Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book VIII

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK VIII

• 8.0 Preface.— The Conclusion of What Has Been Said Above. The Rule to Be Observed in the More Difficult Questions of the Faith.
• 8.1 De indifferenti magnitudine trinitatis in qua non est plus ipsa trinitas simul quam singula quaeque persona. Chapter 1.— It is Shown by Reason that in God Three are Not Anything Greater Than One Person.
• 8.2 Quod de essentia veritatis quae est trinitas deus nihil corporeum neque mutabile debeat cogitari. Chapter 2.— Every Corporeal Conception Must Be Rejected, in Order that It May Be Understood How God is Truth.
• 8.3 De vero et summo et uno bono. Chapter 3.— How God May Be Known to Be the Chief Good. The Mind Does Not Become Good Unless by Turning to God.
• 8.4 De dilectione in deum per fidem. Chapter 4.— God Must First Be Known by an Unerring Faith, that He May Be Loved.
• 8.5 De sacramento incarnationis domini et saluatoris nostri Iesu Christi. Chapter 5.— How the Trinity May Be Loved Though Unknown.
• 8.6 Quid in sanctis quos non vidimus diligamus. Chapter 6.— How the Man Not Yet Righteous Can Know the Righteous Man Whom He Loves.
• 8.7 De vera dilectione. Chapter 7.— Of True Love, by Which We Arrive at the Knowledge of the Trinity. God is to Be Sought, Not Outwardly, by Seeking to Do Wonderful Things with the Angels, But Inwardly, by Imitating the Piety of Good Angels.
• 8.8 Quod qui fratrem diligit deum diligat qui amat et ipsam dilectionem quae ex deo est et deus est. Chapter 8.— That He Who Loves His Brother, Loves God; Because He Loves Love Itself, Which is of God, and is God.
• 8.9 Quod ex ea forma qua diligitur iustus diligatur deus quia non potest ea quae dilectio nem excit at forma non diligi eademque est deus quia deus caritas est. Chapter 9.— Our Love of the Righteous is Kindled from Love Itself of the Unchangeable Form of Righteousness.
• 8.10 De amante et quod amatur et amore. Chapter 10.— There are Three Things in Love, as It Were a Trace of the Trinity.

Latin	Latin
LIBER VIII	On the Trinity (Book VIII)
	Explains and proves that not only the Father is not greater than the Son, but neither are both together anything greater than the Holy Spirit, nor any two together in the same trinity anything greater than one, nor all three together anything greater than each severally. It is then shown how the nature itself of God may be understood from our understanding of truth, and from our knowledge of the supreme good, and from the innate love of righteousness, whereby a righteous soul is loved even by a soul that is itself not yet righteous. But it is urged above all, that the knowledge of God is to be sought by love, which God is said to be in the Scriptures; and in this love is also pointed out the existence of some trace of a trinity.
[8.0.1] Diximus alibi ea dici proprie in illa trinitate distincte ad singulas personas pertinentia quae relative dicuntur ad invicem sicut pater et filius et utriusque donum spiritus sanctus, non enim pater trinitas aut filius trinitas aut trinitas donum. Quod vero ad se dicuntur singuli non dici pluraliter tres sed unum ipsam trinitatem sicut deus pater, deus filius deus spiritus sanctus; et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus spiritus sanctus; et omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus; nec tamen tres dii aut tres boni aut tres omnipotentes, sed unus deus, bonus, omnipotens, ipsa trinitas, et quidquid aliud non ad invicem relative sed ad se singuli dicuntur. Hoc enim secundum essentiam dicuntur quia hoc est ibi esse quod magnum esse, quod bonum, quod sapientem esse, et quidquid aliud ad se unaquaeque ibi persona vel ipsa trinitas dicitur. Ideoque dici tres personas vel tres substantias non ut aliqua intellegatur diversitas essentiae sed ut vel uno aliquo vocabulo responderi possit cum dicitur quid tres vel quid tria; tantamque esse aequalitatem in ea trinitate ut non solum pater non sit maior quam filius quod attinet ad divinitatem, sed nec pater et filius simul maius aliquid sint quam spiritus sanctus, aut singula quaeque persona quaelibet trium minus aliquid sit quam ipsa trinitas. Dicta sunt haec, et si saepius versando repetantur, familiarius quidem innotescunt; sed et modus aliquis adhibendus est deoque supplicandum deuotissima pietate ut intellectum aperiat et studium contentionis absumat quo possit mente cerni essentia veritatis sine ulla mole, sine ulla mutabilitate. Nunc itaque in quantum ipse adivuat creator mire misericors attendamus haec quae modo interiore quam superiora tractavimus, cum sint eadem, servata illa regula ut quod intellectui nostro nondum eluxerit a firmit at e fidei non dimittatur.	1. We have said elsewhere that those things are predicated specially in the Trinity as belonging severally to each person, which are predicated relatively the one to the other, as Father and Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit; for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son the Trinity, nor the gift the Trinity: but what whenever each is singly spoken of in respect to themselves, then they are not spoken of as three in the plural number, but one, the Trinity itself, as the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God; the Father good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and the Father omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit omnipotent: yet neither three Gods, nor three goods, nor three omnipotents, but one God, good, omnipotent, the Trinity itself; and whatsoever else is said of them not relatively in respect to each other, but individually in respect to themselves. For they are thus spoken of according to essence, since in them to be is the same as to be great, as to be good, as to be wise, and whatever else is said of each person individually therein, or of the Trinity itself, in respect to themselves. And that therefore they are called three persons, or three substances, not in order that any difference of essence may be understood, but that we may be able to answer by some one word, should any one ask what three, or what three things? And that there is so great an equality in that Trinity, that not only the Father is not greater than the Son, as regards divinity, but neither are the Father and Son together greater than the Holy Spirit; nor is each individual person, whichever it be of the three, less than the Trinity itself. This is what we have said; and if it is handled and repeated frequently, it becomes, no doubt, more familiarly known: yet some limit, too, must be put to the discussion, and we must supplicate God with most devout piety, that He will open our understanding, and take away the inclination of disputing, in order that our minds may discern the essence of the truth, that has neither bulk nor moveableness. Now, therefore, so far as the Creator Himself aids us in His marvellous mercy, let us consider these subjects, into which we will enter more deeply than we entered into those which preceded, although they are in truth the same; preserving the while this rule, that what has not yet been made clear to our intellect, be nevertheless not loosened from the firmness of our faith.
[8.1.2] Dicimus enim non esse in hac trinitate maius aliquid duas aut tres personas quam unam earum, quod non capit consuetudo carnalis non ob aliud nisi quia vera quae creata sunt sentit ut potest, veritatem autem ipsam qua creata sunt non potest intueri; nam si posset, nullo modo esset lux ista corporea manifestior quam hoc quod diximus. In substantia quippe veritatis quoniam sola vere est non est maior aliqua nisi quae verius est. Quidquid autem intellegibile atque incommutabile est non aliud alio verius est quia aeque incommutabiliter aeternum est, nec quod ibi magnum dicitur aliunde magnum est quam eo quo vere est. Quapropter ubi magnitudo ipsa veritas est quidquid plus habet magnitudinis necesse est plus habeat veritatis; quidquid ergo plus veritatis non habet non habet etiam plus magnitudinis. Porro quidquid plus habet veritatis profecto verius est sicut maius est quod plus habet magnitudinis; hoc ergo ibi est maius quod verius. Non autem verius est pater et filius simul quam singulus pater aut singulus filius. Non igitur maius aliquid utrumque simul quam singulum eorum. Et quoniam aeque vere est etiam spiritus sanctus, nec pater et filius simul maius aliquid est quam ipse quia nec verius. Pater quoque et spiritus sanctus simul quoniam veritate non superant filium, non enim verius sunt, nec magnitudine superant. Atque ita filius et spiritus sanctus simul tam magnum aliquid sunt quam pater solus quia tam vere sunt. Sic et ipsa trinitas tam magnum est quam unaquaeque ibi persona; non enim ibi maior est quae verior non est ubi est ipsa veritas magnitudo quia in essentia veritatis hoc est verum esse quod est esse, et hoc est esse quod est magnum esse; hoc ergo magnum esse quod verum esse. Quod igitur ibi aeque verum est etiam aeque magnum sit necesse est.	2. For we say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not anything greater than one of them; which carnal perception does not receive, for no other reason except because it perceives as it can the true things which are created, but cannot discern the truth itself by which they are created; for if it could, then the very corporeal light would in no way be more clear than this which we have said. For in respect to the substance of truth, since it alone truly is, nothing is greater, unless because it more truly is. But in respect to whatsoever is intelligible and unchangeable, no one thing is more truly than another, since all alike are unchangeably eternal; and that which therein is called great, is not great from any other source than from that by which it truly is. Wherefore, where magnitude itself is truth, whatsoever has more of magnitude must needs have more of truth; whatsoever therefore has not more of truth, has not also more of magnitude. Further, whatsoever has more of truth is certainly more true, just as that is greater which has more of magnitude; therefore in respect to the substance of truth that is more great which is more true. But the Father and the Son together are not more truly than the Father singly, or the Son singly. Both together, therefore, are not anything greater than each of them singly. And since also the Holy Spirit equally is truly, the Father and Son together are not anything greater than He, since neither are they more truly. The Father also and the Holy Spirit together, since they do not surpass the Son in truth (for they are not more truly), do not surpass Him either in magnitude. And so the Son and the Holy Spirit together are just as great as the Father alone, since they are as truly. So also the Trinity itself is as great as each several person therein. For where truth itself is magnitude, that is not more great which is not more true: since in regard to the essence of truth, to be true is the same as to be, and to be is the same as to be great; therefore to be great is the same as to be true. And in regard to it, therefore, what is equally true must needs also be equally great.
