελέχεια (ὕδωρ γὰρ ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ), ἔχοι ἂν ὡς μόριόν πως πρὸς ὅλον. διὸ καὶ τούτοις ἁφὴ ἔστιν· σύμφυσις δέ, ὅταν ἄμφω ἐνεργείᾳ ἓν γένωνται.	These distinctions will be drawn more carefully later. On the present occasion it was necessary to refer to them: what has now been stated obscurely will then be made more clear. If the matter and the fulfilment are the same thing (for water is both, the one potentially, the other completely), water will be related to air in a way as part to whole. That is why these have contact: it is organic union when both become actually one.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τόπου, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι καὶ τί ἐστιν, εἴρηται.	This concludes my account of place-both of its existence and of its nature.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τοῦ φυσικοῦ θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ κενοῦ, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τόπου· καὶ γὰρ παραπλησίαν ἔχει τήν τε ἀπιστίαν καὶ τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν ὑπολαμβανομένων· οἷον γὰρ τόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀγγεῖον τὸ κενὸν τιθέασιν οἱ λέγοντες, δοκεῖ δὲ πλῆρες μὲν εἶναι, ὅταν ἔχῃ τὸν ὄγκον οὗ δεκτικόν ἐστιν, ὅταν δὲ στερηθῇ, κενόν, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὂν κενὸν καὶ πλῆρες καὶ τόπον, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτοῖς οὐ ταὐτὸ ὄν.	Chapter 6 213a11 The investigation of similar questions about the void, also, must be held to belong to the physicist-namely whether it exists or not, and how it exists or what it is-just as about place. The views taken of it involve arguments both for and against, in much the same sort of way. For those who hold that the void exists regard it as a sort of place or vessel which is supposed to be 'full' when it holds the bulk which it is capable of containing, 'void' when it is deprived of that-as if 'void' and 'full' and 'place' denoted the same thing, though the essence of the three is different.
ἄρξασθαι δὲ δεῖ τῆς σκέψεως λαβοῦσιν ἅ τε λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες, καὶ τρίτον τὰς κοινὰς περὶ αὐτῶν δόξας.	213a19 We must begin the inquiry by putting down the account given by those who say that it exists, then the account of those who say that it does not exist, and third the current view on these questions.
οἱ μὲν οὖν δεικνύναι πειρώμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐχ ὃ βούλονται λέγειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κενόν, τοῦτ' ἐξελέγχουσιν, ἀλλ' <ὃ> ἁμαρτάνοντες λέγουσιν. ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐλέγχοντες. ἐπιδεικνύουσι γὰρ ὅτι ἐστίν τι ὁ ἀήρ, στρεβλοῦντες τοὺς ἀσκοὺς καὶ δεικνύντες ὡς ἰσχυρὸς ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ ἐναπολαμβάνοντες ἐν ταῖς κλεψύδραις. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι βούλονται κενὸν εἶναι διάστημα ἐν ᾧ μηδέν ἐστι σῶμα αἰσθητόν· οἰόμενοι δὲ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι σῶμα φασίν, ἐν ᾧ ὅλως μηδέν ἐστι, τοῦτ' εἶναι κενόν, διὸ τὸ πλῆρες ἀέρος κενὸν εἶναι. οὔκουν τοῦτο δεῖ δεικνύναι, ὅτι ἐστί τι ὁ ἀήρ, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι διάστημα ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων, οὔτε χωριστὸν οὔτε ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, ὃ διαλαμβάνει τὸ πᾶν σῶμα ὥστε εἶναι μὴ συνεχές, καθάπερ λέγουσιν Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος καὶ (213b.) ἕτεροι πολλοὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων, ἢ καὶ εἴ τι ἔξω τοῦ παντὸς σώματός ἐστιν ὄντος συνεχοῦς.	213a22 Those who try to show that the void does not exist do not disprove what people really mean by it, but only their erroneous way of speaking; this is true of Anaxagoras and of those who refute the existence of the void in this way. They merely give an ingenious demonstration that air is something--by straining wine-skins and showing the resistance of the air, and by cutting it off in clepsydras. But people really mean that there is an empty interval in which there is no sensible body. They hold that everything which is in body is body and say that what has nothing in it at all is void (so what is full of air is void). It is not then the existence of air that needs to be proved, but the non-existence of an interval, different from the bodies, either separable or actual-an interval which divides the whole body so as to break its continuity, as Democritus and Leucippus hold, and many other physicists-or even perhaps as something which is outside the whole body, which remains continuous.
οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὐ κατὰ θύρας πρὸς τὸ πρόβλημα ἀπαντῶσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι μᾶλλον.	These people, then, have not reached even the threshold of the problem, but rather those who say that the void exists.
λέγουσιν δ' ἓν μὲν ὅτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ φορὰ καὶ αὔξησις)· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν, εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλῆρες ἀδύνατον εἶναι δέξασθαί τι. εἰ δὲ δέξεται καὶ ἔσται δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν καὶ ὁποσαοῦν εἶναι ἅμα σώματα· τὴν γὰρ διαφοράν, δι' ἣν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεχθέν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ μικρότατον δέξεται τὸ μέγιστον· πολλὰ γὰρ μικρὰ τὸ μέγα ἐστίν· ὥστε εἰ πολλὰ ἴσα ἐνδέχεται ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ πολλὰ ἄνισα.	213b3 (1) They argue, for one thing, that change in place (i.e. locomotion and increase) would not be. For it is maintained that motion would seem not to exist, if there were no void, since what is full cannot contain anything more. If it could, and there were two bodies in the same place, it would also be true that any number of bodies could be together; for it is impossible to draw a line of division beyond which the statement would become untrue. If this were possible, it would follow also that the smallest body would contain the greatest; for 'many a little makes a mickle': thus if many equal bodies can be together, so also can many unequal bodies.
Μέλισσος μὲν οὖν καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι τὸ πᾶν ἀκίνητον ἐκ τούτων· εἰ γὰρ κινήσεται, ἀνάγκη εἶναι (φησί) κενόν, τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὐ τῶν ὄντων.	213b12 Melissus, indeed, infers from these considerations that the All is immovable; for if it were moved there must, he says, be void, but void is not among the things that exist.
ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον ἐκ τούτων δεικνύουσιν ὅτι ἔστιν τι κενόν,	This argument, then, is one way in which they show that there is a void.
ἄλλον δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ἔνια συνιόντα καὶ πιλούμενα, οἷον καὶ τὸν οἶνόν φασι δέχεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἀσκῶν τοὺς πίθους, ὡς εἰς τὰ ἐνόντα κενὰ συνιόντος τοῦ πυκνουμένου σώματος.	213b15 (2) They reason from the fact that some things are observed to contract and be compressed, as people say that a cask will hold the wine which formerly filled it, along with the skins into which the wine has been decanted, which implies that the compressed body contracts into the voids present in it.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ αὔξησις δοκεῖ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαι διὰ κενοῦ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ τροφὴν σῶμα εἶναι, δύο δὲ σώματα ἀδύνατον ἅμα εἶναι.	213b18 Again (3) increase, too, is thought to take always by means of void, for nutriment is body, and it is impossible for two bodies to be together.
μαρτύριον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς τέφρας ποιοῦνται, ἣ δέχεται ἴσον ὕδωρ ὅσον τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ κενόν.	213b21 A proof of this they find also in what happens to ashes, which absorb as much water as the empty vessel.
εἶναι δ' ἔφασαν καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενόν, καὶ ἐπεισιέναι αὐτὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου πνεύματος ὡς ἀναπνέοντι καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινὸς τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ [τῆς] διορίσεως· καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν διορίζειν τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν.	213b22 The Pythagoreans, too, (4) held that void exists and that it enters the heaven itself, which as it were inhales it, from the infinite air. Further it is the void which distinguishes the natures of things, as if it were like what separates and distinguishes the terms of a series. This holds primarily in the numbers, for the void distinguishes their nature.
ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι οἱ δ' οὔ φασι, σχεδὸν τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν.	These, then, and so many, are the main grounds on which people have argued for and against the existence of the void.
Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποτέρως ἔχει δεῖ λαβεῖν τί σημαίνει τοὔνομα.	Chapter 7 213b30 As a step towards settling which view is true, we must determine the meaning of the name.
δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ κενὸν τόπος εἶναι ἐν ᾧ μηδέν ἐστι. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ ὂν σῶμα οἴονται εἶναι, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, κενὸν δὲ ἐν ᾧ τόπῳ μηδέν ἐστι σῶμα, ὥστ' εἴ που μὴ ἔστι σῶμα, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα.	213b31 The void is thought to be place with nothing in it. The reason for this is that people take what exists to be body, and hold that while every body is in place, void is place in which there is no body, so that where there is no body, there must be void.
σῶμα δὲ πάλιν ἅπαν (214a.) οἴονται εἶναι ἁπτόν· τοιοῦτο δὲ ὃ ἂν ἔχῃ βάρος ἢ κουφότητα.	Every body, again, they suppose to be tangible; and of this nature is whatever has weight or lightness.
συμβαίνει οὖν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι κενόν, ἐν ᾧ μηδέν ἐστι βαρὺ ἢ κοῦφον.	Hence, by a syllogism, what has nothing heavy or light in it, is void.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ συμβαίνει.	This result, then, as I have said, is reached by syllogism.
ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ ἡ στιγμὴ κενόν· δεῖ γὰρ τόπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ σώματος ἔστι διά στημα ἁπτοῦ.	214a4 It would be absurd to suppose that the point is void; for the void must be place which has in it an interval in tangible body.
ἀλλ' οὖν φαίνεται λέγεσθαι τὸ κενὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μὴ πλῆρες αἰσθητοῦ σώματος κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν· αἰσθητὸν δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν τὸ βάρος ἔχον ἢ κουφότητα	But at all events we observe then that in one way the void is described as what is not full of body perceptible to touch; and what has heaviness and lightness is perceptible to touch.
(διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, τί ἂν φαῖεν, εἰ ἔχοι τὸ διάστημα χρῶμα ἢ ψόφον, πότερον κενὸν ἢ οὔ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι εἰ μὲν δέχοιτο σῶμα ἁπτόν, κενόν, εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ)·	214a9 So we would raise the question: what would they say of an interval that has colour or sound-is it void or not? Clearly they would reply that if it could receive what is tangible it was void, and if not, not.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, ἐν ᾧ μὴ τόδε τι μηδ' οὐσία τις σωματική. διό φασίν τινες εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕλην (οἵπερ καὶ τὸν τόπον τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο), λέγοντες οὐ καλῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη οὐ χωριστὴ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ζητοῦσιν ὡς χωριστόν.	214a11 In another way void is that in which there is no 'this' or corporeal substance. So some say that the void is the matter of the body (they identify the place, too, with this), and in this they speak incorrectly; for the matter is not separable from the things, but they are inquiring about the void as about something separable.
ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τόπου διώρισται, καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἀνάγκη τόπον εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν, ἐστερημένον σώματος, τόπος δὲ καὶ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴρηται, φανερὸν ὅτι οὕτω μὲν κενὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε κεχωρισμένον οὔτε ἀχώριστον. τὸ γὰρ κενὸν οὐ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σώματος διάστημα βούλεται εἶναι· διὸ καὶ τὸ κενὸν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ διὰ ταὐτά.	214a16 Since we have determined the nature of place, and void must, if it exists, be place deprived of body, and we have stated both in what sense place exists and in what sense it does not, it is plain that on this showing void does not exist, either unseparated or separated; the void is meant to be, not body but rather an interval in body. This is why the void is thought to be something, viz. because place is, and for the same reasons.
ἥκει γὰρ δὴ ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τοῖς τὸν τόπον φάσκουσιν εἶναί τι παρὰ τὰ σώματα τὰ ἐμπίπτοντα καὶ τοῖς τὸ κενόν. αἴτιον δὲ κινήσεως οἴονται εἶναι τὸ κενὸν οὕτως ὡς ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη οἷον τὸν τόπον φασί τινες εἶναι.	214a21 For the fact of motion in respect of place comes to the aid both of those who maintain that place is something over and above the bodies that come to occupy it, and of those who maintain that the void is something. They state that the void is the condition of movement in the sense of that in which movement takes place; and this would be the kind of thing that some say place is.
οὐδεμία δ' ἀνάγκη, εἰ κίνησις ἔστιν, εἶναι κενόν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν πάσης κινήσεως οὐδαμῶς, δι' ὃ καὶ Μέλισσον ἔλαθεν· ἀλλοιοῦσθαι γὰρ τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδέχεται.	214a26 But there is no necessity for there being a void if there is movement. It is not in the least needed as a condition of movement in general, for a reason which, incidentally, escaped Melissus; viz. that the full can suffer qualitative change.
ἀλλὰ δὴ οὐδὲ τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν· ἅμα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ὑπεξιέναι ἀλλήλοις, οὐδενὸς ὄντος διαστήματος χωριστοῦ παρὰ τὰ σώματα τὰ κινούμενα. καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν συνεχῶν δίναις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ὑγρῶν.	But not even movement in respect of place involves a void; for bodies may simultaneously make room for one another, though there is no interval separate and apart from the bodies that are in movement. And this is plain even in the rotation of continuous things, as in that of liquids.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πυκνοῦσθαι μὴ εἰς τὸ κενὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὰ ἐνόντα (214b.) ἐκπυρηνίζειν (οἷον ὕδατος συνθλιβομένου τὸν ἐνόντα ἀέρα),	214a32 And things can also be compressed not into a void but because they squeeze out what is contained in them (as, for instance, when water is compressed the air within it is squeezed out);
καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι οὐ μόνον εἰσιόντος τινὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος γίγνοιτο ἀήρ.	214b1 and things can increase in size not only by the entrance of something but also by qualitative change; e.g. if water were to be transformed into air.
ὅλως δὲ ὅ τε περὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως λόγος καὶ τοῦ εἰς τὴν τέφραν ἐγχεομένου ὕδατος αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐμποδίζει. ἢ γὰρ οὐκ αὐξάνεται ὁτιοῦν, ἢ οὐ σώματι, ἢ ἐνδέχεται δύο σώματα ἐν ταὐτῷ εἶναι (ἀπορίαν οὖν κοινὴν ἀξιοῦσι λύειν, ἀλλ' οὐ κενὸν δεικνύουσιν ὡς ἔστιν), ἢ πᾶν εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ σῶμα κενόν, εἰ πάντῃ αὐξάνεται καὶ αὐξάνεται διὰ κενοῦ. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τέφρας.	214b3 In general, both the argument about increase of size and that about water poured on to the ashes get in their own way. For either not any and every part of the body is increased, or bodies may be increased otherwise than by the addition of body, or there may be two bodies in the same place (in which case they are claiming to solve a quite general difficulty, but are not proving the existence of void), or the whole body must be void, if it is increased in every part and is increased by means of void. The same argument applies to the ashes.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσιν εἶναι τὸ κενὸν λύειν ῥᾴδιον, φανερόν.	It is evident, then, that it is easy to refute the arguments by which they prove the existence of the void.
Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κενὸν οὕτω κεχωρισμένον, ὡς ἔνιοί φασι, λέγωμεν πάλιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑκάστου φορά τις τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων φύσει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ μὲν ἄνω τῇ δὲ γῇ κάτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν τὸ κενὸν αἴτιον εἴη τῆς φορᾶς. τίνος οὖν αἴτιον ἔσται τὸ κενόν; δοκεῖ γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι κινήσεως τῆς κατὰ τόπον, ταύτης δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.	Chapter 8 214b12 Let us explain again that there is no void existing separately, as some maintain. If each of the simple bodies has a natural locomotion, e.g. fire upward and earth downward and towards the middle of the universe, it is clear that it cannot be the void that is the condition of locomotion. What, then, will the void be the condition of? It is thought to be the condition of movement in respect of place, and it is not the condition of this.
ἔτι εἰ ἔστιν τι οἷον τόπος ἐστερημένος σώματος, ὅταν ᾖ κενόν, ποῦ οἰσθήσεται τὸ εἰστεθὲν εἰς αὐτὸ σῶμα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς ἅπαν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τὸν τόπον οἰομένους εἶναί τι κεχωρισμένον, εἰς ὃν φέρεται· πῶς γὰρ οἰσθήσεται τὸ ἐντεθὲν ἢ μενεῖ; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει λόγος εἰκότως· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν τόπον ποιοῦσιν οἱ εἶναι φάσκοντες·	214b17 Again, if void is a sort of place deprived of body, when there is a void where will a body placed in it move to? It certainly cannot move into the whole of the void. The same argument applies as against those who think that place is something separate, into which things are carried; viz. how will what is placed in it move, or rest? Much the same argument will apply to the void as to the 'up' and 'down' in place, as is natural enough since those who maintain the existence of the void make it a place.
καὶ πῶς δὴ ἐνέσται ἢ ἐν [τῷ] τόπῳ ἢ ἐν τῷ κενῷ; οὐ γὰρ συμβαίνει, ὅταν ὅλον τεθῇ ὡς ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ τόπῳ καὶ ὑπομένοντι σῶμά τι· τὸ γὰρ μέρος, ἂν μὴ χωρὶς τιθῆται, οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔτι εἰ μὴ τόπος, οὐδὲ κενὸν ἔσται.	And in what way will things be present either in place-or in the void? For the expected result does not take place when a body is placed as a whole in a place conceived of as separate and permanent; for a part of it, unless it be placed apart, will not be in a place but in the whole. Further, if separate place does not exist, neither will void.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς λέγουσιν εἶναι κενὸν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἔσται κίνησις, τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον, ἄν τις ἐπισκοπῇ, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδὲ ἓν κινεῖσθαι, ἐὰν ᾖ κενόν· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον φάμενοι τὴν γῆν ἠρεμεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ κενῷ ἀνάγκη ἠρεμεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον κινηθήσεται· ᾗ γὰρ κενόν, οὐκ (215a.) ἔχει διαφοράν.	214b28 If people say that the void must exist, as being necessary if there is to be movement, what rather turns out to be the case, if one the matter, is the opposite, that not a single thing can be moved if there is a void; for as with those who for a like reason say the earth is at rest, so, too, in the void things must be at rest; for there is no place to which things can move more or less than to another; since the void in so far as it is void admits no difference.
ἔπειθ' ὅτι πᾶσα κίνησις ἢ βίᾳ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἄν περ ᾖ <ἡ> βίαιος, εἶναι καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν (ἡ μὲν γὰρ βίαιος παρὰ φύσιν, ἡ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ὑστέρα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν)· ὥστ' εἰ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων κίνησις, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται κινήσεων οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γε πῶς ἔσται μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης διαφορᾶς κατὰ τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον; ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἄνω οὐδὲ κάτω οὐδὲ μέσον, ᾗ δὲ κενόν, οὐδὲν διάφορον τὸ ἄνω τοῦ κάτω (ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῦ μηδενὸς οὐδεμία ἔστι διαφορά, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν μὴ ὄν τι καὶ στέρησις δοκεῖ εἶναι). ἡ δὲ φύσει φορὰ διάφορος, ὥστε ἔσται φύσει διάφορα. ἢ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι φύσει οὐδαμοῦ οὐδενὶ φορά, ἢ εἰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστι κενόν.	215a1 The second reason is this: all movement is either compulsory or according to nature, and if there is compulsory movement there must also be natural (for compulsory movement is contrary to nature, and movement contrary to nature is posterior to that according to nature, so that if each of the natural bodies has not a natural movement, none of the other movements can exist); but how can there be natural movement if there is no difference throughout the void or the infinite? For in so far as it is infinite, there will be no up or down or middle, and in so far as it is a void, up differs no whit from down; for as there is no difference in what is nothing, there is none in the void (for the void seems to be a non-existent and a privation of being), but natural locomotion seems to be differentiated, so that the things that exist by nature must be differentiated. Either, then, nothing has a natural locomotion, or else there is no void.
ἔτι νῦν μὲν κινεῖται τὰ ῥιπτούμενα τοῦ ὤσαντος οὐχ ἁπτομένου, ἢ δι' ἀντιπερίστασιν, ὥσπερ ἔνιοί φασιν, ἢ διὰ τὸ ὠθεῖν τὸν ὠσθέντα ἀέρα θάττω κίνησιν τῆς τοῦ ὠσθέντος φορᾶς ἣν φέρεται εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον· ἐν δὲ τῷ κενῷ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπάρχει, οὐδ' ἔσται φέρεσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς τὸ ὀχούμενον.	215a14 Further, in point of fact things that are thrown move though that which gave them their impulse is not touching them, either by reason of mutual replacement, as some maintain, or because the air that has been pushed pushes them with a movement quicker than the natural locomotion of the projectile wherewith it moves to its proper place. But in a void none of these things can take place, nor can anything be moved save as that which is carried is moved.
ἔτι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν διὰ τί κινηθὲν στήσεταί που· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐνταῦθα; ὥστε ἢ ἠρεμήσει ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι, ἐὰν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ κρεῖττον.	215a19 Further, no one could say why a thing once set in motion should stop anywhere; for why should it stop here rather than here? So that a thing will either be at rest or must be moved ad infinitum, unless something more powerful get in its way.
ἔτι νῦν μὲν εἰς τὸ κενὸν διὰ τὸ ὑπείκειν φέ ρεσθαι δοκεῖ· ἐν δὲ τῷ κενῷ πάντῃ ὁμοίως τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥστε πάντῃ οἰσθήσεται.	Further, things are now thought to move into the void because it yields; but in a void this quality is present equally everywhere, so that things should move in all directions.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε φανερὸν τὸ λεγόμενον. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ βάρος καὶ σῶμα θᾶττον φερόμενον διὰ δύο αἰτίας, ἢ τῷ διαφέρειν τὸ δι' οὗ, οἷον δι' ὕδατος ἢ γῆς ἢ δι' ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος, ἢ τῷ διαφέρειν τὸ φερόμενον, ἐὰν τἆλλα ταὐτὰ ὑπάρχῃ, διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ βάρους ἢ τῆς κουφότητος.	215a24 Further, the truth of what we assert is plain from the following considerations. We see the same weight or body moving faster than another for two reasons, either because there is a difference in what it moves through, as between water, air, and earth, or because, other things being equal, the moving body differs from the other owing to excess of weight or of lightness.
τὸ μὲν οὖν δι' οὗ φέρεται αἴτιον, ὅτι ἐμποδίζει μάλιστα μὲν ἀντιφερόμενον, ἔπειτα καὶ μένον· μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μὴ εὐδιαίρετον· τοιοῦτο δὲ τὸ παχύτερον. τὸ δὴ ἐφ' οὗ (215b.) Α οἰσθήσεται διὰ τοῦ Β τὸν ἐφ' ᾧ Γ χρόνον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ Δ λεπτοτέρου ὄντος τὸν ἐφ' ᾧ Ε, εἰ ἴσον τὸ μῆκος τὸ τοῦ Β τῷ Δ, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ ἐμποδίζοντος σώματος. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Β ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ Δ ἀήρ· ὅσῳ δὴ λεπτότερον ἀὴρ ὕδατος καὶ ἀσωματώτερον, τοσούτῳ θᾶττον τὸ Α διὰ τοῦ Δ οἰσθήσεται ἢ διὰ τοῦ Β. ἐχέτω δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὅνπερ διέστηκεν ἀὴρ πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὸ τάχος πρὸς τὸ τάχος. ὥστε εἰ διπλασίως λεπτόν, ἐν διπλασίῳ χρόνῳ τὴν τὸ Β δίεισιν ἢ τὴν τὸ Δ, καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἐφ' ᾧ Γ χρόνος διπλάσιος τοῦ ἐφ' ᾧ Ε. καὶ ἀεὶ δὴ ὅσῳ ἂν ᾖ ἀσωματώτερον καὶ ἧττον ἐμποδιστικὸν καὶ εὐδιαιρετώτερον δι' οὗ φέρεται, θᾶττον οἰσθήσεται.	215a29 Now the medium causes a difference because it impedes the moving thing, most of all if it is moving in the opposite direction, but in a secondary degree even if it is at rest; and especially a medium that is not easily divided, i.e. a medium that is somewhat dense. A, then, will move through B in time G, and through D, which is thinner, in time E (if the length of B is egual to D), in proportion to the density of the hindering body. For let B be water and D air; then by so much as air is thinner and more incorporeal than water, A will move through D faster than through B. Let the speed have the same ratio to the speed, then, that air has to water. Then if air is twice as thin, the body will traverse B in twice the time that it does D, and the time G will be twice the time E. And always, by so much as the medium is more incorporeal and less resistant and more easily divided, the faster will be the movement.
τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὐδένα ἔχει λόγον ᾧ ὑπερέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν πρὸς ἀριθμόν. εἰ γὰρ τὰ τέτταρα τῶν τριῶν ὑπερέχει ἑνί, πλείονι δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν, καὶ ἔτι πλείονι τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, τοῦ δὲ μηδενὸς οὐκέτι ἔχει λόγον ᾧ ὑπερέχει· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ὑπερέχον διαιρεῖσθαι εἴς τε τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον, ὥστε ἔσται τὰ τέτταρα ὅσῳ τε ὑπερέχει καὶ οὐδέν. διὸ οὐδὲ γραμμὴ στιγμῆς ὑπερέχει, εἰ μὴ σύγκειται ἐκ στιγμῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κενὸν πρὸς τὸ πλῆρες οὐδένα οἷόν τε ἔχειν λόγον,	215b12 Now there is no ratio in which the void is exceeded by body, as there is no ratio of 0 to a number. For if 4 exceeds 3 by 1, and 2 by more than 1, and 1 by still more than it exceeds 2, still there is no ratio by which it exceeds 0; for that which exceeds must be divisible into the excess + that which is exceeded, so that will be what it exceeds 0 by + 0. For this reason, too, a line does not exceed a point unless it is composed of points! Similarly the void can bear no ratio to the full,
ὥστε οὐδὲ τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου ἐν τοσῳδὶ τὴν τοσήνδε φέρεται, διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ παντὸς ὑπερβάλλει λόγου.	215b20 and therefore neither can movement through the one to movement through the other, but if a thing moves through the thickest medium such and such a distance in such and such a time, it moves through the void with a speed beyond any ratio.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Ζ κενόν, ἴσον δὲ [τῷ μεγέθει] τοῖς Β καὶ Δ. τὸ δὴ Α εἰ δίεισι καὶ κινηθήσεται ἐν τινὶ μὲν χρόνῳ, τῷ ἐφ' οὗ Η, ἐν ἐλάττονι δὲ τοῦ ἐφ' οὗ Ε, τοῦτον ἕξει τὸν λόγον τὸ κενὸν πρὸς τὸ πλῆρες. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ ὅσος ἐφ' οὗ τὸ Η, τοῦ Δ τὸ Α δίεισι τὴν τὸ Θ. δίεισι δέ γε κἂν ᾖ τι λεπτότητι διαφέρον τοῦ ἀέρος ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ Ζ ταύτην τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἣν ἔχει ὁ χρόνος ἐφ' ᾧ Ε πρὸς τὸν ἐφ' ᾧ Η. ἂν γὰρ ᾖ τοσούτῳ λεπτότερον τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ Ζ σῶμα τοῦ Δ, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει τὸ Ε τοῦ Η, ἀντεστραμμένως δίεισι τῷ (216a.) τάχει ἐν τῷ τοσούτῳ ὅσον τὸ Η, τὴν τὸ Ζ τὸ ἐφ' οὗ Α, ἐὰν φέρηται. ἐὰν τοίνυν μηδὲν ᾖ σῶμα ἐν τῷ Ζ, ἔτι θᾶττον. ἀλλ' ἦν ἐν τῷ Η. ὥστ' ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ δίεισι πλῆρές τε ὂν καὶ κενόν. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον.	215b22 For let Z be void, equal in magnitude to B and to D. Then if A is to traverse and move through it in a certain time, H, a time less than E, however, the void will bear this ratio to the full. But in a time equal to H, A will traverse the part O of A. And it will surely also traverse in that time any substance Z which exceeds air in thickness in the ratio which the time E bears to the time H. For if the body Z be as much thinner than D as E exceeds H, A, if it moves through Z, will traverse it in a time inverse to the speed of the movement, i.e. in a time equal to H. If, then, there is no body in Z, A will traverse Z still more quickly. But we supposed that its traverse of Z when Z was void occupied the time H. So that it will traverse Z in an equal time whether Z be full or void. But this is impossible.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ ἔστι χρόνος ἐν ᾧ τοῦ κενοῦ ὁτιοῦν οἰσθήσεται, συμβήσεται τοῦτο τὸ ἀδύνατον· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ ληφθήσεται πλῆρές τε ὂν διεξιέναι τι καὶ κενόν· ἔσται γάρ τι ἀνάλογον σῶμα ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον ὡς χρόνος πρὸς χρόνον.	216a4 It is plain, then, that if there is a time in which it will move through any part of the void, this impossible result will follow: it will be found to traverse a certain distance, whether this be full or void, in an equal time; for there will be some body which is in the same ratio to the other body as the time is to the time.
ὡς δ' ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, δῆλον τὸ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος αἴτιον, ὅτι κινήσεως μὲν πρὸς κίνησιν πάσης ἔστι λόγος (ἐν χρόνῳ γάρ ἐστι, χρόνου δὲ παντὸς ἔστι πρὸς χρόνον, πεπερασμένων ἀμφοῖν), κενοῦ δὲ πρὸς πλῆρες οὐκ ἔστιν.	To sum the matter up, the cause of this result is obvious, viz. that between any two movements there is a ratio (for they occupy time, and there is a ratio between any two times, so long as both are finite), but there is no ratio of void to full.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν διαφέρουσι δι' ὧν φέρονται, ταῦτα συμβαίνει,	216a11 These are the consequences that result from a difference in the media;
κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν φερομένων ὑπεροχὴν τάδε· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τὰ μείζω ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα ἢ βάρους ἢ κουφότητος, ἐὰν τἆλλα ὁμοίως ἔχῃ [τοῖς σχήμασι], θᾶττον φερόμενα τὸ ἴσον χωρίον, καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὃν ἔχουσι τὰ μεγέθη πρὸς ἄλληλα. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν οἰσθήσεται θᾶττον; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πλήρεσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· θᾶττον γὰρ διαιρεῖ τῇ ἰσχύϊ τὸ μεῖζον· ἢ γὰρ σχήματι διαιρεῖ, ἢ ῥοπῇ ἣν ἔχει τὸ φερόμενον ἢ τὸ ἀφεθέν. ἰσοταχῆ ἄρα πάντ' ἔσται. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον.	216a12 the following depend upon an excess of one moving body over another. We see that bodies which have a greater impulse either of weight or of lightness, if they are alike in other respects, move faster over an equal space, and in the ratio which their magnitudes bear to each other. Therefore they will also move through the void with this ratio of speed. But that is impossible; for why should one move faster? (In moving through plena it must be so; for the greater divides them faster by its force. For a moving thing cleaves the medium either by its shape, or by the impulse which the body that is carried along or is projected possesses.) Therefore all will possess equal velocity. But this is impossible.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔστι κενόν, συμβαίνει τοὐναντίον ἢ δι' ὃ κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι κενόν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. οἱ μὲν οὖν οἴονται τὸ κενὸν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἔσται ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ἀποκεκριμένον καθ' αὑτό· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ τὸν τόπον φάναι εἶναί τι κεχωρισμένον· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, εἴρηται πρότερον.	216a21 It is evident from what has been said, then, that, if there is a void, a result follows which is the very opposite of the reason for which those who believe in a void set it up. They think that if movement in respect of place is to exist, the void cannot exist, separated all by itself; but this is the same as to say that place is a separate cavity; and this has already been stated to be impossible.
καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ σκοποῦσιν φανείη ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον κενὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κενόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐὰν ἐν ὕδατι τιθῇ τις κύβον, ἐκστήσεται τοσοῦτον ὕδωρ ὅσος ὁ κύβος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἀέρι· ἀλλὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἄδηλον. καὶ αἰεὶ δὴ ἐν παντὶ σώματι ἔχοντι μετάστασιν, ἐφ' ὃ πέφυκε μεθίστασθαι, ἀνάγκη, ἂν μὴ συμπιλῆται, μεθίστασθαι ἢ κάτω αἰεί, εἰ κάτω ἡ φορὰ ὥσπερ γῆς, ἢ ἄνω, εἰ πῦρ, ἢ ἐπ' ἄμφω, [ἢ] ὁποῖον ἄν τι ᾖ τὸ ἐντιθέμενον· ἐν δὲ δὴ τῷ κενῷ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον (οὐδὲν γὰρ σῶμα), διὰ δὲ τοῦ κύβου τὸ ἴσον διάστημα διεληλυθέναι, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ πρότερον (216b.) ἐν τῷ κενῷ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ὕδωρ μὴ μεθίστατο τῷ ξυλίνῳ κύβῳ μηδ' ὁ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ διῄεσαν δι' αὐτοῦ.	216a26 But even if we consider it on its own merits the so-called vacuum will be found to be really vacuous. For as, if one puts a cube in water, an amount of water equal to the cube will be displaced; so too in air; but the effect is imperceptible to sense. And indeed always in the case of any body that can be displaced, must, if it is not compressed, be displaced in the direction in which it is its nature to be displaced-always either down, if its locomotion is downwards as in the case of earth, or up, if it is fire, or in both directions-whatever be the nature of the inserted body. Now in the void this is impossible; for it is not body; the void must have penetrated the cube to a distance equal to that which this portion of void formerly occupied in the void, just as if the water or air had not been displaced by the wooden cube, but had penetrated right through it.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὁ κύβος γε ἔχει τοσοῦτον μέγεθος, ὅσον κατέχει κενόν· ὃ εἰ καὶ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν ἐστιν ἢ βαρὺ ἢ κοῦφον, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕτερον τῷ εἶναι πάντων τῶν παθημάτων ἐστί, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστόν·	But the cube also has a magnitude equal to that occupied by the void; a magnitude which, if it is also hot or cold, or heavy or light, is none the less different in essence from all its attributes, even if it is not separable from them;
λέγω δὲ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ξυλίνου κύβου. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ χωρισθείη τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καὶ μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον εἴη, καθέξει τὸ ἴσον κενὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται τῷ τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῷ τοῦ κενοῦ μέρει ἴσῳ ἑαυτῷ. τί οὖν διοίσει τὸ τοῦ κύβου σῶμα τοῦ ἴσου κενοῦ καὶ τόπου; καὶ εἰ δύο τοιαῦτα, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ὁποσαοῦν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται;	216b6 I mean the volume of the wooden cube. So that even if it were separated from everything else and were neither heavy nor light, it will occupy an equal amount of void, and fill the same place, as the part of place or of the void equal to itself. How then will the body of the cube differ from the void or place that is equal to it? And if there can be two such things, why cannot there be any number coinciding?
ἓν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον.	This, then, is one absurd and impossible implication of the theory.
ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ κύβος ἕξει καὶ μεθιστάμενος, ὃ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σώματα πάντ' ἔχει. ὥστ' εἰ τοῦ τόπου μηδὲν διαφέρει, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν τόπον τοῖς σώμασιν παρὰ τὸν ἑκάστου ὄγκον, εἰ ἀπαθὲς ὁ ὄγκος; οὐδὲν γὰρ συμ βάλλεται, εἰ ἕτερον περὶ αὐτὸν ἴσον διάστημα τοιοῦτον εἴη. [ἔτι δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι οἷον κενὸν ἐν τοῖς κινουμένοις. νῦν δ' οὐδαμοῦ ἐντὸς τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ γὰρ ἀὴρ ἔστιν τι, οὐ δοκεῖ δέ γε—οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, εἰ ἦσαν οἱ ἰχθύες σιδηροῖ· τῇ ἁφῇ γὰρ ἡ κρίσις τοῦ ἁπτοῦ.]	216b12 It is also evident that the cube will have this same volume even if it is displaced, which is an attribute possessed by all other bodies also. Therefore if this differs in no respect from its place, why need we assume a place for bodies over and above the volume of each, if their volume be conceived of as free from attributes? It contributes nothing to the situation if there is an equal interval attached to it as well. [Further it ought to be clear by the study of moving things what sort of thing void is. But in fact it is found nowhere in the world. For air is something, though it does not seem to be so – nor, for that matter, would water, if fishes were made of iron; for the discrimination of the tangible is by touch.]
