Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 2/C19

Chapter 19

Greek	Latin	English
		19
66a25 Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ κατασυλλογίζεσθαι παρατηρητέον, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἐρωτᾶι τὸν λόγον, ὅπως μὴ δοθῆι δὶς ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν, ἐπειδήπερ ἴσμεν ὅτι ἄνευ μέσου συλλογισμὸς οὐ γίνεται, μέσον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ πλεονάκις λεγόμενον. ὡς δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον συμπέρασμα τηρεῖν τὸ μέσον, φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ εἰδέναι ποῖον ἐν ἑκάστωι σχήματι δείκνυται. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι πῶς ὑπέχομεν τὸν λόγον.	Ut autem non catasyllogizetur, observandum, quando sine conclusionibus interrogat orationem, ut non detur bis idem in propositionibus, eo quod scimus quoniam sine medio syllogismus non fit, medium autem est quod plerumque dicitur. (0705C) Quomodo autem oportet ad unamquamque conclusionem observare medium manifestum est, eo quod scitur quale in unaquaque figura ostenditur, hoc autem nos non latebit, eo quod videmus quomodo submittimus orationem.	In order to avoid having a syllogism drawn against us we must take care, whenever an opponent asks us to admit the reason without the conclusions, not to grant him the same term twice over in his premisses, since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle term, and that term which is stated more than once is the middle. How we ought to watch the middle in reference to each conclusion, is evident from our knowing what kind of thesis is proved in each figure. This will not escape us since we know how we are maintaining the argument.
Χρὴ δ᾽ ὅπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσται πρῶτον, ἐὰν τὰ συμπεράσματα μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται ἀλλ᾽ εἰλημμένων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄδηλα ἦι, ἔτι δὲ ἂν μὴ τὰ σύνεγγυς ἐρωτᾶι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα ἄμεσα. οἷον ἔστω δέον συμπεραίνεσθαι τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Ζ· μέσα Β Γ Δ Ε. δεῖ οὖν ἐρωτᾶν εἰ τὸ Α τῶι Β, καὶ πάλιν μὴ εἰ τὸ Β τῶι Γ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ Δ τῶι Ε, κἄπειτα εἰ τὸ Β τῶι Γ, καὶ οὕτω ↵ τὰ λοιπά. κἂν δι᾽ ἑνὸς μέσου γίνηται ὁ συλλογισμός, ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἄρχεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν οὕτω λανθάνοι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.	Oportet autem quod custodire praecipimus respondentes, ipsos argumentantes tentare latere, hoc autem erit primum quidem si conclusiones non prius syllogizent, sed sumptis necessariis non manifestae sint. Amplius autem si non propinqua interrogant, sed quam maxime longe media, ut si sit opportunum concludere A D E F, media B E D E, oportet ergo inquirere si A B, et rursum non si B E, sed si D E, deinde si B C, et sic reliqua, et si per unum medium sit syllogismus, A medio incipere, maxime enim sic latebit respondentem.	That which we urge men to beware of in their admissions, they ought in attack to try to conceal. This will be possible first, if, instead of drawing the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms, they take the necessary premisses and leave the conclusions in the dark; secondly if instead of inviting assent to propositions which are closely connected they take as far as possible those that are not connected by middle terms. For example suppose that A is to be inferred to be true of F, B, C, D, and E being middle terms. One ought then to ask whether A belongs to B, and next whether D belongs to E, instead of asking whether B belongs to C; after that he may ask whether B belongs to C, and so on. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle term, he ought to begin with that: in this way he will most likely deceive his opponent.