Authors/Augustine/De duabus animabus

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Latin English
DE DUABUS ANIMABUS Against the Manichæans (A.D. 391)
Source. Translated by Albert H. Newman. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 4. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.)
Manichaeorum error de duabus animabus, quarum altera non sit a Deo, qua ratione expugnatur. Anima omnis cum vita quaedam sit, nonnisi a Deo vitae fonte esse potest. Chapter 1.— By What Course of Reasoning the Error of the Manichæans Concerning Two Souls, One of Which is Not from God, is Refuted. Every Soul, Inasmuch as It is a Certain Life, Can Have Its Existence Only from God the Source of Life
1. 1. Opitulante Dei misericordia, disruptis et derelictis Manichaeorum laqueis, tandem Catholicae gremio restitutum libet considerare nunc saltem ac deplorare illam meam miseriam. Multa enim erant, quae facere debui, ne tam facile ac diebus paucis, religionis verissimae semina mihi a pueritia salubriter insita, errore vel fraude falsorum fallaciumve hominum effossa ex animo pellerentur. Nam primo animarum illa duo genera, quibus ita singulas naturas propriasque tribuerunt, ut alterum de ipsa Dei esse substantia, alterius vero Deum nec conditorem quidem velint accipi, si mecum sobrie diligenterque considerassem, mente in Deum supplici et pia; fortasse mihi satagenti apparuisset, nullam esse qualemlibet vitam, quae non eo ipso quo vita est, et in quantum omnino vita est, ad summum vitae fontem principiumque pertineat: quod nihil aliud quam summum et solum verumque Deum possumus confiteri. Quapropter illas animas, quae a Manichaeis vocantur malae, aut carere vita, et animas non esse, neque quidquam velle seu nolle, appetere vel fugere; aut si viverent, ut et animae esse possent, et aliquid tale agere, quale illi opinantur, nullo modo eas nisi vita vivere: ac si Christum dixisse constaret, ut constat: Ego sum vita 1; nihil esse causae cur non omnes animas, cum animae nisi vivendo esse non possint, per Christum, id est, per vitam creatas et conditas fateremur. 		1. Through the assisting mercy of God, the snares of the Manichæans having been broken to pieces and left behind, having been restored at length to the bosom of the Catholic Church, I am disposed now at least to consider and to deplore my recent wretchedness. For there were many things that I ought to have done to prevent the seeds of the most true religion wholesomely implanted in me from boyhood, from being banished from my mind, having been uprooted by the error and fraud of false and deceitful men. For, in the first place, if I had soberly and diligently considered, with prayerful and pious mind, those two kinds of souls to which they attributed natures and properties so distinct that they wished one to be regarded as of the very substance of God, but were not even willing that God should be accepted as the author of the other; perhaps it would have appeared to me, intent on learning, that there is no life whatsoever, which, by the very fact of its being life and in so far as it is life at all, does not pertain to the supreme source and beginning of life, which we must acknowledge to be nothing else than the supreme and only and true God. Wherefore there is no reason why we should not confess, that those souls which the Manichæans call evil are either devoid of life and so not souls, neither will anything positively or negatively, neither follow after nor flee from anything; or, if they live so that they can be souls, and act as the Manichæans suppose, in no way do they live unless by life, and if it be an established fact, as it is, that Christ has said: "I am the life," John 14:6 that all souls seeing that they cannot be souls except by living were created and fashioned by Christ, that is, by the Life.
Si lux quae sensu percipitur Deum habet auctorem, ut fatentur Manichaei, multo magis anima quae solo intellectu percipitur. Chapter 2.— If the Light that is Perceived by Sense Has God for Its Author, as the Manichæans Acknowledge, Much More The Soul Which is Perceived by Intellect Alone
2. 1a. Quod si tempore illo quaestionem de ipsa vita et de participatione vitae mea cogitatio ferre ac sustinere non posset; quae profecto magna est, et multum serenae disputationis inter doctissimos indigens; illud dispicere fortasse valuissem, quod omni homini sese sine studio partium bene consideranti manifestissime apparet, omne quod scire et nosse dicimur, aut sensu corporis, aut intelligentia nos habere comprehensum. Sensus autem corporis etiam vulgo quinque numerari, visum, auditum, odoratum, gustum, atque tactum: quibus onnibus intelligentiam longe alteque praestare et excellere, quis mihi non vel ingratus impiusque concederet? Quo constituto atque firmato, illud consequi, ut cuncta quae tactu et visu, vel quolibet alio modo corporaliter sentirentur, tanto essent inferiora his quae intellegendo assequeremur, quanto ipsos sensus intelligentiae cedere videremus. Quamobrem cum omnis vita, et ob hoc omnis anima nullo corporis sensu, sed solo intellectu percipi queat; sol autem iste atque luna omnisque lux quae mortalibus his oculis cernitur, ab ipsis quoque Manichaeis vero et bono Deo tribuenda esse dicatur: summam esse dementiam id praedicare pertinere ad Deum, quod per corpus intuemur; quod vero non solum animo, sed ipsa sublimitate animi, mente scilicet atque intelligentia caperemus, id est, vitam, qualiscumque illa diceretur, tamen vitam, eodem Deo auctore privandam et viduandam putare. Num enim quid sit vivere, quamque secretum ab omni corporis sensu, quamque omnino incorporeum, si me ipsum invocato Deo interrogarem, respondere non possim? Aut non illi quoque fateantur, non solum vivere illas, quas detestantur animas, sed etiam immortaliter vivere? Quodque a Christo dictum est: Dimitte mortuos sepelire mortuos suos 2; non de omnino non viventibus, sed de peccantibus dictum, quae immortalis animae sola mors est; scribente Paulo: Mortua est vidua quae in deliciis vivit 3: simul enim et mortuam esse dixit, et vivere. Quare non ego quanto decoloratius vivat peccatrix anima, sed illud ipsum tantum quod vivat attenderem. Quod si percipere nisi intellegendo non possem, credo veniret in mentem, tanto esse quamlibet animam luci, quam per hos sentimus, oculos, praeferendam, quanto intelligentiam ipsis oculis praeferremus. 		2. But if at that time my thought was not able to bear and sustain the question concerning life and partaking of life, which is truly a great question, and one that requires much calm discussion among the learned, I might perchance have had power to discover that which to every man considering himself, without a study of the individual parts, is perfectly evident, namely, that everything we are said to know and to understand, we comprehend either by bodily sense or by mental operation. That the five bodily senses are commonly enumerated as sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, than all of which intellect is immeasurably more noble and excellent, who would have been so ungrateful and impious as not to concede to me; which being established and confirmed, we should have seen how it follows, that whatsoever things are perceived by touch or sight or in any bodily manner at all, are by so much inferior to those things that we comprehend intellectually as the senses are inferior to the intellect. Wherefore, since all life, and so every soul, can be perceived by no bodily sense, but by the intellect alone, whereas while yonder sun and moon and every luminary that is beheld by these mortal eyes, the Manichæans themselves also say must be attributed to the true and good God, it is the height of madness to claim that that belongs to God which we observe bodily; but, on the other hand, to think that what we receive not only by the mind, but by the highest form of mind, namely, reason and intellect, that is life, whatsoever it may be called, nevertheless life, should be deprived and bereft of the same God as its author. For if having invoked God, I had asked myself what living is, how inscrutable it is to every bodily sense, how absolutely incorporeal it is, could not I have answered? Or would not the Manichæans also confess not only that the souls they detest live, but that they live also immortally? And that Christ's saying: "Send the dead to bury their dead," Matthew 8:22 was uttered not with reference to those not living at all, but with reference to sinners, which is the only death of the immortal soul; as when Paul writes: "The widow that gives herself to pleasure is dead while she lives," 1 Timothy 5:6 he says that she at the same time is dead, and alive. Wherefore I should have directed attention not to the great degree of contamination in which the sinful soul lives, but only to the fact itself that it lives. But if I cannot perceive except by an act of intelligence, I believe it would have come into the mind, that by as much as any mind whatever is to be preferred to the light which we see through these eyes, by so much we should give to intellect the preference over the eyes themselves.
Corpus etiam omne a Deo esse unde probatur. Animam illam quae mala dicitur a Manichaeis, luce esse meliorem. Chapter 3.— How It is Proved that Every Body Also is from God. That the Soul Which is Called Evil by the Manichæans is Better Than Light
3. 2. Lucem autem illam illi quoque a Patre Christi esse confirmant: egone tandem, quod ab eo esset quaecumque anima, dubitarem? Ego vero non modo de anima, sed de quovis etiam corpore, quin ab ipso esset, nihil omnino, ne tum quidem, homo scilicet illius imperitiae atque illius aetatis ambigerem, si forma quid esset quidve formatum, quid species et quid indutum specie, deinde quid horum cui causa esset, pie cauteque cogitarem. 		They also affirm that the light is from the Father of Christ: should I then have doubted that every soul is from Him? But not even then, as a man forsooth so inexperienced and so youthful as I was, should I have been in doubt as to the derivation not only of the soul, but also of the body, nay of everything whatsoever, from Him, if I had reverently and cautiously reflected on what form is, or what has been formed, what shape is and what has been endued with shape.
3. 3. Sed de corpore interim taceo: de anima conqueror, de spontaneo et vivido motu, de actu, de vita, de immortalitate: denique conqueror, quod aliquam rem ista omnia sine Dei bonitate habere posse miserrimus credidi; quod quanta essent, negligenter attendi; hoc mihi gemendum, hoc deflendum puto. Volverem mecum haec, loquerer mecum, deferrem ad illos : quae vis esset intellegendi, quam nihil esset in homine, quod huic excellentiae possemus conferre, proponerem. Ubi mihi hoc homines, si modo essent homines, concessissent; quaererem utrum his oculis videre, id est intellegere. Ubi negavissent, colligerem primo longe esse sensui oculorum istorum intelligentiam mentis anteponendam: deinde subiungerem, id quod re meliore perciperemus, necessario melius iudicandum. Quis hoc non daret? Ergo pergerem quaerere, anima illa, quam malam dicerent, oculisne sentiretur istis, an mente intellegeretur? Mente faterentur. Quibus omnibus inter nos convenientibus atque firmatis, quid conficeretur ostenderem; animam scilicet illam quam exsecrarentur, luce ista quam venerarentur esse meliorem: quandoquidem illa intellectu mentis, haec sensu corporis innotescit. Hic vero haererent fortasse, ducemque rationem sequi recusarent: tanta est vis veternosarum opinionum et diu defensae atque creditae falsitatis. Sed ego instarem magis haerentibus, non aspere, non pueriliter, non pervicaciter; repeterem quae concessa sunt; et quam essent concedenda, monstrarem. Hortarer ut in commune consulerent, viderent certe quid nobis negandum esset; utrum intellectum istis carneis luminibus praeferendum, an excellentius esse quod animi excellentia, quam quod vili sensu corporis cognoscitur, falsum putarent: an illas animas, quas alienigenas crederent, tantum intellegendo, id est, ipsa animi excellentia sciri posse nollent fateri; an solem ac lunam non nisi istis oculis notos fieri vellent abnuere. Quod si nihil horum nisi absurdissime atque impudentissime negari posse animadverterent; suaderem non eos oportere dubitare, istam lucem quam colendam praedicarent, esse anima illa viliorem quam fugiendam monerent. 		3. But not to speak at present concerning the body, I lament concerning the soul, concerning spontaneous and vivid movement, concerning action, concerning life, concerning immortality; in fine, I lament that I, miserable, should have believed that anything could have all these properties apart from the goodness of God, which properties, great as they are, I sadly neglected to consider; this I think, should be to me a matter of groaning and of weeping. I should have inwardly pondered these things, I should have discussed them with myself, I should have referred them to others, I should have propounded the inquiry, what the power of knowing is, seeing there is nothing in man that we can compare to this excellency? And as men, if only they had been men, would have granted me this, I should have inquired whether seeing with these eyes is knowing? In case they had answered negatively, I should first have concluded, that mental intelligence is vastly inferior to ocular sensation; then I should have added, that what we perceive by means of a better thing must needs be judged to be itself better. Who would not grant this? I should have gone on to inquire, whether that soul which they call evil is an object of ocular sensation or of mental intelligence? They would have acknowledged that the latter is the case. All which things having been agreed upon and confirmed between us, I should have shown how it follows, that that soul forsooth which they execrate, is better than that light which they venerate, since the former is an object of mental knowledge, the latter an object of corporeal sense perception. But here perhaps they would have halted, and would have refused to follow the lead of reason, so great is the power of inveterate opinion and of falsehood long defended and believed. But I should have pressed yet more upon them halting, not harshly, not in puerile fashion, not obstinately; I should have repeated the things that had been conceded, and have shown how they must be conceded. I should have exhorted that they consult in common, that they may see clearly what must be denied to us; whether they think it false that intellectual perception is to be preferred to these carnal organs of sight, or that what is known by means of the excellency of the mind is more excellent than what is known by vile corporeal sensation; whether they would be unwilling to confess that those souls which they think heterogenous, can be known only by intellectual perception, that is, by the excellency itself of the mind; whether they would wish to deny that the sun and the moon are made known to us only by means of these eyes. But if they had replied that no one of these things could be denied otherwise than most absurdly and most impudently, I should have urged that they ought not to doubt but that the light whose worthiness of worship they proclaim, is viler than that soul which they admonish men to flee.