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι κεχωρισμένον κενόν, ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶ δῆλον.	It is clear, then, from these considerations that there is no separate void.
Εἰσὶν δέ τινες οἳ διὰ τοῦ μανοῦ καὶ πυκνοῦ οἴονται φανερὸν εἶναι ὅτι ἔστι κενόν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔστι μανὸν καὶ πυκνόν, οὐδὲ συνιέναι καὶ πιλεῖσθαι οἷόν τε· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ εἴη, ἢ ὅλως κίνησις οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ κυμανεῖ τὸ ὅλον, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ξοῦθος, ἢ εἰς ἴσον ἀεὶ <δεῖ> μεταβάλλειν ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ (λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κυάθου γέγονεν ἀήρ, ἅμα ἐξ ἴσου ἀέρος ὕδωρ τοσοῦτον γεγενῆσθαι), ἢ κενὸν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· συμπιλεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως.	Chapter 9 216b22 There are some who think that the existence of rarity and density shows that there is a void. If rarity and density do not exist, they say, neither can things contract and be compressed. But if this were not to take place, either there would be no movement at all, or the universe would bulge, as Xuthus said, or air and water must always change into equal amounts (e.g. if air has been made out of a cupful of water, at the same time out of an equal amount of air a cupful of water must have been made), or void must necessarily exist; for compression and expansion cannot take place otherwise.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ μανὸν λέγουσι τὸ πολλὰ κενὰ κεχωρισμένα ἔχον, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μηδὲ κενὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι χωριστὸν ὥσπερ μηδὲ τόπον ἔχοντα διάστημα αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ μανὸν οὕτως·	216b30 Now, if they mean by the rare that which has many voids existing separately, it is plain that if void cannot exist separate any more than a place can exist with an extension all to itself, neither can the rare exist in this sense.
εἰ δὲ μὴ χωριστόν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐνεῖναί τι κενόν, ἧττον μὲν ἀδύνατον, συμβαίνει δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως αἴτιον τὸ κενόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἄνω (τὸ γὰρ μανὸν κοῦφον, διὸ (217a.) καὶ τὸ πῦρ μανὸν εἶναί φασιν), ἔπειτα κινήσεως αἴτιον οὐχ οὕτω τὸ κενὸν ὡς ἐν ᾧ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἀσκοὶ τῷ φέρεσθαι αὐτοὶ ἄνω φέρουσι τὸ συνεχές, οὕτω τὸ κενὸν ἄνω φέρει. καίτοι πῶς οἷόν τε φορὰν εἶναι κενοῦ ἢ τόπον κενοῦ; κενοῦ γὰρ γίγνεται κενόν, εἰς ὃ φέρεται.	217a1 But if they mean that there is void, not separately existent, but still present in the rare, this is less impossible, yet, first, the void turns out not to be a condition of all movement, but only of movement upwards (for the rare is light, which is the reason why they say fire is rare); second, the void turns out to be a condition of movement not as that in which it takes place, but in that the void carries things up as skins by being carried up themselves carry up what is continuous with them. Yet how can void have a local movement or a place? For thus that into which void moves is till then void of a void.
ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ βαρέος ἀποδώσουσιν τὸ φέρεσθαι κάτω;	217a5 Again, how will they explain, in the case of what is heavy, its movement downwards?
καὶ δῆλον ὅτι εἰ ὅσῳ ἂν μανότερον καὶ κενώτερον ᾖ ἄνω οἰσθήσεται, εἰ ὅλως εἴη κενόν, τάχιστ' ἂν φέροιτο. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι· λόγος δ' ὁ αὐτός, ὥσπερ ὅτι ἐν τῷ κενῷ ἀκίνητα πάντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κενὸν ὅτι ἀκίνητον· ἀσύμβλητα γὰρ τὰ τάχη.	217a6 And it is plain that if the rarer and more void a thing is the quicker it will move upwards, if it were completely void it would move with a maximum speed! But perhaps even this is impossible, that it should move at all; the same reason which showed that in the void all things are incapable of moving shows that the void cannot move, viz. the fact that the speeds are incomparable.
ἐπεὶ δὲ κενὸν μὲν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι, τὰ ἄλλα δ' ἠπόρηται ἀληθῶς, ὅτι ἢ κίνησις οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται πύκνωσις καὶ μάνωσις, ἢ κυμανεῖ ὁ οὐρανός, ἢ αἰεὶ ἴσον ὕδωρ ἐξ ἀέρος ἔσται καὶ ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι πλείων ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος γίγνεται· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ μὴ ἔστι πίλησις, ἢ ἐξωθούμενον τὸ ἐχόμενον τὸ ἔσχατον κυμαίνειν ποιεῖν, ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἴσον μεταβάλλειν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, ἵνα ὁ πᾶς ὄγκος τοῦ ὅλου ἴσος ᾖ, ἢ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ μεθισταμένου τοῦτο συμβήσεται, ἂν μὴ κύκλῳ περιίστηται· οὐκ ἀεὶ δ' εἰς τὸ κύκλῳ ἡ φορά, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς εὐθύ)·	217a10 Since we deny that a void exists, but for the rest the problem has been truly stated, that either there will be no movement, if there is not to be condensation and rarefaction, or the universe will bulge, or a transformation of water into air will always be balanced by an equal transformation of air into water (for it is clear that the air produced from water is bulkier than the water): it is necessary therefore, if compression does not exist, either that the next portion will be pushed outwards and make the outermost part bulge, or that somewhere else there must be an equal amount of water produced out of air, so that the entire bulk of the whole may be equal, or that nothing moves. For when anything is displaced this will always happen, unless it comes round in a circle; but locomotion is not always circular, but sometimes in a straight line.
οἱ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα κενόν τι φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι,	These then are the reasons for which they might say that there is a void;
ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅτι ἔστιν ὕλη μία τῶν ἐναντίων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φυσικῶν ἐναντιώσεων, καὶ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν γίγνεται, καὶ οὐ χωριστὴ μὲν ἡ ὕλη, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἰ ἔτυχε, χροιᾶς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ.	217a21 our statement is based on the assumption that there is a single matter for contraries, hot and cold and the other natural contrarieties, and that what exists actually is produced from a potential existent, and that matter is not separable from the contraries but its being is different, and that a single matter may serve for colour and heat and cold.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ σώματος ὕλη καὶ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἡ αὐτή. δῆλον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γένηται, ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη οὐ προσλαβοῦσά τι ἄλλο ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὃ ἦν δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ ἐγένετο, καὶ πάλιν ὕδωρ ἐξ ἀέρος ὡσαύτως, ὁτὲ μὲν εἰς μέγεθος ἐκ μικρότητος, ὁτὲ δ' εἰς μικρό τητα ἐκ μεγέθους.	217a26 The same matter also serves for both a large and a small body. This is evident; for when air is produced from water, the same matter has become something different, not by acquiring an addition to it, but has become actually what it was potentially, and, again, water is produced from air in the same way, the change being sometimes from smallness to greatness, and sometimes from greatness to smallness.
ὁμοίως τοίνυν κἂν ὁ ἀὴρ πολὺς ὢν ἐν ἐλάττονι γίγνηται ὄγκῳ καὶ ἐξ ἐλάττονος μείζων, ἡ δυνάμει οὖσα ὕλη γίγνεται ἄμφω.	217a31 Similarly, therefore, if air which is large in extent comes to have a smaller volume, or becomes greater from being smaller, it is the matter which is potentially both that comes to be each of the two.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐκ ψυχροῦ θερμὸν καὶ ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν ἡ αὐτή, ὅτι ἦν δυνάμει, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ θερμοῦ (217b.) μᾶλλον θερμόν, οὐδενὸς γενομένου ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ θερμοῦ ὃ οὐκ ἦν θερμὸν ὅτε ἧττον ἦν θερμόν, ὥσπερ γε οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ μείζονος κύκλου περιφέρεια καὶ κυρτότης ἐὰν γίγνηται ἐλάττονος κύκλου, <ἢ> ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα ἢ ἄλλη, ἐν οὐθενὶ ἐγγέγονε τὸ κυρτὸν ὃ ἦν οὐ κυρτὸν ἀλλ' εὐθύ (οὐ γὰρ τῷ διαλείπειν τὸ ἧττον ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον ἔστιν)· οὐδ' ἔστι τῆς φλογὸς λαβεῖν τι μέγεθος ἐν ᾧ οὐ καὶ θερμότης καὶ λευκότης ἔνεστιν. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ἡ πρότερον θερμότης <πρὸς> τὴν ὕστερον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἡ μικρότης τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ὄγκου οὐ προσλαβούσης τι τῆς ὕλης ἐπεκτείνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὕλη ἀμφοῖν· ὥστ' ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πυκνὸν καὶ μανόν, καὶ μία ὕλη αὐτῶν.	For as the same matter becomes hot from being cold, and cold from being hot, because it was potentially both, so too from hot it can become more hot, though nothing in the matter has become hot that was not hot when the thing was less hot; just as, if the arc or curve of a greater circle becomes that of a smaller, whether it remains the same or becomes a different curve, convexity has not come to exist in anything that was not convex but straight (for differences of degree do not depend on an intermission of the quality); nor can we get any portion of a flame, in which both heat and whiteness are not present. So too, then, is the earlier heat related to the later. So that the greatness and smallness, also, of the sensible volume are extended, not by the matter's acquiring anything new, but because the matter is potentially matter for both states; so that the same thing is dense and rare, and the two qualities have one matter.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν βαρύ, τὸ δὲ μανὸν κοῦφον. [ἔτι ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ κύκλου περιφέρεια συναγομένη εἰς ἔλαττον οὐκ ἄλλο τι λαμβάνει τὸ κοῖλον, ἀλλ' ὃ ἦν συνήχθη, καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ὅ τι ἄν τις λάβῃ πᾶν ἔσται θερμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναγωγὴ καὶ διαστολὴ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης.] δύο γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε πυκνοῦ καὶ τοῦ μανοῦ· τό τε γὰρ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν πυκνὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τἀναντία μανὰ τό τε κοῦφον καὶ τὸ μαλακόν· διαφωνεῖ δὲ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν ἐπὶ μολίβδου καὶ σιδήρου.	217b11 The dense is heavy, and the rare is light. [Again, as the arc of a circle when contracted into a smaller space does not acquire a new part which is convex, but what was there has been contracted; and as any part of fire that one takes will be hot; so, too, it is all a question of contraction and expansion of the same matter.] There are two types in each case, both in the dense and in the rare; for both the heavy and the hard are thought to be dense, and contrariwise both the light and the soft are rare; and weight and hardness fail to coincide in the case of lead and iron.
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ὡς οὔτ' ἀποκεκριμένον κενὸν ἔστιν, οὔθ' ἁπλῶς οὔτ' ἐν τῷ μανῷ, οὔτε δυνάμει, εἰ μή τις βούλεται πάντως καλεῖν κενὸν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ φέρεσθαι. οὕτω δ' ἡ τοῦ βαρέος καὶ κούφου ὕλη, ᾗ τοιαύτη, εἴη ἂν τὸ κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ μανὸν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐναντίωσιν φορᾶς ποιητικά, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν πάθους καὶ ἀπαθείας, καὶ οὐ φορᾶς ἀλλ' ἑτεροιώσεως μᾶλλον.	217b20 From what has been said it is evident, then, that void does not exist either separate (either absolutely separate or as a separate element in the rare) or potentially, unless one is willing to call the condition of movement void, whatever it may be. At that rate the matter of the heavy and the light, qua matter of them, would be the void; for the dense and the rare are productive of locomotion in virtue of this contrariety, and in virtue of their hardness and softness productive of passivity and impassivity, i.e. not of locomotion but rather of qualitative change.
καὶ περὶ μὲν κενοῦ, πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστι, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	So much, then, for the discussion of the void, and of the sense in which it exists and the sense in which it does not exist.
