Authors/Augustine/City of God/City of God Book XII

ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XII

Introduction
Chapter 1 That the Nature of the Angels, Both Good and Bad, is One and the Same
Chapter 2 That There is No Entity Contrary to the Divine, Because Nonentity Seems to Be that Which is Wholly Opposite to Him Who Supremely and Always is
Chapter 3 That the Enemies of God are So, Not by Nature, But by Will, Which, as It Injures Them, Injures a Good Nature; For If Vice Does Not Injure, It is Not Vice
Chapter 4 Of the Nature of Irrational and Lifeless Creatures, Which in Their Own Kind and Order Do Not Mar the Beauty of the Universe
Chapter 5 That in All Natures, of Every Kind and Rank, God is Glorified
Chapter 6 What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause of the Misery of the Wicked
Chapter 7 That We Ought Not to Expect to Find Any Efficient Cause of the Evil Will
Chapter 8 Of the Misdirected Love Whereby the Will Fell Away from the Immutable to the Mutable Good
Chapter 9 Whether the Angels, Besides Receiving from God Their Nature, Received from Him Also Their Good Will by the Holy Spirit Imbuing Them with Love
Chapter 10 Of the Falseness of the History Which Allots Many Thousand Years to the World's Past
Chapter 11 They are deceived, too, by those highly mendacious documents which profess to give the history of many thousand years, though, reckoning by the sacred writings, we find that not 6000 years have yet passed
Chapter 12 Of Those Who Suppose that This World Indeed is Not Eternal, But that Either There are Numberless Worlds, or that One and the Same World is Perpetually Resolved into Its Elements, and Renewed at the Conclusion of Fixed Cycles
Chapter 13 How These Persons are to Be Answered, Who Find Fault with the Creation of Man on the Score of Its Recent Date
Chapter 14 Of the Revolution of the Ages, Which Some Philosophers Believe Will Bring All Things Round Again, After a Certain Fixed Cycle, to the Same Order and Form as at First
Chapter 15 Of the Creation of the Human Race in Time, and How This Was Effected Without Any New Design or Change of Purpose on God's Part
Chapter 16 Whether We are to Believe that God, as He Has Always Been Sovereign Lord, Has Always Had Creatures Over Whom He Exercised His Sovereignty; And in What Sense We Can Say that the Creature Has Always Been, and Yet Cannot Say It is Co-Eternal
Chapter 17 How We are to Understand God's Promise of Life Eternal, Which Was Uttered Before the "Eternal Times
Chapter 18 What Defence is Made by Sound Faith Regarding God's Unchangeable Counsel and Will, Against the Reasonings of Those Who Hold that the Works of God are Eternally Repeated in Revolving Cycles that Restore All Things as They Were
Chapter 19 Against Those Who Assert that Things that are Infinite Cannot Be Comprehended by the Knowledge of God
Chapter 20 Of Worlds Without End, or Ages of Ages
Chapter 21 Of the Impiety of Those Who Assert that the Souls Which Enjoy True and Perfect Blessedness, Must Yet Again and Again in These Periodic Revolutions Return to Labor and Misery
Chapter 22 That There Was Created at First But One Individual, and that the Human Race Was Created in Him
Chapter 23 That God Foreknew that the First Man Would Sin, and that He at the Same Time Foresaw How Large a Multitude of Godly Persons Would by His Grace Be Translated to the Fellowship of the Angels
Chapter 24 Of the Nature of the Human Soul Created in the Image of God
Chapter 25 Whether the Angels Can Be Said to Be the Creators of Any, Even the Least Creature
Chapter 26 That God Alone is the Creator of Every Kind of Creature, Whatever Its Nature or Form
Chapter 27 Of that Opinion of the Platonists, that the Angels Were Themselves Indeed Created by God, But that Afterwards They Created Man's Body
Chapter 28 That the Whole Plenitude of the Human Race Was Embraced in the First Man, and that God There Saw the Portion of It Which Was to Be Honored and Rewarded, and that Which Was to Be Condemned and Punished

Latin	Latin
BOOK XII []	The City of God (Book XII) Argument-Augustin first institutes two inquiries regarding the angels; namely, whence is there in some a good, and in others an evil will? and, what is the reason of the blessedness of the good, and the misery of the evil? Afterwards he treats of the creation of man, and teaches that he is not from eternity, but was created, and by none other than God.
BOOK XII [I] Antequam de institutione hominis dicam, ubi duarum civitatum, quantum ad rationalium mortalium genus adtinet, apparebit exortus, sicut superiore libro apparuisse in angelis iam videtur: prius mihi quaedam de ipsis angelis video esse dicenda, quibus demonstretur, quantum a nobis potest, quam non inconveniens neque incongrua dicatur esse hominibus angelisque societas, ut non quattuor (duae scilicet angelorum totidemque hominum), sed duae potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito esse dicantur, una in bonis, altera in malis non solum angelis, verum etiam hominibus constitutae. Angelorum bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios adpetitus non naturis principiisque diversis, cum Deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creaverit, sed voluntatibus et cupiditatibus extitisse dubitare fas non est, dum alii constanter in communi omnibus bono, quod ipse illis Deus est, atque in eius aeternitate veritate caritate persistunt; alii sua potestate potius delectati, velut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria defluxerunt et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima aeternitate, uanitatis astutiam pro certissima veritate, studia partium pro individua caritate superbi fallaces inuidi effecti sunt. Beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est adhaerere Deo; quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intellegenda, quod est non adhaerere Deo. Quam ob rem si, cum quaeritur, quare illi beati sint, recte respondetur: Quia Deo adhaerent; et cum quaeritur, cur isti sint miseri, recte respondetur: Quia non adhaerent Deo: non est creaturae rationalis vel intellectualis bonum, quo beata sit, nisi Deus. Ita quamvis non omnis beata possit esse creatura (neque enim hoc munus adipiscuntur aut capiunt ferae ligna saxa et si quid huius modi est), ea tamen, quae potest, non ex se ipsa potest, quia ex nihilo creata est, sed ex illo, a quo creata est. Hoc enim adepto beata, quo amisso misera est. Ille vero qui non alio, sed se ipso bono beatus est, ideo miser non potest esse, quia non se potest amittere. Dicimus itaque inmutabile bonum non esse nisi unum verum beatum Deum; ea vero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo, verum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt. Quamquam ergo summa non sint, quibus est Deus maius bonum: magna sunt tamen ea mutabilia bona, quae adhaerere possunt, ut beata sint, inmutabili bono, quod usque adeo bonum eorum est, ut sine illo misera esse necesse sit. Nec ideo cetera in hac creaturae universitate meliora sunt, quia misera esse non possunt; neque enim cetera membra corporis nostri ideo dicendum est oculis esse meliora, quia caeca esse non possunt. Sicut autem melior est natura sentiens et cum dolet quam lapis qui dolere nullo modo potest: ita rationalis natura praestantior etiam misera, quam illa quae rationis vel sensus est expers, et ideo in eam non cadit miseria. Quod cum ita sit, huic naturae, quae in tanta excellentia creata est, ut, licet sit ipsa mutabilis, inhaerendo tamen incommutabili bono, id est summo Deo, beatitudinem consequatur nec expleat indigentiam suam nisi utique beata sit eique explendae non sufficiat nisi Deus, profecto non illi adhaerere vitium est. Omne autem vitium naturae nocet ac per hoc contra naturam est. Ab illa igitur, quae adhaeret Deo, non natura differt ista, sed vitio; quo tamen etiam vitio valde magna multumque laudabilis ostenditur ipsa natura. Cuius enim recte vituperatur vitium, procul dubio natura laudatur. Nam recta vitii vituperatio est, quod illo dehonestatur natura laudabilis. Sicut ergo, cum vitium oculorum dicitur caecitas, id ostenditur, quod ad naturam oculorum pertinet visus; et cum vitium aurium dicitur surditas, ad earum naturam pertinere demonstratur auditus: ita, cum vitium creaturae angelicae dicitur, quo non adhaeret Deo, hinc apertissime declaratur, eius naturae ut Deo adhaereat convenire. Quam porro magna sit laus adhaerere Deo, ut ei vivat, inde sapiat, illo gaudeat tantoque bono sine morte sine errore sine molestia perfruatur, quis digne cogitare possit aut eloqui? Quapropter etiam vitio malorum angelorum, quo non adhaerent Deo, quoniam omne vitium naturae nocet, satis manifestatur Deum tam bonam eorum creasse naturam, cui noxium sit non esse cum Deo.	It has already, in the preceding book, been shown how the two cities originated among the angels. Before I speak of the creation of man, and show how the cities took their rise so far as regards the race of rational mortals I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak of a society composed of angels and men together; so that there are not four cities or societies,-two, namely, of angels, and as many of men,-but rather two in all, one composed of the good, the other of the wicked, angels or men indifferently.That the contrary propensities in good and bad angels have arisen, not from a difference in their nature and origin, since God, the good Author and Creator of all essences, created them both, but from a difference in their wills and desires, it is impossible to doubt. While some steadfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and in His eternity, truth, and love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to this private good of their own, from that higher and beatific good which was common to all, and, bartering the lofty dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the most assured verity for the slyness of vanity, uniting love for factious partisanship, they became proud, deceived, envious. The cause, therefore, of the blessedness of the good is adherence to God. And so the cause of the others' misery will be found in the contrary, that is, in their not adhering to God. Wherefore, if when the question is asked, why are the former blessed, it is rightly answered, because they adhere to God; and when it is asked, why are the latter miserable, it is rightly answered, because they do not adhere to God,-then there is no other good for the rational or intellectual creature save God only. Thus, though it is not every creature that can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, and things of that kind have not this capacity), yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable. He, then, who is blessed not in another, but in himself, cannot be miserable, because he cannot lose himself.Accordingly we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of nothing. Although, therefore, they are not the supreme good, for God is a greater good, yet those mutable things which can adhere to the immutable good, and so be blessed, are very good; for so completely is He their good, that without Him they cannot but be wretched. And the other created things in the universe are not better on this account, that they cannot be miserable. For no one would say that the other members of the body are superior to the eyes, because they cannot be blind. But as the sentient nature, even when it feels pain, is superior to the stony, which can feel none, so the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than that which lacks reason or feeling, and can therefore experience no misery. And since this is so, then in this nature which has been created so excellent, that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus blessed save in God,-in this nature, I say, not to adhere to God, is manifestly a fault. Now every fault injures the nature, and is consequently contrary to the nature. The creature, therefore, which cleaves to God, differs from those who do not, not by nature, but by fault; and yet by this very fault the nature itself is proved to be very noble and admirable. For that nature is certainly praised, the fault of which is justly blamed. For we justly blame the fault because it mars the praiseworthy nature. As, then, when we say that blindness is a defect of the eyes, we prove that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes; and when we say that deafness is a defect of the ears, hearing is thereby proved to belong to their nature;-so, when we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, we hereby most plainly declare that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God. And who can worthily conceive or express how great a glory that is, to cleave to God, so as to live to Him, to draw wisdom from Him, to delight in Him, and to enjoy this so great good, without death, error, or grief? And thus, since every vice is an injury of the nature, that very vice of the wicked angels, their departure from God, is sufficient proof that God created their nature so good, that it is an injury to it not to be with God.
BOOK XII [II] Haec dicta sint, ne quisquam, cum de angelis apostaticis loquimur, existimet eos aliam velut ex alio principio habere potuisse naturam, nec eorum naturae auctorem Deum. Cuius erroris impietate tanto quisque carebit expeditius et facilius, quanto perspicacius intellegere potuerit, quod per angelum Deus dixit, quando Moysen mittebat ad filios Israel: Ego sum, qui sum. Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit: rebus, quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit (sicut enim ab eo, quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia, sic ab eo, quod est esse, vocatur essentia, nouo quidem nomine, quo usi ueteres non sunt Latini sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant *ou)si/an; hoc enim verbum e verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia); ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae non est. Ei quippe, quod est, non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae et auctori omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est.	This may be enough to prevent any one from supposing, when we speak of the apostate angels, that they could have another nature, derived, as it were, from some different origin, and not from God. From the great impiety of this error we shall disentangle ourselves the more readily and easily, the more distinctly we understand that which God spoke by the angel when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: "I am that I am." Exodus 3:14 For since God is the supreme existence, that is to say, supremely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like Himself. To some He communicated a more ample, to others a more limited existence, and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks. For as from sapere comes sapientia, so from esse comes essentia,-a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day, that our language may not want an equivalent for the Greek ??s?a . For this is expressed word for word by essentia. Consequently, to that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all beings whatsoever.
BOOK XII [III] Dicuntur autem in scripturis inimici Dei, qui non natura, sed vitiis adversantur eius imperio, nihil ei valentes nocere, sed sibi. Inimici enim sunt resistendi voluntate, non potestate laedendi. Deus namque inmutabilis est et omni modo incorruptibilis. Idcirco vitium, quo resistunt Deo qui eius appellantur inimici, non est Deo, sed ipsis malum, neque hoc ob aliud, nisi quia corrumpit in eis naturae bonum. Natura igitur contraria non est Deo, sed vitium quia malum est, contrarium est bono. Quis autem neget Deum summe bonum? Vitium ergo contrarium est Deo, tamquam malum bono. Porro autem bonum est et natura quam vitiat; unde et huic bono utique contrarium est; sed Deo tantummodo tamquam bono malum, naturae vero, quam vitiat, non tantum malum, sed etiam noxium. Nulla quippe mala Deo noxia, sed mutabilibus corruptibilibusque naturis, bonis tamen ipsorum quoque testimonio vitiorum. Si enim bonae non essent, eis vitia nocere non possent. Nam quid eis nocendo faciunt, nisi adimunt integritatem pulchritudinem, salutem virtutem et quidquid boni naturae per vitium detrahi sive minui consuevit? Quod si omnino desit, nihil boni adimendo non nocet ac per hoc nec vitium est. Nam esse vitium et non nocere non potest. Unde colligitur, quamvis non possit vitium nocere incommutabili bono, non tamen posse nocere nisi bono, quia non inest, nisi ubi nocet. Hoc etiam isto modo dici potest, vitium esse nec in summo posse bono nec nisi in aliquo bono. Sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala nusquam; quoniam naturae etiam illae; quae ex malae voluntatis initio vitiatae sunt, in quantum vitiosae sunt, malae sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt. Et cum in poenis est natura vitiosa, excepto eo, quod natura est, etiam hoc ibi bonum est, quod inpunita non est. Hoc enim est iustum et omne iustum procul dubio bonum. Non enim quisquam de vitiis naturalibus, sed de voluntariis poenas luit. Nam etiam quod vitium consuetudine nimiove progressu roboratum velut naturaliter inolevit, a voluntate sumpsit exordium. De vitiis quippe nunc loquimur eius naturae, cui mens inest capax intellegibilis lucis, qua discernitur iustum ab iniusto.	In Scripture they are called God's enemies who oppose His rule, not by nature, but by vice; having no power to hurt Him, but only themselves. For they are His enemies, not through their power to hurt, but by their will to oppose Him. For God is unchangeable, and wholly proof against injury. Therefore the vice which makes those who are called His enemies resist Him, is an evil not to God, but to themselves. And to them it is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good of their nature. It is not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God. For that which is evil is contrary to the good. And who will deny that God is the supreme good? Vice, therefore, is contrary to God, as evil to good. Further, the nature it vitiates is a good, and therefore to this good also it is contrary. But while it is contrary to God only as evil to good, it is contrary to the nature it vitiates, both as evil and as hurtful. For to God no evils are hurtful; but only to natures mutable and corruptible, though, by the testimony of the vices themselves, originally good. For were they not good, vices could not hurt them. For how do they hurt them but by depriving them of integrity, beauty, welfare, virtue, and, in short, whatever natural good vice is wont to diminish or destroy? But if there be no good to take away, then no injury can be done, and conse quently there can be no vice. For it is impossible that there should be a harmless vice. Whence we gather, that though vice cannot injure the unchangeable good, it can injure nothing but good; because it does not exist where it does not injure. This, then, may be thus formulated: Vice cannot be in the highest good, and cannot be but in some good. Things solely good, therefore, can in some circumstances exist; things solely evil, never; for even those natures which are vitiated by an evil will, so far indeed as they are vitiated, are evil, but in so far as they are natures they are good. And when a vitiated nature is punished, besides the good it has in being a nature, it has this also, that it is not unpunished. For this is just, and certainly everything just is a good. For no one is punished for natural, but for voluntary vices. For even the vice which by the force of habit and long continuance has become a second nature, had its origin in the will. For at present we are speaking of the vices of the nature, which has a mental capacity for that enlightenment which discriminates between what is just and what is unjust.