Anima etiam muscae praestantior ista luce. Chapter 4.— Even the Soul of a Fly is More Excellent Than the Light
4. 4. Atque hic si forte turbati a me quaererent, num etiam muscae animam huic luci praestare censerem: responderem: Etiam; nec me terreret musca quod parva est, sed quod viva firmaret. Quaeritur enim, quid illa membra tam exigua vegetet, quid huc atque illuc pro naturali appetitu tantillum corpusculum ducat, quid currentis pedes in numerum moveat, quid volantis pennulas moderetur ac vibret. Quod qualecumque est, bene considerantibus, in tam parvo tam magnum eminet, ut cuivis fulgori perstringenti oculos praeferatur. 		4. And here, if perchance in their confusion they had inquired of me whether I thought that the soul even of a fly surpasses that light, I should have replied, yes, nor should it have troubled me that the fly is little, but it should have confirmed me that it is alive. For it is inquired, what causes those members so diminutive to grow, what leads so minute a body here and there according to its natural appetite, what moves its feet in numerical order when it is running, what regulates and gives vibration to its wings when flying? This thing whatever it is in so small a creature towers up so prominently to one well considering, that it excels any lightning flashing upon the eyes.
Vitiosae animae quamquam damnandae, quomodo huic luci, quae in genere suo laudanda est, antecellant. Chapter 5.— How Vicious Souls, However Worthy of Condemnation They May Be, Excel the Light Which is Praiseworthy in Its Kind
5. 4a. Certe quod nemo dubitat, quidquid est, intellegibile est: quod omni sensibili, et ob hoc huic etiam luci divinis legibus antecellit. Quid enim cogitatione percipimus, quaeso, si hoc non percipimus, aliud esse mente intellegere, aliud sentire per corpus, et prius illud ab hoc posteriore incomparabili sublimitate distare; ideoque non posse intellegibilia sensibilibus non praeferri, cum ipse intellectus tantum sensibus praeferatur? 		Certainly nobody doubts that whatever is an object of intellectual perception, by virtue of divine laws surpasses in excellence every sensible object and consequently also this light. For what, I ask, do we perceive by thought, if not that it is one thing to know with the mind, and another thing to experience bodily sensations, and that the former is incomparably more sublime than the latter, and so that intelligible things must needs be preferred to sensible things, since the intellect itself is so highly exalted above the senses?
5. 5. Hinc illud etiam fortasse cognoscerem; quod consequens esse manifestum est, cum iniustitia et intemperantia caeteraque animi vitia non sentiantur, sed intellegantur; quomodo fiat ut etiam ista, quae detestamur et damnanda censemus, tamen quoniam intellegibilia sunt, anteire hanc lucem queant, cum in suo genere ista laudanda sit. Suggeritur enim animo bene sese Deo subiicienti, primo non omne quod laudamus, omni quod vituperamus, esse anteponendum. Neque enim quia laudo purgatissimum plumbum, ob hoc illud vituperando auro pluris aestimo. In suo enim genere quidque considerandum est. Improbo iurisconsultum multas leges ignorantem: sed eum tamen probatissimo sutori sic praefero, ut ne comparandum quidem putem. At istum laudo, quod suae artis peritissimus sit: illum autem, quod suam professionem minus impleat, iure reprehendo. Ex quo reperire deberem, lucem istam, quod in genere proprio perfecta esset, iure laudari: tamen quia sensibilium rerum numero includitur, quod genus intellegibilium generi cedat necesse est, infra iniustas et intemperantes animas, quoniam sunt intellegibiles, esse deputandam; quamvis istas non iniuria damnatione dignissimas iudicemus. Quaerimus namque in his quod concilietur Deo, non quod isti fulgori praeferatur. Quapropter, quisquis hoc lumen ex Deo esse contenderet, non repugnarem; sed magis animas dicerem, vitiosas etiam, non in quantum vitiosae, sed in quantum animae sunt, Deum sibi esse creatorem fateri oportere. 		5. Hence this also I should perchance have known, which manifestly follows, since injustice and intemperance and other vices of the mind are not objects of sense, but of intellect, how it comes about that these too which we detest and consider condemnable, yet in as much as they are objects of intellect, can outrank this light however praiseworthy it may be in its kind. For it is borne in upon the mind subjecting itself well to God, that, first of all, not everything that we praise is to be preferred to everything that we find fault with. For in praising the purest lead, I do not therefore put a higher value upon it than upon the gold that I find fault with. For everything must be considered in its kind. I disapprove of a lawyer ignorant of many statutes, yet I so prefer him to the most approved tailor, that I should think him incomparably superior. But I praise the tailor because he is thoroughly skilled in his own craft, while I rightly blame the lawyer because he imperfectly fulfills the functions of his profession. Wherefore I should have found out that the light which in its own kind is perfect, is rightly to be praised; yet because it is included in the number of sensible things, which class must needs yield to the class of intelligible things, it must be ranked below unjust and intemperate souls, since these are intelligible; although we may without injustice judge these to be most worthy of condemnation. For in the case of these we ask that they be reconciled to God, not that they be preferred to that lightning. Wherefore, if any one had contended that this luminary is from God, I should not have opposed; but rather I should have said, that souls, even vicious ones, not in so far as they are vicious, but in so far as they are souls, must be acknowledged to be creatures of God.
An ipsa etiam vitia tamquam intelligibilia, luci sensibili praeferenda sint, et Deo ut auctori tribuenda. Chapter 6.— Whether Even Vices Themselves as Objects of Intellectual Apprehension are to Be Preferred to Light as an Object of Sense Perception, and are to Be Attributed to God as Their Author. Vice of the Mind and Certain Defects are Not Rightly to Be Counted Among Intelligible Things. Defects Themselves Even If They Should Be Counted Among Intelligible Things Should Never Be Put Before Sensible Things. If Light is Visible by God, Much More is the Soul, Even If Vicious, Which in So Far as It Lives is an Intelligible Thing. Passages of Scripture are Adduced by the Manichæans to the Contrary
6. 6. Hoc loco si quisquam illorum cautus et vigilans, iam etiam studiosior quam pertinacior, me admoneret, non de vitiosis animis, sed de ipsis vitiis esse quaerendum: quae quoniam sensu corporis non cognoscerentur, et tamen cognoscerentur, non nisi intellegibilia posse accipi, quae si sensibilibus omnibus antecellunt, cur lucem Deo auctori esse tribuendam inter nos conveniret, vitiorum vero auctorem Deum nemo nisi sacrilegus diceret: responderem homini, si aut statim et repente, ut bonis Dei cultoribus solet, divinitus infulsisset huius solutio quaestionis, aut fuisset antea praeparata: quorum si neutrum meruissem atque potuissem, coepta differrem; quodque esset propositum, difficile esse ad dignoscendum atque arduum confiterer. Recurrerem in me, prosternerer Deo, alte ingemiscerem, quaerens ne me in medio spatio, quo certis rationibus promovissem, haerere pateretur; ne ancipiti quaestione cogerer aut intellegibilia sensibilibus submittere ac subdere, aut ipsum vitiorum dicere auctorem; cum esset utrumvis horum falsitatis impietatisque plenissimum. Nullo modo possem existimare, quod me sic affectum ille desereret. Admoneret potius suis illis ineffabilibus modis, ut considerarem etiam atque etiam, utrum animi vitia, de quibus aestuarem, inter intellegibilia numeranda essent. Quod ut reperirem, propter imbecillitatem interioris oculi mei, quae mihi peccatis meis iure accidisset, aliquem mihi ad invisibilia contuenda in ipsis visibilibus machinarer gradum: quorum esset nobis nullo modo certior cognitio, sed consuetudo fidentior. Itaque statim quaererem quid ad sensum proprie pertineret oculorum: invenirem colores, quorum principatum lux ista obtineret. Haec enim sunt quae nullus alius sensus attingit: nam motus corporum, et magnitudines, et intervalla, et figuras, quamvis et oculis, non tamen proprie, sed tactu etiam posse sentiri. Unde colligerem tanto caeteris corporeis et sensibilibus praestare lucem, quanto aliis sensibus aspectus esset illustrior. Electa igitur ex omnibus quae corpore sentiuntur ista luce, qua niterer, et in qua gradum illum inquisitionis meae necessario collocarem; pergerem attendere quid ageretur hoc modo, mecumque ita sermocinarer: Si sol iste tanta claritate conspicuus et diei luce sufficiens, usque ad lunae similitudinem in conspectu nostro paulatim deficeret, num aliud quidquam oculis sentiremus quam lucem utcumque fulgentem; lucem tamen quaerentes, quod fuerat non videndo, et haurientes videndo quod aderat? Non ergo illum defectum videremus, sed lucem quae defectui remaneret. Cum autem non videremus, non sentiremus; quidquid enim sentimus aspectu, non potest non videri: quare, si defectus ille neque visu, neque alio sensu sentiretur, non posset inter sensibilia numerari. Nihil enim sensibile est, quod sentiri non potest. Referamus nunc considerationem ad virtutem, cuius intellegibili luce splendere animum convenientissime dicimus. Porro ab hac luce virtutis defectus quidam non perimens animam, sed obscurans, vitium vocatur. Potest igitur recte vitium quoque animae nequaquam inter intellegibilia numerari, ut lucis ille defectus recte de sensibilium numero eximitur: illud tamen quod remanet animae, id est, hoc ipsum quod vivit atque anima est, tam est intellegibile, quam sensibile illud quod in hoc visibili lumine post defectum quantumcumque fulgeret: et ideo animam in quantum anima esset, et vitae participaret, sine qua nullo pacto anima esse potest, rectissime omnibus sensibilibus anteferri. Quamobrem maximi erroris esse, ullam animam dicere non esse ex Deo, ex quo esse solem lunamque glorieris. 		