Ἐχόμενον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἐπελθεῖν περὶ χρόνου· πρῶτον δὲ καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων, πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, εἶτα τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ.	Chapter 10 217b29 Next for discussion after the subjects mentioned is Time. The best plan will be to begin by working out the difficulties connected with it, making use of the current arguments. First, does it belong to the class of things that exist or to that of things that do not exist? Then secondly, what is its nature?
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶνδέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὔπω ἔστιν. (218a.) ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται. τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον ἀδύνατον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε μετέχειν οὐσίας.	217b32 To start, then: the following considerations would make one suspect that it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time-both infinite time and any time you like to take-is made up of these. One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις παντὸς μεριστοῦ, ἄνπερ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη, ὅτε ἔστιν, ἤτοι πάντα τὰ μέρη εἶναι ἢ ἔνια· τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἔστι δ' οὐδέν, ὄντος μεριστοῦ. τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος· μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ συγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν.	218a3 Further, if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary that, when it exists, all or some of its parts must exist. But of time some parts have been, while others have to be, and no part of it is though it is divisible. For what is 'now' is not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up of parts. Time, on the other hand, is not held to be made up of 'nows'.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ νῦν, ὃ φαίνεται διορίζειν τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον, πότερον ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ διαμένει ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν.	218a8 Again, the 'now' which seems to bound the past and the future-does it always remain one and the same or is it always other and other? It is hard to say.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον, μηδὲν δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἅμα (ὃ μὴ περιέχει, τὸ δὲ περιέχεται, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐλάττων χρόνος ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος), τὸ δὲ νῦν μὴ ὂν πρότερον δὲ ὂν ἀνάγκη ἐφθάρθαι ποτέ, καὶ τὰ νῦν ἅμα μὲν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφθάρθαι δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ τὸ πρότερον. ἐν αὑτῷ μὲν οὖν ἐφθάρθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε διὰ τὸ εἶναι τότε, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ νῦν ἐφθάρθαι τὸ πρότερον νῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἔστω γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐχόμενα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ νῦν, ὥσπερ στιγμὴν στιγμῆς. εἴπερ οὖν ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὐκ ἔφθαρται ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ [τοῖς] νῦν ἀπείροις οὖσιν ἅμα ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.	218a11 (1) If it is always different and different, and if none of the parts in time which are other and other are simultaneous (unless the one contains and the other is contained, as the shorter time is by the longer), and if the 'now' which is not, but formerly was, must have ceased-to-be at some time, the 'nows' too cannot be simultaneous with one another, but the prior 'now' must always have ceased-to-be. But the prior 'now' cannot have ceased-to-be in itself (since it then existed); yet it cannot have ceased-to-be in another 'now'. For we may lay it down that one 'now' cannot be next to another, any more than point to point. If then it did not cease-to-be in the next 'now' but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the innumerable 'nows' between the two-which is impossible.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διαμένειν δυνατόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ διαιρετοῦ πεπερασμένου ἓν πέρας ἔστιν, οὔτε ἂν ἐφ' ἓν ᾖ συνεχὲς οὔτε ἂν ἐπὶ πλείω· τὸ δὲ νῦν πέρας ἐστίν, καὶ χρόνον ἔστι λαβεῖν πεπερασμένον.	218a21 Yes, but (2) neither is it possible for the 'now' to remain always the same. No determinate divisible thing has a single termination, whether it is continuously extended in one or in more than one dimension: but the 'now' is a termination, and it is possible to cut off a determinate time.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἅμα εἶναι κατὰ χρόνον καὶ μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἑνὶ [τῷ] νῦν ἐστιν, εἰ τά τε πρότερον καὶ τὰ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ νῦν τῳδί ἐστιν, ἅμα ἂν εἴη τὰ ἔτος γενόμενα μυριοστὸν τοῖς γε νομένοις τήμερον, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλου.	218a25 Further, if coincidence in time (i.e. being neither prior nor posterior) means to be 'in one and the same "now"', then, if both what is before and what is after are in this same 'now', things which happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with what has happened to-day, and nothing would be before or after anything else.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τοσαῦτ' ἔστω διη πορημένα·	This may serve as a statement of the difficulties about the attributes of time.
τί δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, ὁμοίως ἔκ τε τῶν παραδεδομένων ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, καὶ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διεληλυθότες πρότερον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου	218a31 As to what time is or what is its nature, the traditional accounts give us as little light as the preliminary problems which we have worked through.
(218b.) κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν σφαῖραν αὐτήν.	218b1 Some assert that it is (1) the movement of the whole, others that it is (2) the sphere itself.
καίτοι τῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ τὸ μέρος χρόνος τίς ἐστι, περιφορὰ δέ γε οὔ· μέρος γὰρ περιφορᾶς τὸ ληφθέν, ἀλλ' οὐ περιφορά. ἔτι δ' εἰ πλείους ἦσαν οἱ οὐρανοί, ὁμοίως ἂν ἦν ὁ χρόνος ἡ ὁτουοῦν αὐτῶν κίνησις, ὥστε πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα.	218b3 (1) Yet part, too, of the revolution is a time, but it certainly is not a revolution: for what is taken is part of a revolution, not a revolution. Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the movement of any of them equally would be time, so that there would be many times at the same time.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου σφαῖρα ἔδοξε μὲν τοῖς εἰποῦσιν εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅτι ἔν τε τῷ χρόνῳ πάντα ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σφαίρᾳ· ἔστιν δ' εὐηθικώτερον τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπισκοπεῖν.	218b5 (2) Those who said that time is the sphere of the whole thought so, no doubt, on the ground that all things are in time and all things are in the sphere of the whole. The view is too naive for it to be worth while to consider the impossibilities implied in it.
ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κίνησις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον.	218b9 But as time is most usually supposed to be (3) motion and a kind of change, we must consider this view.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὗ ἂν τύχῃ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν.	Now (a) the change or movement of each thing is only in the thing which changes or where the thing itself which moves or changes may chance to be. But time is present equally everywhere and with all things.
ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μέν ἐστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὥρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός.	218b13 Again, (b) change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for 'fast' and 'slow' are defined by time-'fast' is what moves much in a short time, 'slow' what moves little in a long time; but time is not defined by time, by being either a certain amount or a certain kind of it.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν· μηδὲν δὲ διαφερέτω λέγειν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κίνησιν ἢ μεταβολήν.	Clearly then it is not movement. (We need not distinguish at present between 'movement' and 'change'.)
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐν Σαρδοῖ μυθολογουμένοις καθεύδειν παρὰ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὅταν ἐγερθῶσι· συνάπτουσι γὰρ τῷ πρότερον νῦν τὸ ὕστερον νῦν καὶ ἓν ποιοῦσιν, ἐξαιροῦντες διὰ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὸ μεταξύ. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ μὴ ἦν ἕτερον τὸ νῦν ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν χρόνος, οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ λανθάνει ἕτερον ὄν, οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ χρόνος. εἰ δὴ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι χρόνον τότε συμβαίνει ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὴ ὁρίσωμεν μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ φαίνηται ἡ ψυχὴ μένειν, ὅταν δ' αἰσθώμεθα καὶ ὁρίσωμεν, τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς (219a.) χρόνος.	Chapter 11 218b21 But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our own minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize that time has elapsed, any more than those who are fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the earlier 'now' with the later and make them one, cutting out the interval because of their failure to notice it. So, just as, if the 'now' were not different but one and the same, there would not have been time, so too when its difference escapes our notice the interval does not seem to be time. If, then, the non-realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change, but the soul seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of movement and change.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε κίνησις οὔτ' ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστί, φανερόν·	219a1 It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of movement.
ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν.	We must take this as our starting-point and try to discover-since we wish to know what time is-what exactly it has to do with movement.
ἅμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου· καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος καὶ μηδὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος πάσχωμεν, κίνησις δέ τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνῇ, εὐθὺς ἅμα δοκεῖ τις γεγονέναι καὶ χρόνος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅταν γε χρόνος δοκῇ γεγονέναι τις, ἅμα καὶ κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ γεγονέναι. ὥστε ἤτοι κίνησις ἢ τῆς κινήσεώς τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη τῆς κινήσεώς τι εἶναι αὐτόν.	Now we perceive movement and time together: for even when it is dark and we are not being affected through the body, if any movement takes place in the mind we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed; and not only that but also, when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it seems to have taken place. Hence time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is not movement, it must be the other.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἴς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.	219a10 But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time; for the time that has passed is always thought to be in proportion to the movement.
τὸ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει·	219a14 The distinction of 'before' and 'after' holds primarily, then, in place; and there in virtue of relative position.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἔστι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ.	219a19 Since then 'before' and 'after' hold in magnitude, they must hold also in movement, these corresponding to those.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστιν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν κίνησις [ἐστιν]· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις.	But also in time the distinction of 'before' and 'after' must hold, for time and movement always correspond with each other. The 'before' and 'after' in motion is identical in substratum with motion yet differs from it in definition, and is not identical with motion.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν.	219a22 But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by 'before' and 'after'; and it is only when we have perceived 'before' and 'after' in motion that we say that time has elapsed.
ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω.	219a25 Now we mark them by judging that A and B are different, and that some third thing is intermediate to them. When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the 'nows' are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded by the 'now' is thought to be time-we may assume this.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὡς ἓν τὸ νῦν αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἤτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὑστέρου τινός, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐδείς, ὅτι οὐδὲ κίνησις. ὅταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον (219b.) καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγομεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.	When, therefore, we perceive the 'now' one, and neither as before and after in a motion nor as an identity but in relation to a 'before' and an 'after', no time is thought to have elapsed, because there has been no motion either. On the other hand, when we do perceive a 'before' and an 'after', then we say that there is time. For time is just this-number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'.
οὐκ ἄρα κί νησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις.	Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.
σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος.	219b2 A proof of this: we discriminate the more or the less by number, but more or less movement by time. Time then is a kind of number.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν.	219b5 (Number, we must note, is used in two senses-both of what is counted or the countable and also of that with which we count. Time obviously is what is counted, not that with which we count: there are different kinds of thing.)
ἔστι δ' ἕτερον ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις αἰεὶ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη, καὶ ὁ χρόνος (ὁ δ' ἅμα πᾶς χρόνος ὁ αὐτός· τὸ γὰρ νῦν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ποτ' ἦν—τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον—τὸ δὲ νῦν τὸν χρόνον ὁρίζει, ᾗ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον).	219b9 Just as motion is a perpetual succession, so also is time. But every simultaneous time is self-identical; for the 'now' as a subject is an identity, but it accepts different attributes. The 'now' measures time, in so far as time involves the 'before and after'.
τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτό, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτό· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἕτερον (τοῦτο δ' ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ νῦν <εἶναι>, ὃ δέ ποτε ὄν ἐστι τὸ νῦν, τὸ αὐτό.	219b12 The 'now' in one sense is the same, in another it is not the same. In so far as it is in succession, it is different (which is just what its being was supposed to mean), but its substratum is an identity:
ἀκολουθεῖ γάρ, ὡς ἐλέχθη, τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις, ταύτῃ δ' ὁ χρόνος, ὥς φαμεν· καὶ ὁμοίως δὴ τῇ στιγμῇ τὸ φερόμενον, ᾧ τὴν κίνησιν γνωρίζομεν καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. τοῦτο δὲ ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν τὸ αὐτό (ἢ στιγμὴ γὰρ ἢ λίθος ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτόν ἐστι), τῷ λόγῳ δὲ ἄλλο, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ λαμβάνουσιν ἕτερον τὸ Κορίσκον ἐν Λυκείῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ Κορίσκον ἐν ἀγορᾷ. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τῷ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἄλλοθι εἶναι ἕτερον· τῷ δὲ φερομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ νῦν, ὥσπερ ὁ χρόνος τῇ κινήσει (τῷ γὰρ φερομένῳ γνωρίζομεν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει, ᾗ δ' ἀριθμητὸν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τὸ νῦν ἔστιν)· ὥστε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν νῦν ἐστι, τὸ αὐτό (τὸ πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν κινήσει), τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον (ᾗ ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τὸ νῦν ἔστιν).	219b15 for motion, as was said, goes with magnitude, and time, as we maintain, with motion. Similarly, then, there corresponds to the point the body which is carried along, and by which we are aware of the motion and of the 'before and after' involved in it. This is an identical substratum (whether a point or a stone or something else of the kind), but it has different attributes as the sophists assume that Coriscus' being in the Lyceum is a different thing from Coriscus' being in the market-place. And the body which is carried along is different, in so far as it is at one time here and at another there. But the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion. For it is by means of the body that is carried along that we become aware of the 'before and after' the motion, and if we regard these as countable we get the 'now'. Hence in these also the 'now' as substratum remains the same (for it is what is before and after in movement), but what is predicated of it is different; for it is in so far as the 'before and after' is numerable that we get the 'now'.