BOOK XII [IV] Ceterum vitia pecorum et arborum aliarumque rerum mutabilium atque mortalium vel intellectu vel sensu vel vita omnino carentium, quibus eorum dissolubilis natura corrumpitur, damnabilia putare ridiculum est, cum istae creaturae eum modum nutu Creatoris acceperint, ut cedendo ac succedendo peragant infimam pulchritudinem temporum in genere suo istius mundi partibus congruentem. Neque enim caelestibus fuerant terrena coaequanda, aut ideo universitati deesse ista debuerunt, quoniam sunt illa meliora. Cum ergo in his locis, ubi esse talia competebat, aliis alia deficientibus oriuntur et succumbunt minora maioribus atque in qualitates superantium superata vertuntur, rerum est ordo transeuntium. Cuius ordinis decus nos propterea non delectat, quoniam parti eius pro condicione nostrae mortalitatis intexti universum, cui particulae, quae nos offendunt, satis apte decenterque conveniunt, sentire non possumus. Vnde nobis, in quibus eam contemplari minus idonei sumus, rectissime credenda praecipitur providentia Conditoris, ne tanti artificis opus in aliquo reprehendere uanitate humanae temeritatis audeamus. Quamquam et vitia rerum terrenarum non voluntaria neque poenalia naturas ipsas, quarum nulla omnino est, cuius non sit auctor et conditor Deus, si prudenter adtendamus, eadem ratione commendant, quia et in eis hoc nobis per vitium tolli displicet, quod in natura placet; nisi quia hominibus etiam ipsae naturae plerumque displicent, cum eis fiunt noxiae, non eas considerantibus, sed utilitatem suam, sicut illa animalia, quorum abundantia Aegyptiorum superbia uapulavit. Sed isto modo possunt et solem vituperare, quoniam quidam peccantes vel debita non reddentes poni a iudicibus iubentur ad solem. Non itaque e commodo vel incommodo nostro, sed per se ipsam considerata natura dat artifici suo gloriam. Sic est et natura ignis aeterni sine ulla dubitatione laudabilis, quamvis damnatis impiis futura poenalis. Quid enim est igne flammante vigente lucente pulchrius? quid calfaciente curante coquente utilius? quamvis eo nihil sit urente molestius. Idem igitur ipse aliter adpositus perniciosus, qui convenienter adhibitus commodissimus invenitur. Nam eius in universo mundo utilitates verbis explicare quis sufficit? Nec audiendi sunt, qui laudant in igne lucem, ardorem autem vituperant, videlicet non ex vi naturae, sed ex suo commodo vel incommodo. Videre enim volunt, ardere nolunt. Sed parum adtendunt eam ipsam lucem, quae certe et illis placet, oculis infirmis per inconvenientiam nocere, et in illo ardore, qui eis displicet, nonnulla animalia per convenientiam salubriter vivere.	But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and mutable things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator's will, an existence fitting them, by passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a requisite part of this world. For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe it, lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great an Artificer. At the same time, if we attentively consider even these faults of earthly things, which are neither voluntary nor penal, they seem to illustrate the excellence of the natures themselves, which are all originated and created by God; for it is that which pleases us in this nature which we are displeased to see removed by the fault,-unless even the natures themselves displease men, as often happens when they become hurtful to them, and then men estimate them not by their nature, but by their utility; as in the case of those animals whose swarms scourged the pride of the Egyptians. But in this way of estimating, they may find fault with the sun itself; for certain criminals or debtors are sentenced by the judges to be set in the sun. Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with respect to their own nature, that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the nature of the eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is most assuredly worthy of praise. For what is more beautiful than fire flaming, blazing, and shining? What more useful than fire for warming, restoring, cooking, though nothing is more destructive than fire burning and consuming? The same thing, then, when applied in one way, is destructive, but when applied suitably, is most beneficial. For who can find words to tell its uses throughout the whole world? We must not listen, then, to those who praise the light of fire but find fault with its heat, judging it not by its nature, but by their convenience or discomfort. For they wish to see, but not to be burnt. But they forget that this very light which is so pleasant to them, disagrees with and hurts weak eyes; and in that heat which is disagreeable to them, some animals find the most suitable conditions of a healthy life.
BOOK XII [V] Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam sunt et ideo habent modum suum, speciem suam et quandam secum pacem suam, profecto bonae sunt; et cum ibi sunt, ubi esse per naturae ordinem debent, quantum acceperunt, suum esse custodiunt; et quae semper esse non acceperunt, pro usu motuque rerum, quibus Creatoris lege subduntur, in melius deteriusue mutantur, in eum divina providentia tendentes exitum, quem ratio gubernandae universitatis includit; ita ut nec tanta corruptio, quanta usque ad interitum naturas mutabiles mortalesque perducit, sic faciat non esse quod erat, ut non inde fiat consequenter quod esse debebat. Quae cum ita sint, Deus, qui summe est atque ob hoc ab illo facta est omnis essentia, quae non summe est (quia neque illi aequalis esse deberet, quae de nihilo facta esset, neque ullo modo esse posset, si ab illo facta non esset), nec ullorum vitiorum offensione vituperandus et omnium naturarum consideratione laudandus est.	All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they preserve such being as they have received. And those things which have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or for worse, so as to suit the wants and motions of those things to which the Creator's law has made them subservient; and thus they tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the government of the universe. So that, though the corruption of transitory and perishable things brings them to utter destruction, it does not prevent their producing that which was designed to be their result. And this being so, God, who supremely is, and who therefore created every being which has not supreme existence (for that which was made of nothing could not be equal to Him, and indeed could not be at all had He not made it), is not to be found fault with on account of the creature's faults, but is to be praised in view of the natures He has made.
BOOK XII [VI] Proinde causa beatitudinis angelorum bonorum ea verissima reperitur, quod ei adhaerent qui summe est. Cum vero causa miseriae malorum angelorum quaeritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo, qui summe est, aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non summe sunt; et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupetur? Initium quippe omnis peccati superbia. Noluerunt ergo ad illum custodire fortitudinem suam, et qui magis essent, si ei qui summe est adhaererent, se illi praeferendo id quod minus est praetulerunt. Hic primus defectus et prima inopia primumque vitium eius naturae, quae ita creata est, ut nec summe esset, et tamen ad beatitudinem habendam eo, qui summe est, frui posset, a quo aversa non quidem nulla, sed tamen minus esset atque ob hoc misera fieret. Huius porro malae voluntatis causa efficiens si quaeratur, nihil invenitur. Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis mali, malae autem voluntatis efficiens nihil est. Quoniam si res aliqua est, aut habet aut non habet aliquam voluntatem; si habet, aut bonam profecto habet aut malam; si bonam, quis ita desipiat, ut dicat quod bona voluntas faciat voluntatem malam? Erit enim, si ita est, bona voluntas causa peccati, quo absurdius putari nihil potest. Si autem res ista, quae putatur facere voluntatem malam, ipsa quoque habet voluntatem malam, etiam eam quae fecerit res consequenter interrogo, atque ita, ut sit aliquis inquirendi modus, causam primae malae voluntatis inquiro. Non est enim prima voluntas mala, quam fecit voluntas mala; sed illa prima est, quam nulla fecit. Nam si praecessit a qua fieret, illa prior est, quae alteram fecit. Si t respondetur quod eam nulla res fecerit et ideo semper fuerit: quaero utrum in aliqua natura fuerit. Si enim in nulla fuit, omnino non fuit; si autem in aliqua, vitiabat eam et corrumpebat eratque illi noxia ac per hoc bono privabat. Et ideo in mala natura voluntas mala esse non poterat, sed in bona, mutabili tamen, cui vitium hoc posset nocere. Si enim non nocuit, non utique vitium fuit, ac per hoc nec mala voluntas fuisse dicenda est. Porro si nocuit, bonum auferendo vel minvendo utique nocuit. Non igitur esse potuit sempiterna voluntas mala in ea re, in qua bonum naturale praecesserat, quod mala voluntas nocendo posset adimere. Si ergo non erat sempiterna, quis eam fecerit quaero. Restat ut dicatur, quod ea res fecerit malam voluntatem, in qua nulla voluntas fuit. Haec utrum superior sit, requiro, an inferior, an aequalis. Sed superior utique melior; quo modo ergo nullius, ac non potius bonae voluntatis? Hoc idem profecto et aequalis. Duo quippe quamdiu sunt pariter voluntatis bonae, non facit alter in altero voluntatem malam. Relinquitur ut inferior res, cui nulla voluntas est, fecerit angelicae naturae, quae prima peccavit, voluntatem malam. Sed etiam res ipsa quaecumque est inferior usque ad infimam terram, quoniam natura et essentia est, procul dubio bona est, habens modum et speciem suam in genere atque ordine suo. Quo modo ergo res bona efficiens est voluntatis malae? Quo modo, inquam, bonum est causa mali? Cum enim se voluntas relicto superiore ad inferiora convertit, efficitur mala, non quia malum est, quo se convertit, sed quia peruersa est ipsa conversio. Idcirco non res inferior voluntatem malam fecit, sed rem inferiorem prave atque inordinate, ipsa quia facta est, adpetivit. Si enim aliqui duo aequaliter affecti animo et corpore videant unius corporis pulchritudinem, qua visa unus eorum ad inlicite fruendum moveatur, alter in voluntate pudica stabilis perseueret, quid putamus esse causae, ut in illo fiat, in illo non fiat voluntas mala? Quae illam res fecit in quo facta est? Neque enim pulchritudo illa corporis; nam eam non fecit in ambobus, quando quidem amborum non dispariliter occurrit aspectibus. An caro intuentis in causa est? cur non et illius? An vero animus? cur non utriusque? Ambos enim et animo et corpore aequaliter affectos fuisse praediximus. An dicendum est alterum eorum occulta maligni spiritus suggestione temptatum, quasi non eidem suggestioni et qualicumque suasioni propria voluntate consenserit? Hanc igitur consensionem, hanc malam quam male suadenti adhibuit voluntatem quae in eo res fecerit, quaerimus. Nam ut hoc quoque inpedimentum ab ista quaestione tollatur, si eadem temptatione ambo temptentur, et unus ei cedat atque consentiat, alter idem qui fuerat perseueret: quid aliud apparet, nisi unum noluisse, alterum voluisse a castitate deficere? Vnde, nisi propria voluntate, ubi eadem fuerat in utroque corporis et animi affectio? Amborum oculis pariter visa est eadem pulchritudo, ambobus pariter institit occulta temptatio; propriam igitur in uno eorum voluntatem malam res quae fecerit scire volentibus, si bene intueantur, nihil occurrit. Si enim dixerimus quod ipse eam fecerit, quid erat ipse ante voluntatem malam nisi natura bona, cuius auctor Deus, qui est inmutabile bonum? Qui ergo dicit eum, qui consensit temptanti atque suadenti, cui non consensit alius, ad inlicite utendum pulchro corpore, quod videndum ambobus pariter adfuit, cum ante illam visionem ac temptationem similes ambo animo et corpore fuerint, ipsum sibi fecisse voluntatem malam, qui utique bonus ante voluntatem malam fuerit: quaerat cur eam fecerit, utrum quia natura est, an quia ex nihilo facta est, et inveniet voluntatem malam non ex eo esse incipere quod natura est, sed ex eo quod de nihilo facta natura est. Nam si natura causa est voluntatis malae, quid aliud cogimur dicere, nisi a bono fieri malum et bonum esse causam mali? si quidem a natura bona fit voluntas mala. Quod unde fieri potest, ut natura bona, quamvis mutabilis, antequam habeat voluntatem malam, faciat aliquid mali, hoc est ipsam voluntatem malam?	Thus the true cause of the blessedness of the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no such essence. And this vice, what else is it called than pride? For "pride is the beginning of sin." Ecclesiastes 10:13 They were unwilling, then, to preserve their strength for God; and as adherence to God was the condition of their enjoying an ampler being, they diminished it by preferring themselves to Him. This was the first defect, and the first impoverishment, and the first flaw of their nature, which was created, not indeed supremely existent, but finding its blessedness in the enjoyment of the Supreme Being; while by abandoning Him it should become, not indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore wretched.If the further question be asked, What was the efficient cause of their evil will? there is none. For what is it which makes the will bad, when it is the will itself which makes the action bad? And consequently the bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will. For if anything is the cause, this thing either has or has not a will. If it has, the will is either good or bad. If good, who is so left to himself as to say that a good will makes a will bad? For in this case a good will would be the cause of sin; a most absurd supposition. On the other hand, if this hypothetical thing has a bad will, I wish to know what made it so; and that we may not go on forever, I ask at once, what made the first evil will bad? For that is not the first which was itself corrupted by an evil will, but that is the first which was made evil by no other will. For if it were preceded by that which made it evil, that will was first which made the other evil. But if it is replied, "Nothing made it evil; it always was evil," I ask if it has been existing in some nature. For if not, then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured it, and consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once good and mutable, which this vice could injure. For if it did no injury, it was no vice; and consequently the will in which it was, could not be called evil. But if it did injury, it did it by taking away or diminishing good. And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity, who, I ask, made it? The only thing that can be suggested in reply is, that something which itself had no will, made the will evil. I ask, then, whether this thing was superior, inferior, or equal to it? If superior, then it is better. How, then, has it no will, and not rather a good will? The same reasoning applies if it was equal; for so long as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will. Then remains the supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing, be it of the lowest and most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and rank of its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil-not because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the desire as he looked? But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition? But why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament of body and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil suasive influence,-what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was equally before the eyes of both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he corrupted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he do so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We shall find that the latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we say than that evil arises from good or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it come to pass that a nature, good though mutable, should produce any evil-that is to say, should make the will itself wicked?
BOOK XII [VII] Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis; non enim est efficiens sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo, quod summe est, ad id, quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras vel audire silentium, quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est, neque illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi per aures, non sane in specie, sed in speciei privatione. Nemo ergo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio, nisi forte ut nescire discat, quod sciri non posse sciendum est. Ea quippe quae non in specie, sed in eius privatione sciuntur, si dici aut intellegi potest, quodam modo nesciendo sciuntur, ut sciendo nesciantur. Cum enim acies etiam oculi corporalis currit per species corporales, nusquam tenebras videt, nisi ubi coeperit non videre. Ita etiam non ad aliquem alium sensum, sed ad solas aures pertinet sentire silentium, quod tamen nullo modo nisi non audiendo sentitur. Sic species intellegibiles mens quidem nostra intellegendo conspicit; sed ubi deficiunt, nesciendo condiscit. Delicta enim quis intellegit?	Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being,-this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections,-causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient,-is as if some one sought to see darkness, or hear silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter only by the ear; but not by their positive actuality, but by their want of it. Let no one, then seek to know from me what I know that I do not know; unless he perhaps wishes to learn to be ignorant of that of which all we know is, that it cannot be known. For those things which are known not by their actuality, but by their want of it, are known, if our expression may be allowed and understood, by not knowing them, that by knowing them they may be not known. For when the eyesight surveys objects that strike the sense, it nowhere sees darkness but where it begins not to see. And so no other sense but the ear can perceive silence, and yet it is only perceived by not hearing. Thus, too, our mind perceives intelligible forms by understanding them; but when they are deficient, it knows them by not knowing them; for "who can understand defects?"