At this point, in case some one of them, cautious and watchful, now also more studious than pertinacious, had admonished me that the inquiry is not about vicious souls but about vices themselves, which, seeing that they are not known by corporeal sense, and yet are known, can only be received as objects of intellectual apprehension, which if they excel all objects of sense, why can we not agree in attributing light to God as its author, but only a sacrilegious person would say that God is the author of vices; I should have replied to the man, if either on the spur of the moment, as is customary to the worshippers of the good God, a solution of this question had darted like lightning from on high, or a solution had been previously prepared. If I had not deserved or was unable to avail myself of either of these methods, I should have deferred the undertaking, and should have confessed that the thing propounded was difficult to discern and arduous. I should have withdrawn to myself, prostrated myself before God, groaned aloud asking Him not to suffer me to halt in mid space, when I should have moved forward with assured arguments, asking Him that I might not be compelled by a doubtful question either to subordinate intelligible things to sensible, and to yield, or to call Himself the author of vices; since either of these alternatives would have been absolutely full of falsehood and impiety. I can by no means suppose that He would have deserted me in such a frame of mind. Rather, in His own ineffable way, He would have admonished me to consider again and again whether vices of mind concerning which I was so troubled should be reckoned among intelligible things. But that I might find out, on account of the weakness of my inner eye, which rightly befell me on account of my sins, I should have devised some sort of stage for gazing upon spiritual things in visible things themselves, of which we have by no means a surer knowledge, but a more confident familiarity. Therefore I should straightway have inquired, what properly pertains to the sensation of the eyes. I should have found that it is the color, the dominion of which the light holds. For these are the things that no other sense touches, for the motions and magnitudes and intervals and figures of bodies, although they also can be perceived by the eyes, yet to perceive such is not their peculiar function, but belongs also to touch. Whence I should have gathered that by as much as yonder light excels other corporeal and sensible things, by so much is sight more noble than the other senses. The light therefore having been selected from all the things that are perceived by bodily sense, by this [light] I should have striven, and in this of necessity I should have placed that stage of my inquiry. I should have gone on to consider what might be done in this way, and thus I should have reasoned with myself: If yonder sun, conspicuous by its brightness and sufficing for day by its light, should little by little decline in our sight into the likeness of the moon, would we perceive anything else with our eyes than light however refulgent, yet seeking light by reason of not seeing what had been, and using it for seeing what was present? Therefore we should not see the decline, but the light that should survive the decline. But since we should not see, we should not perceive; for whatever we perceive by sight must necessarily be seen; wherefore if that decline were perceived neither by sight nor by any other sense, it cannot be reckoned among objects of sense. For nothing is an object of sense that cannot be perceived by sense. Let us apply now the consideration to virtue, by whose intellectual light we most fittingly say the mind shines. Again, a certain decline from this light of virtue, not destroying the soul, but obscuring it, is called vice. Therefore also vice can by no means be reckoned among objects of intellectual perception, as that decline of light is rightly excluded from the number of objects of sense perception. Yet what remains of soul, that is that which lives and is soul is just as much an object of intellectual perception as that is an object of sense perception which should shine in this visible luminary after any imaginable degree of decline. And so the soul, in so far as it is soul and partakes of life, without which it can in no way be soul, is most correctly to be preferred to all objects of sense perception. Wherefore it is most erroneous to say that any soul is not from God, from whom you boast that the sun and moon have their existence.
Si lumen visibile a Deo est, multo magis ab ipso anima, quae in quantum vivit intelligibilis res est, etiamsi vitiosa.
6. 7. Quod si iam placeret omnia sensibilia nominare non modo ea quae sentiremus, sed etiam ea quae non sentiendo tamen per corpus iudicaremus, sicut per oculos tenebras, et per aures silentium; et illas enim non videndo, et hoc non audiendo cognoscimus: rursusque intellegibilia, non ea tantum quae illustrata mente conspicimus, sicuti est ipsa sapientia; sed etiam illa quae ipsius illustrationis privatione aversamur, ut est insipientia, quam tenebras animi congrue dixerim: nullam de verbo facerem controversiam, sed totam quaestionem facili divisione dissolverem, statimque approbarem bene attendentibus, substantias intellegibiles sensibilibus substantiis divina et incorrupta veritatis lege praeponi, non earum substantiarum defectus; quamvis hos intellegibiles, illos sensibiles appellare vellemus. Quapropter, qui et haec lumina visibilia, et illas intellegibiles animas substantias esse faterentur, omni modo eos cogi sublimiores partes animis concedere, atque tribuere; defectus vero utriusque generis non posse alteros alteris anteponi, privant enim tantum, et non esse indicant, quod usquequaque eamdem vim habent, sicut ipsae negationes. Nam cum dicimus: Non est aurum, et: Non est virtus; quamvis inter aurum et virtutem plurimum, nihil tamen inter negationes, quas eis adiunximus, distat. Verum enimvero peius est non esse virtutem, quam non esse aurum: nemo sanus hinc ambigit; quod non propter ipsas negationes, sed propter res quibus adiungantur, accidere quis non intellegat? Auro enim virtus quanto praestat, tanto est virtute quam auro carere miserius. Quamobrem, cum res intellegibiles sensibilibus rebus antecellunt, defectum in intellegibilibus quam in sensibilibus merito aegrius toleramus; non eos defectus, sed ea quae deficiunt, carius vel vilius aestimantes. Ex quo iam illud apparet, defectum vitae, quae intellegibilis est, multo miserabiliorem esse, quam huius sensibilis lucis; quod scilicet multo est carior intellecta vita, quam lux ista conspecta. 		7. But if now it should be thought fit to designate as objects of sense perception not only all those things that we perceive by the senses, but also all those things that though not perceiving by the senses we judge of by means of the body, as of darkness through the eyes, of silence through the ears—for not by seeing darkness and not by hearing silence do we know of their existence—and again, in the case of objects of intellectual perception, not those things only which we see illuminated by the mind, as is wisdom itself, but also those things which by the illumination itself we avoid, such as foolishness, which I might fittingly designate mental darkness; I should have made no controversy about a word, but should have dissolved the whole question by an easy division, and straightway I should have proved to those giving good attention, that by the divine law of truth intelligible subsistences are to be preferred to sensible subsistences, not the decline of these subsistences, even though we should choose to call these intelligible, those sensible. Wherefore, that those who acknowledge that these visible luminaries and those intelligible souls are subsistences, are in every way compelled to grant and to attribute the sublimer part to souls; but that defects of either kind cannot be preferred the one to the other, for they are only privative and indicate nonexistence, and therefore have precisely the same force as negations themselves. For when we say, It is not gold, and, It is not virtue, although there is the greatest possible difference between gold and virtue, yet there is no difference between the negations that we adjoin to them. But that it is worse indeed not to be virtue than not to be gold, no sane man doubts. Who does not know that the difference lies not in the negations themselves, but in the things to which they are adjoined? For by as much as virtue is more excellent than gold, by so much is it more wretched to be in want of virtue than of gold. Wherefore, since intelligible things excel sensible things, we rightly feel greater repugnance towards defect in intelligible than in sensible things, esteeming not the defects, but the things that are deficient more or less precious. From which now it appears, that defect of light, which is intelligible, is far more wretched than defect of the sensible light, because, forsooth, life which is known is by far more precious than yonder light which is seen.
6. 8. Quae cum ita sint, audebitne quisquam, cum solem ac lunam, et quidquid in sideribus, quidquid denique in hoc igne nostro atque terreno luce visibili effulget, Deo tribuat, animas quaslibet, quae profecto nisi vivendo animae non sunt, cum tantum hoc lumen vita praecedat nolle concedere ex Deo esse? et cum ille verum dicat, qui dicit: In quantum nitet, ex Deo est; egone tandem, Deus magne, mentiar, si dicam: In quantum vivit, ex Deo est? Non usque adeo, quaeso, caecitas mentis suppliciaque augeantur animorum, ut haec homines non intellegant. Sed quoquo modo illorum error aut pertinacia sese haberet, his ego fretus armatusque rationibus, credo cum ad eos rem ita consideratam perspectamque detulissem, et cum his placide contulissem, vererer ne mihi quisquam eorum alicuius momenti esse videretur, si aut intellectum, aut ea quae intellectu non per defectum perciperentur, sensui conaretur praeferre, aut saltem comparare corporeo, vel his rebus quae ad eumdem sensum cognoscendae similiter pertinerent. Quo constituto, quando ille mihi vel quisquam negare auderet, animas quantum vellet malas, tamen quoniam animae essent, intellegibilium rerum numero contineri, neque illas per defectum intellegi? Siquidem animae non alio essent, nisi quo viverent. Licet enim per defectum intellegerentur vitiosae, quia virtutis egestate vitiosae; non tamen per defectum animae, quia vivendo animae. Nec fieri potest ut vitae praesentia sit causa deficiendi; cum tanto quidque deficiat, quanto deseritur a vita. 		8. This being the case, who will dare, while attributing sun and moon, and whatever is refulgent in the stars, nay in this fire of ours and in this visible earthly life, to God, to decline to grant that any souls whatsoever, which are not souls except by the fact of their being perfectly alive, since in this fact alone life has the precedence of light, are from God. And since he speaks truth who says, In as far as a thing shines it is from God, would I speak falsely, mighty God, if I should say, In so far as a thing lives it is from God? Let not, I beseech you, blindness of intellect and perversions of mind be increased to such an extent that men may fail to know these things. But however great their error and pertinacity might have been, trusting in these arguments and armed therewith, I believe that when I should have laid the matter before them thus considered and canvassed, and should have calmly conferred with them, I should have feared lest any one of them should have seemed to me to be of any consequence, should he endeavor to subordinate or even to compare to bodily sense, or to those things that pertain to bodily sense as objects of knowledge, either intellect or those things that are perceived (not by way of defect) by the intellect. Which point having been settled, how would he or any other have dared to deny that such souls as he would consider evil, yet since they are souls, are to be reckoned in the number of intelligible things, nor are objects of intellectual perception by way of defect? This is on the supposition that souls are souls only by being alive. For if they were intellectually perceived as vicious through defect, being vicious by lack of virtue, yet they are perceived as souls not through defect, for they are souls by reason of being alive. Nor can it be maintained that presence of life is a cause of defect, for by as much as anything is defective, by so much is it severed from life.
6. 9. Omni modo igitur cum pateret non posse ullas animas ab eo auctore separari, a quo lux ista non separatur; iam quidquid afferrent, non acciperem: moneremque potius, ut eos mecum sequi mallent, qui omne quidquid esset, quoniam esset, in quantumcumque esset, ex uno Deo esse praedicarent. 		9. Since therefore it would have been every way evident that no souls can be separated from that Author from whom yonder light is not separated, whatever they might have now adduced I should not have accepted, and should rather have admonished them that they should choose with me to follow those who maintain that whatever is, since it is, and in whatever degree it is, has its existence from the one God.
Obiectantur contra a Manichaeis loca Scripturae. Mali quomodo ex Deo, et non ex Deo. Chapter 7.— How Evil Men are of God, and Not of God
7. 9a. Recitarent adversus me voces illas evangelicas: Vos propterea non auditis, quia ex Deo non estis 4; Vos ex patre diabolo estis 5. Ego quoque contra recitarem: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil 6; et illud Apostoli: Unus Deus ex quo omnia; et unus Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia 7; et iterum eiusdem Apostoli: Ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia, ipsi gloria 8: hortarerque homines (si tamen homines invenirem), nihil nos iam quasi comperisse praesumeremus; sed quaereremus potius magistros, qui sententiarum istarum, quae nobis inter se pugnare viderentur, pacem concordiamque monstrarent. Nam in una atque eadem auctoritate Scripturarum, cum alibi sonaret: Omnia ex Deo 9; et alibi: Vos non estis ex Deo 10: quoniam Libros temere condemnare nefas esset, quis non videret peritum doctorem, cui quaestionis huius solutio nota esset, inveniendum fuisse? qui profecto si esset bonus intellector, et, ut divinitus dicitur, homo spiritalis 11, quoniam necessario faveret veris rationibus, quas de intellegibili sensibilique natura, quantum potui, tractavi atque disserui, imo eas ipse multo melius, et ad docendum aptius aperiret; nihil ab eo aliud de hac quaestione audiremus, nisi quemadmodum fieri posset, ut et nullum animarum genus non esset ex Deo, et recte tamen peccatoribus et infidelibus diceretur: Non estis ex Deo. Nam et nos fortasse implorato in auxilium Deo facile videre possemus, aliud esse vivere, aliud peccare: et quanquam vita in peccatis in comparatione iustae vitae mors appellata sit 12; utrumque tamen in homine uno posse inveniri, ut simul sit vivus atque peccator: sed quod vivus, ex Deo; quod peccator, non ex Deo. In qua divisione utimur ea parte de duabus, quae nostrae sententiae competit: ut cum Dei conditoris omnipotentiam insinuare volumus, etiam peccatoribus dicamus quod ex Deo sint. Dicimus enim his qui aliqua specie continentur, dicimus animantibus, dicimus rationalibus, dicimus postremo, quod ad rem maxime attinet, viventibus: quae omnia per se ipsa divina sunt munera. Cum autem malos arguere propositum est, recte dicimus: Non estis ex Deo. Dicimus enim se a veritate avertentibus, infidelibus, facinorosis, flagitiosis, et, quod nomine uno totum continet, peccatoribus: quae rursus omnia ex Deo non esse quis dubitet? Itaque Christus peccatoribus, idipsum quod peccatores erant et sibi non credebant coarguens, quid mirum si ait: Non estis ex Deo; ex alia parte illa salva manente sententia quod: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt; et, Omnia ex Deo? Nam si Christo non credere, Christi adventum repudiare, Christum non recipere, certum indicium esset animarum quae non sunt Dei; et ideo dictum esset: Vos propterea non auditis, quia non estis ex Deo: quomodo vera esset vox illa Apostoli, in ipso Evangelii memorabili principio, qua dictum est: In sua propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt 13? Unde sui, si non receperunt: aut unde ideo non sui, quia non receperunt: nisi quia homines peccatores, eo quod sunt homines, ad Deum; eo vero quod peccatores, ad diabolum pertinent? Hic ergo partem naturae tenuit qui ait: Sui eum non receperunt; ille vero voluntatis, qui ait: Non estis ex Deo. Evangelista enim Dei opera commendabat, Christus hominum peccata coercebat. 		They might have cited against me those words of the gospel: "You therefore do not hear, because you are not of God;" "You are of your father the devil." I also should have cited: "All things were made by Him and without Him was not anything made," John 1:3 and this of the Apostle: "One God of whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things," 1 Corinthians 8:6 and again from the same Apostle: "Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, to Him be glory." Romans 11:36 I should have exhorted those men (if indeed I had found them men), that we should presume upon nothing as if we had found it out, but should rather inquire of the masters who would demonstrate the agreement and harmony of those passages that seem to be discordant. For when in one and the same Scriptural authority we read: "All things are of God," 1 Corinthians 11:12 and elsewhere: "You are not of God," since it is wrong rashly to condemn books of Scripture, who would not have seen that a skilled teacher should be found who would know a solution of this problem, from whom assuredly if endowed with good intellectual powers, and a "spiritual man," as is said by divine inspiration 1 Corinthians 2:15 (for he would necessarily have favored the true arguments concerning the intelligible and sensible nature, which, as far as I can, I have conducted and handled, nay he would have disclosed them far better and more convincingly); we should have heard nothing else concerning this problem, except, as might happen, that there is no class of souls but has its existence from God, and that it is yet rightly said to sinners and unbelievers: "You are not of God." For we also, perchance, Divine aid having been implored, should have been able easily to see, that it is one thing to live and another to sin, and (although life in sin may be called death in comparison with just life, 1 Timothy 5:6 and while in one man it may be found, that he is at the same time alive and a sinner) that so far as he is alive, he is of God, so far as he is a sinner he is not of God. In which division we use that alternative that suits our sentiment; so that when we wish to insist upon the omnipotence of God as Creator, we may say even to sinners that they are of God. For we are speaking to those who are contained in some class, we are speaking to those having animal life, we are speaking to rational beings, we are speaking lastly— and this applies especially to the matter in hand— to living beings, all which things are essentially divine functions. But when our purpose is to convict evil men, we rightly say: "You are not of God." For we speak to them as averse to truth, unbelieving, criminal, infamous, and, to sum up all in one term— sinners, all of which things are undoubtedly not of God. Therefore what wonder is it, if Christ says to sinners, convicting them of this very thing that they were sinners and did not believe in Him: "You are not of God;" and on the other hand, without prejudice to the former statement: "All things were made through Him," and "All things are of God?" For if not to believe Christ, to repudiate Christ's advent, not to accept Christ, was a sure mark of souls that are not of God; and so it was said: "You therefore hear not, because you are not of God;" how would that saying of the apostle be true that occurs in the memorable beginning of the gospel: "He came unto his own things, and his own people did not receive him?" John 1:11 Whence his own if they did not receive him; or whence therefore not his own because they did not receive him, unless that sinners by virtue of being men belong to God, but by virtue of being sinners belong to the devil? He who says: "His own people received him not" had reference to nature; but he who says: "You are not of God." had reference to will; for the evangelist was commending the works of God, Christ was censuring the sins of men.
Quaerunt unde malum, et hac quaestione vincere se putant Manichaei. Cognoscant prius quod facillimum est, nihil vivere posse sine Deo. Summum malum non cognoscitur nisi cognito summo bono, quod est Deus. Chapter 8.— The Manichæans Inquire Whence is Evil and by This Question Think They Have Triumphed. Let Them First Know, Which is Most Easy to Do, that Nothing Can Live Without God. Consummate Evil Cannot Be Known Except by the Knowledge of Consummate Good, Which is God
8. 10. Hic fortasse quis dicat: Unde ipsa peccata, et omnino unde malum? Si ab homine, unde homo? si ab angelo, unde angelus? Quos ex Deo esse cum dicitur, quamvis recte vereque dicatur, videntur tamen imperitis et minus valentibus acriter res abditas intueri, quasi per quamdam catenam ad Deum mala et peccata connecti. Hac quaestione illi regnare se putant: quasi vero interrogare sit scire. Utinam id esset; nemo me scientior reperiretur. Sed nescio quomodo saepe in altercando magnae quaestionis propositor personam magni doctoris ostentat, plerumque ipse ipso quem terret, in eo de quo terret indoctior. Itaque isti multitudini se praeferendos arbitrantur, quia priores interrogant quod cum multitudine ignorant. Sed si eo tempore quo cum eis me, non sicut iam diu ago, egisse nunc poenitet, mihi has rationes depromenti hoc obiecissent, dicerem: Quaeso, interim cognoscite mecum quod facillimum est, si nihil sine Deo potest fulgere, multo minus posse aliquid vivere sine Deo; ne in tantis monstris opinionum remaneamus, ut nescio quas animas vitam sine Deo habere praedicemus. Sic enim fortasse continget ut id quod mecum ignoratis, id est, unde sit malum, vel simul, vel quolibet ordine aliquando discamus. Quid si enim cognitio summi mali sine cognitione summi boni contingere homini non potest? Non enim nossemus tenebras, si in tenebris semper essemus: sed lucis notitia contrarium suum non sinit incognitum. Summum autem bonum id est, quo superius esse nihil potest: Deus autem bonum, et Deo superius esse nihil potest : Deus igitur summum bonum. Cognoscamus ergo Deum, atque ita nos illud quod praepropere quaerimus non latebit. Mediocrisne negotii tandem vel meriti cognitionem Dei esse arbitramini? Quod enim nobis aliud praemium, quam vita aeterna promittitur, quae Dei cognitio est? Ait enim magister Deus: Haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum et verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum 14. Etenim anima quamvis sit immortalis, tamen quia mors eius recte dicitur a Dei cognitione aversio; cum se convertit ad Deum, meritum est aeternae vitae consequendae, ut sit aeterna vita, sicut dictum est, ipsa cognitio. Converti autem ad Deum nemo, nisi ab hoc mundo se avertat, potest. Hoc ego mihi arduum et difficillimum sentio: vobis si facile est, ille ipse Deus viderit. Ego vellem credere, nisi me moveret, quod cum iste mundus, a quo averti iubemur, visibilis sit, dixeritque Apostolus: Ea quae videntur, temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna sunt 15: vos plus istorum oculorum quam mentis iudicio tribuitis, apud quos nullam esse fulgentem pennam quae non ex Deo fulgeat, et esse viventem animam quae non ex Deo vivat, praedicatur et creditur. Haec et his similia vel illis etiam dicerem, vel mecum reputarem. Possem namque Deum omnibus, ut dicitur, visceribus deprecans, et Scripturis quantum licebat intentus, etiam tunc fortasse talia vel dicere, vel quod saluti sat erat cogitare. 		Here perchance some one may say: Whence are sins themselves, and whence is evil in general? If from man, whence is man? If from an angel, whence is the angel? When it is said, however truly and rightly, that these are from God, it nevertheless seems to those unskillful and possessed of little power to look into recondite matters, that evils and sins are thereby connected, as by a sort of chain, to God. By this question they think themselves triumphant, as if forsooth to ask were to know—would it were so, for in that case no one would be more knowing than myself. Yet very often in controversy the propounder of a great question, while impersonating the great teacher, is himself more ignorant in the matter concerning which he would frighten his opponent, than he whom he would frighten. These therefore suppose that they are superior to the common run, because the former ask questions that the latter cannot answer. If therefore when I most unfortunately was associated with them, not in the position in which I have now for some time been, they had raised these objections when I had brought forward this argument, I should have said: I ask that you meanwhile agree with me, which is most easy, that if nothing can shine without God, much less can anything live without God. Let us not persist in such monstrous opinions as to maintain that any souls whatsoever have life apart from God. For perchance it may so happen that with me you are ignorant as to this thing, namely whence is evil, let us then learn either simultaneously or in any order, I care not what. For what if knowledge of the perfection of evil is impossible to man without knowledge of the perfection of good? For we should not know darkness if we were always in darkness. But the notion of light does not allow its opposite to be unknown. But the highest good is that than which there is nothing higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God therefore is the highest good. Let us therefore together so recognize God, and thus what we seek too hastily will not be hidden from us. Do you suppose then that the knowledge of God is a matter of small account or desert. For what other reward is there for us than life eternal, which is to know God? For God the Master says: "But this is life eternal, that they might know You the only and true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." John 17:3 For the soul, although it is immortal, yet because aversion from the knowledge of God is rightly called its death, when it is converted to God, the reward of eternal life to be attained is that knowledge; so that this is, as has been said, eternal life. But no one can be converted to God, except he turn himself away from this world. This for myself I feel to be arduous and exceedingly difficult, whether it is easy to you, God Himself would have seen. I should have been inclined to think it easy to you, had I not been moved by the fact, that, since the world from which we are commanded to turn away is visible, and the apostle says: "The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are unseen are eternal," 2 Corinthians 4:18 you ascribe more importance to the judgment of these eyes than to that of the mind, asserting and believing as you do that there is no shining feather that does not shine from God; and that there are living souls that do not live from God. These and like things I should either have said to them or considered with myself, for even then, supplicating God with all my bowels, so to speak, and examining as attentively as possible the Scriptures, I should perchance have been able either to say such things or to think them, so far as was necessary for my salvation.
Augustinus familiaritate cum Manichaeis et successu victoriae de christianis imperitis a se reportatae deceptus. Manichaei ex cognitione item peccati et voluntatis facile refellendi. Chapter 9.— Augustine Deceived by Familiarity with the Manichæans, and by the Succession of Victories Over Ignorant Christians Reported by Them. The Manichæans are Likewise Easily Refuted from the Knowledge of Sin and the Will
9. 11. Sed me duo quaedam maxime, quae incautam illam aetatem facile capiunt, per admirabiles attrivere circuitus; quorum est unum familiaritas, nescio quomodo repens quadam imagine bonitatis, tamquam sinuosum aliquod vinculum multipliciter collo involutum. Alterum quod quaedam noxia victoria pene mihi semper in disputationibus proveniebat disserenti cum christianis imperitis, sed tamen fidem suam certatim, ut quisque posset, defendere molientibus. Quo successu creberrimo gliscebat adolescentis animositas, et impetu suo in pervicaciae magnum malum imprudenter vergebat. Quod altercandi genus quia post eorum auditionem aggressus eram, quidquid meo vel qualicumque ingenio vel aliis lectionibus poteram, solis illis libentissime tribuebam. Ita ex illorum sermonibus ardor in certamina, ex certaminum proventu amor in illos quotidie novabatur. Ex quo accedebat ut quidquid dicerent, miris quibusdam morbis, non quia sciebam, sed quia optabam verum esse, pro vero approbarem. Ita factum est ut quamvis pedetentim atque caute, tamen diu sequerer homines nitidam stipulam viventi animae praeferentes. 		But two things especially, which easily lay hold upon that unwary age, urged me through wonderful circuits. One of these was familiarity, suddenly, by a certain false semblance of goodness, wrapped many times around my neck as a certain sinuous chain. The other was, that I was almost always noxiously victorious in arguing with ignorant Christians who yet eagerly attempted, each as he could, to defend their faith. By which frequent success the ardor of youth was kindled, and by its own impulse rashly verged upon the great evil of stubbornness. For this kind of wrangling, after I had become an auditor among them, whatever I was able to do either by my own genius, such as it was, or by reading the works of others, I most gladly devoted to them alone. Accordingly from their speeches ardor in disputations was daily increased, from success in disputations love for them [the Manichæans]. Whence it resulted that whatever they said, as if affected by certain strange disorders, I approved of as true, not because I knew it to be true, but because I wished it to be. So it came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a long time I followed men that preferred a sleek straw to a living soul.
9. 12. Verum esto, non poteram illo tempore sensibilia ab intellegibilibus, carnalia scilicet ab spiritalibus diiudicare atque discernere; non erat aetatis, non disciplinae, non cuiusdam etiam consuetudinis, non ullorum denique meritorum; non enim parvi gaudii et felicitatis res est: itane tandem ne illud quidem arripere poteram, quod in omnium hominum iudicio summi Dei legibus natura ipsa constituit? 		12. So be it, I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern sensible from intelligible things, carnal forsooth from spiritual. It did not belong to age, nor to discipline, nor even to any habit, nor, finally, to any deserts; for it is a matter of no small joy and felicitation: had I not thus been able at length even to grasp that which in the judgment of all men nature itself by the laws of the most High God has established?
Peccatum nonnisi a voluntate. Vita et voluntas sua cuique notissima. Voluntas quid sit. Chapter 10.— Sin is Only from the Will. His Own Life and Will Best Known to Each Individual. What Will is
10. 12a. Quivis enim homines, quos modo a communi sensu generis humani nulla disrupisset amentia, quae vellent ad iudicandum studia detulissent, quamlibet imperitiam, quantamcumque etiam tarditatem; velim experiri quid mihi responderent roganti, utrum eis peccasse videretur, de cuius dormientis manu scripsisset alius aliquid flagitiosum. Omnes quis dubitet ita fuisse negaturos illud esse peccatum, ita reclamaturos, ut etiam succenserent fortasse quod tali eos rogatione dignos putaverim? A quibus ego, quoquo modo poteram, reconciliatis et in consilium restitutis peterem, ut me aliud tam manifestum, et in omnium cognitione positum, interrogantem non moleste ferrent: tunc quaererem, si non dormientis, sed scientis manu, qui membris tamen caeteris vinctus atque constrictus esset, quisquam valentior aliquid similiter fecisset mali, utrum quia id nosset, quamvis omnino noluisset, ullo peccati nomine teneretur. Et hic mihi omnes mirantes quod talia sciscitarer, sine cunctatione responderent, nihil etiam istum omnino peccasse. Quid ita? Quia de quo nesciente, vel resistere non valente quisquam quidpiam mali fecerit, iuste damnari nullo modo potest. Atque idipsum cur ita esset, si in illis hominibus naturam ipsam percontarer humanam, facile pervenirem ad id quod cuperem, isto modo quaerens: Quid, si dormiens ille iam sciret quid alius de manu eius facturus esset, et de industria, plus potus etiam ne expergisceretur, se somno dederet, ut aliquem iurando falleret; num ei quidquam somnus ad innocentiam suffragaretur? Quid aliud quam nocentem hominem pronuntiarent ? Quod si et ille volens vinctus est, ut aliquem similiter praetenta defensione deciperet, quid ei tandem, ut peccato careat, illa vincula profuerunt? Quanquam his obstrictus, revera resistere non valeret; sicut ille dormiens, quid tunc fieret, omnino nesciret. Numquidnam igitur dubitandum est quin peccasse ambo iudicarentur? Quibus concessis colligerem, nusquam scilicet nisi in voluntate esse peccatum: cum mihi auxiliaretur etiam illud, quod iustitia peccantes tenet sola mala voluntate, quamvis quod voluerint implere nequiverint. 		For let any men whatever, if only no madness has broken them loose from the common sense of the human race, bring whatever zeal they like for judging, whatever ignorance, nay whatever slowness of mind, I should like to find out what they would have replied to me had I asked, whether a man would seem to them to have sinned by whose hand while he was asleep another should have written something disgraceful? Who doubts that they would have denied that it is a sin, and have exclaimed against it so vehemently that they might perchance have been enraged that I should have thought them proper objects of such a question? Of whom reconciled and restored to equanimity, as best I could do it, I should have begged that they would not take it amiss if I asked them another thing just as manifest, just as completely within the knowledge of all. Then I should have asked, if some stronger person had done some evil thing by the hand of one not sleeping but conscious, yet with the rest of his members bound and in constraint, whether because he knew it, though absolutely unwilling, he should be held guilty of any sin? And here all marvelling that I should ask such questions, would reply without hesitation, that he had absolutely not sinned at all. Why so? Because whoever has done anything evil by means of one unconscious or unable to resist, the latter can by no means be justly condemned. And precisely why this is so, if I should inquire of the human nature in these men, I should easily bring out the desired answer, by asking in this manner: Suppose that the sleeper already knew what the other would do with his hand, and of purpose aforethought, having drunk so much as would prevent his being awakened, should go to sleep, in order to deceive some one with an oath. Would any amount of sleep suffice to prove his innocence? What else than a guilty man would one pronounce him? But if he has also willingly been bound that he may deceive some one by this pretext, in what respect then would those chains profit as a means of relieving him of sin? Although bound by these he was really not able to resist, as in the other case the sleeper was absolutely ignorant of what he was then doing. Is there therefore any possibility of doubting that both should be judged to have sinned? Which things having been conceded, I should have argued, that sin is indeed nowhere but in the will, since this consideration also would have helped me, that justice holds guilty those sinning by evil will alone, although they may have been unable to accomplish what they willed.
10. 13. Quisquamne me ista tractantem, posset dicere, in rebus obscuris abditisque versari, ubi propter intellegentium paucitatem vel fraudis vel ostentationis suspicio nasci solet? Secedat paulisper illa intellegibilium sensibiliumque distinctio: nulla mihi fiat invidia, quod tardas animas subtilium disputationum stimulis persequor. Liceat mihi me scire vivere, liceat mihi scire me velle vivere: in quae si consentit genus humanum, tam nobis cognita est voluntas nostra, quam vita. Neque cum istam scientiam profitemur, metuendum est ne nos quisquam falli posse convincat: hoc ipsum enim falli nemo potest, si aut non vivat, aut nihil velit. Non me arbitror quidquam obscurum attulisse, et vereor ne cuiquam magis, quod haec nimium manifesta sint, videar esse culpandus: sed quorsum haec tendant, consideremus. 		13. For who could have said that, in adducing these considerations, I was dwelling upon obscure and recondite things, where on account of the fewness of those able to understand, either fraud or suspicion of ostentation is accustomed to arise? Let that distinction between intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little: let me not be found fault with for following up slow minds with the stimuli of subtle disputations. Permit me to know that I live, permit me to know that I will to live. If in this the human race agrees, as our life is known to us, so also is our will. Nor when we become possessed of this knowledge, is there any occasion to fear lest any one should convince us that we may be deceived; for no one can be deceived as to whether he does not live, or wishes nothing. I do not think that I have adduced anything obscure, and my concern is rather lest some should find fault with me for dwelling on things that are too manifest. But let us consider the bearing of these things.
Quid sit voluntas.
10. 14. Non igitur nisi voluntate peccatur. Nobis autem voluntas nostra notissima est: neque enim scirem me velle, si quid sit voluntas ipsa nescirem. Definitur itaque isto modo: Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum. Cur ergo ita tunc definire non possem? An erat difficile videre invitum volenti esse contrarium, ita ut contrarium sinistrum dextro esse dicimus, non ut nigrum albo? Nam eadem res simul et nigra et alba esse non potest: duorum autem in medio quisque positus, ad alterum sinister est, ad alterum dexter; simul quidem utrumque unus homo, sed simul utrumque ad unum hominem nullo modo. Ita quidem invitus et volens unus animus simul esse potest; sed unum atque idem nolle simul et velle non potest. Cum enim quisque invitus aliquid facit, si eum roges utrum id facere velit, nolle se dicit: item si roges utrum id velit non facere, velle respondet. Ita invitum ad faciendum, ad non faciendum autem volentem reperies: id est enim unum animum uno tempore habentem utrumque, sed aliud atque aliud ad singula referentem. Cur haec dico? Quia si rursum quaeramus quam ob causam id invitus faciat, cogi se dicet. Nam et omnis invitus faciens cogitur; et omnis qui cogitur, si facit, nonnisi invitus facit. Restat ut volens a cogente sit liber, etiamsi se quisquam cogi putet. Et hoc enim modo omnis qui volens facit, non cogitur; et omnis qui non cogitur, aut volens facit, aut non facit. Haec cum in omnibus hominibus, quos interrogare non absurde possumus, a puero usque ad senem, a ludo litterario usque ad solium sapientis, natura ipsa proclamet; cur ego tunc non viderem in definitione voluntatis ponendum esse: Cogente nullo, quod nunc quasi experientia maiore cautissimus posui? At si hoc ubique manifestum est, et non doctrina, sed natura omnibus promptum; quid restat quod videatur obscurum, nisi forte ullum lateat, aliquid nos velle cum volumus, et ad hoc moveri animum nostrum, idque aut habere nos aut non habere, et si haberemus retinere velle, si non haberemus acquirere? Quare aut non amittere, aut adipisci aliquid vult, omnis qui vult. Quamobrem, si omnia ista luce clariora sunt, sicuti sunt, neque meae tantum, sed notitiae generis humani veritatis ipsius liberalitate donata, cur illo etiam tempore dicere non possem: Voluntas est motus animi, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum? 		14. Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will. But our will is very well known to us; for neither should I know that I will, if I did not know what will itself is. Accordingly, it is thus defined: will is a movement of mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something. Why therefore could not I have so defined it then? Was it difficult to see that one unwilling is contrary to one willing, just as the left hand is contrary to the right, not as black to white? For the same thing cannot be at the same time black and white. But whoever is placed between two men is on the left hand with reference to one, on the right with reference to the other. One man is both on the right hand and on the left hand at the same time, but by no means both to the one man. So indeed one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the same thing. For when any one unwillingly does anything; if you ask him whether he wished to do it, he says that he did not. Likewise if you ask whether he wished not to do it, he replies that he did. So you will find him unwilling with reference to doing, willing with reference to not doing, that is to say, one mind at the same time having both attitudes, but each referring to different things. Why do I say this? Because if we should again ask wherefore though unwilling he does this, he will say that he is compelled. For every one also who does a thing unwillingly is compelled, and every one who is compelled, if he does a thing, does it only unwillingly. It follows that he that is willing is free from compulsion, even if any one thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who willingly does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled, either does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaims these things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the boy even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the wise, why then should I not have seen that in the definition of will should be put, "no one compelling," which now as if with greater experience most cautiously I have done. But if this is everywhere manifest, and promptly occurs to all not by instruction but by nature, what is there left that seems obscure, unless perchance it be concealed from some one, that when we wish for something, we will, and our mind is moved towards it, and we either have it or do not have it, and if we have it we will to retain it, if we have it not, to acquire it? Wherefore everyone who wills, wills either not to lose something or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are clearer than day, as they are, nor are they given to my conception alone, but by the liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I not have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something?
Peccatum quid. Chapter 11.— What Sin is
11. 15. Dicet aliquis: Et hoc te adversum Manichaeos quid adiuvaret? Exspecta; sine prius etiam peccatum definiamus, quod sine voluntate esse non posse omnis mens apud se divinitus conscriptum legit. Ergo peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quanquam si liberum non sit, non est voluntas. Sed malui grossius quam scrupulosius definire. Etiamne hi libri obscuri mihi scrutandi erant, unde discerem neminem vituperatione suppliciove dignum, qui aut id velit quod iustitia velle non prohibet, aut id non faciat quod facere non potest? Nonne ista cantant et in montibus pastores, et in theatris poetae, et indocti in circulis, et docti in bibliothecis, et magistri in scholis, et antistites in sacratis locis, et in orbe terrarum genus humanum? Quod si nemo vituperatione vel damnatione dignus est, aut non contra vetitum iustitiae faciens, aut quod non potest non faciens, omne autem peccatum vel vituperandum est, vel damnandum; quis dubitet tunc esse peccatum, cum et velle iniustum est, et liberum nolle; et ideo definitionem illam et veram et ad intellegendum esse facillimam, et non modo nunc, sed tunc quoque a me potuisse dici: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere? 		Some one will say: What assistance would this have furnished you against the Manichæans? Wait a moment; permit me first also to define sin, which, every mind reads divinely written in itself, cannot exist apart from will. Sin therefore is the will to retain and follow after what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain. Although if it be not free, it is not will. But I have preferred to define more roughly than precisely. Should I not also have carefully examined those obscure books, whence I might have learned that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills what justice does not prohibit him from willing, or does not do what he is not able to do? Do not shepherds on mountains, poets in theatres, unlearned in social intercourse, learned in libraries, masters in schools, priests in consecrated places, and the human race throughout the whole world, sing out these things? But if no one is worthy of blame and condemnation, who either does not act against the prohibition of justice, or who does not do what he cannot do, yet every sin is blameworthy and condemnable, who doubts then that it is sin, when willing is unjust, and not willing is free. And hence that definition is both true and easy to understand, and not only now but then also could have been spoken by me: Sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining, what justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain?
Ex datis definitionibus peccati et voluntatis haeresim Manichaeorum totam evertit. Chapter 12.— From the Definitions Given of Sin and Will, He Overthrows the Entire Heresy of the Manichæans. Likewise from the Just Condemnation of Evil Souls It Follows that They are Evil Not by Nature But by Will. That Souls are Good By Nature, to Which the Pardon of Sins is Granted
12. 16. Age nunc, videamus quid nos haec adiuvarent. Plurimum omnino, ut nihil amplius desiderarem: totam quippe causam finirent. Nam quisquis secreta conscientiae suae legesque divinas penitus naturae inditas, apud animum intus, ubi expressiores certioresque sunt, consulens, has duas definitiones voluntatis atque peccati veras esse concedit, totam Manichaeorum haeresim paucissimis et brevissimis, sed plane invictissimis ratiunculis sine ulla cunctatione condemnat. Quod sic considerari potest. Duo animarum genera esse dicunt, unum bonum, quod ita ex Deo sit, ut non ex aliqua materia vel ex nihilo ab eo factum, sed de ipsa eius omnino substantia pars quaedam processisse dicatur, alterum autem malum, quod nulla prorsus ex parte ad Deum pertinere credunt credendumque commendant: et ideo illud summum bonum, hoc vero summum malum esse praedicant: atque ista duo genera fuisse aliquando discreta, nunc esse commixta. Genus quidem commixtionis huius et causam nondum audieram: sed tamen iam quaerere poteram, utrum illud malum genus animarum, antequam bono misceretur, habuisset aliquam voluntatem. Si enim non habebat, sine peccato atque innocens erat, et ideo nullo modo malum. Si autem ideo malum, quia licet esset sine voluntate, tamquam ignis, tamen si bonum attigisset, violaret, atque corrumperet: quantum est nefas, et naturam mali tantum valere ad commutandam ullam Dei partem, et summum illud bonum corruptibile et violabile credere? Quod si voluntas inerat, profecto inerat, cogente nullo, motus animi ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum. Hoc autem aliquid, aut bonum erat, aut bonum putabatur: non enim aliter appeti posset. Sed in summo malo, ante commixtionem quam praedicant, nullum unquam bonum fuit. Unde igitur ibi vel scientia vel opinio boni esse potuit? An nihil volebant quod apud se esset, atque illud bonum verum, quod extra erat, appetebant? Ista vero praeclara et magna laude praedicanda voluntas est, qua summum appetitur et verum bonum. Unde igitur in summo malo motus animi tanta laude dignissimus? An studio nocendi appetebant? Primo, eodem revolvitur ratio. Qui enim nocere vult, bono aliquo vult privare alium propter aliquod bonum suum. Erat igitur in eis vel scientia boni, vel opinio, quae summo malo nullo modo esse debebat. Deinde bonum illud extra se positum, cui nocere studebant, utrum omnino esset, unde cognoverant? Si intellexerant, quid tali mente praeclarius? An quidquam est aliud, quo magnis laboribus omnis bonorum porrigatur intentio, nisi ut summum illud et sincerum bonum intellegatur? Quod ergo nunc vix paucis bonis iustisque conceditur, id tunc illud merum malum nullo bono adiuvante iam poterat? Si autem illae animae corpora gerebant, et id oculis viderant; quae linguae, quae pectora, quae ingenia laudandis istis oculis praedicandisque sufficiunt, quibus vix possunt mentes iustorum adaequari? Quanta bona invenimus in summo malo! Si enim videre Deum malum est, non est bonum Deus: bonum est autem Deus: bonum est igitur Deum videre; et nescio quid huic bono comparari queat. Porro quod videre bonum est, unde fieri potest ut posse videre sit malum? Quapropter quidquid vel in illis oculis, vel in istis mentibus fecit, ut ab his possit videri divina substantia, magnum et ineffabili laude dignissimum bonum fecit. Si autem non factum, sed ipsum per se tale ac sempiternum erat, difficile hoc malo quidquam melius invenitur. 		16. Come now, let us see in what respect these things would have aided us. Much every way, so that I should have desired nothing more; for they end the whole cause; for whoever consulting in the inner mind, where they are more pronounced and assured, the secrets of his own conscience, and the divine laws absolutely imposed upon nature, grants that these two definitions of will and sin are true, condemns without any hesitation by the fewest and the briefest, but plainly the most invincible reasons, the whole heresy of the Manichæans. Which can be thus considered. They say that there are two kinds of souls, the one good, which is in such a way from God, that it is said not to have been made by Him out of any material or out of nothing, but to have proceeded as a certain part from the very substance itself of God; the other evil, which they believe and strive to get others to believe pertains to God in no way whatever; and so they maintain that the one is the perfection of good, but the other the perfection of evil, and that these two classes were at one time distinct but are now commingled. The character and the cause of this commingling I had not yet heard; but nevertheless I could have inquired whether that evil kind of souls, before it was mingled with the good, had any will. For if not, it was without sin and innocent, and so by no means evil. But if evil in such a way, that though without will, as fire, yet if it should touch the good it would violate and corrupt it; how impious it is to believe that the nature of evil is powerful enough to change any part of God, and that the Highest Good is corruptible and violable! But if the will was present, assuredly there was present, no one compelling, a movement of the mind either towards not losing something or obtaining something. But this something was either good, or was thought to be good, for not otherwise could it be earnestly desired. But in supreme evil, before the commingling which they maintain, there never was any good. Whence then could there be in it either the knowledge or the thought of good? Did they wish for nothing that was in themselves, and earnestly desire that true good which was without? That will must truly be declared worthy of distinguished and great praise by which is earnestly desired the supreme and true good. Whence then in supreme evil was this movement of mind most worthy of so great praise? Did they seek it for the sake of injuring it? In the first place, the argument comes to the same thing. For he who wishes to injure, wishes to deprive another of some good for the sake of some good of his own. There was therefore in them either a knowledge of good or an opinion of good, which ought by no means to belong to supreme evil. In the second place, whence had they known, that good placed outside of themselves, which they designed to injure, existed at all. If they had intellectually perceived it, what is more excellent than such a mind? Is there anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth except the knowledge of that supreme and sincere good? What therefore is now scarcely conceded to a few good and just men, was mere evil, no good assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls bore bodies and saw the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what hearts, what intellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those eyes, with which the minds of just men can scarcely be compared? How great good things we find in supreme evil! For if to see God is evil, God is not a good; but God is a good; therefore to see God is good; and I know not what can be compared to this good. Since to see anything is good, whence can it be made out that to be able to see is evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds brought it about, that the divine essence could be seen by them, brought about a great thing and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But if it was not brought about, but it was such in itself and eternal, it is difficult to find anything better than this evil.
Ex malarum item animarum iusta damnatione sequitur non natura, sed voluntate malas esse.
12. 17. Postremo, ut nihil horum laudandorum habeant illae animae, quae illorum rationibus habere coguntur, quaererem utrum aliquas an nullas animas Deus damnet. Si nullas, nullum meritorum iudicium est, nulla providentia et casu potius quam ratione mundus administratur, vel potius non administratur: non enim administratio casibus danda est. Hoc autem si omnibus qualibet religione devinctis credere nefas est, restat ut aut sit aliquarum animarum damnatio, aut nulla peccata sint. Sed si nulla peccata sunt, etiam nullum malum: quod isti si dixerint, haeresim suam uno ictu interficiunt. Convenit igitur mihi cum illis, animas aliquas divina lege iudicioque damnari. At hae, si bonae sint, quae illa iustitia est? Si malae; natura, an voluntate? Sed natura esse malae animae nullo modo queunt. Unde hoc docemus? De superioribus definitionibus voluntatis atque peccati. Quia dicere animas, et esse malas, et nihil peccare, plenum est dementiae: dicere autem peccare sine voluntate, magnum deliramentum est; et peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae. Quamobrem illae animae quidquid faciunt, si natura, non voluntate faciunt, id est, si libero et ad faciendum et ad non faciendum motu animi carent; si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, peccatum earum tenere non possumus. At omnes fatentur, et malas animas iuste, et eas quae non peccaverunt, iniuste damnari: fatentur igitur eas malas esse quae peccant. Illae autem, sicut ratio docuit, non peccant. Animarum ergo malarum genus nescio quod extraneum, quod a Manichaeis inducitur, nullum est. 		17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy things which by the reasonings of the Manichæans they are compelled to have, I should have asked, whether God condemns any or no souls. If none, there is no judgment of rewards and punishments, no providence, and the world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or rather is not administered at all. For the name administration must not be given to chances. But if it is impious for all those that are bound by any religion to believe this, it remains either that there is condemnation of some souls, or that there are no sins. But if there are no sins, neither is there any evil. Which if the Manichæans should say, they would slay their heresy with a single blow. Therefore they and I agree that some souls are condemned by divine law and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is that justice? If evil, are they so by nature, or by will? But by nature souls can in no way be evil. Whence do we teach this. From the above definitions of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil, and that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin without will, is great craziness, and to hold any one guilty of sin for not doing what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity and insanity. Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by nature not by will, that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind free both for doing and not doing, if finally no power of abstaining from their work is conceded to them; we cannot hold that the sin is theirs. But all confess both that evil souls are justly, and souls that have not sinned are unjustly condemned; therefore they confess that those souls are evil that sin. But these, as reason teaches, do not sin. Therefore the extraneous class of evil souls of the Manichæans, whatever it may be, is a non-entity.
Animas esse natura bonas, quibus datur venia peccatorum.
12. 18. Nunc bonum illud genus videamus, quod rursus ita laudant, ut ipsam Dei substantiam dicant esse. Quanto autem melius est ut suum ordinem meritumque quisque cognoscat, nec ita sacrilega superbia ventiletur, ut cum se toties commutari sentiat, summi illius boni, quod incommutabile pia ratio profitetur et docet, credat esse substantiam? Ecce enim cum manifestum sit non peccare animas in eo quod non sunt tales, quales esse non possunt; unde constat iam nescio quas illas inductitias nullo modo peccare, et propterea illas omnino non esse: relinquitur, ut quoniam concedunt esse peccata, non inveniant quibus ea tribuant, nisi bono generi animarum et substantiae Dei. Maxime autem urgentur auctoritate christiana: numquam enim negaverunt dari veniam peccatorum, cum fuerit ad Deum quisque conversus; numquam dixerunt (ut alia multa) quod Scripturis divinis hoc quispiam corruptor inseruerit. Quibus ergo peccata donantur? Si alieni generis illis malis, possunt et bonae fieri, possunt Dei regnum possidere cum Christo. Quod isti quia negant, nec habent alterum genus, nisi earum quas de substantia Dei esse perhibent; restat ut non solum etiam ipsas, sed ipsas solas peccare fateantur. Ego autem nihil pugno ne solae peccent: peccant tamen. At enim mali commixtione coguntur? Si ita cogantur, ut resistendi potestas nulla sit, non peccant: si est in potestate sua resistere, et propria voluntate consentiunt, cur tanta bona in summo malo, cur hoc malum in summo bono, per doctrinam illorum cogimur invenire; nisi quia neque illud malum est quod suspicione inducunt, neque hoc summum bonum quod superstitione pervertunt? 		18. Let us now look at that good class of souls, which again they exalt to such a degree as to say that it is the very substance of God. But how much better it is that each one should recognize his own rank and merit, nor be so puffed up with sacrilegious pride as to believe that as often as he experiences a change in himself it is the substance of that supreme good, which devout reason holds and teaches to be unchangeable! For behold! since it is manifest that souls do not sin in not being such as they cannot be; it follows that these supposititious souls, whatever they may be, do not sin at all, and moreover that they are absolutely non-existent; it remains that since there are sins, they find none to whom to attribute them except the good class of souls and the substance of God. But especially are they pressed by Christian authority; for never have they denied that forgiveness of sins is granted when any one has been converted to God; never have they said (as they have said of many other passages) that some corrupter has interpolated this into the divine Scriptures. To whom then are sins attributed? If to those evil souls of the alien class, these also can become good, can possess the kingdom of God with Christ. Which denying, they [the Manichæans] have no other class except those souls which they maintain are of the substance of God. It remains that they acknowledge that not only these latter also, but these alone sin. But I make no contention about their being alone in sinning; yet they sin. But are they compelled to sin by being commingled with evil? If so compelled that there was no power of resisting, they do not sin. If it is in their power to resist, and they voluntarily consent, we are compelled to find out through their [the Manichæan] teaching, why so great good things in supreme evil, why this evil in supreme good, unless it be that neither is that which they bring into suspicion evil, nor is that which they pervert by superstition supreme good?
Ex deliberatione in malam et in bonam partem non haberi duo animarum genera. Concesso genere animarum illicentium ad turpia, non sequi has esse natura malas, alias esse summum bonum. Chapter 13.— From Deliberation on the Evil and on the Good Part It Results that Two Classes of Souls are Not to Be Held to. A Class of Souls Enticing to Shameful Deeds Having Been Conceded, It Does Not Follow that These are Evil by Nature, that the Others are Supreme Good
13. 19. At si de duobus istis generibus animarum delirare illos et errare docuissem, aut certe ipse didicissem, quid remanere poterat, cur mihi iam de ulla re audiendi vel consulendi viderentur? An ut discerem hinc ostendi animarum duo esse genera, quod in deliberando nunc in malam partem, nunc in bonam nutat assensio? Cur non magis hoc signum est unius animae, quae libera illa voluntate huc et huc ferri, hinc atque hinc referri potest? Nam mihi cum accidit, unum me esse sentio utrumque considerantem, alterutrum eligentem: sed plerumque illud libet, hoc decet, quorum nos in medio positi fluctuamus. Nec mirum: ita enim nunc constituti sumus, ut et per carnem voluptate affici, et per spiritum honestate possimus. Quare non duas animas hinc fateri cogor? Possumus enim melius et multo expeditius intellegere duo genera bonarum rerum, quorum tamen neutrum ab auctore Deo sit alienum, unam animam ex diversis afficere partibus, inferiore ac superiore, vel quod recte ita dici potest, exteriore atque interiore. Ista sunt duo genera, quae sensibilium et intellegibilium nomine paulo ante tractavimus, quae carnalia et spiritalia libentius et familiarius nos vocamus. Sed factum est nobis difficile a carnalibus abstinere, cum panis verissimus noster spiritalis sit. Cum labore namque nunc edimus panem. Neque enim nullo in supplicio sumus peccato transgressionis mortales ex immortalibus facti. Ideo contingit ut cum ad meliora conantibus nobis, consuetudo facta cum carne et peccata nostra quodam modo militare contra nos, et difficultatem nobis facere coeperint, nonnulli stulti aliud genus animarum quod non sit ex Deo superstitione obtusissima suspicentur. 		19. But if I had taught, or at any rate had myself learned, that they rave and err regarding those two classes of souls, why should I have thenceforth thought them worthy of being heard or consulted about anything? That I might learn hence, that these two kinds of souls are pointed out, which in the course of deliberation assent puts now on the evil side, now on the good? Why is not this rather the sign of one soul which by free will can be borne here and there, swayed hither and there? For it was my own experience to feel that I am one, considering evil and good and choosing one or the other, but for the most part the one pleases, the other is fitting, placed in the midst of which we fluctuate. Nor is it to be wondered at, for we are now so constituted that through the flesh we can be affected by sensual pleasure, and through the spirit by honorable considerations. Am I not therefore compelled to acknowledge two souls? Nay, we can better and with far less difficulty recognize two classes of good things, of which neither is alien from God as its author, one soul acted upon from diverse directions, the lower and the higher, or to speak more correctly, the external and the internal. These are the two classes which a little while ago we considered under the names sensible and intelligible, which we now prefer to call more familiarly carnal and spiritual. But it has been made difficult for us to abstain from carnal things, since our truest bread is spiritual. For with great labor we now eat this bread. For neither without punishment for the sin of transgression have we been changed from immortal into mortal. So it happens, that when we strive after better things, habit formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our way, some foolish persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another kind of souls which is not of God.
