Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book V

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK V

• 5.1 Quam modeste ac sobrie debeat homo cui etiam suae mentis natura inexplicabilis est de dei substantia cogitare. Chapter 1.— What the Author Entreats from God, What from the Reader. In God Nothing is to Be Thought Corporeal or Changeable.
• 5.2 De incommutabili essentia quod solus est deus. Chapter 2.— God the Only Unchangeable Essence.
• 5.3 Contra arrianorum argumentationem, an in deo ingeniti et geniti appellatio substantiarum indices diversitatem. Chapter 3.— The Argument of the Arians is Refuted, Which is Drawn from the Words Begotten and Unbegotten.
• 5.4 De accidentibus sive separabilibus sive inseparabilibus quae in deo quia mutabilis non est esse non possunt. Chapter 4.— The Accidental Always Implies Some Change in the Thing.
• 5.5 Quae in deo ad aliquid dicuntur non secundum substantiam dici nec tamen esse accidentia sed relativa incommutabilia. Chapter 5.— Nothing is Spoken of God According to Accident, But According to Substance or According to Relation.
• 5.6 An ingenitus quod pater dicitur possit inter illa accipi quae ad se ipsum et substantialiter dicuntur. Chapter 6.— Reply is Made to the Cavils of the Heretics in Respect to the Same Words Begotten and Unbegotten.
• 5.7 Quid in quibusque locutionibus valeat negativa particula qua aliquid non quid sit sed quid non sit ostenditur. Chapter 7.— The Addition of a Negative Does Not Change the Predicament.
• 5.8 Quod in trinitate deitatis quidquid ad se dicitur quaeque persona indifferens atque commune sit et unam significet eandemque substantiam. Chapter 8.— Whatever is Spoken of God According to Substance, is Spoken of Each Person Severally, and Together of the Trinity Itself. One Essence in God, and Three, in Greek, Hypostases, in Latin, Persons.
• 5.9 Qua necessitate tres personae in trinitate dicantur. Chapter 9.— The Three Persons Not Properly So Called [in a Human Sense].
• 5.10 De vera magnitudine cuius participatione magna sunt quaecumque sunt magna. Chapter 10.— Those Things Which Belong Absolutely to God as an Essence, are Spoken of the Trinity in the Singular, Not in the Plural.
• 5.11 Relative non substantialiter dici quidquid vel aut pater aut filius aut spiritus sanctus proprie nominatur. Chapter 11.— What is Said Relatively in the Trinity.
• 5.12 De relativis quae referri ad invicem nequeunt cum tamen relativa sint. Chapter 12.— In Relative Things that are Reciprocal, Names are Sometimes Wanting.
• 5.13 Trinitatem deum non tria principia sed unum esse principium quia et pater et filius et spiritus sanctus UntSS creator est sicut unus deus est. Chapter 13.— How the Word Beginning (Principium) is Spoken Relatively in the Trinity.
• 5.14 Quomodo in trinitate et peter ad filium principium sit et peter et filius ad spiritum sanctum. Chapter 14.— The Father and the Son the Only Beginning (Principium) of the Holy Spirit.
• 5.15 Quomodo in spiritu sancto etiam antequam daretur possit doni nomen intellegi ut ei semper non aliud fuerit donum esse quam ipsum esse. Chapter 15.— Whether the Holy Spirit Was a Gift Before as Well as After He Was Given.
• 5.16 De appellationibus relativis quae non ad deum sed ad creaturam referendae sunt quondam deo nihil accidit. Chapter 16.— What is Said of God in Time, is Said Relatively, Not Accidentally.

Latin	Latin
LIBER V	On the Trinity (Book V)
	Proceeds to treat of the arguments put forward by the heretics, not from Scripture, but from their own reason. Those are refuted, who think the substance of the Father and of the Son to be not the same, because everything predicated of God is, in their opinion, predicated of Him according to substance; and therefore it follows, that to beget and to be begotten, or to be begotten and unbegotten, being diverse, are diverse substances; whereas it is here demonstrated that not everything predicated of God is predicated according to substance, in such manner as He is called good and great according to substance, or anything else that is predicated of Him in respect to Himself; but that some things are also predicated of Him relatively, i.e. not in respect to Himself, but to something not Himself, as He is called Father in respect to the Son, and Lord in respect to the creature that serves Him; in which case, if anything thus predicated relatively, i.e. in respect to something not Himself, is even predicated as happening in time, as e.g. Lord, you have become our refuge, yet nothing happens to God so as to work a change in Him, but He Himself remains absolutely unchangeable in His own nature or essence.
[5.1.1] Hinc iam exordiens ea dicere quae dici ut cogitantur vel ab homine aliquo vel certe a nobis non omni modo possunt, quamvis et ipsa nostra cogitatio cum de deo trinitate cogitamus longe se illi de quo cogitat imparem sentiat neque ut est eum capiat sed, ut scriptum est etiam a tantis quantus Paulus apostolus hic erat, per speculum in aenigmate videatur, primum ab ipso domino deo nostro de quo semper cogitare debemus et de quo digne cogitare non possumus, cui laudando reddenda est omni tempore benedictio et cui enuntiando nulla competit dictio, et adiutorium ad intellegenda atque explicanda quae intendo et veniam precor sicubi offendo. Memor enim sum non solum voluntatis verum etiam infirmitatis meae. Ab his etiam qui ista lecturi sunt ut ignoscant peto ubi me magis voluisse quam potuisse dicere adverterint quod vel ipsi melius intellegunt vel propter mei eloquii difficultatem non intellegunt, sicut ego eis ignosco ubi propter suam tarditatem intellegere non possunt.	1. Beginning, as I now do henceforward, to speak of subjects which cannot altogether be spoken as they are thought, either by any man, or, at any rate, not by myself; although even our very thought, when we think of God the Trinity, falls (as we feel) very far short of Him of whom we think, nor comprehends Him as He is; but He is seen, as it is written, even by those who are so great as was the Apostle Paul, through a glass and in an enigma: first, I pray to our Lord God Himself, of whom we ought always to think, and of whom we are not able to think worthily, in praise of whom blessing is at all times to be rendered, and whom no speech is sufficient to declare, that He will grant me both help for understanding and explaining that which I design, and pardon if in anything I offend. For I bear in mind, not only my desire, but also my infirmity. I ask also of my readers to pardon me, where they may perceive me to have had the desire rather than the power to speak, what they either understand better themselves, or fail to understand through the obscurity of my language, just as I myself pardon them what they cannot understand through their own dullness.