BOOK XII [VIII] Hoc scio, naturam Dei numquam, nusquam, nulla ex parte posse deficere, et ea posse deficere, quae ex nihilo facta sunt. Quae tamen quanto magis sunt et bona faciunt (tunc enim aliquid faciunt), causas habent efficientes; in quantum autem deficiunt et ex hoc mala faciunt (quid enim tunc faciunt nisi uana?), causas habent deficientes. Itemque scio, in quo fit mala voluntas, id in eo fieri, quod si nollet non fieret, et ideo non necessarios, sed voluntarios defectus iusta poena consequitur. Deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male, id est non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est. Neque enim auri vitium est auaritia, sed hominis peruerse amantis aurum iustitia derelicta, quae incomparabiliter auro debuit anteponi; nec luxuria vitium est pulchrorum suaviumque corporum, sed animae peruerse amantis corporeas voluptates neglecta temperantia, qua rebus spiritaliter pulchrioribus et incorruptibiliter suavioribus coaptamur; nec iactantia vitium est laudis humanae, sed animae peruerse amantis laudari ab hominibus spreto testimonio conscientiae; nec superbia vitium est dantis potestatem vel ipsius etiam potestatis, sed animae peruerse amantis potestatem suam potentioris iustiore contempta. Ac per hoc qui peruerse amat cuiuslibet naturae bonum, etiamsi adipiscatur, ipse fit in bono malus et miser meliore privatus.	This I do know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and the more good they do (for then they do something positive), the more they have efficient causes; but in so far as they are defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes. And I know likewise, that the will could not become evil, were it unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly punished, being not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections are not to evil things, but are themselves evil; that is to say, are not towards things that are naturally and in themselves evil, but the defection of the will is evil, because it is contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of that which has supreme being for that which has less. For avarice is not a fault inherent in gold, but in the man who inordinately loves gold, to the detriment of justice, which ought to be held in incomparably higher regard than gold. Neither is luxury the fault of lovely and charming objects, but of the heart that inordinately loves sensual pleasures, to the neglect of temperance, which attaches us to objects more lovely in their spirituality, and more delectable by their incorruptibility. Nor yet is boasting the fault of human praise, but of the soul that is inordinately fond of the applause of men, and that makes light of the voice of conscience. Pride, too, is not the fault of him who delegates power, nor of power itself, but of the soul that is inordinately enamored of its own power, and despises the more just dominion of a higher authority. Consequently he who inordinately loves the good which any nature possesses, even though he obtain it, himself becomes evil in the good, and wretched because deprived of a greater good.
BOOK XII [IX] Cum ergo malae voluntatis efficiens naturalis vel, si dici potest, essentialis nulla sit causa (ab ipsa quippe incipit spirituum mutabilium malum, quo minuitur atque deprauatur naturae bonum, nec talem voluntatem facit nisi defectio, qua deseritur Deus, cuius defectionis etiam causa utique deficit): si dixerimus nullam esse efficientem causam etiam voluntatis bonae, cavendum est, ne voluntas bona bonorum angelorum non facta, sed Deo coaeterna esse credatur. Cum ergo ipsi facti sint, quo modo illa non esse facta dicetur? Porro quia facta est, utrum cum ipsis facta est, an sine illa fuerunt prius? Sed si cum ipsis, non dubium quod ab illo facta sit, a quo et ipsi; simulque ut facti sunt, ei, a quo facti sunt, amore, cum quo facti sunt, adhaeserunt; eoque sunt isti ab illorum societate discreti, quod illi in eadem bona voluntate manserunt, isti ab ea deficiendo mutati sunt, mala scilicet voluntate hoc ipso quod a bona defecerunt; a qua non defecissent, si utique noluissent. Si autem boni angeli fuerunt prius sine bona voluntate eamque in se ipsi Deo non operante fecerunt: ergo meliores a se ipsis quam ab illo facti sunt? Absit. Quid enim erant sine bona voluntate nisi mali? Aut si propterea non mali, quia nec mala voluntas eis inerat (neque enim ab ea, quam nondum coeperant habere, defecerant), certe nondum tales, nondum tam boni quam esse cum bona voluntate coeperunt. At si non potuerunt se ipsos facere meliores; quam eos ille fecerat, quo nemo melius quicquam facit: profecto et bonam voluntatem, qua meliores essent, nisi operante adiutorio Creatoris habere non possent. Et cum id egit eorum voluntas bona, ut non ad se ipsos, qui minus erant, sed ad illum, qui summe est, converterentur eique adhaerentes magis essent eiusque participatione sapienter beateque viverent: quid aliud ostenditur nisi voluntatem quamlibet bonam inopem fuisse in solo desiderio remansuram, nisi ille, qui bonam naturam ex nihilo sui capacem fecerat, ex se ipso faceret inplendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem? Nam et hoc discutiendum est, si boni angeli ipsi in se fecerunt bonam voluntatem, utrum aliqua eam an nulla voluntate fecerunt. Si nulla, utique nec fecerunt. Si aliqua, utrum mala an bona? Si mala, quo modo esse potuit mala voluntas bonae voluntatis effectrix? Si bona, iam ergo habebant. Et istam quis fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, creavit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam? Vnde sine bona voluntate, hoc est Dei amore, numquam sanctos angelos fuisse credendum est. Isti autem, qui, cum boni creati essent, tamen mali sunt (mala propria voluntate, quam bona natura non fecit, nisi cum a bono sponte defecit, ut mali causa non sit bonum, sed defectus a bono), aut minorem acceperunt divini amoris gratiam quam illi, qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utrique boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus illi amplius adiuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se numquam casuros certissimi fierent, peruenerunt; sicut iam etiam in libro, quem sequitur iste, tractavimus. Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude Creatoris non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis angelis posse dici, quod caritas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis; nec tantum hominum, sed primitus praecipueque angelorum bonum esse, quod scriptum est: Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est. Hoc bonum quibus commune est, habent et cum illo cui adhaerent et inter se sanctam societatem et sunt una civitas Dei eademque vivum sacrificium eius vivumque templum eius. Cuius pars, quae coniungenda inmortalibus angelis ex mortalibus hominibus congregatur et nunc mutabiliter peregrinatur in terris vel in eis, qui mortem obierunt, secretis animarum receptaculis sedibusque requiescit, eodem Deo creante quem ad modum exorta sit, sicut de angelis dictum est, iam video esse dicendum. Ex uno quippe homine, quem primum Deus condidit, humanum genus sumpsit exordium secundum sanctae scripturae fidem, quae mirabilem auctoritatem non inmerito habet in orbe terrarum atque in omnibus gentibus, quas sibi esse credituras inter cetera vera, quae dixit, vera divinitate praedixit.	There is, then, no natural efficient cause or, if I may be allowed the expression, no essential cause, of the evil will, since itself is the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted; and the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God,-a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient. But as to the good will, if we should say that there is no efficient cause of it, we must beware of giving currency to the opinion that the good will of the good angels is not created, but is co-eternal with God. For if they themselves are created, how can we say that their good will was eternal? But if created, was it created along with themselves, or did they exist for a time without it? If along with themselves, then doubtless it was created by Him who created them, and, as soon as ever they were created, they attached themselves to Him who created them, with the love He created in them. And they are separated from the society of the rest, because they have continued in the same good will; while the others have fallen away to another will, which is an evil one, by the very fact of its being a falling away from the good; from which, we may add, they would not have fallen away had they been unwilling to do so. But if the good angels existed for a time without a good will, and produced it in themselves without God's interference, then it follows that they made themselves better than He made them. Away with such a thought! For without a good will, what were they but evil? Or if they were not evil, because they had not an evil will any more than a good one (for they had not fallen away from that which as yet they had not begun to enjoy), certainly they were not the same, not so good, as when they came to have a good will. Or if they could not make themselves better than they were made by Him who is surpassed by none in His work, then certainly, without His helpful operation, they could not come to possess that good will which made them better. And though their good will effected that they did not turn to themselves, who had a more stinted existence, but to Him who supremely is, and that, being united to Him, their own being was enlarged, and they lived a wise and blessed life by His communications to them, what does this prove but that the will, however good it might be, would have continued helplessly only to desire Him, had not He who had made their nature out of nothing, and yet capable of enjoying Him, first stimulated it to desire Him, and then filled it with Himself, and so made it better?Besides, this too has to be inquired into, whether, if the good angels made their own will good, they did so with or without will? If without, then it was not their doing. If with, was the will good or bad? If bad, how could a bad will give birth to a good one? If good, then already they had a good will. And who made this will, which already they had, but He who created them with a good will, or with that chaste love by which they cleaved to Him, in one and the same act creating their nature, and endowing it with grace? And thus we are driven to believe that the holy angels never existed without a good will or the love of God. But the angels who, though created good, are yet evil now, became so by their own will. And this will was not made evil by their good nature, unless by its voluntary defection from good; for good is not the cause of evil, but a defection from good is. These angels, therefore, either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became certain they should never fall from it,-as we have already shown in the preceding book. We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that "the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto them." Romans 5:5 And that not only of men, but primarily and principally of angels it is true, as it is written, "It is good to draw near to God." And those who have this good in common, have, both with Him to whom they draw near, and with one another, a holy fellowship, and form one city of God-His living sacrifice, and His living temple. And I see that, as I have now spoken of the rise of this city among the angels, it is time to speak of the origin of that part of it which is hereafter to be united to the immortal angels, and which at present is being gathered from among mortal men, and is either sojourning on earth, or, in the persons of those who have passed through death, is resting in the secret receptacles and abodes of disembodied spirits. For from one man, whom God created as the first, the whole human race descended, according to the faith of Holy Scripture, which deservedly is of wonderful authority among all nations throughout the world; since, among its other true statements, it predicted, by its divine foresight, that all nations would give credit to it.
BOOK XII [X] Omittamus igitur coniecturas hominum nescientium quid loquantur de natura vel institutione generis humani. Alii namque, sicut de ipso mundo crediderunt, semper fuisse homines opinantur. Vnde ait et Apuleius, cum hoc animantium genus describeret: "Singillatim mortales, cuncti tamen universo genere perpetui." Et cum illis dictum fuerit, si semper fuit humanum genus, quonam modo verum eorum loquatur historia narrans qui fuerint quarumque rerum inventores, qui primi liberalium disciplinarum aliarumque artium institutores, vel a quibus primum. illa vel illa regio parsque terrarum, illa atque illa insula incoli coeperit, respondent diluuiis et conflagrationibus per certa interualla temporum non quidem omnia, sed plurima terrarum ita uastari, ut redigantur homines ad exiguam paucitatem, ex quorum progenie rursus multitudo pristina reparetur; ac sic identidem reperiri et institui quasi prima, cum restituantur potius, quae fuerant illis nimiis uastationibus interrupta et extincta; ceterum hominem nisi ex homine existere omnino non posse. Dicunt autem quod putant, non quod sciunt.	Let us, then, omit the conjectures of men who know not what they say, when they speak of the nature and origin of the human race. For some hold the same opinion regarding men that they hold regarding the world itself, that they have always been. Thus Apuleius says when he is describing our race, "Individually they are mortal, but collectively, and as a race, they are immortal." And when they are asked, how, if the human race has always been, they vindicate the truth of their history, which narrates who were the inventors, and what they invented, and who first instituted the liberal studies and the other arts, and who first inhabited this or that region, and this or that island? they reply, that most, if not all lands, were so desolated at intervals by fire and flood, that men were greatly reduced in numbers, and from these, again, the population was restored to its former numbers, and that thus there was at intervals a new beginning made, and though those things which had been interrupted and checked by the severe devastations were only renewed, yet they seemed to be originated then; but that man could not exist at all save as produced by man. But they say what they think, not what they know.
BOOK XII [XI] Fallunt eos etiam quaedam mendacissimae litterae, quas perhibent in historia temporum multa annorum milia continere, cum ex litteris sacris ab institutione hominis nondum completa annorum sex milia computemus. Vnde ne multa disputem quem ad modum illarum litterarum, in quibus longe plura annorum milia referuntur, uanitas refellatur et nulla in illis rei huius idonea reperiatur auctoritas: illa epistula Alexandri Magni ad Olympiadem matrem suam, quam scripsit narrationem cuiusdam Aegyptii sacerdotis insinuans, quam protulit ex litteris quae sacrae apud illos haberentur, continet etiam regna, quae Graeca quoque novit historia; in quibus regnum Assyriorum in eadem epistula Alexandri quinque milia excedit annorum; in Graeca vero historia mille ferme et trecentos habet ab ipsius Beli principatu, quem regem et ille Aegyptius in eiusdem regni ponit exordio; Persarum autem et Macedonum imperium usque ad ipsum Alexandrum, cui loquebatur, plus quam octo annorum milia ille constituit, cum apud Graecos Macedonum usque ad mortem Alexandri quadringenti octoginta quinque reperiantur, Persarum vero, donec ipsius Alexandri victoria finiretur, ducenti et triginta tres computentur. Longe itaque hi numeri annorum illis Aegyptiis sunt minores, nec eis, etiamsi ter tantum computarentur, aequarent. Perhibentur enim Aegyptii quondam tam breues annos habuisse, ut quaternis mensibus finirentur; unde annus plenior et verior, qualis nunc et nobis et illis est, tres eorum annos complectebatur antiquos. Sed ne sic quidem, ut dixi, Graeca Aegyptiae numero temporum concordat historia. Et ideo Graecae potius fides habenda est, quia veritatem non excedit annorum, qui litteris nostris, quae vere sacrae sunt, continentur. Porro si haec epistula Alexandri, quae maxime innotuit, multum abhorret in spatiis temporum a probabili fide rerum: quanto minus credendum est illis litteris, quas plenas fabulosis velut antiquitatibus proferre voluerint contra auctoritatem notissimorum divinorumque librorum, quae totum orbem sibi crediturum esse praedixit, et cui totus orbis, sicut ab ea praedictum est, credidit; quae vera se narrasse praeterita ex his, quae futura praenuntiavit, cum tanta veritate inplentur, ostendit.	And, not to spend many words in exposing the baselessness of these documents, in which so many thousands of years are accounted for, nor in proving that their authorities are totally inadequate, let me cite only that letter which Alexander the Great wrote to his mother Olympias, giving her the narrative he had from an Egyptian priest, which he had extracted from their sacred archives, and which gave an account of kingdoms mentioned also by the Greek historians. In this letter of Alexander's a term of upwards of 5000 years is assigned to the kingdom of Assyria; while in the Greek history only 1300 years are reckoned from the reign of Bel himself, whom both Greek and Egyptian agree in counting the first king of Assyria. Then to the empire of the Persians and Macedonians this Egyptian assigned more than 8000 years, counting to the time of Alexander, to whom he was speaking; while among the Greeks, 485 years are assigned to the Macedonians down to the death of Alexander, and to the Persians 233 years, reckoning to the termination of his conquests. Thus these give a much smaller number of years than the Egyptians; and indeed, though multiplied three times, the Greek chronology would still be shorter. For the Egyptians are said to have formerly reckoned only four months to their year; so that one year, according to the fuller and truer computation now in use among them as well as among ourselves, would comprehend three of their old years. But not even thus, as I said, does the Greek history correspond with the Egyptian in its chronology. And therefore the former must receive the greater credit, because it does not exceed the true account of the duration of the world as it is given by our documents, which are truly sacred. Further, if this letter of Alexander, which has become so famous, differs widely in this matter of chronology from the probable credible account, how much less can we believe these documents which, though full of fabu lous and fictitious antiquities, they would fain oppose to the authority of our well-known and divine books, which predicted that the whole world would believe them, and which the whole world accordingly has believed; which proved, too, that it had truly narrated past events by its prediction of future events, which have so exactly come to pass!
BOOK XII [XII] Alii vero, qui mundum istum non existimant sempiternum, sive non eum solum,sed innumerabiles opinentur, sive solum quidem esse, sed certis saeculorum interuallis innumerabiliter oriri et occidere, necesse est fateantur hominum genus prius sine hominibus gignentibus extitisse. Neque enim ut alluuionibus incendiisque terrarum, quas illi non putant toto prorsus orbe contingere, et ideo paucos homines, ex quibus multitudo pristina reparetur, semper remanere contendunt, ita et hi possunt putare, quod aliquid hominum pereunte mundo relinquatur in mundo; sed sicut ipsum mundum ex materia sua renasci existimant, ita in illo ex elementis eius genus humanum ac deinde a parentibus progeniem pullulare mortalium, sicut aliorum animalium.	There are some, again, who, though they do not suppose that this world is eternal, are of opinion either that this is not the only world, but that there are numberless worlds or that indeed it is the only one, but that it dies, and is born again at fixed intervals, and this times without number; but they must acknowledge that the human race existed before there were other men to beget them. For they cannot suppose that, if the whole world perish, some men would be left alive in the world, as they might survive in floods and conflagrations, which those other speculators suppose to be partial, and from which they can therefore reasonably argue that a few then survived whose posterity would renew the population; but as they believe that the world itself is renewed out of its own material, so they must believe that out of its elements the human race was produced, and then that the progeny of mortals sprang like that of other animals from their parents.