καὶ γνώριμον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ ἡ φορὰ διὰ τὸ φερόμενον· τόδε γάρ τι τὸ φερόμενον, ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὔ. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν αἰεί, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φερόμενον.	219b28 This is what is most knowable: for, similarly, motion is known because of that which is moved, locomotion because of that which is carried. what is carried is a real thing, the movement is not. Thus what is called 'now' in one sense is always the same; in another it is not the same: for this is true also of what is carried.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἴτε χρόνος μὴ εἴη, τὸ νῦν οὐκ ἂν (220a.) εἴη, εἴτε τὸ νῦν μὴ εἴη, χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἅμα γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ φερόμενον καὶ ἡ φορά, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τοῦ φερομένου καὶ ὁ τῆς φορᾶς.	219b33 Clearly, too, if there were no time, there would be no 'now', and vice versa. just as the moving body and its locomotion involve each other mutually, so too do the number of the moving body and the number of its locomotion. For the number of the locomotion is time, while the 'now' corresponds to the moving body, and is like the unit of number.
χρόνος μὲν γὰρ ὁ τῆς φορᾶς ἀριθμός, τὸ νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ φερόμενον, οἷον μονὰς ἀριθμοῦ. καὶ συνεχής τε δὴ ὁ χρόνος τῷ νῦν, καὶ διῄρηται κατὰ τὸ νῦν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τῇ φορᾷ καὶ τῷ φερομένῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ φορὰ μία τῷ φερομένῳ, ὅτι ἕν (καὶ οὐχ ὅ ποτε ὄν—καὶ γὰρ ἂν διαλίποι—ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ)· καὶ ὁρίζει δὲ τὴν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον κίνησιν τοῦτο.	220a4 Time, then, also is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it. For here too there is a correspondence with the locomotion and the moving body. For the motion or locomotion is made one by the thing which is moved, because it is one-not because it is one in its own nature (for there might be pauses in the movement of such a thing)-but because it is one in definition: for this determines the movement as 'before' and 'after'.
ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτό πως τῇ στιγμῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ συνέχει τὸ μῆκος καὶ ὁρίζει· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δὲ τελευτή. ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν οὕτω λαμβάνῃ τις ὡς δυσὶ χρώμενος τῇ μιᾷ, ἀνάγκη ἵστασθαι, εἰ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ ἡ αὐτὴ στιγμή· τὸ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ φερόμενον αἰεὶ ἕτερον.	220a9 Here, too there is a correspondence with the point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length-it is the beginning of one and the end of another. But when you take it in this way, using the one point as two, a pause is necessary, if the same point is to be the beginning and the end. The 'now' on the other hand, since the body carried is moving, is always different.
ὥσθ' ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς στιγμῆς, ὅτι ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς γραμμῆς μᾶλλον—καὶ οὐχ ὡς τὰ μέρη, διά τε τὸ εἰρημένον (τῇ γὰρ μέσῃ στιγμῇ ὡς δυσὶ χρήσεται, ὥστε ἠρεμεῖν συμβήσεται),	Hence time is not number in the sense in which there is 'number' of the same point because it is beginning and end, but rather as the extremities of a line form a number, and not as the parts of the line do so, both for the reason given (for we can use the middle point as two, so that on that analogy time might stand still),
καὶ ἔτι φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν μόριον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου, οὐδ' ἡ διαίρεσις τῆς κινήσεως, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ στιγμὴ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ αἱ δύο τῆς μιᾶς μόρια.	220a18 and further because obviously the 'now' is no part of time nor the section any part of the movement, any more than the points are parts of the line-for it is two lines that are parts of one line.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν πέρας τὸ νῦν, οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν· ᾗ δ' ἀριθμεῖ, ἀριθμός · τὰ μὲν γὰρ πέρατα ἐκείνου μόνον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστιν πέρατα, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶνδε τῶν ἵππων, ἡ δεκάς, καὶ ἄλλοθι.	In so far then as the 'now' is a boundary, it is not time, but an attribute of it; in so far as it numbers, it is number; for boundaries belong only to that which they bound, but number (e.g. ten) is the number of these horses, and belongs also elsewhere.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ συνεχής (συνεχοῦς γάρ), φανερόν.	220a24 It is clear, then, that time is 'number of movement in respect of the before and after', and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous.
Ἐλάχιστος δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστὶν ἡ δυάς· τὶς δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἔστιν, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον γραμμῆς ἐλάχιστος πλήθει μέν ἐστιν αἱ δύο ἢ ἡ μία, μεγέθει δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστος· ἀεὶ γὰρ διαιρεῖται πᾶσα γραμμή. ὥστε ὁμοίως καὶ χρόνος· ἐλάχιστος γὰρ κατὰ μὲν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ δύο, κατὰ μέγεθος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.	Chapter 12 The smallest number, in the strict sense of the word 'number', is two. But of number as concrete, sometimes there is a minimum, sometimes not: e.g. of a 'line', the smallest in respect of multiplicity is two (or, if you like, one), but in respect of size there is no minimum; for every line is divided ad infinitum. Hence it is so with time. In respect of number the minimum is one (or two); in point of extent there is no minimum.
φανερὸν (220b.) δὲ καὶ ὅτι ταχὺς μὲν καὶ βραδὺς οὐ λέγεται, πολὺς δὲ καὶ ὀλίγος καὶ μακρὸς καὶ βραχύς. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ συνεχής, μακρὸς καὶ βραχύς, ᾗ δὲ ἀριθμός, πολὺς καὶ ὀλίγος.	220a32 It is clear, too, that time is not described as fast or slow, but as many or few and as long or short. For as continuous it is long or short and as a number many or few, but it is not fast or slow-any more than any number with which we number is fast or slow.
ταχὺς δὲ καὶ βραδὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ᾗ ἀριθμοῦμεν ταχὺς καὶ βραδὺς οὐδείς. καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ πανταχοῦ ἅμα· πρότερον δὲ καὶ ὕστερον οὐχ ὁ αὐτός, ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἡ μὲν παροῦσα μία, ἡ δὲ γεγενημένη καὶ ἡ μέλλουσα ἑτέρα, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμούμενος, οὗτος δὲ συμβαίνει πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἀεὶ ἕτερος· τὰ γὰρ νῦν ἕτερα. ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἷς μὲν καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἵππων καὶ ὁ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν δ' ἀριθμός, ἕτερα, οἱ ἵπποι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.	220b5 Further, there is the same time everywhere at once, but not the same time before and after, for while the present change is one, the change which has happened and that which will happen are different. Time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted, and this according as it occurs before or after is always different, for the 'nows' are different. And the number of a hundred horses and a hundred men is the same, but the things numbered are different-the horses from the men.
ἔτι ὡς ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον, οἷον ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ἔαρ ἢ μετόπωρον.	220b12 Further, as a movement can be one and the same again and again, so too can time, e.g. a year or a spring or an autumn.
οὐ μόνον δὲ τὴν κίνησιν τῷ χρόνῳ μετροῦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ κινήσει τὸν χρόνον διὰ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ὁρίζει τὴν κίνησιν ἀριθμὸς ὢν αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ κίνησις τὸν χρόνον. καὶ λέγομεν πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον τῇ κινήσει μετροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ τῷ ἀριθμητῷ τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἷον τῷ ἑνὶ ἵππῳ τὸν τῶν ἵππων ἀριθμόν. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τῶν ἵππων πλῆθος γνωρίζομεν, πάλιν δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ ἵππῳ τὸν τῶν ἵππων ἀριθμὸν αὐτόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τῆς κινήσεως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρόνῳ τὴν κίνησιν, τῇ δὲ κινήσει τὸν χρόνον μετροῦμεν.	220b14 Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other. The time marks the movement, since it is its number, and the movement the time. We describe the time as much or little, measuring it by the movement, just as we know the number by what is numbered, e.g. the number of the horses by one horse as the unit. For we know how many horses there are by the use of the number; and again by using the one horse as unit we know the number of the horses itself. So it is with the time and the movement; for we measure the movement by the time and vice versa.
καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις, τῇ δὲ κινήσει ὁ χρό νος, τῷ καὶ ποσὰ καὶ συνεχῆ καὶ διαιρετὰ εἶναι· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἡ κίνησις ταῦτα πέπονθεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος. καὶ μετροῦμεν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῇ. κινήσει καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τῷ μεγέθει· πολλὴν γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν τὴν ὁδόν, ἂν ἡ πορεία πολλή, καὶ ταύτην πολλήν, ἂν ἡ ὁδὸς [ᾖ] πολλή· καὶ τὸν χρόνον, ἂν ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν, ἂν ὁ χρόνος.	220b24 It is natural that this should happen; for the movement goes with the distance and the time with the movement, because they are quanta and continuous and divisible. The movement has these attributes because the distance is of this nature, and the time has them because of the movement. And we measure both the distance by the movement and the movement by the distance; for we say that the road is long, if the journey is long, and that this is long, if the road is long-the time, too, if the movement, and the movement, if the time.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον (221a.) κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, μετρεῖ δ' οὗτος τὴν κίνησιν τῷ ὁρίσαι τινὰ κίνησιν ἣ καταμετρήσει τὴν ὅλην (ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μῆκος ὁ πῆχυς τῷ ὁρίσαι τι μέγεθος ὃ ἀναμετρήσει τὸ ὅλον), καὶ ἔστιν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς (ἅμα γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως μετρεῖ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι),	220b32 Time is a measure of motion and of being moved, and it measures the motion by determining a motion which will measure exactly the whole motion, as the cubit does the length by determining an amount which will measure out the whole. Further 'to be in time' means for movement, that both it and its essence are measured by time (for simultaneously it measures both the movement and its essence, and this is what being in time means for it, that its essence should be measured).
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου. τὸ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι δυοῖν ἐστιν θάτερον, ἓν μὲν τὸ εἶναι τότε ὅτε ὁ χρόνος ἔστιν, ἓν δὲ ὥσπερ ἔνια λέγομεν ὅτι ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ σημαίνει ἤτοι ὡς μέρος ἀριθμοῦ καὶ πάθος, καὶ ὅλως ὅτι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τι, ἢ ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἀριθμός.	221a7 Clearly then 'to be in time' has the same meaning for other things also, namely, that their being should be measured by time. 'To be in time' is one of two things: (1) to exist when time exists, (2) as we say of some things that they are 'in number'. The latter means either what is a part or mode of number-in general, something which belongs to number-or that things have a number.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὁ χρόνος, τὸ μὲν νῦν καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα οὕτως ἐν χρόνῳ ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ μονὰς καὶ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τί ἐστιν)· τὰ δὲ πράγματα ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου ὥσπερ <καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ> καὶ τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὑπὸ τόπου.	Now, since time is number, the 'now' and the 'before' and the like are in time, just as 'unit' and 'odd' and 'even' are in number, i.e. in the sense that the one set belongs to number, the other to time. But things are in time as they are in number. If this is so, they are contained by time as things in place are contained by place.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ὅτε ὁ χρόνος ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ὅτε ἡ κίνησις καὶ ὁ τόπος ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἔν τινι οὕτω, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐν ὁτῳοῦν ἔσται, καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῇ κέγχρῳ· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ κέγχρος ἔστιν, ἔστι καὶ ὁ οὐρανός. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναί τινα χρόνον ὅτε κἀκεῖνο ἔστιν, καὶ τῷ ἐν κινήσει ὄντι εἶναι τότε κίνησιν.	Plainly, too, to be in time does not mean to co-exist with time, any more than to be in motion or in place means to co-exist with motion or place. For if 'to be in something' is to mean this, then all things will be in anything, and the heaven will be in a grain; for when the grain is, then also is the heaven. But this is a merely incidental conjunction, whereas the other is necessarily involved: that which is in time necessarily involves that there is time when it is, and that which is in motion that there is motion when it is.
ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστιν ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ληφθήσεταί τις πλείων χρόνος παντὸς τοῦ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντος· διὸ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντα περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ χρόνου, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἔν τινί ἐστιν, οἷον τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ τόπου.	221a26 Since what is 'in time' is so in the same sense as what is in number is so, a time greater than everything in time can be found. So it is necessary that all the things in time should be contained by time, just like other things also which are 'in anything', e.g. the things 'in place' by place.
καὶ πάσχει δή τι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καθάπερ καὶ λέγειν εἰώθαμεν ὅτι κατατήκει ὁ χρόνος, καὶ γηράσκει πάνθ' ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεται διὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ' (221b.) οὐ μεμάθηκεν, οὐδὲ νέον γέγονεν οὐδὲ καλόν· φθορᾶς γὰρ αἴτιος καθ' ἑαυτὸν μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ κινήσεως, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἐξίστησιν τὸ ὑπάρχον·	221a30 A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed to say that time wastes things away, and that all things grow old through time, and that there is oblivion owing to the lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know or of becoming young or fair. For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it is the number of change, and change removes what is.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα, ᾗ αἰεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου, οὐδὲ μετρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου·	221b3 Hence, plainly, things which are always are not, as such, in time, for they are not contained time, nor is their being measured by time.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου ὡς οὐκ ὄντα ἐν χρόνῳ.	221b5 A proof of this is that none of them is affected by time, which indicates that they are not in time.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἠρεμίας μέτρον [κατὰ συμβεβηκός]· πᾶσα γὰρ ἠρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ.	221b7 Since time is the measure of motion, it will be the measure of rest too-indirectly. For all rest is in time.
οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ὂν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως, ἐν ἀριθμῷ δὲ κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.	221b9 For it does not follow that what is in time is moved, though what is in motion is necessarily moved. For time is not motion, but 'number of motion': and what is at rest, also, can be in the number of motion.
οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀκίνητον ἠρεμεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐστερημένον κινήσεως πεφυκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον.	221b12 Not everything that is not in motion can be said to be 'at rest'-but only that which can be moved, though it actually is not moved, as was said above.
τὸ δ' εἶναι ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἐστιν τὸ εἶναί τινα ἀριθμὸν τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ μετρεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, ὥστ' εἰ ἐν χρόνῳ, ὑπὸ χρόνου. μετρήσει δ' ὁ χρόνος τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν, ᾗ τὸ μὲν κινούμενον τὸ δὲ ἠρεμοῦν·	'To be in number' means that there is a number of the thing, and that its being is measured by the number in which it is. Hence if a thing is 'in time' it will be measured by time.
τὴν γὰρ κίνησιν αὐτῶν μετρήσει καὶ τὴν ἠρεμίαν, πόση τις.	221b16 But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one qua moved, the other qua at rest; for it will measure their motion and rest respectively.
ὥστε τὸ κινούμενον οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἔσται μετρητὸν ὑπὸ χρόνου, ᾗ ποσόν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ ποσή. ὥστε ὅσα μήτε κινεῖται μήτ' ἠρεμεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαί ἐστι χρόνῳ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος κινήσεως καὶ ἠρεμίας μέτρον.	221b20 Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in so far as it has quantity, but in so far as its motion has quantity. Thus none of the things which are neither moved nor at rest are in time: for 'to be in time' is 'to be measured by time', while time is the measure of motion and rest.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ, οἷον ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον.	221b23 Plainly, then, neither will everything that does not exist be in time, i.e. those non-existent things that cannot exist, as the diagonal cannot be commensurate with the side.
ὅλως γάρ, εἰ μέτρον μέν ἐστι κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος καθ' αὑτό, τῶν δ' ἄλλων κατὰ συμβεβηκός, δῆλον ὅτι ὧν τὸ εἶναι μετρεῖ, τούτοις ἅπασιν ἔσται τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἠρεμεῖν ἢ κινεῖσθαι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν φθαρτὰ καὶ γενητὰ καὶ ὅλως ὁτὲ μὲν ὄντα ὁτὲ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκη ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι (ἔστιν γὰρ χρόνος τις πλείων, ὃς ὑπερέξει τοῦ τε εἶναι αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ μετροῦντος τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν)· τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὅσα μὲν περιέχει ὁ χρόνος, τὰ μὲν ἦν, οἷον Ὅμηρός ποτε (222a.) ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἔσται, οἷον τῶν μελλόντων τι, ἐφ' ὁπότερα περιέχει· καὶ εἰ ἐπ' ἄμφω, ἀμφότερα [καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔσται]· ὅσα δὲ μὴ περιέχει μηδαμῇ, οὔτε ἦν οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὅσων τἀντικείμενα αἰεὶ ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀεὶ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτ' ἐν χρόνῳ. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ σύμμετρον· διὸ αἰεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅτι ἐναντίον τῷ αἰεὶ ὄντι. ὅσων δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ αἰεί, ταῦτα δὲ δύναται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μή, καὶ ἔστιν γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ αὐτῶν.	Generally, if time is directly the measure of motion and indirectly of other things, it is clear that a thing whose existence is measured by it will have its existence in rest or motion. Those things therefore which are subject to perishing and becoming-generally, those which at one time exist, at another do not-are necessarily in time: for there is a greater time which will extend both beyond their existence and beyond the time which measures their existence. Of things which do not exist but are contained by time some were, e.g. Homer once was, some will be, e.g. a future event; this depends on the direction in which time contains them; if on both, they have both modes of existence. As to such things as it does not contain in any way, they neither were nor are nor will be. These are those nonexistents whose opposites always are, as the incommensurability of the diagonal always is-and this will not be in time. Nor will the commensurability, therefore; hence this eternally is not, because it is contrary to what eternally is. A thing whose contrary is not eternal can be and not be, and it is of such things that there is coming to be and passing away.
Τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστιν συνέχεια χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη· συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ πέρας χρόνου ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχή, τοῦ δὲ τελευτή. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς στιγμῆς μενούσης φανερόν.	Chapter 13 222a10 The 'now' is the link of time, as has been said (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other). But this is not obvious as it is with the point, which is fixed.
διαιρεῖ δὲ δυνάμει. καὶ ᾗ μὲν τοιοῦτο, αἰεὶ ἕτερον τὸ νῦν, ᾗ δὲ συνδεῖ, αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτό, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν γραμμῶν (οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ αἰεὶ στιγμὴ τῇ νοήσει· διαιρούντων γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη· ᾗ δὲ μία, ἡ αὐτὴ πάντῃ)	222a14 It divides potentially, and in so far as it is dividing the 'now' is always different, but in so far as it connects it is always the same, as it is with mathematical lines. For the intellect it is not always one and the same point, since it is other and other when one divides the line; but in so far as it is one, it is the same in every respect.
—οὕτω καὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν τοῦ χρόνου διαίρεσις κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἑνότης·	So the 'now' also is in one way a potential dividing of time, in another the termination of both parts, and their unity.
ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἡ διαίρεσις καὶ ἡ ἕνωσις, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό.	222a19 And the dividing and the uniting are the same thing and in the same reference, but in essence they are not the same.
τὸ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται τῶν νῦν,	So one kind of 'now' is described in this way:
ἄλλο δ' ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ὁ τούτου ἐγγὺς ᾖ. ἥξει νῦν, ὅτι τήμερον ἥξει· ἥκει νῦν, ὅτι ἦλθε τήμερον. τὰ δ' ἐν Ἰλίῳ γέγονεν οὐ νῦν, οὐδ' ὁ κατακλυσμὸς [γέγονε] νῦν· καίτοι συνεχὴς ὁ χρόνος εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς.	222a21 another is when the time is near this kind of 'now'. 'He will come now' because he will come to-day; 'he has come now' because he came to-day. But the things in the Iliad have not happened 'now', nor is the flood 'now'-not that the time from now to them is not continuous, but because they are not near.
τὸ δὲ ποτέ χρόνος ὡρισμένος πρὸς τὸ πρότερον νῦν, οἷον ποτὲ ἐλήφθη Τροία, καὶ ποτὲ ἔσται κατακλυσμός· δεῖ γὰρ πεπεράνθαι πρὸς τὸ νῦν. ἔσται ἄρα ποσός τις ἀπὸ τοῦδε χρόνος εἰς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἦν εἰς τὸ παρελθόν.	222a24 'At some time' means a time determined in relation to the first of the two types of 'now', e.g. 'at some time' Troy was taken, and 'at some time' there will be a flood; for it must be determined with reference to the 'now'. There will thus be a determinate time from this 'now' to that, and there was such in reference to the past event. But if there be no time which is not 'sometime', every time will be determined.
εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς χρόνος ὃς οὔ ποτε, πᾶς ἂν εἴη χρόνος πεπερασμένος. ἆρ' οὖν ὑπολείψει; ἢ οὔ, εἴπερ αἰεὶ ἔστι κίνησις; ἄλλος οὖν ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλάκις; δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἂν ἡ κίνησις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία γίγνεταί ποτε, ἔσται καὶ χρόνος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται.	222a28 Will time then fail? Surely not, if motion always exists. Is time then always different or does the same time recur? Clearly time is, in the same way as motion is. For if one and the same motion sometimes recurs, it will be one and the same time, and if not, not.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νῦν τελευτὴ (222b.) καὶ ἀρχὴ χρόνου, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρήκοντος τελευτή, ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἔχοι ἂν ὥσπερ ὁ κύκλος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πως τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τελευτῇ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἀεὶ ἕτερος· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ νῦν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία ἂν εἴη. καὶ οὐχ ὑπολείψει δή· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ.	Since the 'now' is an end and a beginning of time, not of the same time however, but the end of that which is past and the beginning of that which is to come, it follows that, as the circle has its convexity and its concavity, in a sense, in the same thing, so time is always at a beginning and at an end. And for this reason it seems to be always different; for the 'now' is not the beginning and the end of the same thing; if it were, it would be at the same time and in the same respect two opposites. And time will not fail; for it is always at a beginning.
τὸ δ' ἤδη τὸ ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ παρόντος νῦν ἀτόμου μέρος τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου (πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη, ὅτι ἐγγὺς ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μέλλει), καὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὸ μὴ πόρρω τοῦ νῦν (πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη βεβάδικα). τὸ δὲ Ἴλιον φάναι ἤδη ἑαλωκέναι οὐ λέγομεν, ὅτι λίαν πόρρω τοῦ νῦν.	222b7 'Presently' or 'just' refers to the part of future time which is near the indivisible present 'now' ('When do you walk? 'Presently', because the time in which he is going to do so is near), and to the part of past time which is not far from the 'now' ('When do you walk?' 'I have just been walking'). But to say that Troy has just been taken-we do not say that, because it is too far from the 'now'.
καὶ τὸ ἄρτι τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ παρόντος νῦν [τὸ] μόριον τοῦ παρελθόντος. πότε ἦλθες; ἄρτι, ἐὰν ᾖ ὁ χρόνος ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος νῦν. πάλαι δὲ τὸ πόρρω.	222b12 'Lately', too, refers to the part of past time which is near the present 'now'. 'When did you go?' 'Lately', if the time is near the existing now. 'Long ago' refers to the distant past.
