Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book XII

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK XII

• 12.1 Quid sit quod etiam in animo nostro intellegendum sit ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. Chapter 1.— Of What Kind are the Outer and the Inner Man.
• 12.2 Corporales sensus communes nobis esse cum pecore, sed proprium esse hominis de his quae sensu corporis comprehendit secundum aeternas iudicare rationes. Chapter 2.— Man Alone of Animate Creatures Perceives the Eternal Reasons of Things Pertaining to the Body.
• 12.3 Actiones corporales ita demum esse rectas si eis regendis mentis intellectuale praefuerit. Chapter 3.— The Higher Reason Which Belongs to Contemplation, and the Lower Which Belongs to Action, are in One Mind.
• 12.4 Quid intersit inter illud quo mens inclinatur ad temporalia et illud quo contemplatur aeterna. Chapter 4.— The Trinity and the Image of God is in that Part of the Mind Alone Which Belongs to the Contemplation of Eternal Things.
• 12.5 De opinione eorum qui coniugio masculi et feminae et eorum proli divinam comparant trinitatem. Chapter 5.— The Opinion Which Devises an Image of the Trinity in the Marriage of Male and Female, and in Their Offspring.
• 12.6 Quod homo non ad unius in trinitate personae sed ad totius trinitatis imaginem sit creatus. Chapter 6. — Why This Opinion is to Be Rejected.
• 12.7 De eo quod apostolus dicit virum esse imaginem dei, mulierem autem gloriam viri. Chapter 7.— How Man is the Image of God. Whether the Woman is Not Also the Image of God. How the Saying of the Apostle, that the Man is the Image of God, But the Woman is the Glory of the Man, is to Be Understood Figuratively and Mystically.
• 12.8 Quibus progressibus mens corporalium usu et imagine delectata ab aeternorum contemplatione deficiat. Chapter 8.— Turning Aside from the Image of God.
• 12.9 Quam perniciose relicto communi bono privata quaerantur. Chapter 9.— The Same Argument is Continued.
• 12.10 Quae sit humana temptatio et quod peccatum extra corpus habeatur. Chapter 10.— The Lowest Degradation Reached by Degrees.
• 12.11 Quibus dcminutionibus homo ab imagine dei in similitudinem pecoris delabatur. Chapter 11.— The Image of the Beast in Man.
• 12.12 Quam comparabilis sit primorum hominum praeuaricationi mens quae ad amorem temporalium sensu est tracta corporeo. Chapter 12.— There is a Kind of Hidden Wedlock in the Inner Man. Unlawful Pleasures of the Thoughts.
• 12.13 De eorum sententia qui in uno homine, mentem in persona viri, sensum autem corporis in persona mulieris accipiendum esse dixerunt. Chapter 13.— The Opinion of Those Who Have Thought that the Mind Was Signified by the Man, the Bodily Sense by the Woman.
• 12.14 In quae officia proprie sapientia et scientia dividantur. Chapter 14.— What is the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge. The Worship of God is the Love of Him. How the Intellectual Cognizance of Eternal Things Comes to Pass Through Wisdom.
• 12.15 De opinione Platonis qua credidit animas aliam vitam priusquam corporibus inderentur habuisse. Chapter 15.— In Opposition to the Reminiscence of Plato and Pythagoras. Pythagoras the Samian. Of the Difference Between Wisdom and Knowledge, and of Seeking the Trinity in the Knowledge of Temporal Things.

