Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book XI

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK XI

11.1 De imagine trinitatis etiam in eo quod imago dei non est, id est in homine exteriore, quaerenda. Chapter 1.— A Trace of the Trinity Also In the Outer Man.
11.2 De visibili et vidente atque visione. Chapter 2.— A Certain Trinity in the Sight. That There are Three Things in Sight, Which Differ in Their Own Nature. In What Manner from a Visible Thing Vision is Produced, or the Image of that Thing Which is Seen. The Matter is Shown More Clearly by an Example. How These Three Combine in One.
11.3 De memoria qua visorum imago retinetur et intentione animi qua in utrumque concurritur. Chapter 3.— The Unity of the Three Takes Place in Thought, Viz Of Memory, of Ternal Vision,and of Will Combining Both.
11.4 De imaginibus quas cogitationis acies intuetur in phantasia quam memoria concepit. Chapter 4.— How This Unity Comes to Pass.
11.5 De cogitationibus innoxiis et de his quae ab acie recordationis abigendae sunt. Chapter 5.— The Trinity of the Outer Man, or of External Vision, is Not an Image of God. The Likeness of God is Desired Even in Sins. In External Vision the Form of the Corporeal Thing is as It Were the Parent, Vision the Offspring; But the Will that Unites These Suggests the Holy Spirit.
11.6 De fine voluntatis quo cognoscitur si recta an praua cupiamus. Chapter 6.— Of What Kind We are to Reckon the Rest (Requies), and End (Finis), of the Will in Vision.
11.7 De ea trinitate quae iam non ex corpore neque ex corporis sensu sed de memoria nascitur cogitantis. Chapter 7.— There is Another Trinity in the Memory of Him Who Thinks Over Again What He Has Seen.
11.8 De multiplicationibus trinitatis quae ex recordat~one pariuntur. Chapter 8.— Different Modes of Conceiving.
11.9 Quod in quolibet genere trinitatum voluntas nec parens inveniatur esse nec proles. Chapter 9.— Species is Produced by Species in Succession.
11.10 Quam facile sit cogitanti fingere sibi eas species quas non uidit ex earum recordatione quas vidit. Chapter 10.— The Imagination Also Adds Even to Things We Have Not Seen, Those Things Which We Have Seen Elsewhere.
11.11 De mensura et numero et pondere quorum similitudo sit in memoria et visione et voluntate. Chapter 11.— Number, Weight, Measure.

Latin	Latin
LIBER XI	On the Trinity (Book XI)
	A kind of image of the Trinity is pointed out, even in the outer man; first of all, in those things which are perceived from without, viz. in the bodily object that is seen, and in the form that is impressed by it upon the sight of the seer, and in the purpose of the will that combines the two; although these three are neither mutually equal, nor of one substance. Next, a kind of trinity, in three somewhats of one substance, is observed to exist in the mind itself, as it were introduced there from those things that are perceived from without; viz. the image of the bodily object which is in the memory, and the impression formed therefrom when the mind's eye of the thinker is turned to it, and the purpose of the will combining both. And this latter trinity is also said to pertain to the outer man, in that it is introduced into the mind from bodily objects, which are perceived from without.
[11.1.1] Nemini dubium est sicut interiorem hominem intellegentia sic exteriorem sensu corporis praeditum. Nitamur igitur si possumus in hoc quoque exteriore indagare qualecumque uestigium trinitatis, non quia et ipse eodem modo sit imago dei. Manifesta est quippe apostolica sententia quae interiorem hominem renouari in dei agnitionem declarat secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum cum et alio loco dicat: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renouatur de die in diem. In hoc ergo qui corrumpitur quaeramus quemadmodum possumus quandam trinitatis effigiem, et si non expressiorem tamen fortassis ad dinoscendum faciliorem. Neque enim frustra et iste homo dicitur nisi quia inest ei nonnulla interioris similitudo, et illo ipso ordine conditionis nostrae quo mortales atque carnales effecti sumus facilius et quasi familiarius visibilia quam intellegibilia pertractamus cum ista sint exterius, illa interius, et ista sensu corporis sentiamus, illa mente intellegamus; nosque ipsi animi non sensibiles simus, id est corpora, sed intellegibiles quoniam vita sumus; tamen, ut dixi, tanta facta est in corporibus consuetudo et ita in haec miro modo relabens foras se nostra proicit intentio ut cum ab incerto corporum ablata fuerit, ut in spiritu multo certiore ac stabiliore cognitione figatur, refugiat ad ista et ibi appetat requiem unde traxit infirmitatem. Cuius aegritudini congruendum est ut si quando interiora spiritalia adcommodatius distinguere atque facilius insinuare conamur, de corporalibus exterioribus similitudinum documenta capiamus. Sensu igitur corporis exterior homo praeditus sentit corpora, et iste sensus quod facile advertitur quinquepertitus est, videndo, audiendo olfaciendo, gustando, tangendo. Sed et multum est et non necessarium ut omnes hos quinque sensus id quod quaerimus interrogemus; quod enim nobis unus eorum renuntiat etiam in caeteris valet. Itaque potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum; is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior.	1. No one doubts that, as the inner man is endued with understanding, so is the outer with bodily sense. Let us try, then, if we can, to discover in this outer man also, some trace, however slight, of the Trinity, not that itself also is in the same manner the image of God. For the opinion of the apostle is evident, which declares the inner man to be renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him: whereas he says also in another place, But though our outer man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. Let us seek, then, so far as we can, in that which perishes, some image of the Trinity, if not so express, yet perhaps more easy to be discerned. For that outer man also is not called man to no purpose, but because there is in it some likeness of the inner man. And owing to that very order of our condition whereby we are made mortal and fleshly, we handle things visible more easily and more familiarly than things intelligible; since the former are outward, the latter inward; and the former are perceived by the bodily sense, the latter are understood by the mind; and we ourselves, i.e. our minds, are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but intelligible things, since we are life. And yet, as I said, we are so familiarly occupied with bodies, and our thought has projected itself outwardly with so wonderful a proclivity towards bodies, that, when it has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of things corporeal, that it may be fixed with a much more certain and stable knowledge in that which is spirit, it flies back to those bodies, and seeks rest there whence it has drawn weakness. And to this its feebleness we must suit our argument; so that, if we would endeavor at any time to distinguish more aptly, and intimate more readily, the inward spiritual thing, we must take examples of likenesses from outward things pertaining to the body. The outer man, then, endued as he is with the bodily sense, is conversant with bodies. And this bodily sense, as is easily observed, is fivefold; seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it is both a good deal of trouble, and is not necessary, that we should inquire of all these five senses about that which we seek. For that which one of them declares to us, holds also good in the rest. Let us use, then, principally the testimony of the eyes. For this bodily sense far surpasses the rest; and in proportion to its difference of kind, is nearer to the sight of the mind.
[11.2.2] Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dinoscenda. Primo ipsa res quam videmus sive lapidem sive aliquam flammam sive quid aliud quod videri oculis potest, quod utique iam esse poterat et antequam videretur. Deinde visio quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus. Tertio quod in ea re quae videtur quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est animi intentio. In his igitur tribus non solum est manifesta distinctio sed etiam discreta natura. Primum quippe illud corpus visibile longe alterius naturae est quam sensus oculorum quo sibimet incidente fit visio, ipsaque visio quae quid aliud quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? Quamvis re visibili detracta nulla sit nec ulla omnino esse possit talis visio si corpus non sit quod videri queat, nullo modo tamen eiusdem substantiae est corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum cum idem corpus videtur et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimitur sensui, quae visio vocatur. Corpus enim a visu in sua natura separabile est; sensus autem qui iam erat in animante etiam priusquam videret quod videre posset cum in aliquid visibile incurreret, vel visio quae fit in sensu ex visibili corpore cum iam coniunctum est et videtur, sensus ergo vel visio, id est sensus non formatus extrinsecus vel sensus formatus extrinsecus, ad animantis naturam pertinet omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod videndo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur ut sensus sit sed ut visio sit. Nam sensus et ante obiectum rei sensibilis nisi esset in nobis non distaremus a caecis dum nihil videmus sive in tenebris sive clausis luminibus. Hoc autem distamus quod nobis inest et non videntibus quo videre possimus, qui sensus vocatur; illis vero non inest, nec aliunde nisi quod eo carent caeci appellantur. Itemque illa animi intentio quae in ea re quam videmus sensum tenet atque utrumque coniungit non tantum ab ea re visibili natura differt quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est, sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque visione quoniam solius animi est haec intentio. Sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur nisi quia et ipsi oculi membra sunt corporis, et quamvis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sentit corporeum et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur. Qui etiam passione corporis cum quisque excaecatur, interceptus exstinguitur, cum idem maneat animus, et eius intentio luminibus amissis non habeat quidem sensum corporis quem videndo extrinsecus corpori adiungat atque in eo viso figat aspectum, nisu tamen ipso indicet se adempto corporis sensu nec perire potuisse nec minui; manet enim quidam videndi appetitus integer sive id possit fieri sive non possit. Haec igitur tria, corpus quod videtur et ipsa visio et quae utrumque coniungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dinoscendum non solum propter propria singulorum verum etiam propter differentiam naturarum.	2. When, then, we see any corporeal object, these three things, as is most easy to do, are to be considered and distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the object seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind. In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, but also a diverse nature. For, first, that visible body is of a far different nature from the sense of the eyes, through the incidence of which sense upon it vision arises. And what plainly is vision itself other than perception informed by that thing which is perceived? Although there is no vision if the visible object be withdrawn, nor could there be any vision of the kind at all if there were no body that could be seen; yet the body by which the sense of the eyes is informed, when that body is seen, and the form itself which is imprinted by it upon the sense, which is called vision, are by no means of the same substance. For the body that is seen is, in its own nature, separable; but the sense, which was already in the living subject, even before it saw what it was able to see, when it fell in with something visible—or the vision which comes to be in the sense from the visible body when now brought into connection with it and seen—the sense, then, I say, or the vision, that is, the sense informed from without, belongs to the nature of the living subject, which is altogether other than that body which we perceive by seeing, and by which the sense is not so formed as to be sense, but as to be vision. For unless the sense were also in us before the presentation to us of the sensible object, we should not differ from the blind, at times when we are seeing nothing, whether in darkness, or when our eyes are closed. But we differ from them in this, that there is in us, even when we are not seeing, that whereby we are able to see, which is called the sense; whereas this is not in them, nor are they called blind for any other reason than because they have it not. Further also, that attention of the mind which keeps the sense in that thing which we see, and connects both, not only differs from that visible thing in its nature; in that the one is mind, and the other body; but also from the sense and the vision itself: since this attention is the act of the mind alone; but the sense of the eyes is called a bodily sense, for no other reason than because the eyes themselves also are members of the body; and although an inanimate body does not perceive, yet the soul commingled with the body perceives through a corporeal instrument, and that instrument is called sense. And this sense, too, is cut off and extinguished by suffering on the part of the body, when any one is blinded; while the mind remains the same; and its attention, since the eyes are lost, has not, indeed, the sense of the body which it may join, by seeing, to the body without it, and so fix its look thereupon and see it, yet by the very effort shows that, although the bodily sense be taken away, itself can neither perish nor be diminished. For there remains unimpaired a desire [appetitus] of seeing, whether it can be carried into effect or not. These three, then, the body that is seen, and vision itself, and the attention of mind which joins both together, are manifestly distinguishable, not only on account of the properties of each, but also on account of the difference of their natures.