[5.1.2] Facilius autem nobis invicem ignoscimus si noverimus aut certe credendo firmum tenuerimus ea quae de natura incommutabili et inuisibili summeque vivente ac sibi sufficiente dicuntur non ex consuetudine visibilium atque mutabilium et mortalium vel egenarum rerum esse metienda. Sed cum in his etiam quae nostris corporalibus adiacent sensibus vel quod nos ipsi in interiore homine sumus scientia comprehendendis laboremus nec sufficiamus, non tamen impudenter in illa quae supra sunt divina et ineffabilia pietas fidelis ardescit, non quam suarum virium inflat arrogantia sed quam gratia ipsius creatoris et saluatoris inflammat. Nam quo intellectu homo deum capit qui ipsum intellectum suum quo eum vult capere nondum capit? Si autem hunc iam capit, attendat diligenter nihil eo esse in sua natura melius, et videat utrum ibi videat ulla lineamenta formarum, nitores colorum, spatiosam granditatem, partium distantiam, molis distensionem, aliquas per locorum interualla motiones vel quid eiusmodi. Nihil certe istorum invenimus in eo quo in natura nostra nihil melius invenimus, id est in nostro intellectu quo sapientiam capimus quantae capaces sumus. Quod ergo non invenimus in meliore nostro non debemus in illo quaerere quod longe melius est meliore nostro, ut sic intellegamus deum si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem. Quisquis deum ita cogitat etsi nondum potest omni modo invenire quid sit, pie tamen cavet quantum potest aliquid de illo sentire quod non sit.	2. And we shall mutually pardon one another the more easily, if we know, or at any rate firmly believe and hold, that whatever is said of a nature, unchangeable, invisible and having life absolutely and sufficient to itself, must not be measured after the custom of things visible, and changeable, and mortal, or not self-sufficient. But although we labor, and yet fail, to grasp and know even those things which are within the scope of our corporeal senses, or what we are ourselves in the inner man; yet it is with no shamelessness that faithful piety burns after those divine and unspeakable things which are above: piety, I say, not inflated by the arrogance of its own power, but inflamed by the grace of its Creator and Saviour Himself. For with what understanding can man apprehend God, who does not yet apprehend that very understanding itself of his own, by which he desires to apprehend Him? And if he does already apprehend this, let him carefully consider that there is nothing in his own nature better than it; and let him see whether he can there see any outlines of forms, or brightness of colors, or greatness of space, or distance of parts, or extension of size, or any movements through intervals of place, or any such thing at all. Certainly we find nothing of all this in that, than which we find nothing better in our own nature, that is, in our own intellect, by which we apprehend wisdom according to our capacity. What, therefore, we do not find in that which is our own best, we ought not to seek in Him who is far better than that best of ours; that so we may understand God, if we are able, and as much as we are able, as good without quality, great without quantity, a creator though He lack nothing, ruling but from no position, sustaining all things without having them, in His wholeness everywhere, yet without place, eternal without time, making things that are changeable, without change of Himself, and without passion. Whoso thus thinks of God, although he cannot yet find out in all ways what He is, yet piously takes heed, as much as he is able, to think nothing of Him that He is not.
[5.2.3] Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia vel si melius hoc appellatur essentia, quam graeci *ousian* vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est quam ille qui dixit famulo suo: Ego sum qui sum et: Dices filiis Israhel: Qui est misit me ad vos? Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae capiunt accidentias quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest. Et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia quae deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse unde essentia nominata est maxime ac verissime competit. Quod enim mutatur non servat ipsum esse, et quod mutari potest etiamsi non mutetur potest quod fuerat non esse, ac per hoc illud solum quod non tantum non mutatur verum etiam mutari omnino non potest sine scrupulo occurrit quod verissime dicatur esse.	3. He is, however, without doubt, a substance, or, if it be better so to call it, an essence, which the Greeks call ??s?a . For as wisdom is so called from the being wise, and knowledge from knowing; so from being comes that which we call essence. And who is there that is, more than He who said to His servant Moses, I am that I am; and, Thus shall you say unto the children of Israel, He who is has sent me unto you? But other things that are called essences or substances admit of accidents, whereby a change, whether great or small, is produced in them. But there can be no accident of this kind in respect to God; and therefore He who is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence, to whom certainly being itself, whence comes the name of essence, most especially and most truly belongs. For that which is changed does not retain its own being; and that which can be changed, although it be not actually changed, is able not to be that which it had been; and hence that which not only is not changed, but also cannot at all be changed, alone falls most truly, without difficulty or hesitation, under the category of being .
[5.3.4] Quamobrem ut iam etiam de his quae nec dicuntur ut cogitantur nec cogitantur ut sunt respondere incipiamus fidei nostrae adversariis, inter multa quae arriani adversus catholicam fidem solent disputare hoc sibi maxime callidissimum machinamentum proponere videntur cum dicunt: 'Quidquid de deo dicitur vel intellegitur non secundum accidens sed secundum substantiam dicitur. Quapropter ingenitum esse patri secundum substantiam est, et genitum esse filio secundum substantiam est. Diversum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diversa est ergo substantia patris et filii.' Quibus respondemus: Si quidquid de deo dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur, ergo quod dictum est: Ego et pater unum sumus secundum substantiam dictum est. Una est igitur substantia patris et filii. Aut si hoc non secundum substantiam dictum est, dicitur ergo aliquid de deo non secundum substantiam, et ideo iam non cogimur secundum substantiam intellegere ingenitum et genitum. Item dictum est de filio: Non rapinam arhitratus est esse aequalis deo. Quaerimus secundum quid aequalis. Si enim non secundum substantiam dicitur aequalis, admittunt ut dicatur aliquid de deo non secundum substantiam, admittant ergo non secundum substantiam dici ingenitum et genitum. Quod si propterea non admittunt quia omnia de deo secundum substantiam dici volunt, secundum substantiam filius aequalis est patri.	4. Wherefore—to being now to answer the adversaries of our faith, respecting those things also, which are neither said as they are thought, nor thought as they really are:— among the many things which the Arians are wont to dispute against the Catholic faith, they seem chiefly to set forth this, as their most crafty device, namely, that whatsoever is said or understood of God, is said not according to accident, but according to substance, and therefore, to be unbegotten belongs to the Father according to substance, and to be begotten belongs to the Son according to substance; but to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different; therefore the substance of the Father and that of the Son are different. To whom we reply, If whatever is spoken of God is spoken according to substance, then that which is said, I and the Father are one, is spoken according to substance. Therefore there is one substance of the Father and the Son. Or if this is not said according to substance, then something is said of God not according to substance, and therefore we are no longer compelled to understand unbegotten and begotten according to substance. It is also said of the Son, He thought it not robbery to be equal with God. We ask, equal according to what? For if He is not said to be equal according to substance, then they admit that something may be said of God not according to substance. Let them admit, then, that unbegotten and begotten are not spoken according to substance. And if they do not admit this, on the ground that they will have all things to be spoken of God according to substance, then the Son is equal to the Father according to substance.
[5.4.5] Accidens autem dici non solet nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. Nam etsi quaedam dicuntur accidentia inseparabilia, quae appellantur graece *achorista*, sicuti est plumae corui color niger; amittit eum tamen non quidem quamdiu pluma est sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illud animal vel illa pluma totumque illud corpus in terram mutatur et vertitur, amittit utique etiam illum colorem. Quamvis et accidens quod separabile dicitur non separatione sed mutatione amittatur, sicuti est capillis hominum nigritudo, quoniam dum capilli sunt possunt albescere, separabile accidens dicitur, sed diligenter intuentibus satis apparet non separatione quasi emigrare aliquid a capite dum canescit ut nigritudo inde candore succedente discedat et aliquo eat, sed illam qualitatem coloris ibi verti atque mutari. Nihil itaque accidens in deo quia nihil mutabile aut amissibile. Quod si et illud dici accidens placet quod licet non amittatur minuitur tamen vel augetur, sicuti est animae vita (nam et quamdiu anima est tamdiu vivit, et quia semper anima est semper vivit, sed quia magis vivit cum sapit minusque dum desipit, fit etiam hic aliqua mutatio non ut desit vita sicuti deest insipienti sapientia, sed ut minus sit), nec tale aliquid in deo fit quia omnino incommutabilis manes.	5. That which is accidental commonly implies that it can be lost by some change of the thing to which it is an accident. For although some accidents are said to be inseparable, which in Greek are called ?????sta, as the color black is to the feather of a raven; yet the feather loses that color, not indeed so long as it is a feather, but because the feather is not always. Wherefore the matter itself is changeable; and whenever that animal or that feather ceases to be, and the whole of that body is changed and turned into earth, it loses certainly that color also. Although the kind of accident which is called separable may likewise be lost, not by separation, but by change; as, for instance, blackness is called a separable accident to the hair of men, because hair continuing to be hair can grow white; yet, if carefully considered, it is sufficiently apparent, that it is not as if anything departed by separation away from the head when it grows white, as though blackness departed thence and went somewhere and whiteness came in its place, but that the quality of color there is turned and changed. Therefore there is nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or that may be lost. But if you choose to call that also accidental, which, although it may not be lost, yet can be decreased or increased—as, for instance, the life of the soul: for as long as it is a soul, so long it lives, and because the soul is always, it always lives; but because it lives more when it is wise, and less when it is foolish, here, too, some change comes to pass, not such that life is absent, as wisdom is absent to the foolish, but such that it is less—nothing of this kind, either, happens to God, because He remains altogether unchangeable.