BOOK XII [XIII] Quod autem respondimus, cum de mundi origine quaestio verteretur, eis, qui nolunt credere non eum semper fuisse, sed esse coepisse, sicut etiam Plato apertissime confitetur, quamvis a nonnullis contra quam loquitur sensisse credatur: hoc etiam de prima hominis conditione responderim, propter eos, qui similiter moventur, cur homo per innumerabilia atque infinita retro tempora creatus non sit tamque sero sit creatus, ut minus quam sex milia sint annorum, ex quo esse coepisse in sacris litteris invenitur. Si enim brevitas eos offendit temporis, quod tam pauci eis videntur anni, ex quo institutus homo in nostris auctoritatibus legitur: considerent nihil esse diuturnum , in quo est aliquid extremum, et omnia saeculorum spatia definita, si aeternitati interminae comparentur, non exigua existimanda esse, sed nulla. Ac per hoc si non quinque vel sex, verum etiam sexaginta milia sive sescenta, aut sexagiens aut sescentiens aut sescentiens miliens dicerentur annorum, aut itidem per totidem totiens multipficaretur haec summa, ubi iam nullum numeri nomen haberemus, ex quo Deus hominem fecit: similiter quaeri posset, cur ante non fecerit. Dei quippe ab hominis creatione cessatio retrorsus aeterna sine initio tanta est, ut, si ei conferatur quamlibet magna et ineffabilis numerositas temporum, quae tamen fine conclusa certi spatii terminatur, nec saltem tanta videri debeat, quanta si umoris brevissimam guttam universo mari, etiam quantum oceanus circumfluit, comparemus; quoniam istorum duorum unum quidem perexiguum est, alterum incomparabiliter magnum, sed utrumque finitum; illud vero temporis spatium, quod ab aliquo initio progreditur et aliquo termino cohercetur, magnitudine quantacumque tendatur, comparatum illi, quod initium non habet, nescio utrum pro minimo an potius pro nullo deputandum est. Hinc eum si a fine vel brevissma singillatim momenta detrahantur, decrescente numero licet tam ingenti, ut vocabulum non inveniat, retrorsum redeundo (tamquam si hominis dies ab illo, in quo nunc vivit, usque ad illum, in quo natus est, detrahas) quandoque ad initium illa detractio perducetur. Si autem detrahantur retrorsus in spatio, quod a nullo coepit exordio, non dico singillatim minuta momenta vel horarum aut dierum aut mensum aut annorum etiam quantitates, sed tam magna spatia, quanta illa summa conprehendit annorum, quae iam dici a quibuslibet computatoribus non potest, quae tamen momentorum minutatim detractione consumitur, et detrahantur haec tanta spatia non semel atque iterum saepiusque, sed semper: quid fit, quid agitur, quando numquam ad initium, quod omnino nullum est, pervenitur? Quapropter quod nos modo quaerimus post quinque milia et quod excurrit annorum, possent et posteri etiam post annorum sescentiens miliens eadem curiositate requirere, si in tantum haec mortalitas hominum exoriendo et occubando et inperita perseueraret infirmitas. Potuerunt et qui fuerunt ante nos ipsis recentibus hominis creati temporibus istam movere quaestionem. Ipse denique primus homo vel postridie vel eodem die postea quam factus est potuit inquirere, cur non ante sit factus; et quandocumque antea factus esset, non vires tunc alias et alias nunc vel etiam postea ista de initio rerum temporalium controversia reperiret.	As to those who are always asking why man was not created during these countless ages of the infinitely extended past, and came into being so lately that, according to Scripture, less than 6000 years have elapsed since He began to be, I would reply to them regarding the creation of man, just as I replied regarding the origin of the world to those who will not believe that it is not eternal, but had a beginning, which even Plato himself most plainly declares, though some think his statement was not consistent with his real opinion. If it offends them that the time that has elapsed since the creation of man is so short, and his years so few according to our authorities, let them take this into consideration, that nothing that has a limit is long, and that all the ages of time being finite, are very little, or indeed nothing at all, when compared to the interminable eternity. Consequently, if there had elapsed since the creation of man, I do not say five or six, but even sixty or six hundred thousand years, or sixty times as many, or six hundred or six hundred thousand times as many, or this sum multiplied until it could no longer be expressed in numbers, the same question could still be put, Why was he not made before? For the past and boundless eternity during which God abstained from creating man is so great, that, compare it with what vast and untold number of ages you please, so long as there is a definite conclusion of this term of time, it is not even as if you compared the minutest drop of water with the ocean that everywhere flows around the globe. For of these two, one indeed is very small, the other incomparably vast, yet both are finite; but that space of time which starts from some beginning, and is limited by some termination, be it of what extent it may, if you compare it with that which has no beginning, I know not whether to say we should count it the very minutest thing, or nothing at all. For, take this limited time, and deduct from the end of it, one by one, the briefest moments (as you might take day by day from a man's life, beginning at the day in which he now lives, back to that of his birth), and though the number of moments you must subtract in this backward movement be so great that no word can express it, yet this subtraction will sometime carry you to the beginning. But if you take away from a time which has no beginning, I do not say brief moments one by one, nor yet hours, or days, or months, or years even in quantities, but terms of years so vast that they cannot be named by the most skillful arithmeticians,-take away terms of years as vast as that which we have supposed to be gradually consumed by the deduction of moments,-and take them away not once and again repeatedly, but always, and what do you effect, what do you make by your deduction, since you never reach the beginning, which has no existence? Wherefore, that which we now demand after five thousand odd years, our descendants might with like curiosity demand after six hundred thousand years, supposing these dying generations of men continue so long to decay and be renewed, and supposing posterity continues as weak and ignorant as ourselves. The same question might have been asked by those who have lived before us and while man was even newer upon earth. The first man himself in short might the day after or the very day of his creation have asked why he was created no sooner. And no matter at what earlier or later period he had been created, this controversy about the commencement of this world's history would have had precisely the same difficulties as it has now.
BOOK XII [XIV] Hanc autem se philosophi mundi huius non aliter putaverunt posse vel debere dissoluere, nisi ut circuitus temporum inducerent, quibus eadem semper fuisse renouata atque repetita in rerum natura atque ita deinceps fore sine cessatione adseuerarent volumina venientium et praetereuntium saeculorum; sive in mundo permanente isti circuitus fierent, sive certis interuallis oriens et occidens mundus eadem semper quasi noua, quae transacta et ventura sunt, exhiberet. A quo ludibrio prorsus inmortalem animam, etiam cum sapientiam perceperit, liberare non possunt, euntem sine cessatione ad falsam beatitudinem et ad veram miseriam sine cessatione redeuntem. Quo modo enim vera beatitudo est, de cuius numquam aeternitate confiditur, dum anima venturam miseriam aut inperitissime in veritate nescit aut infelicissime in beatitudine pertimescit? At si ad miserias numquam ulterius reditura ex his ad beatitudinem pergit: fit ergo aliquid novi in tempore, quod finem non habet temporis. Cur non ergo et mundus? cur non et homo factus in mundo? ut illi nescio qui falsi circuitus a falsis sapientibus fallacibusque comperti in doctrina sana tramite recti itineris evitentur. Nam quidam et illud, quod legitur in libro Salomonis, qui vocatur ecclesiastes: Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod erit. Et quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod fiet; et non est omne recens sub sole. Qui loquetur et dicet: Ecce hoc nouum est: iam fuit saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos, propter hos circuitus in eadem redeuntes et in eadem cuncta reuocantes dictum intellegi volunt; quod ille aut de his rebus dixit, de quibus superius loquebatur, hoc est de generationibus aliis euntibus, aliis venientibus, de solis anfractibus, de torrentium lapsibus; aut certe de omnium rerum generibus, quae oriuntur atque occidunt. Fuerunt enim homines ante nos, sunt et nobiscum, erunt et post nos; ita quaeque animantia vel arbusta. Monstra quoque ipsa, quae inusitata nascuntur, quamvis inter se diversa sint et quaedam eorum semel facta narrentur, tamen secundum id, quod generaliter miracula et monstra sunt, utique et fuerunt et erunt, nec recens et nouum est, ut monstrum sub sole nascatur. Quamuis haec verba quidam sic intellexerint, tamquam in praedestinatione Dei iam facta fuisse omnia sapiens ille voluisset intellegi, et ideo nihil recens esse sub sole. Absit autem a recta fide, ut his Salomonis verbis illos circuitus significatos esse credamus, quibus illi putant sic eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum volumina repeti, ut verbi gratia, sicut isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi et in ea schola, quae Academia dicta est, discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro saecula multum quidem prolixis interuallis, sed tamen.certis, et idem Plato et eadem civitas et eadem schola idemque discipuli repetiti et per innumerabilia deinde saecula repetendi sint. Absit, inquam, ut nos ista credamus. Semel enim Christus mortuus est pro peccatis nostris; surgens autem a mortuis iam non moritur, et mors ei ultra non dominabitur, et nos post resurrectionem semper cum Domino erimus, cui modo dicimus, quod sacer admonet psalmus: Tu, Domine, servabis nos et custodies nos a generatione hac et in aeternum. Satis autem istis existimo convenire quod sequitur: In circuitu impii ambulabunt; non quia per circulos, quos opinantur, eorum vita est recursura, sed quia modo talis est erroris eorum via, id est falsa doctrina. This controversy some philosophers have seen no other approved means of solving than by introducing cycles of time, in which there should be a constant renewal and repetition of the order of nature; and they have therefore asserted that these cycles will ceaselessly recur, one passing away and another coming, though they are not agreed as to whether one permanent world shall pass through all these cycles, or whether the world shall at fixed intervals die out, and be renewed so as to exhibit a recurrence of the same phenomena-the things which have been, and those which are to be, coinciding. And from this fantastic vicissitude they exempt not even the immortal soul that has attained wisdom, consigning it to a ceaseless transmigration between delusive blessedness and real misery. For how can that be truly called blessed which has no assurance of being so eternally, and is either in ignorance of the truth, and blind to the misery that is approaching, or, knowing it, is in misery and fear? Or if it passes to bliss, and leaves miseries forever, then there happens in time a new thing which time shall not end. Why not, then, the world also? Why may not man, too, be a similar thing? So that, by following the straight path of sound doctrine, we escape, I know not what circuitous paths, discovered by deceiving and deceived sages.Some, too, in advocating these recurring cycles that restore all things to their original cite in favor of their supposition what Solomon says in the book of Ecclesiastes: "What is that which has been? It is that which shall be. And what is that which is done? It is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun. Who can speak and say, See, this is new? It has been already of old time, which was before us." This he said either of those things of which he had just been speaking-the succession of generations, the orbit of the sun, the course of rivers,-or else of all kinds of creatures that are born and die. For men were before us, are with us, and shall be after us; and so all living things and all plants. Even monstrous and irregular productions, though differing from one another, and though some are reported as solitary instances, yet resemble one another generally, in so far as they are miraculous and monstrous, and, in this sense, have been, and shall be, and are no new and recent things under the sun. However, some would understand these words as meaning that in the predestination of God all things have already existed, and that thus there is no new thing under the sun. At all events, far be it from any true believer to suppose that by these words of Solomon those cycles are meant, in which, according to those philosophers, the same periods and events of time are repeated; as if, for example, the philosopher Plato, having taught in the school at Athens which is called the Academy, so, numberless ages before, at long but certain intervals, this same Plato and the same school, and the same disciples existed, and so also are to be repeated during the countless cycles that are yet to be,-far be it, I say, from us to believe this. For once Christ died for our sins; and, rising from the dead, He dies no more. "Death has no more dominion over Him; Romans 6:9 and we ourselves after the resurrection shall be "ever with the Lord," to whom we now say, as the sacred Psalmist dictates, "You shall keep us, O Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation." And that too which follows, is, I think, appropriate enough: "The wicked walk in a circle," not because their life is to recur by means of these circles, which these philosophers imagine, but because the path in which their false doctrine now runs is circuitous.
BOOK XII [XV] Quid autem mirum est, si in his circuitibus errantes nec aditum nec exitum inveniunt? quia genus humanum atque ista nostra mortalitas nec quo initio coepta sit sciunt, nec quo fine claudatur; quando quidem altitudinem Dei penetrare non possunt, qua, cum ipse sit aeternus et sine initio, ab aliquo tamen initio exorsus est tempora et hominem, quem numquam antea fecerat, fecit in tempore, non tamen nouo et repentino, sed inmutabili aeternoque consilio. Quis hanc valeat altitudinem investigabilem uestigare et inscrutabilem perscrutari, secundum quam Deus hominem temporalem, ante quem nemo umquam hominum fuit, non mutabili voluntate in tempore condidit et genus humanum ex uno multiplicavit? Quando quidem psalmus ipse cum praemisisset atque dixisset: Tu, Domine, servabis nos et custodies nos a generatione hac et in aeternum, ac deinde repercussisset eos, in quorum stulta impiaque doctrina nulla liberationis et beatitudinis animae servatur aeternitas, continuo subiciens: In circuitu impii ambulabunt: tamquam ei diceretur: "Quid ergo tu credis, sentis, intellegis? numquidnam existimandum est subito Deo placuisse hominem facere, quem numquam antea infinita retro aeternitate fecisset, cui nihil novi accidere potest, in quo mutabile aliquid non est?" continuo respondit ad ipsum Deum loquens: Secundum altitudinem tuam multiplicasti filios hominum. Sentiant, inquit, homines quod putant, et quod eis placet opinentur et disputent: Secundum altitudinem tuam, quam nullus potest nosse hominum, multiplicasti filios hominum. Valde quippe altum est et semper fuisse, et hominem, quem numquam fecerat, ex aliquo tempore primum facere voluisse, nec consilium voluntatemque mutasse.	What wonder is it if, entangled in these circles, they find neither entrance nor egress? For they know not how the human race, and this mortal condition of ours, took its origin, nor how it will be brought to an end, since they cannot penetrate the inscrutable wisdom of God. For, though Himself eternal, and without beginning, yet He caused time to have a beginning; and man, whom He had not previously made He made in time, not from a new and sudden resolution, but by His unchangeable and eternal design. Who can search out the unsearchable depth of this purpose, who can scrutinize the inscrutable wisdom, wherewith God, without change of will, created man, who had never before been, and gave him an existence in time, and increased the human race from one individual? For the Psalmist himself, when he had first said, "You shall keep us, O Lord, You shall preserve us from this generation for ever," and had then rebuked those whose foolish and impious doctrine preserves for the soul no eternal deliverance and blessedness adds immediately, "The wicked walk in a circle." Then, as if it were said to him, "What then do you believe, feel, know? Are we to believe that it suddenly occurred to God to create man, whom He had never before made in a past eternity,-God, to whom nothing new can occur, and in whom is no changeableness?" the Psalmist goes on to reply, as if addressing God Himself, "According to the depth of Your wisdom You have multiplied the children of men." Let men, he seems to say, fancy what they please, let them conjecture and dispute as seems good to them, but You have multiplied the children of men according to the depth of your wisdom, which no man can comprehend. For this is a depth indeed, that God always has been, and that man, whom He had never made before, He willed to make in time, and this without changing His design and will.