[11.2.3] Atque in his cum sensus non procedat ex corpore illo quod videtur sed ex corpore sentientis animantis cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur, tamen ex corpore quod videtur gignitur visio, id est sensus ipse formatur ut iam non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest dum est incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae visio vocatur. Gignitur ergo ex re visibili visio, sed non ex sola nisi adsit et videns. Quocirca ex visibili et vidente gignitur visio ita sane ut ex vidente sit sensus oculorum et aspicientis atque intuentis intentio; illa tamen informatio sensus quae visio dicitur a solo imprimatur corpore quod videtur, id est a re aliqua visibili. Qua detracta nulla remanet forma quae inerat sensui dum adesset illud quod videbatur; sensus tamen ipse remanet qui erat et priusquam aliquid sentiretur velut in aqua uestigium tamdiu est donec ipsum corpus quod imprimitur inest, quo ablato nullum erit cum remaneat aqua quae erat et antequam illam formam corporis caperet. Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res visibilis; gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem suam quae fit in sensu cum aliquid videndo sentimus. Sed formam corporis quod videmus et formam quae ab illa in sensu videntis fit per eundem sensum non discernimus quoniam tanta coniunctio est ut non pateat discernendi locus. Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire nisi fieret in sensu nostro aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis. Neque enim cum anulus cerae imprimitur ideo nulla imago facta est quia non discernitur nisi cum fuerit separata. Sed quoniam post ceram separatam manet quod factum est ut videri possit, propterea facile persuadetur quod inerat iam cerae forma impressa ex anulo et antequam ab illa separaretur. Si autem liquido humori adiungeretur anulus, eo detracto nihil imaginis appareret. Nec ideo tamen discernere ratio non deberet fuisse in illo humore antequam detraheretur anuli formam factam ex anulo, quae distinguenda est ab ea forma quae in anulo est unde ista facta est quae detracto anulo non erit, quamvis illa in anulo maneat unde ista facta est. Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod videtur quamdiu videtur quia eo detracto non remanet. Ac per hoc tardioribus ingeniis difficillime persuaderi potest formari in sensu nostro imaginem rei visibilis cum eam videmus, et eandem formam esse visionem.	3. And since, in this case, the sensation does not proceed from that body which is seen, but from the body of the living being that perceives, with which the soul is tempered together in some wonderful way of its own; yet vision is produced, that is, the sense itself is informed, by the body which is seen; so that now, not only is there the power of sense, which can exist also unimpaired even in darkness, provided the eyes are sound, but also a sense actually informed, which is called vision. Vision, then, is produced from a thing that is visible; but not from that alone, unless there be present also one who sees. Therefore vision is produced from a thing that is visible, together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part of him who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention of looking and gazing at the object; while yet that information of the sense, which is called vision, is imprinted only by the body which is seen, that is, by some visible thing; which being taken away, that form remains no more which was in the sense so long as that which was seen was present: yet the sense itself remains, which existed also before anything was perceived; just as the trace of a thing in water remains so long as the body itself, which is impressed on it, is in the water; but if this has been taken away, there will no longer be any such trace, although the water remains, which existed also before it took the form of that body. And therefore we cannot, indeed, say that a visible thing produces the sense; yet it produces the form, which is, as it were, its own likeness, which comes to be in the sense, when we perceive anything by seeing. But we do not distinguish, through the same sense, the form of the body which we see, from the form which is produced by it in the sense of him who sees; since the union of the two is so close that there is no room for distinguishing them. But we rationally infer that we could not have sensation at all, unless some similitude of the body seen was wrought in our own sense. For when a ring is imprinted on wax, it does not follow that no image is produced, because we cannot discern it unless when it has been separated. But since, after the wax is separated, what was made remains, so that it can be seen; we are on that account easily persuaded that there was already also in the wax a form impressed from the ring before it was separated from it. But if the ring were imprinted upon a fluid, no image at all would appear when it was withdrawn; and yet none the less for this ought the reason to discern that there was in that fluid before the ring was withdrawn a form of the ring produced from the ring, which is to be distinguished from that form which is in the ring, whence that form was produced which ceases to be when the ring is withdrawn, although that in the ring remains, whence the other was produced. And so the [sensuous] perception of the eyes may not be supposed to contain no image of the body, which is seen as long as it is seen, [merely] because when that is withdrawn the image does not remain. And hence it is very difficult to persuade men of duller mind that an image of the visible thing is formed in our sense, when we see it, and that this same form is vision.
[11.2.4] Sed qui forte adverterunt quod commemorabo non ita in hac inquisitione laborabunt. Plerumque cum diuscule attenderimus quaeque luminaria et deinde oculos clauserimus, quasi versantur in conspectu quidam lucidi colores varie sese commutantes et minus minusque fulgentes donec omnino desistant, quas intellegendum est reliquias esse formae illius quae facta erat in sensu cum corpus lucidum videretur paulatimque et quodam modo gradatim deficiendo variari. Nam et insertarum fenestrarum cancelli si eos forte intuebamur, saepe in illis apparuere coloribus ut manifestum sit hanc affectionem nostro sensui ex ea re quae videbatur impressam. Erat ergo etiam cum videremus, et illa erat clarior et expressior sed multum coniuncta cum specie rei eius quae cernebatur ut discerni omnino non posset, et ipsa erat visio. Quin etiam cum lucernae flammula modo quodam divaricatis radiis oculorum quasi geminatur, duae visiones fiunt, cum sit res una quae videtur. Singillatim quippe afficiuntur idem radii de suo quisque oculo emicantes dum non sinuntur in illud corpus intuendum pariter coniuncteque concurrere ut unus fiat ex utroque contuitus, et ideo si unum oculum clauserimus, non geminum ignem sed sicuti est unum videbimus. Cur autem sinistro clauso illa species videri desinit quae ad dextrum erat vicissimque dextro clauso illa intermoritur quae ad sinistrum erat, et longum est et rei praesenti non necessarium modo quaerere atque disserere. Quod enim ad susceptam quaestionem sat est nisi fieret in sensu nostro quaedam imago simillima rei eius quam cernimus, non secundum oculorum numerum flammae species geminaretur cum quidam cernendi modus adhibitus fuerit qui possit concursum separare radiorum. Ex uno quippe oculo quolibet modo deducto aut impresso aut intorto si alter clausus est, dupliciter videri aliquid quod sit unum nullo pacto potest.	4. But if any perhaps attend to what I am about to mention, they will find no such trouble in this inquiry. Commonly, when we have looked for some little time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there seem to play before our eyes certain bright colors variously changing themselves, and shining less and less until they wholly cease; and these we must understand to be the remains of that form which was wrought in the sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these variations take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade away. For the lattices, too, of windows, should we happen to be gazing at them, appear often in these colors; so that it is evident that our sense is affected by such impressions from that thing which is seen. That form therefore existed also while we were seeing, and at that time it was more clear and express. But it was then closely joined with the species of that thing which was being perceived, so that it could not be at all distinguished from it; and this was vision itself. Why, even when the little flame of a lamp is in some way, as it were, doubled by the divergent rays of the eyes, a twofold vision comes to pass, although the thing which is seen is one. For the same rays, as they shoot forth each from its own eye, are affected severally, in that they are not allowed to meet evenly and conjointly, in regarding that corporeal thing, so that one combined view might be formed from both. And so, if we shut one eye, we shall not see two flames, but one as it really is. But why, if we shut the left eye, that appearance ceases to be seen, which was on the right; and if, in turn, we shut the right eye, that drops out of existence which was on the left, is a matter both tedious in itself, and not necessary at all to our present subject to inquire and discuss. For it is enough for the business in hand to consider, that unless some image, precisely like the thing we perceive, were produced in our sense, the appearance of the flame would not be doubled according to the number of the eyes; since a certain way of perceiving has been employed, which could separate the union of rays. Certainly nothing that is really single can be seen as if it were double by one eye, draw it down, or press, or distort it as you please, if the other is shut.
[11.2.5] Quae cum ita sint, tria haec quamvis diversa natura quemadmodum in quandam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus, id est species corporis quae videtur et imago eius impressa sensui quod est visio sensusue formatus et voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet, in eoque ipsam visionem tenet. Horum primum, id est res ipsa visibilis, non pertinet ad animantis naturam nisi cum corpus nostrum cernimus. Alterum autem ita pertinet ut et in corpore fiat et per corpus in anima; fit enim in sensu qui neque sine corpore est neque sine anima. Tertium vero solius animae est quia voluntas est. Cum igitur horum trium tam diversae substantiae sint, tamen in tantam coeunt unitatem ut duo priora vix intercedente iudice ratione discerni valeant, species videlicet corporis quod videtur et imago eius quae fit in sensu, id est visio. Voluntas autem tantam habet vim copulandi haec duo ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur et in ea formatum teneat. Et si tam violenta est ut possit vocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam caeterum corpus animantis uehementer afficit, et ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies m similem speciem coloremque commutat. Licet videre corpusculum chamaeleontis ad colores quos videt facillima conversione variari. Aliorum autem animalium quia non est ad conversionem facilis corpulentia, fetus plerumque produnt libidines matrum quid cum magna delectatione conspexerint. Quam enim teneriora atque ut ita dixerim formabiliora sunt primordia seminum, tam efficaciter et capaciter sequuntur intentionem maternae animae et quae in ea facta est phantasia per corpus quod cupide aspexit. Sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint, sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis libris quod fecit Iacob ut oves et caprae varios coloribus parerent supponendo eis variata virgulta in canalibus aquarum quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant.	5. The case then being so, let us remember how these three things, although diverse in nature, are tempered together into a kind of unity; that is, the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it impressed on the sense, which is vision or sense informed, and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and retains the vision itself in it. The first of these, that is, the visible thing itself, does not belong to the nature of the living being, except when we discern our own body. But the second belongs to that nature to this extent, that it is wrought in the body, and through the body in the soul; for it is wrought in the sense, which is neither without the body nor without the soul. But the third is of the soul alone, because it is the will. Although then the substances of these three are so different, yet they coalesce into such a unity that the two former can scarcely be distinguished, even with the intervention of the reason as judge, namely the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it which is wrought in the sense, that is, vision. And the will so powerfully combines these two, as both to apply the sense, in order to be informed, to that thing which is perceived, and to retain it when informed in that thing. And if it is so vehement that it can be called love, or desire, or lust, it vehemently affects also the rest of the body of the living being; and where a duller and harder matter does not resist, changes it into like shape and color. One may see the little body of a chameleon vary with ready change, according to the colors which it sees. And in the case of other animals, since their grossness of flesh does not easily admit change, the offspring, for the most part, betray the particular fancies of the mothers, whatever it is that they have beheld with special delight. For the more tender, and so to say, the more formable, are the primary seeds, the more effectually and capably they follow the bent of the soul of the mother, and the phantasy that is wrought in it through that body, which it has greedily beheld. Abundant instances might be adduced, but one is sufficient, taken from the most trustworthy books; viz. what Jacob did, that the sheep and goats might give birth to offspring of various colors, by placing variegated rods before them in the troughs of water for them to look at as they drank, at the time they had conceived.
[11.2.6] Sed anima rationalis deformiter vivit cum secundum trinitatem exterioris hominis vivit, id est cum ad ea quae forinsecus sensum corporis formant non laudabilem voluntatem qua haec ad utile aliquid referat, sed turpem cupiditatem qua his inhaerescat accommodat.	6. The rational soul, however, lives in a degenerate fashion, when it lives according to a trinity of the outer man; that is, when it applies to those things which form the bodily sense from without, not a praiseworthy will, by which to refer them to some useful end, but a base desire, by which to cleave to them.
[11.3.6] Quia etiam detracta specie corporis quae corporaliter sentiebatur remanet in memoria similitudo eius quo rursus voluntas convertat aciem ut inde formetur intrinsecus sicut ex corpore obiecto sensibili sensus extrinsecus formabatur. Atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria et interna visione et quae utrumque copulat voluntate, quae tria cum in unum coguntur ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur. Nec iam in his tribus diversa substantia est. Neque enim aut corpus illud sensibile ibi est quod omnino discretum est ab animantis natura, aut sensus corporis ibi formatur ut fiat visio, aut ipsa voluntas id agit ut formandum sensum sensibili corpori admoveat, in eoque formatum detineat. Sed pro illa specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum combibit anima, proque illa visione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur succedit intus similis visio cum ex eo quod memoria tenet formatur acies animi et absentia corpora cogitantur, voluntasque ipsa quomodo foris corpori obiecto formandum sensum admovebat formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam ut ex eo quod illa retinuit ista formetur, et fit in cogitatione similis visio. Sicut autem ratione discernebatur species visibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur et eius similitudo quae fiebat in sensu formato ut esset visio (alioquin ita erant coniunctae ut omnino una eademque putaretur, sic illa phantasia, cum animus cogitat speciem visi corporis, cum constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi, tamen sic una et singularis apparet ut duo quaedam esse non inveniantur nisi iudicante ratione qua intellegimus aliud esse illud quod in memoria manet etiam cum aliunde cogitamus et aliud fieri cum recordamur, id est ad memoriam redimus, et illic invenimus eandem speciem. Quae si iam non ibi esset, ita oblitos nos esse diceremus ut omnino recolere non possemus, si autem acies recordantis non formaretur ex ea re quae erat in memoria, nullo modo fieret visio cogitantis. Sed utriusque coniunctio, id est eius quam memoria tenet et eius quae inde exprimitur ut formetur acies recordantis, quia simillimae sunt, veluti unam facit apparere. Cum autem cogitantis acies aversa inde fuerit atque id quod in memoria cernebatur destiterit intueri, nihil formae quae impressa erat in eadem acie remanebit, atque inde formabitur quo rursus conversa fuerit ut alia cogitatio fiat. Manet tamen illud quod reliquit in memoria, quo rursus cum id recordamur convertatur, et conversa formetur atque unum cum eo fiat unde formatur.	Since even if the form of the body, which was corporeally perceived, be withdrawn, its likeness remains in the memory, to which the will may again direct its eye, so as to be formed thence from within, as the sense was formed from without by the presentation of the sensible body. And so that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision, and from the will which unites both. And when these three things are combined into one, from that combination itself they are called conception. And in these three there is no longer any diversity of substance. For neither is the sensible body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of the living being, nor is the bodily sense there informed so as to produce vision, nor does the will itself perform its office of applying the sense, that is to be informed, to the sensible body, and of retaining it in it when informed; but in place of that bodily species which was perceived from without, there comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has imbibed through the bodily sense; and in place of that vision which was outward when the sense was informed through the sensible body, there comes a similar vision within, while the eye of the mind is informed from that which the memory retains, and the corporeal things that are thought of are absent; and the will itself, as before it applied the sense yet to be informed to the corporeal thing presented from without, and united it thereto when informed, so now converts the vision of the recollecting mind to memory, in order that the mental sight may be informed by that which the memory has retained, and so there may be in the conception a like vision. And as it was the reason that distinguished the visible appearance by which the bodily sense was informed, from the similitude of it, which was wrought in the sense when informed in order to produce vision (otherwise they had been so united as to be thought altogether one and the same); so, although that phantasy also, which arises from the mind thinking of the appearance of a body that it has seen, consists of the similitude of the body which the memory retains, together with that which is thence formed in the eye of the mind that recollects; yet it so seems to be one and single, that it can only be discovered to be two by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that which remains in the memory, even when we think it from some other source, to be a different thing from that which is brought into being when we remember, that is, come back again to the memory, and there find the same appearance. And if this were not now there, we should say that we had so forgotten as to be altogether unable to recollect. And if the eye of him who recollects were not informed from that thing which was in the memory, the vision of the thinker could in no way take place; but the conjunction of both, that is, of that which the memory retains, and of that which is thence expressed so as to inform the eye of him who recollects, makes them appear as if they were one, because they are exceedingly like. But when the eye of the concipient is turned away thence, and has ceased to look at that which was perceived in the memory, then nothing of the form that was impressed thereon will remain in that eye, and it will be informed by that to which it had again been turned, so as to bring about another conception. Yet that remains which it has left in the memory, to which it may again be turned when we recollect it, and being turned thereto may be informed by it, and become one with that whence it is informed.
[11.4.7] Voluntas vero illa quae hac atque hac fert et refert aciem formandam coniungitque formatam, si ad interiorem phantasiam tota confluxerit atque a praesentia corporum quae circumiacent sensibus atque ab ipsis sensibus corporis animi aciem omnino averterit atque ad eam quae intus cernitur imaginem penitus converterit, tanta offunditur similitudo speciei corporalis expressa ex memoria ut nec ipsa ratio discernere sinatur utrum foris corpus ipsum videatur an intus tale aliquid cogitetur. Nam interdum homines nimia cogitatione rerum visibilium vel inlecti vel territi etiam eiusmodi repente voces ediderunt quasi reuera in mediis talibus actionibus seu passionibus versarentur. Et memini me audisse a quodam quod tam expressam et quasi solidam speciem feminei corporis in cogitando cernere soleret ut ei se quasi misceri sentiens etiam genitalibus flueret. Tantum habet virium anima in corpus suum et tantum valet ad indumenti qualitatem vertendam atque mutandam quomodo afficiatur indutus qui cohaeret indumento suo. Ex eodem genere affectionis etiam illud est quod in somnis per imagines ludimur. Sed plurimum differt utrum sopitis sensibus corporis sicuti sunt dormientium, aut ab interiore compage turbatis sicuti sunt furentium, aut alio quodam modo alienatis sicuti sunt divinantium vel prophetantium, animi intentio quadam necessitate incurrat in eas quae occurrunt imagines sive ex memoria sive alia aliqua occulta vi per quasdam spiritales mixturas similiter spiritalis substantiae, an sicut sanis atque vigilantibus interdum contingit ut cogitatione occupata se voluntas avertat a sensibus atque ita formet animi aciem variis imaginibus rerum sensibilium tamquam ipsa sensibilia sentiantur. Non tantum autem cum appetendo in talia voluntas intenditur fiunt istae impressiones imaginum, sed etiam cum devitandi et cavendi causa rapitur animus in ea contuenda quae fugiat. Unde non solum cupiendo sed etiam metuendo infertur vel sensus ipsis sensibilibus vel acies animi formanda imaginibus sensibilium. Itaque aut metus aut cupiditas quanto uehementior fuerit tanto expressius formatur acies sive sentientis ex corpore quod in loco adiacet sive cogitantis ex imagine corporis quae memoria continetur. Quod ergo est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco, hoc est ad animi aciem similitudo corporis in memoria; et quod est aspicientis visio ad eam speciem corporis ex qua sensus formatur, hoc est visio cogitantis ad imaginem corporis in memoria constitutam ex qua formatur acies animi; et quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulandam ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium quamvis eorum sit diversa natura, hoc est eadem voluntatis intentio ad copulandam imaginem corporis quae inest in memoria et visionem cogitantis, id est formam quam cepit acies animi rediens ad memoriam, ut fiat et hic quaedam unitas ex tribus non iam naturae diversitate discretis sed unius eiusdemque substantiae quia hoc totum intus est et totum unus animus.	7. But if that will which moves to and fro, hither and there, the eye that is to be informed, and unites it when formed, shall have wholly converged to the inward phantasy, and shall have absolutely turned the mind's eye from the presence of the bodies which lie around the senses, and from the very bodily senses themselves, and shall have wholly turned it to that image, which is perceived within; then so exact a likeness of the bodily species expressed from the memory is presented, that not even reason itself is permitted to discern whether the body itself is seen without, or only something of the kind thought of within. For men sometimes either allured or frightened by over-much thinking of visible things, have even suddenly uttered words accordingly, as if in real fact they were engaged in the very midst of such actions or sufferings. And I remember some one telling me that he was wont to perceive in thought, so distinct and as it were solid, a form of a female body, as to be moved, as though it were a reality. Such power has the soul over its own body, and such influence has it in turning and changing the quality of its [corporeal] garment; just as a man may be affected when clothed, to whom his clothing sticks. It is the same kind of affection, too, with which we are beguiled through imaginations in sleep. But it makes a very great difference, whether the senses of the body are lulled to torpor, as in the case of sleepers, or disturbed from their inward structure, as in the case of madmen, or distracted in some other mode, as in that of diviners or prophets; and so from one or other of these causes, the intention of the mind is forced by a kind of necessity upon those images which occur to it, either from memory, or by some other hidden force through certain spiritual commixtures of a similarly spiritual substance: or whether, as sometimes happens to people in health and awake, that the will occupied by thought turns itself away from the senses, and so informs the eye of the mind by various images of sensible things, as though those sensible things themselves were actually perceived. But these impressions of images not only take place when the will is directed upon such things by desiring them, but also when, in order to avoid and guard against them, the mind is carried away to look upon these very thing so as to flee from them. And hence, not only desire, but fear, causes both the bodily eye to be informed by the sensible things themselves, and the mental eye (acies) by the images of those sensible things. Accordingly, the more vehement has been either fear or desire, the more distinctly is the eye informed, whether in the case of him who [sensuously] perceives by means of the body that which lies close to him in place, or in the case of him who conceives from the image of the body which is contained in the memory. What then a body in place is to the bodily sense, that, the similitude of a body in memory is to the eye of the mind; and what the vision of one who looks at a thing is to that appearance of the body from which the sense is informed, that, the vision of a concipient is to the image of the body established in the memory, from which the eye of the mind is informed; and what the intention of the will is towards a body seen and the vision to be combined with it, in order that a certain unity of three things may therein take place, although their nature is diverse, that, the same intention of the will is towards combining the image of the body which is in the memory, and the vision of the concipient, that is, the form which the eye of the mind has taken in returning to the memory, in order that here too a certain unity may take place of three things, not now distinguished by diversity of nature, but of one and the same substance; because this whole is within, and the whole is one mind.
[11.4.8] Sicut autem cum forma et species corporis interierit non potest ad eam voluntas sensum reuocare cernentis, ita cum imago quam memoria gerit oblivione deleta est non erit quo animi aciem formandam voluntas recordando retorqueat.	8. But as, when [both] the form and species of a body have perished, the will cannot recall to it the sense of perceiving; so, when the image which memory bears is blotted out by forgetfulness, the will will be unable to force back the eye of the mind by recollection, so as to be formed thereby.
[11.5.8] Sed quia praeualet animus non solum oblita verum etiam non sensa nec experta confingere ea quae non exciderunt augendo, minvendo, commutando, et pro arbitrio componendo, saepe imaginatur quasi ita sit aliquid quod aut scit non ita esse aut nescit ita esse. In quo genere cavendum est ne aut mentiatur ut decipiat aut opinetur ut decipiatur. Quibus duobus malis evitatis nihil ei obsunt imaginata phantasmata sicut nihil obsunt experta sensibilia et retenta memoriter si neque cupide appetantur si ivuant neque turpiter fugiantur si offendunt. Cum autem in his voluntas relictis melioribus avida volutatur, immunda fit, atque ita et cum adsunt perniciose et cum absunt perniciosius cogitantur. Male itaque vivitur et deformiter secundum trinitatem hominis exterioris quia et illam trinitatem quae licet interius imaginetur, exteriora tamen imaginatur, sensibilium corporaliumque utendorum causa peperit. Nullus enim eis uti posset etiam bene nisi sensarum rerum imagines memoria tenerentur, et nisi pars maxima volun tatis in superioribus atque interioribus habit et , eaque ipsa quae commodatur sive foris corporibus sive intus imaginibus eorum nisi quidquid in eis capit ad meliorem verioremque vitam referat atque in eo fine cuius intuitu haec agenda iudicat adquiescat. Quid aliud facimus nisi quod nos apostolus facere prohibet dicens: Nolite conformari huic saeculo? Quapropter non est ista trinitas imago dei. Ex ultima quippe, id est corporea creatura qua superior est anima, in ipsa anima fit per sensum corporis. Nec tamen est omni modo dissimilis. Quid enim non pro suo genere ac pro suo modulo habet similitudinem dei quandoquidem deus fecit omnia bona valde non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est? In quantum ergo bonum est quidquid est in tantum scilicet quamvis longe distantem habet tamen nonnullam similitudinem summi boni, et si naturalem utique rectam et ordinatam; si autem vitiosam utique turpem atque peruersam. Nam et animae in ipsis peccatis suis non nisi quandam similitudinem dei superba et praepostera et, ut ita dicam, seruili libertate sectantur. Ita nec primis parentibus nostris persuaderi peccatum posset nisi diceretur: Eritis sicut dii. Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est deo etiam eius imago dicenda est, sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est.	But because the mind has great power to imagine not only things forgotten, but also things that it never saw, or experienced, either by increasing, or diminishing, or changing, or compounding, after its pleasure, those which have not dropped out of its remembrance, it often imagines things to be such as either it knows they are not, or does not know that they are. And in this case we have to take care, lest it either speak falsely that it may deceive, or hold an opinion so as to be deceived. And if it avoid these two evils, then imagined phantasms do not hinder it: just as sensible things experienced or retained by memory do not hinder it, if they are neither passionately sought for when pleasant, nor basely shunned when unpleasant. But when the will leaves better things, and greedily wallows in these, then it becomes unclean; and they are so thought of hurtfully, when they are present, and also more hurtfully when they are absent. And he therefore lives badly and degenerately who lives according to the trinity of the outer man; because it is the purpose of using things sensible and corporeal, that has begotten also that trinity, which although it imagines within, yet imagines things without. For no one could use those things even well, unless the images of things perceived by the senses were retained in the memory. And unless the will for the greatest part dwells in the higher and interior things, and unless that will itself, which is accommodated either to bodies without, or to the images of them within, refers whatever it receives in them to a better and truer life, and rests in that end by gazing at which it judges that those things ought to be done; what else do we do, but that which the apostle prohibits us from doing, when he says, Be not conformed to this world? And therefore that trinity is not an image of God since it is produced in the mind itself through the bodily sense, from the lowest, that is, the corporeal creature, than which the mind is higher. Yet neither is it altogether dissimilar: for what is there that has not a likeness of God, in proportion to its kind and measure, seeing that God made all things very good, and for no other reason except that He Himself is supremely good? In so far, therefore, as anything that is, is good, in so far plainly it has still some likeness of the supreme good, at however great a distance; and if a natural likeness, then certainly a right and well-ordered one; but if a faulty likeness, then certainly a debased and perverse one. For even souls in their very sins strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness of God, in a proud and preposterous, and, so to say, slavish liberty. So neither could our first parents have been persuaded to sin unless it had been said, You shall be as gods. No doubt every thing in the creatures which is in any way like God, is not also to be called His image; but that alone than which He Himself alone is higher. For that only is in all points copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is interposed.
[11.5.9] Visionis igitur illius, id est formae quae fit in sensu cernentis, quasi parens est forma corporis ex qua fit. Sed parens illa non vera, unde necista vera proles est; neque enim omnino inde gignitur quoniam aliquid aliud adhibetur corpori ut ex illo formetur, id est sensus videntis. Quocirca id amare alienari est. Itaque voluntas quae utrumque coniungit quasi parentem et quasi prolem magis spiritalis est quam utrumlibet illorum. Nam corpus illud quod cernitur omnino spiritale non est; visio vero quae fit in sensu habet admixtum aliquid spiritale quia sine anima fieri non potest, sed non totum ita est quoniam ille qui formatur corporis sensus est. Voluntas ergo quae utrumque coniungit magis, ut dixi, spiritalis agnoscitur, et ideo tamquam personam spiritus insinuare incipit in illa trinitate. Sed magis pertinet ad sensum formatum quam ad illud corpus unde formatur. Sensus enim animantis et voluntas animae est non lapidis aut alicuius corporis quod videtur. Non ergo ab illo quasi parente procedit, sed nec ab ista quasi prole, hoc est visione ac forma quae in sensu est. Prius enim quam visio fieret iam erat voluntas quae formandum sensum cernendo corpori admovit, sed nondum erat placitum. Quomodo enim placeret quod nondum erat visum? Placitum autem quieta voluntas est. Ideoque nec quasi prolem visionis possumus dicere voluntatem quia erat ante visionem, nec quasi parentem quia non ex voluntate sed ex viso corpore formata et expressa est.	9. Of that vision then; that is, of the form which is wrought in the sense of him who sees; the form of the bodily thing from which it is wrought, is, as it were, the parent. But it is not a true parent; whence neither is that a true offspring; for it is not altogether born therefrom, since something else is applied to the bodily thing in order that it may be formed from it, namely, the sense of him who sees. And for this reason, to love this is to be estranged. Therefore the will which unites both, viz. the quasi-parent and the quasi-child, is more spiritual than either of them. For that bodily thing which is discerned, is not spiritual at all. But the vision which comes into existence in the sense, has something spiritual mingled with it, since it cannot come into existence without the soul. But it is not wholly spiritual; since that which is formed is a sense of the body. Therefore the will which unites both is confessedly more spiritual, as I have said; and so it begins to suggest (insinuare), as it were, the person of the Spirit in the Trinity. But it belongs more to the sense that is formed, than to the bodily thing whence it is formed. For the sense and will of an animate being belongs to the soul, not to the stone or other bodily thing that is seen. It does not therefore proceed from that bodily thing as from a parent; yet neither does it proceed from that other as it were offspring, namely, the vision and form that is in the sense. For the will existed before the vision came to pass, which will applied the sense that was to be formed to the bodily thing that was to be discerned; but it was not yet satisfied. For how could that which was not yet seen satisfy? And satisfaction means a will that rests content. And, therefore, we can neither call the will the quasi-offspring of vision, since it existed before vision; nor the quasi-parent, since that vision was not formed and expressed from the will, but from the bodily thing that was seen.
[11.5.10] Finem fortasse voluntatis et requiem possumus recte dicere visionem ad hoc dumtaxat unum; neque enim propterea nihil aliud volet quia videt aliquid quod volebat.	10. Perhaps we can rightly call vision the end and rest of the will, only with respect to this one object [namely, the bodily thing that is visible]. For it will not will nothing else merely because it sees something which it is now willing.
[11.6.10] Non itaque omnino ipsa voluntas hominis cuius finis non est nisi beatitudo, sed ad hoc unum interim voluntas videndi finem non habet nisi visionem sive id referat ad aliud sine non referat. Si enim non referat ad aliud visionem sed tantum voluit ut videret, non est disputandum quomodo ostendatur finem voluntatis esse visionem, manifestum est enim. Si autem referat ad aliud, vult utique aliud nec iam videndi voluntas erit, aut si videndi, non hoc videndi. Tamquam si velit quisque videre cicatricem ut inde doceat uulnus fuisse, aut si velit videre fenestram ut per fenestram videat transeuntes; omnes istae atque aliae tales voluntates suos proprios fines habent qui referuntur ad finem illius voluntatis qua volumus beate vivere et ad eam pervenire vitam quae non referatur ad aliud sed amanti per se ipsa sufficiat. Voluntas ergo videndi finem habet visionem, et voluntas hanc rem videndi finem habet huius rei visionem. Voluntas itaque videndi cicatricem finem suum expetit, hoc est visionem cicatricis, et ad eam ultra non pertinet; voluntas enim probandi uulnus fuisse alia voluntas est, quamvis ex illa religetur, cuius item finis est probatio. uulneris. Et voluntas videndi fenestram finem habet fenestrae visionem; altera est enim quae ex ista nectitur voluntas per fenestram videndi transeuntes, cuius item finis est visio transeuntium. Rectae autem sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur; si autem praua est, prauae sunt omnes. Et ideo rectarum voluntatum conexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem quod certis velut passibus agitur; prauarum autem atque distortarum voluntatum implicatio vinculum est quo alligabitur qui hoc agit ut proiciatur in tenebras exteriores. Beati ergo qui factis et moribus cantant canticum graduum, et uae his qui trahunt peccata sicut restem longam. Sic est autem requies voluntatis quem dicimus finem si adhuc refertur ad aliud quemadmodum possumus dicere requiem pedis esse in ambulando cum ponitur unde alius innitatur cum passibus pergitur. Si autem aliquid ita placet ut in eo cum aliqua delectatione voluntas adquiescat nondum est tamen illud quo tenditur, sed et hoc refertur ad aliud; deputetur non tamquam patria civis sed tamquam refectio vel etiam mansio viatoris.	It is not therefore the whole will itself of the man, of which the end is nothing else than blessedness; but the will provisionally directed to this one object, which has as its end in seeing, nothing but vision, whether it refer the thing seen to any other thing or not. For if it does not refer the vision to anything further, but wills only to see this, there can be no question made about showing that the end of the will is the vision; for it is manifest. But if it does refer it to anything further, then certainly it does will something else, and it will not be now a will merely to see; or if to see, not one to see the particular thing. Just as, if any one wished to see the scar, that from thence he might learn that there had been a wound; or wished to see the window, that through the window he might see the passers-by: all these and other such acts of will have their own proper [proximate] ends, which are referred to that [final] end of the will by which we will to live blessedly, and to attain to that life which is not referred to anything else, but suffices of itself to him who loves it. The will then to see, has as its end vision; and the will to see this particular thing, has as its end the vision of this particular thing. Therefore the will to see the scar, desires its own end, that is, the vision of the scar, and does not reach beyond it; for the will to prove that there had been a wound, is a distinct will, although dependent upon that, of which the end also is to prove that there had been a wound. And the will to see the window, has as its end the vision of the window; for that is another and further will which depends upon it, viz. to see the passers-by through the window, of which also the end is the vision of the passers-by. But all the several wills that are bound to each other, are at once right, if that one is good, to which all are referred; and if that is bad, then all are bad. And so the connected series of right wills is a sort of road which consists as it were of certain steps, whereby to ascend to blessedness; but the entanglement of depraved and distorted wills is a bond by which he will be bound who thus acts, so as to be cast into outer darkness. Blessed therefore are they who in act and character sing the song of the steps [degrees]; and woe to those that draw sin, as it were a long rope. And it is just the same to speak of the will being in repose, which we call its end, if it is still referred to something further, as if we should say that the foot is at rest in walking, when it is placed there, whence yet another foot may be planted in the direction of the man's steps. But if something so satisfies, that the will acquiesces in it with a certain delight; it is nevertheless not yet that to which the man ultimately tends; but this too is referred to something further, so as to be regarded not as the native country of a citizen, but as a place of refreshment, or even of stopping, for a traveller.
[11.7.11] Iam vero in alia trinitate interiore quidem quam est ista in sensibilibus et in sensibus sed tamen quae inde concepta est, cum iam non ex corpore sensus corporis sed ex memoria formatur acies animi cum in ipsa memoria species inhaeserit corporis quod forinsecus sensimus, illam speciem quae m memoria est quasi parentem dicimus eius quae fit in phantasia cogitantis. Erat enim in memoria et priusquam cogitaretur a nobis sicut erat corpus in loco et priusquam sentiretur ut visio fieret. Sed cum cogitatur ex illa quam memoria tenet, exprimitur in acie cogitantis et reminiscendo formatur ea species quae quasi proles est eius quam memoria tenet. Sed neque illa vera parens, neque ista vera proles est. Acies quippe animi quae formatur ex memoria cum recordando aliquid cogitamus non ex ea specie procedit quam meminimus visam quandoquidem eorum meminisse non possemus nisi vidissemus; acies autem animi quae reminiscendo formatur erat etiam priusquam corpus quod meminimus videremus. Quanto magis priusquam id memoriae mandaremus. Quamquam itaque forma quae fit in acie recordantis ex ea fiat quae inest memoriae, ipsa tamen acies non inde exsistit, sed erat ante ista. Consequens est autem ut si non est illa vera parens, nec ista vera sit proles. Sed et illa quasi parens et ista quasi proles aliquid insinuant unde interiora atque veriora exercitatius certiusque videantur.	11. But yet again, take the case of another trinity, more inward indeed than that which is in things sensible, and in the senses, but which is yet conceived from thence; while now it is no longer the sense of the body that is informed from the body, but the eye of the mind that is informed from the memory, since the species of the body which we perceived from without has inhered in the memory itself. And that species, which is in the memory, we call the quasi-parent of that which is wrought in the phantasy of one who conceives. For it was in the memory also, before we conceived it, just as the body was in place also before we [sensuously] perceived it, in order that vision might take place. But when it is conceived, then from that form which the memory retains, there is copied in the mind's eye (acie) of him who conceives, and by remembrance is formed, that species, which is the quasi-offspring of that which the memory retains. But neither is the one a true parent, nor the other a true offspring. For the mind's vision which is formed from memory when we think anything by recollection, does not proceed from that species which we remember as seen; since we could not indeed have remembered those things, unless we had seen them; yet the mind's eye, which is informed by the recollection, existed also before we saw the body that we remember; and therefore how much more before we committed it to memory? Although therefore the form which is wrought in the mind's eye of him who remembers, is wrought from that form which is in the memory; yet the mind's eye itself does not exist from thence, but existed before it. And it follows, that if the one is not a true parent, neither is the other a true offspring. But both that quasi-parent and that quasi-offspring suggest something, whence the inner and truer things may appear more practically and more certainly.
[11.7.12] Difficilius iam plane discernitur utrum voluntas quae memoriae copulat visionem non sit alicuius eorum sive parens sive proles, et hanc discretionis difficultatem facit eiusdem naturae atque substantiae parilitas et aequalitas. Neque enim sicut foris facile discernebatur formatus sensus a sensibili corpore et voluntas ab utroque propter naturae diversitatem quae inest ab invicem omnibus tribus, de qua satis supra disseruimus, ita et hic potest. Quamvis enim haec trinitas de qua nunc quaeritur forinsecus invecta est animo, intus tamen agitur et non est quidquam eius praeter ipsius animi naturam. Quo igitur pacto demonstrari potest, voluntatem nec quasi parentem nec quasi prolem esse, sive corporeae similitudinis quae memoria continetur sive eius quae inde cum recordamur exprimitur, quando utrumque in cogitando ita copulat ut tamquam unum singulariter appareat et discerni nisi ratione non possit? Atque illud primum videndum est non esse posse voluntatem reminiscendi nisi vel totum vel aliquid rei eius quam reminisci volumus in penetralibus memoriae teneamus. Quod enim omni modo et omni ex parte obliti fuerimus, nec reminiscendi voluntas exoritur quoniam quidquid recordari volumus recordati iam sumus in memoria nostra esse vel fuisse. Verbi gratia si recordari volo quid heri coenaverim, aut recordatus iam sum coenasse me, aut si et hoc nondum, certe circa ipsum tempus aliquid recordatus sum, si nihil aliud ipsum saltem hesternum diem et eius eam partem qua coenari solet et quid sit coenare. Nam si nihil tale recordatus essem, quid heri coenaverim recordari velle non possem. Unde intellegi potest voluntatem reminiscendi ab his quidem rebus quae memoria continentur procedere adiunctis simul eis quae inde per recordationem cernendo exprimuntur, id est ex copulatione rei cuiusdam quam recordati sumus et visionis quae inde facta est in acie cogitantis cum recordati sumus. Ipsa quae utrumque copulat voluntas requirit et aliud quod quasi vicinum est atque contiguum recordanti. Tot igitur huius generis trinitates quot recordationes quia nulla est earum ubi non haec tria sint, illud quod in memoria reconditum est etiam antequam cogitetur, et illud quod fit in cogitatione cum cernitur, et voluntas utrumque coniungens et ex utroque ac tertia se ipsa unum aliquid complens. An potius ita cognoscitur una quaedam in hoc genere trinitas ut unum aliquid generaliter dicamus quidquid corporalium specierum in memoria latet, et rursus unum aliquid generalem visionem animi talia recordantis atque cogitantis quorum duorum copulationi tertia coniungitur copulatrix voluntas ut sit hoc totum unum quiddam ex quibusdam tribus?	12. Further, it is more difficult to discern clearly, whether the will which connects the vision to the memory is not either the parent or the offspring of some one of them; and the likeness and equality of the same nature and substance cause this difficulty of distinguishing. For it is not possible to do in this case, as with the sense that is formed from without (which is easily discerned from the sensible body, and again the will from both), on account of the difference of nature which is mutually in all three, and of which we have treated sufficiently above. For although this trinity, of which we at present speak, is introduced into the mind from without; yet it is transacted within, and there is no part of it outside of the nature of the mind itself. In what way, then, can it be demonstrated that the will is neither the quasi-parent, nor the quasi-offspring, either of the corporeal likeness which is contained in the memory, or of that which is copied thence in recollecting; when it so unites both in the act of conceiving, as that they appear singly as one, and cannot be discerned except by reason? It is then first to be considered that there cannot be any will to remember, unless we retain in the recesses of the memory either the whole, or some part, of that thing which we wish to remember. For the very will to remember cannot arise in the case of a thing which we have forgotten altogether and absolutely; since we have already remembered that the thing which we wish to remember is or has been, in our memory. For example, if I wish to remember what I supped on yesterday, either I have already remembered that I did sup, or if not yet this, at least I have remembered something about that time itself, if nothing else; at all events, I have remembered yesterday, and that part of yesterday in which people usually sup, and what supping is. For if I had not remembered anything at all of this kind, I could not wish to remember what I supped on yesterday. Whence we may perceive that the will of remembering proceeds, indeed, from those things which are retained in the memory, with the addition also of those which, by the act of discerning, are copied thence through recollection; that is, from the combination of something which we have remembered, and of the vision which was thence wrought, when we remembered, in the mind's eye of him who thinks. But the will itself which unites both requires also some other thing, which is, as it were, close at hand, and adjacent to him who remembers. There are, then, as many trinities of this kind as there are remembrances; because there is no one of them wherein there are not these three things, viz. that which was stored up in the memory also before it was thought, and that which takes place in the conception when this is discerned, and the will that unites both, and from both and itself as a third, completes one single thing. Or is it rather that we so recognize some one trinity in this kind, as that we are to speak generally, of whatever corporeal species lie hidden in the memory, as of a single unity, and again of the general vision of the mind which remembers and conceives such things, as of a single unity, to the combination of which two there is to be joined as a third the will that combines them, that this whole may be a certain unity made up from three?
[11.8.12] Sed quoniam non potest acies animi simul omnia quae memoria tenet uno aspectu contueri, alternant vicissim cedendo ac succedendo trinitates cogitationum, atque ita fit ista innumerabiliter numerosissima trinitas, nec tamen infinita si numerus in memoria reconditarum rerum non excedatur. Ex quo enim coepit unusquisque sentire corpora quolibet corporis sensu, etiam si posset adiungere quae oblitus est, certus ac determinatus profecto numerus foret quamvis innumerabilis. Dicimus enim innumerabilia non solum infinita sed etiam quae ita finita sunt ut facultatem numerantis excedant.	But since the eye of the mind cannot look at all things together, in one glance, which the memory retains, these trinities of thought alternate in a series of withdrawals and successions, and so that trinity becomes most innumerably numerous; and yet not infinite, if it pass not beyond the number of things stored up in the memory. For, although we begin to reckon from the earliest perception which any one has of material things through any bodily sense, and even take in also those things which he has forgotten, yet the number would undoubtedly be certain and determined, although innumerable. For we not only call infinite things innumerable, but also those, which, although finite, exceed any one's power of reckoning.
[11.8.13] Sed hinc adverti aliquanto manifestius potest aliud esse quod reconditum memoria tenet et aliud quod inde in cogitatione recordantis exprimitur, quamvis cum fit utriusque copulatio unum idemque videatur, quia meminisse non possumus corporum species nisi tot quot sensimus et quantas sensimus et sicut sensimus (ex corporis enim sensu eas in memoria combibit animus); visiones tamen illae cogitantium ex his quidem rebus quae sunt in memoria, sed tamen innumerabiliter atque omnino infinite multiplicantur atque variantur. Unum quippe solem memini quia sicuti est unum vidi; si voluero autem duos cogito vel tres vel quotquot volo, sed ex eadem memoria qua unum memini formatur acies multos cogitantis. Et tantum memini quantum vidi; si enim maiorem vel minorem memini quam vidi, iam non memini quod vidi et ideo nec memini. Quia vero memini, tantum memini quantum vidi. Vel maiorem tamen pro voluntate cogito vel minorem. Et ita memini ut vidi, cogito autem sicut volo currentem et ubi volo stantem, unde volo et quo volo venientem. Quadrum etiam mihi cogitare in promptu est cum rotundum meminerim, et cuiuslibet coloris cum solem viridem numquam viderim et ideo non meminerim, atque ut solem ita caetera. Hae autem rerum formae quoniam corporales atque sensibiles sunt, errat quidem animus cum eas opinatur eo modo foris esse quomodo intus cogitat vel cum iam interierunt foris et adhuc in memoria retinentur, vel cum aliter etiam quod meminimus non recordandi fide sed cogitandi varietate formatur.	13. But we can hence perceive a little more clearly that what the memory stores up and retains is a different thing from that which is thence copied in the conception of the man who remembers, although, when both are combined together, they appear to be one and the same; because we can only remember just as many species of bodies as we have actually seen, and so great, and such, as we have actually seen; for the mind imbibes them into the memory from the bodily sense; whereas the things seen in conception, although drawn from those things which are in the memory, yet are multiplied and varied innumerably, and altogether without end. For I remember, no doubt, but one sun, because according to the fact, I have seen but one; but if I please, I conceive of two, or three, or as many as I will; but the vision of my mind, when I conceive of many, is formed from the same memory by which I remember one. And I remember it just as large as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I saw it, then I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do not remember it. But because I remember it, I remember it as large as I saw it; yet I conceive of it as greater or as less according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it; but I conceive of it as running its course as I will, and as standing still where I will, and as coming whence I will, and whither I will. For it is in my power to conceive of it as square, although I remember it as round; and again, of what color I please, although I have never seen, and therefore do not remember, a green sun; and as the sun, so all other things. But owing to the corporeal and sensible nature of these forms of things, the mind falls into error when it imagines them to exist without, in the same mode in which it conceives them within, either when they have already ceased to exist without, but are still retained in the memory, or when in any other way also, that which we remember is formed in the mind, not by faithful recollection, but after the variations of thought.
[11.8.14] Quamquam saepissime credamus etiam vera narrantibus quae ipsi sensibus perceperunt. Quae cum in ipso auditu quando narrantur cogitamus, non videtur ad memoriam retorqueri acies ut fiant visiones cogitantium; neque enim ea nobis recordantibus sed alio narrante cogitamus. Atque illa trinitas non hic videtur expleri quae fit cum species in memoria latens et visio recordantis tertia voluntate copulantur. Non enim quod latebat in memoria mea sed quod audio, cogito cum aliquid mihi narratur. Non ipsas voces loquentis dico ne quisquam putet in illam me exisse trinitatem quae foris in sensibilibus et in sensibus agitur, sed eas cogito corporum species quas narrans verbis sonisque significat, quas utique non reminiscens sed audiens cogito. Sed si diligentius consideremus, nec tunc exceditur memoriae modus. Neque enim vel intellegere possem narrantem si ea quae dicit et si contexta tunc primum audirem, non tamen generaliter singula meminissem. Qui enim mihi narrat verbi gratia aliquem montem silua exutum et oleis indutum, ei narrat qui meminerim species et montium et siluarum et olearum. Quas si oblitus essem, quid diceret omnino nescirem et ideo narrationem illam cogitare non possem. Ita fit ut omnis qui corporalia cogitat, sive ipse aliquid confingat, sive audiat aut legat vel praeterita narrantem vel futura praenuntiantem, ad memoriam suam recurrat et ibi reperiat modum atque mensuram omnium formarum quas cogitans intuetur. Nam neque colorem quem numquam vidit neque figuram corporis nec sonum quem numquam audivit nec saporem quem numquam gustavit nec odorem quem numquam olefecit nec ullam contrectationem corporis quam numquam sensit potest quisquam omnino cogitare. At si propterea nemo aliquid corporale cogitat nisi quod sensit, quia nemo meminit corporale aliquid nisi quod sensit, sicut in corporibus sentiendi sic in memoria est cogitandi modus. Sensus enim accipit speciem ab eo corpore quod sentimus et a sensu memoria, a memoria vero acies cogitantis.	14. Yet it very often happens that we believe also a true narrative, told us by others, of things which the narrators have themselves perceived by their senses. And in this case, when we conceive the things narrated to us, as we hear them, the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the memory, in order to bring up visions in our thoughts; for we do not conceive these things from our own recollection, but upon the narration of another; and that trinity does not here seem to come to its completion, which is made when the species lying hid in the memory, and the vision of the man that remembers, are combined by will as a third. For I do not conceive that which lay hid in my memory, but that which I hear, when anything is narrated to me. I am not speaking of the words themselves of the speaker, lest any one should suppose that I have gone off to that other trinity, which is transacted without, in sensible things, or in the senses: but I am conceiving of those species of material things, which the narrator signifies to me by words and sounds; which species certainly I conceive of not by remembering, but by hearing. But if we consider the matter more carefully, even in this case, the limit of the memory is not overstepped. For I could not even understand the narrator, if I did not remember generically the individual things of which he speaks, even although I then hear them for the first time as connected together in one tale. For he who, for instance, describes to me some mountain stripped of timber, and clothed with olive trees, describes it to me who remembers the species both of mountains, and of timber, and of olive trees; and if I had forgotten these, I should not know at all of what he was speaking, and therefore could not conceive that description. And so it comes to pass, that every one who conceives things corporeal, whether he himself imagine anything, or hear, or read, either a narrative of things past, or a foretelling of things future, has recourse to his memory, and finds there the limit and measure of all the forms at which he gazes in his thought. For no one can conceive at all, either a color or a form of body, which he never saw, or a sound which he never heard, or a flavor which he never tasted, or a scent which he never smelt, or any touch of a corporeal thing which he never felt. But if no one conceives anything corporeal except what he has [sensuously] perceived, because no one remembers anything corporeal except what he has thus perceived, then, as is the limit of perceiving in bodies, so is the limit of thinking in the memory. For the sense receives the species from that body which we perceive, and the memory from the sense; but the mental eye of the concipient, from the memory.
[11.8.15] Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic cogitantis aciem memoriae. Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id est voluntas. Sed a sentiendis corporibus motu corporis separat corporis sensus ne aliquid sentiamus aut ut sentire desinamus veluti cum oculos ab eo quod videre nolumus avertimus vel claudimus; sic aures a sonis, sic nares ab odoribus. Ita etiam vel os claudendo vel aliquid ex ore respuendo a saporibus aversamur. In tactu quoque vel subtrahimus corpus ne tangamus quod nolumus, vel si iam tangebamus, abicimus aut repellimus. Ita motu corporis agit voluntas ne sensus corporis rebus sensibilibus copuletur. Et agit hoc quantum potest. Nam cum in hac actione propter conditionem seruilis mortalitatis difficultatem patitur, cruciatus est consequens ut voluntati nihil reliqui fiat nisi tolerantia. Memoriam vero a sensu voluntas avertit cum in aliud intenta non ei sinit inhaerere praesentia. Quod animadvertere facile est cum saepe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis videmur. Falsum est autem; audivimus enim sed non meminimus subinde per aurium sensum labentibus vocibus alienato nutu voluntatis per quem solent infigi memoriae. Verius itaque dixerimus cum tale aliquid accidit: 'Non meminimus,' quam: 'Non audivimus.' Nam et legentibus evenit et mihi saepissime ut perlecta pagina vel epistula nesciam quid legerim et repetam. In aliud quippe intento nutu voluntatis non sic est adhibita memoria sensui corporis quomodo ipse sensus adhibitus est litteris. Ita et ambulantes intenta in aliud voluntate nesciunt qua transierint. Quod si non vidissent, non ambulassent aut maiore intentione palpando ambulassent, praesertim si per incognita pergerent; sed quia facile ambulaverunt, utique viderunt. Quia vero non sicut sensus oculorum locis quacumque pergebant ita ipsi sensui memoria iungebatur, nullo modo id quod viderunt etiam recentissimum meminisse potuerunt. Iam porro ab eo quod in memoria est animi aciem velle avertere nihil est aliud quam non inde cogitare.	15. Further, as the will applies the sense to the bodily object, so it applies the memory to the sense, and the eye of the mind of the concipient to the memory. But that which harmonizes those things and unites them, itself also disjoins and separates them, that is, the will. But it separates the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it: as when we avert our eyes from that which we are unwilling to see, or shut them; so, again, the ears from sounds, or the nostrils from smells. So also we turn away from tastes, either by shutting the mouth, or by casting the thing out of the mouth. In touch, also, we either remove the bodily thing, that we may not touch what we do not wish, or if we were already touching it, we fling or push it away. Thus the will acts by movement of the body, so that the bodily sense shall not be joined to the sensible things. And it does this according to its power; for when it endures hardship in so doing, on account of the condition of slavish mortality, then torment is the result, in such wise that nothing remains to the will save endurance. But the will averts the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer things present to cleave to it. As any one may see, when often we do not seem to ourselves to have heard some one who was speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else. But this is a mistake; for we did hear, but we do not remember, because the words of the speaker presently slipped out of the perception of our ears, through the bidding of the will being diverted elsewhere, by which they are usually fixed in the memory. Therefore, we should say more accurately in such a case, we do not remember, than, we did not hear; for it happens even in reading, and to myself very frequently, that when I have read through a page or an epistle, I do not know what I have read, and I begin it again. For the purpose of the will being fixed on something else, the memory was not so applied to the bodily sense, as the sense itself was applied to the letters. So, too, any one who walks with the will intent on something else, does not know where he has got to; for if he had not seen, he would not have walked there, or would have felt his way in walking with greater attention, especially if he was passing through a place he did not know; yet, because he walked easily, certainly he saw; but because the memory was not applied to the sense itself in the same way as the sense of the eyes was applied to the places through which he was passing, he could not remember at all even the last thing he saw. Now, to will to turn away the eye of the mind from that which is in the memory, is nothing else but not to think thereupon.
[11.9.16] In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus ab specie corporis et pervenimus usque ad speciem quae fit in contuitu cogitantis, quattuor species reperiuntur quasi gradatim natae altera ex altera, secunda de prima, tertia de secunda, quarta de tertia. Ab specie quippe corporis quod cernitur exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis, et ab hac ea quae fit in memoria, et ab hac ea quae fit in acie cogitantis. Quapropter voluntas quasi parentem cum prole ter copulat: primo speciem corporis cum ea quam gignit in corpons sensu, et ipsam rursus cum ea quae ex illa fit in memoria, atque istam quoque tertio cum ea quae ex illa paritur in cogitantis intuitu. Sed media copula quae secunda est, cum sit vicinior, non tam similis est primae quam tertiae. Visiones enim duae sunt, una sentientis, altera cogitantis. Ut autem possit esse visio cogitantis ideo fit in memoria de visione sentientis simile aliquid quo se ita convertat in cogitando acies animi, sicut se in cernendo convertit ad corpus acies oculorum. Propterea duas in hoc genere trinitates volui commendare, unam cum visio sentientis formatur ex corpore, aliam cum visio cogitantis formatur ex memoria. Mediam vero nolui quia non ibi solet visio dici cum memoriae commendatur forma quae fit in sensu cernentis. Ubique tamen voluntas non apparet nisi copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis. Et ideo undecumque procedat, nec parens nec proles dici potest.	16. In this arrangement, then, while we begin from the bodily species and arrive finally at the species which comes to be in the intuition (contuitu) of the concipient, we find four species born, as it were, step by step one from the other, the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third: since from the species of the body itself, there arises that which comes to be in the sense of the percipient; and from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this, that which comes to be in the mind's eye of the concipient. And the will, therefore, thrice combines as it were parent with offspring: first the species of the body with that to which it gives birth in the sense of the body; and that again with that which from it comes to be in the memory; and this also, thirdly, with that which is born from it in the intuition of the concipient's mind. But the intermediate combination which is the second, although it is nearer to the first, is yet not so like the first as the third is. For there are two kinds of vision, the one of [sensuous] perception (sentientis), the other of conception (cogitantis). But in order that the vision of conception may come to be, there is wrought for the purpose, in the memory, from the vision of [sensuous] perception something like it, to which the eye of the mind may turn itself in conceiving, as the glance (acies) of the eyes turns itself in [sensuously] perceiving to the bodily object. I have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of [sensuous] perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of conception is formed from the memory. But I have refrained from commending an intermediate one; because we do not commonly call it vision, when the form which comes to be in the sense of him who perceives, is entrusted to the memory. Yet in all cases the will does not appear unless as the combiner as it were of parent and offspring; and so, proceed from whence it may, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.
[11.10.17] At enim si non meminimus nisi quod sensimus neque cogitamus nisi quod meminimus, cur plerumque falsa cogitamus cum ea quae sensimus non utique falso meminerimus nisi quia voluntas illa quam coniunctricem ac separatricem huiuscemodi rerum iam quantum potui demonstrare curavi formandam cogitantis aciem per condita memoriae ducit ut libitum est, et ad cogitanda ea quae non meminimus ex eis quae meminimus aliud hinc, aliud inde, ut sumat impellit? Quae in unam visionem coeuntia faciunt aliquid quod ideo falsum dicatur quia vel non est foris in rerum corporearum natura vel non de memoria videtur expressum cum tale nihil nos sensisse meminimus. Quis enim vidit cygnum nigrum? Et propterea nemo meminit. Cogitare tamen quis non potest? Facile est enim illam figuram quam videndo cognovimus nigro colore perfundere quem nihilominus in aliis corporibus vidimus, et quia utrumque sensimus, utrumque meminimus. Nec avem quadrupedem memini quia non vidi, sed phantasiam talem facillime intueor dum alicui formae volatili qualem vidi adiungo alios duos pedes quales itidem vidi. Quapropter dum coniuncta cogitamus quae singillatim sensa meminimus, videmur non id quod meminimus cogitare, cum id agamus moderante memoria unde sumimus omnia quae multipliciter ac varie pro nostra voluntate componimus. Nam neque ipsas magnitudines corporum quas numquam vidimus sine ope memoriae cogitamus. Quantum enim spatii solet occupare per magnitudinem mundi noster obtutus, in tantum extendimus quaslibet corporum moles cum eas maximas cogitamus. Et ratio quidem pergit in ampliora, sed phantasia non sequitur. Sequitur quippe cum infinitatem quoque numeri ratio renuntiet, quam nulla visio corporalia cogitantis apprehendit. Eadem ratio docet minutissima etiam corpuscula infinite dividi; cum tamen ad eas tenuitates vel minutias peruentum fuerit quas visas meminimus, exiliores minutioresque phantasias iam non possumus intueri, quamvis ratio non desinat persequi ac dividere. Ita nulla corporalia nisi aut ea quae meminimus aut ex his quae meminimus cogitamus.	17. But if we do not remember except what we have [sensuously] perceived, nor conceive except what we remember; why do we often conceive things that are false, when certainly we do not remember falsely those things which we have perceived, unless it be because that will (which I have already taken pains to show as much as I can to be the uniter and the separater of things of this kind) leads the vision of the conceiver that is to be formed, after its own will and pleasure, through the hidden stores of the memory; and, in order to conceive [imagine] those things which we do not remember, impels it to take one thing from hence, and another from thence, from those which we do remember; and these things combining into one vision make something which is called false, because it either does not exist externally in the nature of corporeal things, or does not seem copied from the memory, in that we do not remember that we ever saw such a thing. For who ever saw a black swan? And therefore no one remembers a black swan; yet who is there that cannot conceive it? For it is easy to apply to that shape which we have come to know by seeing it, a black color, which we have not the less seen in other bodies; and because we have seen both, we remember both. Neither do I remember a bird with four feet, because I never saw one; but I contemplate such a phantasy very easily, by adding to some winged shape such as I have seen, two other feet, such as I have likewise seen. And therefore, in conceiving conjointly, what we remember to have seen singly, we seem not to conceive that which we remember; while we really do this under the law of the memory, whence we take everything which we join together after our own pleasure in manifold and diverse ways. For we do not conceive even the very magnitudes of bodies, which magnitudes we never saw, without help of the memory; for the measure of space to which our gaze commonly reaches through the magnitude of the world, is the measure also to which we enlarge the bulk of bodies, whatever they may be, when we conceive them as great as we can. And reason, indeed, proceeds still beyond, but phantasy does not follow her; as when reason announces the infinity of number also, which no vision of him who conceives according to corporeal things can apprehend. The same reason also teaches that the most minute atoms are infinitely divisible; yet when we have come to those slight and minute particles which we remember to have seen, then we can no longer behold phantasms more slender and more minute, although reason does not cease to continue to divide them. So we conceive no corporeal things, except either those we remember, or from those things which we remember.
[11.11.18] Sed quia numerose cogitari possunt quae singillatim sunt impressa memoriae, videtur ad memoriam mensura, ad visionem vero numerus pertinere quia licet innumerabilis sit multiplicitas talium visionum, singulis tamen in memoria praescriptus est intransgressibilis modus. Mensura igitur in memoria, in visionibus numerus apparet sicut in ipsis corporibus visibilibus mensura quaedam est cui numerosissime coaptatur sensus videndi, et ex uno visibili multorum cernentium formatur aspectus ita ut etiam unus propter duorum oculorum numerum plerumque unam rem geminata specie videat sicut supra docuimus. In his ergo rebus unde visiones exprimuntur quaedam mensura est, in ipsis autem visionibus numerus. Voluntas vero quae ista coniungit et ordinat et quadam unitate copulat, nec sentiendi aut cogitandi appetitum nisi in his rebus unde visiones formantur adquiescens conlocat, ponderi similis est. Quapropter haec tria, mensuram, numerum, pondus, etiam in caeteris omnibus rebus animadvertenda praelibaverim. Nunc interim voluntatem copulatricem rei visibilis atque visionis quasi parentis et prolis, sive in sentiendo sive in cogitando, nec parentem nec prolem dici posse quomodo valui et quibus valui demonstravi. Unde tempus admonet hanc eandem trinitatem in interiore homine requirere atque ab isto de quo tamdiu locutus sum animali atque carnali qui exterior dicitur introrsus tendere. Ubi speramus invenire nos posse secundum trinitatem imaginem dei, conatus nostros illo ipso adivuante quem omnia sicut res ipsae indicant, ita etiam sancta scriptura in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisse testatur.	18. But because those things which are impressed on the memory singly, can be conceived according to number, measure seems to belong to the memory, but number to the vision; because, although the multiplicity of such visions is innumerable, yet a limit not to be transgressed is prescribed for each in the memory. Therefore, measure appears in the memory, number in the vision of things: as there is some measure in visible bodies themselves, to which measure the sense of those who see is most numerously adjusted, and from one visible object is formed the vision of many beholders, so that even a single person sees commonly a single thing under a double appearance, on account of the number of his two eyes, as we have laid down above. Therefore there is some measure in those things whence visions are copied, but in the visions themselves there is number. But the will which unites and regulates these things, and combines them into a certain unity, and does not quietly rest its desire of [sensuously] perceiving or of conceiving, except in those things from whence the visions are formed, resembles weight. And therefore I would just notice by way of anticipation these three things, measure, number, weight, which are to be perceived in all other things also. In the meantime, I have now shown as much as I can, and to whom I can, that the will is the uniter of the visible thing and of the vision; as it were, of parent and of offspring; whether in [sensuous] perception or in conception, and that it cannot be called either parent or offspring. Wherefore time admonishes us to seek for this same trinity in the inner man, and to strive to pass inwards from that animal and carnal and (as he is called) outward man, of whom I have so long spoken. And here we hope to be able to find an image of God according to the Trinity, He Himself helping our efforts, who as things themselves show, and as Holy Scripture also witnesses, has regulated all things in measure, and number, and weight.	}

Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book XI

Navigation menu

Page actions

Page actions

Personal tools

Navigation

Search

Tools