[8.2.3] In corporibus autem fieri potest ut aeque verum sit hoc aurum atque illud, sed maius hoc sit quam illud quia non eadem ibi est magnitudo quae veritas, aliudque illi est aurum esse, aliud magnum esse. Sic et in animi natura secundum quod dicitur magnus animus, non secundum hoc dicitur verus animus; animum enim verum habet etiam qui non est magnanimus quandoquidem corporis et animi essentia non est ipsius veritatis essentia sicuti est trinitas, deus unus, solus, magnus, verus, verax, veritas. Quem si cogitare conamur quantum sinit et donat, nullus cogitetur per locorum spatia contactus aut complexus quasi trium corporum, nulla compago iuncturae sicut tricorporem Geryonem fabulae ferunt; sed quidquid animo tale occurrerit ut maius sit in tribus quam in singulis minusque in uno quam in duobus sine ulla dubitatione respuatur; ita enim respuitur omne corporeum. In spiritalibus autem omne mutabile quod occurrerit non putetur deus. Non enim paruae notitiae pars est cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus si antequam scire possimus quid sit deus, possumus iam scire quid non sit. Non est enim certe nec terra nec caelum nec quasi terra et caelum nec tale aliquid quale videmus in caelo, nec quidquid tale non videmus et est fortassis in caelo. Nec si augeas imaginatione cogitationis lucem solis quantum poses, sive quo sit maior sive quo sit clarior, millies tantum aut innumerabiliter, neque hoc est deus. Nec sicut cogitantur angel) mundi spiritus caelestia corpora inspirantes atque ad arbitrium quo seruiunt deo mutantes atque versantes neque si omnes, cum sint milia millium, in unum conlati unus fiant, nec tale aliquid deus est. Nec si eosdem spiritus sine corporibus cogites, quod quidem carnali cogitationi difficillimum est. Ecce vide si poses, o anima praegrauata corpore quod corrumpitur et onusta terrenis cogitationibus multis et variis, ecce vide si poses, deus veritas est. Hoc enim scriptum est: Quoniam deus lux est non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor cum audit, veritas est. Noli quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubila ehantasmatum et perturbabunt serenitatem quae primo ictu diluxit tibi cum dicerem, veritas. Ecce in ipso primo ictu qua velut coruscatione perstringeris cum dicitur veritas mane si poses; sed non poses. Relaberis in ista solita atque terrena. Quo tandem pondere, quaeso, relaberis nisi sordium contractarum cupiditatis visco et peregrinationis erroribus?	3. But in respect to bodies, it may be the case that this gold and that gold may be equally true [real], but this may be greater than that, since magnitude is not the same thing in this case as truth; and it is one thing for it to be gold, another to be great. So also in the nature of the soul; a soul is not called great in the same respect in which it is called true. For he, too, has a true [real] soul who has not a great soul; since the essence of body and soul is not the essence of the truth [reality] itself; as is the Trinity, one God, alone, great, true, truthful, the truth. Of whom if we endeavor to think, so far as He Himself permits and grants, let us not think of any touch or embrace in local space, as if of three bodies, or of any compactness of conjunction, as fables tell of three-bodied Geryon; but let whatsoever may occur to the mind, that is of such sort as to be greater in three than in each singly, and less in one than in two, be rejected without any doubt; for so everything corporeal is rejected. But also in spiritual things let nothing changeable that may have occurred to the mind be thought of God. For when we aspire from this depth to that height, it is a step towards no small knowledge, if, before we can know what God is, we can already know what He is not. For certainly He is neither earth nor heaven; nor, as it were, earth and heaven; nor any such thing as we see in the heaven; nor any such thing as we do not see, but which perhaps is in heaven. Neither if you were to magnify in the imagination of your thought the light of the sun as much as you are able, either that it may be greater, or that it may be brighter, a thousand times as much, or times without number; neither is this God. Neither as we think of the pure angels as spirits animating celestial bodies, and changing and dealing with them after the will by which they serve God; not even if all, and there are thousands of thousands, were brought together into one, and became one; neither is any such thing God. Neither if you were to think of the same spirits as without bodies— a thing indeed most difficult for carnal thought to do. Behold and see, if you can, O soul pressed down by the corruptible body, and weighed down by earthly thoughts, many and various; behold and see, if you can, that God is truth. For it is written that God is light; not in such way as these eyes see, but in such way as the heart sees, when it is said, He is truth [reality]. Ask not what is truth [reality] for immediately the darkness of corporeal images and the clouds of phantasms will put themselves in the way, and will disturb that calm which at the first twinkling shone forth to you, when I said truth [reality]. See that you remain, if you can, in that first twinkling with which you are dazzled, as it were, by a flash, when it is said to you, Truth [Reality]. But you can not; you will glide back into those usual and earthly things. And what weight, pray, is it that will cause you so to glide back, unless it be the bird-lime of the stains of appetite you have contracted, and the errors of your wandering from the right path?
[8.3.4] Ecce iterum vide si potes. Non amas certe nisi bonum quia bona est terra altitudine montium et temperamento collium et planitie camporum, et bonum praedium amoenum ac fertile, et bona domus paribus membris disposita et ample et lucida, et bona animalia animate corpora, et bonus aer modestus et salubris, et bonus cibus suavis atque aptus valetudini, et bona valetudo sine doloribus et lassitudine, et bona facies hominis dimensa pariliter et affecta hilariter et luculente colorata, et bonus animus amici consensionis dulcedine et amoris fide, et bonus vir iustus, et bonae divitiae quia facile expediunt, et bonum caelum cum sole et luna et stellis suis, et boni angeli sancta obedientia, et bona locutio suaviter docens et congruenter movens audientem, et bonum carmen canorum numeris et sententus grave. Quid plura et plura? Bonum hoc et bonum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum si poses; ita deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis bond. Neque enim in his omnibus bonds vel quae commemoravi vel quae alla cernuntur sive cogitantur diceremus aliud alio melius cum vere iudicamus nisi esset nobis im, pressa notio ipsius bond secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud alii praeponeremus. Sic amandus est deus, non hoc et illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum; quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cuu superuolitet iudicando, sed cui haereat amando, et quid hoc nisi deus? Non bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum caelum, sed bonum bonum. Sic enim forte facilius advertitur quid velim dicere. Cum enim audio verbi gratia quod dicitur animus bonus, sicut duo verba sunt ita ex eis verbis duo quaedam intellego, aliud quo animus est, aliud quo bonus. Et quidem ut animus esset non egit ipse ahqmd; non enim iam erat qui ageret ut esset. Ut autem sit bonus animus video agendum esse voluntate, non quia idipsum quo animus est non est aliquid bond (nam unde iam dicitur et verissime dicitur corpore melior?) sed ideo nondum dicitur bonus animus quia restat ei actio voluntatis qua sit praestantior. Quam si neglexerit, lure culpatur recteque dicitur non bonus animus; distat enim ab eo qui hoc agit, et quia ille laudabilis, profecto iste qui hoc non agit vituperabilis est. Cum vero agit hoc studio et fit bonus animus, nisi se ad aliquid convertat quod ipse non est non potest hoc assequi. Quo se autem convertit ut fiat bonus animus nisi ad bonum, cum hoc amat et appetit et adipiscitur? Unde se si rursus avertat fiatque non bonus, hoc ipso quod se avertit a bono, nisi maneat in se illud bonum unde se avertit, non est quo se iterum si voluerit emendare convertat.	4. Behold again, and see if you can. You certainly do not love anything except what is good, since good is the earth, with the loftiness of its mountains, and the due measure of its hills, and the level surface of its plains; and good is an estate that is pleasant and fertile; and good is a house that is arranged in due proportions, and is spacious and bright; and good are animal and animate bodies; and good is air that is temperate, and salubrious; and good is food that is agreeable and fit for health; and good is health, without pains or lassitude; and good is the countenance of man that is disposed in fit proportions, and is cheerful in look, and bright in color; and good is the mind of a friend, with the sweetness of agreement, and with the confidence of love; and good is a righteous man; and good are riches, since they are readily useful; and good is the heaven, with its sun, and moon, and stars; and good are the angels, by their holy obedience; and good is discourse that sweetly teaches and suitably admonishes the hearer; and good is a poem that is harmonious in its numbers and weighty in its sense. And why add yet more and more? This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that, and regard good itself if you can, so will you see God, not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all good. For in all these good things, whether those which I have mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought, we could not say that one was better than another, when we judge truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both approve some things as good, and prefer one good to another. So God is to be loved, not this and that good, but the good itself. For the good that must be sought for the soul is not one above which it is to fly by judging, but to which it is to cleave by loving; and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or the good heaven, but the good good. For perhaps what I wish to say may be more easily perceived in this way. For when, for instance, a mind is called good, as there are two words, so from these words I understand two things— one whereby it is mind, and another whereby it is good. And itself had no share in making itself a mind, for there was nothing as yet to make itself to be anything; but to make itself to be a good mind, I see, must be brought about by the will: not because that by which it is mind is not itself anything good—for how else is it already called, and most truly called, better than the body?— but it is not yet called a good mind, for this reason, that the action of the will still is wanted, by which it is to become more excellent; and if it has neglected this, then it is justly blamed, and is rightly called not a good mind. For it then differs from the mind which does perform this; and since the latter is praiseworthy, the former doubtless, which does not perform, it is blameable. But when it does this of set purpose, and becomes a good mind, it yet cannot attain to being so unless it turn itself to something which itself is not. And to what can it turn itself that it may become a good mind, except to the good which it loves, and seeks, and obtains? And if it turns itself back again from this, and becomes not good, then by the very act of turning away from the good, unless that good remain in it from which it turns away, it cannot again turn itself back there if it should wish to amend.
