Authors/Augustine/City of God/City of God Book XI

ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XI

Introduction
Chapter 1 Of This Part of the Work, Wherein We Begin to Explain the Origin and End of the Two Cities
Chapter 2 Of the Knowledge of God, to Which No Man Can Attain Save Through the Mediator Between God and Men, the Man Christ Jesus
Chapter 3 Of the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures Composed by the Divine Spirit
Chapter 4 That the World is Neither Without Beginning, Nor Yet Created by a New Decree of God, by Which He Afterwards Willed What He Had Not Before Willed
Chapter 5 That We Ought Not to Seek to Comprehend the Infinite Ages of Time Before the World, Nor the Infinite Realms of Space
Chapter 6 That the World and Time Had Both One Beginning, and the One Did Not Anticipate the Other
Chapter 7 Of the Nature of the First Days, Which are Said to Have Had Morning and Evening, Before There Was a Sun
Chapter 8 What We are to Understand of God's Resting on the Seventh Day, After the Six Days' Work
Chapter 9 What the Scriptures Teach Us to Believe Concerning the Creation of the Angels
Chapter 10 Of the Simple and Unchangeable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, One God, in Whom Substance and Quality are Identical
Chapter 11 Whether the Angels that Fell Partook of the Blessedness Which the Holy Angels Have Always Enjoyed from the Time of Their Creation
Chapter 12 A Comparison of the Blessedness of the Righteous, Who Have Not Yet Received the Divine Reward, with that of Our First Parents in Paradise
Chapter 13 Whether All the Angels Were So Created in One Common State of Felicity, that Those Who Fell Were Not Aware that They Would Fall, and that Those Who Stood Received Assurance of Their Own Perseverance After the Ruin of the Fallen
Chapter 14 An Explanation of What is Said of the Devil, that He Did Not Abide in the Truth, Because the Truth Was Not in Him
Chapter 15 How We are to Understand the Words, "The Devil Sins from the Beginning
Chapter 16 Of the Ranks and Differences of the Creatures, Estimated by Their Utility, or According to the Natural Gradations of Being
Chapter 17 That the Flaw of Wickedness is Not Nature, But Contrary to Nature, and Has Its Origin, Not in the Creator, But in the Will
Chapter 18 Of the Beauty of the Universe, Which Becomes, by God's Ordinance, More Brilliant by the Opposition of Contraries
Chapter 19 What, Seemingly, We are to Understand by the Words, "God Divided the Light from the Darkness
Chapter 20 Of the Words Which Follow the Separation of Light and Darkness, "And God Saw the Light that It Was Good
Chapter 21 Of God's Eternal and Unchangeable Knowledge and Will, Whereby All He Has Made Pleased Him in the Eternal Design as Well as in the Actual Result
Chapter 22 Of Those Who Do Not Approve of Certain Things Which are a Part of This Good Creation of a Good Creator, and Who Think that There is Some Natural Evil
Chapter 23 Of the Error in Which the Doctrine of Origen is Involved
Chapter 24 Of the Divine Trinity, and the Indications of Its Presence Scattered Everywhere Among Its Works
Chapter 25 Of the Division of Philosophy into Three Parts
Chapter 26 Of the Image of the Supreme Trinity, Which We Find in Some Sort in Human Nature Even in Its Present State
Chapter 27 Of Existence, and Knowledge of It, and the Love of Both
Chapter 28 Whether We Ought to Love the Love Itself with Which We Love Our Existence and Our Knowledge of It, that So We May More Nearly Resemble the Image of the Divine Trinity
Chapter 29 Of the Knowledge by Which the Holy Angels Know God in His Essence, and by Which They See the Causes of His Works in the Art of the Worker, Before They See Them in the Works of the Artist
Chapter 30 Of the Perfection of the Number Six, Which is the First of the Numbers Which is Composed of Its Aliquot Parts
Chapter 31 Of the Seventh Day, in Which Completeness and Repose are Celebrated
Chapter 32 Of the Opinion that the Angels Were Created Before the World
Chapter 33 Of the Two Different and Dissimilar Communities of Angels, Which are Not Inappropriately Signified by the Names Light and Darkness
Chapter 34 Of the Idea that the Angels Were Meant Where the Separation of the Waters by the Firmament is Spoken Of, and of that Other Idea that the Waters Were Not Created

Latin	Latin
BOOK XI []	The City of God (Book XI) Argument-Here begins the second partof this work, which treats of the origin, history, and destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. In the first place, Augustin shows in this book how the two cities were formed originally, by the separation of the good and bad angels; and takes occasion to treat of the creation of the world, as it is described in Holy Scripture in the beginning of the book of Genesis.
BOOK XI [I] Civitatem Dei dicimus, cuius ea scriptura testis est, quae non fortuitis motibus animorum, sed plane summae dispositione providentiae super omnes omnium gentium litteras omnia sibi genera ingeniorum humanorum divina excellens auctoritate subiecit. Ibi quippe scriptum est: Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei; et in alio psalmo legitur: Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis in civitate Dei nostri, in monte sancto eius, dilatans exultationes universae terrae f et paulo post in eodem psalmo: Sicut audivimus, ita et vidimus, in civitate domini virtutum, in civitate Dei nostri; Deus fundavit eam in aeternum; item in alio: Fluminis impetus laetificat civitatem Dei, sanctificavit tabernaculum suum Altissimus; Deus in medio eius non commovebitur. His atque huius modi testimoniis, quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, didicimus esse quandam civitatem Dei, cuius cives esse concupivimus illo amore, quem nobis illius conditor inspiravit. Huic conditori sanctae civitatis cives terrenae civitatis deos suos praeferunt ignorantes eum esse Deum deorum, non deorum falsorum, hoc est impiorum et superborum, qui eius incommutabili omnibusque communi luce privati et ob hoc ad quandam egenam potestatem redacti suas quodam modo privatas potentias consectantur honoresque divinos a deceptis subditis quaerunt; sed deorum piorum atque sanctorum, qui potius se ipsos uni subdere quam multos sibi, potiusque Deum colere quam pro Deo coli delectantur. Sed huius sanctae civitatis inimicis decem superioribus libris, quantum potuimus, domino et rege nostro adivuante respondimus. Nunc vero quid a me iam expectetur agnoscens meique non inmemor debiti de duarum civitatum, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, quas in hoc interim saeculo perplexas quodam modo diximus inuicemque permixtas, exortu et excursu et debitis finibus, quantum valuero, disputare eius ipsius domini et regis nostri ubique opitulatione fretus adgrediar, primumque dicam, quem ad modum exordia duarum istarum civitatum in angelorum diversitate praecesserint.	The city of God we speak of is the same to which testimony is borne by that Scripture, which excels all the writings of all nations by its divine authority, and has brought under its influence all kinds of minds, and this not by a casual intellectual movement, but obviously by an express providential arrangement. For there it is written, "Glorious things are spoken of you, O city of God." And in another psalm we read, "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised in the city of our God, in the mountain of His holiness, increasing the joy of the whole earth." And, a little after, in the same psalm, "As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of the Lord of hosts, in the city of our God. God has established it for ever." And in another, "There is a river the streams whereof shall make glad the city of our God, the holy place of the tabernacles of the Most High. God is in the midst of her, she shall not be moved." From these and similar testimonies, all of which it were tedious to cite, we have learned that there is a city of God, and its Founder has inspired us with a love which makes us covet its citizenship. To this Founder of the holy city the citizens of the earthly city prefer their own gods, not knowing that He is the God of gods, not of false, i.e., of impious and proud gods, who, being deprived of His unchangeable and freely communicated light, and so reduced to a kind of poverty-stricken power, eagerly grasp at their own private privileges, and seek divine honors from their deluded subjects; but of the pious and holy gods, who are better pleased to submit themselves to one, than to subject many to themselves, and who would rather worship God than be worshipped as God. But to the enemies of this city we have replied in the ten preceding books, according to our ability and the help afforded by our Lord and King. Now, recognizing what is expected of me, and not unmindful of my promise, and relying, too, on the same succor, I will endeavor to treat of the origin, and progress, and deserved destinies of the two cities (the earthly and the heavenly, to wit), which, as we said, are in this present world commingled, and as it were entangled together. And, first, I will explain how the foundations of these two cities were originally laid, in the difference that arose among the angels.
BOOK XI [II] Magnum est et admodum rarum universam creaturam corpoream et incorpoream consideratam compertamque mutabilem intentione mentis excedere atque ad incommutabilem Dei substantiam pervenire et illic discere ex ipso, quod cunctam naturam, quae non est quod ipse, non fecit nisi ipse. Sic enim Deus cum homine non per aliquam creaturam loquitur corporalem, corporalibus instrepens auribus, ut inter sonantem et audientem aeria spatia verberentur, neque per eius modi spiritalem, quae corporum similitudinibus figuratur, sicut in somnis vel quo alio tali modo (nam et sic velut corporis auribus loquitur, quia velut per corpus loquitur et velut interposito corporalium locorum interuallo; multum enim similia sunt talia visa corporibus); sed loquitur ipsa veritate, si quis sit idoneus ad audiendum mente, non corpore. Ad illud enim hominis ita loquitur, quod in homine ceteris, quibus homo constat, est melius, et quo ipse Deus solus est melior. Cum enim homo rectissime intellegatur vel, si hoc non potest, saltem credatur factus ad imaginem Dei: profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori Deo, qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet. Sed quia ipsa mens, cui ratio et intellegentia naturaliter inest, vitiis quibusdam tenebrosis et ueteribus inualida est, non solum ad inhaerendum fruendo, verum etiam ad perferendum incommutabile lumen, donec de die in diem renouata atque sanata fiat tantae felicitatis capax, fide primum fuerat inbuenda atque purganda. In qua ut fidentius ambularet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Deus Dei filius, homine adsumpto, non Deo consumpto, eandem constituit et fundavit fidem, ut ad hominis Deum iter esset homini per hominem Deum. Hic est enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Per hoc enim mediator, per quod homo, per hoc et via. Quoniam si inter eum qui tendit et illud quo tendit via media est, spes est perveniendi; si autem desit aut ignoretur qua eundum sit, quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit? Sola est autem adversus omnes errores via munitissima, ut idem ipse sit Deus et homo; quo itur Deus, qua itur homo.	It is a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal, and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and, by the continued soaring of his mind, to attain to the unchangeable substance of God, and, in that height of contemplation, to learn from God Himself that none but He has made all that is not of the divine essence. For God speaks with a man not by means of some audible creature dinning in his ears, so that atmospheric vibrations connect Him that makes with him that hears the sound, nor even by means of a spiritual being with the semblance of a body, such as we see in dreams or similar states; for even in this case He speaks as if to the ears of the body, because it is by means of the semblance of a body He speaks, and with the appearance of a real interval of space,-for visions are exact representations of bodily objects. Not by these, then, does God speak, but by the truth itself, if any one is prepared to hear with the mind rather than with the body. For He speaks to that part of man which is better than all else that is in him, and than which God Himself alone is better. For since man is most properly understood (or, if that cannot be, then, at least, believed) to be made in God's image, no doubt it is that part of him by which he rises above those lower parts he has in common with the beasts, which brings him nearer to the Supreme. But since the mind itself, though naturally capable of reason and intelligence is disabled by besotting and inveterate vices not merely from delighting and abiding in, but even from tolerating His unchangeable light, until it has been gradually healed, and renewed, and made capable of such felicity, it had, in the first place, to be impregnated with faith, and so purified. And that in this faith it might advance the more confidently towards the truth, the truth itself, God, God's Son, assuming humanity without destroying His divinity, established and founded this faith, that there might be a way for man to man's God through a God-man. For this is the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. For it is as man that He is the Mediator and the Way. Since, if the way lies between him who goes, and the place whither he goes, there is hope of his reaching it; but if there be no way, or if he know not where it is, what boots it to know whither he should go? Now the only way that is infallibly secured against all mistakes, is when the very same person is at once God and man, God our end, man our way.
BOOK XI [III] Hic prius per prophetas, deinde per se ipsum, postea per apostolos, quantum satis esse iudicavit, locutus etiam scripturam condidit, quae canonica nominatur, eminentissimae auctoritatis, cui fidem habemus de his rebus, quas ignorare non expedit nec per nos ipsos nosse idonei sumus. Nam si ea sciri possunt testibus nobis, quae remota non sunt a sensibus nostris sive interioribus sive etiam exterioribus (unde et praesentia nuncupantur, quod ita ea dicimus esse prae sensibus, sicut prae oculis quae praesto sunt oculis): profecto ea, quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostro testimonio scire non possumus, de his alios testes requirimus eisque credimus, a quorum sensibus remota esse vel fuisse non credimus. Sicut ergo de visibilibus, quae non vidimus, eis credimus, qui viderunt, atque ita de ceteris, quae ad suum quemque sensum corporis pertinent: ita de his, quae animo ac mente sentiuntur (quia et ipse rectissime dicitur sensus, unde et sententia vocabulum accepit), hoc est de inuisibilibus quae a nostro sensu interiore remota sunt, his nos oportet credere, qui haec in illo incorporeo lumine disposita didicerunt vel manentia contuentur.	This Mediator, having spoken what He judged sufficient first by the prophets, then by His own lips, and afterwards by the apostles, has besides produced the Scripture which is called canonical, which has paramount authority, and to which we yield assent in all matters of which we ought not to be ignorant, and yet cannot know of ourselves. For if we attain the knowledge of present objects by the testimony of our own senses, whether internal or external, then, regarding objects remote from our own senses, we need others to bring their testimony, since we cannot know them by our own, and we credit the persons to whom the objects have been or are sensibly present. Accordingly, as in the case of visible objects which we have not seen, we trust those who have, (and likewise with all sensible objects,) so in the case of things which are perceived by the mind and spirit, i.e., which are remote from our own interior sense, it behoves us to trust those who have seen them set in that incorporeal light, or abidingly contemplate them.
BOOK XI [IV] Visibilium omnium maximus mundus est, inuisibilium omnium maximus Deus est. Sed mundum esse conspicimus, Deum esse credimus. Quod autem Deus fecerit mundum, nulli tutius credimus quam ipsi Deo. Vbi eum audivimus? Nusquam interim nos melius quam in scripturis sanctis, ubi dixit propheta eius: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Numquidnam ibi fuit iste propheta, quando fecit Deus caelum et terram? Non; sed ibi fuit sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quae in animas sanctas etiam se transfert, amicos Dei et prophetas constituit eisque opera sua sine strepitu intus enarrat. Loquuntur eis quoque angeli Dei, qui semper vident faciem Patris voluntatemque eius quibus oportet adnuntiant. Ex his unus erat iste propheta, qui dixit et scripsit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Qui tam idoneus testis est, per quem Deo credendum sit, ut eodem spiritu Dei, quo haec sibi reuelata cognovit, etiam ipsam fidem nostram futuram tanto ante praedixerit. Sed quid placuit aeterno Deo tunc facere caelum et terram, quae antea non fecisset? Qui hoc dicunt, si mundum aeternum sine ullo initio et ideo nec a Deo factum videri volunt, nimis aversi sunt a veritate et letali morbo impietatis insaniunt. Exceptis enim propheticis vocibus mundus ipse ordinatissima sua mutabilitate et mobilitate et visibilium omnium pulcherrima specie quodam modo tacitus et factum se esse et non nisi a Deo ineffabiliter atque inuisibiliter magno et ineffabiliter atque inuisibiliter pulchro fieri se potuisse proclamat. Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis volunt habere, sed suae creationis initium, ut modo quodam vix intellegibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid, unde sibi Deum videntur velut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi venisse credatur in mentem, quod numquam ante venisset, facere mundum, et accidisse illi voluntatem nouam, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis; sed non video quo modo eis possit in ceteris rebus ratio ista subsistere maximeque in anima, quam si Deo coaeternam esse contenderint, unde illi acciderit noua miseria, quae numquam antea per aeternum, nullo modo poterunt explicare. Si enim alternasse semper eius miseriam et beatitudinem dixerint, necesse est dicant etiam semper alternaturam; unde illa eos sequetur absurditas, ut etiam cum beata dicitur in hoc utique non sit beata, si futuram suam miseriam et turpitudinem praevidet; si autem non praevidet nec se turpem ac miseram fore, sed beatam semper existimat. falsa opinione sit beata; quo dici stultius nihil potest. Si autem semper quidem per saecula retro infinita cum beatitudine alternasse animae miseriam putant, sed nunc iam de cetero, cum fuerit liberata, ad miseriam non esse redituram, nihilo minus conuincuntur numquam eam fuisse vere beatam, sed deinceps esse incipere noua quadam nec fallaci beatitudine. ac per hoc fatebuntur accidere illi aliquid novi, et hoc magnum atque praeclarum, quod numquam retro per aeternitatem accidisset. Cuius novitatis causam si Deum negabunt in aeterno habuisse consilio, simul eum negabunt beatitudinis eius auctorem, quod nefandae impietatis est; si autem dicent etiam ipsum nouo consilio excogitasse, ut de cetero sit anima in aeternum beata, quo modo eum alienum ab ea, quae illis quoque displicet, mutabilitate monstrabunt? Porro si ex tempore creatam, sed nullo ulterius tempore perituram, tamquam numerum, habere initium, sed non habere finem fatentur, et ideo semel expertam miserias, si ab eis fuerit liberata, numquam miseram postea futuram: non utique dubitabunt hoc fieri manente incommutabilitate consilii Dei, Sic ergo credant et mundum ex tempore fieri potuisse, nec tamen ideo Deum in eo faciendo aeternum consilium voluntatemque mutasse.	Of all visible things, the world is the greatest; of all invisible, the greatest is God. But, that the world is, we see; that God is, we believe. That God made the world, we can believe from no one more safely than from God Himself. But where have we heard Him? Nowhere more distinctly than in the Holy Scriptures, where His prophet said, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Genesis 1:1 Was the prophet present when God made the heavens and the earth? No; but the wisdom of God, by whom all things were made, was there, Proverbs 8:27 and wisdom insinuates itself into holy souls, and makes them the friends of God and His prophets, and noiselessly informs them of His works. They are taught also by the angels of God, who always behold the face of the Father, Matthew 18:10 and announce His will to whom it befits. Of these prophets was he who said and wrote, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." And so fit a witness was he of God, that the same Spirit of God, who revealed these things to him, enabled him also so long before to predict that our faith also would be forthcoming.But why did God choose then to create the heavens and earth which up to that time He had not made? If they who put this question wish to make out that the world is eternal and without beginning, and that consequently it has not been made by God, they are strangely deceived, and rave in the incurable madness of impiety. For, though the voices of the prophets were silent, the world itself, by its well-ordered changes and movements, and by the fair appearance of all visible things, bears a testimony of its own, both that it has been created, and also that it could not have been created save by God, whose greatness and beauty are unutterable and invisible. As for those who own, indeed, that it was made by God, and yet ascribe to it not a temporal but only a creational beginning, so that in some scarcely intelligible way the world should always have existed a created world they make an assertion which seems to them to defend God from the charge of arbitrary hastiness, or of suddenly conceiving the idea of creating the world as a quite new idea, or of casually changing His will, though He be unchangeable. But I do not see how this supposition of theirs can stand in other respects, and chiefly in respect of the soul; for if they contend that it is co-eternal with God, they will be quite at a loss to explain whence there has accrued to it new misery, which through a previous eternity had not existed. For if they said that its happiness and misery ceaselessly alternate, they must say, further, that this alternation will continue for ever; whence will result this absurdity, that, though the soul is called blessed, it is not so in this, that it foresees its own misery and disgrace. And yet, if it does not foresee it, and supposes that it will be neither disgraced nor wretched, but always blessed, then it is blessed because it is deceived; and a more foolish statement one cannot make. But if their idea is that the soul's misery has alternated with its bliss during the ages of the past eternity, but that now, when once the soul has been set free, it will return henceforth no more to misery, they are nevertheless of opinion that it has never been truly blessed before, but begins at last to enjoy a new and uncertain happiness; that is to say, they must acknowledge that some new thing, and that an important and signal thing, happens to the soul which never in a whole past eternity happened it before. And if they deny that God's eternal purpose included this new experience of the soul, they deny that He is the Author of its blessedness, which is unspeakable impiety. If, on the other hand, they say that the future blessedness of the soul is the result of a new decree of God, how will they show that God is not chargeable with that mutability which displeases them? Further, if they acknowledge that it was created in time, but will never perish in time,-that it has, like number, a beginning but no end,-and that, therefore, having once made trial of misery, and been delivered from it, it will never again return thereto, they will certainly admit that this takes place without any violation of the immutable counsel of God. Let them, then, in like manner believe regarding the world that it too could be made in time, and yet that God, in making it, did not alter His eternal design.