[5.4.6] Quamobrem nihil in eo secundum accidens dicitur quia nihil ei accidit; nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. In rebus enim creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. Omnia enim accidunt eis, quae vel amitti possum vel minui et magnitudines et qualitates, et quod dicitur ad aliquid sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, seruitutes, similitudines, aequalitates et si qua huiusmodi et situs et habitus et loca et tempora et opera atque passiones.	6. Wherefore nothing in Him is said in respect to accident, since nothing is accidental to Him, and yet all that is said is not said according to substance. For in created and changeable things, that which is not said according to substance, must, by necessary alternative, be said according to accident. For all things are accidents to them, which can be either lost or diminished, whether magnitudes or qualities; and so also is that which is said in relation to something, as friendships, relationships, services, likenesses, equalities, and anything else of the kind; so also positions and conditions, places and times, acts and passions.
[5.5.6] In deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur quia nihil in eo mutabile est, nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem, quod non est accidens quia et ille semper pater et ille semper filius, et non ita semper quasi ex quo natus est filius aut ex eo quod numquam desinat esse filius pater esse non desinat pater, sed ex eo quod semper natus est filius nec coepit umquam esse filius. Quod si aliquando esse coepisset aut aliquando esse desineret filius, secundum accidens diceretur. Si vero quod dicitur pater ad se ipsum diceretur non ad filium, et quod dicitur filius ad se ipsum diceretur non ad patrem, secundum substantiam diceretur et ille pater et ille filius. Sed quia et pater non dicitur pater nisi ex eo quod est ei filius et filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum sed ad invicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur; neque secundum accidens quia et quod dicitur pater et quod dicitur filius aeternum atque incommutabile est eis. Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit patrem esse et filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur sed secundum relativum quod tamen relativum non est accidens quia non est mutabile.	But in God nothing is said to be according to accident, because in Him nothing is changeable; and yet everything that is said, is not said, according to substance. For it is said in relation to something, as the Father in relation to the Son and the Son in relation to the Father, which is not accident; because both the one is always Father, and the other is always Son: yet not always, meaning from the time when the Son was born [natus], so that the Father ceases not to be the Father because the Son never ceases to be the Son, but because the Son was always born, and never began to be the Son. But if He had begun to be at any time, or were at any time to cease to be, the Son, then He would be called Son according to accident. But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not different; because they are so called, not according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable.
[5.6.7] Si autem huic sic putant resistendum esse sermoni quod pater quidem ad filium dicitur et filius ad patrem, ingenitus tamen et genitus ad se ipsos dicuntur non ad alterutrum; non enim hoc est dicere ingenitum quod est patrem dicere quia et si filium non genuisset nihil prohiberet dicere eum ingenitum, et si gignat quisque filium non ex eo ipse est ingenitus quia geniti homines ex aliis hominibus gignunt et ipsi altos--inquiunt ergo: 'Peter ad filium dicitur et filius ad patrem; ingenitus autem ad se ipsum et genitus ad se ipsum dicitur. Et ideo si quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur; diversum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diversa igitur substantia est.' Hoc si dicunt non intellegunt de ingenito quidem aliquid se dicere quod diligentius pertractandum sit, quia nec ideo quisque pater quia ingenitus nec ingenitus ideo quia pater, et propterea non ad aliquid sed ad se dici putatur ingenitus genitum vero mire caecitate non advertunt dici non posse nisi ad aliquid. Ideo quippe filius quia genitus et quia filius utique genitus. Sicut autem filius ad patrem sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium ita genitor ad genitum. Ideoque alla notio est qua intellegitur genitor, alla qua ingenitus. Nam quamvis de patre deo utrumque dicatur, illud tamen ad genitum, id est ad filium dicitur, quod nec illi negant; hoc autem quod ingenitus dicitur ad se ipsum dici perhibent. Dicunt ergo: 'Si aliquid ad se ipsum dicitur pater quod ad se ipsum dici non potest filius, et quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur, et ad se ipsum dicitur ingenitus quod dici non potest filius, ergo secundum sub stantiam dicitur ingenitus quo d filius quia dici non potest non est eiusdem substantiae.' Cui versutiae respondetur ita ut ipsi cogantur dicere secundum quid sit aequalis filius patri, utrum secundum id quod ad se dicitur an secundum id quod ad patrem dicitur. Non enim secundum id quod ad patrem dicitur quondam ad patrem filius dicitur; ille autem non filius sed pater est--quia non sic ad se dicuntur pater et filius quomodo amici aut vicini. Relative quippe amicus dicitur ad amicum, et si aequaliter se diligunt, eadem in utroque amicitia est, et relative vicinus dicitur ad vicinum et quia aequaliter sibi vicini sunt (quantum enim iste illi, tantum et ille huic vicinatur), eadem in utroque vicinitas. Quia vero filius non ad filium relative dicitur sed ad patrem, non secundum hoc quod ad patrem dicitur aequalis est filius patri. Restat ut secundum id aequalis sit quod ad se dicitur. Quidquid autem ad se dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Restat ergo ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis. Eadem est igitur utriusque substantia. Cum vero ingenitus dicitur pater, non quid sit sed quid non sit dicitur. Cum autem relativum negatur, non secundum substantiam negatur quia ipsum relativum non secundum substantiam dicitur.	7. But if they think they can answer this reasoning thus—that the Father indeed is so called in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father, but that they are said to be unbegotten and begotten in relation to themselves, not in relation each to the other; for that it is not the same thing to call Him unbegotten as it is to call Him the Father, because there would be nothing to hinder our calling Him unbegotten even if He had not begotten the Son; and if any one beget a son, he is not therefore himself unbegotten, for men, who are begotten by other men, themselves also beget others; and therefore they say the Father is called Father in relation to the Son, and the Son is called Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten is said in relation to Himself, and begotten in relation to Himself; and therefore, if whatever is said in relation to oneself is said according to substance, while to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different, then the substance is different:— if this is what they say, then they do not understand that they do indeed say something that requires more careful discussion in respect to the term unbegotten, because neither is any one therefore a father because unbegotten, nor therefore unbegotten because he is a father, and on that account he is supposed to be called unbegotten, not in relation to anything else, but in respect to himself; but, on the other hand, with a wonderful blindness, they do not perceive that no one can be said to be begotten except in relation to something. For he is therefore a son because begotten; and because a son, therefore certainly begotten. And as is the relation of son to father, so is the relation of the begotten to the begetter; and as is the relation of father to son, so is the relation of the begetter to the begotten. And therefore any one is understood to be a begetter under one notion, but understood to be unbegotten under another. For though both are said of God the Father, yet the former is said in relation to the begotten, that is to the Son, which, indeed, they do not deny; but that He is called unbegotten, they declare to be said in respect to Himself. They say then, If anything is said to be a father in respect to itself, which cannot be said to be a son in respect to itself, and whatever is said in respect to self is said according to substance; and He is said to be unbegotten in respect to Himself, which the Son cannot be said to be; therefore He is said to be unbegotten according to substance; and because the Son cannot be so said to be, therefore He is not of the same substance. This subtlety is to be answered by compelling them to say themselves according to what it is that the Son is equal to the Father; whether according to that which is said in relation to Himself, or according to that which is said in relation to the Father. For it is not according to that which is said in relation to the Father, since in relation to the Father He is said to be Son, and the Father is not Son, but Father. Since Father and Son are not so called in relation to each other in the same way as friends and neighbors are; for a friend is so called relatively to his friend, and if they love each other equally, then the same friendship is in both; and a neighbor is so called relatively to a neighbor, and because they are equally neighbors to each other (for each is neighbor to the other, in the same degree as the other is neighbor to him), there is the same neighborhood in both. But because the Son is not so called relatively to the Son, but to the Father, it is not according to that which is said in relation to the Father that the Son is equal to the Father; and it remains that He is equal according to that which is said in relation to Himself. But whatever is said in relation to self is said according to substance: it remains therefore that He is equal according to substance; therefore the substance of both is the same. But when the Father is said to be unbegotten, it is not said what He is, but what He is not; and when a relative term is denied, it is not denied according to substance, since the relative itself is not affirmed according to substance.