[8.3.5] Quapropter nulla essent mutabilia bon a nisi esset incommutabile bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud quae possum alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris sine illis quae participatione bond bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cuius participatione bona sunt (simul enim et ipsum intellegis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum), si ergo potueris illis detractis per se ipsum perspicere bonum, perspexeris deum. Et si amore inhaeseris, continuo beat)ficaberis. Pudeat autem cum alia lon amentur nisi quia bona sunt, eis inhaerendo non amare bonum ipsum unde bona sunt. Illud etiam quod animus tantum quia est animus, etiam nondum eo modo bonus quo se convertit ad incommutabile bonum, sea, ut dixi, tantum animus cum ita nobis places ut eum omni etiam luci corporeae cum b en e in tellegimus , praeferamus , non in se ipso nobis places sed in illa arte qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus ubi videtur fuisse faciendus. Haec est veritas et simplex bonum; non enim est aliud aliquid quam ipsum bonum ac per hoc etiam summum bonum. Non enim minui vel augeri bonum potest nisi quod ex alio bono bonum est. Ad hoc se igitur animus convertit ut bonus sit a quo habet ut animus sit. Tunc ergo voluntas naturae congruit ut perficiatur in bono animus cum illud bonum diligitur conversione voluntatis unde est et illud quod non amittitur nec aversione voluntatis. Avertendo enim se a summo bono amittit animus ut sit bonus animus; non autem amittit ut sit animus cum et hoc iam bonum sit corpore melius. Hoc ergo amittit voluntas quod voluntas adipiscitur, iam enim erat animus qui converti ad id vellet a quo erat; qui autem vellet esse antequam esset nondum erat. Et hoc est bonum nostrum ubi videmus utrum esse debuerit aut debeat quidquid esse debuisse aut debere comprehendimus, et ubi videmus esse non potuisse nisi esse debuisset quidquid etiam quomodo esse debuerit non comprehendimus. Hoc ergo bonum non longe positum est ab unoquoque nostrum: In illo enim vivimus et movemur et sumus.	5. Wherefore there would be no changeable goods, unless there were the unchangeable good. Whenever then you are told of this good thing and that good thing, which things can also in other respects be called not good, if you can put aside those things which are good by the participation of the good, and discern that good itself by the participation of which they are good (for when this or that good thing is spoken of, you understand together with them the good itself also): if, then, I say you can remove these things, and canst discern the good in itself, then you will have discerned God. And if you shall cleave to Him with love, you shall be immediately blessed. But whereas other things are not loved, except because they are good, be ashamed, in cleaving to them, not to love the good itself whence they are good. That also, which is a mind, only because it is a mind, while it is not yet also good by the turning itself to the unchangeable good, but, as I said, is only a mind; whenever it so pleases us, as that we prefer it even, if we understand aright, to all corporeal light, does not please us in itself, but in that skill by which it was made. For it is thence approved as made, wherein it is seen to have been to be made. This is truth, and simple good: for it is nothing else than the good itself, and for this reason also the chief good. For no good can be diminished or increased, except that which is good from some other good. Therefore the mind turns itself, in order to be good, to that by which it comes to be a mind. Therefore the will is then in harmony with nature, so that the mind may be perfected in good, when that good is loved by the turning of the will to it, whence that other good also comes which is not lost by the turning away of the will from it. For by turning itself from the chief good, the mind loses the being a good mind; but it does not lose the being a mind. And this, too, is a good already, and one better than the body. The will, therefore, loses that which the will obtains. For the mind already was, that could wish to be turned to that from which it was: but that as yet was not, that could wish to be before it was. And herein is our [supreme] good, when we see whether the thing ought to be or to have been, respecting which we comprehend that it ought to be or to have been, and when we see that the thing could not have been unless it ought to have been, of which we also do not comprehend in what manner it ought to have been. This good then is not far from every one of us: for in it we live, and move, and have our being.
[8.4.6] Sed dilectione standum est ad illud et inhaerendum illi ut praesente perfruamur a quo sumus, quo absente nec esse possemus. Cum enim per fidem adhuc ambulamus non per speciem nondum utique videmus deum sicut idem ait facie ad faciem. Quem tamen nisi iam nunc diligamus, numquam videbimus. Sed quis diligit quod ignorat? Sciri enim aliquid et non diligi potest; diligi autem quod nescitur, quaero utrum possit quia si non potest, nemo diligit deum antequam sciat. Et quid est deum scire nisi eum mente conspicere firmeque percipere? Non enim corpus est, ut carneis oculis inquiratur. Sed et priusquam valeamus conspicere atque percipere deum sicut conspici et percipi potest, quod mundis cordibus licet: Beati enim mundicordes quia ipsi deum videbunt nisi per fidem diligatur, non poterit cor mundari quo ad eum videndum sit aptum et idoneum. Ubi sunt enim illa tria propter quae in animo aedificanda omnium divinorum librorum machinamenta consurgunt, fides, spes, caritas nisi in animo credente quod nondum videt et sperante atque amante quod credit? Amatur ergo et quod ignoratur sed tamen creditur. Nimirum autem cavendum est ne credens animus id quod non videt fingat sibi aliquid quod non est et speret diligatque quod falsum est. Quod si fit, non erit caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, qui finis praecepti est sicut idem apostolus dicit.	6. But it is by love that we must stand firm to this and cleave to this, in order that we may enjoy the presence of that by which we are, and in the absence of which we could not be at all. For as we walk as yet by faith, and not by sight, we certainly do not yet see God, as the same [apostle] says, face to face: whom however we shall never see, unless now already we love. But who loves what he does not know? For it is possible something may be known and not loved: but I ask whether it is possible that what is not known can be loved; since if it cannot, then no one loves God before he knows Him. And what is it to know God except to behold Him and steadfastly perceive Him with the mind? For He is not a body to be searched out by carnal eyes. But before also that we have power to behold and to perceive God, as He can be beheld and perceived, which is permitted to the pure in heart; for blessed are the pure in heart. for they shall see God; except He is loved by faith, it will not be possible for the heart to be cleansed, in order that it may be apt and meet to see Him. For where are there those three, in order to build up which in the mind the whole apparatus of the divine Scriptures has been raised up, namely Faith, Hope, and Charity, except in a mind believing what it does not yet see, and hoping and loving what it believes? Even He therefore who is not known, but yet is believed, can be loved. But indisputably we must take care, lest the mind believing that which it does not see, feign to itself something which is not, and hope for and love that which is false. For in that case, it will not be charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned, which is the end of the commandment, as the same apostle says.
