Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 2/C21

Chapter 21

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0706A) CAPUT XXI. De fallacia secundum opinionem.	21
66b18 Συμβαίνει δ᾽ ἐνίοτε, καθάπερ ἐν τῆι θέσει τῶν ὅρων ἀπατώμεθα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπάτην, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ πλείοσι πρώτοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ μὲν λεληθέναι τινὰ καὶ οἴεσθαι μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ εἰδέναι. ἔστω τὸ Α τῶι Β καὶ τῶι Γ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχον, καὶ ταῦτα παντὶ τῶι Δ ὡσαύτως. εἰ δὴ τῶι μὲν Β τὸ Α παντὶ οἴεται ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τοῦτο τῶι Δ, τῶι δὲ Γ τὸ Α μηδενί, καὶ τοῦτο τῶι Δ παντί, τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἕξει ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἄγνοιαν.	Accidit autem quandoque (quemadmodum in positione terminorum fallebamur) et secundum opinionem fieri fallaciam, ut si contingat idem pluribus principaliter inesse, et hoc quidem latere aliquem, et putare nulli inesse, illud autem scire, ut insit A B et C per se, et haec omni D similiter. Si igitur B quidem putet omni A inesse, et hoc D, C autem nulli A, et hoc omni D, eiusdem secundum idem habebit disciplinam et ignorantiam.	It sometimes happens that just as we are deceived in the arrangement of the terms, so error may arise in our thought about them, e.g. if it is possible that the same predicate should belong to more than one subject immediately, but although knowing the one, a man may forget the other and think the opposite true. Suppose that A belongs to B and to C in virtue of their nature, and that B and C belong to all D in the same way. If then a man thinks that A belongs to all B, and B to D, but A to no C, and C to all D, he will both know and not know the same thing in respect of the same thing.
πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπατηθείη περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει τῶι Β, τοῦτο δὲ τῶι Γ καὶ τὸ Γ τῶι Δ, ὑπολαμβάνοι δὲ τὸ Α παντὶ τῶι Β ὑπάρχειν καὶ πάλιν μηδενὶ τῶι Γ· ἅμα γὰρ εἴσεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ὑπολήψεται ὑπάρχειν. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀξιοῖ ἐκ τούτων ἢ ὁ ἐπίσταται, τοῦτο μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν; ἐπίσταται γάρ πως ὅτι τὸ Α τῶι Γ ὑπάρχει διὰ τοῦ Β, ὡς τῆι καθόλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ὥστε ὅ πως ἐπίσταται, τοῦτο ὅλως ἀξιοῖ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.	(0706B) Rursum si quis fallatur circa ea quae sunt ex eadem coniugatione, ut si A inest B, hoc autem C, et C D, opinetur autem A inesse omni B, et rursum nulli C. Simul enim sciet, et non opinabitur inesse; ergo nihil aliud existimat ex iis quam scit, hoc non opinari, scit enim aliquo modo quoniam A inest C per B, velut in universali hoc quod est particulare; quare quod aliquo modo scit, hoc omnino existimat non opinari, quod est impossibile.	Again if a man were to make a mistake about the members of a single series; e.g. suppose A belongs to B, B to C, and C to D, but some one thinks that A belongs to all B, but to no C: he will both know that A belongs to D, and think that it does not. Does he then maintain after this simply that what he knows, he does not think? For he knows in a way that A belongs to C through B, since the part is included in the whole; so that what he knows in a way, this he maintains he does not think at all: but that is impossible.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος, εἰ μὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς συστοιχίας τὸ μέσον, καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον μὲν τῶν μέσων ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν, οἷον τὸ Α τῶι μὲν Β παντί, τῶι δὲ Γ μηδενί, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀμφότερα παντὶ τῶι Δ. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντίαν λαμβάνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην πρότασιν.	In eo autem quod prius dictum est, si non ex eadem coniugatione sit medium; secundum utrumque quidem mediorum ambas propositiones non possibile est opinari, ut A B quidem omni, C autem nulli, haec autem utraque omni D; accidit autem aut simpliciter aut in aliquo contrariam sumere primam propositionem.	In the former case, where the middle term does not belong to the same series, it is not possible to think both the premisses with reference to each of the two middle terms: e.g. that A belongs to all B, but to no C, and both B and C belong to all D. For it turns out that the first premiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or partially contrary to the first premiss of the other.