BOOK XI [V] Deinde videndum est, isti, qui Deum conditorem mundi esse consentiunt et tamen quaerunt de mundi tempore quid respondeamus, quid ipsi respondeant de mundi loco. Ita enim quaeritur, cur potius tunc et non antea factus sit, quem ad modum quaeri potest, cur hic potius ubi est et non alibi. Nam si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus eis non videtur Deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum, in quibus si quisquam dicat non potuisse uacare Omnipotentem, nonne consequens erit, ut innumerabiles mundos cum Epicuro somniare cogantur (ea tantum differentia, quod eos ille fortuitis motibus atomorum gigni asserit et resolvi, isti autem opere Dei factos dicturi sunt), si eum per interminabilem inmensitatem locorum extra mundum circumquaque patentium uacare noluerint, nec eosdem mundos, quod etiam de isto sentiunt, ulla causa posse dissolvi? Cum his enim agimus, qui et Deum incorporeum et omnium naturarum, quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; alios autem nimis indignum est ad istam disputationem religionis admittere, maxime quod apud eos, qui multis diis sacrorum obsequium deferendum putant, isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate atque auctoritate vicerunt, non ob aliud, nisi quia longo quidem interuallo, verum tamen reliquis propinquiores sunt veritati. An forte substantiam Dei, quam nec includunt nec determinant nec distendunt loco, sed eam, sicut de Deo sentire dignum est, fatentur incorporea praesentia ubique totam, a tantis locorum extra mundum spatiis absentem esse dicturi sunt, et uno tantum atque in comparatione illius infinitatis tam exiguo loco, in quo mundus est, occupatam? Non opinor eos in haec uaniloquia progressuros. Cum igitur unum mundum ingenti quidem mole corporea, finitum tamen et loco suo determinatum et operante Deo factum esse dicant: quod respondent de infinitis extra mundum locis, cur in eis ab opere Deus cesset, hoc sibi respondeant de infinitis ante mundum temporibus, cur in eis ab opere Deus cessaverit. Et sicut non est consequens, ut fortuito potius quam ratione divina Deus non alio, sed isto in quo est loco mundum constituerit, cum pariter infinitis ubique patentibus nullo excellentiore merito posset hic eligi, quamvis eandem divinam rationem, qua id factum est nulla possit humana conprehendere: ita non est consequens, ut Deo aliquid existimemus accidisse fortuitum, quod illo potius quam anteriore tempore condidit mundum, cum aequaliter anteriora tempora per infinitum retro spatium praeterissent nec fuisset aliqua differentia, unde tempus tempori eligendo praeponeretur. Quod si dicunt inanes esse hominum cogitationes, quibus infinita imaginantur loca, cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum: respondetur eis isto modo inaniter homines cogitare praeterita tempora uacationis Dei, cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum.	Next, we must see what reply can be made to those who agree that God is the Creator of the world, but have difficulties about the time of its creation, and what reply, also, they can make to difficulties we might raise about the place of its creation. For, as they demand why the world was created then and no sooner, we may ask why it was created just here where it is, and not elsewhere. For if they imagine infinite spaces of time before the world, during which God could not have been idle, in like manner they may conceive outside the world infinite realms of space, in which, if any one says that the Omnipotent cannot hold His hand from working, will it not follow that they must adopt Epicurus' dream of innumerable worlds? with this difference only, that he asserts that they are formed and destroyed by the fortuitous movements of atoms, while they will hold that they are made by God's hand, if they maintain that, throughout the boundless immensity of space, stretching interminably in every direction round the world, God cannot rest, and that the worlds which they suppose Him to make cannot be destroyed. For here the question is with those who, with ourselves, believe that God is spiritual, and the Creator of all existences but Himself. As for others, it is a condescension to dispute with them on a religious ques tion, for they have acquired a reputation only among men who pay divine honors to a number of gods, and have become conspicuous among the other philosophers for no other reason than that, though they are still far from the truth, they are near it in comparison with the rest. While these, then, neither confine in any place, nor limit, nor distribute the divine substance, but, as is worthy of God, own it to be wholly though spiritually present everywhere, will they perchance say that this substance is absent from such immense spaces outside the world, and is occupied in one only, (and that a very little one compared with the infinity beyond), the one, namely, in which is the world? I think they will not proceed to this absurdity. Since they maintain that there is but one world, of vast material bulk, indeed, yet finite, and in its own determinate position, and that this was made by the working of God, let them give the same account of God's resting in the infinite times before the world as they give of His resting in the infinite spaces outside of it. And as it does not follow that God set the world in the very spot it occupies and no other by accident rather than by divine reason, although no human reason can comprehend why it was so set, and though there was no merit in the spot chosen to give it the precedence of infinite others, so neither does it follow that we should suppose that God was guided by chance when He created the world in that and no earlier time, although previous times had been running by during an infinite past, and though there was no difference by which one time could be chosen in preference to another. But if they say that the thoughts of men are idle when they conceive infinite places, since there is no place beside the world, we reply that, by the same showing, it is vain to conceive of the past times of God's rest, since there is no time before the world.
BOOK XI [VI] Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est: quis non videat, quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret, cuius motionis et mutationis cum aliud atque aliud, quae simul esse non possunt, cedit atque succedit, in brevioribus vel productioribus morarum interuallis tempus sequeretur? Cum igitur Deus, in cuius aeternitate nulla est omnino mutatio, creator sit temporum et ordinator: quo modo dicatur post temporum spatia mundum creasse non video, nisi dicatur ante mundum iam aliquam fuisse creaturam, cuius motibus tempora currerent. Porro si litterae sacrae maximeque veraces ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum caelum et terram, ut nihil antea fecisse intellegatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante cetera cuncta quae fecit: procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore. Quod enim fit in tempore, et post aliquod fit et ante aliquod tempus; post id quod praeteritum est, ante id quod futurum est; nullum autem posset esse praeteritum, quia nulla erat creatura, cuius mutabilibus motibus ageretur. Cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in eius conditione factus est mutabilis motus, sicut videtur se habere etiam ordo ille primorum sex vel septem dierum, in quibus et mane et uespera nominantur, donec omnia, quae his diebus Deus fecit, sexto perficiantur die septimoque in magno mysterio Dei uacatio commendatur. Qui dies cuius modi sint, aut perdifficile nobis aut etiam inpossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.	For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change,-the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another,-and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals of duration, time would begin? Since then, God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to the world there was some creature by whose movement time could pass. And if the sacred and infallible Scriptures say that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, in order that it may be understood that He had made nothing previously,-for if He had made anything before the rest, this thing would rather be said to have been made "in the beginning,"-then assuredly the world was made, not in time, but simultaneously with time. For that which is made in time is made both after and before some time,-after that which is past, before that which is future. But none could then be past, for there was no creature by whose movements its duration could be measured. But simultaneously with time the world was made, if in the world's creation change and motion were created, as seems evident from the order of the first six or seven days. For in these days the morning and evening are counted, until, on the sixth day, all things which God then made were finished, and on the seventh the rest of God was mysteriously and sublimely signalized. What kind of days these were it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible for us to conceive, and how much more to say!
BOOK XI [VII] Videmus quippe istos dies notos non habere uesperam nisi de solis occasu nec mane nisi de solis exortu; illorum autem priores tres dies sine sole peracti sunt, qui die quarto factus refertur. Et primitus quidem lux verbo Dei facta atque inter ipsam et tenebras Deus separasse narratur et eandem lucem vocasse diem, tenebras autem noctem; sed qualis illa sit lux et quo alternante motu qualemque uesperam et mane fecerit, remotum est a sensibus nostris, nec ita ut est intellegi a nobis potest, quod tamen sine ulla haesitatione credendum est. Aut enim aliqua lux corporea est, sive in superioribus mundi partibus longe a conspectibus nostris sive unde sol postmodum accensus est; aut lucis nomine significata est sancta civitas in sanctis angelis et spiritibus beatis, de qua dicit apostolus: Quae sursum est Hierusalem, mater nostra aeterna in caelis; ait quippe et alio loco: Omnes enim vos filii lucis estis et filii diei; non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum; si tamen et uesperam diei huius et mane aliquatenus congruenter intellegere valeamus. Quoniam scientia creaturae in comparatione scientiae Creatoris quodam modo uesperascit, itemque lucescit et mane fit, cum et ipsa refertur ad laudem dilectionemque Creatoris; nec in noctem vergitur, ubi non Creator creaturae dilectione relinquitur. Denique scriptura cum illos dies dinumeraret ex ordine, nusquam interposuit vocabulum noctis. Non enim ait alicubi: Facta est nox; sed: Facta est uespera et factum est mane dies unus. Ita dies secundus et ceteri. Cognitio quippe creaturae in se ipsa decoloratior est, ut ita dicam, quam cum in Dei sapientia cognoscitur, velut in arte qua facta est. Ideo uespera quam nox congruentius dici potest; quae tamen, ut dixi, cum ad laudandum et amandum refertur Creatorem, recurrit in mane. Et hoc cum facit in cognitione sui ipsius, dies unus est; cum in cognitione firmamenti, quod inter aquas inferiores et superiores caelum appellatum est, dies secundus; cum in cognitione terrae ac maris omniumque gignentium, quae radicibus continuata sunt terrae, dies tertius; cum in cognitione luminarium maioris et minoris omniumque siderum, dies quartus; cum in cognitione omnium ex aquis animalium natatilium atque volatilium, dies quintus; cum in cognitione omnium animalium terrenorum atque ipsius hominis, dies sextus.	We see, indeed, that our ordinary days have no evening but by the setting, and no morning but by the rising, of the sun; but the first three days of all were passed without sun, since it is reported to have been made on the fourth day. And first of all, indeed, light was made by the word of God, and God, we read, separated it from the darkness, and called the light Day, and the darkness Night; but what kind of light that was, and by what periodic movement it made evening and morning, is beyond the reach of our senses; neither can we understand how it was, and yet must unhesitatingly believe it. For either it was some material light, whether proceeding from the upper parts of the world, far removed from our sight, or from the spot where the sun was afterwards kindled; or under the name of light the holy city was signified, composed of holy angels and blessed spirits, the city of which the apostle says, "Jerusalem which is above is our eternal mother in heaven;" Galatians 4:26 and in another place, "For you are all the children of the light, and the children of the day; we are not of the night, nor of darkness." Yet in some respects we may appropriately speak of a morning and evening of this day also. For the knowledge of the creature is, in comparison of the knowledge of the Creator, but a twilight; and so it dawns and breaks into morning when the creature is drawn to the praise and love of the Creator; and night never falls when the Creator is not forsaken through love of the creature. In fine, Scripture, when it would recount those days in order, never mentions the word night. It never says, "Night was," but "The evening and the morning were the first day." So of the second and the rest. And, indeed, the knowledge of created things contemplated by themselves is, so to speak, more colorless than when they are seen in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which they were made. Therefore evening is a more suitable figure than night; and yet, as I said, morning returns when the creature returns to the praise and love of the Creator. When it does so in the knowledge of itself, that is the first day; when in the knowledge of the firmament, which is the name given to the sky between the waters above and those beneath, that is the second day; when in the knowledge of the earth, and the sea, and all things that grow out of the earth, that is the third day; when in the knowledge of the greater and less luminaries, and all the stars, that is the fourth day; when in the knowledge of all animals that swim in the waters and that fly in the air, that is the fifth day; when in the knowledge of all animals that live on the earth, and of man himself, that is the sixth day.
BOOK XI [VIII] Cum vero in die septimo requiescit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis et sanctificat eum, nequaquam est accipiendum pueriliter, tamquam Deus laboraverit operando, qui dixit et facta sunt verbo intellegibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. Sed requies Dei requiem significat eorum qui requiescunt in Deo, sicut laetitia domus laetitiam significat eorum, qui laetantur in domo, etiamsi non eos domus ipsa, sed alia res aliqua laetos facit. Quanto magis, si eadem domus pulchritudine sua faciat laetos habitatores, ut non solum eo loquendi modo laeta dicatur, quo significamus per id quod continet id quod continetur (sicut "theatra plaudunt, prata mugiunt", cum in illis homines plaudunt, in his boves mugiunt); sed etiam illo, quo significatur per efficientem id quod efficitur; sicut laeta epistula dicitur, significans eorum laetitiam, quos legentes efficit laetos. Convenientissime itaque, cum Deum requievisse prophetica narrat auctoritas, significatur requies eorum, qui in illo requiescunt et quos facit ipse requiescere; hoc etiam hominibus, quibus loquitur et propter quos utique conscripta est, promittente prophetia, quod etiam ipsi post bona opera, quae in eis et per eos operatur Deus, si ad illum prius in ista vita per fidem quodam modo accesserint, in illo habebunt requiem sempiternam. Hoc enim et sabbati uacatione ex praecepto legis in uetere Dei populo figuratum est, unde suo loco diligentius arbitror disserendum.	When it is said that God rested on the seventh day from all His works, and hallowed it, we are not to conceive of this in a childish fashion, as if work were a toil to God, who "spoke and it was done,"-spoke by the spiritual and eternal, not audible and transitory word. But God's rest signifies the rest of those who rest in God, as the joy of a house means the joy of those in the house who rejoice, though not the house, but something else, causes the joy. How much more intelligible is such phraseology, then, if the house itself, by its own beauty, makes the inhabitants joyful! For in this case we not only call it joyful by that figure of speech in which the thing containing is used for the thing contained (as when we say, "The theatres applaud," "The meadows low," meaning that the men in the one applaud, and the oxen in the other low), but also by that figure in which the cause is spoken of as if it were the effect, as when a letter is said to be joyful, because it makes its readers so. Most appropriately, therefore, the sacred narrative states that God rested, meaning thereby that those rest who are in Him, and whom He makes to rest. And this the prophetic narrative promises also to the men to whom it speaks, and for whom it was written, that they themselves, after those good works which God does in and by them, if they have managed by faith to get near to God in this life, shall enjoy in Him eternal rest. This was pre-figured to the ancient people of God by the rest enjoined in their sabbath law, of which, in its own place, I shall speak more at large.