[8.4.7] Necesse est autem cum aliqua corporalia recta vel audita quae non vidimus credimus, fingat sibi animus aliquid in lineamentis formisque corporum sicut occurrerit cogitanti, quod aut verum non sit aut etiam si verum est, quod rarissime potest accidere, non hoc tamen fide ut teneamus quidquam prodest, sed ad aliud aliquid utile quod per hoc insinuatur. Quis enim legentium vel audientium quae scripsit apostolus Paulus vel quae de illo scripta sunt non fingat animo et ipsius apostoli faciem et omnium quorum ibi nomina commemorantur? Et cum in tanta hominum multitudine quibus illae litterae notae sunt alius aliter lineamenta figuramque illorum corporum cogitet, quis propinquius et similius cogitet utique incertum est. Neque ibi occupatur fides nostra qua facie corporis fuerint illi homines, sed tantum quia per dei gratiam ita vixerunt et ea gesserunt quae scriptura illa testatur. Hoc utile est credere et non desperandum et appetendum. Nam et ipsius facies dominicae carnis innumerabilium cogitationum diversitate variatur et fingitur, quae tamen una erat quaecumque erat. Neque in fide nostra quam de domino Iesu Christo habemus illud salubre est quod sibi animus fingit longe fortasse aliter quam res habet, sed illud quod secundum speciem de homine cogitamus; habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam naturae humanae notitiam secundum quam quidquid tale aspicimus statim hominem esse cognoscimus vel hominis formam.	7. But it must needs be, that, when by reading or hearing of them we believe in any corporeal things which we have not seen, the mind frames for itself something under bodily features and forms, just as it may occur to our thoughts; which either is not true, or even if it be true, which can most rarely happen, yet this is of no benefit to us to believe in by faith, but it is useful for some other purpose, which is intimated by means of it. For who is there that reads or hears what the Apostle Paul has written, or what has been written of him, that does not imagine to himself the countenance both of the apostle himself, and of all those whose names are there mentioned? And whereas, among such a multitude of men to whom these books are known, each imagines in a different way those bodily features and forms, it is assuredly uncertain which it is that imagines them more nearly and more like the reality. Nor, indeed, is our faith busied therein with the bodily countenance of those men; but only that by the grace of God they so lived and so acted as that Scripture witnesses: this it is which it is both useful to believe, and which must not be despaired of, and must be sought. For even the countenance of our Lord Himself in the flesh is variously fancied by the diversity of countless imaginations, which yet was one, whatever it was. Nor in our faith which we have of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that wholesome which the mind imagines for itself, perhaps far other than the reality, but that which we think of man according to his kind: for we have a notion of human nature implanted in us, as it were by rule, according to which we know immediately, that whatever such thing we see is a man or the form of a man.
[8.5.7] Secundum hanc notitiam cogitatio nostra informatur cum credimus pro nobis deum hominem factum ad humilitatis exemplum et ad demonstrandam erga nos dilectionem dei. Hoc enim nobis prodest credere et firmum atque inconcussum corde retinere, humilitatem qua natus est deus ex femina et a mortalibus per tantas contumelias perductus ad mortem summum esse medicamentum quo superbiae nostrae sanaretur tumor et altum sacramentum quo peccati vinculum solueretur. Sic et virtutem miraculorum et ipsius resurrectionis eius, quoniam novimus quid sit omnipotentia, de omnipotente deo credimus et secundum species et genera rerum vel natura insita vel experientia collecta de factis huiuscemodi cogitamus ut non ficta sit fides nostra. Neque enim novimus faciem virginis Mariae ex qua ille a viro intacta neque in ipso partu corrupta mirabiliter natus est; nec quibus membrorum lineamentis fuerit Lazarus nec Bethaniam nec sepulcrum lapidemque illum quem removeri iussit cum eum resuscitaret vidimus; nec monumentum nouum excisum in patra unde ipse resurrexit, nec montem Oliveti unde ascendit in caelum; neque omnuno scimus quicumque ista non vidimus an ita sint ut ea cogitamus, immo vero probabilius existimamus ita non esse. Namque cum alicuius facies vel loci vel hominis vel cuiuslibet corporis eadem occurrerit oculis nostris quae occurrebat animo cum eam priusquam videremus cogitabamus, non paruo miraculo movemur ita raro et pene numquam accidit, et tamen ea firmissime credimus quia secundum specialem generalemque notitiam quae certa nobis est cogitamus. Credimus enim dominum Iesum Christum natum de virgine quae Maria vocabatur. Quid sit autem virgo et quid sit nasci et quid sit nomen proprium non credimus sed prorsus novimus. Utrum autem illa facies Mariae fuerit quae occurrerit animo cum ista loquimur aut recordamur nec novimus omnino nec credimus. Itaque hic salua fide licet dicere: 'Forte talem habebat faciem, forte non talem'; 'Forte' autem 'de virgine natus est Christus,' nemo salua fide christiana dixerit.	Our conception is framed according to this notion, when we believe that God was made man for us, as an example of humility, and to show the love of God towards us. For this it is which it is good for us to believe, and to retain firmly and unshakenly in our heart, that the humility by which God was born of a woman, and was led to death through contumelies so great by mortal men, is the chiefest remedy by which the swelling of our pride may be cured, and the profound mystery by which the bond of sin may be loosed. So also, because we know what omnipotence is, we believe concerning the omnipotent God in the power of His miracles and of His resurrection, and we frame conceptions respecting actions of this kind, according to the species and genera of things that are either ingrafted in us by nature, or gathered by experience, that our faith may not be feigned. For neither do we know the countenance of the Virgin Mary; from whom, untouched by a husband, nor tainted in the birth itself, He was wonderfully born. Neither have we seen what were the lineaments of the body of Lazarus; nor yet Bethany; nor the sepulchre, and that stone which He commanded to be removed when He raised Him from the dead; nor the new tomb cut out in the rock, whence He Himself arose; nor the Mount of Olives, from whence He ascended into heaven. And, in short, whoever of us have not seen these things, know not whether they are as we conceive them to be, nay judge them more probably not to be so. For when the aspect either of a place, or a man, or of any other body, which we happened to imagine before we saw it, turns out to be the same when it occurs to our sight as it was when it occurred to our mind, we are moved with no little wonder. So scarcely and hardly ever does it happen. And yet we believe those things most steadfastly, because we imagine them according to a special and general notion, of which we are certain. For we believe our Lord Jesus Christ to be born of a virgin who was called Mary. But what a virgin is, or what it is to be born, and what is a proper name, we do not believe, but certainly know. And whether that was the countenance of Mary which occurred to the mind in speaking of those things or recollecting them, we neither know at all, nor believe. It is allowable, then, in this case to say without violation of the faith, perhaps she had such or such a countenance, perhaps she had not: but no one could say without violation of the Christian faith, that perhaps Christ was born of a virgin.
[8.5.8] Quamobrem quoniam trinitatis aeternitatem et aequalitatem et unitatem quantum datur intellegere cupimus, prius autem quam intellegamus credere debemus vigilandumque nobis est ne ficta sit fides nostra. Eadem quippe trinitate fruendum est ut beate vivamus; si autem falsum de illa crediderimus, inanis erit spes et non caste caritas. Quomodo igitur eam trinitatem quam non novimus credendo diligimus? An secundum specialem generalemue notitiam secundum quam diligimus apostolum Paulum? Qui etiam si non ea facie fun' quae nobis occurrit de illo cogitantibus, et hoc penitus ignoramus, novimus tamen quid sit homo. Ut enim longe non eamus, hoc sumus, et ilium hoc fuisse et animam eius corpori copulatam mortaliter vixisse manifestum est. Hoc ergo de illo credimus quod invenimus in nobis iuxta speciem vel genus quo humane omnis natura pariter continetur. Quid igitur de illa excellentia trinitatis sive specialiter sive generaliter novimus quasi multae sint tales trinitates quarum aliquas experti sumus ut per regulam similitudinis impressam vel specialem vel generalem notitiam illam quoque talem esse credamus, atque ita rem quam credimus et nondum novimus ex parilitate rei quam novimus diligamus? Quod utique non ita est. An quemadmodum diligimus in domino Iesu Christo quod resurrexit a mortuis, quamvis inde neminem umquam resurrexisse viderimus, ita trinitatem quam non videmus et qualem nullam umquam vidimus, possumus credendo diligere? Sed quid sit vivere et quid sit mori utique scimus quia et vivimus et mortuos ac morientes aliquando vidimus atque experti sumus. Quid est autem aliud resurgere nisi reviviscere, id est ex morte ad vitam redire? Cum ergo dicimus et credimus esse trinitatem, novimus quid sit trinitas quia novimus quid sint tria; sed hoc non diligimus. Nam id ubi volumus facile habemus, ut alia lmittam vel micando digitis tribus. An vero diligimus non quod omnis trinitas sed quod trinitas deus? Hoc ergo diligimus in trinitate, quod deus est. Sed deum nullum alium vidimus aut novimus quia unus est deus, ille solus quem nondum vidimus et credendo diligimus. Sed ex qua rerum notarum similitudine vel comparatione credamus quo etiam nondum notum deum diligamus, hoc quaeritur.	8. Wherefore, since we desire to understand the eternity, and equality, and unity of the Trinity, as much as is permitted us, but ought to believe before we understand; and since we must watch carefully, that our faith be not feigned; since we must have the fruition of the same Trinity, that we may live blessedly; but if we have believed anything false of it, our hope would be worthless, and our charity not pure: how then can we love, by believing, that Trinity which we do not know? Is it according to the special or general notion, according to which we love the Apostle Paul? In whose case, even if he was not of that countenance which occurs to us when we think of him (and this we do not know at all), yet we know what a man is. For not to go far away, this we are; and it is manifest he, too, was this, and that his soul joined to his body lived after the manner of mortals. Therefore we believe this of him, which we find in ourselves, according to the species or genus under which all human nature alike is comprised. What then do we know, whether specially or generally, of that most excellent Trinity, as if there were many such trinities, some of which we had learned by experience, so that we may believe that Trinity, too, to have been such as they, through the rule of similitude, impressed upon us, whether a special or a general notion; and thus love also that thing which we believe and do not yet know, from the parity of the thing which we do know? But this certainly is not so. Or is it that, as we love in our Lord Jesus Christ, that He rose from the dead, although we never saw any one rise from thence, so we can believe in and love the Trinity which we do not see, and the like of which we never have seen? But we certainly know what it is to die, and what it is to live; because we both live, and from time to time have seen and experienced both dead and dying persons. And what else is it to rise again, except to live again, that is, to return to life from death? When, therefore, we say and believe that there is a Trinity, we know what a Trinity is, because we know what three are; but this is not what we love. For we can easily have this whenever we will, to pass over other things, by just holding up three fingers. Or do we indeed love, not every trinity, but the Trinity, that is God? We love then in the Trinity, that it is God: but we never saw or knew any other God, because God is One; He alone whom we have not yet seen, and whom we love by believing. But the question is, from what likeness or comparison of known things can we believe, in order that we may love God, whom we do not yet know?