[5.7.8] Hoc exemplis plenum faciendum est. Ac primum videndum est hoc significari cum dicitur genitus quod significatur cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius quia genitus, et quia filius utique genitus. Quod ergo dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur quod non sit filius. Sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur; filius autem latine dicitur, sed 'infilius' ut dicatur non admittit loquendi consuetudo. Nihil tamen intellectui demitur si dicatur non filius quemadmodum etiam si dicatur non genitus pro eo quod dicitur ingenitus nihil aliud dicitur. Sic enim et vicinus et amicus relative dicuntur, nec tamen potest 'inuicinus' dici quomodo dicitur inimicus. Quamobrem non est in reb us considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sin at dici usus sermonis nostri sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat. Non ergo iam dicamus ingenitum quamvis dici latine possit, sed pro eo dicamus non genitum quod tantum valet. Num ergo aliud dicimus quam non filium? Negativa porro ista particula non id efficit ut quod sine illa relative dicitur eadem praeposita substantialiter dicatur, sed id tantum negatur quod sine illa aiebatur sicut in caeteris praedicamentis. Velut cum dicimus: 'Homo est,' substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit: 'Non homo est,' non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam ado: 'Homo est,' sic secundum substantiam nego cum dico: 'Non homo est.' Et cum quaeritur, quantus sit et ado: 'Quadripedalis est,' id est quattuor pedum, qui dicit: 'Non quadripedalis est,' secundum quantitatem negat. 'Candidus est,' secundum qualitatem ado; 'Non candidus est,' secundum qualitatem nego. 'Propinquus est,' secundum relativum ado, 'Non proinquus est,' secundum relativum nego. Secundum situm aio cum dico: 'Iacet'; secundum situm nego cum dico: 'Non facet.' Secundum habitum aio cum dico: 'Armatus est' secundum habitum nego cum dico: 'Non armatus est,' tantumdem autem valet si dicam: 'Inermis est.' Secundum tempus aio cum dico: 'Hesternus est'; secundum tempus nego cum dico: 'Non hesternus est.' Et cum dico: 'Romae est,'secundum locum ado, et secundum locum nego cum dico: 'Non Romae est.' Secundum id quod est facere aio cum dico: 'Caedit'; si autem dicam: 'Non caedit,' secundum id quod est facere nego ut ostendam non hoc facere. Et cum dico: 'Vapulat,' secundum praedicamentum aio quod pati vocatur et secundum id nego cum dico: 'Non uapulat.' Et omnino nullum praedicamenti genus est secundum quod aliquid aiere volumus nisi ut secundum idipsum praedicamentum negare conuincamur si praeponere negativam particulam voluerimus. Quae cum ita sint, si substantialiter aierem dicendo 'filius'; substantialiter negarem dicendo 'non filius.' Quia vero relative aio cum dico: 'Filius est,' ad patrem enim refero; relative nego si dico: 'Non filius est,' ad parentem enim eandem negationem refero volens ostendere quod ei parens non sit. At si quantum valet quod dicitur 'filius,' tantundem valet quod dicitur 'genitus' sicut praelocuti sumus, tantundem ergo valet quod dicitur 'non genitus' quantum valet quod dicitur 'non filius.' Relative autem negamus dicendo 'non filius'; relative igitur negamus dicendo 'non genitus.' Ingenitus porro quid est nisi non genitus? Non ergo receditur a relativo praedicamento cum ingenitus dicitur. Sicut enim genitus non ad se ipsum dicitur sed quod ex genitore sit, ita cum dicitur ingenitus non ad se ipsum dicitur sed quod ex genitore non sit ostenditur. In eodem tamen praedicamento quod relativum vocatur utraque significatio vertitur. Quod autem relative pronuntiatur non indicat substantiam. Ita quamvis diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, non indicat diversam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem et non filius ad non patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem et non genitus ad non genitorem referatur necesse est.	8. This is to be made clear by examples. And first we must notice, that by the word begotten is signified the same thing as is signified by the word son. For therefore a son, because begotten, and because a son, therefore certainly begotten. By the word unbegotten, therefore, it is declared that he is not son. But begotten and unbegotten are both of them terms suitably employed; whereas in Latin we can use the word filius, but the custom of the language does not allow us to speak of infilius. It makes no difference, however, in the meaning if he is called non filius; just as it is precisely the same thing if he is called non genitus, instead of ingenitus. For so the terms of both neighbor and friend are used relatively, yet we cannot speak of invicinus as we can of inimicus. Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we must not consider what the usage of our own language either allows or does not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of the things themselves. Let us not therefore any longer call it unbegotten, although it can be so called in Latin; but instead of this let us call it not begotten, which means the same. Is this then anything else than saying that he is not a son? Now the prefixing of that negative particle does not make that to be said according to substance, which, without it, is said relatively; but that only is denied, which, without it, was affirmed, as in the other predicaments. When we say he is a man, we denote substance. He therefore who says he is not a man, enunciates no other kind of predicament, but only denies that. As therefore I affirm according to substance in saying he is a man, so I deny according to substance in saying he is not a man. And when the question is asked how large he is? And I say he is quadrupedal, that is, four feet in measure, I affirm according to quantity, and he who says he is not quadrupedal, denies according to quantity. I say he is white, I affirm according to quality; if I say he is not white, I deny according to quality. I say he is near, I affirm according to relation; if I say he is not near, I deny according to relation. I affirm according to position, when I say he lies down; I deny according to position, when I say he does not lie down. I speak according to condition, when I say he is armed; I deny according to condition, when I say he is not armed; and it comes to the same thing as if I should say he is unarmed. I affirm according to time, when I say he is of yesterday; I deny according to time, when I say he is not of yesterday. And when I say he is at Rome, I affirm according to place; and I deny according to place, when I say he is not at Rome. I affirm according to the predicament of action, when I say he smites; but if I say he does not smite, I deny according to action, so as to declare that he does not so act. And when I say he is smitten, I affirm according to the predicament of passion; and I deny according to the same, when I say he is not smitten. And, in a word, there is no kind of predicament according to which we may please to affirm anything, without being proved to deny according to the same predicament, if we prefix the negative particle. And since this is so, if I were to affirm according to substance, in saying son, I should deny according to substance, in saying not son. But because I affirm relatively when I say he is a son, for I refer to the father; therefore I deny relatively if I say he is not a son, for I refer the same negation to the father, in that I wish to declare that he has not a parent. But if to be called son is precisely equivalent to the being called begotten (as we said before), then to be called not begotten is precisely equivalent to the being called not son. But we deny relatively when we say he is not son, therefore we deny relatively when we say he is not begotten. Further, what is unbegotten, unless not begotten? We do not escape, therefore, from the relative predicament, when he is called unbegotten. For as begotten is not said in relation to self, but in that he is of a begetter; so when one is called unbegotten, he is not so called in relation to himself, but it is declared that he is not of a begetter. Both meanings, however, turn upon the same predicament, which is called that of relation. But that which is asserted relatively does not denote substance, and accordingly, although begotten and unbegotten are diverse, they do not denote a different substance; because, as son is referred to father, and not son to not father, so it follows inevitably that begotten must be referred to begetter, and not-begotten to not-begetter.