BOOK XII [XVI] Ego quidem sicut Dominum Deum aliquando dominum non fuisse dicere non audeo, ita hominem numquam antea fuisse et ex quodam tempore primum hominem creatum esse dubitare non debeo. Sed cum cogito cuius rei dominus semper fuerit, si semper creatura non fuerit, adfirmare aliquid pertimesco, quia et me ipsum intueor et scriptum esse recolo: Quis hominum potest scire consilium Dei, aut quis poterit cogitare quid velit Dominus? Cogitationes enim mortalium timidae et incertae adinventiones nostrae. Curruptibile enim corpus adgrauat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem. Ex his igitur, quae in hac terrena inhabitatione multa cogito (ideo utique multa, quia unum, quod ex illis vel praeter illa, quod forte non cogito, verum est, invenire non possum), si dixero semper fuisse creaturam, cuius dominus esset, qui semper est dominus nec dominus umquam non fuit; sed nunc illam, nunc aliam per alia atque alia temporum spatia, ne aliquam Creatori coaeternam esse dicamus, quod fides ratioque sana condemnat: cavendum est, ne sit absurdum et a luce veritatis alienum mortalem quidem per vices temporum semper fuisse creaturam, decedentem aliam, aliam succedentem; inmortalem vero non esse coepisse, nisi cum ad nostrum saeculum ventum est, quando et angeli creati sunt, si eos recte lux illa primum facta significat aut illud potius caelum, de quo dictum est: In principio fecit Deus caelum et terram, cum tamen non fuerint, antequam fierent, ne inmortales, si semper fuisse dicuntur, Deo coaeterni esse credantur. Si autem dixero non in tempore creatos angelos, sed ante omnia tempora c:t ipsos fuisse, quorum Deus dominus esset, qui numquam nisi dominus fuit: quaeretur a me etiam, si ante omnia tempora facti sunt, utrum semper potuerint esse qui facti sunt. Hic respondendum forte videatur: Quo modo non semper, cum id, quod est omni tempore, non inconvenienter semper esse dicatur? Vsque adeo autem isti omni tempore fuerunt, ut etiam ante omnia tempora facti sint; si tamen a caelo coepta sunt tempora, et illi iam erant ante caelum. At si tempus non a caelo, verum et ante caelum fuit; non quidem in horis et diebus et mensibus et annis (nam istae dimensiones temporalium spatiorum, quae usitate ac proprie dicuntur tempora, manifestum est quod a motu siderum coeperint; unde et Deus, cum haec institueret, dixit: Et sint in signa et in tempora et in dies et in annos), sed in aliquo mutabili motu, cuius aliud prius, aliud posterius praeterit, eo quod simul esse non possunt; - si ergo ante caelum in angelicis motibus tale aliquid fuit et ideo tempus iam fuit atque angeli, ex quo facti sunt, temporaliter movebantur: etiam sic omni tempore fuerunt, quando quidem cum illis facta sunt tempora. Quis autem dicat: Non semper fuit, quod omni tempore fuit? Sed si hoc respondero, dicetur mihi: Quo modo ergo non coaeterni Creatori, si semper ille, semper illi fuerunt? Quo modo etiam creati dicendi sunt, si semper fuisse intelleguntur? Ad hoc quid respondebitur? An dicendum est et semper eos fuisse, quoniam omni tempore fuerunt, qui cum tempore facti sunt, aut cum quibus facta sunt tempora, et tamen creatos ? Neque enim et ipsa tempora creata esse negabimus, quamvis omni tempore tempus fuisse nemo ambigat. Nam si non omni tempore fuit tempus, erat ergo tempus, quando nullum erat tempus. Quis hoc stultissimus dixerit? Possumus enim recte dicere: Erat tempus, quando non erat Roma; erat tempus, quando non erat Hierusalem; erat tempus, quando non erat Abraham; erat tempus, quando non erat homo, et si quid huius modi; postremo si non cum initio temporis, sed post aliquod tempus factus est mundus, possumus dicere: Erat tempus, quando non erat mundus; at vero: Erat tempus, quando nullum erat tempus, tam inconvenienter dicimus, ac si quisquam dicat: Erat homo, quando nullus erat homo, aut: Erat iste mundus, quando iste non erat mundus. Si enim de alio atque alio intellegatur, potest dici aliquo modo, hoc est: Erat alius homo, quando non erat iste homo; sic ergo: Erat aliud tempus, quando non erat hoc tempus, recte possumus dicere; at vero: Erat tempus, quando nullum erat tempus, quis vel insipientissimus dixerit? Sicut ergo dicimus creatum tempus, cum ideo semper fuisse dicatur, quia omni tempore tempus fuit: ita non est consequens, ut, si semper fuerunt angeli, ideo non sint creati, ut propterea semper fuisse dicantur, quia omni tempore fuerunt, et propterea omni tempore fuerunt, quia nullo modo sine his ipsa tempora esse potuerunt. Vbi enim nulla creatura est, cuius mutabilibus motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse n on possunt; ac per hoc etsi semper fuerunt, creati sunt, nec si semper fuerunt, ideo Creatori coaeterni sunt. Ille enim semper fuit aeternitate inmutabili; isti autem facti sunt; sed ideo semper fuisse dicuntur, quia omni tempore fuerunt, sine quibus tempora nullo modo esse potuerunt; tempus autem quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati inmutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiamsi inmortalitas angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit, nec futura quasi nondum sit: tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt, et ideo Creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt. Quapropter si Deus semper dominus fuit, semper habuit creaturam suo dominatui seruientem; verum tamen non de ipso genitam, sed ab ipso de nihilo factam nec ei coaeternam; erat quippe ante illam, quamvis nullo tempore sine illa; non eam spatio transcurrente, sed manente perpetuitate praecedens. Sed hoc si respondero eis qui requirunt, quo modo semper creator, semper dominus fuit, si creatura seruiens non semper fuit; aut quo modo creata est et non potius creatori coaeterna est, si semper fuit: vereor ne facilius iudicer adfirmare quod nescio, quam docere quod scio. Redeo igitur ad id, quod creator noster scire nos voluit; illa vero, quae vel sapientioribus in hac vita scire permisit vel omnino perfectis in alia vita scienda servavit, ultra vires meas esse confiteor. Sed ideo putavi sine adfirmatione tractanda, ut qui haec legunt videant a quibus quaestionum periculis debeant temperare, nec ad omnia se idoneos arbitrentur potiusque intellegant quam sit apostolo obtemperandum praecipienti salubriter, ubi ait: Dico autem per gratiam Dei quae data est mihi omnibus qui sunt in vobis, non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad temperantiam, unicuique sicut Deus partitus est mensuram fidei. Si enim pro viribus suis alatur infans, fiet, ut crescendo plus capiat; si autem vires suae capacitatis excedat, deficiet antequam crescat.	For my own part, indeed, as I dare not say that there ever was a time when the Lord God was not Lord, so I ought not to doubt that man had no existence before time, and was first created in time. But when I consider what God could be the Lord of, if there was not always some creature, I shrink from making any assertion, remembering my own insignificance, and that it is written, "What man is he that can know the counsel of God? or who can think what the will of the Lord is? For the thoughts of mortal men are timid, and our devices are but uncertain. For the corruptible body presses down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the mind that muses upon many things." Wisdom 9:13-15 Many things certainly do I muse upon in this earthly tabernacle, because the one thing which is true among the many, or beyond the many, I cannot find. If, then, among these many thoughts, I say that there have always been creatures for Him to be Lord of, who is always and ever has been Lord, but that these creatures have not always been the same, but succeeded one another (for we would not seem to say that any is co-eternal with the Creator, an assertion condemned equally by faith and sound reason), I must take care lest I fall into the absurd and ignorant error of maintaining that by these successions and changes mortal creatures have always existed, whereas the immortal creatures had not begun to exist until the date of our own world, when the angels were created; if at least the angels are intended by that light which was first made, or, rather, by that heaven of which it is said, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Genesis 1:1 The angels, at least did not exist before they were created; for if we say that they have always existed, we shall seem to make them co-eternal with the Creator. Again, if I say that the angels were not created in time, but existed before all times, as those over whom God, who has ever been Sovereign, exercised His sovereignty, then I shall be asked whether, if they were created before all time, they, being creatures, could possibly always exist. It may perhaps be replied, Why not always, since that which is in all time may very properly be said to be "always?" Now so true is it that these angels have existed in all time that even before time was they were created; if at least time began with the heavens, and the angels existed before the heavens. And if time was even before the heavenly bodies, not indeed marked by hours, days, months, and years,-for these measures of time's periods which are commonly and properly called times, did manifestly begin with the motion of the heavenly bodies, and so God said, when He appointed them, "Let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years," Genesis 1:14 -if, I say, time was before these heavenly bodies by some changing movement, whose parts succeeded one another and could not exist simultaneously, and if there was some such movement among the angels which necessitated the existence of time, and that they from their very creation should be subject to these temporal changes, then they have existed in all time, for time came into being along with them. And who will say that what was in all time, was not always?But if I make such a reply, it will be said to me, How, then, are they not co-eternal with the Creator, if He and they always have been? How even can they be said to have been created, if we are to understand that they have always existed? What shall we reply to this? Shall we say that both statements are true? that they always have been, since they have been in all time, they being created along with time, or time along with them, and yet that also they were created? For, similarly, we will not deny that time itself was created, though no one doubts that time has been in all time; for if it has not been in all time, then there was a time when there was no time. But the most foolish person could not make such an assertion. For we can reasonably say there was a time when Rome was not; there was a time when Jerusalem was not; there was a time when Abraham was not; there was a time when man was not, and so on: in fine, if the world was not made at the commencement of time, but after some time had elapsed, we can say there was a time when the world was not. But to say there was a time when time was not, is as absurd as to say there was a man when there was no man; or, this world was when this world was not. For if we are not referring to the same object, the form of expression may be used, as, there was another man when this man was not. Thus we can reasonably say there was another time when this time was not; but not the merest simpleton could say there was a time when there was no time. As, then, we say that time was created, though we also say that it always has been, since in all time time has been, so it does not follow that if the angels have always been, they were therefore not created. For we say that they have always been, because they have been in all time; and we say they have been in all time, because time itself could no wise be without them. For where there is no creature whose changing movements admit of succession, there cannot be time at all. And consequently, even if they have always existed, they were created; neither, if they have always existed, are they therefore co-eternal with the Creator. For He has always existed in unchangeable eternity; while they were created, and are said to have been always, because they have been in all time, time being impossible without the creature. But time passing away by its changefulness, cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity. And consequently, though the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, does not become past as if now it were not, nor has a future as if it were not yet, still their movements, which are the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and therefore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in whose movement we cannot say that there has been that which now is not, or shall be that which is not yet. Wherefore, if God always has been Lord, He has always had creatures under His dominion,-creatures, however, not begotten of Him, but created by Him out of nothing; nor co-eternal with Him, for He was before them though at no time without them, because He preceded them, not by the lapse of time, but by His abiding eternity. But if I make this reply to those who demand how He was always Creator, always Lord, if there were not always a subject creation; or how this was created, and not rather co-eternal with its Creator, if it always was, I fear I may be accused of recklessly affirming what I know not, instead of teaching what I know. I return, therefore, to that which our Creator has seen fit that we should know; and those things which He has allowed the abler men to know in this life, or has reserved to be known in the next by the perfected saints, I acknowledge to be beyond my capacity. But I have thought it right to discuss these matters without making positive assertions, that they who read may be warned to abstain from hazardous questions, and may not deem themselves fit for everything. Let them rather endeavor to obey the wholesome injunction of the apostle, when he says, "For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, according as God has dealt to every man the measure of faith." Romans 12:3 For if an infant receive nourishment suited to its strength, it becomes capable, as it grows, of taking more; but if its strength and capacity be overtaxed, it dwines away in place of growing.
BOOK XII [XVII] Quae saecula praeterierint antequam genus institueretur humanum, me fateor ignorare; non tamen dubito nihil omnino creaturae Creatori esse coaeternum. Dicit etiam apostolus tempora aeterna, nec ea futura, sed, quos magis est mirandum, praeterita. Sic enim ait: In spem vitae aeternae, quam promisit non mendax Deus ante tempora aeterna; manifestavit autem temporibus suis verbum suum. Ecce dixit retro quod fuerint tempora aeterna, quae tamen non fuerint Deo coaeterna, si quidem ille ante tempora aeterna non solum erat, verum etiam promisit vitam aeternam, quam manifestavit temporibus suis, id est congruis, quid aliud quam Verbum suum? Hoc est enim vita aeterna. Quo modo autem promisit, cum hominibus utique promiserit, qui nondum erant ante tempora aeterna, nisi quia in eius aeternitate atque in ipso Verbo eius eidem coaeterno iam praedestinatione fixum erat, quod suo tempore futurum erat?	"I own that I do not know what ages passed before the human race was created, yet I have no doubt that no created thing is co-eternal with the Creator. But even the apostle speaks of time as eternal, and this with reference, not to the future, but, which is more surprising, to the past. For he says, "In hope of eternal life, which God that cannot lie promised before the eternal times, but has in due times manifested His word." You see he says that in the past there have been eternal times, which, however, were not co-eternal with God. And since God before these eternal times not only existed, but also, "promised" life eternal, which He manifested in its own times (that is to say, in due times), what else is this than His word? For this is life eternal. But then, how did He promise; for the promise was made to men, and yet they had no existence before eternal times? Does this not mean that, in His own eternity, and in His co-eternal word, that which was to be in its own time was already predestined and fixed?