BOOK XI [IX] Nunc, quoniam de sanctae civitatis exortu dicere institui et prius quod ad sanctos angelos adtinet dicendum putavi, quae huius civitatis et magna pars est et eo beatior, quod numquam peregrinata, quae hinc divina testimonia suppetant, quantum satis videbitur, Deo largiente explicare curabo. Vbi de mundi constitutione sacrae litterae loquuntur, non evidenter dicitur, utrum vel quo ordine creati sint angeli; sed si praetermissi non sunt, vel caeli nomine, ubi dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, vel potius lucis huius, de qua loquor, significati sunt. Non autem esse praetermissos hinc existimo, quod scriptum est, requievisse Deum in die septimo ab omnibus operibus suis quae fecit, cum liber ipse ita sit exorsus: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; ut ante caelum et terram nihil aliud fecisse videatur. Cum ergo a caelo et terra coeperit, atque ipsa terra, quam primitus fecit, sicut scriptura consequenter eloquitur, inuisibilis et incomposita nondumque luce facta utique tenebrae fuerint super abyssum, id est super quandam terrae et aquae indistinctam confusionem (ubi enim lux non est, tenebrae sint necesse est), deinde omnia creando disposita sint, quae per sex dies consummata narrantur: quo modo angeli praetermitterentur, tamquam non essent in operibus Dei, a quibus in die septimo requievit? Opus autem Dei esse angelos hic quidem etsi non praetermissum, non tamen evidenter expressum est; sed alibi hoc sancta scriptura clarissima voce testatur. Nam et in hymno trium in camino virorum cum praedictum esset: Benedicite omnia opera Domini Dominum, in executione eorundem operum etiam angeli nominati sunt; et in psalmo canitur: Laudate Dominum de caelis, laudate eum in excelsis; laudate eum omnes angeli eius, laudate eum omnes virtutes eius; laudate eum sol et luna, laudate eum omnes stellae et lumen; laudate eum caeli caelorum, et aquae, quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen Domini; quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt. ipse mandavit, et creata sunt. Etiam hic apertissime a Deo factos esse angelos divinitus dictum est, cum eis inter cetera caelestia commemoratis infertur ad omnia: Ipse dixit, et facta sunt. Quis porro audebit opinari post omnia ista, quae sex diebus enumerata sunt, angelos factos? Sed etsi quisquam ita desipit, redarguit istam uanitatem illa scriptura paris auctoritatis, ubi Deus dicit: Quando facta sunt sidera, laudaverunt me voce magna omnes angeli mei. Iam ergo erant angeli, quando facta sunt sidera. Facta sunt autem quarto die. Numquidnam ergo die tertio factos esse dicemus? Absit. In promptu est enim, quid illo die factum sit. Ab aquis utique terra discreta est et distinctas sui generis species duo ista elementa sumpserunt et produxit terra quidquid ei radicitus inhaeret. Numquidnam secundo? Ne hoc quidem. Tunc enim firmamentum factum est inter aquas superiores et inferiores caelumque appellatum est; in quo firmamento quarto die facta sunt sidera. Nimirum ergo si ad istorum dierum opera Dei pertinent angeli, ipsi sunt illa lux, quae diei nomen accepit, cuius unitas ut commendaretur, non est dictus dies primus, sed dies unus. Nec alius est dies secundus aut tertius aut ceteri; sed idem ipse unus ad inplendum senarium vel septenarium numerum repetitus est propter septenariam cognitionem; senariam scilicet operum, quae fecit Deus, et septimam quietis Dei. Cum enim dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, si recte in hac luce creatio intellegitur angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei filium; ut ea luce inluminati, qua creati, fierent lux et vocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est verbum Dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. Lumen quippe verum, quod inluminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, hoc inluminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo; a quo si avertitur angelus, fit inmundus; sicut sunt omnes, qui vocantur inmundi spiritus, nec iam lux in Domino, sed in se ipsis tenebrae, privati participatione lucis aeternae. Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.	At present, since I have undertaken to treat of the origin of the holy city, and first of the holy angels, who constitute a large part of this city, and indeed the more blessed part, since they have never been expatriated, I will give myself to the task of explaining, by God's help, and as far as seems suitable, the Scriptures which relate to this point. Where Scripture speaks of the world's creation, it is not plainly said whether or when the angels were created; but if mention of them is made, it is implicitly under the name of "heaven," when it is said, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," or perhaps rather under the name of "light," of which presently. But that they were wholly omitted, I am unable to believe, because it is written that God on the seventh day rested from all His works which He made; and this very book itself begins, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," so that before heaven and earth God seems to have made nothing. Since, therefore, He began with the heavens and the earth,-and the earth itself, as Scripture adds, was at first invisible and formless, light not being as yet made, and darkness covering the face of the deep (that is to say, covering an undefined chaos of earth and sea, for where light is not, darkness must needs be),-and then when all things, which are recorded to have been completed in six days, were created and arranged, how should the angels be omitted, as if they were not among the works of God, from which on the seventh day He rested? Yet, though the fact that the angels are the work of God is not omitted here, it is indeed not explicitly mentioned; but elsewhere Holy Scripture asserts it in the clearest manner. For in the Hymn of the Three Children in the Furnace it was said, "O all you works of the Lord bless ye the Lord;" and among these works mentioned afterwards in detail, the angels are named. And in the psalm it is said, "Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, praise Him in the heights. Praise ye Him, all His angels; praise ye Him, all His hosts. Praise ye Him, sun and moon; praise him, all you stars of light. Praise Him, you heaven of heavens; and you waters that be above the heavens. Let them praise the name of the Lord; for He commanded, and they were created." Here the angels are most expressly and by divine authority said to have been made by God, for of them among the other heavenly things it is said, "He commanded, and they were created." Who, then, will be bold enough to suggest that the angels were made after the six days' creation? If any one is so foolish, his folly is disposed of by a scripture of like authority, where God says, "When the stars were made, the angels praised me with a loud voice." Job 38:7 The angels therefore existed before the stars; and the stars were made the fourth day. Shall we then say that they were made the third day? Far from it; for we know what was made that day. The earth was separated from the water, and each element took its own distinct form, and the earth produced all that grows on it. On the second day, then? Not even on this; for on it the firmament was made between the waters above and beneath, and was called "Heaven," in which firmament the stars were made on the fourth day. There is no question, then, that if the angels are included in the works of God during these six days, they are that light which was called "Day," and whose unity Scripture signalizes by calling that day not the "first day," but "one day." For the second day, the third, and the rest are not other days; but the same "one" day is repeated to complete the number six or seven, so that there should be knowledge both of God's works and of His rest. For when God said, "Let there be light, and there was light," if we are justified in understanding in this light the creation of the angels, then certainly they were created partakers of the eternal light which is the unchangeable Wisdom of God, by which all things were made, and whom we call the only-begotten Son of God; so that they, being illumined by the Light that created them, might themselves become light and be called "Day," in participation of that unchangeable Light and Day which is the Word of God, by whom both themselves and all else were made. "The true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world," John 1:9 -this Light lights also every pure angel, that he may be light not in himself, but in God; from whom if an angel turn away, he becomes impure, as are all those who are called unclean spirits, and are no longer light in the Lord, but darkness in themselves, being deprived of the participation of Light eternal. For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name "evil."
BOOK XI [X] Est itaque bonum solum simplex et ob hoc solum incommutabile, quod est Deus. Ab hoc bono creata sunt omnia bona, sed non simplicia et ob hoc mutabilia. Creata sane, inquam, id est facta, non genita. Quod enim de simplici bono genitum est, pariter simplex est et hoc est quod illud de quo genitum est; quae duo Patrem et Filium dicimus; et utrumque hoc.cum spiritu suo unus Deus est; qui spiritus Patris et Filii Spiritus sanctus propria quadam notione huius nominis in sacris litteris nuncupatur. Alius est autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nec Pater est nec Filius; sed "alius" dixi, non "aliud", quia et hoc pariter simplex pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec trinitas unus est Deus; nec ideo non simplex, quia trinitas. Neque enim propter hoc naturam istam boni simplicem dicimus, quia Pater in ea solus aut solus Filius aut solus Spiritus sanctus, aut vero sola est ista nominis trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani haeretici putaverunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, nec tamen ipse est Filius <, et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater&lg. In quo ergo ad semet ipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet; sicut ad se ipsum dicitur vivus habendo utique vitam, et eadem vita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut uas aliquem liquorem aut corpus colorem aut aer lucem sive feruorem aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet; nam neque uas liquor est nec corpus color nec aer lux sive feruor neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est quod etiam privari possunt rebus, quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates verti atque mutari, ut et uas euacuetur umore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur et aer tenebrescat sive frigescat et anima desipiat. Sed etsi sit corpus incorruptibile, quale sanctis in resurrectione promittitur, habet quidem ipsius incorruptionis inamissibilem qualitatem, sed manente substantia corporali non hoc est, quod ipsa incorruptio. Nam illa etiam per singulas partes corporis tota est nec alibi maior, alibi minor; neque enim ulla pars est incorruptior quam altera; corpus vero ipsum maius est in toto quam in parte; et cum alia pars est in eo amplior, alia minor, non ea quae amplior est incorruptior quam quae minor. Aliud est itaque corpus, quod non ubique sui totum est, alia incorruptio, quae ubique eius tota est, quia omnis pars incorruptibilis corporis etiam ceteris inaequalis aequaliter incorrupta est. Neque enim verbi gratia, quia digitus minor est quam tota manus, ideo incorruptibilior manus quam digitus. Ita cum sint inaequales manus et digitus, aequalis est tamen incorruptibilitas manus et digiti. Ac per hoc quamvis a corpore incorruptibili inseparabilis incorruptibilitas sit, aliud est tamen substantia, qua corpus dicitur, aliud qualitas eius, qua incorruptibile nuncupatur. Et ideo etiam sic non hoc est quod habet. Anima quoque ipsa, etiamsi semper sit sapiens, sicut erit cum liberabitur in aeternum, participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit, quae non est quod ipsa. Neque enim si aer infusa luce numquam deseratur, ideo non aliud est ipse, aliud lux qua inluminatur. Neque hoc ita dixerim, quasi aer sit anima, quod putaverunt quidam qui non potuerunt incorpoream cogitare naturam. Sed habent haec ad illa etiam in magna disparilitate quandam similitudinem, ut non inconvenienter dicatur sic inluminari animam incorpoream luce incorporea simplicis sapientiae Dei, sicut inluminatur aeris corpus luce corporea; et sicut aer tenebrescit ista luce desertus (nam nihil sunt aliud quae dicuntur locorum quorumque corporalium tenebrae quam aer carens luce), ita tenebrescere animam sapientiae luce privatam. Secundum hoc ergo dicuntur illa simplicia, quae principaliter vereque divina sunt, quod non aliud est in eis qualitas, aliud substantia, nec aliorum participatione vel divina vel sapientia vel beata sunt. Ceterum dictus est in scripturis sanctis Spiritus sapientiae multiplex, eo quod multa in sese habeat; sed quae habet, haec et est, et ea omnia unus est. Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thensauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest; porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae noverat. Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset.	There is, accordingly, a good which is alone simple, and therefore alone unchangeable, and this is God. By this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and therefore not unchangeable. "Created," I say,-that is, made, not begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son, for He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another," not "another thing," because He is equally with them the simple Good, unchangeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, because it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the persons to one another. For, in regard to this relation, it is true that the Father has a Son, and yet is not Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, and is not Himself the Father. But, as regards Himself, irrespective of relation to the other, each is what He has; thus, He is in Himself living, for He has life, and is Himself the Life which He has.It is for this reason, then, that the nature of the Trinity is called simple, because it has not anything which it can lose, and because it is not one thing and its contents another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the light or heat of it, or a mind and its wisdom. For none of these is what it has: the cup is not liquor, nor the body color, nor the air light and heat, nor the mind wisdom. And hence they can be deprived of what they have, and can be turned or changed into other qualities and states, so that the cup may be emptied of the liquid of which it is full, the body be discolored, the air darken, the mind grow silly. The incorruptible body which is promised to the saints in the resurrection cannot, indeed, lose its quality of incorruption, but the bodily substance and the quality of incorruption are not the same thing. For the quality of incorruption resides entire in each several part, not greater in one and less in another; for no part is more incorruptible than another. The body, indeed, is itself greater in whole than in part; and one part of it is larger, another smaller, yet is not the larger more incorruptible than the smaller. The body, then, which is not in each of its parts a whole body, is one thing; incorruptibility, which is throughout complete, is another thing;-for every part of the incorruptible body, however unequal to the rest otherwise, is equally incorrupt. For the hand, e.g., is not more incorrupt than the finger because it is larger than the finger; so, though finger and hand are unequal, their incorruptibility is equal. Thus, although incorruptibility is inseparable from an incorruptible body, yet the substance of the body is one thing, the quality of incorruption another. And therefore the body is not what it has. The soul itself, too, though it be always wise (as it will be eternally when it is redeemed), will be so by participating in the unchangeable wisdom, which it is not; for though the air be never robbed of the light that is shed abroad in it, it is not on that account the same thing as the light. I do not mean that the soul is air, as has been supposed by some who could not conceive a spiritual nature; but, with much dissimilarity, the two things have a kind of likeness, which makes it suitable to say that the immaterial soul is illumined with the immaterial light of the simple wisdom of God, as the material air is irradiated with material light, and that, as the air, when deprived of this light, grows dark, (for material darkness is nothing else than air wanting light,) so the soul, deprived of the light of wisdom, grows dark.According to this, then, those things which are essentially and truly divine are called simple, because in them quality and substance are identical, and because they are divine, or wise, or blessed in themselves, and without extraneous supplement. In Holy Scripture, it is true, the Spirit of wisdom is called "manifold" Wisdom 7:22 because it contains many things in it; but what it contains it also is, and it being one is all these things. For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it. For God made nothing unwittingly; not even a human workman can be said to do so. But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God.
BOOK XI [XI] Quae cum ita sint, nullo modo quidem secundum spatium aliquod temporis prius erant spiritus illi tenebrae, quos angelos dicimus; sed simul ut facti sunt, lux facti sunt; non tamen tantum ita creati, ut quoquo modo essent et quoquo modo viverent; sed etiam inluminati, ut sapienter beateque viverent. Ab hac inluminatione aversi quidam angeli non obtinverunt excellentiam sapientis beataeque vitae, quae procul dubio non nisi aeterna est aeternitatisque suae certa atque secura; sed rationalem vitam licet insipientem sic habent, ut eam non possint amittere, nec si velint. Quatenus autem, antequam peccassent, illius sapientiae fuerint participes, definire quis potest? In eius tamen participatione aequales fuisse istos illis, qui propterea vere pleneque beati sunt, quoniam nequaquam de suae beatitudinis aeternitate falluntur, quo modo dicturi sumus? quando quidem si aequales in ea fuissent, etiam isti in eius aeternitate mansissent pariter beati, quia pariter certi. Neque enim sicut vita, quamdiucumque fuerit, ita aeterna vita veraciter dici poterit, si finem habitura sit; si quidem vita tantummodo vivendo, aeterna vero finem non habendo nominata est. Quapropter quamvis non, quidquid aeternum, continuo beatum sit (dicitur enim etiam poenalis ignis aeternus): tamen si vere perfecteque beata vita non nisi aeterna est, non erat talis istorum, quandoque desitura et propterea non aeterna, sive id scirent, sive nescientes aliud putarent; quia scientes timor, nescientes error beatos esse utique non sinebat. Si autem hoc ita nesciebant, ut falsis incertisue non fiderent, sed utrum sempiternum an quandoque finem habiturum esset bonum suum, in neutram partem firma adsensione ferrentur: ipsa de tanta felicitate cunctatio eam beatae vitae plenitudinem, quam in sanctis angelis esse credimus, non habebat. Neque enim beatae vitae vocabulum ita contrahimus ad quasdam significationis angustias, ut solum Deum dicamus beatum; qui tamen vere ita beatus est, ut maior beatitudo esse non possit, in cuius comparatione, quod angeli beati sunt summa quadam sua beatitudine, quanta esse in angelis potest, quid aut quantum est?	And since these things are so, those spirits whom we call angels were never at any time or in any way darkness, but, as soon as they were made, were made light; yet they were not so created in order that they might exist and live in any way whatever, but were enlightened that they might live wisely and blessedly. Some of them, having turned away from this light, have not won this wise and blessed life, which is certainly eternal, and accompanied with the sure confidence of its eternity; but they have still the life of reason, though darkened with folly, and this they cannot lose even if they would. But who can determine to what extent they were partakers of that wisdom before they fell? And how shall we say that they participated in it equally with those who through it are truly and fully blessed, resting in a true certainty of eternal felicity? For if they had equally participated in this true knowledge, then the evil angels would have remained eternally blessed equally with the good, because they were equally expectant of it. For, though a life be never so long, it cannot be truly called eternal if it is destined to have an end; for it is called life inasmuch as it is lived, but eternal because it has no end. Wherefore, although everything eternal is not therefore blessed (for is eternal), yet if no life can be truly and perfectly blessed except it be eternal, the life of these angels was not blessed, for it was doomed to end, and therefore not eternal, whether they knew it or not. In the one case fear, in the other ignorance, prevented them from being blessed. And even if their ignorance was not so great as to breed in them a wholly false expectation, but left them wavering in uncertainty whether their good would be eternal or would some time terminate, this very doubt concerning so grand a destiny was incompatible with the plenitude of blessedness which we believe the holy angels enjoyed. For we do not so narrow and restrict the application of the term "blessedness" as to apply it to God only, though doubtless He is so truly blessed that greater blessedness cannot be; and, in comparison of His blessedness, what is that of the angels, though, according to their capacity, they be perfectly blessed?