[5.8.9] Quapropter illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter sed relative; tantamque vim esse eiusdem substantiae in patre et filio et spiritu sancto ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur non pluraliter in summa sed singulariter accipiatur. Quemadmodum enim deus est pater et filius deus est et spiritus sanctus deus est, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat, non tamen tres deos sed unum deum dicimus eam ipsam praestantissimam trinitatem. Ita magnus pater, magnus filius, magnus et spiritus sanctus; nec tamen tres magni sed unus magnus. Non enim de patre solo sicut illi peruerse sentiunt, sed de patre et filio et spiritu sancto scriptum est: Tu es solus deus, magnus. Et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus et spiritus sanctus; nec tres bond sed unus bonus de quo dictum est: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus. Etenim dominus Iesus ne ab illo qui dixerat: Magister bone tamquam hominem compellans secundum hominem tantummodo intellegeretur ideo non ait: 'Nemo bonus nisi solus pater,' sea: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus. In patris enim nomine ipse per se pater pronuntiatur, in dei vero et ipse et filius et spiritus sanctus quia trinitas unus deus. Situs vero et habitue et loca et tempora non proprie sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in deo. Nam et sedere super cherubim dicitur, quod ad situm dicitur; et abyssus tamquam uestimentum amictus ipsius quod ad habitum; et: Anni tui non deficient quod ad tempus; et: Si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es quod ad locum. Quod autem ad faciendum attinet fortassis de solo deo verissime dicatur; solus enim deus facit et ipse non fit, neque patitur quantum ad eius substantiam pertinet qua deus est. Itaque omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus, nec tamen tres omnipotentes sed unus omnipotens; ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ipsi gloria. Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur deus et de singulis personis ter dicitur patre et filio et spiritu sancto, et simul de ipsa trinitate non pluraliter sed singulariter dicitur. Quoniam quippe non aliud est deo esse et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse, propterea sicut non dicimus tres essential, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. Essentiam dico quae *ousia* graece dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam vocamus.	9. Wherefore let us hold this above all, that whatsoever is said of that most eminent and divine loftiness in respect to itself, is said in respect to substance, but that which is said in relation to anything, is not said in respect to substance, but relatively; and that the effect of the same substance in Father and Son and Holy Spirit is, that whatsoever is said of each in respect to themselves, is to be taken of them, not in the plural in sum, but in the singular. For as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, which no one doubts to be said in respect to substance, yet we do not say that the very Supreme Trinity itself is three Gods, but one God. So the Father is great, the Son great, and the Holy Spirit great; yet not three greats, but one great. For it is not written of the Father alone, as they perversely suppose, but of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, You are great: You are God alone. And the Father is good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; yet not three goods, but one good, of whom it is said, None is good, save one, that is, God. For the Lord Jesus, lest He should be understood as man only by him who said, Good Master, as addressing a man, does not therefore say, There is none good, save the Father alone; but, None is good, save one, that is, God. For the Father by Himself is declared by the name of Father; but by the name of God, both Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God. But position, and condition, and places, and times, are not said to be in God properly, but metaphorically and through similitudes. For He is both said to dwell between the cherubims, which is spoken in respect to position; and to be covered with the deep as with a garment, which is said in respect to condition; and Your years shall have no end, which is said in respect of time; and, If I ascend up into heaven, You are there, which is said in respect to place. And as respects action (or making), perhaps it may be said most truly of God alone, for God alone makes and Himself is not made. Nor is He liable to passions as far as belongs to that substance whereby He is God. So the Father is omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit is omnipotent; yet not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent: For of Him are all things, and through Him are all things, and in Him are all things; to whom be glory. Whatever, therefore, is spoken of God in respect to Himself, is both spoken singly of each person, that is, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and together of the Trinity itself, not plurally but in the singular. For inasmuch as to God it is not one thing to be, and another thing to be great, but to Him it is the same thing to be, as it is to be great; therefore, as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness. I say essence, which in Greek is called ??s?a, and which we call more usually substance.
[5.8.10] Dicunt quidem et illi *hypostasin* sed nescio quid volunt interesse inter *ousian* et *hypostasin* ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio dicere consuerint *mian ousian treis hypostaseis*, quod est latine, unam essentiam tres substantiam.	10. They indeed use also the word hypostasis; but they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between ??s?a and hypostasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language, are accustomed to say, µ?a? ??s?a?, t?e?? ?p?st?se?? or in Latin, one essence, three substances.
[5.9.10] Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit ut hoc intellegatur cum dicimus essentiam quod intellegitur cum dicimus substantiam, non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantiae, sed unam essentiam vel substantiam. Tres autem personas multi latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intellegebant. Reuera enim quod pater non sit filius et filius non sit pater et spiritus sanctus ille qui etiam donum dei vocatur nec pater sit nec filius, tres utique sunt. Ideoque pluraliter dictum est: Ego et pater unum sumus. Non enim dixit 'unum est,' quod sabelliani dicunt, sed unum sumus. Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur.	But because with us the usage has already obtained, that by essence we understand the same thing which is understood by substance; we do not dare to say one essence, three substances, but one essence or substance and three persons: as many writers in Latin, who treat of these things, and are of authority, have said, in that they could not find any other more suitable way by which to enunciate in words that which they understood without words. For, in truth, as the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, and that Holy Spirit who is also called the gift of God is neither the Father nor the Son, certainly they are three. And so it is said plurally, I and my Father are one. For He has not said, is one, as the Sabellians say; but, are one. Yet, when the question is asked, What three? human language labors altogether under great poverty of speech. The answer, however, is given, three persons, not that it might be [completely] spoken, but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken.
[5.10.11] Sicut ergo non dicimus tres essential, ita non dicimus tres magnitudines neque tres magnos. In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse sicut magna domus et magnus mons et magnus animus, in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magmtudine magnum est, et prorsus non hoc est magrutudo quod est magna domus. Sed illa est vera magnitudo qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est et qua magnus est mons quisquis magnus est, sed etiam qua magnum est quidquid aliud magnum dicitur, ut aliud sit ipsa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magna dicuntur. Quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt. Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est quae non est quod ipse ut quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus est (alioquin illa ent maior magnitudo quam deus; deo autem non est aliquid maius), ea igitur magnitudine magnus est qua ipse est eadem magnitudo. Et ideo sicut non dicimus tres essential sic nec tres magnitudines; hoc est enim deo esse quod est magnum esse. Eadem causa nec magnos tres dicimus sed unum magnum quia non participatione magnitudinis deus magnus est sed se ipso magno magnus est quia ipse sua est magnitudo. Hoc et de bonitate et de aeternitate et de omnipotentia dei dictum sit omnibusque omnino praedicamentis quae de deo possum pronuntiari, quod ad se ipsum dicitur non translate ac per similitudinem sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore hominis dici potest.	11. As, therefore, we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, or three who are great. For in things which are great by partaking of greatness, to which it is one thing to be, and another to be great, as a great house, and a great mountain, and a great mind; in these things, I say, greatness is one thing, and that which is great because of greatness is another, and a great house, certainly, is not absolute greatness itself. But that is absolute greatness by which not only a great house is great, and any great mountain is great, but also by which every other thing whatsoever is great, which is called great; so that greatness itself is one thing, and those things are another which are called great from it. And this greatness certainly is primarily great, and in a much more excellent way than those things which are great by partaking of it. But since God is not great with that greatness which is not Himself, so that God, in being great, is, as it were, partaker of that greatness—otherwise that will be a greatness greater than God, whereas there is nothing greater than God; therefore, He is great with that greatness by which He Himself is that same greatness. And, therefore, as we do not say three essences, so neither do we say three greatnesses; for it is the same thing to God to be, and to be great. For the same reason neither do we say three greats, but one who is great; since God is not great by partaking of greatness, but He is great by Himself being great, because He Himself is His own greatness. Let the same be said also of the goodness, and of the eternity, and of the omnipotence of God, and, in short, of all the predicaments which can be predicated of God, as He is spoken of in respect to Himself, not metaphorically and by similitude, but properly, if indeed anything can be spoken of Him properly, by the mouth of man.