BOOK XII [XVIII] Illud quoque non dubito, antequam homo primus creatus esset, numquam quemquam fuisse hominem; nec eundem ipsum nescio quibus circuitibus nescio quotiens reuolutum, nec alium aliquem natura similem. Neque ab hac fide me philosophorum argumenta deterrent, quorum acutissimum illud putatur, quod dicunt nulla infinita ulla scientia posse conprehendi; ac per hoc Deus, inquiunt, rerum quas facit omnium finitarum omnes finitas apud se rationes habet; bonitas autem eius numquam uacua fuisse credenda est, ne sit temporalis eius operatio, cuius retro fuerit aeterna cessatio, quasi paenituerit eum prioris sine initio uacationis ac propterea sit operis adgressus initium; et ideo necesse est, inquiunt, eadem semper repeti eademque semper repetenda transcurrere, vel manente mundo mutabiliter, qui licet numquam non fuerit et sine initio temporis tamen factus est, vel eius quoque ortu et occasu semper illis circuitibus repetito semperque repetendo; ne videlicet, si aliquando primum Dei opera coepta dicuntur, priorem suam sine initio uacationem tamquam inertem ac desidiosam et ideo sibi displicentem damnasse quodam modo atque ob hoc mutasse credatur; si autem semper quidem temporalia, sed alia atque alia perbibetur operatus ac sic aliquando etiam ad hominem faciendum, quem numquam antea fecerat, pervenisse, non scientia, qua putant non posse quaecumque infinita conprehendi, sed quasi ad horam, sicut veniebat in mentem, fortuita quadam inconstantia videatur fecisse quae fecit. Porro si illi circuitus admittantur, inquiunt, quibus vel manente mundo vel ipso quoque reuolubiles ortus suos et occassus eisdem circuitibus inserente eadem temporalia repetuntur, nec ignauum otium, praesertim tam longae sine initio diuturnitatis, Deo tribuitur, nec inprovida temeritas operum suorum; quoniam si non eadem repetantur, non possunt infinita diversitate variata ulla eius scientia vel praescientia conprehendi. Has argumentationes, quibus impii nostram simplicem pietatem, ut cum illis in circuitu ambulemus, de via recta conantur avertere, si ratio refutare non posset, fides inridere deberet. Huc accedit, quod in adiutorio Domini Dei nostri hos volubiles circulos, quos opinio confingit, ratio manifesta confringit. Hinc enim maxime isti errant, ut in circuitu falso ambulare quam vero et recto itinere malint, quod mentem divinam omnino inmutabilem, cuiuslibet infinitatis capacem et innumera omnia sine cogitationis alternatione numerantem, de sua humana mutabili angustaque metiuntur; et fit illis quod ait apostolus: Comparantes enim semet ipsos sibimet ipsis non intellegunt. Nam quia illis quidquid novi faciendum venit in mentem, nouo consilio faciunt (mutabiles quippe mentes gerunt: profecto non Deum, quem cogitare non possunt, sed semet ipsos pro illo cogitantes, non illum, sed se ipsos, nec illi, sed sibi comparant. Nobis autem fas non est credere, aliter affici Deum cum uacat, aliter cum operatur; quia nec affici dicendus est, tamquam in eius natura fiat aliquid, quod ante non fuerit. Patitur quippe qui afficitur, et mutabile est omne quod aliquid patitur. Non itaque in eius uacatione cogitetur ignavia desidia inertia, sicut nec in eius opere labor conatus industria. Novit quiescens agere et agens quiescere. Potest ad opus nouum non nouum, sed sempiternum adhibere consilium; nec paenitendo, quia prius cessaverat, coepit facere quod non fecerat. Sed et si prius cessavit et posterius operatus est (quod nescio quem ad modum ab homine possit intellegi): hoc procul dubio, quod dicitur prius et posterius, in rebus prius non existentibus et posterius existentibus fuit; in illo autem non alteram praecedentem altera subsequens mutavit aut abstulit voluntatem, sed una eademque sempiterna et inmutabili voluntate res, quas condidit, et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt, hinc eis, qui talia videre possunt, mirabiliter fortassis ostendens, quam non eis indiguerit, sed eas gratuita bonitate condiderit, cum sine illis ex aeternitate initio carente in non minore beatitate permansit.	Of this, too, I have no doubt, that before the first man was created, there never had been a man at all, neither this same man himself recurring by I know not what cycles, and having made I know not how many revolutions, nor any other of similar nature. From this belief I am not frightened by philosophical arguments, among which that is reckoned the most acute which is founded on the assertion that the infinite cannot be comprehended by any mode of knowledge. Consequently, they argue, God has in his own mind finite conceptions of all finite things which He makes. Now it cannot be supposed that His goodness was ever idle; for if it were, there should be ascribed to Him an awakening to activity in time, from a past eternity of inactivity, as if He repented of an idleness that had no beginning, and proceeded, therefore, to make a beginning of work. This being the case, they say it must be that the same things are always repeated, and that as they pass, so they are destined always to return, whether amidst all these changes the world remains the same,-the world which has always been, and yet was created,-or that the world in these revolutions is perpetually dying out and being renewed; otherwise, if we point to a time when the works of God were begun, it would be believed that He considered His past eternal leisure to be inert and indolent, and therefore condemned and altered it as displeasing to Himself. Now if God is supposed to have been indeed always making temporal things, but different from one another, and one after the other, so, that He thus came at last to make man, whom He had never made before, then it may seem that He made man not with knowledge (for they suppose no knowledge can comprehend the infinite succession of creatures), but at the dictate of the hour, as it struck him at the moment, with a sudden and accidental change of mind. On the other hand, say they, if those cycles be admitted, and if we suppose that the same temporal things are repeated, while the world either remains identical through all these rotations, or else dies away and is renewed, then there is ascribed to God neither the slothful ease of a past eternity, nor a rash and unforeseen creation. And if the same things be not thus repeated in cycles, then they cannot by any science or prescience be comprehended in their endless diversity. Even though reason could not refute, faith would smile at these argumentations, with which the godless endeavor to turn our simple piety from the right way, that we may walk with them "in a circle." But by the help of the Lord our God, even reason, and that readily enough, shatters these revolving circles which conjecture frames. For that which specially leads these men astray to refer their own circles to the straight path of truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow intellect the divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and without succession of thought, counting all things without number. So that saying of the apostle comes true of them, for, "comparing themselves with themselves, they do not understand." For because they do, in virtue of a new purpose, whatever new thing has occurred to them to be done (their minds being changeable), they conclude it is so with God; and thus compare, not God,-for they cannot conceive God, but think of one like themselves when they think of Him,-not God, but themselves, and not with Him, but with themselves. For our part, we dare not believe that God is affected in one way when He works, in another when He rests. Indeed, to say that He is affected at all, is an abuse of language, since it implies that there comes to be something in His nature which was not there before. For he who is affected is acted upon, and whatever is acted upon is changeable. His leisure, therefore, is no laziness, indolence, inactivity; as in His work is no labor, effort, industry. He can act while He reposes, and repose while He acts. He can begin a new work with (not a new, but) an eternal design; and what He has not made before, He does not now begin to make because He repents of His former repose. But when one speaks of His former repose and subsequent operation (and I know not how men can understand these things), this "former" and "subsequent" are applied only to the things created, which formerly did not exist, and subsequently came into existence. But in God the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long as they were not, they should not be, and that subsequently, when they began to be, they should come into existence. And thus, perhaps, He would show, in a very striking way, to those who have eyes for such things, how independent He is of what He makes, and how it is of His own gratuitous goodness He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures in no less perfect a blessedness.
BOOK XII [XIX] Illud autem aliud quod dicunt, nec Dei scientia quae infinita sunt posse conprehendi: restat eis, ut dicere audeant atque huic se voragini profundae inpietatis inmergant, quod non omnes numeros Deus noverit. Eos quippe infinitos esse, certissimum est; quoniam in quocumque numero finem faciendum putaveris, idem ipse, non dico uno addito augeri, sed quamlibet sit magnus et quamlibet ingentem multitudinem continens, in ipsa ratione atque scientia numerorum non solum duplicari, verum etiam multiplicari potest. Ita vero suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuicumque alteri possit. Ergo et dispares inter se atque diversi sunt, et singuli quique finiti sunt, et omnes infiniti sunt. Itane numeros propter infinitatem nescit omnes Deus, et usque ad quandam summam numerorum scientia Dei pervenit, ceteros ignorat? Quis hoc etiam dementissimus dixerit? Nec audebunt isti contemnere numeros et eos dicere ad Dei scientiam non pertinere, apud quos Plato Deum magna auctoritate commendat mundum numeris fabricantem. Et apud nos Deo dictum legitur: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti; de quo et propheta dicit: Qui profert numerose saeculum, et Saluator in euangelio: Capilli, inquit, uestri omnes numerati sunt. Absit itaque ut dubitemus, quod ei notus sit omnis numerus, cuius intellegentiae, sicut in psalmo canitur, non est numerus. Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen inconprehensibilis ei, cuius intellegentiae non est numerus. Quapropter si, quidquid scientia conprehenditur, scientis conprehensione finitur: profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius inconprehensibilis non est. Quare si infinitas numerorum scientiae Dei, qua conprehenditur, esse non potest infinita: qui tandem nos sumus homunculi, qui eius scientiae limites figere praesumamus, dicentes quod, nisi eisdem circuitibus temporum eadem temporalia repetantur, non potest Deus cuncta quae facit vel praescire ut faciat, vel scire cum fecerit? cuius sapientia simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis tam inconprehensibili conprehensione omnia inconprehensibilia conprehendit, ut, quaecumque noua et dissimilia consequentia praecedentibus si semper facere vellet, inordinata et inprovisa habere non posset, nec ea provideret ex proximo tempore, sed aeterna praescientia contineret.	As for their other assertion, that God's knowledge cannot comprehend things infinite, it only remains for them to affirm, in order that they may sound the depths of their impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For it is very certain that they are infinite; since, no matter of what number you suppose an end to be made, this number can be, I will not say, increased by the addition of one more, but however great it be, and however vast be the multitude of which it is the rational and scientific expression, it can still be not only doubled, but even multiplied. Moreover, each number is so defined by its own properties, that no two numbers are equal. They are therefore both unequal and different from one another; and while they are simply finite, collectively they are infinite. Does God, therefore, not know numbers on account of this infinity; and does His knowledge extend only to a certain height in numbers, while of the rest He is ignorant? Who is so left to himself as to say so? Yet they can hardly pretend to put numbers out of the question, or maintain that they have nothing to do with the knowledge of God; for Plato, their great authority, represents God as framing the world on numerical principles: and in our books also it is said to God, "You have ordered all things in number, and measure, and weight." Wisdom 11:20 The prophet also says," Who brings out their host by number." Isaiah 40:26 And the Saviour says in the Gospel, "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." Matthew 10:30 Far be it, then, from us to doubt that all number is known to Him "whose understanding," according to the Psalmist, "is infinite." The infinity of number, though there be no numbering of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible by Him whose understanding is infinite. And thus, if everything which is comprehended is defined or made finite by the comprehension of him who knows it, then all infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God, for it is comprehensible by His knowledge. Wherefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, by which it is comprehended, what are we poor creatures that we should presume to fix limits to His knowledge, and say that unless the same temporal thing be repeated by the same periodic revolutions, God cannot either foreknow His creatures that He may make them, or know them when He has made them? God, whose knowledge is simply manifold, and uniform in its variety, comprehends all incomprehensibles with so incomprehensible a comprehension, that though He willed always to make His later works novel and unlike what went before them, He could not produce them without order and foresight, nor conceive them suddenly, but by His eternal foreknowledge.
BOOK XII [XX] Quod utrum ita faciat, et continuata sibi conexione copulentur quae appellantur saecula saeculorum, alia tamen atque alia ordinata dissimilitudine procurrentia, eis dumtaxat, qui ex miseria liberantur, in sua beata inmortalitate sine fine manentibus; an ita dicantur saecula saeculorum, ut intellegantur saecula in sapientia Dei inconcussa stabilitate manentia istorum, quae cum tempore transeunt, tamquam efficientia saeculorum, definire non audeo. Fortassis enim possit dici saeculum, quae sunt saecula, ut nihil aliud perhibeatur saeculum saeculi quam saecula saeculorum, sicut nihil aliud dicitur caelum caeli quam caeli caelorum. Nam caelum Deus vocavit firmamentum super quod sunt aquae; et tamen psalmus: Et aquae, inquit, quae super caelos, laudent nomen Domini. Quid ergo istorum duorum sit, an praeter haec duo aliquid aliud de saeculis saeculorum possit intellegi, profundissima quaestio est, neque hoc quod nunc agimus inpedit, si indiscussa interim differatur; sive aliquid in ea definire valeamus, sive nos faciat cautiores diligentior ipsa tractatio, ne in tanta obscuritate rerum adfirmare temere aliquid audeamus. Nunc enim contra opinionem disputamus, qua illi circuitus asseruntur, quibus semper eadem per interualla temporum necesse esse repeti existimantur; quaelibet autem illarum sententiarum de saeculis saeculorum vera sit, ad hos circuitus nihil pertinet; quoniam sive saecula saeculorum sint non eadem repetita, sed alterum ex altero contextione ordinatissima procurrentia, liberatorum beatitudine sine ullo recursu miseriarum certissima permanente, sive saecula saeculorum aeterna sint temporalium tamquam dominantia subditorum, circuitus illi eadem reuoluentes locum non habent, quos maxime refellit aeterna vita sanctorum.	I do not presume to determine whether God does so, and whether these times which are called "ages of ages" are joined together in a continuous series, and succeed one another with a regulated diversity, and leave exempt from their vicissitudes only those who are freed from their misery, and abide without end in a blessed immortality; or whether these are called "ages of ages," that we may understand that the ages remain unchangeable in God's unwavering wisdom, and are the efficient causes, as it were, of those ages which are being spent in time. Possibly "ages" is used for "age," so that nothing else is meant by "ages of ages" than by "age of age," as nothing else is meant by "heavens of heavens" than by "heaven of heaven." For God called the firmament, above which are the waters, "Heaven," and yet the psalm says, "Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord." Which of these two meanings we are to attach to "ages of ages," or whether there is not some other and better meaning still, is a very profound question; and the subject we are at present handling presents no obstacle to our meanwhile deferring the discussion of it, whether we may be able to determine anything about it, or may only be made more cautious by its further treatment, so as to be deterred from making any rash affirmations in a matter of such obscurity. For at present we are disputing the opinion that affirms the existence of those periodic revolutions by which the same things are always recurring at intervals of time. Now whichever of these suppositions regarding the "ages of ages" be the true one, it avails nothing for the substantiating of those cycles; for whether the ages of ages be not a repetition of the same world, but different worlds succeeding one another in a regulated connection, the ransomed souls abiding in well-assured bliss without any recurrence of misery, or whether the ages of ages be the eternal causes which rule what shall be and is in time, it equally follows, that those cycles which bring round the same things have no existence; and nothing more thoroughly explodes them than the fact of the eternal life of the saints.