BOOK XI [XII] Nec ipsos tantum, quod adtinet ad rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam, beatos nuncupandos putamus. Quis enim primos illos homines in paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum, quamvis sua beatitudo quam diuturna vel utrum aeterna esset incertos (esset autem aeterna, nisi peccassent), cum hodie non inpudenter beatos vocemus, quos videmus iuste ac pie cum spe futurae inmortalitatis hanc vitam ducere sine crimine uastante conscientiam, facile inpetrantes peccatis huius infirmitatis divinam misericordiam. Qui licet de suae perseuerantiae praemio certi sint, de ipsa tamen perseuerantia sua reperiuntur incerti. Quis enim hominum se in actione provectuque iustitiae perseueraturum usque in finem sciat, nisi aliqua reuelatione ab illo fiat certus, qui de hac re iusto latentique iudicio non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit? Quantum itaque pertinet ad delectationem praesentis boni, beatior erat primus homo in paradiso, quam quilibet iustus in hac infirmitate mortali; quantum autem ad spem futuri, beatior quilibet in quibuslibet cruciatibus corporis, cui non opinione, sed certa veritate manifestum est, sine fine se habiturum omni molestia carentem societatem angelorum in participatione summi Dei, quam erat ille homo sui casus incertus in magna illa felicitate paradisi.	And the angels are not the only members of the rational and intellectual creation whom we call blessed. For who will take upon him to deny that those first men in Paradise were blessed previously to sin, although they were uncertain how long their blessedness was to last, and whether it would be eternal (and eternal it would have been had they not sinned),-who, I say, will do so, seeing that even now we not unbecomingly call those blessed whom we see leading a righteous and holy life, in hope of immortality, who have no harrowing remorse of conscience, but obtain readily divine remission of the sins of their present infirmity? These, though they are certain that they shall be rewarded if they persevere, are not certain that they will persevere. For what man can know that he will persevere to the end in the exercise and increase of grace, unless he has been certified by some revelation from Him who, in His just and secret judgment, while He deceives none, informs few regarding this matter? Accordingly, so far as present comfort goes, the first man in Paradise was more blessed than any just man in this insecure state; but as regards the hope of future good, every man who not merely supposes, but certainly knows that he shall eternally enjoy the most high God in the company of angels, and beyond the reach of ill,-this man, no matter what bodily torments afflict him, is more blessed than was he who, even in that great felicity of Paradise, was uncertain of his fate.
BOOK XI [XIII] Quocirca cuivis iam non difficulter occurrit utroque coniuncto effici beatitudinem, quam recto proposito intellectualis natura desiderat, hoc est, ut et bono incommutabili, quod Deus est, sine ulla molestia perfruatur et in eo se in aeternum esse mansurum nec ulla dubitatione cunctetur nec ullo errore fallatur. Hanc habere angelos lucis pia fide credimus; hanc nec antequam caderent habuisse angelos peccatores, qui sua pravitate illa luce privati sunt, consequenti ratione colligimus; habuisse tamen aliquam, etsi non praesciam, beatitudinem, si vitam egerunt ante peccatum, profecto credendi sunt. Aut si durum videtur, quando facti sunt angeli, alios credere ita factos ut non acciperent praescientiam vel perseuerantiae vel casus sui, alios autem ita ut veritate certissima aeternitatem suae beatitudinis nossent, sed aequalis felicitatis omnes ab initio creati sunt, et ita fuerunt, donec isti, qui nunc mali sunt, ab illo bonitatis lumine sua voluntate cecidissent: procul dubio multo est durius nunc putare angelos sanctos aeternae suae beatitudinis incertos, et ipsos de semet ipsis ignorare, quod nos de illis per scripturas sanctas nosse potuimus. Quis enim catholicus Christianus ignorat nullum nouum" diabolum ex bonis angelis ulterius futurum, sicut nec istum in societatem bonorum angelorum ulterius rediturum? Veritas quippe in euangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit, quod erunt aequales angelis Dei; quibus etiam promittitur, quod ibunt in vitam aeternam. Porro autem si nos certi sumus numquam nos ex illa inmortali felicitate casuros, illi vero certi non sunt: iam potiores, non aequales eis erimus. Sed quia nequaquam Veritas fallit et aequales eis erimus, profecto etiam ipsi certi sunt suae felicitatis aeternae. Cuius illi alii quia certi non fuerunt (non enim erat eorum aeterna felicitas cuius certi essent, quae finem fuerat habitura), restat, ut aut inpares fuerint, aut, si pares fuerunt, post istorum ruinam illis certa scientia suae sempiternae felicitatis accesserit. Nisi forte quis dicat id, quod Dominus ait de diabolo in euangelio: Ille homicida erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, sic esse accipiendum, ut non solum homicida fuerit ab initio, id est initio humani generis, ex quo utique homo factus est, quem decipiendo posset occidere, verum etiam ab initio suae conditionis in veritate non steterit et ideo numquam beatus cum sanctis angelis fuerit, suo recusans esse subditus creatori et sua per superbiam velut privata potestate laetatus, ac per hoc falsus et fallax, quia nec quisquam potestatem Omnipotentis euadit, et qui per piam subiectionem noluit tenere quod vere est, adfectat per superbam elationem simulare quod non est, ut sic intellegatur etiam quod beatus Iohannes apostolus ait: Ab initio diabolus peccat, hoc est, ex quo creatus est, iustitiam recusavit, quam nisi pia Deoque subdita voluntas habere non posset. Huic sententiae quisquis adquiescit, non cum illis haereticis sapit, id est Manichaeis, et si quae aliae pestes ita sentiunt, quod suam quandam propriam tamquam ex adverso quodam principio diabolus habeat naturam mali; qui tanta uanitate desipiunt, ut, cum verba ista euangelica in auctoritate nobiscum habeant, non adtendant non dixisse Dominum: A veritate alienus fuit; sed: In veritate non stetit, ubi a veritate lapsum intellegi voluit, in qua utique si stetisset, eius particeps factus beatus cum sanctis angelis permaneret.	From all this, it will readily occur to any one that the blessedness which an intelligent being desires as its legitimate object results from a combination of these two things, namely, that it uninterruptedly enjoy the unchangeable good, which is God; and that it be delivered from all dubiety, and know certainly that it shall eternally abide in the same enjoyment. That it is so with the angels of light we piously believe; but that the fallen angels, who by their own default lost that light, did not enjoy this blessedness even before they sinned, reason bids us conclude. Yet if their life was of any duration before they fell, we must allow them a blessedness of some kind, though not that which is accompanied with foresight. Or, if it seems hard to believe that, when the angels were created, some were created in ignorance either of their perseverance or their fall, while others were most certainly assured of the eternity of their felicity,-if it is hard to believe that they were not all from the beginning on an equal footing, until these who are now evil did of their own will fall away from the light of goodness, certainly it is much harder to believe that the holy angels are now uncertain of their eternal blessedness, and do not know regarding themselves as much as we have been able to gather regarding them from the Holy Scriptures. For what catholic Christian does not know that no new devil will ever arise among the good angels, as he knows that this present devil will never again return into the fellowship of the good? For the truth in the gospel promises to the saints and the faithful that they will be equal to the angels of God; and it is also promised them that they will "go away into life eternal." Matthew 25:46 But if we are certain that we shall never lapse from eternal felicity, while they are not certain, then we shall not be their equals, but their superiors. But as the truth never deceives, and as we shall be their equals, they must be certain of their blessedness. And because the evil angels could not be certain of that, since their blessedness was destined to come to an end, it follows either that the angels were unequal, or that, if equal, the good angels were assured of the eternity of their blessedness after the perdition of the others; unless, possibly, some one may say that the words of the Lord about the devil "He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth," John 8:44 are to be understood as if he was not only a murderer from the beginning of the human race, when man, whom he could kill by his deceit, was made, but also that he did not abide in the truth from the time of his own creation, and was accordingly never blessed with the holy angels, but refused to submit to his Creator, and proudly exulted as if in a private lordship of his own, and was thus deceived and deceiving. For the dominion of the Almighty cannot be eluded; and he who will not piously submit himself to things as they are, proudly feigns, and mocks himself with a state of things that does not exist; so that what the blessed Apostle John says thus becomes intelligible: "The devil from the beginning," 1 John 3:8 -that is, from the time he was created he refused righteousness, which none but a will piously subject to God can enjoy. Whoever adopts this opinion at least disagrees with those heretics the Manichees, and with any other pestilential sect that may suppose that the devil has derived from some adverse evil principle a nature proper to himself. These persons are so befooled by error, that, although they acknowledge with ourselves the authority of the gospels, they do not notice that the Lord did not say, "The devil was naturally a stranger to the truth," but "The devil abode not in the truth," by which He meant us to understand that he had fallen from the truth, in which, if he had abode, he would have become a partaker of it, and have remained in blessedness along with the holy angels.
BOOK XI [XIV] Subiecit autem indicium, quasi quaesissemus, unde ostendatur, quod in veritate non steterit, atque ait: Quia non est veritas in eo. Esset autem in eo, si.in illa stetisset. Locutione autem dictum est minus usitata. Sic enim videtur sonare: In veritate non stetit, quia veritas non est in eo, tamquam ea sit causa, ut in veritate non steterit, quod in eo veritas non sit; cum potius ea sit causa, ut in eo veritas non sit, quod in veritate non stetit. Ista locutio est et in psalmo: Ego clamavi, quoniam exaudisti me Deus; cum dicendum fuisse videatur: Exaudisti me Deus, quoniam clamavi. Sed cum dixisset: "Ego clamavi", tamquam ab eo quaereretur, unde se clamasse monstraret, ab effectu exauditionis Dei clamoris sui ostendit affectum; tamquam diceret: "Hinc ostendo clamasse me, quoniam exaudisti me."	Moreover, as if we had been inquiring why the devil did not abide in the truth, our Lord subjoins the reason, saying, "because the truth is not in him." Now, it would be in him had he abode in it. But the phraseology is unusual. For, as the words stand, "He abode not in the truth, because the truth is not in him," it seems as if the truth's not being in him were the cause of his not abiding in it; whereas his not abiding in the truth is rather the cause of its not being in him. The same form of speech is found in the psalm: "I have called upon You, for You have heard me, O God," where we should expect it to be said, You have heard me, O God, for I have called upon You. But when he had said, "I have called," then, as if some one were seeking proof of this, he demonstrates the effectual earnestness of his prayer by the effect of God's hearing it; as if he had said, The proof that I have prayed is that You have heard me.
BOOK XI [XV] Illud etiam, quod ait de diabolo Iohannes: Ab initio diabolus peccat, non intellegunt, si natura talis est, nullo modo esse peccatum. Sed quid respondetur propheticis testimoniis, sive quod ait Esaias sub figurata persona principis Babyloniae diabolum notans: Quo modo cecidit Lucifer, qui mane oriebatur. sive quod Hiezechiel: In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es? Vbi intellegitur fuisse aliquando sine peccato. Nam expressius ei paulo post dicitur: Ambulasti in diebus tuis sine vitio. Quae si aliter convenientius intellegi nequeunt, oportet etiam illud, quod dictum est: In veritate non stetit, sic accipiamus, quod in veritate fuerit, sed non permanserit; et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio, ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est, sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum. Nec illud, quod scriptum est in libro Iob, cum de diabolo sermo esset: Hoc est initium figmenti Domini, quod fecit ad inludendum ab angelis suis (cui consonare videtur et psalmus, ubi legitur: Draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei), sic intellegendum est, ut existimemus talem ab initio creatum, cui ab angelis inluderetur, sed in hac poena post peccatum ordinatum. Initium ergo eius figmentum est Domini; non enim est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimisque bestiolis, quam non ille constituit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest; quanto magis angelica creatura, quae omnia cetera, quae Deus condidit, naturae dignitate praecedit!	"As for what John says about the devil, "The devil from the beginning" 1 John 3:8 they who suppose it is meant hereby that the devil was made with a sinful nature, misunderstand it; for if sin be natural, it is not sin at all. And how do they answer the prophetic proofs,-either what Isaiah says when he represents the devil under the person of the king of Babylon, "How are you fallen, O Lucifer, son of the morning!" Isaiah 14:12 or what Ezekiel says, "You have been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was your covering," Ezekiel 28:13 where it is meant that he was some time without sin; for a little after it is still more explicitly said, "You were perfect in your ways?" And if these passages cannot well be otherwise interpreted, we must understand by this one also, "He abode not in the truth," that he was once in the truth, but did not remain in it. And from this passage, "The devil from the beginning," it is not to be supposed that he sinned from the beginning of his created existence, but from the beginning of his sin, when by his pride he had once commenced to sin. There is a passage, too, in the Book of Job, of which the devil is the subject: "This is the beginning of the creation of God, which He made to be a sport to His angels," which agrees with the psalm, where it is said, "There is that dragon which You have made to be a sport therein." But these passages are not to lead us to suppose that the devil was originally created to be the sport of the angels, but that he was doomed to this punishment after his sin. His beginning, then, is the handiwork of God; for there is no nature, even among the least, and lowest, and last of the beasts, which was not the work of Him from whom has proceeded all measure, all form, all order, without which nothing can be planned or conceived. How much more, then, is this angelic nature, which surpasses in dignity all else that He has made, the handiwork of the Most High!
BOOK XI [XVI] In his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo facta sunt, praeponuntur viventia non viventibus, sicut ea, quae habent vim gignendi vel etiam appetendi, his, quae isto motu carent; et in his, quae vivunt, praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia; et in his, quae sentiunt, praeponuntur intellegentia non intellegentibus, sicut homines pecoribus; et in his, quae intellegunt, praeponuntur inmortalia mortalibus, sicut angeli hominibus. Sed ista praeponuntur naturae ordine; est autem alius atque alius pro suo cuiusque usu aestimationis modus, quo fit, ut quaedam sensu carentia quibusdam sentientibus praeponamus, in tantum, ut si potestas esset ea prorsus de natura rerum auferre vellemus, sive quem in ea locum habeant ignorantes, sive etiamsi sciamus nostris ea commodis postponentes. Quis enim non domui suae panem habere quam mures, nummos quam pulices malit? Sed quid mirum, cum in ipsorum etiam hominum aestimatione, quorum certe natura tantae est dignitatis, plerumque carius comparetur equus quam seruus, gemma quam famula? Ita libertate iudicandi plurimum distat ratio considerantis a necessitate indigentis seu voluptate cupientis, cum ista quid per se ipsum in rerum gradibus pendat, necessitas autem quid propter quid expetat cogitat, et ista quid verum luci mentis appareat, voluptas vero quid iucundum corporis sensibus blandiatur spectat. Sed tantum valet in naturis rationalibus quoddam veluti pondus voluntatis et amoris, ut, cum ordine naturae angeli hominibus, tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis angelis praeferantur.	For, among those beings which exist, and which are not of God the Creator's essence, those which have life are ranked above those which have none; those that have the power of generation, or even of desiring, above those which want this faculty. And, among things that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation, as animals are ranked above trees. And, among the sentient, the intelligent are above those that have not intelligence,-men, e.g., above cattle. And, among the intelligent, the immortal such as the angels, above the mortal, such as men. These are the gradations according to the order of nature; but according to the utility each man finds in a thing, there are various standards of value, so that it comes to pass that we prefer some things that have no sensation to some sentient beings. And so strong is this preference, that, had we the power, we would abolish the latter from nature altogether, whether in ignorance of the place they hold in nature, or, though we know it, sacrificing them to our own convenience. Who, e.g., would not rather have bread in his house than mice, gold than fleas? But there is little to wonder at in this, seeing that even when valued by men themselves (whose nature is certainly of the highest dignity), more is often given for a horse than for a slave, for a jewel than for a maid. Thus the reason of one contemplating nature prompts very different judgments from those dictated by the necessity of the needy, or the desire of the voluptuous; for the former considers what value a thing in itself has in the scale of creation, while necessity considers how it meets its need; reason looks for what the mental light will judge to be true, while pleasure looks for what pleasantly titilates the bodily sense. But of such consequence in rational natures is the weight, so to speak, of will and of love, that though in the order of nature angels rank above men, yet, by the scale of justice, good men are of greater value than bad angels.
BOOK XI [XVII] Propter naturam igitur, non propter malitiam diaboli, dictum recte intellegimus: Hoc est initium figmenti Domini. Quia sine dubio, ubi est vitium malitiae, natura non vitiata praecessit. Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae. Non itaque esset vitium recedere a Deo, nisi naturae, cuius id vitium est, potius competeret esse cum Deo. Quapropter etiam voluntas mala grande testimonium est naturae bonae. Sed Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus creator est, ita malarum voluntatum iustissimus ordinator; ut, cum illae male utuntur naturis bonis, ipse bene utatur etiam voluntatibus malis. Itaque fecit, ut diabolus institutione illius bonus, voluntate sua malus, in inferioribus ordinatus inluderetur ab angelis eius, id est, ut prosint temptationes eius sanctis, quibus eas obesse desiderat. Et quoniam Deus, cum eum conderet, futurae malignitatis eius non erat utique ignarus et.praevidebat quae bona de malo eius esset ipse facturus: propterea psalmus ait: Draco hic, quem finxisti ad inludendum ei, ut in eo ipso quod eum finxit, licet per suam bonitatem bonum, iam per suam praescientiam praeparasse intellegatur quo modo illo uteretur et malo.	It is with reference to the nature, then, and not to the wickedness of the devil, that we are to understand these words, "This is the beginning of God's handiwork;" for, without doubt, wickedness can be a flaw or vice only where the nature previously was not vitiated. Vice, too, is so contrary to nature, that it cannot but damage it. And therefore departure from God would be no vice, unless in a nature whose property it was to abide with God. So that even the wicked will is a strong proof of the goodness of the nature. But God, as He is the supremely good Creator of good natures, so is He of evil wills the most just Ruler; so that, while they make an ill use of good natures, He makes a good use even of evil wills. Accordingly, He caused the devil (good by God's creation, wicked by his own will) to be cast down from his high position, and to become the mockery of His angels,-that is, He caused his temptations to benefit those whom he wishes to injure by them. And because God, when He created him, was certainly not ignorant of his future malignity, and foresaw the good which He Himself would bring out of his evil, therefore says the psalm, "This leviathan whom You have made to be a sport therein," that we may see that, even while God in His goodness created him good, He yet had already foreseen and arranged how He would make use of him when he became wicked.