[5.11.12] Quod autem proprie singula in eadem trinitate dicuntur nullo modo ad se ipsa sed ad invicem aut ad creaturam dicuntur, et ideo relative non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est. Sicut enim trinitas unus deus dicitur magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deltas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia; non sic dici potest trinitas pater nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est: Audi, Israhel: dominus deus tuus dominus unus est non utique excepto filio aut excepto spiritu sancto oportet intellegi, quem unum dominum deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam patrem nostrum per gratiam suam nos regenerantem. Trinitas autem filius nullo modo dici potest. Spiritus vero sanctus secundum id quod scriptum est: Quoniam deus Spiritus est potest quidem universaliter dici quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Itaque pater et filius et spiritus sanctus quondam unus deus et utique deus sanctus est et deus spiritus est potest appellari trinitas et spiritus et sanctus. Sed tamen ille spiritus sanctus qui non trinitas sed in trinitate intellegitur in eo quod proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relative dicitur cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris et filii spiritus est. Sed ipsa relatio non apparel in hoc nomine, apparel autem cum dicitur donum dei. Donum enim est patris et filii quia et a patre procedit, sicut dominus dicit, et quod apostolus ait: Qui spiritum Christi non habet hic non est eius de ipso utique spiritu sancto ait. 'Donum' ergo 'donatoris' et 'donator doni' cum dicimus relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus. Ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filoque communio, et ideo fortasse sic appellatur quia patri et filio potest eadem appellatio convenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod illi communiter quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Ut ergo ex nomine quod utrique convenit utriusque communio significetur, vocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus. Et haec trinitas unus deus, solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia.	12. But whereas, in the same Trinity, some things severally are specially predicated, these are in no way said in reference to themselves in themselves, but either in mutual reference, or in respect to the creature; and, therefore, it is manifest that such things are spoken relatively, not in the way of substance. For the Trinity is called one God, great, good, eternal, omnipotent; and the same God Himself may be called His own deity, His own magnitude, His own goodness, His own eternity, His own omnipotence: but the Trinity cannot in the same way be called the Father, except perhaps metaphorically, in respect to the creature, on account of the adoption of sons. For that which is written, Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord, ought certainly not to be understood as if the Son were excepted, or the Holy Spirit were excepted; which one Lord our God we rightly call also our Father, as regenerating us by His grace. Neither can the Trinity in any wise be called the Son, but it can be called, in its entirety, the Holy Spirit, according to that which is written, God is a Spirit; because both the Father is a spirit and the Son is a spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. Therefore, since the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, and certainly God is holy, and God is a spirit, the Trinity can be called also the Holy Spirit. But yet that Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity, but is understood as in the Trinity, is spoken of in His proper name of the Holy Spirit relatively, since He is referred both to the Father and to the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. But the relation is not itself apparent in that name, but it is apparent when He is called the gift of God; for He is the gift of the Father and of the Son, because He proceeds from the Father, as the Lord says; and because that which the apostle says, Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His, he says certainly of the Holy Spirit Himself. When we say, therefore, the gift of the giver, and the giver of the gift, we speak in both cases relatively in reciprocal reference. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain unutterable communion of the Father and the Son; and on that account, perhaps, He is so called, because the same name is suitable to both the Father and the Son. For He Himself is called specially that which they are called in common; because both the Father is a spirit and the Son a spirit, both the Father is holy and the Son holy. In order, therefore, that the communion of both may be signified from a name which is suitable to both, the Holy Spirit is called the gift of both. And this Trinity is one God, alone, good, great, eternal, omnipotent; itself its own unity, deity, greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence.
[5.12.13] Nec movere debet quoniam diximus relative dici spiritum sanctum (non ipsam trinitatem sed eum qui est in trinitate), quia non ei videtur vicissim respondere vocabulum eius ad quem refertur. Non enim sicut dicimus seruum domini et dominum serui, filium patris et patrem filii quoniam ista relative dicuntur, ita etiam hic possumus dicere. Dicimus enim spiritum sanctum patris, sed non vicissim dicimus patrem spiritus sancti ne filius eius intellegatur spiritus sanctus. Item dicimus spiritum sanctum filii, sed non dicimus filium spiritus sancti ne pater eius intellegatur spiritus sanctus. In multis enim relativis hoc contingit ut non inveniatur vocabulum quo sibi vicissim respondeant quae ad se referuntur. Quid enim tam manifeste relative dicitur quam pignus? Ad id quippe refertur cuius pignis est, et semper pignus alicuius rei pignus est. Num ergo cum dicimus pignus patris et filii possumus vicissim dicere patrem pignoris aut filium pignoris? At vero cum dicimus donum patris et filii, non quidem possumus dicere patrem doni aut filium doni, sed ut haec vicissim respondeant dicimus donum donatoris et donatorem doni quia hic potuit inveniri usitatum vocabulum, illic non potuit.	13. Neither ought it to influence us— since we have said that the Holy Spirit is so called relatively, not the Trinity itself, but He who is in the Trinity— that the designation of Him to whom He is referred, does not seem to answer in turn to His designation. For we cannot, as we say the servant of a master, and the master of a servant, the son of a father and the father of a son, so also say here— because these things are said relatively. For we speak of the Holy Spirit of the Father; but, on the other hand, we do not speak of the Father of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit should be understood to be His Son. So also we speak of the Holy Spirit of the Son; but we do not speak of the Son of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood to be His Father. For it is the case in many relatives, that no designation is to be found by which those things which bear relation to each other may [in name] mutually correspond to each other. For what is more clearly spoken relatively than the word earnest? Since it is referred to that of which it is an earnest, and an earnest is always an earnest of something. Can we then, as we say, the earnest of the Father and of the Son, say in turn, the Father of the earnest or the Son of the earnest? But, on the other hand, when we say the gift of the Father and of the Son, we cannot indeed say the Father of the gift, or the Son of the gift; but that these may correspond mutually to each other, we say the gift of the giver and the giver of the gift; because here a word in use may be found, there it cannot.
[5.13.14] Dicitur ergo relative pater idemque relative dicitur principium et si quid forte aliud; sed pater ad filium dicitur, principium vero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dicitur relative filius; relative dicitur et verbum et imago, et in omnibus his vocabulis ad patrem refertur, nihil autem horum pater dicitur. Et principium dicitur filius; cum enim diceretur ei: Tu quis es? respondit: Principium quia et loquor vobis. Sed numquid patris principium? Creatorem se quippe ostendere voluit cum se dixit esse principium, sicut et pater principium est creaturae quod ab ipso sunt omnia. Nam et creator relative dicitur ad creaturam sicut dominus ad seruum. Et ideo cum dicimus et patrem principium et filium principium, non duo principia creaturae dicimus quia pater et filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est sicut unus creator, sicut unus deus. Si autem quidquid in se manet et gignit aliquid vel operatur principium est ei rei quam gignit vel ei quam operatur, non possumus negare etiam spiritum sanctum recte dici principium quia non eum separamus ab appellatione creatoris. Et scriptum est de illo quod operetur, et utique in se manens operatur; non enim in aliquid eorum quae operatur ipse mutatur et vertitur. Et quae operatur vide: Unicuique autem inquit, datur manifestatio spiritus ad vitilitatem. Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum; alteri autem fides in eodem spiritu alii donatio curationum in uno spiritu; alii operationes virtutum; alii prophetia; alii diiudicatio spirituum; alteri genera linguarum. Omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus dividens propria unicuique prout vult utique sicut deus. Quis enim tanta illa potest operari nisi deus? Idem autem deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Nam et singillatim si interrogemur de spiritu sancto, verissime respondemus quod deus sit, et cum patre et filio simul unus deus est. Unum ergo principium ad creaturam dicitur deus, non duo vel tria principia.	14. The Father is called so, therefore, relatively, and He is also relatively said to be the Beginning, and whatever else there may be of the kind; but He is called the Father in relation to the Son, the Beginning in relation to all things, which are from Him. So the Son is relatively so called; He is called also relatively the Word and the Image. And in all these appellations He is referred to the Father, but the Father is called by none of them. And the Son is also called the Beginning; for when it was said to Him, Who are You? He replied, Even the Beginning, who also speak to you. But is He, pray, the Beginning of the Father? For He intended to show Himself to be the Creator when He said that He was the Beginning, as the Father also is the beginning of the creature in that all things are from Him. For creator, too, is spoken relatively to creature, as master to servant. And so when we say, both that the Father is the Beginning, and that the Son is the Beginning, we do not speak of two beginnings of the creature; since both the Father and the Son together is one beginning in respect to the creature, as one Creator, as one God. But if whatever remains within itself and produces or works anything is a beginning to that thing which it produces or works; then we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit also is rightly called the Beginning, since we do not separate Him from the appellation of Creator: and it is written of Him that He works; and assuredly, in working, He remains within Himself; for He Himself is not changed and turned into any of the things which He works. And see what it is that He works: But the manifestation of the Spirit, he says, is given to every man to profit withal. For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another the discerning of spirits; to another various kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues: but all these works that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as He will; certainly as God— for who can work such great things but God?— but it is the same God which works all in all. For if we are asked point by point concerning the Holy Spirit, we answer most truly that He is God; and with the Father and the Son together He is one God. Therefore, God is spoken of as one Beginning in respect to the creature, not as two or three beginnings.