[8.6.9] Redi ergo mecum et consideremus cur diligamus apostolum. Numquidnam propter humanam speciem quam notissimam habemus eo quod credimus eum hominem fuisse? Non utique; alioquin nunc non est quem diligamus quandoquidem homo ille iam non est; anima enim eius a corpore separate est. Sed id quod in illo amamus etiam nunc vivere credimus; amamus enim animum iustum. Ex qua ergo generali aut speciali regula nisi quia scimus et quid sit animus et quid sit iustus? Et animus quidem quid sit non incongrue nos dicimus ideo nosse quia et nos habemus animum; neque enim umquam oculis vidimus et ex similitudine visorum plurium notionem generalem specialemue percepimus, sed potius, ut dixi, quia et nos habemus. Quid enim tam intime scitur seque ipsum esse sentit quam id quo etiam caetera sentiuntur, id est ipse animus? Nam et motus corporum quibus praeter nos alits vivere sentimus ex nostra similitudine agnoscimus quia et nos ita movemus corpus vivendo sicut illa corpora moveri advertimus. Neque enim cum corpus vivum movetur aperitur ulla via oculis nostris ad videndum animum, rem quae oculis videri non potest; sed illi dei aliquid inesse sentimus quale nobis inest ad movendam similiter molem nostram, quod est vita et anima. Neque quasi humanae prudentiae rationisque proprium est. Et bestiae quippe sentiunt vivere non tantum se ipsas sed etiam invicem atque alterutrum et nos ipsos, nec animas nostras vident sed ex motibus corporis idque statim et facillime quadam conspiratione naturali. )nimum igitur cuiuslibet ex nostro novimus, et ex nostro credimus quem non novimus. Non enim tantum sentimus animum, sed etiam scire possumus quid sit animus consideratione nostri; habemus enim animum. Sed quid sit iustus unde novimus? Dixeramus enim apostolum nos non alia lausa diligere nisi quod sit iustus animus. Novimus ergo et quid sit iustus sicut quid sit animus. Sed quid sit animus, ut dictum est, novimus ex nobis; inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit iustus unde novimus si iusti non sumus? Quod si nemo novit quid sit iustus nisi qui iustus est, nemo diligit iustum nisi iustus; non enim potest diligere quem iustum esse credit ob hoc ipsum quia iustum esse credit si quid sit iustus ignorat secundum quod superius demonstravimus neminem diligere quod credit et non videt nisi ex aliqua regula notitiae generalis sive specialist Ac per hoc si non diligit iustum nisi iustus, quomodo volet quisque iustus esse qui nondum est? Non enim vult quisquam esse quod non diligit. Ut autem sit iustus qui nondum est volet utique iustus esse; ut autem velit diligit iustum. Diligit ergo iustum et qui nondum iustus est. Diligere autem iustum non potest si quid sit iustus ignorat. Proinde novit quid sit iustus etiam qui nondum est. Ubi ergo novit? Num oculis vidit aut ullum corpus iustum velut album aut nigrum aut quadrum aut rotundum? Quis hoc dixerit? At oculis non vidit nisi corpora; iustus autem in homine non est nisi animus, et cum homo iustus dicitur ex animo dicitur non ex corpore. Est enim quaedam pulchritudo animi iustitia qua pulchri sunt homines plerique etiam qui corpore distorti atque deformes sunt. Sicut autem animus non videtur oculis ita nec pulchritudo eius. Ubi ergo novit quid sit iustus qui nondum est atque ut sit diligit iustum? An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant quibus ille aut ille homo esse iustus apparet? Sed unde novit illa signa esse animi iusti nesciens quid omnino sit iustus? Novit ergo. Sed ubi novimus quid sit iustus etiam cum iusti nondum sumus? Si extra quam nos novimus, in corpore aliquo novimus. Sed non est ista res corporis. In nobis igitur novimus quid sit iustus. Non enim alibi hoc invenio cum quaero ut hoc eloquar nisi apud me ipsum; et si interrogem alium quid sit iustus, apud se ipsum quaerit quid respondeat; et quisquis hinc verum respondere potuit apud se ipsum quid responderet invenit. Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo apud me ipsum quaero ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis Sed eam per corpus accept, id est per corpons sensum quomam praesens in ea corpore fui et eam vidi atque sensi memoriaque retinui ut apud me invenirem de illa verbum cum eam vellem dicere. Ipsa enim phantasia eius in memoria mea verbum eius, non sonus iste trisyllabus cum Carthago nominatur vel etiam tacite nomen ipsum per spatia temporum cogitatur, sed illud quod in animo meo cerno cum hoc trisyllabum voce profero vel antequam proferam. Sic et Alexandnam cum eloqui volo quam numquam vidi praesto est apud me phantasma eius. Cum enim a multis audissem et credidissem magnam esse illam urbem sicut mihi narrari potuit, finxi animo imaginem eius quam potui, et hoc est apud me verbum eius cum eam volo dicere antequam voce quinque syllabas proferam, quod nomen eius fere omnibus notum est. Quam tamen imaginem si ex animo meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam noverunt, profecto aut omnes dicerent: 'Non est ipsa,' aut si dicerent: 'Ipsa est,' multum mirarer atque ipsam intuens in animo meo, id est imaginem quasi picturam eius, ipsam tamen esse nescirem sed eis crederem qui visam tenerent. Non autem ita quaero quid sit iustus, nec ita invenio nec ita intueor cum id eloquor, nec ita probor cum audior, nec ita probo cum audio quasi tale aliquid oculis viderim aut ullo corporis sensu didicerim aut ab eis qui ita didicissent audierim. Cum enim dico et sciens dico: 'Iustus est animus qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit,' non aliquam rem absentem cogito sicut Carthaginem aut fingo ut possum sicut Alexandriam, sive ita sit sive non ita; sed praesens quiddam cerno et cerno apud me etsi non sum ipse quod cerno, et multi si audiant, approbabunt. Et quisquis me audit atque scienter approbat apud se et ipse hoc idem cernit etiamsi non sit et ipse quod cernit. Iustus vero cum id dicit id quod ipse est cernit et dicit. Et ubi etiam ipse cernit nisi apud se ipsum? Sed hoc mirum non est; ubi enim se ipsum cerneret nisi apud se ipsum? Illud mirabile ut apud se animus videat quod alibi nusquam vidit et verum videat, et ipsum verum iustum animum videat, et sit ipse animus et non sit iustus animus quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto? Aut si non est, quem ibi videt cum videt et dicit quid sit animus iustus, nec alibi quam in se videt, cum ipse non sit animus iustus? An illud quod videt veritas est interior praesens animo qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent, et qui intueri valent hoc etiam quod intuentur non omnes sunt hoc est non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi sicut possum videre ac dicere quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse poterunt nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur ut inde formentur et sint iusti ammi, non tantum cernentes et dicentes iustum esse animum 'qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit,' sed etiam ut ipsi iuste vivant iusteque morati sint sua cuique distribuendo ut nemini quidquam debeant nisi ut invicem diligant? Et unde inhaeretur illi formae nisi amando? Cur ergo alium diligimus quem credimus iustum et non diligimus ipsam formam ubi videmus quid sit iustus animus ut et nos iusti esse possimus? An vero nisi et istam diligeremus nullo modo eum diligeremus quem ex ista diligimus, sed dum iusti non sumus minus eam diligimus quam ut iusti esse valeamus? Homo ergo qui creditur iustus ex ea forma et ventate diligitur quam cernit et intellegit apud se ille qui diligit; ipsa vero forma et veritas non est quomodo aliunde diligatur. Neque enim invenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam ut eam cum incognita est credendo diligamus ex eo quod iam tale aliquid novimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris ipsa est, et non est quidquam tale quondam sola ipsa talis est qualis ipsa est. Qui ergo amat homines, aut quia iusti sunt aut ut iusti sint amare debet. Sic enim et se ipsum amare debet aut quia iustus est aut ut iustus sit; sic enim diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum sine ullo periculo. Qui enim aliter se diligit iniuste se diligit quondam se ad hoc diligit ut sit iniustus, ad hoc ergo ut sit malus, ac per hoc iam non se diligit: Qui enim diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam.	9. Return then with me, and let us consider why we love the apostle. Is it at all on account of his human kind, which we know right well, in that we believe him to have been a man? Assuredly not; for if it were so, he now is not him whom we love, since he is no longer that man, for his soul is separated from his body. But we believe that which we love in him to be still living, for we love his righteous mind. From what general or special rule then, except that we know both what a mind is, and what it is to be righteous? And we say, indeed, not unfitly, that we therefore know what a mind is, because we too have a mind. For neither did we ever see it with our eyes, and gather a special or general notion from the resemblance of more minds than one, which we had seen; but rather, as I have said before, because we too have it. For what is known so intimately, and so perceives itself to be itself, as that by which also all other things are perceived, that is, the mind itself? For we recognize the movements of bodies also, by which we perceive that others live besides ourselves, from the resemblance of ourselves; since