BOOK XI [XVIII] Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret atque ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae appellantur in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae Latine ut appellentur opposita, vel, quod expressius dicitur, contraposita, non est apud nos huius vocabuli consuetudo, cum tamen eisdem ornamentis locutionis etiam sermo Latinus utatur, immo linguae omnium gentium. His antithetis et Paulus apostolus in secunda ad Corinthios epistula illum locum suaviter explicat, ubi dicit: Per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra: per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam; ut seductores et veraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur. quasi morientes, et ecce vivimus, ut coherciti et non mortificati; ut tristes, semper autem gaudentes, sicut egeni, multos autem ditantes, tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes. Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt: ita quadam n on verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur. Apertissime hoc positum est in libro ecclesiastico isto modo: Contra malum bonum est et contra mortem vita; sic contra pium peccator. Et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi, bina bina, unum contra unum.	For God would never have created any, I do not say angel, but even man, whose future wickedness He foreknew, unless He had equally known to what uses in behalf of the good He could turn him, thus embellishing, the course of the ages, as it were an exquisite poem set off with antitheses. For what are called antitheses are among the most elegant of the ornaments of speech. They might be called in Latin "oppositions," or, to speak more accurately, "contrapositions;" but this word is not in common use among us, though the Latin, and indeed the languages of all nations, avail themselves of the same ornaments of style. In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians the Apostle Paul also makes a graceful use of antithesis, in that place where he says, "By the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by honor and dishonor, by evil report and good report: as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and, behold, we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things." 2 Corinthians 6:7-10 As, then, these oppositions of contraries lend beauty to the language, so the beauty of the course of this world is achieved by the opposition of contraries, arranged, as it were, by an eloquence not of words, but of things. This is quite plainly stated in the Book of Ecclesiasticus, in this way: "Good is set against evil, and life against death: so is the sinner against the godly. So look upon all the works of the Most High, and these are two and two, one against another." Sirach 33:15
BOOK XI [XIX] Quamuis itaque divini sermonis obscuritas etiam ad hoc sit utilis, quod plures sententias veritatis parit et in lucem notitiae producit, dum alius eum sic, alius sic intellegit (ita tamen ut, quod in obscuro loco intellegitur, vel adtestatione rerum manifestarum vel aliis locis minime dubiis asseratur; sive, cum multa tractantur, ad id quoque perveniatur, quod sensit ille qui scripsit, sive id lateat, sed ex occasione tractandae profundae obscuritatis alia quaedam vera dicantur): non mihi videtur ab operibus Dei absurda sententia, si, cum lux prima illa facta est, angeli creati intelleguntur, inter sanctos angelos et inmundos fuisse discretum, ubi dictum est: Et divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et vocavit Deus lucem diem et tenebras vocavit noctem. Solus quippe ille ista discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam priusquam caderent praescire casuros et privatos lumine veritatis in tenebrosa superbia remansuros. Nam inter istum nobis notissimum diem et noctem, id est inter hanc lucem et has tenebras, uulgatissima sensibus nostris luminaria caeli ut dividerent imperavit: Fiant, inquit, luminaria in firmamento caeli, ut luceant super terram et dividant inter diem et noctem; et paulo post: Et fecit, inquit, Deus duo luminaria magna, luminare maius in principia diei, et luminare minus in principia noctis, et stellas; et posuit illa Deus in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et praeesse diei et nocti et dividere inter lucem et tenebras. Inter illam vero lucem, quae sancta societas angelorum est inlustratione veritatis intellegibiliter fulgens, et ei contrarias tenebras, id est malorum angelorum aversorum a luce iustitiae taeterrimas mentes, ipse dividere potuit, cui etiam futurum non naturae, sed voluntatis malum occultum aut incertum esse non potuit.	"Accordingly, though the obscurity of the divine word has certainly this advantage, that it causes many opinions about the truth to be started and discussed, each reader seeing some fresh meaning in it, yet, whatever is said to be meant by an obscure passage should be either confirmed by the testimony of obvious facts, or should be asserted in other and less ambiguous texts. This obscurity is beneficial, whether the sense of the author is at last reached after the discussion of many other interpretations, or whether, though that sense remain concealed, other truths are brought out by the discussion of the obscurity. To me it does not seem incongruous with the working of God, if we understand that the angels were created when that first light was made, and that a separation was made between the holy and the unclean angels, when, as is said, "God divided the light from the darkness; and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night." For He alone could make this discrimination, who was able also before they fell, to foreknow that they would fall, and that, being deprived of the light of truth, they would abide in the darkness of pride. For, so far as regards the day and night, with which we are familiar, He commanded those luminaries of heaven that are obvious to our senses to divide between the light and the darkness. "Let there be," He says, "lights in the firmament of the heaven, to divide the day from the night;" and shortly after He says, "And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness." Genesis 1:14-18 But between that light, which is the holy company of the angels spiritually radiant with the illumination of the truth, and that opposing darkness, which is the noisome foulness of the spiritual condition of those angels who are turned away from the light of righteousness, only He Himself could divide, from whom their wickedness (not of nature, but of will), while yet it was future, could not be hidden or uncertain.
BOOK XI [XX] Denique nec illud est praetereundum silentio, quod, ubi dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, continuo subiunctum est; Et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est f non postea quam separavit inter lucem et tenebras et vocavit lucem diem et tenebras noctem, ne simul cum luce etiam talibus tenebris testimonium placiti sui perhibuisse videretur. Nam ubi tenebrae inculpabiles sunt, inter quas et lucem istam his oculis conspicuam luminaria caeli dividunt, non ante, sed post infertur: Et vidit Deus quia bonum est. Posuit illa, inquit, in firmamento caeli lucere super terram et pracesse diei et nocti et separare inter lucem et tenebras. Et vidit Deus quia bonum est. Vtrumque placuit, quia utrumque sine peccato est. Vbi autem dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est; et postmodum infertur: Et separavit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et vocavit Deus lucem diem et tenebras vocavit noctem: non hoc loco additum est: Et vidit Deus quia bonum est, ne utrumque appellaretur bonum, cum esset horum alterum malum, vitio proprio, non natura. Et ideo sola ibi lux placuit Conditori: tenebrae autem angelicae, etsi fuerant ordinandae, non tamen fuerant adprobandae.	"Then, we must not pass from this passage of Scripture without noticing that when God said, "Let there be light, and there was light," it was immediately added, "And God saw the light that it was good." No such expression followed the statement that He separated the light from the darkness, and called the light Day and the darkness Night, lest the seal of His approval might seem to be set on such darkness, as well as on the light. For when the darkness was not subject of disapprobation, as when it was divided by the heavenly bodies from this light which our eyes discern, the statement that God saw that it was good is inserted, not before, but after the division is recorded. "And God set them," so runs the passage, "in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness: and God saw that it was good." For He approved of both, because both were sinless. But where God said, "Let there be light, and there was light; and God saw the light that it was good;" and the narrative goes on, "and God divided the light from the darkness! and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night," there was not in this place subjoined the statement, "And God saw that it was good," lest both should be designated good, while one of them was evil, not by nature, but by its own fault. And therefore, in this case, the light alone received the approbation of the Creator, while the angelic darkness, though it had been ordained, was yet not approved.
BOOK XI [XXI] Quid est enim aliud intellegendum in eo, quod per omnia dicitur: Vidit Deus quia bonum est, nisi operis adprobatio secundum artem facti, quae sapientia Dei est? Deus autem usque adeo non, cum factum est, tunc didicit bonum, ut nihil eorum fieret, si ei fuisset incognitum. Dum ergo videt quia bonum est, quod, nisi vidisset antequam fieret, non utique fieret: docet bonum esse, non discit. Et Plato quidem plus ausus est dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi universitate perfecta. Vbi et ipse non usque adeo desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis novitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere voluit artifici suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia varietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non enim more nostro ille vel quod futurum est prospicit, vel quod praesens est aspicit, vel quod praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alteque diverso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter videt; ita ut illa quidem, quae temporaliter fiunt, et futura nondum sint et praesentia iam sint et praeterita iam non sint, ipse vero haec omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia conprehendat; nec aliter oculis, aliter mente; non enim ex animo constat et corpore; nec aliter nunc et aliter antea et aliter postea; quoniam non sicut nostra, ita eius quoque scientia trium temporum, praesentis videlicet et praeteriti vel futuri, varietate mutatur, apud quem non est inmutatio nec momenti obumbratio. Neque enim eius intentio de cogitatione in cogitationem transit, in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt cuncta quae novit; quoniam tempora ita novit nullis suis temporalibus notionibus, quem ad modum temporalia movet nullis suis temporalibus motibus. Ibi ergo vidit bonum esse quod fecit, ubi bonum esse vidit ut faceret; nec quia factum vidit scientiam duplicavit vel ex aliqua parte auxit, tamquam minoris scientiae fuerit priusquam faceret quod videret, qui tam perfecte non operare-, nisi tam perfecta scientia, cui nihil ex eius operibus adderetur. Quapropter, si tantummodo nobis insinuandum esset quis fecerit lucem, sufficeret dicere, fecit Deus lucem; si autem non solum quis fecerit, verum etiam per quid fecerit, satis esset ita enuntiari: Et dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux; ut non tantum Deum, sed etiam per Verbum lucem fecisse nossemus. Quia vero tria quaedam maxime scienda de creatura nobis oportuit intimari, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit: Dixit Deus, inquit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux. Et vidit Deus lucem quia bona est. Si ergo quaerimus, quis fecerit: Deus est, si per quid fecerit: Dixit: Fiat, et facta est; si quare fecerit: Quia bona est. Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars efficacior Dei verbo, nec causa melior quam ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Hanc etiam Plato causam condendi mundi iustissimam dicit, ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent; sive ista legerit, sive ab his qui legerant forte cognoverit; sive acerrimo ingenio inuisibilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspexerit, sive ab his qui ista conspexerant et ipse didicerit.	For what else is to be understood by that invariable refrain, "And God saw that it was good," than the approval of the work in its design, which is the wisdom of God? For certainly God did not in the actual achievement of the work first learn that it was good, but, on the contrary, nothing would have been made had it not been first known by Him. While, therefore, He sees that that is good which, had He not seen it before it was made, would never have been made, it is plain that He is not discovering, but teaching that it is good. Plato, indeed, was bold enough to say that, when the universe was completed, God was, as it were, elated with joy. And Plato was not so foolish as to mean by this that God was rendered more blessed by the novelty of His creation; but he wished thus to indicate that the work now completed met with its Maker's approval, as it had while yet in design. It is not as if the knowledge of God were of various kinds, knowing in different ways things which as yet are not, things which are, and things which have been. For not in our fashion does He look forward to what is future, nor at what is present, nor back upon what is past; but in a manner quite different and far and profoundly remote from our way of thinking. For He does not pass from this to that by transition of thought, but beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness; so that of those things which emerge in time, the future, indeed, are not yet, and the present are now, and the past no longer are; but all of these are by Him comprehended in His stable and eternal presence. Neither does He see in one fashion by the eye, in another by the mind, for He is not composed of mind and body; nor does His present knowledge differ from that which it ever was or shall be, for those variations of time, past, present, and future, though they alter our knowledge, do not affect His, "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." James 1:17 Neither is there any growth from thought to thought in the conceptions of Him in whose spiritual vision all things which He knows are at once embraced. For as without any movement that time can measure, He Himself moves all temporal things, so He knows all times with a knowledge that time cannot measure. And therefore He saw that what He had made was good, when He saw that it was good to make it. And when He saw it made, He had not on that account a twofold nor any way increased knowledge of it; as if He had less knowledge before He made what He saw. For certainly He would not be the perfect worker He is, unless His knowledge were so perfect as to receive no addition from His finished works. Wherefore, if the only object had been to inform us who made the light, it had been enough to say, "God made the light;" and if further information regarding the means by which it was made had been intended, it would have sufficed to say, "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light," that we might know not only that God had made the world, but also that He had made it by the word. But because it was right that three leading truths regarding the creature be intimated to us, viz., who made it, by what means, and why, it is written, "God said, Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw the light that it was good." If, then, we ask who made it, it was "God." If, by what means, He said "Let it be," and it was. If we ask, why He made it, "it was good." Neither is there any author more excellent than God, nor any skill more efficacious than the word of God, nor any cause better than that good might be created by the good God. This also Plato has assigned as the most sufficient reason for the creation of the world, that good works might be made by a good God; whether he read this passage, or, perhaps, was informed of these things by those who had read them, or, by his quick-sighted genius, penetrated to things spiritual and invisible through the things that are created, or was instructed regarding them by those who had discerned them.
BOOK XI [XXII] Hanc tamen causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei, hanc, inquam, causam tam iustam atque idoneam, quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controversias quaerentium mundi originem terminat, quidam haeretici non viderunt, quia egenam carnis huius fragilemque mortalitate.m iam de iusto supplicio venientem, dum ei non conveniunt, plurima offendunt, sicut ignis aut frigus aut fera bestia aut qquid eius modi; nec adtendunt, quam vel in suis locis naturisque vigeant pulchroque ordine disponantur, quantumque universitati rerum pro suis portionibus decoris tamquam in communem rem publicam conferant vel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter atque scienter utamur, commoditatis adtribuant, ita ut venena ipsa, quae per inconvenientiam perniciosa sunt, convenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta vertantur; quamque a contrario etiam haec, quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, inmoderato et inopportuno usu noxia sentiantur. Vnde nos admonet divina providentia non res insipienter vituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium vel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quaedam, quae vix potuimus invenire; quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio aut humilitatis exercitatio est aut elationis adtritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni. Sed a terrenis usque ad caelestia et a visibilibus usque ad inuisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora, ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia; Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in paruis; quae parua non sua granditate (nam nulla est), sed artificis sapientia metienda sunt; sicut in specie visibilis hominis, si unum radatur supercilium, quam propemodum nihil corpori, et quam multum detrahitur pulchritudini, quoniam non mole constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione membrorum! Nec sane multum mirandum est, quod hi, qui nonnullam malam putant esse naturam suo quodam contrario exortam propagatamque principio, nolunt accipere istam causam creationis rerum, ut bonus Deus conderet bona, credentes eum potius ad haec mundana molimina rebellantis adversum se mali repellendi extrema necessitate perductum suamque naturam bonam malo cohercendo superandoque miscuisse, quam turpissime pollutam et crudelissime captivatam et oppressam labore magno vix mundet ac liberet; non tamen totam, sed quod eius non potuerit ab illa inquinatione purgari, tegmen ac vinculum futurum hostis victi et inclusi. Sic autem Manichaei non desiperent vel potius insanirent, si Dei naturam, sicuti est, incommutabilem atque omnino incorruptibilem crederent, cui nocere nulla res possit; animam vero, quae voluntate mutari in deterius et peccato corrumpi potuit atque ita incommutabilis veritatis luce privari, non Dei partem nec eius naturae, quae Dei est, sed ab illo conditam longe inparem Conditori Christiana sanitate sentirent.	This cause, however, of a good creation, namely, the goodness of God,-this cause, I say, so just and fit, which, when piously and carefully weighed, terminates all the controversies of those who inquire into the origin of the world, has not been recognized by some heretics, because there are, forsooth, many things, such as fire, frost, wild beasts, and so forth, which do not suit but injure this thin blooded and frail mortality of our flesh, which is at present under just punishment. They do not consider how admirable these things are in their own places, how excellent in their own natures, how beautifully adjusted to the rest of creation, and how much grace they contribute to the universe by their own contributions as to a commonwealth; and how serviceable they are even to ourselves, if we use them with a knowledge of their fit adaptations,-so that even poisons, which are destructive when used injudiciously, become wholesome and medicinal when used in conformity with their qualities and design; just as, on the other hand, those things which give us pleasure, such as food, drink, and the light of the sun, are found to be hurtful when immoderately or unseasonably used. And thus divine providence admonishes us not foolishly to vituperate things, but to investigate their utility with care; and, where our mental capacity or infirmity is at fault, to believe that there is a utility, though hidden, as we have experienced that there were other things which we all but failed to discover. For this concealment of the use of things is itself either an exercise of our humility or a levelling of our pride; for no nature at all is evil, and this is a name for nothing but the want of good. But from things earthly to things heavenly, from the visible to the invisible, there are some things better than others; and for this purpose are they unequal, in order that they might all exist. Now God is in such sort a great worker in great things, that He is not less in little things,-for these little things are to be measured not by their own greatness (which does not exist), but by the wisdom of their Designer; as, in the visible appearance of a man, if one eyebrow be shaved off, how nearly nothing is taken from the body, but how much from the beauty!-for that is not constituted by bulk, but by the proportion and arrangement of the members. But we do not greatly wonder that persons, who suppose that some evil nature has been generated and propagated by a kind of opposing principle proper to it, refuse to admit that the cause of the creation was this, that the good God produced a good creation. For they believe that He was driven to this enterprise of creation by the urgent necessity of repulsing the evil that warred against Him, and that He mixed His good nature with the evil for the sake of restraining and conquering it; and that this nature of His, being thus shamefully polluted, and most cruelly oppressed and held captive, He labors to cleanse and deliver it, and with all His pains does not wholly succeed; but such part of it as could not be cleansed from that defilement is to serve as a prison and chain of the conquered and incarcerated enemy. The Manichжans would not drivel, or rather, rave in such a style as this, if they believed the nature of God to be, as it is, unchangeable and absolutely incorruptible, and subject to no injury; and if, moreover, they held in Christian sobriety, that the soul which has shown itself capable of being altered for the worse by its own will, and of being corrupted by sin, and so, of being deprived of the light of eternal truth,-that this soul, I say, is not a part of God, nor of the same nature as God, but is created by Him, and is far different from its Creator.