[5.14.15] Ad se autem invicem in trinitate si gignens ad id quod gignit principium est, pater ad filium principium est quia genuit eum. Utrum autem et ad spiritum sanctum principium sit pater quondam dictum est: De patre procedit non parua quaestio est. Quia si ita est, non iam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit sed etiam ei quam cat. Ubi et illud elucescit ut potest quod soles multos movere, cur non sit filius etiam spiritus sanctus cum et ipse a patre exeat sicut in euangelio legitur. Exit enim non quomodo natus sed quomodo datus, et ideo non dicitur filius quia neque natus est sicut unigenitus neque factus ut per gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur sicuti nos. Quod enim de patre natum est ad patrem solum refertur cum dicitur filius, et ideo filius patris est non et noster. Quod autem datum est et ad eum qui dedit refertur et ad eos quibus dedit; itaque spiritus sanetus non tantum patris et filii qui dederunt sed etiam noster dieitur qui accepimus, sicut dicitur domini salus qui dat salutem, eadem etiam nostra salus est qui accepimus. Spiritus ergo et dei qui dedit et noster qui accepimus. Non ille spiritus noster quo sumus, quia ipse spiritus est hominis qui in ipso est, sed alio modo iste noster quo dicimus et: Panem nostrum da nobis. Quamquam et ilium spiritum qui hominis dicitur utique accepimus. Quid enim habes, inquit, quod non accepisti? Sed aliud est quod accepimus ut essemus aliud quod accepimus ut sancti essemus. Unde scriptum est et de Iohanne quod in spiritu et virtute Heliae veniret; dictus est Heliae spiritus, sed spiritus sanctus quem accepit Helias. Hoc et de Moyse intellegendum est cum ait ei dominus: Tollam de spiritu tuo et dabo eis hoc est dabo illis de spiritu sancto quem iam tibi dedi. Si ergo et quod datur principium habet eum a quo datur quia non aliunde accepit illud quod ab ipso procedit, fatendum est patrem et filium principium esse spiritus sancti, non duo principia, sed sicut pater et filius unus deus et ad creaturam relative unus creator et unus dominus, sic relative ad spiritum sanctum unum principium, ad creaturam vero pater et filius et spiritus sanctus unum principium sicut unus creator et unus dominus.	15. But in their mutual relation to one another in the Trinity itself, if the begetter is a beginning in relation to that which he begets, the Father is a beginning in relation to the Son, because He begets Him; but whether the Father is also a beginning in relation to the Holy Spirit, since it is said, He proceeds from the Father, is no small question. Because, if it is so, He will not only be a beginning to that thing which He begets or makes, but also to that which He gives. And here, too, that question comes to light, as it can, which is wont to trouble many, Why the Holy Spirit is not also a son, since He, too, comes forth from the Father, as it is read in the Gospel. For the Spirit came forth, not as born, but as given; and so He is not called a son, because He was neither born, as the Only-begotten, nor made, so that by the grace of God He might be born into adoption, as we are. For that which is born of the Father, is referred to the Father only when called Son, and so the Son is the Son of the Father, and not also our Son; but that which is given is referred both to Him who gave, and to those to whom He gave; and so the Holy Spirit is not only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son who gave Him, but He is also called ours, who have received Him: as The salvation of the Lord, who gives salvation, is said also to be our salvation, who have received it. Therefore, the Spirit is both the Spirit of God who gave Him, and ours who have received Him. Not, indeed, that spirit of ours by which we are, because that is the spirit of a man which is in him; but this Spirit is ours in another mode, viz. that in which we also say, Give us this day our bread. Although certainly we have received that spirit also, which is called the spirit of a man. For what have you, he says, which you did not receive? But that is one thing, which we have received that we might be; another, that which we have received that we might be holy. Whence it is also written of John, that he came in the spirit and power of Elias; and by the spirit of Elias is meant the Holy Spirit, whom Elias received. And the same thing is to be understood of Moses, when the Lord says to him, And I will take of your spirit, and will put it upon them; that is, I will give to them of the Holy Spirit, which I have already given to you. If, therefore, that also which is given has him for a beginning by whom it is given, since it has received from no other source that which proceeds from him; it must be admitted that the Father and the Son are a Beginning of the Holy Spirit, not two Beginnings; but as the Father and Son are one God, and one Creator, and one Lord relatively to the creature, so are they one Beginning relatively to the Holy Spirit. But the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one Beginning in respect to the creature, as also one Creator and one God.
[5.15.15] Interius autem quaeritur utrum quemadmodum filius non hoc tantum habet nascendo ut filius sit sed omnino ut sit, sic et spiritus sanctus eo quo datur habeat non tantum ut donum sit sed omnino ut sit; utrum ergo erat antequam daretur sed nondum erat donum, an eo ipso quo daturus erat eum deus iam donum erat et antequam daretur. Sed si non procedit nisi cum datur, nec procederet utique priusquam esset cui daretur. Quomodo iam erat ipsa substantia si non est nisi quia datur, sicut filius non tantum ut sit filius quod relative dicitur sed omnino ut sit ipsa substantia nascendo habet? An semper procedit spiritus sanctus et non ex tempore sed ab aeternitate procedit, sed quia sic procedebat ut esset donabile, iam donum erat et antequam esset cui daretur? Aliter enim intellegitur cum dicitur donum, aliter cum dicitur donatum. Nam donum potest esse et antequam detur; donatum autem nisi datum fuerit nullo modo dici potest.	16. But it is asked further, whether, as the Son, by being born, has not only this, that He is the Son, but that He is absolutely; and so also the Holy Spirit, by being given, has not only this, that He is given, but that He is absolutely— whether therefore He was, before He was given, but was not yet a gift; or whether, for the very reason that God was about to give Him, He was already a gift also before He was given. But if He does not proceed unless when He is given, and assuredly could not proceed before there was one to whom He might be given; how, in that case, was He [absolutely] in His very substance, if He is not unless because He is given? just as the Son, by being born, not only has this, that He is a Son, which is said relatively, but His very substance absolutely, so that He is. Does the Holy Spirit proceed always, and proceed not in time, but from eternity, but because He so proceeded that He was capable of being given, was already a gift even before there was one to whom He might be given? For there is a difference in meaning between a gift and a thing that has been given. For a gift may exist even before it is given; but it cannot be called a thing that has been given unless it has been given.