τὸ δ' ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν·	'Suddenly' refers to what has departed from its former condition in a time imperceptible because of its smallness;
μεταβολὴ δὲ πᾶσα φύσει ἐκστατικόν. ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντα γίγνεται καὶ φθείρεται· διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν σοφώτατον ἔλεγον, ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρειος Πάρων ἀμαθέστατον, ὅτι καὶ ἐπιλανθάνονται ἐν τούτῳ, λέγων ὀρθότερον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι φθορᾶς μᾶλλον ἔσται καθ' αὑτὸν αἴτιος ἢ γενέσεως, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον (ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ἡ μεταβολὴ καθ' αὑτήν), γενέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	222b16 but it is the nature of all change to alter things from their former condition. In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view. It is clear then that it must be in itself, as we said before, the condition of destruction rather than of coming into being (for change, in itself, makes things depart from their former condition), and only incidentally of coming into being, and of being.
σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανὸν ὅτι γίγνεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ κινεῖσθαί πως αὐτὸ καὶ πράττειν, φθείρεται δὲ καὶ μηδὲν κινούμενον. καὶ ταύτην μάλιστα λέγειν εἰώθαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου φθοράν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταύτην ὁ χρόνος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἐν χρόνῳ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταύτην τὴν μεταβολήν.	222b22 A sufficient evidence of this is that nothing comes into being without itself moving somehow and acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if it does not move at all. And this is what, as a rule, we chiefly mean by a thing's being destroyed by time. Still, time does not work even this change; even this sort of change takes place incidentally in time.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος καὶ τί, καὶ ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ νῦν, καὶ τί τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ἄρτι καὶ τὸ ἤδη καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ τὸ ἐξαίφνης, εἴρηται.	222b27 We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time', 'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean.
Τούτων δ' ἡμῖν οὕτω διωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσα μεταβολὴ καὶ ἅπαν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ. τὸ γὰρ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον κατὰ πᾶσάν ἐστιν μεταβολήν (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ οὕτω φαίνεται)· λέγω δὲ θᾶττον κινεῖσθαι τὸ πρότερον (223a.) μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα καὶ ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν κινούμενον (οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς φορᾶς, εἰ ἄμφω κατὰ τὴν περιφερῆ κινεῖται ἢ ἄμφω κατὰ τὴν εὐθεῖαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων).	Chapter 14 222b30 These distinctions having been drawn, it is evident that every change and everything that moves is in time; for the distinction of faster and slower exists in reference to all change, since it is found in every instance. In the phrase 'moving faster' I refer to that which changes before another into the condition in question, when it moves over the same interval and with a regular movement; e.g. in the case of locomotion, if both things move along the circumference of a circle, or both along a straight line; and similarly in all other cases.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρότερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστί· πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ὕστερον λέγομεν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἀπόστασιν, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅρος τοῦ παρήκοντος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὰ νῦν ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἔσται· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ τὸ νῦν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ νῦν ἀπόστασις. (ἐναντίως δὲ λέγεται τὸ πρότερον κατά τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ παρεληλυθότι πρότερον λέγομεν τὸ πορρώτερον τοῦ νῦν, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον, ἐν δὲ τῷ μέλλοντι πρότερον μὲν τὸ ἐγγύτερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ πορρώτερον.) ὥστε ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐν χρόνῳ, πάσῃ δ' ἀκολουθεῖ κινήσει τὸ πρότερον, φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσα μεταβολὴ καὶ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν.	223a4 But what is before is in time; for we say 'before' and 'after' with reference to the distance from the 'now', and the 'now' is the boundary of the past and the future; so that since 'nows' are in time, the before and the after will be in time too; for in that in which the 'now' is, the distance from the 'now' will also be. But 'before' is used contrariwise with reference to past and to future time; for in the past we call 'before' what is farther from the 'now', and 'after' what is nearer, but in the future we call the nearer 'before' and the farther 'after'. So that since the 'before' is in time, and every movement involves a 'before', evidently every change and every movement is in time.
ἄξιον δ' ἐπισκέψεως καὶ πῶς ποτε ἔχει ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ διὰ τί ἐν παντὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ἐν γῇ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ.	223a16 It is also worth considering how time can be related to the soul; and why time is thought to be in everything, both in earth and in sea and in heaven.
ἢ ὅτι κινήσεώς τι πάθος ἢ ἕξις, ἀριθμός γε ὤν, ταῦτα δὲ κινητὰ πάντα (ἐν τόπῳ γὰρ πάντα), ὁ δὲ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἅμα κατά τε δύναμιν καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν;	223a18 Is because it is an attribute, or state, or movement (since it is the number of movement) and all these things are movable (for they are all in place), and time and movement are together, both in respect of potentiality and in respect of actuality?
πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὔ, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις.	223a21 Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked;
ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός. ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἠριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν.	223a22 for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has been, or what can be, counted.
εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὔσης, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο ὅ ποτε ὂν ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς. τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ᾗ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν.	223a25 But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time unless there were soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can exist without soul, and the before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua numerable.
ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ ποίας κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός. ἢ ὁποιασοῦν;	223a29 One might also raise the question what sort of movement time is the number of. Must we not say 'of any kind'?
καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ φθείρεται καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ φέρεται· ᾗ οὖν κίνησίς ἐστι, ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ἑκάστης κινήσεως ἀριθμός. διὸ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀριθμὸς (223b.) συνεχοῦς, ἀλλ' οὐ τινός.	223a30 For things both come into being in time and pass away, and grow, and are altered in time, and are moved locally; thus it is of each movement qua movement that time is the number. And so it is simply the number of continuous movement, not of any particular kind of it.
ἀλλ' ἔστι νῦν κεκινῆσθαι καὶ ἄλλο· ὧν ἑκατέρας τῆς κινήσεως εἴη ἂν ἀριθμός. ἕτερος οὖν χρόνος ἔστιν, καὶ ἅμα δύο ἴσοι χρόνοι ἂν εἶεν·	223b1 But other things as well may have been moved now, and there would be a number of each of the two movements. Is there another time, then, and will there be two equal times at once?
ἢ οὔ; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ χρόνος καὶ εἷς ὁ ἴσος καὶ ἅμα· εἴδει δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ ἅμα· εἰ γὰρ εἶεν κύνες, οἱ δ' ἵπποι, ἑκάτεροι δ' ἑπτά, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἅμα περαινομένων ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ταχεῖα ἴσως ἡ δ' οὔ, καὶ ἡ μὲν φορὰ ἡ δ' ἀλλοίωσις· ὁ μέντοι χρόνος ὁ αὐτός, εἴπερ καὶ [ὁ ἀριθμὸς] ἴσος καὶ ἅμα, τῆς τε ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ τῆς φορᾶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ μὲν κινήσεις ἕτεραι καὶ χωρίς, ὁ δὲ χρόνος πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πανταχοῦ ὁ τῶν ἴσων καὶ ἅμα.	223b3 Surely not. For a time that is both equal and simultaneous is one and the same time, and even those that are not simultaneous are one in kind; for if there were dogs, and horses, and seven of each, it would be the same number. So, too, movements that have simultaneous limits have the same time, yet the one may in fact be fast and the other not, and one may be locomotion and the other alteration; still the time of the two changes is the same if their number also is equal and simultaneous; and for this reason, while the movements are different and separate, the time is everywhere the same, because the number of equal and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and the same.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι φορὰ καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ, ἀριθμεῖται δ' ἕκαστον ἑνί τινι συγγενεῖ,	223b12 Now there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion there is included circular movement, and everything is measured by some one thing homogeneous with it,
μονάδες μονάδι, ἵπποι δ' ἵππῳ, οὕτω <δὲ> καὶ ὁ χρόνος χρόνῳ τινὶ ὡρισμένῳ, μετρεῖται δ', ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,	units by a unit, horses by a horse, and similarly times by some definite time, and, as we said,
ὅ τε χρόνος κινήσει καὶ ἡ κίνησις χρόνῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὑπὸ τῆς ὡρισμένης κινήσεως χρόνῳ μετρεῖται τῆς τε κινήσεως τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τοῦ χρόνου)—	time is measured by motion as well as motion by time (this being so because by a motion definite in time the quantity both of the motion and of the time is measured):
εἰ οὖν τὸ πρῶτον μέτρον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν, ἡ κυκλοφορία ἡ ὁμαλὴς μέτρον μάλιστα, ὅτι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ ταύτης γνωριμώτατος. ἀλλοίωσις μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ αὔξησις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐκ εἰσὶν ὁμαλεῖς, φορὰ δ' ἔστιν.	223b18 if, then, what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is the best known. Now neither alteration nor increase nor coming into being can be regular, but locomotion can be.
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ χρόνος εἶναι ἡ τῆς σφαίρας κίνησις, ὅτι ταύτῃ μετροῦνται αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις καὶ ὁ χρόνος ταύτῃ τῇ κινήσει.	223b21 This also is why time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz. because the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement.
διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς λέγεσθαι συμβαίνει· φασὶν γὰρ κύκλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κίνησιν ἐχόντων φυσικὴν καὶ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν. τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ κρίνεται, καὶ λαμβάνει τελευτὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κατά τινα περίοδον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ κύκλος τις· τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν δοκεῖ, διότι τοιαύτης ἐστὶ φορᾶς μέτρον καὶ μετρεῖται αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοιαύτης. ὥστε τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν πραγμάτων κύκλον τὸ λέγειν ἐστὶν τοῦ χρόνου εἶναί τινα κύκλον· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι μετρεῖται τῇ κυκλοφορίᾳ· παρὰ γὰρ τὸ μέτρον οὐδὲν (224a.) ἄλλο παρεμφαίνεται τῷ μετρουμένῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείω μέτρα τὸ ὅλον.	223b23 This also explains the common saying that human affairs form a circle, and that there is a circle in all other things that have a natural movement and coming into being and passing away. This is because all other things are discriminated by time, and end and begin as though conforming to a cycle; for even time itself is thought to be a circle. And this opinion again is held because time is the measure of this kind of locomotion and is itself measured by such. So that to say that the things that come into being form a circle is to say that there is a circle of time; and this is to say that it is measured by the circular movement; for apart from the measure nothing else to be measured is observed; the whole is just a plurality of measures.
λέγεται δὲ ὀρθῶς καὶ ὅτι ἀριθμὸς μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν κυνῶν, εἰ ἴσος ἑκάτερος, δεκὰς δὲ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐδὲ δέκα τὰ αὐτά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τρίγωνα τὰ αὐτὰ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ τὸ σκαληνές, καίτοι σχῆμά γε ταὐτό, ὅτι τρίγωνα ἄμφω· ταὐτὸ γὰρ λέγεται οὗ μὴ διαφέρει διαφορᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ οὗ διαφέρει, οἷον τρίγωνον τριγώνου <τριγώνου> διαφορᾷ διαφέρει· τοιγαροῦν ἕτερα τρίγωνα· σχήματος δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ διαιρέσει καὶ μιᾷ. σχῆμα γὰρ τὸ μὲν τοιόνδε κύκλος, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε τρίγωνον, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν τοι όνδε ἰσόπλευρον, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σκαληνές. σχῆμα μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτο τρίγωνον, τρίγωνον δ' οὐ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὴ ὁ αὐτός (οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἀριθμοῦ διαφορᾷ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν), δεκὰς δ' οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· ἐφ' ὧν γὰρ λέγεται, διαφέρει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ κύνες, τὰ δ' ἵπποι.	224a2 It is said rightly, too, that the number of the sheep and of the dogs is the same number if the two numbers are equal, but not the same decad or the same ten; just as the equilateral and the scalene are not the same triangle, yet they are the same figure, because they are both triangles. For things are called the same so-and-so if they do not differ by a differentia of that thing, but not if they do; e.g. triangle differs from triangle by a differentia of triangle, therefore they are different triangles; but they do not differ by a differentia of figure, but are in one and the same division of it. For a figure of the one kind is a circle and a figure of another kind of triangle, and a triangle of one kind is equilateral and a triangle of another kind scalene. They are the same figure, then, that, triangle, but not the same triangle. Therefore the number of two groups also-is the same number (for their number does not differ by a differentia of number), but it is not the same decad; for the things of which it is asserted differ; one group are dogs, and the other horses.
καὶ περὶ μὲν χρόνου καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν οἰκείων τῇ σκέψει εἴρηται.	We have now discussed time-both time itself and the matters appropriate to the consideration of it.