BOOK XI [XXIII] Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam, qui unum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium, ullamque naturam, quae non est quod Deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse, noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ac simpliciter credere, ut Deus bonus conderet bona et essent post Deum quae non essent quod est Deus, bona tamen, quae non faceret nisi bonus Deus; sed animas dicunt, non quidem partes Dei, sed factas a Deo, peccasse a Conditore recedendo et diversis progressibus pro diversitate peccatorum a caelis usque ad terras diversa corpora quasi vincula meruisse, et hunc esse mundum eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderentur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. Hinc Origenes iure culpatur. In libris enim quos appellat peri\ a)rxw=n, id est de principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit. Vbi plus quam dici potest miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum non adtendisse, primum quam hoc esset contrarium scripturae huius tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera Dei subiungens: Et vidit Deus, quia bonum est, completisque omnibus inferens: Et vidit Deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona valde, nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi voluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono Deo. Vbi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt impleta peccatis, cum bonorum longe maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem seruet; nec mala voluntas, quia naturae ordinem servare noluit, ideo iusti Dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco suo posito, ita universitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamvis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet. Deinde videre debuit Origenes et quicumque ista sapiunt, si haec opinio vera esset, mundum ideo factum, ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tamquam ergastula, quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leviora quae minus, inferiora vero et graviora quae amplius peccaverunt, daemones, quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora, quibus inferius et gravius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam bonos habere debuisse. Nunc vero, ut intellegeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon, homo autem, et nunc licet malus longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae, et certe ante peccatum, tamen luteum corpus accepit. Quid autem stultius dici potest, quam istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis vel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum, sed hoc potius evenisse, quia una anima sic peccaverat, ut tali corpore mereretur includi? ac per hoc si contigisset, ut non una, sed duae; immo non duae, sed decem vel centum similiter aequaliterque peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus? Quod ut non fieret, non opificis provisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est, sed contigit.potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis, ut sola corpus tale mereretur. Non plane animarum, de quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed eorum ipsorum, qui talia sapiunt multum longe a veritate, [et] merito est cohercenda progressio. Haec ergo tria, quae superius commendavi, cum in unaquaque creatura requirantur, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit, ut respondeatur "Deus, per Verbum, quia bona est", utrum altitudine mystica nobis ipsa trinitas intimetur, hoc est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, an aliquid occurrat, quod hoc loco scripturarum id accipiendum esse prohibeat, multi sermonis est quaestio, nec omnia uno volumine ut explicemus urgendum est.	But it is much more surprising that some even of those who, with ourselves, believe that there is one only source of all things, and that no nature which is not divine can exist unless originated by that Creator, have yet refused to accept with a good and simple faith this so good and simple a reason of the world's creation, that a good God made it good; and that the things created, being different from God, were inferior to Him, and yet were good, being created by none other than He. But they say that souls, though not, indeed, parts of God, but created by Him, sinned by abandoning God; that, in proportion to their various sins, they merited different degrees of debasement from heaven to earth, and diverse bodies as prison-houses; and that this is the world, and this the cause of its creation, not the production of good things, but the restraining of evil. Origen is justly blamed for holding this opinion. For in the books which he entitles pe?? a????, that is, Of Origins, this is his sentiment, this his utterance. And I can not sufficiently express my astonishment, that a man so erudite and well versed in ecclesiastical literature, should not have observed, in the first place, how opposed this is to the meaning of this authoritative Scripture, which, in recounting all the works of God, regularly adds, "And God saw that it was good;" and, when all were completed, inserts the words, "And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good." Genesis 1:31 Was it not obviously meant to be understood that there was no other cause of the world's creation than that good creatures should be made by a good God? In this creation, had no one sinned, the world would have been filled and beautified with natures good without exception; and though there is sin, all things are not therefore full of sin, for the great majority of the heavenly inhabitants preserve their nature's integrity. And the sinful will though it violated the order of its own nature, did not on that account escape the laws of God, who justly orders all things for good. For as the beauty of a picture is increased by well-managed shadows, so, to the eye that has skill to discern it, the universe is beautified even by sinners, though, considered by themselves, their deformity is a sad blemish.In the second place, Origen, and all who think with him, ought to have seen that if it were the true opinion that the world was created in order that souls might, for their sins, be accommodated with bodies in which they should be shut up as in houses of correction, the more venial sinners receiving lighter and more ethereal bodies, while the grosser and graver sinners received bodies more crass and grovelling, then it would follow that the devils, who are deepest in wickedness, ought, rather than even wicked men, to have earthly bodies, since these are the grossest and least ethereal of all. But in point of fact, that we might see that the deserts of souls are not to be estimated by the qualities of bodies, the wickedest devil possesses an ethereal body, while man, wicked, it is true, but with a wickedness small and venial in comparison with his, received even before his sin a body of clay. And what more foolish assertion can be advanced than that God, by this sun of ours, did not design to benefit the material creation, or lend lustre to its loveliness, and therefore created one single sun for this single world, but that it so happened that one soul only had so sinned as to deserve to be enclosed in such a body as it is? On this principle, if it had chanced that not one, but two, yea, or ten, or a hundred had sinned similarly, and with a like degree of guilt, then this world would have one hundred suns. And that such is not the case, is due not to the considerate foresight of the Creator, contriving the safety and beauty of things material, but rather to the fact that so fine a quality of sinning was hit upon by only one soul, so that it alone has merited such a body. Manifestly persons holding such opinions should aim at confining, not souls of which they know not what they say, but themselves, lest they fall, and deservedly, far indeed from the truth. And as to these three answers which I formerly recommended when in the case of any creature the questions are put, Who made it? By what means? Why? that it should be replied, God, By the Word, Because it was good,-as to these three answers, it is very questionable whether the Trinity itself is thus mystically indicated, that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, or whether there is some good reason for this acceptation in this passage of Scripture,-this, I say, is questionable, and one can't be expected to explain everything in one volume.
BOOK XI [XXIV] Credimus et tenemus et fideliter praedicamus, quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, unus unum, aeternus coaeternum, summe bonus aequaliter bonum; et quod Spiritus sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus et ipse consubstantialis et coaeternus ambobus; atque hoc totum et trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum et unus Deus propter inseparabilem divinitatem, sicut unus Omnipotens propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam; ita tamen, ut etiam cum de singulis quaeritur unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres dii vel tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se voluit praedicari. Vtrum autem boni Patris et boni Filii Spiritus sanctus, quia communis ambobus est, recte bonitas dici possit amborum, non audeo temerariam praecipitare sententiam; verum tamen amborum eum dicere sanctitatem facilius ausus fuero, non amborum quasi qualitatem, sed ipsum quoque substantiam et tertiam in trinitate personam. Ad hoc enim me probabilius ducit, quod, cum sit et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus, proprie tamen ipse vocatur Spiritus sanctus tamquam sanctitas substantialis et consubstantialis amborum. Sed si nihil est aliud bonitas divina quam sanctitas, profecto et illa diligentia rationis est, non praesumptionis audacia, ut in operibus Dei secreto quodam loquendi modo, quo nostra exerceatur intentio, eadem nobis insinuata intellegatur trinitas, unamquamque creaturam quis fecerit, per quid fecerit, propter quid fecerit. Pater quippe intellegitur Verbi, qui dixit ut fiat; quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est; in eo vero quod dicitur: Vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est; quod ideo postea quam factum est dicitur, ut res, quae facta est, congruere bonitati, propter quam facta est, indicetur. Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intellegitur, universa nobis trinitas in suis operibus intimatur. Inde est civitatis sanctae, quae in sanctis angelis sursum est, et origo et informatio et beatitudo. Nam si quaeratur unde sit: Deus eam condidit; si unde sit sapiens: a Deo inluminatur; si unde sit felix: Deo fruitur; subsistens modificatur, contemplans inlustratur, inhaerens iucundatur; est, videt, amat; in aeternitate Dei viget, in veritate Dei lucet, in bonitate Dei gaudet.	We believe, we maintain, we faithfully preach, that the Father begat the Word, that is, Wisdom, by which all things were made, the only-begotten Son, one as the Father is one, eternal as the Father is eternal, and, equally with the Father, supremely good; and that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit alike of Father and of Son, and is Himself consubstantial and co-eternal with both; and that this whole is a Trinity by reason of the individuality of the persons, and one God by reason of the indivisible divine substance, as also one Almighty by reason of the indivisible omnipotence; yet so that, when we inquire regarding each singly, it is said that each is God and Almighty; and, when we speak of all together, it is said that there are not three Gods, nor three Almighties, but one God Almighty; so great is the indivisible unity of these Three, which requires that it be so stated. But, whether the Holy Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, who are both good, can be with propriety called the goodness of both, because He is common to both, I do not presume to determine hastily. Nevertheless, I would have less hesitation in saying that He is the holiness of both, not as if He were a divine attribute merely, but Himself also the divine substance, and the third person in the Trinity. I am the rather emboldened to make this statement, because, though the Father is a spirit, and the Son a spirit, and the Father holy, and the Son holy, yet the third person is distinctively called the Holy Spirit, as if He were the substantial holiness consubstantial with the other two. But if the divine goodness is nothing else than the divine holiness, then certainly it is a reasonable studiousness, and not presumptuous intrusion, to inquire whether the same Trinity be not hinted at in an enigmatical mode of speech, by which our inquiry is stimulated, when it is written who made each creature, and by what means, and why. For it is the Father of the Word who said, Let there be. And that which was made when He spoke was certainly made by means of the Word. And by the words, "God saw that it was good," it is sufficiently intimated that God made what was made not from any necessity, nor for the sake of supplying any want, but solely from His own goodness, i.e., because it was good. And this is stated after the creation had taken place, that there might be no doubt that the thing made satisfied the goodness on account of which it was made. And if we are right in understanding; that this goodness is the Holy Spirit, then the whole Trinity is revealed to us in the creation. In this, too, is the origin, the enlightenment, the blessedness of the holy city which is above among the holy angels. For if we inquire whence it is, God created it; or whence its wisdom, God illumined it; or whence its blessedness, God is its bliss. It has its form by subsisting in Him; its enlightenment by contemplating Him; its joy by abiding in Him. It is; it sees; it loves. In God's eternity is its life; in God's truth its light; in God's goodness its joy.
BOOK XI [XXV] Quantum intellegi datur, hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripertitam esse voluerunt, immo tripertitam esse animadvertere potuerunt (neque enim ipsi instituerunt ut ita esset, sed ita esse potius invenerunt), cuius una pars appellaretur physica, altera logica, tertia ethica (quarum nomina Latina iam multorum litteris frequentata sunt, ut naturalis, rationalis moralisque vocarentur; quas etiam in octauo libro breviter strinximus); non quo sit consequens, ut isti in his tribus aliquid secundum Deum de trinitate cogitaverint, quamvis Plato primus istam distributionem repperisse et commendasse dicatur, cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus visus est neque intellegentiae dator neque amoris, quo bene beateque vivitur, inspirator. Sed certe cum et de natura rerum et de ratione indagandae veritatis et de boni fine, ad quem cuncta quae agimus referre debemus, diversi diversa sentiant: in his tamen tribus magnis et generalibus quaestionibus omnis eorum versatur intentio. Ita cum in unaquaque earum quid quisque sectetur multiplex discrepantia sit opinionum, esse tamen aliquam naturae causam, scientiae formam, vitae summam nemo cunctatur. Tria etiam sunt, quae in unoquoque homine artifice spectantur, ut aliquid efficiat: natura, doctrina, usus; natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus fructu diiudicandus est. Nec ignoro, quod proprie fructus fruentis, usus utentis sit, atque hoc interesse videatur, quod ea re frui dicimur, quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsa delectat; uti vero ea re, quam propter aliud quaerimus (unde temporalibus magis utendum est, quam fruendum, ut frui mereamur aeternis; non sicut peruersi, qui frui volunt nummo, uti autem Deo; quoniam non nummum propter Deum inpendunt, sed Deum propter nummum colunt); verum tamen eo loquendi modo, quem pius obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur et usibus fruimur; nam et fructus iam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes temporaliter utimur. Hoc itaque more usum dixerim in his tribus, quae in homine spectanda commonui, quae sunt natura, doctrina, usus. Ex his propter obtinendam beatam vitam tripertita, ut dixi, a philosophis inventa est disciplina, naturalis propter naturam, rationalis propter doctrinam, moralis propter usum. Si ergo natura nostra esset a nobis, profecto et nostram nos genuissemus sapientiam nec eam doctrina, id est aliunde discendo, percipere curaremus; et noster amor a nobis profectus et ad nos relatus et ad beate vivendum sufficeret nec bono alio quo frueremur ullo indigeret; nunc vero quia natura nostra, ut esset, Deum habet auctorem, procul dubio ut vera sapiamus ipsum debemus habere doctorem, ipsum etiam ut beati simus suavitatis intimae largitorem.	As far as one can judge, it is for the same reason that philosophers have aimed at a threefold division of science, or rather, were enabled to see that there was a threefold division (for they did not invent, but only discovered it), of which one part is called physical, another logical, the third ethical. The Latin equivalents of these names are now naturalized in the writings of many authors, so that these divisions are called natural, rational, and moral, on which I have touched slightly in the eighth book. Not that I would conclude that these philosophers, in this threefold division, had any thought of a trinity in God, although Plato is said to have been the first to discover and promulgate this distribution, and he saw that God alone could be the author of nature, the bestower of intelligence, and the kindler of love by which life becomes good and blessed. But certain it is that, though philosophers disagree both regarding the nature of things, and the mode of investigating truth, and of the good to which all our actions ought to tend, yet in these three great general questions all their intellectual energy is spent. And though there be a confusing diversity of opinion, every man striving to establish his own opinion in regard to each of these questions, yet no one of them all doubts that nature has some cause, science some method, life some end and aim. Then, again, there are three things which every artificer must possess if he is to effect anything,-nature, education, practice. Nature is to be judged by capacity, education by knowledge, practice by its fruit. I am aware that, properly speaking, fruit is what one enjoys, use [practice] what one uses. And this seems to be the difference between them, that we are said to enjoy that which in itself, and irrespective of other ends, delights us; to use that which we seek for the sake of some end beyond. For which reason the things of time are to be used rather than enjoyed, that we may deserve to enjoy things eternal; and not as those perverse creatures who would fain enjoy money and use God,-not spending money for God's sake, but worshipping God for money's sake. However, in common parlance, we both use fruits and enjoy uses. For we correctly speak of the "fruits of the field," which certainly we all use in the present life. And it was in accordance with this usage that I said that there were three things to be observed in a man, nature, education, practice. From these the philosophers have elaborated, as I said, the threefold division of that science by which a blessed life is attained: the natural having respect to nature, the rational to education, the moral to practice. If, then, we were ourselves the authors of our nature, we should have generated knowledge in ourselves, and should not require to reach it by education, i.e., by learning it from others. Our love, too, proceeding from ourselves and returning to us, would suffice to make our life blessed, and would stand in need of no extraneous enjoyment. But now, since our nature has God as its requisite author, it is certain that we must have Him for our teacher that we may be wise; Him, too, to dispense to us spiritual sweetness that we may be blessed.
BOOK XI [XXVI] Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo valde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo brevius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas veri similis turbat. Non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, velut colores videndo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas cogitatione versamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur; sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quiargo sum si fallor, quo modo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me novi esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me novi nosse, non fallar. Sicut enim novi esse me, ita novi etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque amorem quiddam tertium nec inparis aestimationis eis quas novi rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar; quamquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare verum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum vero et illa vera atque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor verus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non esse beatus velit. Quo modo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?	And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him,-being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him,-is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance. For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us,-colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by touching,-of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?