[5.16.17] Nec moveat quod spiritus sanctus, cum sit coaeternus patri et filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore veluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiterne spiritus donum, temporaliter autem donatum. Nam et si dominus non dicitur nisi cum habere incipit seruum, etiam ista appellatio relativa ex tempore est deo, non enim sempiterna creatura est cuius est ille dominus. Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit deo temporaliter quia non est mutabilis sicut in exordio huius disputationis tractavimus? Ecce dominum esse non sempiternum habet ne cogamur etiam creaturam sempiternam dicere, quia ille sempiterne non dominaretur nisi etiam ista sempiterne famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse seruus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet seruum. Et quisquis exstiterit qui aeternum quidem deum solum dicat, tempora autem non esse aeterna propter varietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen tempora non in tempore esse coepisse (non enim erat tempus antequam inciperent tempora, et ideo non in tempore accidit deo ut dominus esset quia ipsorum temporum dominus erat quae utique non in tempore esse coeperunt), quid respondebit de homine qui in tempore factus est cuius utique dominus non erat antequam esset cui esset? Certe vel ut dominus hominis esset ex tempore accidit deo, et ut omnis auferri videatur controversia, certe ut tuus dominus esset aut meus qui modo esse coepimus ex tempore accidit deo. Aut si et hoc propter obscuram quaestionem animae videtur incertum, quid ut esset dominus populi Israhel? Quia etsi iam erat animae natura quam ille populus habebat -quomodo non quaerimus -- tamen ille populus nondum erat et quando esse coepit apparet. Postremo ut dominus esset huius arboris et huius segetis ex tempore accidit quae modo esse coeperunt. Quia etsi materies ipsa iam erat, aliud est tamen dominum esse materiae, aliud esse dominum iam factae naturae. Alio enim tempore est etiam homo dominus ligni et alio tempore est dominus arcae quamvis ex ipso ligno fabricatae, quod utique non erat cum ligni dominus iam esset. Quomodo igitur obtinebimus nihil secundum accidens dici deum nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit quo mutetur, ut ea sint accidentia relativa quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt? Sicut amicus relative dicitur, neque enim esse incipit nisi cum amare coeperit; fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis ut amicus dicatur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua similia. Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione totiens dici relative ut neque cum incipit dici neque cum desinit aliquid in eius natura vel forma qua nummus est mutationis fiat, quanto facilius de illa incommutabili dei substantia debemus accipere ut ita dicatur relative aliquid ad creaturam ut, quamvis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae dei accidisse intellegatur sed illi creaturae ad quam dicitur? Domine, inquit, refugium factus es nobis. Refugium ergo nostrum deus relative dicitur; ad nos enim refertur; et tunc refugium nostrum fit cum ad eum refugimus. Numquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura quod antequam ad eum refugeremus non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio; deteriores enim fuimus antequam ad eum refugeremus, et efficimur ad eum refugiendo meliores; in illo autem nulla. Sic et pater noster esse incipit cum per eius gratiam regeneramur quoniam dedit nobis potestatem filios dei fieri. Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius cum filii eius efficimur; simul et ille pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla suae commutatione substantiae. Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit deus quod antea non dicebatur manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens dei quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid deus incipit relative. Et quod amicus dei iustus esse incipit ipse mutatur; deus autem absit ut temporaliter aliquem diligat quasi noua dilectione quae in ipso ante non erat apud quem nec praeterita transierunt et futura iam facta sunt. Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit sicut praedestinavit, sed cum convertuntur et inveniunt illum tunc incipere ab eo diligi dicuntur ut eo modo dicatur quo potest humano affectu capi quod dicitur. Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur et placidus bonis, illi mutantur non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scilicet mutatione non sua.	17. Nor let it trouble us that the Holy Spirit, although He is co-eternal with the Father and the Son, yet is called something which exists in time; as, for instance, this very thing which we have called Him, a thing that has been given. For the Spirit is a gift eternally, but a thing that has been given in time. For if a lord also is not so called unless when he begins to have a slave, that appellation likewise is relative and in time to God; for the creature is not from all eternity, of which He is the Lord. How then shall we make it good that relative terms themselves are not accidental, since nothing happens accidentally to God in time, because He is incapable of change, as we have argued in the beginning of this discussion? Behold! To be the Lord, is not eternal to God; otherwise we should be compelled to say that the creature also is from eternity, since He would not be a lord from all eternity unless the creature also was a servant from all eternity. But as he cannot be a slave who has not a lord, neither can he be a lord who has not a slave. And if there be any one who says that God, indeed, is alone eternal, and that times are not eternal on account of their variety and changeableness, but that times nevertheless did not begin to be in time (for there was no time before times began, and therefore it did not happen to God in time that He should be Lord, since He was Lord of the very times themselves, which assuredly did not begin in time): what will he reply respecting man, who was made in time, and of whom assuredly He was not the Lord before he was of whom He was to be Lord? Certainly to be the Lord of man happened to God in time. And that all dispute may seem to be taken away, certainly to be your Lord, or mine, who have only lately begun to be, happened to God in time. Or if this, too, seems uncertain on account of the obscure question respecting the soul, what is to be said of His being the Lord of the people of Israel? Since, although the nature of the soul already existed, which that people had (a matter into which we do not now inquire), yet that people existed not as yet, and the time is apparent when it began to exist. Lastly, that He should be Lord of this or that tree, or of this or that grain crop, which only lately began to be, happened in time; since, although the matter itself already existed, yet it is one thing to be Lord of the matter (materiæ), another to be Lord of the already created nature (naturæ). For man, too, is lord of the wood at one time, and at another he is lord of the chest, although fabricated of that same wood; which he certainly was not at the time when he was already the lord of the wood. How then shall we make it good that nothing is said of God according to accident, except because nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed, so that those things are relative accidents which happen in connection with some change of the things of which they are spoken. As a friend is so called relatively: for he does not begin to be one, unless when he has begun to love; therefore some change of will takes place, in order that he may be called a friend. And money, when it is called a price, is spoken of relatively, and yet it was not changed when it began to be a price; nor, again, when it is called a pledge, or any other thing of the kind. If, therefore, money can so often be spoken of relatively with no change of itself, so that neither when it begins, nor when it ceases to be so spoken of, does any change take place in that nature or form of it, whereby it is money; how much more easily ought we to admit, concerning that unchangeable substance of God, that something may be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature, that although it begin to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance itself of God, but only to that creature in respect to which it is predicated? Lord, it is said, You have been made our refuge. God, therefore, is said to be our refuge relatively, for He is referred to us, and He then becomes our refuge when we flee to Him; pray does anything come to pass then in His nature, which, before we fled to Him, was not? In us therefore some change does take place; for we were worse before we fled to Him, and we become better by fleeing to Him: but in Him there is no change. So also He begins to be our Father, when we are regenerated through His grace, since He gave us power to become the sons of God. Our substance therefore is changed for the better, when we become His sons; and He at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any change of His own substance. Therefore that which begins to be spoken of God in time, and which was not spoken of Him before, is manifestly spoken of Him relatively; yet not according to any accident of God, so that anything should have happened to Him, but clearly according to some accident of that, in respect to which God begins to be called something relatively. When a righteous man begins to be a friend of God, he himself is changed; but far be it from us to say, that God loves any one in time with as it were a new love, which was not in Him before, with whom things gone by have not passed away and things future have been already done. Therefore He loved all His saints before the foundation of the world, as He predestinated them; but when they are converted and find them; then they are said to begin to be loved by Him, that what is said may be said in that way in which it can be comprehended by human affections. So also, when He is said to be angry with the unrighteous, and gentle with the good, they are changed, not He: just as the light is troublesome to weak eyes, pleasant to those that are strong; namely, by their change, not its own.	}