BOOK XII [XXI] Quorum enim aures piorum ferant post emensam tot tantisque calamitatibus vitam (si tamen vita ista dicenda est, quae potius mors est, ita gravis, ut mors, quae ab hac liberat, mortis huius amore timeatur), post tam magna mala tamque multa et horrenda tandem aliquando per veram religionem atque sapientiam expiata atque finita ita pervenire ad conspectum Dei atque ita fieri beatum contemplatione incorporeae lucis per participationem inmutabilis inmortalitatis eius, cuius adipiscendae amore flagramus, ut eam quandoque necesse sit deseri et eos, qui deserunt, ab illa aeternitate veritate felicitate deiectos tartareae mortalitati, turpi stultitiae, miseriis exsecrabilibus implicari, ubi Deus amittatur, ubi odio veritas habeatur, ubi per inmundas nequitias beatitudo quaeratur, et hoc itidem atque itidem sine ullo fine priorum et posteriorum certis interuallis et dimensionibus saeculorum factum et futurum; et hoc propterea, ut possint Deo circuitibus definitis euntibus semper atque redeuntibus per nostras falsas beatitudines et veras miserias alternatim quidem, sed reuolutione incessabili sempiternas nota esse opera sua, quoniam neque a faciendo quiescere neque sciendo potest ea, quae infinita sunt, indagare? Quis haec audiat? quis credat? quis ferat? Quae si vera essent, non solum tacerentur prudentius, verum etiam (ut quo modo valeo dicam quod volo) doctius nescirentur. Nam si haec illic in memoria non habebimus et ideo beati erimus, cur hic per eorum scientiam grauatur amplius nostra miseria? Si autem ibi ea necessario scituri sumus, hic saltem nesciamus, ut hic felicior sit expectatio quam illic adeptio summi boni; quando hic aeterna vita consequenda expectatur; ibi autem beata, sed non aeterna, quandoque amittenda cognoscitur. Si autem dicunt neminem posse ad illam beatitudinem pervenire, nisi hos circuitus, ubi beatitudo et miseria vicissim alternant, in huius vitae eruditione cognoverit: quo modo ergo fatentur, quanto plus quisque amaverit Deum, tanto eum facilius ad beatitudinem peruenturum, qui ea docent, quibus amor ipse torpescat? Nam quis non remissius et tepidius amet eum, quem se cogitat necessario deserturum et contra eius veritatem sapientiamque sensurum, et hoc cum ad eius plenam pro sua capacitate notitiam beatitudinis perfectione peruenerit? quando nec hominem amicum possit quisque amare fideliter, cui se futurum novit inimicum. Sed absit ut vera sint, quae nobis minantur veram miseriam numquam finiendam, sed interpositionibus falsae beatitudinis saepe ac sine fine rumpendam. Quid enim illa beatitudine falsius atque fallacius, ubi nos futuros miseros aut in tanta veritatis luce nesciamus aut in summa felicitatis arce timeamus? Si enim venturam calamitatem ignoraturi sumus, peritior est hic nostra miseria, ubi venturam beatitudinem novimus; si autem nos illic clades inminens non latebit, beatius tempora transigit anima misera, quibus transactis ad beatitudinem subleuetur, quam beata, quibus transactis in miseriam reuoluatur. Atque ita spes nostrae infelicitatis est felix et felicitatis infelix. Vnde fit, ut, quia hic mala praesentia patimur, ibi metuimus inminentia, verius semper miseri quam beati aliquando esse possimus. Sed quoniam haec falsa sunt clamante pietate, conuincente veritate (illa enim nobis veraciter promittitur vera felicitas, cuius erit semper retinenda et nulla infelicitate rumpenda certa securitas): viam rectam sequentes, quod nobis est Christus, eo duce ac saluatore a uano et inepto impiorum circuitu iter fidei mentemque avertamus. Si enim de istis circuitibus et sine cessatione alternantibus itionibus et reditionibus animarum Porphyrius Platonicus suorum opinionem sequi noluit, sive ipsius rei uanitate permotus sive iam tempora Christiana reueritus, et, quod in libro decimo commemoravi, dicere maluit animam propter cognoscenda mala traditam mundo, ut ab eis liberata atque purgata, cum ad Patrem redierit, nihil ulterius tale patiatur: quanto magis nos istam inimicam Christianae fidei falsitatem detestari ac devitare debemus! His autem circuitibus euacuatis atque frustratis nulla necessitas nos compellit ideo putare non habere initium temporis ex quo esse coeperit genus humanum, quia per nescio quos circuitus nihil sit in rebus novi, quod non et antea certis interuallis temporum fuerit et postea sit futurum. Si enim liberatur anima non reditura ad miserias, sicut numquam antea liberata est: fit in illa aliquid, quod antea numquam factum est, et hoc quidem valde magnum, id est quae numquam desinat aeterna felicitas. Si autem in natura inmortali fit tanta novitas nullo repetita, nullo repetenda circuitu: cur in rebus mortalibus fieri non posse contenditur? Si dicunt non fieri in anima beatitudinis novitatem, quoniam ad eam reuertitur, in qua semper fuit, ipsa certe liberatio noua fit, cum de miseria liberatur in qua numquam fuit, et ipsa miseriae novitas in ea facta est quae numquam fuit. Haec autem novitas si non in rerum, quae divina providentia gubernantur, ordinem venit, sed casu potius evenit, ubi sunt illi determinati dimensique circuitus, in quibus nulla noua fiunt, sed repetuntur eadem quae fuerunt? Si autem et haec novitas ab ordinatione providentiae non excluditur, sive data sit anima sive lapsa sit: possunt fieri noua, quae neque antea facta sint nec tamen a rerum ordine aliena sint. Et si potuit anima per inprudentiam facere sibi nouam miseriam, quae non esset inprovisa divinae providentiae, ut hanc quoque in rerum ordine includeret et ab hac eam non inprovide liberaret: qua tandem temeritate humanae uanitatis audemus negare divinitatem facere posse res, non sibi, sed mundo nouas, quas neque antea fecerit nec umquam habuerit inprovisas? Si autem dicunt liberatas quidem animas ad miseriam non reuersuras, sed cum hoc fit in rebus nihil novi fieri, quoniam semper aliae atque aliae liberatae sunt et liberantur et liberabuntur: hoc certe concedunt, si ita est, nouas animas fieri, quibus sit et noua miseria et noua liberatio. Nam si antiquas eas esse dicunt et retrorsum sempiternas, ex quibus cotidie novi fiant homines, de quorum corporibus, si sapienter vixerint, ita liberentur, ut numquam ad miserias reuoluantur, consequenter dicturi sunt infinitas. Quantuslibet namque finitus numerus fuisset animarum, infinitis retro saeculis sufficere non valeret, ut ex illo semper homines fierent, quorum essent animae ab ista semper mortalitate liberandae, numquam ad eam deinceps rediturae. Nec ullo modo explicabunt, quo modo in rebus, quas, ut Deo notae esse possint, finitas volunt, infinitus sit numerus animarum. Quapropter quoniam circuitus illi iam explosi sunt, quibus ad easdem miserias necessario putabatur anima reditura: quid restat convenientius pietati quam credere non esse inpossibile Deo et ea, quae numquam fecerit, noua facere et ineffabili praescientia voluntatem mutabilem non habere? Porro autem utrum animarum liberatarum nec ulterius ad miserias rediturarum numerus possit semper augeri, ipsi viderint, qui de rerum infinitate cohibenda tam subtiliter disputant; nos vero ratiocinationem nostram ex utroque latere terminamus. Si enim potest, quid causae est, ut negetur creari potuisse quod numquam antea creatum esset, si liberatarum animarum numerus, qui numquam antea fuit, non solum factus est semel, sed fieri numquam desinet? Si autem oportet ut certus sit liberatarum aliquis numerus animarum, quae ad miseriam numquam redeant, neque iste numerus ulterius augeatur: etiam ipse sine dubio, quicumque erit, ante utique numquam fuit; qui profecto crescere et ad suae quantitatis terminum pervenire sine aliquo non posset initio; quod initium eo modo antea numquam fuit. Hoc ergo ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit.	What pious ears could bear to hear that after a life spent in so many and severe distresses (if, indeed, that should be called a life at all which is rather a death, so utter that the love of this present death makes us fear that death which delivers us from it,) that after evils so disastrous, and miseries of all kinds have at length been expiated and finished by the help of true religion and wisdom, and when we have thus attained to the vision of God, and have entered into bliss by the contemplation of spiritual light and participation in His unchangeable immortality, which we burn to attain,-that we must at some time lose all this, and that they who do lose it are cast down from that eternity, truth, and felicity to infernal mortality and shameful foolishness, and are involved in accursed woes, in which God is lost, truth held in detestation, and happiness sought in iniquitous impurities? and that this will happen endlessly again and again, recurring at fixed intervals, and in regularly returning periods? and that this everlasting and ceaseless revolution of definite cycles, which remove and restore true misery and deceitful bliss in turn, is contrived in order that God may be able to know His own works, since on the one hand He cannot rest from creating and on the other, cannot know the infinite number of His creatures, if He always makes creatures? Who, I say, can listen to such things? Who can accept or suffer them to be spoken? Were they true, it were not only more prudent to keep silence regarding them, but even (to express myself as best I can) it were the part of wisdom not to know them. For if in the future world we shall not remember these things, and by this oblivion be blessed, why should we now increase our misery, already burdensome enough, by the knowledge of them? If, on the other hand, the knowledge of them will be forced upon us hereafter, now at least let us remain in ignorance, that in the present expectation we may enjoy a blessedness which the future reality is not to bestow; since in this life we are expecting to obtain life everlasting, but in the world to come are to discover it to be blessed, but not everlasting.And if they maintain that no one can attain to the blessedness of the world to come, unless in this life he has been indoctrinated in those cycles in which bliss and misery relieve one another, how do they avow that the more a man loves God, the more readily he attains to blessedness,-they who teach what paralyzes love itself? For who would not be more remiss and lukewarm in his love for a person whom he thinks he shall be forced to abandon, and whose truth and wisdom he shall come to hate; and this, too, after he has quite attained to the utmost and most blissful knowledge of Him that he is capable of? Can any one be faithful in his love, even to a human friend, if he knows that he is destined to become his enemy? God forbid that there be any truth in an opinion which threatens us with a real misery that is never to end, but is often and endlessly to be interrupted by intervals of fallacious happiness. For what happiness can be more fallacious and false than that in whose blaze of truth we yet remain ignorant that we shall be miserable, or in whose most secure citadel we yet fear that we shall be so? For if, on the one hand, we are to be ignorant of coming calamity, then our present misery is not so short-sighted for it is assured of coming bliss. If, on the other hand, the disaster that threatens is not concealed from us in the world to come, then the time of misery which is to be at last exchanged for a state of blessedness, is spent by the soul more happily than its time of happiness, which is to end in a return to misery. And thus our expectation of unhappiness is happy, but of happiness unhappy. And therefore, as we here suffer present ills, and hereafter fear ills that are imminent, it were truer to say that we shall always be miserable than that we can some time be happy.But these things are declared to be false by the loud testimony of religion and truth; for religion truthfully promises a true blessedness, of which we shall be eternally assured, and which cannot be interrupted by any disaster. Let us therefore keep to the straight path, which is Christ, and, with Him as our Guide and Saviour, let us turn away in heart and mind from the unreal and futile cycles of the godless. Porphyry, Platonist though he was, abjured the opinion of his school, that in these cycles souls are ceaselessly passing away and returning, either being struck with the extravagance of the idea, or sobered by his knowledge of Christianity. As I mentioned in the tenth book, he preferred saying that the soul, as it had been sent into the world that it might know evil, and be purged and delivered from it, was never again exposed to such an experience after it had once returned to the Father. And if he abjured the tenets of his school, how much more ought we Christians to abominate and avoid an opinion so unfounded and hostile to our faith? But having disposed of these cycles and escaped out of them, no necessity compels us to suppose that the human race had no beginning in time, on the ground that there is nothing new in nature which, by I know not what cycles, has not at some previous period existed, and is not hereafter to exist again. For if the soul, once delivered, as it never was before, is never to return to misery, then there happens in its experience something which never happened before; and this, indeed, something of the greatest consequence, to wit, the secure entrance into eternal felicity. And if in an immortal nature there can occur a novelty, which never has been, nor ever shall be, reproduced by any cycle, why is it disputed that the same may occur in mortal natures? If they maintain that blessedness is no new experience to the soul, but only a return to that state in which it has been eternally, then at least its deliverance from misery is something new, since, by their own showing, the misery from which it is delivered is itself, too, a new experience. And if this new experience fell out by accident, and was not embraced in the order of things appointed by Divine Providence, then where are those determinate and measured cycles in which no new thing happens, but all things are reproduced as they were before? If, however, this new experience was embraced in that providential order of nature (whether the soul was exposed to the evil of this world for the sake of discipline, or fell into it by sin), then it is possible for new things to happen which never happened before, and which yet are not extraneous to the order of nature. And if the soul is able by its own imprudence to create for itself a new misery, which was not unforeseen by the Divine Providence, but was provided for in the order of nature along with the deliverance from it, how can we, even with all the rashness of human vanity, presume to deny that God can create new things-new to the world, but not to Him-which He never before created, but yet foresaw from all eternity? If they say that it is indeed true that ransomed souls return no more to misery, but that even so no new thing happens, since there always have been, now are, and ever shall be a succession of ransomed souls, they must at least grant that in this case there are new souls to whom the misery and the deliverance from it are new. For if they maintain that those souls out of which new men are daily being made (from whose bodies, if they have lived wisely, they are so delivered that they never return to misery) are not new, but have existed from eternity, they must logically admit that they are infinite. For however great a finite number of souls there were, that would not have sufficed to make perpetually new men from eternity,-men whose souls were to be eternally freed from this mortal state, and never afterwards to return to it. And our philosophers will find it hard to explain how there is an infinite number of souls in an order of nature which they require shall be finite, that it may be known by God.And now that we have exploded these cycles which were supposed to bring back the soul at fixed periods to the same miseries, what can seem more in accordance with godly reason than to believe that it is possible for God both to create new things never before created, and in doing so, to preserve His will unaltered? But whether the number of eternally redeemed souls can be continually increased or not, let the philosophers themselves decide, who are so subtle in determining where infinity cannot be admitted. For our own part, our reasoning holds in either case. For if the number of souls can be indefinitely increased, what reason is there to deny that what had never before been created, could be created? since the number of ransomed souls never existed before, and has yet not only been once made, but will never cease to be anew coming into being. If, on the other hand, it be more suitable that the number of eternally ransomed souls be definite, and that this number will never be increased, yet this number, whatever it be, did assuredly never exist before, and it cannot increase, and reach the amount it signifies, without having some beginning; and this beginning never before existed. That this beginning, therefore, might be, the first man was created.
BOOK XII [XXII] Hac igitur quaestione difficillima propter aeternitatem Dei noua creantis sine novitate aliqua voluntatis, quantum potuimus, explicata non est arduum videre multo fuisse melius quod factum est, ut ex uno homine, quem primum condidit, multiplicaret genus humanum, quam si id incohasset a pluribus. Nam cum animantes alias solitarias et quodam modo solivagas, id est, quae solitudinem magis adpetant, sicuti sunt aquilae milui, leones lupi et quaecumque ita sunt, alias congreges instituerit, quae congregatae atque in gregibus malint vivere, ut sunt columbi sturni, cerui dammulae et cetera huius modi: utrumque tamen genus non ex singulis propagavit, sed plura simul iussit existere. Hominem vero, cuius naturam quodam modo mediam inter angelos bestiasque condebat, ut, si Creatori suo tamquam vero domino subditus praeceptum eius pia oboedientia custodiret, in consortium transiret angelicum, sine morte media beatam inmortalitatem absque ullo termino consecutus; si autem Dominum Deum suum libera voluntate superbe atque inoboedienter usus offenderet, morti addictus bestialiter viveret, libidinis seruus aeternoque post mortem supplicio destinatus, unum ac singulum creavit, non utique solum sine humana societate deserendum, sed ut eo modo uehementius ei commendaretur ipsius societatis unitas vinculumque concordiae, si non tantum inter se naturae similitudine, verum etiam cognationis affectu homines necterentur; quando ne ipsam quidem feminam copulandam viro sicut ipsum creare illi placuit, sed ex ipso, ut omnino ex homine uno diffunderetur genus humanum.	Now that we have solved, as well as we could, this very difficult question about the eternal God creating new things, without any novelty of will, it is easy to see how much better it is that God was pleased to produce the human race from the one individual whom He created, than if He had originated it in several men. For as to the other animals, He created some solitary, and naturally seeking lonely places,-as the eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and such like; others gregarious, which herd together, and prefer to live in company,-as pigeons, starlings, stags, and little fallow deer, and the like: but neither class did He cause to be propagated from individuals, but called into being several at once. Man, on the other hand, whose nature was to be a mean between the angelic and bestial, He created in such sort, that if he remained in subjection to His Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His commandments, he should pass into the company of the angels, and obtain, without the intervention of death, a blessed and endless immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he should become subject to death, and live as the beasts do,-the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death. And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly, that he might be a solitary, bereft of all society, but that by this means the unity of society and the bond of concord might be more effectually commended to him, men being bound together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection. And indeed He did not even create the woman that was to be given him as his wife, as he created the man, but created her out of the man, that the whole human race might derive from one man.
BOOK XII [XXIII] Nec ignorabat Deus hominem peccaturum et morti iam obnoxium morituros propagaturum eoque progressuros peccandi inmanitate mortales, ut tutius atque pacatius inter se rationalis voluntatis expertes bestiae sui generis viverent, quarum ex aquis et terris plurium pullulavit exordium, quam homines, quorum genus ex uno est ad commendandam concordiam propagatum. Neque enim umquam inter se leones aut inter se dracones, qualia homines, bella gesserunt. Sed praevidebat etiam gratia sua populum piorum in adoptionem vocandum remissisque peccatis iustificatum spiritu sancto sanctis angelis in aeterna pace sociandum, novissima inimica morte destructa; cui populo esset huius rei consideratio profutura, quod ex uno homine Deus ad commendandum hominibus, quam ei grata sit etiam in pluribus unitas, genus instituisset humanum.	And God was not ignorant that man would sin, and that, being himself made subject now to death, he would propagate men doomed to die, and that these mortals would run to such enormities in sin, that even the beasts devoid of rational will, and who were created in numbers from the waters and the earth, would live more securely and peaceably with their own kind than men, who had been propagated from one individual for the very purpose of commending concord. For not even lions or dragons have ever waged with their kind such wars as men have waged with one another. But God foresaw also that by His grace a people would be called to adoption, and that they, being justified by the remission of their sins, would be united by the Holy Ghost to the holy angels in eternal peace, the last enemy, death, being destroyed; and He knew that this people would derive profit from the consideration that God had caused all men to be derived from one, for the sake of showing how highly He prizes unity in a multitude.
BOOK XII [XXIV] Fecit ergo Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. Talem quippe illi animam creavit, qua per rationem atque intellegentiam omnibus esset praestantior animalibus terrestribus et natatilibus et volatilibus, quae mentem huius modi non haberent. Et cum virum terreno formasset ex puluere eique animam qualem dixi sive quam iam fecerat sufflando indidisset sive potius sufflando fecisset eumque flatum, quem sufflando fecit (nam quid est aliud sufflare quam flatum facere?), animam hominis esse voluisset, etiam coniugem illi in adiutorium generandi ex eius latere osse detracto fecit, ut Deus. Neque enim haec carnali consuetudine cogitanda sunt, ut videre solemus opifices ex materia quacumque terrena corporalibus membris, quod artis industria potuerint, fabricantes. Manus Dei potentia Dei est, qui etiam visibilia inuisibiliter operatur. Sed haec fabulosa potius quam vera esse arbitrantur, qui virtutem ac sapientiam Dei, qua novit et potest etiam sine seminibus ipsa certe facere semina, ex his usitatis et cotidianis metiuntur operibus; ea vero, quae primitus instituta sunt, quoniam non noverunt, infideliter cogitant, quasi non haec ipsa, quae noverunt de humanis conceptibus atque partubus, si inexpertis narrarentur, incredibiliora viderentur; quamvis et ea ipsa plerique magis naturae corporalibus causis quam operibus divinae mentis adsignent.	God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so gifted. And when He had formed the man out of the dust of the earth, and had willed that his soul should be such as I have said,-whether He had already made it, and now by breathing imparted it to man, or rather made it by breathing, so that that breath which God made by breathing (for what else is "to breathe" than to make breath?) is the soul,-He made also a wife for him, to aid him in the work of generating his kind, and her He formed of a bone taken out of the man's side, working in a divine manner. For we are not to conceive of this work in a carnal fashion, as if God wrought as we commonly see artisans, who use their hands, and material furnished to them, that by their artistic skill they may fashion some material object. God's hand is God's power; and He, working invisibly, effects visible results. But this seems fabulous rather than true to men, who measure by customary and everyday works the power and wisdom of God, whereby He understands and produces without seeds even seeds themselves; and because they cannot understand the things which at the beginning were created, they are sceptical regarding them-as if the very things which they do know about human propagation, conceptions and births, would seem less incredible if told to those who had no experience of them; though these very things, too, are attributed by many rather to physical and natural causes than to the work of the divine mind.