εἰ γὰρ ὧι τὸ Β ὑπάρχει, παντὶ τὸ Α ὑπολαμβάνει ↵ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τῶι Δ οἶδε, καὶ ὅτι τῶι Δ τὸ Α οἶδεν. ὥστ᾽ εἰ πάλιν, ὧι τὸ Γ, μηδενὶ οἴεται τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν, ὧι τὸ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχει, τούτωι οὐκ οἴεται τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ παντὶ οἰόμενον ὧι τὸ Β, πάλιν τινὶ μὴ οἴεσθαι ὧι τὸ Β, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντίον ἐστίν. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπολαβεῖν, καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον δὲ τὴν μίαν ἢ κατὰ θάτερον ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον τὸ Α παντὶ τῶι Β καὶ τὸ Β τῶι Δ, καὶ πάλιν τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῶι Γ.	(0706C) Si enim cui B inest omni A opinatur inesse, B autem D novit, et quoniam A D novit, quare si rursum cui C nulli, putat A inesse, cui B alicui inest, huic non putat A inesse, quod autem omni putat cui B, rursum alicui non putare cui B, aut simpliciter, aut in aliquo contrarium et; sic ergo non contingit opinari. Secundum utrumque autem unam, aut secundum alterum utrasque, nihil prohibet A omni B, et B D, et rursum A nulli C.	For if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs, and he knows that B belongs to D, then he knows that A belongs to D. Consequently if again he thinks that A belongs to nothing to which C belongs, he thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs; but if he thinks that A belongs to everything to which B belongs, and again thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs, these beliefs are wholly or partially contrary. In this way then it is not possible to think; but nothing prevents a man thinking one premiss of each syllogism of both premisses of one of the two syllogisms: e.g. A belongs to all B, and B to D, and again A belongs to no C.
ὁμοία γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀπάτη καὶ ὡς ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὰς ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ ὧι τὸ Β, παντὶ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ Β τῶι Γ παντί, τὸ Α παντὶ τῶι Γ ὑπάρξει. εἰ οὖν τις οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ Α, ὧι τὸ Β, ὑπάρ- χει παντί, οἶδε καὶ ὅτι τῶι Γ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγνοεῖν τὸ Γ ὅτι ἔστιν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν Α δύο ὀρθαί, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Β τρίγωνον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Γ αἰσθητὸν τρίγωνον. ὑπολάβοι γὰρ ἄν τις μὴ εἶναι τὸ Γ, εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δύο ὀρθάς, ὥσθ᾽ ἅμα εἴσεται καὶ ἀγνοήσει ταὐτόν. τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι πᾶν τρίγωνον ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῶι τὴν καθόλου ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ τὴν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὡς τῆι καθόλου οἶδε τὸ Γ ὅτι δύο ὀρθαί, ὡς δὲ τῆι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὐκ οἶδεν, ὥστ᾽ οὐχ ἕξει τὰς ἐναντίας.	(0706D) Nam similis huiusmodi fallacia, veluti fallimur circa particularia, ut si A omni B inest, B autem omni C, A omni C inerit; si ergo aliquis novit quoniam A cui B inest omni, novit et quoniam ei quod est C; sed nihil prohibet ignorare C quoniam est, ut si A quidem duo recti, in quo autem B triangulus, in quo vero C sensibilis triangulus; opinabitur enim aliquis non esse C, sciens quoniam omnis triangulus habet duos rectos: quare simul sciet et ignorabit idem, nam scire omnem triangulum quoniam duobus rectis, non simplex est, sed hoc quidem universalem habet disciplinam, illud vero singularem. Sic ergo in universali novit C, quoniam duobus rectis, in singulari autem non novit, quare non habebit contrarias.	An error of this kind is similar to the error into which we fall concerning particulars: e.g. if A belongs to all B, and B to all C, A will belong to all C. If then a man knows that A belongs to everything to which B belongs, he knows that A belongs to C. But nothing prevents his being ignorant that C exists; e.g. let A stand for two right angles, B for triangle, C for a particular diagram of a triangle. A man might think that C did not exist, though he knew that every triangle contains two right angles; consequently he will know and not know the same thing at the same time. For the expression ‘to know that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles’ is ambiguous, meaning to have the knowledge either of the universal or of the particulars. Thus then he knows that C contains two right angles with a knowledge of the universal, but not with a knowledge of the particulars; consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to his ignorance.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῶι Μένωνι λόγος, ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ συμβαίνει προεπίστασθαι τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῆι ἐπαγωγῆι λαμβάνειν τὴν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ ἀναγνωρίζοντας. ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ἴσμεν, οἷον ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς, ἐὰν ἴδωμεν ὅτι τρίγωνον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Similiter autem est quae in Menone est oratio, quoniam disciplina est reminiscentia; nunquam enim accidit praescire quod singulare est, sed simul inductione sumere particularium disciplinam, velut recognoscentes. Nam quaedam scientes, statim scimus, ut quoniam duobus rectis, si scimus quoniam triangulus, similiter autem et in aliis.	The argument in the Meno that learning is recollection may be criticized in a similar way. For it never happens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the particular, but along with the process of being led to see the general principle he receives a knowledge of the particulars, by an act (as it were) of recognition. For we know some things directly; e.g. that the angles are equal to two right angles, if we know that the figure is a triangle. Similarly in all other cases.