we also so move our body in living as we observe those bodies to be moved. For even when a living body is moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see the mind, a thing which cannot be seen by the eyes; but we perceive something to be contained in that bulk, such as is contained in ourselves, so as to move in like manner our own bulk, which is the life and the soul. Neither is this, as it were, the property of human foresight and reason, since brute animals also perceive that not only they themselves live, but also other brute animals interchangeably, and the one the other, and that we ourselves do so. Neither do they see our souls, save from the movements of the body, and that immediately and most easily by some natural agreement. Therefore we both know the mind of any one from our own, and believe also from our own of him whom we do not know. For not only do we perceive that there is a mind, but we can also know what a mind is, by reflecting upon our own: for we have a mind. But whence do we know what a righteous man is? For we said above that we love the apostle for no other reason except that he is a righteous mind. We know, then, what a righteous man also is, just as we know what a mind is. But what a mind is, as has been said, we know from ourselves, for there is a mind in us. But whence do we know what a righteous man is, if we are not righteous? But if no one but he who is righteous knows what is a righteous man, no one but a righteous man loves a righteous man; for one cannot love him whom one believes to be righteous, for this very reason that one does believe him to be righteous, if one does not know what it is to be righteous; according to that which we have shown above, that no one loves what he believes and does not see, except by some rule of a general or special notion. And if for this reason no one but a righteous man loves a righteous man, how will any one wish to be a righteous man who is not yet so? For no one wishes to be that which he does not love. But, certainly, that he who is not righteous may be so, it is necessary that he should wish to be righteous; and in order that he may wish to be righteous, he loves the righteous man. Therefore, even he who is not yet righteous, loves the righteous man. But he cannot love the righteous man, who is ignorant what a righteous man is. Accordingly, even he who is not yet righteous, knows what a righteous man is. Whence then does he know this? Does he see it with his eyes? Is any corporeal thing righteous, as it is white, or black, or square, or round? Who could say this? Yet with one's eyes one has seen nothing except corporeal things. But there is nothing righteous in a man except the mind; and when a man is called a righteous man, he is called so from the mind, not from the body. For righteousness is in some sort the beauty of the mind, by which men are beautiful; very many too who are misshapen and deformed in body. And as the mind is not seen with the eyes, so neither is its beauty. From whence then does he who is not yet righteous know what a righteous man is, and love the righteous man that he may become righteous? Do certain signs shine forth by the motion of the body, by which this or that man is manifested to be righteous? But whence does any one know that these are the signs of a righteous mind when he is wholly ignorant what it is to be righteous? Therefore he does know. But whence do we know what it is to be righteous, even when we are not yet righteous? If we know from without ourselves, we know it by some bodily thing. But this is not a thing of the body. Therefore we know in ourselves what it is to be righteous. For I find this nowhere else when I seek to utter it, except within myself; and if I ask another what it is to be righteous, he seeks within himself what to answer; and whosoever hence can answer truly, he has found within himself what to answer. And when indeed I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself what to speak, and I find within myself a notion or image of Carthage; but I have received this through the body, that is, through the perception of the body, since I have been present in that city in the body, and I saw and perceived it, and retained it in my memory, that I might find within myself a word concerning it, whenever I might wish to speak of it. For its word is the image itself of it in my memory, not that sound of two syllables when Carthage is named, or even when that name itself is thought of silently from time to time, but that which I discern in my mind, when I utter that dissyllable with my voice, or even before I utter it. So also, when I wish to speak of Alexandria, which I never saw, an image of it is present with me. For whereas I had heard from many and had believed that city to be great, in such way as it could be told me, I formed an image of it in my mind as I was able; and this is with me its word when I wish to speak of it, before I utter with my voice the five syllables which make the name that almost every one knows. And yet if I could bring forth that image from my mind to the eyes of men who know Alexandria, certainly all either would say, It is not it; or if they said, It is, I should greatly wonder; and as I gazed at it in my mind, that is, at the image which was as it were its picture, I should yet not know it to be it, but should believe those who retained an image they had seen. But I do not so ask what it is to be righteous, nor do I so find it, nor do I so gaze upon it, when I utter it; neither am I so approved when I am heard, nor do I so approve when I hear; as though I have seen such a thing with my eyes, or learned it by some perception of the body, or heard it from those who had so learned it. For when I say, and say knowingly, that mind is righteous which knowingly and of purpose assigns to every one his due in life and behavior, I do not think of anything absent, as Carthage, or imagine it as I am able, as Alexandria, whether it be so or not; but I discern something present, and I discern it within myself, though I myself am not that which I discern; and many if they hear will approve it. And whoever hears me and knowingly approves, he too discerns this same thing within himself, even though he himself be not what he discerns. But when a righteous man says this, he discerns and says that which he himself is. And whence also does he discern it, except within himself? But this is not to be wondered at; for whence should he discern himself except within himself? The wonderful thing is, that the mind should see within itself that which it has seen nowhere else, and should see truly, and should see the very true righteous mind, and should itself be a mind, and yet not a righteous mind, which nevertheless it sees within itself. Is there another mind that is righteous in a mind that is not yet righteous? Or if there is not, what does it there see when it sees and says what is a righteous mind, nor sees it anywhere else but in itself, when itself is not a righteous mind? Is that which it sees an inner truth present to the mind which has power to behold it? Yet all have not that power; and they who have power to behold it, are not all also that which they behold, that is, they are not also righteous minds themselves, just as they are able to see and to say what is a righteous mind. And whence will they be able to be so, except by cleaving to that very same form itself which they behold, so that from thence they may be formed and may be righteous minds; not only discerning and saying that the mind is righteous which knowingly and of purpose assigns to every one that which is his due in life and behavior, but so likewise that they themselves may live righteously and be righteous in character, by assigning to every one that which is his due, so as to owe no man anything, but to love one another. And whence can any one cleave to that form but by loving it? Why then do we love another whom we believe to be righteous, and do not love that form itself wherein we see what is a righteous mind, that we also may be able to be righteous? Is it that unless we loved that also, we should not love him at all, whom through it we love; but while we are not righteous, we love that form too little to allow of our being able to be righteous? The man therefore who is believed to be righteous, is loved through that form and truth which he who loves discerns and understands within himself; but that very form and truth itself cannot be loved from any other source than itself. For we do not find any other such thing besides itself, so that by believing we might love it when it is unknown, in that we here already know another such thing. For whatsoever of such a kind one may have seen, is itself; and there is not any other such thing, since itself alone is such as itself is. He therefore who loves men, ought to love them either because they are righteous, or that they may become righteous. For so also he ought to love himself, either because he is righteous, or that he may become righteous; for in this way he loves his neighbor as himself without any risk. For he who loves himself otherwise, loves himself wrongfully, since he loves himself to this end that he may be unrighteous; therefore to this end that he may be wicked; and hence it follows next that he does not love himself; for, He who loves iniquity, hates his own soul.
[8.7.10] Quapropter non est praecipue videndum in hac quaestione quae de trinitate nobis est et de cognoscendo deo nisi quid sit vera dilectio, immo vero quid sit dilectio. Ea quippe dilectio dicenda quae vera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita cupidi abusive dicuntur diligere quemadmodum cupere abusive dicuntur qui diligunt. Haec est autem vera dilectio ut inhaerentes veritati iuste vivamus, et ideo contemnamus omnia mortalia prae amore hominum quo eos volumus iuste vivere. Ita enim et mori pro fratribus utiliter parati esse poterimus, quod nos exemplo suo dominus Iesus Christus docuit. Cum enim duo praecepta sint in quibus tota lex pendet et prophetae, dilectio dei et dilectio proximi non immerito plerumque scriptura pro utroque unum ponit. Sive tantum dei sicuti est illud: Scimus quoniam diligentibus deum omnia cooperantur in bonum et iterum: Quisquis autem diligit deum hic cognitus est ab illo et illud: Quoniam caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis et alia multa quia et qui diligit deum, consequens est ut faciat quod praecepit deus et in tantum diligit in quantum facit; consequens ergo est ut et proximum diligat quia hoc praecepit deus. Sive tantum proximi dilectionem scriptura commemorat sicuti est illud: Invicem onera uestra portate et sic adimplebitis legem Christi et illud: Omnis enim lex in uno sermone impletur, in eo quod scriptum est: Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum et in euangelio: Omnia quaecumque uultis ut faciant vobis homines bona, haec et vos facite illis; haec est enim lex et prophetae et pleraque alia reperimus in litteris sanctis in quibus sola dilectio proximi ad perfectionem praecipi videtur et taceri de dilectione dei cum in utroque praecepto lex pendeat et prophetae, sed et hoc ideo quia et qui proximum diligit consequens est ut ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est, et qui manet in dilectione in deo manet. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue deum diligat.	10. No other thing, then, is chiefly to be regarded in this inquiry, which we make concerning the Trinity and concerning knowing God, except what is true love, nay, rather what is love. For that is to be called love which is true, otherwise it is desire; and so those who desire are said improperly to love, just as they who love are said improperly to desire. But this is true love, that cleaving to the truth we may live righteously, and so may despise all mortal things in comparison with the love of men, whereby we wish them to live righteously. For so we should be prepared also to die profitably for our brethren, as our Lord Jesus Christ taught us by His example. For as there are two commandments on which hang all the Law and the prophets, love of God and love of our neighbor; not without cause the Scripture mostly puts one for both: whether it be of God only, as is that text, For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God; and again, But if any man love God, the same is known of Him; and that, Because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us; and many other passages; because he who loves God must both needs do what God has commanded, and loves Him just in such proportion as he does so; therefore he must needs also love his neighbor, because God has commanded it: or whether it be that Scripture only mentions the love of our neighbor, as in that text, Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ; and again, For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, You shall love your neighbor as yourself; and in the Gospel, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the Law and the prophets. And many other passages occur in the sacred writings, in which only the love of our neighbor seems to be commanded for perfection, while the love of God is passed over in silence; whereas the Law and the prophets hang on both precepts. But this, too, is because he who loves his neighbor must needs also love above all else love itself. But God is love; and he that dwells in love, dwells in God. Therefore he must needs above all else love God.
[8.7.11] Quapropter qui quaerunt deum per istas potestates quae mundo praesunt vel partibus mundi auferuntur ab eo longeque iactantur non interuallis locorum sed diversitate affectuum; exterius enim conantur ire et interiora sua deserunt quibus interior est deus. Itaque etiamsi aliquam sanctam caelitem potestatem vel audierint vel utcumque cogitaverint, facta magis eius appetunt quae humana miratur infirmitas; non imitantur pietatem qua divina requies comparatur. Malunt enim superbe hoc posse quod angelus quam deuote hoc esse quod angelus. Non enim sanctus quisquam potestate sua gaudet sed eius a quo habet posse quidquid congruenter potest, et novit potentius esse coniungi omnipotenti pia voluntate quam propria voluntate posse quod contremescant qui talia non possunt. Itaque ipse dominus Iesus Christus talia faciens ut mirantes doceret ampliora et temporalibus insolitis intentos atque suspensos ad aeterna atque interiora converteret: Venite, inquit, ad me qui laboratis et onerati estis, et ego vos reficiam; tollite iugum meum super vos. Et non dixit: 'Discite a me quia triduanos mortuos suscito,' sed ait: Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Potentior est enim et tutior solidissima humilitas quam ventosissima celsitudo. Et ideo sequitur dicens: Et invenietis requiem animabus uestris. Dilectio enim non inflatur, et deus dilectio est, et fideles in dilectione adquiescunt illi reuocati ab strepitu qui foris est ad gaudia silentia. Ecce, deus dilectio est. Utquid imus et currimus in sublimia caelorum et ima terrarum quaerentes eum qui est apud nos si nos esse velimus apud eum?	11. Wherefore they who seek God through those Powers which rule over the world, or parts of the world, are removed and cast away far from Him; not by intervals of space, but by difference of affections: for they endeavor to find a path outwardly, and forsake their own inward things, within which is God. Therefore, even although they may either have heard some holy heavenly Power, or in some way or another may have thought of it, yet they rather covet its deeds at which human weakness marvels, but do not imitate the piety by which divine rest is acquired. For they prefer, through pride, to be able to do that which an angel does, more than, through devotion, to be that which an angel is. For no holy being rejoices in his own power, but in His from whom he has the power which he fitly can have; and he knows it to be more a mark of power to be united to the Omnipotent by a pious will, than to be able, by his own power and will, to do what they may tremble at who are not able to do such things. Therefore the Lord Jesus Christ Himself, in doing such things, in order that He might teach better things to those who marvelled at them, and might turn those who were intent and in doubt about unusual temporal things to eternal and inner things, says, Come unto me, all you that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you. And He does not say, Learn of me, because I raise those who have been dead four days; but He says, Learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart. For humility, which is most solid, is more powerful and safer than pride, that is most inflated. And so He goes on to say, And you shall find rest unto your souls, for Love is not puffed up; and God is Love; and such as be faithful in love shall rest in Him, called back from the din which is without to silent joys. Behold, God is Love: why do we go forth and run to the heights of the heavens and the lowest parts of the earth, seeking Him who is within us, if we wish to be with Him?
[8.8.12] Nemo dicat: 'Non novi quod diligam.' Diligat fratrem et diligat eandem dilectionem; magis enim novit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligit. Ecce iam potest notiorem deum habere quam fratrem, plane notiorem quia praesentiorem, notiorem quia interiorem, notiorem quia certiorem. Amplectere dilectionem deum et dilectione amplectere deum. Ipsa est dilectio quae omnes bonos angelos et omnes dei seruos consociat vinculo sanctitatis, nosque et illos coniungit invicem nobis et subiungit sibi. Quanto igitur saniores sumus a tumore superbiae tanto sumus dilectione pleniores. Et quo nisi deo plenus est qui plenus est dilectione? 'At enim caritatem video, et quantum possum eam mente conspicio, et credo scripturae dicenti: Quoniam deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate in deo manet. Sed cum eam video non in ea video trinitatem.' Immo vero vides trinitatem si caritatem vides. Sed commonebo si potero ut videre te videas; adsit tantum ipsa ut moveamur caritate ad aliquod bonum. Quia cum diligimus caritatem, aliquid diligentem diligimus propter hoc ipsum quia diligit aliquid. Ergo quid diligit caritas ut possit etiam ipsa caritas diligi? Caritas enim non est quae nihil diligit. Si autem se ipsam diligit, diligat aliquid oportet ut caritate se diligat. Sicut enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipsum, sed non se verbum indicat nisi se aliquid indicare indicet; sic et caritas diligit quidem se, sed nisi se aliquid diligentem diligat non caritate se diligit. Quid ergo diligit caritas nisi quod caritate diligimus? Id autem ut a proximo provehamur frater est. Dilectionem autem fraternam quantum commendet Iohannes apostolus attendamus: Qui diligit, inquit, fratrem suum in lumine manet, et scandalum in eo non est. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit; nam in quo scandalum non est utique perfectus est. Et tamen videtur dilectionem dei tacuisse. Quod numquam faceret nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione vult intellegi deum. Apertissime enim in eadem epistula paulo post ita dicit: Dilectissimi, diligamus invicem quia dilectio ex deo est, et omnis qui diligit ex deo natus est et cognovit deum. Qui non diligit non cognovit deum quia deus dilectio est. Ista contextio satis aperteque declarat eandem ipsam fraternam dilectionem (nam fraterna dilectio est qua diligimus invicem) non solum ex deo sed etiam deum esse tanta auctoritate praedicari. Cum ergo de dilectione diligimus fratrem, de deo diligimus fratrem; nec fieri potest ut eandem dilectionem non praecipue diligamus qua fratrem diligimus. Unde colligitur duo illa praecepta non posse sine invicem. Quoniam quippe deus dilectio est deum certe diligit qui diligit dilectionem dilectionem autem necesse est diligat qui diligit fratrem. Et ideo quod paulo post ait: Non potest deum diligere quem non videt qui fratrem quem videt non diligit quia haec illi causa est non videndi deum quod non diligit fratrem. Qui enim non diligit fratrem non est in dilectione, et qui non est in dilectione non est in deo quia deus dilectio est. Porro qui non est in deo non est in lumine quia deus lumen est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Qui ergo non est in lumine quid mirum si non videt lumen, id est non videt deum quia in tenebris est? Fratrem autem videt humano visu quo videri deus non potest. Sed si eum quem videt humano visu spiritali caritate diligeret, videret deum qui est ipsa caritas visu interiore quo videri potest. Itaque qui fratrem quem videt non diligit, deum, quem propterea non videt quia deus dilectio est qua caret qui fratrem non diligit, quomodo potest diligere? Nec illa iam quaestio moveat quantum caritatis fratri debeamus impendere, quantum deo. Fratri enim quantum nobis ipsis, nos autem ipsos tanto magis diligimus quanto magis diligimus deum. Ex una igitur eademque caritate deum proximumque diligimus, sed deum propter deum, nos autem et proximum propter deum.	12. Let no one say, I do not know what I love. Let him love his brother, and he will love the same love. For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother: clearly known more, because more present; known more, because more within him; known more, because more certain. Embrace the love of God, and by love embrace God. That is love itself, which associates together all good angels and all the servants of God by the bond of sanctity, and joins together us and them mutually with ourselves, and joins us subordinately to Himself. In proportion, therefore, as we are healed from the swelling of pride, in such proportion are we more filled with love; and with what is he full, who is full of love, except with God? Well, but you will say, I see love, and, as far as I am able, I gaze upon it with my mind, and I believe the Scripture, saying, that God is love; and he that dwells in love, dwells in God; but when I see love, I do not see in it the Trinity. Nay, but you see the Trinity if you see love. But if I can I will put you in mind, that you may see that you see it; only let itself be present, that we may be moved by love to something good. Since, when we love love, we love one who loves something, and that on account of this very thing, that he does love something; therefore what does love love, that love itself also may be loved? For that is not love which loves nothing. But if it loves itself it must love something, that it may love itself as love. For as a word indicates something, and indicates also itself, but does not indicate itself to be a word, unless it indicates that it does indicate something; so love also loves indeed itself, but except it love itself as loving something, it loves itself not as love. What therefore does love love, except that which we love with love? But this, to begin from that which is nearest to us, is our brother. And listen how greatly the Apostle John commends brotherly love: He that loves his brother abides in the light, and there is none occasion of stumbling in him. It is manifest that he placed the perfection of righteousness in the love of our brother; for he certainly is perfect in whom there is no occasion of stumbling. And yet he seems to have passed by the love of God in silence; which he never would have done, unless because he intends God to be understood in brotherly love itself. For in this same epistle, a little further on, he says most plainly thus: Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loves is born of God, and knows God. He that loves not, knows not God; for God is love. And this passage declares sufficiently and plainly, that this same brotherly love itself (for that is brotherly love by which we love each other) is set forth by so great authority, not only to be from God, but also to be God. When, therefore, we love our brother from love, we love our brother from God; neither can it be that we do not love above all else that same love by which we love our brother: whence it may be gathered that these two commandments cannot exist unless interchangeably. For since God is love, he who loves love certainly loves God; but he must needs love love, who loves his brother. And so a little after he says, For he that loves not his brother whom he has seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen? because the reason that he does not see God is, that he does not love his brother. For he who does not love his brother, abides not in love; and he who abides not in love, abides not in God, because God is love. Further, he who abides not in God, abides not in light; for God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. He therefore who abides not in light, what wonder is it if he does not see light, that is, does not see God, because he is in darkness? But he sees his brother with human sight, with which God cannot be seen. But if he loved with spiritual love him whom he sees with human sight, he would see God, who is love itself, with the inner sight by which He can be seen. Therefore he who does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God, whom on that account he does not see, because God is love, which he has not who does not love his brother? Neither let that further question disturb us, how much of love we ought to spend upon our brother, and how much upon God: incomparably more upon God than upon ourselves, but upon our brother as much as upon ourselves; and we love ourselves so much the more, the more we love God. Therefore we love God and our neighbor from one and the same love; but we love God for the sake of God, and ourselves and our neighbors for the sake of God.
[8.9.13] Quid enim est, quaeso, quod exardescimus cum audimus et legimus: Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile, ecce nunc dies salutis. Nullam in quoquam dantes offensionem ut non reprehendatur ministerium nostrum, sed in omnibus commendantes nosmetipsos ut dei ministros, in multa patientia, in tribulationibus, in necessitatibus, in angustiis, in plagis, in carceribus, in iactationibus, in laboribus, in vigiliis, in ieiuniis, in castitate, in scientia, in longanimitate, in bonitate, in spiritu sancto, in caritate non ficta, in verbo veritatis, in virtute dei, per arma iustitiae dextra et sinistra, per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam, ut seductores et veraces, ut qui ignoramur et cognoscimur, quasi morientes et ecce vivimus, ut coerciti et non mortificati, ut tristes semper autem gaudentes, sicut egeni multos autem ditantes, tamquam nihil habentes et omnia possidentes? Quid est quod accendimur in dilectione Pauli apostoli cum ista legimus nisi quod credimus eum ita vixisse? Vivendum tamen sic esse dei ministris non de aliquibus auditum credimus sed intus apud nos, vel potius supra nos in ipsa veritate conspicimus. Illum ergo quem sic vixisse credimus ex hoc quod videmus diligimus, et nisi hanc formam quam semper stabilem atque incommutabilem cernimus praecipue diligeremus, non ideo diligeremus illum quia eius vit am cum in carne viveret huic formae co apt atam et congruentem fuisse fide retinemus. Sed nescio quomodo amplius et in ipsius formae caritatem excitamur per fidem qua credimus vixisse sic aliquem, et spem qua nos quoque ita posse vivere qui homines sumus ex eo quod aliqui homines ita vixerunt minime desperamus ut hoc et desideremus ardentius et fidentius precemur. Ita et ipsorum vitam facit a nobis diligi formae illius dilectio secundum quam vixisse creduntur, et illorum vita credita in eandem formam flagrantiorem excitat caritatem ut quanto flagrantius diligimus deum, tanto certius sereniusque videamus quia in deo conspicimus incommutabilem formam iustitiae secundum quam hominem vivere oportere iudicamus. Valet ergo fides ad cognitionem et ad dilectionem dei, non tamquam omnino incogniti aut omnino non dilecti, sed quo cognoscatur manifestius et quo firmius diligatur.	13. For why is it, pray, that we burn when we hear and read, Behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation: giving no offense in anything, that the ministry be not blamed: but in all things approving ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, in necessities, in distresses, in stripes, in imprisonments, in tumults, in labors, in watchings, in fastings; by pureness, by knowledge, by long-suffering, by kindness, by the Holy Ghost, by love unfeigned, by the word of truth, by the power of God, by the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left, by honor and dishonor, by evil report and good report: as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and, behold, we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things? Why is it that we are inflamed with love of the Apostle Paul, when we read these things, unless that we believe him so to have lived? But we do not believe that the ministers of God ought so to live because we have heard it from any one, but because we behold it inwardly within ourselves, or rather above ourselves, in the truth itself. Him, therefore, whom we believe to have so lived, we love for that which we see. And except we loved above all else that form which we discern as always steadfast and unchangeable, we should not for that reason love him, because we hold fast in our belief that his life, when he was living in the flesh, was adapted to, and in harmony with, this form. But somehow we are stirred up the more to the love of this form itself, through the belief by which we believe some one to have so lived; and to the hope by which we no more at all despair, that we, too, are able so to live; we who are men, from this fact itself, that some men have so lived, so that we both desire this more ardently, and pray for it more confidently. So both the love of that form, according to which they are believed to have lived, makes the life of these men themselves to be loved by us; and their life thus believed stirs up a more burning love towards that same form; so that the more ardently we love God, the more certainly and the more calmly do we see Him, because we behold in God the unchangeable form of righteousness, according to which we judge that man ought to live. Therefore faith avails to the knowledge and to the love of God, not as though of one altogether unknown, or altogether not loved; but so that thereby He may be known more clearly, and loved more steadfastly.
[8.10.14] Quid est autem dilectio vel caritas quam tantopere scriptura divina laudat et praedicat nisi amor boni? Amor autem alicuius amantis est, et amore aliquid amatur. Ecce tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor. Quid est ergo amor nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans vel copulari appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur? Et hoc etiam in extremis carnalibusque amoribus ita est. Sed ut aliquid purius et liquidius hauriamus calcata carne ascendamus ad animum. Quid amat animus in amico nisi animum? Et illic igitur tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor. Restat etiam hinc ascendere et superius ista quaerere quantum homini datur. Sed hic paululum requiescat intentio non ut se iam existimet invenisse quod quaerit, sed sicut solet inveniri locus ubi quaerendum est aliquid. Nondum illud inventum est, sed iam inventum est ubi quaeratur. Ita hoc dixisse suffecerit ut tamquam ab articulo alicuius exordii caetera contexamus.	14. But what is love or charity, which divine Scripture so greatly praises and proclaims, except the love of good? But love is of some one that loves, and with love something is loved. Behold, then, there are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love. What, then, is love, except a certain life which couples or seeks to couple together some two things, namely, him that loves, and that which is loved? And this is so even in outward and carnal loves. But that we may drink in something more pure and clear, let us tread down the flesh and ascend to the mind. What does the mind love in a friend except the mind? There, then, also are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love. It remains to ascend also from hence, and to seek those things which are above, as far as is given to man. But here for a little while let our purpose rest, not that it may think itself to have found already what it seeks; but just as usually the place has first to be found where anything is to be sought, while the thing itself is not yet found, but we have only found already where to look for it; so let it suffice to have said thus much, that we may have, as it were, the hinge of some starting-point, whence to weave the rest of our discourse.	}