BOOK XI [XXVII] Ita vero vi quadam naturali ipsum esse iucundum est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire et, cum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de rebus, sed miseriam suam potius auferri velint. Illis etiam, qui et sibi miserrimi apparent et plane sunt et non solum a sapientibus, quoniam stulti, verum et ab his, qui se beatos putant, miseri iudicantur, quia pauperes atque mendici sunt, si quis inmortalitatem daret, qua nec ipsa miseria moreretur, proposito sibi quod, si in eadem miseria semper esse nollent, nulli et nusquam essent futuri, sed omni modo perituri, profecto exultarent laetitia et sic semper eligerent esse quam omnino non esse. Huius rei testis est notissimus sensus illorum. Vnde enim mori metuunt et malunt in illa aerumna vivere, quam eam morte finire, nisi quia satis apparet quam refugiat natura non esse? Atque ideo cum se noverint esse morituros, pro magno beneficio sibi hanc inpendi misericordiam desiderant, ut aliquanto productius in eadem miseria vivant tardiusque moriantur. Procul dubio ergo indicant, inmortalitatem, saltem talem quae non habeat finem mendicitatis, quanta gratulatione susciperent. Quid? animalia omnia etiam inrationalia, quibus datum non est ista cogitare, ab inmensis draconibus usque ad exiguos vermiculos nonne se esse velle atque ob hoc interitum fugere omnibus quibus possunt motibus indicant? Quid? arbusta omnesque frutices, quibus nullus est sensus ad vitandam manifesta motione perniciem, nonne ut in auras tutum cacuminis germen emittant, aliud terrae radicis adfigunt, quo alimentum trahant atque ita suum quodam modo esse conseruent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est vita, ita tamen vel exiliunt in superna vel in ima descendunt vel librantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam, ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant. Iam vero nosse quantum ametur quamque falli nolit humana natura, vel hinc intellegi potest, quod lamentari quisque sana mente mauult quam laetari in amentia. Quae vis magna atque mirabilis mortalibus praeter homini animantibus nulla est, licet eorum quibusdam ad istam lucem contuendam multo quam nobis sit acrior sensus oculorum; sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo radiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verum tamen inest in sensibus inrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo; cetera autem rerum corporalium, non quia sentiunt, sed quia sentiuntur, sensibilia nuncupata sunt. Quorum in arbustis hoc simile est sensibus, quod aluntur et gignunt. Verum tamen et haec et omnia corporalia latentes in natura causas habent; sed formas suas, quibus mundi huius visibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent, ut pro eo, quod nosse non possunt, quasi innotescere velle videantur. Sed nos ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus, iusta per intellegibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupulae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum.	And truly the very fact of existing is by some natural spell so pleasant, that even the wretched are, for no other reason, unwilling to perish; and, when they feel that they are wretched, wish not that they themselves be annihilated, but that their misery be so. Take even those who, both in their own esteem, and in point of fact, are utterly wretched, and who are reckoned so, not only by wise men on account of their folly, but by those who count themselves blessed, and who think them wretched because they are poor and destitute,-if any one should give these men an immortality, in which their misery should be deathless, and should offer the alternative, that if they shrank from existing eternally in the same misery they might be annihilated, and exist nowhere at all, nor in any condition, on the instant they would joyfully, nay exultantly, make election to exist always, even in such a condition, rather than not exist at all. The well-known feeling of such men witnesses to this. For when we see that they fear to die, and will rather live in such misfortune than end it by death, is it not obvious enough how nature shrinks from annihilation? And, accordingly, when they know that they must die, they seek, as a great boon, that this mercy be shown them, that they may a little longer live in the same misery, and delay to end it by death. And so they indubitably prove with what glad alacrity they would accept immortality, even though it secured to them endless destruction. What! do not even all irrational animals, to whom such calculations are unknown, from the huge dragons down to the least worms, all testify that they wish to exist, and therefore shun death by every movement in their power? Nay, the very plants and shrubs, which have no such life as enables them to shun destruction by movements we can see, do not they all seek in their own fashion to conserve their existence, by rooting themselves more and more deeply in the earth, that so they may draw nourishment, and throw out healthy branches towards the sky? In fine, even the lifeless bodies, which want not only sensation but seminal life, yet either seek the upper air or sink deep, or are balanced in an intermediate position, so that they may protect their existence in that situation where they can exist in most accordance with their nature. And how much human nature loves the knowledge of its existence, and how it shrinks from being deceived, will be sufficiently understood from this fact, that every man prefers to grieve in a sane mind, rather than to be glad in madness. And this grand and wonderful instinct belongs to men alone of all animals; for, though some of them have keener eyesight than ourselves for this world's light, they cannot attain to that spiritual light with which our mind is somehow irradiated, so that we can form right judgments of all things. For our power to judge is proportioned to our acceptance of this light. Nevertheless, the irrational animals, though they have not knowledge, have certainly something resembling knowledge; whereas the other material things are said to be sensible, not because they have senses, but because they are the objects of our senses. Yet among plants, their nourishment and generation have some resemblance to sensible life. However, both these and all material things have their causes hidden in their nature; but their outward forms, which lend beauty to this visible structure of the world, are perceived by our senses, so that they seem to wish to compensate for their own want of knowledge by providing us with knowledge. But we perceive them by our bodily senses in such a way that we do not judge of them by these senses. For we have another and far superior sense, belonging to the inner man, by which we perceive what things are just, and what unjust,-just by means of an intelligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I am, and that I know this; and these two I love, and in the same manner I am assured that I love them.
BOOK XI [XXVIII] Sed de duobus illis, essentia scilicet et notitia, quantum amentur in nobis, et quem ad modum etiam in ceteris rebus, quae infra sunt, eorum reperiatur, etsi differens, quaedam tamen similitudo, quantum suscepti huius operis ratio visa est postulare, satis diximus; de amore autem, quo amantur, utrum et ipse amor ametur, non dictum est. Amatur autem; et hinc probamus, quod in hominibus, qui rectius amantur, ipse magis amatur. Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. Cur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quidquid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo amatur et quod amandum non est, et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut illo proficiente quo bene vivimus iste deficiat quo male vivimus, donec ad perfectum sanetur et in bonum commutetur omne quod vivimus. Si enim pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum eius est amaremus idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum et secundum hoc, cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, verum tamen id quasi adpetere videremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides aut fluctus aut ventus aut flamma vel quid huius modi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis adpetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate sive sursum levitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est vera aeternitas, aeterna veritas, aeterna et vera caritas, estque ipse aeterna et vera et cara trinitas neque confusa neque separata: in his quidem rebus, quae infra nos sunt, quoniam et ipsa nec aliquo modo essent nec aliqua specie continerentur nec aliquem ordinem vel adpeterent vel tenerent, nisi ab illo facta essent, qui summe est, qui summe sapiens est, qui summe bonus est, tamquam per omnia, quae fecit mirabili stabilitate, currentes quasi quaedam eius alibi magis, alibi minus inpressa uestigia colligamus; In nobis autem ipsis eius imaginem contuentes tamquam minor ille euang icus filius ad nosmet ipsos reuersi surgamus et ad illum redeamus, a quo peccando recesseramus. Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem. Nunc autem tria ista nostra quamvis certa teneamus nec aliis ea credamus testibus, sed nos ipsi praesentia sentiamus atque interiore veracissimo cernamus aspectu, tamen, quamdiu futura vel utrum numquam defutura et quo si male, quo autem si bene agantur peruentura sint, quoniam per nos ipsos nosse non possumus, alios hinc testes vel quaerimus vel habemus; de quorum fide cur nulla debeat esse dubitatio, non est iste, sed posterior erit diligentius disserendi locus. In hoc autem libro de civitate Dei, quae non peregrinatur in huius vitae mortalitate, sed inmortalis semper in caelis est, id est de angelis sanctis Deo cohaerentibus, qui nec fuerunt umquam nec futuri sunt desertores, inter quos et illos, qui aeternam lucem deserentes tenebrae facti sunt, Deum primitus divisisse iam diximus, illo adivuante quod coepimus ut possumus explicemus.	We have said as much as the scope of this work demands regarding these two things, to wit, our existence, and our knowledge of it, and how much they are loved by us, and how there is found even in the lower creatures a kind of likeness of these things, and yet with a difference. We have yet to speak of the love wherewith they are loved, to determine whether this love itself is loved. And doubtless it is; and this is the proof. Because in men who are justly loved, it is rather love itself that is loved; for he is not justly called a good man who knows what is good, but who loves it. Is it not then obvious that we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever good we love? For there is also a love wherewith we love that which we ought not to love; and this love is hated by him who loves that wherewith he loves what ought to be loved. For it is quite possible for both to exist in one man. And this co-existence is good for a man, to the end that this love which conduces to our living well may grow, and the other, which leads us to evil may decrease, until our whole life be perfectly healed and transmuted into good. For if we were beasts, we should love the fleshly and sensual life, and this would be our sufficient good; and when it was well with us in respect of it, we should seek nothing beyond. In like manner, if we were trees, we could not, indeed, in the strict sense of the word, love anything; nevertheless we should seem, as it were, to long for that by which we might become more abundantly and luxuriantly fruitful. If we were stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of that kind, we should want, indeed, both sensation and life, yet should possess a kind of attraction towards our own proper position and natural order. For the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried downwards by their weight, or upwards by their levity. For the body is borne by its gravity, as the spirit by love, whithersoever it is borne. But we are men, created in the image of our Creator, whose eternity is true, and whose truth is eternal, whose love is eternal and true, and who Himself is the eternal, true, and adorable Trinity, without confusion, without separation; and, therefore, while, as we run over all the works which He has established, we may detect, as it were, His footprints, now more and now less distinct even in those things that are beneath us, since they could not so much as exist, or be bodied forth in any shape, or follow and observe any law, had they not been made by Him who supremely is, and is supremely good and supremely wise; yet in ourselves beholding His image, let us, like that younger son of the gospel, come to ourselves, and arise and return to Him from whom by our sin we had departed. There our being will have no death, our knowledge no error, our love no mishap. But now, though we are assured of our possession of these three things, not on the testimony of others, but by our own consciousness of their presence, and because we see them with our own most truthful interior vision, yet, as we cannot of our selves know how long they are to continue, and whether they shall never cease to be, and what issue their good or bad use will lead to, we seek for others who can acquaint us of these things, if we have not already found them. Of the trustworthiness of these witnesses, there will, not now, but subsequently, be an opportunity of speaking. But in this book let us go on as we have begun, with God's help, to speak of the city of God, not in its state of pilgrimage and mortality, but as it exists ever immortal in the heavens,-that is, let us speak of the holy angels who maintain their allegiance to God, who never were, nor ever shall be, apostate, between whom and those who forsook light eternal and became darkness, God, as we have already said, made at the first a separation.
BOOK XI [XXIX] Illi quippe angeli sancti non per verba sonantia Deum discunt, sed per ipsam praesentiam inmutabilis veritatis, hoc est Verbum eius unigenitum, et ipsum Verbum et Patrem et eorum Spiritum sanctum, eamque esse inseparabilem trinitatem singulasque in ea personas esse substantiam, et tamen omnes non tres deos esse, sed unum Deum, ita noverunt, ut eis magis ista, quam nos ipsi nobis cogniti simus. Ipsam quoque creaturam melius ibi, hoc est in sapientia Dei, tamquam in arte, qua facta est, quam in ea ipsa sciunt; ac per hoc et se ipsos ibi melius quam in se ipsis, verum tamen et in se ipsis. Facti sunt enim et aliud sunt quam ille qui fecit. Ibi ergo tamquam in diurna cognitione, in se ipsis autem tamquam in uespertina, sicut iam supra diximus. Multum enim differt, utrum in ea ratione cognoscatur aliquid, secundum quam factum est, an in se ipso; sicut aliter scitur rectitudo linearum seu veritas figurarum, cum intellecta conspicitur, aliter cum in puluere scribitur; et aliter iustitia in veritate incommutabili, aliter in anima iusti. Sic deinde cetera, sicut firmamentum inter aquas superiores et inferiores, quod caelum vocatum est; sicut deorsum aquarum congeries terraeque nudatio et herbarum institutio atque lignorum; sicut solis ac lunae stellarumque conditio; sicut ex aquis animalium, volucrum scilicet atque piscium beluarumque natantium; sicut quorumque in terra gradientium atque repentium et ipsius hominis, qui cunctis in terra rebus excelleret. Omnia haec aliter in Verbo Dei cognoscuntur ab angelis, ubi habent causas rationesque suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in se ipsis; illa clariore, hac obscuriore cognitione, velut artis atque operum; quae tamen opera cum ad ipsius Creatoris laudem venerationemque referuntur, tamquam mane lucescit in mentibus contemplantium.	Those holy angels come to the knowledge of God not by audible words, but by the presence to their souls of immutable truth, i.e., of the only-begotten Word of God; and they know this Word Himself, and the Father, and their Holy Spirit, and that this Trinity is indivisible, and that the three persons of it are one substance, and that there are not three Gods but one God; and this they so know that it is better understood by them than we are by ourselves. Thus, too, they know the creature also, not in itself, but by this better way, in the wisdom of God, as if in the art by which it was created; and, consequently, they know themselves better in God than in themselves, though they have also this latter knowledge. For they were created, and are different from their Creator. In Him, therefore, they have, as it were, a noonday knowledge; in themselves, a twilight knowledge, according to our former explanations. For there is a great difference between knowing a thing in the design in conformity to which it was made, and knowing it in itself,-e.g., the straightness of lines and correctness of figures is known in one way when mentally conceived, in another when described on paper; and justice is known in one way in the unchangeable truth, in another in the spirit of a just man. So is it with all other things,-as, the firmament between the water above and below, which was called the heaven; the gathering of the waters beneath, and the laying bare of the dry land, and the production of plants and trees; the creation of sun, moon, and stars; and of the animals out of the waters, fowls, and fish, and monsters of the deep; and of everything that walks or creeps on the earth, and of man himself, who excels all that is on the earth,-all these things are known in one way by the angels in the Word of God, in which they see the eternally abiding causes and reasons according to which they were made, and in another way in themselves: in the former, with a clearer knowledge; in the latter, with a knowledge dimmer, and rather of the bare works than of the design. Yet, when these works are referred to the praise and adoration of the Creator Himself, it is as if morning dawned in the minds of those who contemplate them.
BOOK XI [XXX] Haec autem propter senarii numeri perfectionem eodem die sexiens repetito sex diebus perfecta narrantur, non quia Deo fuerit necessaria mora temporum, quasi qui non potuerit creare omnia simul, quae deinceps congruis motibus peragerent tempora; sed quia per senarium numerum est operum significata perfectio. Numerus quippe senarius primus completur suis partibus, id est sexta sui parte et tertia et dimidia, quae sunt unum et duo et tria, quae in summam ducta sex fiunt. Partes autem in hac consideratione numerorum illae intellegendae sunt, quae quotae sint dici potest; sicut dimidia, tertia, quarta et deinceps ab aliquo numero denominatae. Neque enim exempli gratia quia in novenario numero quattuor pars aliqua eius est, ideo dici potest quota eius sit; unum autem potest, nam nona eius est; et tria potest, nam tertia eius est. Coniunctae vero istae duae partes eius, nona scilicet atque tertia, id est unum et tria, longe sunt a tota summa eius, quod est novem. Itemque in denario quaternarius est aliqua pars eius; sed quota sit dici non potest; unum autem potest; nam decima pars eius est. Habet et quintam, quod sunt duo; habet et dimidiam, quod sunt quinque. Sed hae tres partes eius, decima et quinta et dimidia, id est unum et duo et quinque, simul ductae non complent decem; sunt enim octo. Duodenarii vero numeri partes in summam ductae transeunt eum; habet enim duodecimam, quod est unum; habet sextam, quae sunt duo; habet quartam, quae sunt tria; habet tertiam, quae sunt quattuor; habet et dimidiam, quae sunt sex; unum autem et duo et tria et quattuor et sex non duodecim, sed amplius, id est sedecim, fiunt. Hoc breviter commemorandum putavi ad commendandam senarii numeri perfectionem, qui primus, ut dixi, partibus suis in summam redactis ipse perficitur; in quo perfecit Deus opera sua. Vnde ratio numeri contemnenda non est, quae in multis sanctarum scripturarum locis quam magni aestimanda sit elucet diligenter intuentibus. Nec frustra in laudibus Dei dictum est: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.	These works are recorded to have been completed in six days (the same day being six times repeated), because six is a perfect number,-not because God required a protracted time, as if He could not at once create all things, which then should mark the course of time by the movements proper to them, but because the perfection of the works was signified by the number six. For the number six is the first which is made up of its own parts, i.e., of its sixth, third, and half, which are respectively one, two, and three, and which make a total of six. In this way of looking at a number, those are said to be its parts which exactly divide it, as a half, a third, a fourth, or a fraction with any denominator, e.g., four is a part of nine, but not therefore an aliquot part; but one is, for it is the ninth part; and three is, for it is the third. Yet these two parts, the ninth and the third, or one and three, are far from making its whole sum of nine. So again, in the number ten, four is a part, yet does not divide it; but one is an aliquot part, for it is a tenth; so it has a fifth, which is two; and a half, which is five. But these three parts, a tenth, a fifth, and a half, or one, two, and five, added together, do not make ten, but eight. Of the number twelve, again, the parts added together exceed the whole; for it has a twelfth, that is, one; a sixth, or two; a fourth, which is three; a third, which is four; and a half, which is six. But one, two, three, four, and six make up, not twelve, but more, viz., sixteen. So much I have thought fit to state for the sake of illustrating the perfection of the number six, which is, as I said, the first which is exactly made up of its own parts added together; and in this number of days God finished His work. And, therefore, we must not despise the science of numbers, which, in many passages of holy Scripture, is found to be of eminent service to the careful interpreter. Neither has it been without reason numbered among God's praises, "You have ordered all things in number, and measure, and weight." Wisdom 11:20
BOOK XI [XXXI] In septimo autem die, id est eodem die septiens repetito, qui numerus etiam ipse alia ratione perfectus est, Dei requies commendatur, in qua primum sanctificatio sonat. Ita Deus noluit istum diem in ullis suis operibus sanctificare, sed in requie sua, quae non habet uesperam; neque enim ulla creatura est, ut etiam ipsa aliter in Dei Verbo, aliter in se cognita faciat aliam velut diurnam, aliam velut uespertinam notitiam. De septenarii porro numeri perfectione dici quidem plura possunt; sed et liber iste iam prolixus est, et vereor ne occasione comperta scientiolam nostram leviter magis quam utiliter iactare velle videamur. Habenda est itaque ratio moderationis atque gravitatis, ne forte, cum de numero multum loquimur, mensuram et pondus neglegere iudicemur. Hoc itaque satis sit admonere, quod totus inpar primus numerus ternarius est, totus par quaternarius; ex quibus duobus septenarius constat. Ideo pro universo saepe ponitur, sicuti est: Septiens cadet iustus, et resurget; id est: Quotienscumque ceciderit, non peribit; quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intellegi voluit; et: Septiens in die laudabo te; quod alibi alio modo dictum est: Semper laus eius in ore meo; et multa huius modi in divinis auctoritatibus reperiuntur, in quibus septenarius numerus, ut dixi, pro cuiusque rei universitate poni solet. Propter hoc eodem saepe numero significatur Spiritus sanctus, de quo Dominus ait: Docebit vos omnem veritatem. Ibi requies Dei, qua requiescitur in Deo. In toto quippe, id est in plena perfectione, requies; in parte autem labor. Ideo laboramus, quamdiu ex parte scimus, sed cum venerit quod perfectum est, quod ex parte est euacuabitur. Hinc est quod etiam scripturas istas cum labore rimamur. Sancti vero angeli quorum societati et congregationi in hac peregrinatione laboriosissima suspiramus, sicut habent permanendi aeternitatem, ita cognoscendi facilitatem et requiescendi felicitatem. Sine difficultate quippe nos adivuant, quoniam spiritalibus motibus puris et liberis non laborant.	But, on the seventh day (i.e., the same day repeated seven times, which number is also a perfect one, though for another reason), the rest of God is set forth, and then, too, we first hear of its being hallowed. So that God did not wish to hallow this day by His works, but by His rest, which has no evening, for it is not a creature; so that, being known in one way in the Word of God, and in another in itself, it should make a twofold knowledge, daylight and dusk (day and evening). Much more might be said about the perfection of the number seven, but this book is already too long, and I fear lest I should seem to catch at an opportunity of airing my little smattering of science more childishly than profitably. I must speak, therefore, in moderation and with dignity, lest, in too keenly following "number," I be accused of forgetting "weight" and "measure." Suffice it here to say, that three is the first whole number that is odd, four the first that is even, and of these two, seven is composed. On this account it is often put for all numbers together, as, "A just man falls seven times, and rises up again," Proverbs 24:16 -that is, let him fall never so often, he will not perish (and this was meant to be understood not of sins, but of afflictions conducing to lowliness). Again, "Seven times a day will I praise You," which elsewhere is expressed thus, "I will bless the Lord at all times." And many such instances are found in the divine authorities, in which the number seven is, as I said, commonly used to express the whole, or the completeness of anything. And so the Holy Spirit, of whom the Lord says, "He will teach you all truth," John 16:13 is signified by this number. In it is the rest of God, the rest His people find in Him. For rest is in the whole, i.e., in perfect completeness, while in the part there is labor. And thus we labor as long as we know in part; "but when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." It is even with toil we search into the Scriptures themselves. But the holy angels, towards whose society and assembly we sigh while in this our toilsome pilgrimage, as they already abide in their eternal home, so do they enjoy perfect facility of knowledge and felicity of rest. It is without difficulty that they help us; for their spiritual movements, pure and free, cost them no effort.