BOOK XII [XXV] Sed cum his nullum nobis est in his libris negotium, qui divinam mentem facere vel curare ista non credunt. Illi autem qui Platoni suo credunt non ab illo summo Deo, qui fabricatus est mundum, sed ab aliis minoribus, quos quidem ipse creaverit, permissu sive iussu eius animalia facta esse cuncta mortalia, in quibus homo praecipuum diisque ipsis cognatum teneret locum, si superstitione careant, qua quaerunt unde iuste videantur sacra et sacrificia facere quasi conditoribus suis, facile carebunt etiam huius opinionis errore. Neque enim fas est ullius naturae quamlibet minimae mortalisque creatorem nisi Deum credere ac dicere, et antequam possit intellegi. Angeli autem, quos illi deos libentius appellant, etiamsi adhibent vel iussi vel permissi operationem suam rebus quae gignuntur in mundo, tam non eos dicimus creatores animalium, quam nec agricolas frugum atque arborum.	But in this book we have nothing to do with those who do not believe that the divine mind made or cares for this world. As for those who believe their own Plato, that all mortal animals-among whom man holds the pre-eminent place, and is near to the gods themselves-were created not by that most high God who made the world, but by other lesser gods created by the Supreme, and exercising a delegated power under His control,-if only those persons be delivered from the superstition which prompts them to seek a plausible reason for paying divine honors and sacrificing to these gods as their creators, they will easily be disentangled also from this their error. For it is blasphemy to believe or to say (even before it can be understood) that any other than God is creator of any nature, be it never so small and mortal. And as for the angels, whom those Platonists prefer to call gods, although they do, so far as they are permitted and commissioned, aid in the production of the things around us, yet not on that account are we to call them creators, any more than we call gardeners the creators of fruits and trees.
BOOK XII [XXVI] Cum enim alia sit species, quae adhibetur extrinsecus cuicumque materiae corporali, sicut operantur homines figuli et fabri atque id genus opifices, qui etiam pingunt et effingunt formas similes corporibus animalium; alia vero, quae intrinsecus efficientes causas habet de secreto et occulto naturae viventis atque intellegentis arbitrio, quae non solum naturales corporum species, verum etiam ipsas animantium animas, dum non fit, facit: supra dicta illa species artificibus quibusque tribuatur; haec autem altera non nisi uni artifici, creatori et conditori Deo, qui mundum ipsum et angelos sine ullo mundo et sine ullis angelis fecit. Qua enim vi divina et, ut ita dicam, effectiva, quae fieri nescit, sed facere, accepit speciem, cum mundus fieret, rutunditas caeli et rutunditas solis: eadem vi divina et effectiva, quae fieri nescit, sed facere, accepit speciem rutunditas oculi et rutunditas pomi et ceterae figurae naturales, quas videmus in rebus quibusque nascentibus non extrinsecus adhiberi, sed intima Creatoris potentia, qui dixit: Caelum et terram ego impleo, et cuius sapientia est, quae adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suaviter. Proinde facti primitus angeli cuius modi ministerium praebuerint Creatori cetera facienti nescio; nec tribuere illis audeo quod forte non possunt, nec debeo derogare quod possunt. Creationem tamen conditionemque omnium naturarum, qua fit ut omnino naturae sint, eis quoque faventibus illi Deo tribuo, cui se etiam ipsi debere quod sunt cum gratiarum actione noverunt. Non solum igitur agricolas non dicimus fructuum quorumque creatores, cum legamus: Neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus; sed ne ipsam quidem terram, quamvis mater omnium fecunda videatur, quae germinibus erumpentia promovet et fixa radicibus continet, cum itidem legamus: Deus illi dat corpus quo modo voluerit et unicuique seminum proprium corpus. Ita nec feminam sui puerperii creatricem appellare debemus, sed potius illum qui cuidam famulo suo dixit: Priusquam te formarem in utero, novi te. Et quamvis anima sic vel sic affecta praegnantis valeat aliquibus velut induere qualitatibus fetum, sicut de virgis variatis fecit Iacob, ut pecora colore varia gignerentur: naturam tamen illam, quae gignitur, tam ipsa non fecit, quam nec ipsa se fecit. Quaelibet igitur corporales vel seminales causae gignendis rebus adhibeantur, sive operationibus angelorum aut hominum aut quorumque animalium sive manum feminarumque mixtionibus; quaelibet etiam desideria motusue animae matris valeant aliquid liniamentorum aut colorum aspergere teneris mollibusque conceptibus: ipsas omnino naturas, quae sic vel sic in suo genere afficiantur, non facit nisi summus Deus, cuius occulta potentia cuncta penetrans incontaminabili praesentia facit esse quidquid aliquo modo est, in quantumcumque est; quia nisi faciente illo non tale vel tale esset, sed prorsus esse non posset. Quapropter si in illa specie, quam forinsecus corporalibus opifices rebus inponunt, urbem Romam et urbem Alexandriam non fabros et architectos, sed reges, quorum voluntate consilio imperio fabricatae sunt, illam Romam, illam Alexandrum habuisse dicimus conditores: quanto potius non nisi Deum debemus conditorem dicere naturarum, qui neque ex ea materia facit aliquid, quam ipse non fecerit, nec operarios habet, nisi quos ipse creaverit; et si potentiam suam, ut ita dicam, fabricatoriam rebus subtrahat, ita non erunt, sicut ante quam fierent non fuerunt. Sed ante dico aeternitate, non tempore. Quis enim alius creator est temporum, nisi qui fecit ea, quorum motibus currerent tempora?	For whereas there is one form which is given from without to every bodily substance,-such as the form which is constructed by potters and smiths, and that class of artists who paint and fashion forms like the body of animals,-but another and internal form which is not itself constructed, but, as the efficient cause, produces not only the natural bodily forms, but even the life itself of the living creatures, and which proceeds from the secret and hidden choice of an intelligent and living nature,-let that first-mentioned form be attributed to every artificer, but this latter to one only, God, the Creator and Originator who made the world itself and the angels, without the help of world or angels. For the same divine and, so to speak, creative energy, which cannot be made, but makes, and which gave to the earth and sky their roundness,-this same divine, effective, and creative energy gave their roundness to the eye and to the apple; and the other natural objects which we anywhere see, received also their form, not from without, but from the secret and profound might of the Creator, who said, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?" and whose wisdom it is that "reaches from one end to another mightily; and sweetly does she order all things." Wisdom 8:1 Wherefore I know not what kind of aid the angels, themselves created first, afforded to the Creator in making other things. I cannot ascribe to them what perhaps they cannot do, neither ought I to deny them such faculty as they have. But, by their leave, I attribute the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures to God, to whom they themselves thankfully ascribe their existence. We do not call gardeners the creators of their fruits, for we read, "Neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters, but God that gives the increase." 1 Corinthians 3:7 Nay, not even the earth itself do we call a creator, though she seems to be the prolific mother of all things which she aids in germinating and bursting forth from the seed, and which she keeps rooted in her own breast; for we likewise read, "God gives it a body, as it has pleased Him, and to every seed his own body." 1 Corinthians 15:38 We ought not even to call a woman the creatress of her own offspring; for He rather is its creator who said to His servant, "Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you." And although the various mental emotions of a pregnant woman do produce in the fruit of her womb similar qualities,-as Jacob with his peeled wands caused piebald sheep to be produced,-yet the mother as little creates her offspring as she created herself. Whatever bodily or seminal causes, then, may be used for the production of things, either by the cooperation of angels, men, or the lower animals, or by sexual generation; and whatever power the desires and mental emotions of the mother have to produce in the tender and plastic f_S tus corresponding lineaments and colors; yet the natures themselves, which are thus variously affected, are the production of none but the most high God. It is His occult power which pervades all things, and is present in all without being contaminated, which gives being to all that is, and modifies and limits its existence; so that without Him it would not be thus, or thus, nor would have any being at all. If, then, in regard to that outward form which the workman's hand imposes on his work, we do not say that Rome and Alexandria were built by masons and architects, but by the kings by whose will, plan, and resources they were built, so that the one has Romulus, the other Alexander, for its founder; with how much greater reason ought we to say that God alone is the Author of all natures, since He neither uses for His work any material which was not made by Him, nor any workmen who were not also made by Him, and since, if He were, so to speak, to withdraw from created things His creative power, they would straightway relapse into the nothingness in which they were before they were created? "Before," I mean, in respect of eternity, not of time. For what other creator could there be of time, than He who created those things whose movements make time?
BOOK XII [XXVII] Ita sane Plato minores et a summo Deo factos deos effectores esse voluit animalium ceterorum, ut inmortalem partem ab ipso sumerent, ipsi vero mortalem adtexerent. Proinde animarum nostrarum eos creatores noluit esse, sed corporum. Vnde quoniam Porphyrius propter animae purgationem dicit corpus omne fugiendum simulque cum suo Platone aliisque Platonicis sentit eos, qui inmoderate atque inhoneste vixerint, propter luendas poenas ad corpora redire mortalia, Plato quidem etiam bestiarum, Porphyrius tantummodo ad hominum: sequitur eos, ut dicant deos istos, quos a nobis volunt quasi parentes et conditores nostros coli, nihil esse aliud quam fabros compedum carcerumue nostrorum, nec institutores, sed inclusores adligatoresque nostros ergastulis aerumnosis et gravissimis vinculis. Aut ergo desinant Platonici poenas animarum ex istis corporibus comminari, aut eos nobis deos colendos non praedicent, quorum in nobis operationem, ut quantum possumus fugiamus et euadamus, hortantur, cum tamen sit utrumque falsissimum. Nam neque ita luunt poenas animae, cum ad istam vitam denuo reuoluuntur, et omnium viventium sive in caelo sive in terra nullus est conditor, nisi a quo facta sunt caelum et terra. Nam si nulla causa est vivendi in hoc corpore nisi propter pendenda supplicia: quo modo dicit idem Plato aliter mundum fieri non potuisse pulcherrimum atque optimum, nisi omnium animalium, id est et inmortalium et mortalium, generibus impleretur? Si autem nostra institutio, qua vel mortales conditi sumus, divinum munus est: quo modo poena est ad ista corpora, id est ad divina beneficia, remeare? Et si Deus, quod adsidue Plato commemorat, sicut mundi universi, ita omnium animalium species aeterna intellegentia continebat: quo modo non ipse cuncta condebat? An aliquorum esse artifex nollet, quorum efficiendorum artem ineffabilis eius et ineffabiliter laudabilis mens haberet?	It is obvious, that in attributing the creation of the other animals to those inferior gods who were made by the Supreme, he meant it to be understood that the immortal part was taken from God Himself, and that these minor creators added the mortal part; that is to say, he meant them to be considered the creators of our bodies, but not of our souls. But since Porphyry maintains that if the soul is to be purified all entanglement with a body must be escaped from; and at the same time agrees with Plato and the Platonistsin thinking that those who have not spent a temperate and honorable life return to mortal bodies as their punishment (to bodies of brutes in Plato's opinion, to human bodies in Porphyry's); it follows that those whom they would have us worship as our parents and authors, that they may plausibly call them gods, are, after all, but the forgers of our fetters and chains,-not our creators, but our jailers and turnkeys, who lock us up in the most bitter and melancholy house of correction. Let the Platonists, then, either cease menacing us with our bodies as the punishment of our souls, or preaching that we are to worship as gods those whose work upon us they exhort us by all means in our power to avoid and escape from. But, indeed, both opinions are quite false. It is false that souls return again to this life to be punished; and it is false that there is any other creator of anything in heaven or earth, than He who made the heaven and the earth. For if we live in a body only to expiate our sins, how says Plato in another place, that the world could not have been the most beautiful and good, had it not been filled with all kinds of creatures, mortal and immortal? But if our creation even as mortals be a divine benefit, how is it a punishment to be restored to a body, that is, to a divine benefit? And if God, as Plato continually maintains, embraced in His eternal intelligence the ideas both of the universe and of all the animals, how, then, should He not with His own hand make them all? Could He be unwilling to be the constructor of works, the idea and plan of which called for His ineffable and ineffably to be praised intelligence?
BOOK XII [XXVIII] Merito igitur vera religio, quem mundi universi, eum animalium quoque universorum, hoc est et animarum et corporum, conditorem agnoscit et praedicat. In quibus terrenis praecipuus ab illo ad eius imaginem homo propter eam causam, quam dixi, et si qua forte alia maior latet, factus est unus, sed non relictus est solus. Nihil enim est quam hoc genus tam discordiosum vitio, tam sociale natura. Neque commodius contra vitium discordiae vel cavendum ne existeret, vel sanandum cum extitisset, natura loqueretur humana, quam recordationem illius parentis, quem propterea Deus creare voluit unum, de quo multitudo propagaretur, ut hac admonitione etiam in multis concors unitas servaretur. Quod vero femina illi ex eius latere facta est, etiam hic satis significatum est quam cara mariti et uxoris debeat esse coniunctio. Haec opera Dei propterea sunt utique inusitate, quia prima. Qui autem ista non credunt, nulla facta prodigia debent credere; neque enim et ipsa, si usitato naturae curriculo gignerentur, prodigia dicerentur. Quid autem sub tanta gubernatione divinae providentiae, quamvis eius causa lateat, frustra gignitur? Ait quidam psalmus sacer: Venite et videte opera Domini, quae posuit prodigia super terram. Cur ergo ex latere viri femina facta sit, et hoc primum quodam modo prodigium quid praefiguraverit, dicetur alio loco, quantum me Deus adivuerit. Nunc quoniam liber iste claudendus est, in hoc [primo] homine, qui primitus factus est, nondum quidem secundum evidentiam, iam tamen secundum Dei praescientiam exortas fuisse existimemus in genere humano societates tamquam civitates duas. Ex illo enim futuri erant homines, alii malis angelis in supplicio, alii bonis in praemio sociandi, quamvis occulto Dei iudicio, sed tamen iusto. Cum enim scriptum sit: Vniversae viae Domini misericordia et veritas: nec iniusta eius gratia nec crudelis potest esse iustitia.	With good cause, therefore, does the true religion recognize and proclaim that the same God who created the universal cosmos, created also all the animals, souls as well as bodies. Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His own image, and, for the reason I have given, was made one individual, though he was not left solitary. For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate, either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it, where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, that all men might be derived from one, and that they might thus be admonished to preserve unity among their whole multitude. But from the fact that the woman was made for him from his side, it was plainly meant that we should learn how dear the bond between man and wife should be. These works of God do certainly seem extraordinary, because they are the first works. They who do not believe them, ought not to believe any prodigies; for these would not be called prodigies did they not happen out of the ordinary course of nature. But, is it possible that anything should happen in vain, however hidden be its cause, in so grand a government of divine providence? One of the sacred Psalmists says, "Come, behold the works of the Lord, what prodigies He has wrought in the earth." Why God made woman out of man's side, and what this first prodigy prefigured, I shall, with God's help, tell in another place. But at present, since this book must be concluded, let us merely say that in this first man, who was created in the beginning, there was laid the foundation, not indeed evidently, but in God's foreknowledge, of these two cities or societies, so far as regards the human race. For from that man all men were to be derived-some of them to be associated with the good angels in their reward, others with the wicked in punishment; all being ordered by the secret yet just judgment of God. For since it is written, "All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth," neither can His grace be unjust, nor His justice cruel.	}

Authors/Augustine/City of God/City of God Book XII

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