Τῆι μὲν οὖν καθόλου θεωροῦμεν τὰ ἐν μέρει, τῆι δ᾽ οἰκείαι οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὥστ᾽ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ αὐτά, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν μὲν τὴν καθόλου, ἀπατᾶσθαι δὲ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.	Ergo universali quidem speculamur particularia, propria autem non scimus; quare contingit et falli circa ea, verum non contrarie, sed habere quidem universale, decipi autem particulari.	By a knowledge of the universal then we see the particulars, but we do not know them by the kind of knowledge which is proper to them; consequently it is possible that we may make mistakes about them, but not that we should have the knowledge and error that are contrary to one another: rather we have the knowledge of the universal but make a mistake in apprehending the particular.
ὁμοίως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων· οὐ γὰρ ἐναντία ἡ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἀπάτη τῆι κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστήμηι, οὐδ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τῶν μέσων ὑπόληψις. οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει εἰδότα καὶ ὅτι τὸ Α ὅλωι τῶι Β ὑπάρχει καὶ πάλιν τοῦτο τῶι Γ, οἰηθῆναι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῶι Γ, οἷον ὅτι πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος καὶ αὕτη ἡμίονος οἴεσθαι κύειν ταύτην· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταται ὅτι τὸ Α τῶι Γ, μὴ συνθεωρῶν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον.	(0707A) Similiter autem in praedictis, non enim contraria quae est secundum medium ei quae est secundum syllogismum disciplinae, nec quae est secundum utrumque mediorum opinatio, nihil enim prohibet scientem, et quoniam A toti B inest, et rursum hoc toti C, putare non inesse, ut quoniam omnis mula sterilis, et haec mula, putare hanc habere in utero; non enim scit quoniam A, C qui non conspicit, quod est secundum utrumque.	Similarly in the cases stated above. The error in respect of the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism, nor is the thought in respect of one middle term contrary to that in respect of the other. Nothing prevents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B, and that B again belongs to C, thinking that A does not belong to C, e.g. knowing that every mule is sterile and that this is a mule, and thinking that this animal is with foal: for he does not know that A belongs to C, unless he considers the two propositions together.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν οἶδε τὸ δὲ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀπατηθήσεται· ὅπερ ἔχουσιν αἱ καθόλου πρὸς τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμας. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰ↵σθητῶν ἔξω τῆς αἰσθήσεως γενόμενον ἴσμεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἠισθημένοι τυγχάνωμεν, εἰ μὴ ὡς τῶι καθόλου καὶ τῶι ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς τῶι ἐνεργεῖν.	Quare manifestum quoniam et si hoc quidem novit, illud vero non novit, falletur, quod habent universales ad particulares disciplinas; nullum enim sensibilium cum extra sensum fit scimus, nec si sentientes fuerimus scimus, nisi ut in universali, et in eo quod habet propriam disciplinam, sed non in eo quod est in actum.	So it is evident that if he knows the one and does not know the other, he will fall into error. And this is the relation of knowledge of the universal to knowledge of the particular. For we know no sensible thing, once it has passed beyond the range of our senses, even if we happen to have perceived it, except by means of the universal and the possession of the knowledge which is proper to the particular, but without the actual exercise of that knowledge.
τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι λέγεται τριχῶς, ἢ ὡς τῆι καθόλου ἢ ὡς τῆι οἰκείαι ἢ ὡς τῶι ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἠπατῆσθαι τοσαυταχῶς. οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει καὶ εἰδέναι καὶ ἠπατῆσθαι περὶ ταὐτό, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως. ὅπερ συμβαίνει καὶ τῶι καθ᾽ ἑκατέραν εἰδότι τὴν πρότασιν καὶ μὴ ἐπεσκεμμένωι πρότερον. ὑπολαμβάνων γὰρ κύειν τὴν ἡμίονον οὐκ ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπιστήμην, οὐδ᾽ αὖ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἐναντίαν ἀπάτην τῆι ἐπιστήμηι· συλλογισμὸς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντία ἀπάτη τῆι καθόλου.	(0707B) Nam scire tripliciter dicitur, aut ut universali, aut ut propria, aut ut in actu, quare et decipi totidem modis, nihil ergo prohibet et scire, et deceptum esse circa idem, verumtamen non contrarie. Quod accidit et ei qui secundum utramque scit propositionum, et non pertractavit prius, nam opinans in utero habere mulam, non habet secundum ac um disciplinam, neque propter opinionem fallaciam contrariam disciplinae, syllogismus enim est contraria fallacis in universali.	For to know is used in three senses: it may mean either to have knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge proper to the matter in hand or to exercise such knowledge: consequently three kinds of error also are possible. Nothing then prevents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same thing, provided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary. And this happens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the premisses and who has not previously considered the particular question. For when he thinks that the mule is with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual exercise, nor on the other hand has his thought caused an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error contrary to the knowledge of the universal would be a syllogism.
Ὁ δ᾽ ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ ἀγαθῶι εἶναι κακῶι εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπολήψεται ἀγαθῶι εἶναι καὶ κακῶι. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθῶι εἶναι ἐφ᾽ οὗ Α, τὸ δὲ κακῶι εἶναι ἐφ᾽ οὗ Β, πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθῶι εἶναι ἐφ᾽ οὗ Γ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ, καὶ εἶναι τὸ Γ τὸ Β ὑπολήψεται, καὶ πάλιν τὸ Β τὸ Α εἶναι ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Γ τὸ Α. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἦν ἀληθές, καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β, καὶ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Γ τὸ Α ἀληθὲς ἦν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν.	Qui autem opinatur quod bonum esse est malum esse, idem opinabitur bonum esse et malum. Sit enim bonum esse in quo A, malum autem esse in quo B, rursum bonum esse in quo C; quoniam igitur idem opinatur et B et C, et esse C B opinabitur, et rursum B esse A similiter, quare et C A, nam quemadmodum si erat verum de quo C B, et de quo B A, et de quo C A verum erat, sic et in opinatione.	But he who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad. Let A stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of bad, and again C for the essence of good. Since then he thinks B and C identical, he will think that C is B, and similarly that B is A, consequently that C is A. For just as we saw that if B is true of all of which C is true, and A is true of all of which B is true, A is true of C, similarly with the word ‘think’.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ Γ καὶ Β, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ Β καὶ Α, καὶ τὸ Γ τῶι Α ταὐτὸν ἦν· ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξάζειν ὁμοίως. ἆρ᾽ οὖν τοῦτο μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τις δώσει τὸ πρῶτον; ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἐκεῖνο ψεῦδος, τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν τινὰ κακῶι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθῶι εἶναι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πολλαχῶς γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπολαμβάνειν. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο βέλτιον.	Similiter autem et in eo quod est esse. (0707C) Nam cum idem sit C et B, et rursum B et A, C A idem erit, quare et opinatione similiter; ergo hoc quidem necessarium si quis det primum. Sed fortasse illud falsum opinari aliquem quod malum esse est bonum esse, nisi secundum accidens; multipliciter enim possibile est hoc opinari, perspiciendum autem hoc melius.	Similarly also with the word ‘is’; for we saw that if C is the same as B, and B as A, C is the same as A. Similarly therefore with ‘opine’. Perhaps then this is necessary if a man will grant the first point. But presumably that is false, that any one could suppose the essence of good to be the essence of bad, save incidentally. For it is possible to think this in many different ways. But we must consider this matter better.