Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C38

Chapter 38

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0679A) CAPUT XXXVIII. De anadiplosi et thesi syllogismorum, hoc est de geminatione et positione.	38
49a11 Τὸ δ᾽ ἐπαναδιπλούμενον ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσι πρὸς τῶι πρώτωι ἄκρωι θετέον, οὐ πρὸς τῶι μέσωι. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ γένοιτο συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν, τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἧι ἀγαθόν πρὸς τῶι πρώτωι θετέον. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ Β ἀγαθόν, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ Γ δικαιοσύνη. τὸ δὴ Α ἀληθὲς τοῦ Β κατηγορῆσαι·	(0679B) Reduplicatum autem in propositionibus ad primam extremitatem ponendum, non ad medium, dico autem ut si fiat syllogismus, quoniam iustitiae est disciplina quoniam bonum, ad primam extremitatem ponendum. Sit enim A disciplina quoniam bonum, in quo autem B bonum, in quo autem C iustitia, ergo verum est A de B praedicari.	A term which is repeated in the premisses ought to be joined to the first extreme, not to the middle. I mean for example that if a syllogism should be made proving that there is knowledge of justice, that it is good, the expression ‘that it is good’ (or ‘qua good’) should be joined to the first term. Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is good’, B for good, C for justice. It is true to predicate A of B.
τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη ὅπερ ἀγαθόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν γί- νεται ἀνάλυσις. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τῶι Β τεθείη τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἔσται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Α κατὰ τοῦ Β ἀληθὲς ἔσται, τὸ δὲ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἀγαθὸν κατηγορεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ψεῦδος καὶ οὐ συνετόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν δειχθείη ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπιστητὸν ἧι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τραγέλαφος ἧι μὴ ὄν, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φθαρτὸν ἧι αἰσθητόν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς ἐπικατηγορουμένοις πρὸς τῶι ἄκρωι τὴν ἐπαναδίπλωσιν θετέον.	Nam boni est disciplina quoniam bonum. Sed et B de C, nam iustitia quiddam bonum est; sic ergo fit resolutio. (0679C) Si autem ad B ponatur, quoniam bonum, non erit, nam A quidem de B verum erit, B autem de C non erit verum, nam bonum quoniam bonum praedicari de iustitia falsum est, et non intelligibile. Similiter autem et si salubre ostendatur, quoniam disciplinatum est in eo quod bonum, aut hircocervus, opinabilis in eo quod existens, aut homo corruptibilis in eo quod sensibile, in omnibus enim praedicatis ad extremum reduplicationem ponendum.	For of the good there is knowledge that it is good. Also it is true to predicate B of C. For justice is identical with a good. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made. But if the expression ‘that it is good’ were added to B, the conclusion will not follow: for A will be true of B, but B will not be true of C. For to predicate of justice the term ‘good that it is good’ is false and not intelligible. Similarly if it should be proved that the healthy is an object of knowledge qua good, of goat-stag an object of knowledge qua not existing, or man perishable qua an object of sense: in every case in which an addition is made to the predicate, the addition must be joined to the extreme.
Οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ θέσις τῶν ὅρων ὅταν ἁπλῶς τι συλλογισθῆι καὶ ὅταν τόδε τι ἢ πῆι ἢ πώς, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὅταν τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστητὸν δειχθῆι καὶ ὅταν ἐπιστητὸν ὅτι ἀγα θόν· ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητὸν δέδεικται, μέσον θετέον τὸ ὄν, εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, τὸ τὶ ὄν.	Non est autem eadem positio terminorum, quando simpliciter quidem syllogizatum fuerit, et quando hoc aliquid, aut quo, aut quomodo. Dico autem ut quando bonum disciplinatum ostensum erit, et quando disciplinatum quoniam bonum. (0679D) Sed simpliciter quidem disciplinatum ostensum est medium ponendum ens, si autem quoniam bonum, quid ens.	The position of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition, e.g. when the good is proved to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved to be an object of knowledge that it is good. If it has been proved to be an object of knowledge without qualification, we must put as middle term ‘that which is’, but if we add the qualification ‘that it is good’, the middle term must be ‘that which is something’.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τὶ ὄν, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ Β ὄν τι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ ἀγαθόν. ἀληθὲς δὴ τὸ Α τοῦ Β κατηγορεῖν· ἦν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τινὸς ὄντος ὅτι τὶ ὄν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ· τὸ γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ ὄν τι. ὥστε καὶ τὸ Α τοῦ Γ· ἔσται ἄρα ἐπιστήμη τἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν· ἦν γὰρ τὸ τὶ ὂν τῆς ἰδίου σημεῖον οὐσίας. εἰ δὲ τὸ ὂν μέσον ἐτέθη καὶ πρὸς τῶι ἄκρωι τὸ ὂν ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ τὸ τὶ ὂν ἐλέχθη, οὐκ ἂν ἦν συλλογισμὸς ὅτι ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ὄν, οἷον ἐφ᾽ ὧι τὸ Α ἐπιστήμη ↵ ὅτι ὄν, ἐφ᾽ ὧι Β ὄν, ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ ἀγαθόν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐν μέρει συλλογισμοῖς οὕτως ληπτέον τοὺς ὅρους.	Sit enim A disciplina quoniam quid ens, in quo autem B ens quid, in quo autem C bonum, verum est ergo A de B praedicari, erat enim disciplina alicuius entis, quoniam quid ens, sed et B de C, nam in quo C ens quid, quare et A de C, erit ergo disciplina boni quoniam bonum, erat enim quid ens, proprie substantiae signum. Si autem ens medium positum sit, et ad extremum ens simpliciter, et non quid ens dictum sit, non erit syllogismus, quoniam est disciplina boni quoniam bonum, sed quoniam ens, ut si sit in quo A disciplina quoniam ens, in quo B ens, in quo C bonum. Manifestum igitur quoniam in particularibus syllogismis sic sumendum terminos.	Let A stand for ‘knowledge that it is something’, B stand for ‘something’, and C stand for ‘good’. It is true to predicate A of B: for ex hypothesi there is a science of that which is something, that it is something. B too is true of C: for that which C represents is something. Consequently A is true of C: there will then be knowledge of the good, that it is good: for ex hypothesi the term ‘something’ indicates the thing’s special nature. But if ‘being’ were taken as middle and ‘being’ simply were joined to the extreme, not ‘being something’, we should not have had a syllogism proving that there is knowledge of the good, that it is good, but that it is; e.g. let A stand for knowledge that it is, B for being, C for good. Clearly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated.