Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book IX

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AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK IX

  • 9.1 De deo semper quaerendo. Chapter 1.— In What Way We Must Inquire Concerning the Trinity.
  • 9.2 An tria sint amens et quod amatur et amor, an autem duo sint cum quis non alium quam se ipsum diligit. Chapter 2.— The Three Things Which are Found in Love Must Be Considered.
  • 9.3 Menti notitiam sui nisi in se ipsa esse non posse. Chapter 3.— The Image of the Trinity in the Mind of Man Who Knows Himself and Loves Himself. The Mind Knows Itself Through Itself.
  • 9.4 Tria esse in anima quae sint unum, mentem et notitiam sui et amorem. Chapter 4.— The Three are One, and Also Equal, Viz The Mind Itself, and the Love, and the Knowledge of It. That the Same Three Exist Substantially, and are Predicated Relatively. That the Same Three are Inseparable. That the Same Three are Not Joined and Commingled Like Parts, But that They are of One Essence, and are Relatives.
  • 9.5 Quod mens et amor et notitia et singula in se maneant et omnia in omnibus. Chapter 5.— That These Three are Several in Themselves, and Mutually All in All.
  • 9.6 De notitia qua mens non solum se sed etiam alias menses nosse regulariter potest. Chapter 6.— There is One Knowledge of the Thing in the Thing Itself, and Another in Eternal Truth Itself. That Corporeal Things, Too, are to Be Judged the Rules of Eternal Truth.
  • 9.7 De verbo quod mens ex aeterna concipit veritate. Chapter 7.— We Conceive and Beget the Word Within, from the Things We Have Beheld in the Eternal Truth. The Word, Whether of the Creature or of the Creator, is Conceived by Love.
  • 9.8 Quali amore diligi debeat creature. Chapter 8.— In What Desire and Love Differ.
  • 9.9 Quo differat dilectio rerum spiritalium ab amore carnalium. Chapter 9.— In the Love of Spiritual Things the Word Born is the Same as the Word Conceived. It is Otherwise in the Love of Carnal Things.
  • 9.10 Non omnia quae notitia comprehendit dici posse concepta. Chapter 10.— Whether Only Knowledge that is Loved is the Word of the Mind.
  • 9.11 Conceptae notitiae similitudinem tune ad aequalitatem mentis accedere cum id quod cognoscitur neque inferioris neque superioris naturae est. Chapter 11.— That the Image or Begotten Word of the Mind that Knows Itself is Equal to the Mind Itself.
  • 9.12 Cur sicut notitia mentis est proles non etiam amor partus eiusdem sit. Chapter 12.— Why Love is Not the Offspring of the Mind, as Knowledge is So. The Solution of the Question. The Mind with the Knowledge of Itself and the Love of Itself is the Image of the Trinity.


Latin Latin
LIBER IX
 On the Trinity (Book IX)
That a kind of trinity exists in man, who is the image of God, viz. the mind, and the knowledge wherewith the mind knows itself, and the love wherewith it loves both itself and its own knowledge; and these three are shown to be mutually equal, and of one essence.
[9.1.1] Trinitatem certe quaerimus, non quamlibet sed illam trinitatem quae deus est, verusque ac summus et solus deus. Exspecta ergo, quisquis haec audis; adhuc enim quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat quod aut nosse aut eloqui difficillimum est. Affirmantem vero cito iusteque reprehendit quisquis melius vel videt vel docet. Quaerite, inquit, dominum, et vivet anima uestra. Et ne quisquam se tamquam apprehendisse temere gaudeat: Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius semper. Et apostolus: Si quis se, inquit, putat aliquid scire, nondum scit quemadmodum scire oporteat. Quisquis autem diligit deum, hic cognitus est ab illo. Nec sic quidem dixit, 'cognovit illum,' quae periculosa praesumptio est, sed, cognitus est ab illo. Sic et alibi cum dixisset: Nunc autem cognoscentes deum statim corrigens immo cogniti, inquit, a deo. Maximeque illo loco: Fratres, inquit, ego me ipsum non arbitror apprehendisse; unum autem, quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis dei in Christo Iesu. Quotquot ergo perfecti hoc sapiamus. Perfectionem in hac vita dicit non aliud quam ea quae retro sunt oblivisci et in ea quae ante sunt extendi secundum intentionem. Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus et quo extendimur. Sed ea recta intentio est quae proficiscitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem; cognitio vero certa non perficietur nisi post hanc vitam cum videbimus facie ad faciem. Hoc ergo sapiamus ut noverimus tutiorem esse affectum vera quaerendi quam incognita pro cognitis praesumendi. Sic ergo quaeramus tanquam inventuri, et sic inveniamus tamquam quaesituri. Cum enim consummaverit homo, tunc incipit. De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intellegendis nulla temeritate affirmemus, in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his veritas exquirenda. Quod ergo ad istam quaestionem attinet credamus patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum esse unum deum, universae creaturae conditorem atque rectorem; nec patrem esse filium nec spiritum sanctum vel patrem esse vel filium, sed trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum et unitatem aequalis essentiae. Quaeramus hoc autem intellegere ab eo ipso quem intellegere volumus auxilium precantes, et quantum tribuitur quod intellegimus explicare tanta cura et sollicitudine pietatis ut etiam si aliquid aliud pro alio dicimus, nihil tamen dicamus indignum. Ut si quid verbi gratia de patre dicimus quod patri proprie non conveniat, aut filio conveniat aut spiritui sancto aut ipsi trinitati; et si quid de filio quod filio proprie non congruat, saltem congruat patri aut spiritui sancto aut trinitati; item si quid de spiritu sancto quod proprietatem spiritus sancti non doceat, non tamen alienum sit a patre aut a filio aut ab uno deo ipsa trinitate, veluti nunc cupimus videre utrum illa excellentissima caritas proprie spiritus sanctus sit. Quod si non est, aut pater est caritas aut filius aut ipsa trinitas quondam resistere non possumus certissimae fidei et validissimae auctoritati scripturae dicentis: Deus caritas est. Non tamen debemus deviare sacrilego errore ut aliquid de trinitate dicamus quod non creatori sed creaturae potius conveniat aut inani cogitatione fingatur.
 1. We certainly seek a trinity—not any trinity, but that Trinity which is God, and the true and supreme and only God. Let my hearers then wait, for we are still seeking. And no one justly finds fault with such a search, if at least he who seeks that which either to know or to utter is most difficult, is steadfast in the faith. But whosoever either sees or teaches better, finds fault quickly and justly with any one who confidently affirms concerning it. Seek God, he says, and your heart shall live; and lest any one should rashly rejoice that he has, as it were, apprehended it, Seek, he says, His face evermore. And the apostle: If any man, he says, think that he knows anything, he knows nothing yet as he ought to know. But if any man love God, the same is known of Him. He has not said, has known Him, which is dangerous presumption, but is known of Him. So also in another place, when he had said, But now after that you have known God: immediately correcting himself, he says, or rather are known of God. And above all in that other place, Brethren, he says, I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press in purpose toward the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded. Perfection in this life, he tells us, is nothing else than to forget those things which are behind, and to reach forth and press in purpose toward those things which are before. For he that seeks has the safest purpose, [who seeks] until that is taken hold of whither we are tending, and for which we are reaching forth. But that is the right purpose which starts from faith. For a certain faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge; but a certain knowledge will not be made perfect, except after this life, when we shall see face to face. Let us therefore be thus minded, so as to know that the disposition to seek the truth is more safe than that which presumes things unknown to be known. Let us therefore so seek as if we should find, and so find as if we were about to seek. For when a man has done, then he begins. Let us doubt without unbelief of things to be believed; let us affirm without rashness of things to be understood: authority must be held fast in the former, truth sought out in the latter. As regards this question, then, let us believe that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one God, the Creator and Ruler of the whole creature; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a trinity of persons mutually interrelated, and a unity of an equal essence. And let us seek to understand this, praying for help from Himself, whom we wish to understand; and as much as He grants, desiring to explain what we understand with so much pious care and anxiety, that even if in any case we say one thing for another, we may at least say nothing unworthy. As, for the sake of example, if we say anything concerning the Father that does not properly belong to the Father, or does belong to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, or to the Trinity itself; and if anything of the Son which does not properly suit with the Son, or at all events which does suit with the Father, or with the Holy Spirit, or with the Trinity; or if, again, anything concerning the Holy Spirit, which is not fitly a property of the Holy Spirit, yet is not alien from the Father, or from the Son, or from the one God the Trinity itself. Even as now our wish is to see whether the Holy Spirit is properly that love which is most excellent which if He is not, either the Father is love, or the Son, or the Trinity itself; since we cannot withstand the most certain faith and weighty authority of Scripture, saying, God is love. And yet we ought not to deviate into profane error, so as to say anything of the Trinity which does not suit the Creator, but rather the creature, or which is feigned outright by mere empty thought.
[9.2.2] Quae cum ita sint attendamus ista tria quae invenisse nobis videmur. Nondum de supernis loquimur, nondum de deo patre et filio et spiritu sancto, sed de hac impart imagine attamen imagine, id est homine; familiarius enim eam et facilius fortassis intuetur nostrae mentis infirmitas. Ecce ego qui hoc quaero cum aliquid amo tria sunt, ego et quod amo et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem nisi amantem amem, nam non est amor ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt, amens et quod amatur et amor. Quid si non amem nisi me ipsum, nonne duo sunt, quod amo et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur hoc idem est quando se ipse amat, sicut amare et amari eodem modo idipsum est cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur cum dicitur, amat se, et, amatur a se. Tunc non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est alius atque alius amens et amatus. At vero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim quisquis se amat amor est nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor nisi iam aliquid amens quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur; tunc enim amens et quod amatur unum est. Unde videtur non esse consequens ut ubicumque amor fuerit iam tria intellegantur. Auferamus enim ab hac consideratione caetera quae multa sunt quibus homo constat, atque ut haec quae nunc requirimus quantum in his rebus possumus liquido reperiamus, de sola mente tractemus. Mens igitur cum amat se ipsam duo quaedam ostendit, mentem et amorem. Quid est autem amare se nisi praesto sibi esse velle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se vult esse quantum est, par menti voluntas est et amanti amor aequalis Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus sed spiritus, nec mens corpus sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus sed unus spiritus, nec essentiae duae sed una; et tamen duo quaedam unum sunt, amens et amor, sive sic dices, quod amatur et amor. Et haec quidem duo relative ad invicem dicuntur. Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et amor ad amantem; amens enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicuius amantis est. Mens vero et spiritus non relative dicuntur sed essentiam demonstrant. Non enim quia mens et spiritus alicuius hominis est, ideo mens et spiritus est. Retracto enim eo quod homo est, quod adiuncto corpore dicitur, retracto ergo corpore mens et spiritus manes. Retracto autem amante nullus est amor, et retracto amore nullus est amens. Ideoque quantum ad invicem referuntur duo sunt; quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus et simul utrumque unus spiritus, et singula mens et simul utrumque una mens. Ubi ergo trinitas? Attendamus quantum possumus et inuocemus lucem sempiternam ut inluminet tenebras nostras et videamus in nobis quantum sinimur imaginem dei.
 2. And this being so, let us direct our attention to those three things which we fancy we have found. We are not yet speaking of heavenly things, nor yet of God the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, but of that inadequate image, which yet is an image, that is, man; for our feeble mind perhaps can gaze upon this more familiarly and more easily. Well then, when I, who make this inquiry, love anything, there are three things concerned— myself, and that which I love, and love itself. For I do not love love, except I love a lover; for there is no love where nothing is loved. Therefore there are three things— he who loves, and that which is loved, and love. But what if I love none except myself? Will there not then be two things— that which I love, and love? For he who loves and that which is loved are the same when any one loves himself; just as to love and to be loved, in the same way, is the very same thing when any one loves himself. Since the same thing is said, when it is said, he loves himself, and he is loved by himself. For in that case to love and to be loved are not two different things: just as he who loves and he who is loved are not two different persons. But yet, even so, love and what is loved are still two things. For there is no love when any one loves himself, except when love itself is loved. But it is one thing to love one's self, another to love one's own love. For love is not loved, unless as already loving something; since where nothing is loved there is no love. Therefore there are two things when any one loves himself— love, and that which is loved. For then he that loves and that which is loved are one. Whence it seems that it does not follow that three things are to be understood wherever love is. For let us put aside from the inquiry all the other many things of which a man consists; and in order that we may discover clearly what we are now seeking, as far as in such a subject is possible, let us treat of the mind alone. The mind, then, when it loves itself, discloses two things— mind and love. But what is to love one's self, except to wish to help one's self to the enjoyment of self? And when any one wishes himself to be just as much as he is, then the will is on a par with the mind, and the love is equal to him who loves. And if love is a substance, it is certainly not body, but spirit; and the mind also is not body, but spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits, but one spirit; nor yet two essences, but one: and yet here are two things that are one, he that loves and love; or, if you like so to put it, that which is loved and love. And these two, indeed, are mutually said relatively. Since he who loves is referred to love, and love to him who loves. For he who loves, loves with some love, and love is the love of some one who loves. But mind and spirit are not said relatively, but express essence. For mind and spirit do not exist because the mind and spirit of some particular man exists. For if we subtract the body from that which is man, which is so called with the conjunction of body, the mind and spirit remain. But if we subtract him that loves, then there is no love; and if we subtract love, then there is no one that loves. And therefore, in so far as they are mutually referred to one another, they are two; but whereas they are spoken in respect to themselves, each are spirit, and both together also are one spirit; and each are mind, and both together one mind. Where, then, is the trinity? Let us attend as much as we can, and let us invoke the everlasting light, that He may illuminate our darkness, and that we may see in ourselves, as much as we are permitted, the image of God.
[9.3.3] Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest nisi etiam noverit se. Nam quomodo amat quod nescit? Aut si quisquam dicit ex notitia generali vel speciali mentem credere se esse talem quales alias experta est et ideo amare semetipsam, insipientissime loquitur. Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit si se non novit? Neque enim ut oculus corporis videt altos oculos et se non videt, ita mens novit alias menses et ignorat semetipsam. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus quia radios, qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus nisi cum specula intuemur. Quod subtilissime obscurissimeque disseritur donec apertissime demonstretur vel ita se rem habere vel non ita. Sed quoquo modo se habeas vis qua per oculos cernimus, ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus; sed mente quaerimus, et si fieri potest etiam hoc mente comprehendimus. Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam novit quondam est incorporea. Nam si non se novit, non se amat.
 3. For the mind cannot love itself, except also it know itself; for how can it love what it does not know? Or if any body says that the mind, from either general or special knowledge, believes itself of such a character as it has by experience found others to be and therefore loves itself, he speaks most foolishly. For whence does a mind know another mind, if it does not know itself? For the mind does not know other minds and not know itself, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself; for we see bodies through the eyes of the body, because, unless we are looking into a mirror, we cannot refract and reflect the rays into themselves which shine forth through those eyes, and touch whatever we discern—a subject, indeed, which is treated of most subtlely and obscurely, until it be clearly demonstrated whether the fact be so, or whether it be not. But whatever is the nature of the power by which we discern through the eyes, certainly, whether it be rays or anything else, we cannot discern with the eyes that power itself; but we inquire into it with the mind, and if possible, understand even this with the mind. As the mind, then, itself gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal; for if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.
[9.4.4] Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius cum se novit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt. Si enim minus se amat quam est ut verbi gratia tantum se amet hominis mens quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus, peccat et non est perfectus amor eius. Item si amplius se amet quam est velut si tantum se amet quantum amandus est deus, cum incomparabiliter minus sit ipsa quam deus, etiam sic nimio peccat et non perfectum habet amorem suit Maiore autem peruersitate et iniquitate peccat cum corpus tantum amat quantum amandus est deus. Item notitia si minor est quam est illud quod noscitur et plene nosci potest, perfecta non est. Si autem maior est, iam superior est natura quae novit quam illa quae note est, sicut maior est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus quod ea notitia notum est. Illa enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis; corpus autem non est vita. Et vita quaelibet quolibet corpore maior est, non mole sed vi. Mens vero cum se ipsa cognoscit, non se superat notitia sua quia ipsa cognoscit, ipsa cognoscitur. Cum ergo se totem cognoscit neque secum quidquam aliud, par illi est cognitio sua quia neque ex alia natura est eius cognitio cum se ipsa cognoscit. Et cum se totem nihilque amplius percipit, nec minor nec maior est. Recte igitur diximus haec tria cum perfecta sunt esse consequenter aequalia.
 4. But as there are two things (duo quædam), the mind and the love of it, when it loves itself; so there are two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things (tria quædam), and these three are one; and when they are perfect they are equal. For if one loves himself less than as he is—as for example, suppose that the mind of a man only loves itself as much as the body of a man ought to be loved, whereas the mind is more than the body—then it is in fault, and its love is not perfect. Again, if it loves itself more than as it is—as if, for instance, it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, whereas the mind is incomparably less than God—here also it is exceedingly in fault, and its love of self is not perfect. But it is in fault more perversely and wrongly still, when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. Also, if knowledge is less than that thing which is known, and which can be fully known, then knowledge is not perfect; but if it is greater, then the nature which knows is above that which is known, as the knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the reason of the knower, but the body is not life; and any life is greater than any body, not in bulk, but in power. But when the mind knows itself, its own knowledge does not rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself is known. When, therefore, it knows itself entirely, and no other thing with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself; because its knowledge is not from another nature, since it knows itself. And when it perceives itself entirely, and nothing more, then it is neither less nor greater. We said therefore rightly, that these three things, [mind, love, and knowledge], when they are perfect, are by consequence equal.
[9.4.5] Simul etiam admonemur si utcumque videre possumus haec in anima exsistere et tamquam inuoluta euolui ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tamquam in subiecto ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est non excedit subiectum in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore quo se amat potest amare et aliud praeter se. Item non se solam cognoscit mens sed et alla multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens quia et si relative dicuntur ad invicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia; non sicut color et coloratum relative ita dicuntur ad invicem ut color in subiecto colorato sit non habens in se ipso propriam substantiam, quondam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia; sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines quae sunt substantiae, cum homines non relative dicantur, amici autem relative.
 5. Similar reasoning suggests to us, if indeed we can any way understand the matter, that these things [i.e. love and knowledge] exist in the soul, and that, being as it were involved in it, they are so evolved from it as to be perceived and reckoned up substantially, or, so to say, essentially. Not as though in a subject; as color, or shape, or any other quality or quantity, are in the body. For anything of this [material] kind does not go beyond the subject in which it is; for the color or shape of this particular body cannot be also those of another body. But the mind can also love something besides itself, with that love with which it loves itself. And further, the mind does not know itself only, but also many other things. Wherefore love and knowledge are not contained in the mind as in a subject, but these also exist substantially, as the mind itself does; because, even if they are mutually predicated relatively, yet they exist each severally in their own substance. Nor are they so mutually predicated relatively as color and the colored subject are; so that color is in the colored subject, but has not any proper substance in itself, since colored body is a substance, but color is in a substance; but as two friends are also two men, which are substances, while they are said to be men not relatively, but friends relatively.
[9.4.6] Sed item quamvis substantia sit amens vel sciens, substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor, sed amens et amor aut sciens et scientia relative ad se dicantur sicut amici; mens vero aut spiritus non sint relativa sicut nec homines relativa sunt; non tamen sicut amici homines possum seorsum esse ab invicem, sic amens et amor aut sciens et scientia. Quamquam et amici corpore videntur separari posse, non animo in quantum amici sunt, verumtamen fieri potest ut amicus amicum etiam odisse incipiat, et eo ipso amicus esse desinat nesciente illo et adhuc amante. Amor autem quo se mens amat si esse desinat, simul et illa desinit esse amens. Item notitia qua se mens novit si esse desinat simul et illa nosse se desinet. Sicut caput capitati alicuius utique caput est et relative ad se dicuntur quamvis etiam substantiae sins; nam et caput corpus est et capitatum, et si non sit corpus nec capitatum erit. Sed haec praecisione ab invicem separari possunt, illa non possum.
 6. But, further, although one who loves or one who knows is a substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a substance, but he that loves and love, or, he that knows and knowledge, are spoken of relatively to each other, as are friends: yet mind or spirit are not relatives, as neither are men relatives: nevertheless he that loves and love, or he that knows and knowledge, cannot exist separately from each other, as men can that are friends. Although it would seem that friends, too, can be separated in body, not in mind, in as far as they are friends: nay, it can even happen that a friend may even also begin to hate a friend and on this account cease to be a friend while the other does not know it, and still loves him. But if the love with which the mind loves itself ceases to be, then the mind also will at the same time cease to love. Likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself ceases to be, then the mind will also at the same time cease to know itself. Just as the head of anything that has a head is certainly a head, and they are predicated relatively to each other, although they are also substances: for both a head is a body, and so is that which has a head; and if there be no head, then neither will there be that which has a head. Only these things can be separated from each other by cutting off, those cannot.
[9.4.7] Quod si sunt aliqua corpora quae secari omnino et dividi nequeunt, tamen nisi partibus suds constarent corpora non essent. Pars ergo ad totum relative dicitur quia omnis pars alicuius totius pars est et totum omnibus partibus totum est. Sed quondam et pars corpus est et totum, non tantum ista relative dicuntur, sed etiam substantialiter sunt. Fortassis ergo mens totum est et eius quasi parses amor quo se amat et scientia qua se novit, quibus duabus partibus illud totum constat? An tres sunt aequales parses quibus totum unum completur? Sed nulla pars totum cuius pars est complectitur. Mens vero cum se totem novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum eius est notitia eius; et cum se perfecte amat, totem se amat et per totum eius est amor eius. Num ergo sicut ex vino et aqua et melle una fit potio et singula per totum sunt et tamen tria sunt (nulla enim pars est potionis quae non habeas haec tria; non enim iuncta velut si aqua et oleum essent, sed omnino commixta sunt, et substantiae sunt omnes, et totus ille liquor una quaedam est ex tribus confecta substantia), tale aliquid arbitrandum est esse simul haec tria, mentem, amorem, notitiam? Sed non unius substantiae sunt aqua, vinum, et mel, quamvis ex eorum commixtione fiat una substantia potionis Quomodo autem illa tria non sint eiusdem essentiae non video, cum mens ipsa se amet atque ipsa se noverit atque ita sint haec tria ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel note sit. Unius ergo eiusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sins, et ideo si tamquam commixtione confusa essent, nullo modo essent tria nec referri ad invicem possent. Quemadmodum si ex uno eodemque auro tres anulos similes facias quamvis connexos sibi, referuntur ad invicem quod similes sunt; omnis enim similis alicui similis est, et trinitas anulorum est et unum aurum. At si misceantur sibi et per totem singuli massam suam conspergantur, intercidet illa trinitas et omnino non erit, ac non solum unum aurum dicetur sicut in illis tribus anulis dicebatur, sed iam nulla aurea tria.
 7. And even if there are some bodies which cannot be wholly separated and divided, yet they would not be bodies unless they consisted of their own proper parts. A part then is predicated relatively to a whole, since every part is a part of some whole, and a whole is a whole by having all its parts. But since both part and whole are bodies, these things are not only predicated relatively, but exist also substantially. Perhaps, then, the mind is a whole, and the love with which it loves itself, and the knowledge with which it knows itself, are as it were its parts, of which two parts that whole consists. Or are there three equal parts which make up the one whole? But no part embraces the whole, of which it is a part; whereas, when the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows itself perfectly, then the knowledge of it extends through the whole of it; and when it loves itself perfectly, then it loves itself as a whole, and the love of it extends through the whole of it. Is it, then, as one drink is made from wine and water and honey, and each single part extends through the whole, and yet they are three things (for there is no part of the drink which does not contain these three things; for they are not joined as if they were water and oil, but are entirely commingled: and they are all substances, and the whole of that liquor which is composed of the three is one substance),— is it, I say, in some such way as this we are to think these three to be together, mind, love, and knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, although one substance results in the drink made from the commingling of them. And I cannot see how those other three are not of the same substance, since the mind itself loves itself, and itself knows itself; and these three so exist, as that the mind is neither loved nor known by any other thing at all. These three, therefore, must needs be of one and the same essence; and for that reason, if they were confounded together as it were by a commingling, they could not be in any way three, neither could they be mutually referred to each other. Just as if you were to make from one and the same gold three similar rings, although connected with each other, they are mutually referred to each other, because they are similar. For everything similar is similar to something, and there is a trinity of rings, and one gold. But if they are blended with each other, and each mingled with the other through the whole of their own bulk, then that trinity will fall through, and it will not exist at all; and not only will it be called one gold, as it was called in the case of those three rings, but now it will not be called three things of gold at all.
[9.5.8] At in illis tribus cum se novit mens et amat se, manes trinitas, mens, amor, notitia; et nulla commixtione confunditur quamvis et singula sint in se ipsis et invicem tota in totis, sive singula in binis sive bina in singulis, itaque omnia in omnibus. Nam et mens est utique in se ipsa quondam ad se ipsam mens dicitur, quamvis noscens vel note vel noscibilis ad suam notitiam relative dicatur; amens quoque et amata vel amabilis ad amorem referatur quo se amat. Et notitia quamvis referatur ad mentem cognoscentem vel cognitam, tamen et ad se ipsam note et noscens dicitur; non enim sibi est incognita notitia qua se mens ipsa cognoscit. Et amor quamvis referatur ad mentem amantem cuius amor est, tamen et ad se ipsum est amor ut sit etiam in se ipso quia et amor amatur, nec alio nisi amore amari potest, id est se ipso. Ita sunt haec singula in se ipsis. In alternis autem ita sunt quia et mens amens in amore est et amor in amantis notitia et notitia in mente noscente. Singula in binds ita sunt quia mens quae se novit et amat in amore et notitia sua est, et amor amantis mentis seseque scientis in mente notitiaque eius est, et notitia mentis se scientis et amantis in mente atque in amore eius est quia scientem se amat et amantem se novit. Ac per hoc et bina in singulis quia mens quae se novit et amat cum sua notitia est in amore et cum suo amore in notitia, amorque ipse et notitia simul sunt in mente quae se amat et novit. Tota vero in totis quemadmodum sint iam supra ostendimus cum se totem mens amat et totem novit et totum amorem suum novit totamque amat notitiam suam quando tria ista ad se ipsa perfecta sunt. Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quidque substantia est et simul omnia una substantia vel essentia cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.
 8. But in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not confounded together by any commingling: although they are each severally in themselves and mutually all in all, or each severally in each two, or each two in each. Therefore all are in all. For certainly the mind is in itself, since it is called mind in respect to itself: although it is said to be knowing, or known, or knowable, relatively to its own knowledge; and although also as loving, and loved, or lovable, it is referred to love, by which it loves itself. And knowledge, although it is referred to the mind that knows or is known, nevertheless is also predicated both as known and knowing in respect to itself: for the knowledge by which the mind knows itself is not unknown to itself. And although love is referred to the mind that loves, whose love it is; nevertheless it is also love in respect to itself, so as to exist also in itself: since love too is loved, yet cannot be loved with anything except with love, that is with itself. So these things are severally in themselves. But so are they in each other; because both the mind that loves is in love, and love is in the knowledge of him that loves, and knowledge is in the mind that knows. And each severally is in like manner in each two, because the mind which knows and loves itself, is in its own love and knowledge: and the love of the mind that loves and knows itself, is in the mind and in its knowledge: and the knowledge of the mind that knows and loves itself is in the mind and in its love, because it loves itself that knows, and knows itself that loves. And hence also each two is in each severally, since the mind which knows and loves itself, is together with its own knowledge in love, and together with its own love in knowledge; and love too itself and knowledge are together in the mind, which loves and knows itself. But in what way all are in all, we have already shown above; since the mind loves itself as a whole, and knows itself as a whole, and knows its own love wholly, and loves its own knowledge wholly, when these three things are perfect in respect to themselves. Therefore these three things are marvellously inseparable from each other, and yet each of them is severally a substance, and all together are one substance or essence, while they are mutually predicated relatively.
[9.6.9] Sed cum se ipsam novit humane mens et amat se ipsam, non aliquid incommutabile novit et amat. Aliterque unusquisque homo loquendo enuntiat mentem suam quid in se ipso agatur attendens aliter autem humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. Itaque cum mihi de sua propria loquitur, utrum intellegat hoc aut illud an non intellegat, et utrum velit an nolit hoc aut illud, credo, cum vero de humane specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit, agnosco et approbo. Unde manifestum est aliud unumquemque videre in se quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen videat; aliud autem in ipsa veritate quod alius quoque possit intueri, quorum alterum mutari per tempora, alterum incommutabili aeternitate consistere. Neque enim oculis corporeis multas menses videndo per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam, sed intuemur inuiolabilem veritatem ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definiamus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat.
 9. But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love anything unchangeable: and each individual man declares his own particular mind by one manner of speech, when he considers what takes place in himself; but defines the human mind abstractly by special or general knowledge. And so, when he speaks to me of his own individual mind, as to whether he understands this or that, or does not understand it, or whether he wishes or does not wish this or that, I believe; but when he speaks the truth of the mind of man generally or specially, I recognize and approve. Whence it is manifest, that each sees a thing in himself, in such way that another person may believe what he says of it, yet may not see it; but another [sees a thing] in the truth itself, in such way that another person also can gaze upon it; of which the former undergoes changes at successive times, the latter consists in an unchangeable eternity. For we do not gather a generic or specific knowledge of the human mind by means of resemblance by seeing many minds with the eyes of the body: but we gaze upon indestructible truth, from which to define perfectly, as far as we can, not of what sort is the mind of any one particular man, but of what sort it ought to be upon the eternal plan.
[9.6.10] Unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas et quodam modo infuses memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non visa sunt ficto phantasmate cogitantur sive aliter quam sunt sive fortuito sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus vel approbare apud nosmetipsos vel improbare conuincimur cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae vidi et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non vidi easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens, rationabiliter praefero. Viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est, et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtexitur, non tamen inuoluitur atque confunditur.
 10. Whence also, even in the case of the images of things corporeal which are drawn in through the bodily sense, and in some way infused into the memory, from which also those things which have not been seen are thought under a fancied image, whether otherwise than they really are, or even perchance as they are—even here too, we are proved either to accept or reject, within ourselves, by other rules which remain altogether unchangeable above our mind, when we approve or reject anything rightly. For both when I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and imagine to myself the walls of Alexandria which I have not seen, and, in preferring this to that among forms which in both cases are imaginary, make that preference upon grounds of reason; the judgment of truth from above is still strong and clear, and rests firmly upon the utterly indestructible rules of its own right; and if it is covered as it were by cloudiness of corporeal images, yet is not wrapt up and confounded in them.
[9.6.11] Sed interest utrum ego sub illa vel in illa caligine tamquam a caelo perspicuo secludar, an sicut in altissimis montibus accidere solet inter utrumque aere libero fruens et serenissimam lucem supra et densissimas nebulas subter aspiciam. Nam unde in me fraterni amoris inflammatur ardor cum audio virum aliquem pro fidei pulchritudine et firmitate acriora tormenta tolerasse? Et si mihi digito ostendatur ipse homo, studeo mihi coniungere, notum facere, amicitiaconligare. Itaque si facultas datur, accedo, alloquor, sermonem confero, affectum meum in illum quibus verbis possum exprimo, vicissimque in eo fieri quem in me habeat atque exprimi volo, spiritalemque complexum credendo molior quia peruestigare tam cito et cernere penitus eius interiora non possum. Amo itaque fidelem ac fortem virum amore casto atque germano. Quod si mihi inter nostras loquelas fateatur aut incautus aliquo modo sese indicet quod vel de deo credat incongrua atque in illo quoque aliquid carnale desideret et pro tali errore illa pertulerit, vel speratae pecuniae cupiditate vel inani aviditate laudis humanae, statim amor ille quo in eum ferebar offensus et quasi repercussus atque ab indigno homine ablatus in ea forma permanet ex qua eum talem credens amaveram. Nisi forte ad hoc amo iam ut talis sit cum talem non esse comperero. At in illo homine nihil mutatum est; mutari tamen potest ut fiat quod eum iam esse credideram. In mente autem mea mutata est utique ipsa existimatio quae de illo aliter se habebat et aliter habet, idemque amor ab intentione perfruendi ad intentionem consulendi incommutabili desuper iustitia iubente deflexus est. Ipsa vero forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis et in qua fruerer homine bonum eum credens et in qua consulo ut bonus sit eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum et illam phantasiae nubem quam desuper cerno cum eundem hominem quem videram cogito imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit. Item cum arcum pulchre et aequabiliter intortum quem vidi verbi gratia Carthagine animo reuoluo, res quaedam menti nuntiata per oculos memoriaeque transfusa imaginarium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente conspicio secundum quod mihi opus illud placet, unde etiam si displiceret corrigerem. Itaque de istis secundum illam iudicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu. Ista vero aut praesentia sensu corporis tangimus aut imagines absentium fixas in memoria recordamur aut ex earum similitudine talia fingimus qualia nos ipsi si vellemus atque possemus etiam opere moliremur aliter figurantes animo imagines corporum aut per corpus corpora videntes, aliter autem rationes artemque ineffabiliter pulchram talium figurarum super aciem mentis simplici intellegentia capientes.
 11. But it makes a difference, whether, under that or in that darkness, I am shut off as it were from the clear heaven; or whether (as usually happens on lofty mountains), enjoying the free air between both, I at once look up above to the calmest light, and down below upon the densest clouds. For whence is the ardor of brotherly love kindled in me, when I hear that some man has borne bitter torments for the excellence and steadfastness of faith? And if that man is shown to me with the finger, I am eager to join myself to him, to become acquainted with him, to bind him to myself in friendship. And accordingly, if opportunity offers, I draw near, I address him, I converse with him, I express my goodwill towards him in what words I can, and wish that in him too in turn should be brought to pass and expressed goodwill towards me; and I endeavor after a spiritual embrace in the way of belief, since I cannot search out so quickly and discern altogether his innermost heart. I love therefore the faithful and courageous man with a pure and genuine love. But if he were to confess to me in the course of conversation, or were through unguardedness to show in any way, that either he believes something unseemly of God, and desires also something carnal in Him, and that he bore these torments on behalf of such an error, or from the desire of money for which he hoped, or from empty greediness of human praise: immediately it follows that the love with which I was borne towards him, displeased, and as it were repelled, and taken away from an unworthy man, remains in that form, after which, believing him such as I did, I had loved him; unless perhaps I have come to love him to this end, that he may become such, while I have found him not to be such in fact. And in that man, too, nothing is changed: although it can be changed, so that he may become that which I had believed him to be already. But in my mind there certainly is something changed, viz., the estimate I had formed of him, which was before of one sort, and now is of another: and the same love, at the bidding from above of unchangeable righteousness, is turned aside from the purpose of enjoying, to the purpose of taking counsel. But the form itself of unshaken and stable truth, wherein I should have enjoyed the fruition of the man, believing him to be good, and wherein likewise I take counsel that he may be good, sheds in an immoveable eternity the same light of incorruptible and most sound reason, both upon the sight of my mind, and upon that cloud of images, which I discern from above, when I think of the same man whom I had seen. Again, when I call back to my mind some arch, turned beautifully and symmetrically, which, let us say, I saw at Carthage; a certain reality that had been made known to the mind through the eyes, and transferred to the memory, causes the imaginary view. But I behold in my mind yet another thing, according to which that work of art pleases me; and whence also, if it displeased me, I should correct it. We judge therefore of those particular things according to that [form of eternal truth], and discern that form by the intuition of the rational mind. But those things themselves we either touch if present by the bodily sense, or if absent remember their images as fixed in our memory, or picture, in the way of likeness to them, such things as we ourselves also, if we wished and were able, would laboriously build up: figuring in the mind after one fashion the images of bodies, or seeing bodies through the body; but after another, grasping by simple intelligence what is above the eye of the mind, viz., the reasons and the unspeakably beautiful skill of such forms.
[9.7.12] In illa igitur aeterna veritate ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia formam secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tamquam verbum apud nos habemus et dicendo intus gignimus, nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus aut alicuius signi corporalis ut per quandam commemorationem sensibilem tale aliquid fiat etiam in animo audientis quale de loquentis animo non recedit. Nihil itaque agimus per membra corporis in factis dictisque nostris quibus vel approbantur vel improbantur mores hominum quod non verbo apud nos intus edito praevenimus. Nemo enim aliquid volens facit quod non in corde suo prius dixerit.
 12. We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason, either in ourselves, or in things corporeal; and we have the true knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we beget it from within; nor by being born does it depart from us. And when we speak to others, we apply to the word, remaining within us, the ministry of the voice or of some bodily sign, that by some kind of sensible remembrance some similar thing may be wrought also in the mind of him that hears—similar, I say, to that which does not depart from the mind of him that speaks. We do nothing, therefore, through the members of the body in our words and actions, by which the behavior of men is either approved or blamed, which we do not anticipate by a word uttered within ourselves. For no one willingly does anything, which he has not first said in his heart.
[9.7.13] Quod verbum amore concipitur sive creaturae sive creatoris, id est aut naturae mutabilis aut incommutabilis veritatis.
 13. And this word is conceived by love, either of the creature or of the Creator, that is, either of changeable nature or of unchangeable truth.
[9.8.13] Ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate, non quo non sit amanda creatura, sed si ad creatorem refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas sed caritas erit. Tunc enim est cupiditas cum propter se amatur creatura. Tunc non utentem adivuat sed corrumpit fruentem. Cum ergo aut par nobis aut inferior creatura sit, inferiore utendum est ad deum, pari autem fruendum sed in deo. Sicut enim te ipso non in te ipso frui debes sed in eo qui fecit te, sic etiam illo quem diligis tamquam te ipsum. Et nobis ergo et fratribus in domino fruamur, et inde nos nec ad nosmetipsos remit tere et quasi relax are deorsum versus audeamus. Nascitur autem verbum cum excogitatum placet aut ad peccandum aut ad recte faciendum. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur quasi medius amor coniungit seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo sine ulla confusione constringit.
 [Conceived] therefore, either by desire or by love: not that the creature ought not to be loved; but if that love [of the creature] is referred to the Creator, then it will not be desire (cupiditas), but love (charitas). For it is desire when the creature is loved for itself. And then it does not help a man through making use of it, but corrupts him in the enjoying it. When, therefore, the creature is either equal to us or inferior, we must use the inferior in order to God, but we must enjoy the equal duly in God. For as you ought to enjoy yourself, not in yourself, but in Him who made you, so also him whom you love as yourself. Let us enjoy, therefore, both ourselves and our brethren in the Lord; and hence let us not dare to yield, and as it were to relax, ourselves to ourselves in the direction downwards. Now a word is born, when, being thought out, it pleases us either to the effect of sinning, or to that of doing right. Therefore love, as it were a mean, conjoins our word and the mind from which it is conceived, and without any confusion binds itself as a third with them, in an incorporeal embrace.
[9.9.14] Conceptum autem verbum et natum idipsum est cum voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritalium. Qui enim verbi gratia perfecte novit perfecteque amat iustitiam, iam iustus est etiamsi nulla exsistat secundum eam forinsecus per membra corporis operandi necessitas. In amore autem carnalium temporaliumque rerum sicut in ipsis animalium fetibus alius est conceptus verbi, alius partus. Illic enim quod cupiendo concipitur adipiscendo nascitur quoniam non sufficit auaritiae nosse et amare aurum nisi et habeat, neque nosse et amare uesci aut concumbere nisi etiam id agat, neque nosse et amare honores et imperia nisi proveniant. Quae tamen omnia nec adepta sufficiunt: Qui enim biberit, inquit, ex hac aqua sitiet iterum ideoque et in psalmis: Concepit, inquit, dolorem et peperit iniquitatem. Dolorem vel laborem dicit concipi cum ea concipiuntur quae nosse ac velle non sufficit, et inardescit atque aegrotat animus indigentia donec ad ea perveniat et quasi pariat ea. Unde eleganter in latina lingua parta dicuntur et reperta atque comperta, quae verba quasi a partu ducta resonant, quia concupiscentia cum conceperit parit peccatum. Unde dominus clamat: Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis et alio loco: Vae praegnantibus et mammantibus in illis diebus. Cum itaque ad partum verbi referret omnia vel recte facta vel peccata. Ex ore inquit, tuo iustificaberis et ex ore tuo condemnaberis os volens intellegi non hoc visibile sed interius inuisibile cogitationis et cordis.
 14. But the word conceived and the word born are the very same when the will finds rest in knowledge itself, as is the case in the love of spiritual things. For instance, he who knows righteousness perfectly, and loves it perfectly, is already righteous; even if no necessity exist of working according to it outwardly through the members of the body. But in the love of carnal and temporal things, as in the offspring of animals, the conception of the word is one thing, the bringing forth another. For here what is conceived by desiring is born by attaining. Since it does not suffice to avarice to know and to love gold, except it also have it; nor to know and love to eat, or to lie with any one, unless also one does it; nor to know and love honors and power, unless they actually come to pass. Nay, all these things, even if obtained, do not suffice. Whosoever drinks of this water, He says, shall thirst again. And so also the Psalmist, He has conceived pain and brought forth iniquity. And he speaks of pain or labor as conceived, when those things are conceived which it is not sufficient to know and will, and when the mind burns and grows sick with want, until it arrives at those things, and, as it were, brings them forth. Whence in the Latin language we have the word parta used elegantly for both reperta and comperta, which words sound as if derived from bringing forth. Since lust, when it has conceived, brings forth sin. Wherefore the Lord proclaims, Come unto me all you that labor and are heavy laden; and in another place Woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck, in those days! And when therefore He referred all either right actions or sins to the bringing forth of the word, By your mouth, He says, you shall be justified, and by your mouth you shall be condemned, intending thereby not the visible mouth, but that which is within and invisible, of the thought and of the heart.
[9.10.15] Recte ergo quaeritur utrum omnis notitia verbum an tantum amata notitia. Novimus enim et ea quae odimus, sed nec concepta nec parta dicenda sunt animo quae nobis displicent. Non enim omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt concipiuntur, ut tantum nota sint non tamen verba dicantur ista de quibus nunc agimus. Aliter enim dicuntur verba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent sive pronuntientur sive cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est verbum dicitur animo impressum quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest, quamvis res ipsa displiceat; aliter cum placet quod mente concipitur. Secundum quod genus verbi accipiendum est quod ait apostolus: Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in spiritu sancto cum secundum aliam verbi notionem dicant hoc et illi de quibus ipse dominus ait: Non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum. Verumtamen cum et illa quae odimus recte displicent recteque improbantur, approbatur eorum improbatio et placet et verbum est. Neque vitiorum notitia nobis displicet sed ipsa vitia. Nam placet mihi quod novi et definio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc est verbum eius. Sicuti sunt in arte nota vitia, et recte approbatur eorum notitia cum discernit cognitor speciem privationemque virtutis sicut aiere et negare et esse et non esse; attamen virtute privari atque in vitium deficere damnabile est. Et definire intemperantiam verbumque eius dicere pertinet ad artem morum; esse autem intemperantem ad id pertinet quod illa arte culpatur. Sicut nosse ac definire quid sit soloecismus pertinet ad artem loquendi; facere autem vitium est quod eadem arte reprehenditur. Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare volumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens novit et amat iungitur ei amore verbum eius. Et quoniam amat notitiam et novit amorem, et verbum in amore est et amor in verbo et utrumque in amante atque dicente.
 15. It is rightly asked then, whether all knowledge is a word, or only knowledge that is loved. For we also know the things which we hate; but what we do not like, cannot be said to be either conceived or brought forth by the mind. For not all things which in anyway touch it, are conceived by it; but some only reach the point of being known, but yet are not spoken as words, as for instance those of which we speak now. For those are called words in one way, which occupy spaces of time by their syllables, whether they are pronounced or only thought; and in another way, all that is known is called a word imprinted on the mind, as long as it can be brought forth from the memory and defined, even though we dislike the thing itself; and in another way still, when we like that which is conceived in the mind. And that which the apostle says, must be taken according to this last kind of word, No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost; since those also say this, but according to another meaning of the term word, of whom the Lord Himself says, Not every one that says unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. Nay, even in the case of things which we hate, when we rightly dislike and rightly censure them, we approve and like the censure bestowed upon them, and it becomes a word. Nor is it the knowledge of vices that displeases us, but the vices themselves. For I like to know and define what intemperance is; and this is its word. Just as there are known faults in art, and the knowledge of them is rightly approved, when a connoisseur discerns the species or the privation of excellence, as to affirm and deny that it is or that it is not; yet to be without excellence and to fall away into fault, is worthy of condemnation. And to define intemperance, and to say its word, belongs to the art of morals; but to be intemperate belongs to that which that art censures. Just as to know and define what a solecism is, belongs to the art of speaking; but to be guilty of one, is a fault which the same art reprehends. A word, then, which is the point we wish now to discern and intimate, is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks.
[9.10.16] Sed omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei quam novit. Est enim alia notitia secundum privationem quam cum improbamus loquimur, et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat ideoque approbatur.
 16. But all knowledge according to species is like the thing which it knows. For there is another knowledge according to privation, according to which we speak a word only when we condemn. And this condemnation of a privation is equivalent to praise of the species, and so is approved.
[9.11.16] Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem sive cum ea placet sive cum eius privatio displicet. Quocirca in quantum deum novimus similes sumus, sed non adaequalitatem similes quia nec tantum eum novimus quantum ipse se. Et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis discimus corpora fit aliqua eorum similitudo in animo nostro quae phantasia memoriae est (non enim omnino ipsa corpora in animo sunt cum ea cogitamus sed eorum similitudines, itaque cum eas pro illis approbamus erramus; error est namque pro alio alterius approbatio; melior est tamen imaginatio corporns in animo quam illa species corporis in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est in substantia vitali sicuti est animus), ita cum deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata verbum est fitque aliqua dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, creator autem deus. Ex quo colligitur qma cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat sic est eadem notitia verbum eius ut ei sit par omnino et aequale atque identidem quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est sicut corporis neque superioris sicut dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam novit, hoc est cuius notitia est, haec habet perfectam et aequalem qua mens ipsa quae novit est nota. Ideoque et imago et verbum est quia de illa exprimitur cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est.
 The mind, then, contains some likeness to a known species, whether when liking that species or when disliking its privation. And hence, in so far as we know God, we are like Him, but not like to the point of equality, since we do not know Him to the extent of His own being. And as, when we speak of bodies by means of the bodily sense, there arises in our mind some likeness of them, which is a phantasm of the memory; for the bodies themselves are not at all in the mind, when we think them, but only the likenesses of those bodies; therefore, when we approve the latter for the former, we err, for the approving of one thing for another is an error; yet the image of the body in the mind is a thing of a better sort than the species of the body itself, inasmuch as the former is in a better nature, viz. in a living substance, as the mind is: so when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew Him, and above all when the same knowledge being also liked and worthily loved becomes a word, and so that knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God; yet that knowledge is of a lower kind, since it is in a lower nature; for the mind is creature, but God is Creator. And from this it may be inferred, that when the mind knows and approves itself, this same knowledge is in such way its word, as that it is altogether on a par and equal with it, and the same; because it is neither the knowledge of a lower essence, as of the body, nor of a higher, as of God. And whereas knowledge bears a likeness to that which it knows, that is, of which it is the knowledge; in this case it has perfect and equal likeness, when the mind itself, which knows, is known. And so it is both image and word; because it is uttered concerning that mind to which it is equalled in knowing, and that which is begotten is equal to the begetter.
[9.12.17] Quid ergo? Amor non erit imago, non verbum, non genitus? Cur enim mens notitiam suam gignit cum se novit, et amorem suum non gignit cum se amat? Nam si propterea est notionis suae causa quia noscibilis est, amoris etiam sui causa est quia est amabilis. Cur itaque non utrumque genuerit difficile est dicere. Haec enim quaestio etiam de ipsa summa trinitate, omnipotentissimo creatore deo, ad cuius imaginem homo factus est solet movere homines quos veritas dei per humanam locutionem inuitat ad fidem, cur non spiritus quoque sanctus a patre deo genitus vel creditur vel intellegitur, ut filius etiam ipse dicatur. Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque uestigare conamur ut ex inferiore imagine in qua nobis familiarius natura ipsa nostra quasi interrogata respondet exercitatiorem mentis aciem ab inluminata creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus; si tamen veritas ipsa persuaserit, sicut dei verbum filium esse nullus christianus dubitat, ita caritatem esse spiritum sanctum. Ergo ad illam imaginem quae creatura est, hoc est ad rationalem mentem diligentius de hac re interrogandam considerandamque redeamus ubi temporaliter exsistens nonnullarum rerum notitia quae ante non erat, et aliquarum rerum amor quae antea non amabantur, distinctius nobis aperit quid dicamus quia et ipsi locutioni temporaliter dirigendae facilior est ad explicandum res quae in ordine temporum comprehenditur.
 17. What then is love? Will it not be an image? Will it not be a word? Will it not be begotten? For why does the mind beget its knowledge when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves itself? For if it is the cause of its own knowing, for the reason that it is knowable, it is also the cause of its own love because it is lovable. It is hard, then, to say why it does not beget both. For there is a further question also respecting the supreme Trinity itself, the omnipotent God the Creator, after whose image man is made, which troubles men, whom the truth of God invites to the faith by human speech; viz. why the Holy Spirit is not also to be either believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that He also may be called a Son. And this question we are endeavoring in some way to investigate in the human mind, in order that from a lower image, in which our own nature itself as it were answers, upon being questioned, in a way more familiar to ourselves, we may be able to direct a more practised mental vision from the enlightened creature to the unchangeable light; assuming, however, that the truth itself has persuaded us, that as no Christian doubts the Word of God to be the Son, so that the Holy Spirit is love. Let us return, then, to a more careful questioning and consideration upon this subject of that image which is the creature, that is, of the rational mind; wherein the knowledge of some things coming into existence in time, but which did not exist before, and the love of some things which were not loved before, opens to us more clearly what to say: because to speech also itself, which must be disposed in time, that thing is easier of explanation which is comprehended in the order of time.
[9.12.18] Primo itaque manifestum sit posse fieri ut sit aliquid scibile, id est quod sciri possit, et tamen nesciatur; illud autem fieri non posse ut sciatur quod scibile non fuerit. Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus congenerat in nobis notitiam sui, ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito. Itaque mens cum se ipsa cognoscit sola parens est notitiae suae, et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est. Erat autem sibi ipsa noscibilis et antequam se nosset, sed notitia sui non erat in ea cum se ipsa non noverat. Quod ergo cognoscit se parem sibi notitiam sui gignit quia non minus se novit quam est nec alterius essentiae est notitia eius non solum quia ipsa novit, sed etiam quia se ipsam sicut supra diximus. Quid igitur de amore dicendum est cur non etiam cum se amat ipsum quoque amorem sui genuisse videatur? Erat enim amabilis sibi et antequam se amaret quia poterat se amare, sicut erat sibi noscibilis et antequam se nosset quia se poterat nosse. Nam si non sibi esset noscibilis, numquam se nosse potuisset; ita si non sibi esset amabilis, numquam se amare potuisset. Cur itaque amando se non genuisse dicatur amorem suum sicut cognoscendo se genuit notitiam suam? An eo quidem manifeste ostenditur hoc amoris esse principium unde procedit? Ab ipsa quippe mente procedit quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet, atque ita principium est amoris sui quo se amat. Sed ideo non recte dicitur genitus ab ea sicut notitia sui qua se novit quia notitia iam inventum est quod partum vel repertum dicitur, quod saepe praecedit inquisitio eo fine quietura. Nam inquisitio est appetitus inveniendi, quod idem valet si dicas reperiendi. Quae autem reperiuntur quasi pariuntur, unde proli similia sunt. Ubi nisi in ipsa notitia? Ibi enim quasi expressa formantur. Nam etsi iam erant res quas quaerendo invenimus, notitia tamen ipsa non erat quam sicut prolem nascentem deputamus. Porro appetitus ille qui est in quaerendo procedit a quaerente et pendet quodam modo, neque requiescit fine quo intenditur nisi id quod quaeritur inventum quaerenti copuletur. Qui appetitus, id est inquisitio, quamvis amor esse non videatur quo id quod notum est amatur (hoc enim adhuc ut cognoscatur agitur), tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est. Nam voluntas iam dici potest quia omnis qui quaerit invenire vult, et si id quaeritur quod ad notitiam pertineat, omnis qui quaerit nosse vult. Quod si ardenter atque instanter vult, studere dicitur, quod maxime in assequendis atque adipiscendis quibusque doctrinis dici solet. Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo nascitur proles ipsa notitia, ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia partus et proles recte dici non potest. Idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est notitiam gignentique coniungit. Et est quaedam imago trinitatis, ipsa mens et notitia eius, quod est proles eius ac de se ipsa verbum eius, et amor tertius, et haec tria unum atque una substantia. Nec minor proles dum tantam se novit mens quanta est, nec minor amor dum tantum se diligit quantum novit et quanta est.
 18. First, therefore, it is clear that a thing may possibly be knowable, that is, such as can be known, and yet that it may be unknown; but that it is not possible for that to be known which is not knowable. Wherefore it must be clearly held that everything whatsoever that we know begets at the same time in us the knowledge of itself; for knowledge is brought forth from both, from the knower and from the thing known. When, therefore, the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its own knowledge; for it is itself both the thing known and the knower of it. But it was knowable to itself also before it knew itself, only the knowledge of itself was not in itself so long as it did not know itself. In knowing itself, then, it begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself; since it does not know itself as less than itself is, nor is its knowledge the knowledge of the essence of some one else, not only because itself knows, but also because it knows itself, as we have said above. What then is to be said of love; why, when the mind loves itself, it should not seem also to have begotten the love of itself? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved itself since it could love itself; just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, since it could know itself. For if it were not knowable to itself, it never could have known itself; and so, if it were not lovable to itself, it never could have loved itself. Why therefore may it not be said by loving itself to have begotten its own love, as by knowing itself it has begotten its own knowledge? Is it because it is thereby indeed plainly shown that this is the principle of love, whence it proceeds? For it proceeds from the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and so is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself: but that this love is not therefore rightly said to be begotten by the mind, as is the knowledge of itself by which the mind knows itself, because in the case of knowledge the thing has been found already, which is what we call brought forth or discovered; and this is commonly preceded by an inquiry such as to find rest when that end is attained. For inquiry is the desire of finding, or, what is the same thing, of discovering. But those things which are discovered are as it were brought forth, whence they are like offspring; but wherein, except in the case itself of knowledge? For in that case they are as it were uttered and fashioned. For although the things existed already which we found by seeking, yet the knowledge of them did not exist, which knowledge we regard as an offspring that is born. Further, the desire (appetitus) which there is in seeking proceeds from him who seeks, and is in some way in suspense, and does not rest in the end whither it is directed, except that which is sought be found and conjoined with him who seeks. And this desire, that is, inquiry—although it does not seem to be love, by which that which is known is loved, for in this case we are still striving to know—yet it is something of the same kind. For it can be called will (voluntas),since every one who seeks wills (vult) to find; and if that is sought which belongs to knowledge, every one who seeks wills to know. But if he wills ardently and earnestly, he is said to study (studere): a word that is most commonly employed in the case of pursuing and obtaining any branches of learning. Therefore, the bringing forth of the mind is preceded by some desire, by which, through seeking and finding what we wish to know, the offspring, viz. knowledge itself, is born. And for this reason, that desire by which knowledge is conceived and brought forth, cannot rightly be called the bringing forth and the offspring; and the same desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known, while it holds and embraces its accepted offspring, that is, knowledge, and unites it to its begetter. And so there is a kind of image of the Trinity in the mind itself, and the knowledge of it, which is its offspring and its word concerning itself, and love as a third, and these three are one, and one substance. Neither is the offspring less, since the mind knows itself according to the measure of its own being; nor is the love less, since it loves itself according to the measure both of its own knowledge and of its own being.

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