BOOK XI [XXXII] Ne quis autem contendat et dicat non sanctos angelos esse significatos in eo quod scriptum est: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, sed quamlibet lucem tunc primum factam esse corpoream aut opinetur aut doceat; angelos autem prius esse factos non tantum ante firmamentum, quod inter aquas et aquas factum appellatum est caelum, sed ante illud de quo dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; atque illud, quod dictum est: In principio, non ita dictum tamquam primum hoc factum sit, cum ante fecerit angelos, sed quia omnia in sapientia fecit, quod est Verbum eius et ipsum scriptura principium nominavit (sicut ipse in euangelio Iudaeis quaerentibus quis esset respondit se esse principium): non e contrario referam contentionem, maxime quia hoc me delectat plurimum, quod etiam in summo exordio sancti libri geneseos trinitas commendatur. Cum enim ita dicitur: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, ut Pater fecisse intellegatur in Filio, sicut adtestatur psalmus, ubi legitur: Quam magnificata sunt opera tua Domine! omnia in sapientia fecisti: convenientissime paulo post commemoratur etiam Spiritus sanctus. Cum enim dictum esset, qualem terram Deus primitus fecerit, vel quam molem materiamue futurae constructionis mundi caeli et terrae nomine nuncupaverit subiciendo et addendo: Terra autem erat inuisibilis et incomposita et tenebrae erant super abyssum: mox ut trinitatis commemoratio compleretur: Et spiritus, inquit, Dei superferebatur super aquam. Proinde ut volet quisque accipiat, quod ita profundum est, ut ad exercitationem legentium a fidei regula non abhorrentes plures possit generare sententias, dum tamen angelos sanctos in sublimibus sedibus non quidem Deo coaeternos, sed tamen de sua sempiterna et vera felicitate securos et certos esse nemo ambigat. Ad quorum societatem pertinere paruulos suos Dominus docens non solum illud ait: Erunt aequales angelis Dei; verum ipsi quoque angeli qua contemplatione fruantur ostendit, ubi ait: Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex pusillis istis, dico enim vobis, quia angeli eorum in caelis semper vident faciem Patris mei, qui in caelis est.	But if some one oppose our opinion, and say that the holy angels are not referred to when it is said, "Let there be light, and there was light;" if he suppose or teach that some material light, then first created, was meant, and that the angels were created, not only before the firmament dividing the waters and named "the heaven," but also before the time signified in the words, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;" if he allege that this phrase, "In the beginning," does not mean that nothing was made before (for the angels were), but that God made all things by His Wisdom or Word, who is named in Scripture "the Beginning," as He Himself, in the gospel, replied to the Jews when they asked Him who He was, that He was the Beginning;-I will not contest the point, chiefly because it gives me the liveliest satisfaction to find the Trinity celebrated in the very beginning of the book of Genesis. For having said "In the Beginning God created the heaven and the earth," meaning that the Father made them in the Son (as the psalm testifies where it says, "How manifold are Your works, O Lord! in Wisdom have You made them all"), a little afterwards mention is fitly made of the Holy Spirit also. For, when it had been told us what kind of earth God created at first, or what the mass or matter was which God, under the name of "heaven and earth," had provided for the construction of the world, as is told in the additional words, "And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep," then, for the sake of completing the mention of the Trinity, it is immediately added, "And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Let each one, then, take it as he pleases; for it is so profound a passage, that it may well suggest, for the exercise of the reader's tact, many opinions, and none of them widely departing from the rule of faith. At the same time, let none doubt that the holy angels in their heavenly abodes are, though not, indeed, co-eternal with God, yet secure and certain of eternal and true felicity. To their company the Lord teaches that His little ones belong; and not only says, "They shall be equal to the angels of God," Matthew 22:30 but shows, too, what blessed contemplation the angels themselves enjoy, saying, "Take heed that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven." Matthew 18:10
BOOK XI [XXXIII] Peccasse autem quosdam angelos et in huius mundi ima detrusos, qui eis velut carcer est, usque ad futuram in die iudicii ultimam damnationem apostolus Petrus apertissime ostendit dicens, quod Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercerit, sed carceribus caliginis inferi retrudens tradiderit in iudicio puniendos reservari. Inter hos ergo et illos Deum vel praescientia vel opere divisisse quis dubitet? illosque lucem merito appellari quis contradicat? quando quidem nos adhuc in fide viventes et eorum aequalitatem adhuc sperantes, utique nondum tenentes iam lux dicti ab apostolo sumus: Fuistis enim, inquit, aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino. Istos vero desertores tenebras aptissime nuncupari profecto advertunt, qui peiores esse hominibus infidelibus sive intellegunt sive credunt. Quapropter, etsi alia lux in isto huius libri loco intellegenda est, ubi legimus: Dixit Deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, et aliae tenebrae significatae sunt in eo quod scriptum est: Divisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras: nos tamen has duas angelicas societates, unam fruentem Deo, alteram tumentem typho; unam cui dicitur: Adorate eum omnes angeli eius, aliam cuius princeps dicit: Haec omnia tibi dabo, si prostratus adoraveris me; unam Dei sancto amore flagrantem, alteram propriae celsitudinis inmundo amore fumantem; et quoniam, sicut scriptum est, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam, illam in caelis caelorum habitantem, istam inde deiectam in hoc infimo aerio caelo tumultuantem; illam luminosa pietate tranquillam, istam tenebrosis cupiditatibus turbulentam; illam Dei nutu clementer subvenientem, iuste ulciscentem, istam suo fastu subdendi et nocendi libidine exaestuantem; illam, ut quantum uult consulat, Dei bonitati ministram, istam, ne quantum uult noceat, Dei potestate frenatam; illam huic inludentem, ut nolens prosit persecutionibus suis, hanc illi inuidentem, cum peregrinos colligit suos, _ nos ergo has duas societates angelicas inter se dispares atque contrarias, unam et natura bonam et voluntate rectam, aliam vero natura bonam, sed voluntate peruersam, aliis manifestioribus divinarum scripturarum testimoniis declaratas quod etiam in hoc libro, cui nomen est genesis, lucis tenebrarumque vocabulis significatas existimavimus, etiamsi aliud hoc loco sensit forte qui scripsit, non est inutiliter obscuritas huius pertractata sententiae, quia, etsi voluntatem auctoris libri huius indagare nequivimus, a regula tamen fidei, quae per alias eiusdem auctoritatis sacras litteras satis fidelibus nota est, non abhorruimus. Etsi enim corporalia hic commemorata sunt opera Dei, habent procul dubio nonnullam similitudinem spiritalium, secundum quam dicit apostolus: Omnes enim vos filii lucis estis et filii diei, non sumus noctis neque tenebrarum. Si autem hoc sensit etiam ille qui scripsit, ad perfectiorem disputationis finem nostra pervenit intentio, ut homo Dei tam eximiae divinaeque sapientiae, immo per eum Spiritus Dei in commemorandis operibus Dei, quae omnia sexto die dicit esse perfecta, nullo modo angelos praetermisisse credatur, sive in principio, quia primo fecit, sive, quod convenientius intellegitur, in principio, quia in Verbo unigenito fecit, scriptum sit: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram; quibus nominibus universalis est significata creatura, vel spiritalis et corporalis, quod est credibilius, vel magnae duae mundi partes, quibus omnia quae creata sunt continentur, ut primitus eam totam proponeret ac deinde partes eius secundum mysticum dierum numerum exsequeretur.	That certain angels sinned, and were thrust down to the lowest parts of this world, where they are, as it were, incarcerated till their final damnation in the day of judgment, the Apostle Peter very plainly declares, when he says that "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved into judgment." 2 Peter 2:4 Who, then, can doubt that God, either in foreknowledge or in act, separated between these and the rest? And who will dispute that the rest are justly called "light?" For even we who are yet living by faith, hoping only and not yet enjoying equality with them, are already called "light" by the apostle: "For you were sometimes darkness, but now are you light in the Lord." Ephesians 5:8 But as for these apostate angels, all who understand or believe them to be worse than unbelieving men are well aware that they are called "darkness." Wherefore, though light and darkness are to be taken in their literal signification in these passages of Genesis in which it is said, "God said, Let there be light, and there was light," and "God divided the light from the darkness," yet, for our part, we understand these two societies of angels,-the one enjoying God, the other swelling with pride; the one to whom it is said, "Praise ye Him, all His angels," the other whose prince says, "All these things will I give You if You will fall down and worship me;" Matthew 4:9 the one blazing with the holy love of God, the other reeking with the unclean lust of self-advancement. And since, as it is written, "God resists the proud, but gives grace unto the humble," James 4:6 we may say, the one dwelling in the heaven of heavens, the other cast thence, and raging through the lower regions of the air; the one tranquil in the brightness of piety, the other tempest-tossed with beclouding desires; the one, at God's pleasure, tenderly succoring, justly avenging,-the other, set on by its own pride, boiling with the lust of subduing and hurting; the one the minister of God's goodness to the utmost of their good pleasure, the other held in by God's power from doing the harm it would; the former laughing at the latter when it does good unwillingly by its persecutions, the latter envying the former when it gathers in its pilgrims. These two angelic communities, then, dissimilar and contrary to one another, the one both by nature good and by will upright, the other also good by nature but by will depraved, as they are exhibited in other and more explicit passages of holy writ, so I think they are spoken of in this book of Genesis under the names of light and darkness; and even if the author perhaps had a different meaning, yet our discussion of the obscure language has not been wasted time; for, though we have been unable to discover his meaning, yet we have adhered to the rule of faith, which is sufficiently ascertained by the faithful from other passages of equal authority. For, though it is the material works of God which are here spoken of, they have certainly a resemblance to the spiritual, so that Paul can say, "You are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we are not of the night, nor of darkness." If, on the other hand, the author of Genesis saw in the words what we see, then our discussion reaches this more satisfactory conclusion, that the man of God, so eminently and divinely wise, or rather, that the Spirit of God who by him recorded God's works which were finished on the sixth day, may be supposed not to have omitted all mention of the angels whether he included them in the words "in the beginning," because He made them first, or, which seems most likely, because He made them in the only-begotten Word. And, under these names heaven and earth, the whole creation is signified, either as divided into spiritual and material, which seems the more likely, or into the two great parts of the world in which all created things are contained, so that, first of all, the creation is presented in sum, and then its parts are enumerated according to the mystic number of the days.
BOOK XI [XXXIV] Quamquam nonnulli putaverint aquarum nomine significatos quodam modo populos angelorum et hoc esse quod dictum est: Fiat firmamentum inter aquam et aquam, ut supra firmamentum angeli intellegantur, infra vero vel aquae istae visibiles vel malorum angelorum multitudo vel omnium hominum gentes. Quod si ita est, non illic apparet ubi facti sint angeli, sed ubi discreti; quamvis et aquas, quod peruersissimae atque impiae uanitatis est, negent quidam factas a Deo, quoniam nusquam scriptum est: Dixit Deus: Fiant aquae. Quod possunt simili uanitate etiam de terra dicere; nusquam enim legitur: Dixit Deus: Fiat terra. Sed, inquiunt, scriptum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram. Illic ergo et aqua intellegenda est; uno enim nomine utrumque conprehensum est. Nam ipsius est mare, sicut in psalmo legitur, et ipse fecit illud, et aridam terram manus eius finxerunt. Sed hi, qui in nomine aquarum, quae super caelos sunt, angelos intellegi volunt, ponderibus elementorum moventur et ideo non putant aquarum fluuidam gravemque naturam in superioribus mundi locis potuisse constitui; qui secundum rationes suas, si ipsi hominem facere possent, non ei pituitam, quod Graece phlegma dicitur et tamquam in elementis corporis nostri aquarum vicem obtinet, in capite ponerent. Ibi enim sedes est phlegmatis, secundum Dei opus utique aptissime, secundum istorum autem coniecturam tam absurde, ut, si hoc nesciremus et in hoc libro similiter scriptum esset, quod Deus umorem fluuidum et frigidum ac per hoc gravem in superiore omnibus ceteris humani corporis parte posuerit, isti trutinatores elementorum nequaquam crederent, et si auctoritati eiusdem scripturae subditi essent, aliquid aliud ex hoc intellegendum esse censerent. Sed quoniam, si diligenter singula scrutemur atque tractemus, quae in illo divino libro de constitutione mundi scripta sunt, et multa dicenda et a proposito instituti operis longe digrediendum est, iamque de duabus istis diversis inter se atque contrariis societatibus angelorum, in quibus sunt quaedam exordia duarum etiam in rebus humanis civitatum, de quibus deinceps dicere institui, quantum satis esse visum est, disputavimus: hunc quoque librum aliquando claudamus.	Some, however, have supposed that the angelic hosts are somehow referred to under the name of waters, and that this is what is meant by "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters:" Genesis 1:6 that the waters above should be understood of the angels, and those below either of the visible waters, or of the multitude of bad angels, or of the nations of men. If this be so, then it does not here appear when the angels were created, but when they were separated. Though there have not been wanting men foolish and wicked enough to deny that the waters were made by God, because it is nowhere written, "God said, Let there be waters." With equal folly they might say the same of the earth, for nowhere do we read, "God said, Let the earth be." But, say they, it is written, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Yes, and there the water is meant, for both are included in one word. For "the sea is His," as the psalm says, "and He made it; and His hands formed the dry land." But those who would understand the angels by the waters above the skies have a difficulty about the specific gravity of the elements, and fear that the waters, owing to their fluidity and weight, could not be set in the upper parts of the world. So that, if they were to construct a man upon their own principles, they would not put in his head any moist humors, or "phlegm" as the Greeks call it, and which acts the part of water among the elements of our body. But, in God's handiwork, the head is the seat of the phlegm, and surely most fitly; and yet, according to their supposition, so absurdly that if we were not aware of the fact, and were informed by this same record that God had put a moist and cold and therefore heavy humor in the uppermost part of man's body, these world-weighers would refuse belief. And if they were confronted with the authority of Scripture, they would maintain that something else must be meant by the words. But, were we to investigate and discover all the details which are written in this divine book regarding the creation of the world, we should have much to say, and should widely digress from the proposed aim of this work. Since, then, we have now said what seemed needful regarding these two diverse and contrary communities of angels, in which the origin of the two human communities (of which we intend to speak anon) is also found, let us at once bring this book also to a conclusion.	}

Authors/Augustine/City of God/City of God Book XI

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