13. 20. Quanquam etiam si eis concedatur inferiore alio genere animarum nos illici ad turpia, non inde conficiunt aut illas natura malas esse, aut istas summum bonum. Fieri enim potest ut propria illae voluntate appetendo quod non licebat, hoc est, peccando, ex bonis factae sint malae; rursusque fieri bonae possint, sed ut fit quamdiu manent in peccato, ad sese alias occulta quadam suasione traducant: deinde, ut omnino malae non sint, sed in suo genere, quamvis inferiore, opus proprium sine ullo peccato exerceant: istae autem superiores quibus actionem longe praestantiorem rerum moderatrix iustitia summa tribuerit, si illas inferiores sequi et imitari voluerint, peccando fiunt malae, non quia malas, sed quia male imitantur. Ab illis enim agitur proprium, ab istis appetitur alienum: unde illae in suo gradu manent, istae ad inferiora merguntur, velut cum homines ferina sectantur. Pulchre namque incedit quadrupedans equus: at si hoc homo pedibus manibusque imitetur, quis eum vel palearum cibo dignum putet? Recte igitur plerumque improbamus imitantem, cum eum quem imitatur probemus. Improbamus autem, non quia non sit assecutus, sed quia omnino assequi voluit. In equo enim probamus illud, cui quantum praeponimus hominem, tantum offendimur quod inferiora sectatur. Quid inter ipsos homines, in emittenda voce nonne quod praeco bene facit, etiamsi clarius ac melius id faciat senator praecone, insanus est? Coelestia suscipe: lucens luna laudatur, suoque cursu atque vicibus bene considerantibus satis placet; tamen si eam sol velit imitari (fingamus enim eum posse habere huiusmodi voluntates), cui non summe ac iure displiceat? Ex quibus illud est quod intellegi volo. Etiam si sunt animae (quod interim incertum est), corporeis officiis non peccato, sed natura deditae, nosque, quanquam sint inferiores, aliqua tamen interiore vicinitate contingunt, non illas ideo malas haberi oportere, quia et nos cum eas sequimur, et corporea diligimus, mali sumus. Propterea enim corporea diligendo peccamus, quia spiritalia diligere et iustitia iubemur et natura possumus, et tunc in nostro genere optimi et beatissimi sumus. 		20. However even if it be conceded to them that we are enticed to shameful deeds by another inferior kind of souls, they do not thence make it evident that those enticing are evil by nature, or those enticed, supremely good. For it may be, the former of their own will, by striving after what was not lawful, that is, by sinning, from being good have become evil; and again they may be made good, but in such manner that for a long time they remain in sin, and by a certain occult suasion traduce to themselves other souls. Then, they may not be absolutely evil, but in their own kind, however inferior, they may exercise their own functions without any sin. But those superior souls to whom justice, the directress of things, has assigned a far more excellent activity, if they should wish to follow and to imitate those inferior ones, become evil, not because they imitate evil souls, but because they imitate in an evil way. By the evil souls is done what is proper to them, by the good what is alien to them is striven after. Hence the former remain in their own grade, the latter are plunged into a lower. It is as when men copy after beasts. For the four-footed horse walks beautifully, but if a man on all fours should imitate him, who would think him worthy even of chaff for food? Rightly therefore we generally disapprove of one who imitates, while we approve of him whom he imitates. But we disapprove not because he has not succeeded, but for wishing to succeed at all. For in the horse we approve of that to which by as much as we prefer man, by so much are we offended that he copies after inferior creatures. So among men, however well the crier may do in sending forth his voice, would not the senator be insane, if he should do it even more clearly and better than the crier? Take an illustration from the heavenly bodies: The moon when shining is praised, and by its course and its changes is quite pleasing to those that pay attention to such things. But if the sun should wish to imitate it (for we may feign that it has desires of this sort ), who would not be greatly and rightly displeased. From which illustrations I wish it to be understood, that even if there are souls (which meanwhile is left an open question ) devoted to bodily offices not by sin but by nature, and even if they are related to us, however inferior they may be, by some inner affinity, they should not be esteemed evil simply because we are evil ourselves in following them and in loving corporeal things. For we sin by loving corporeal things, because by justice we are required and by nature we are able to love spiritual things, and when we do this we are, in our kind, the best and the happiest.
13. 21. Quamobrem, quid habet argumenti aestuans in utramque partem deliberatio, modo in peccatum prona, modo in recte factum subvecta, ut duo animarum genera, quorum alterius natura ex Deo sit, alterius non sit, cogamur accipere, cum alias tot causas alternantis cogitationis coniicere liceat? Sed haec obscura esse, et incassum ab animis lippientibus quaeri, quisquis bonus rerum existimator est, videt. Quare illa potius quae de voluntate atque peccato dicta sunt, illa, inquam, quae summa iustitia neminem ratione utentem ignorare permittit, illa quae si auferantur nobis, nihil est unde disciplina virtutis inchoetur, nihil unde a vitiorum morte surgatur, etiam atque etiam considerata satis clare ac dilucide Manichaeorum haeresim falsam esse convincunt. 		21. Wherefore what proof does deliberation, violently urged in both directions, now prone to sin, now borne on toward right conduct, furnish, that we are compelled to accept two kinds of souls, the nature of one of which is from God, of the other not; when we are free to conjecture so many other causes of alternating states of mind? But that these things are obscure and are to no purpose pried into by blear-eyed minds, whoever is a good judge of things sees. Wherefore those things rather which have been said regarding the will and sin, those things, I say, that supreme justice permits no man using his reason to be ignorant of, those things which if they were taken from us, there is nothing whence the discipline of virtue may begin, nothing whence it may rise from the death of vices, those things I say considered again and again with sufficient clearness and lucidity convince us that the heresy of the Manichæans is false.
Rursum ex paenitendi utilitate monstratur animas non natura malas esse. Chapter 14.— Again It is Shown from the Utility of Repenting that Souls are Not by Nature Evil. So Sure a Demonstration is Not Contradicted Except from the Habit of Erring
14. 22. Horum simile est quod de poenitendo nunc dicam. Nam, ut inter omnes sanos constat, et quod ipsi Manichaei non solum fatentur, sed et praecipiunt, utile est poenitere peccati. Quid ego nunc in hanc rem divinarum Scripturarum testimonia, quae usquequaque diffusa sunt, colligam? Vox est etiam ista naturae: neminem stultum rei huius notitia deseruit; hoc nobis nisi penitus insitum esset, periremus. Potest aliquis dicere, non se peccare: non autem sibi esse, si peccaverit, poenitendum, nulla barbaries dicere audebit. Quae cum ita sint, quaero ex duobus illis generibus animarum, cuius sit poenitere peccati? Scio quidem neque illius esse posse, qui male facere, neque illius qui bene facere non potest: quare, ut eorum verbis utar, si animam tenebrarum peccati poenitet, non est de substantia summi mali; si animam lucis, non est de substantia summi boni. Poenitendi enim affectus ille qui prodest, et male fecisse poenitentem, et bene facere potuisse testatur. Quomodo igitur ex me nihil mali, si ego perperam feci? aut quomodo me recte poenitet, si ego non feci? Audi partem alteram: Quomodo ex me nihil boni est, cui bona voluntas inest? aut quomodo me recte poenitet, si non inest? Quamobrem aut negent isti esse poenitendi magnam utilitatem, ut non solum a christiano nomine, sed ab omni etiam vel imaginaria ratione pellantur; aut animarum illa duo genera, unum ex quo nihil mali, alterum ex quo nihil boni sit, dicere atque docere iam desinant: quod si faciant, Manichaei esse utique iam desinent; nam tota illa secta ista bicipiti, vel potius praecipiti animarum varietate fulcitur. 		22. Like the foregoing considerations is what I shall now say about repenting. For as among all sane people it is agreed, and this the Manichæans themselves not only confess but also teach, that to repent of sin is useful. Why shall I now, in this matter, collect the testimonies of the divine Scriptures, which are scattered throughout their pages? It is also the voice of nature; notice of this thing has escaped no fool. We should be undone, if this were not deeply imbedded in our nature. Some one may say that he does not sin; but no barbarity will dare to say, that if one sins he should not repent of it. This being the case, I ask to which of the two kinds of souls does repenting pertain? I know indeed that it can pertain neither to him who does ill nor to him who cannot do well. Wherefore, that I may use the words of the Manichæans, if a soul of darkness repent of sin, it is not of the substance of supreme evil, if a soul of light, it is not of the substance of supreme good; that disposition of repenting which is profitable testifies alike that the penitent has done ill, and that he could have done well. How, therefore, is there from me nothing of evil, if I have acted unadvisedly, or how can I rightly repent if I have not so done? Hear the other part. How is there from me nothing of good, if in me there is good will, or how do I rightly repent if there is not? Wherefore, either let them deny that there is great utility in repenting, so that they may be driven not only from the Christian name, but from every even imaginary argument for their views, or let them cease to say and to teach that there are two kinds of souls, one of which has nothing of evil, the other nothing of good; for that whole sect is propped up by this two-headed or rather headlong variety of souls.
14. 23. Ac mihi quidem satis est sic scire quod Manichaei errent, ut scio poenitendum esse peccati: et tamen si nunc amicorum meorum aliquem, qui usque adhuc illos audiendos putat, compellem iure amicitiae, et ei dicam: Scisne utile esse, cum quisque peccaverit, poenitere? sine dubitatione se scire iurabit. Si ergo te fecero ita scire falsam esse Manichaeorum haeresim, desiderabisne amplius? Quid amplius se posse in hac re desiderare respondeat. Bene quidem huc usque. Sed cum ostendere coepero certas necessariasque rationes, quae illam propositionem adamantinis, ut dicitur, catenis innexae consequuntur, remque totam ad conclusionem qua illa evertitur secta perduxero; negabit se forsitan scire utilitatem illam poenitendi, quam nemo doctus, nemo indoctus ignorat; et potius se scire contendet, cum dubitamus et deliberamus, duas in nobis animas patrocinia propria singulis quaestionis partibus adhibere. O consuetudo peccati! o comes poena peccati! Vos me tunc a rerum tam manifestarum consideratione avertistis; sed non sentienti nocebatis: nunc vero in familiarissimis meis similiter non sentientibus me iam vulneratis torquetisque sentientem. 		23. And to me indeed it is sufficient thus to know that the Manichæans err, that I know that sin must be repented of; and yet if now by right of friendship I should accost some one of my friends who still thinks that they are worthy of being listened to, and should say to him: Do you not know that it is useful, when any one has sinned, to repent? Without hesitation he will swear that he knows. If then I shall have convinced you that Manichæism is false, will you not desire anything more? Let him reply what more he can desire in this matter. Very well, so far. But when I shall have begun to show the sure and necessary arguments which, bound to it with adamantine chains, as the saying is, follow that proposition, and shall have conducted to its conclusion the whole process by which that sect is overthrown, he will deny perhaps that he knows the utility of repenting, which no learned man, no unlearned, is ignorant of, and will rather contend, when we hesitate and deliberate, that two souls in us furnish each its own proper help to the solution of the different parts of the question. O habit of sin! O accompanying penalty of sin! Then you turned me away from the consideration of things so manifest, but you injured me when I did not discern. But now, among my most familiar acquaintances who do not discern, you wound and torment me discerning.
Orat pro amicis quos habuit erroris socios. Chapter 15.— He Prays for His Friends Whom He Has Had as Associates in Error
15. 24. Attendite ista, quaeso, carissimi: vestra ingenia bene novi. Si mihi nunc vos qualiscumque hominis mentem rationemque conceditis, multo certiora sunt, quam quae ibi vel videbamur discere, vel magis credere cogebamur. Deus magne, Deus omnipotens, Deus summae bonitatis, quam inviolabilem atque incommutabilem credi atque intellegi fas est, Trina unitas, quam catholica Ecclesia colit, supplex oro, expertus in me misericordiam tuam, ne homines cum quibus mihi a pueritia in omni convictu fuit summa consensio, in tuo cultu a me dissentire permittas. Video maxime exspectari hoc loco, quomodo etiam catholicas Scripturas a Manichaeis accusatas vel tunc defenderem, si, ut dico, cautus essem; vel nunc defendi posse demonstrem. Sed in aliis voluminibus Deus adiuvabit propositum meum; nam huius iam, quantum arbitror, moderata parci sibi postulat longitudo. 		24. Give heed to these things, I beseech you, dearly beloved. Your dispositions I have well known. If you now concede to me the mind and the reason of any sort of man, these things are far more certain than the things that we seemed to learn or rather were compelled to believe. Great God, God omnipotent, God of supreme goodness, whose right it is to be believed and known to be inviolable and unchangeable. Trinal Unity, whom the Catholic Church worships, as one who have experienced in myself Your mercy, I supplicate You, that You will not permit those with whom from boyhood I have lived most harmoniously in every relation to dissent from me in Your worship. I see how it was especially to be expected in this place that I should either even then have defended the Catholic Scriptures attacked by the Manichæans, if as I say, I had been cautious; or I should now show that they can be defended. But in other volumes God will aid my purpose, for the moderate length of this, as I suppose, already asks to be spared.

Notes

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