Latin	Latin
LIBER XII	On the Trinity (Book XII)
	Commencing with a distinction between wisdom and knowledge, points out a kind of trinity, of a peculiar sort, in that which is properly called knowledge, and which is the lower of the two; and this trinity, although it certainly pertains to the inner man, is still not yet to be called or thought an image of God.
[12.1.1] Age nunc videamus ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quidquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore recte adhuc dicitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. Non enim solum corpus homo exterior deputabitur sed adiuncta quadam vita sue qua compages corporis et omnes sensus vigent quibus instructus est ad exteriora sentienda. Quorum sensorum imagines infixae in memoria cum recordando revisuntur res adhuc agitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinens. Atque in his omnibus non distamus a pecore nisi quod figura corporis non proni sed erect) sumus. Qua in re admonemur ab eo qui nos fecit ne meliore nostri parse, id est animo, similes pecoribus simus a quibus corporis erectione distamus. Non ut in ea quae sublimia sunt in corporibus animum proiciamus. Nam vel in talibus quietem voluntatis appetere prosternere est animum. Sed sicut corpus ad ea quae sunt excelsa corporum, id est ad caelestia, naturaliter erectum est, sic animus quae substantia spiritalis est ad ea quae sunt in spiritalibus excelsa erigendus est non elatione superbiae sed pietate iustitiae.	1. Come now, and let us see where lies, as it were, the boundary line between the outer and inner man. For whatever we have in the mind common with the beasts, thus much is rightly said to belong to the outer man. For the outer man is not to be considered to be the body only, but with the addition also of a certain peculiar life of the body, whence the structure of the body derives its vigor, and all the senses with which he is equipped for the perception of outward things; and when the images of these outward things already perceived, that have been fixed in the memory, are seen again by recollection, it is still a matter pertaining to the outer man. And in all these things we do not differ from the beasts, except that in shape of body we are not prone, but upright. And we are admonished through this, by Him who made us, not to be like the beasts in that which is our better part— that is, the mind— while we differ from them by the uprightness of the body. Not that we are to throw our mind into those bodily things which are exalted; for to seek rest for the will, even in such things, is to prostrate the mind. But as the body is naturally raised upright to those bodily things which are most elevated, that is, to things celestial; so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised upright to those things which are most elevated in spiritual things, not by the elation of pride, but by the dutifulness of righteousness.
[12.2.2] Possunt autem et pecora et sentire per corporis sensus extrinsecus corporalia et ea memoriae fixa reminisci atque in eis appetere conducibilia, fugere incommode. Verum ea notare ac non solum naturaliter rapta sed etiam de industria memoriae commendata retinere et in oblivionem iamiamque labentia recordando atque cogitando rursus imprimere ut quemadmodum ex eo quod gerit memoria cogitatio formatur, sic et hoc ipsum quod in memoria est cogitatione firmetur, fictas etiam visiones hinc atque inde recordata quaelibet sumendo et quasi assuendo componere, inspicere quemadmodum in hoc rerum genere quae verisimilia sunt discernantur a veris, non spiritalibus sed ipsis corporalibus, haec atque huiusmodi, quamvis in sensibilibus atque in eis quae inde animus per sensum corporis traxit agantur atque versentur, non sunt tamen rationis expertia nec hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent, atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus de corporalibus iudicare. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum quam incommutabiliter manere mens novit.	2. And the beasts, too, are able both to perceive things corporeal from without, through the senses of the body, and to fix them in the memory, and remember them, and in them to seek after things suitable, and shun things inconvenient. But to note these things, and to retain them not only as caught up naturally but also as deliberately committed to memory, and to imprint them again by recollection and conception when now just slipping away into forgetfulness; in order that as conception is formed from that which the memory contains, so also the contents themselves of the memory may be fixed firmly by thought: to combine again imaginary objects of sight, by taking this or that of what the memory remembers, and, as it were, tacking them to one another: to examine after what manner it is that in this kind things like the true are to be distinguished from the true, and this not in things spiritual, but in corporeal things themselves—these acts, and the like, although performed in reference to things sensible, and those which the mind has deduced through the bodily senses, yet, as they are combined with reason, so are not common to men and beasts. But it is the part of the higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons; which, unless they were above the human mind, would certainly not be unchangeable; and yet, unless something of our own were subjoined to them, we should not be able to employ them as our measures by which to judge of corporeal things. But we judge of corporeal things from the rule of dimensions and figures, which the mind knows to remain unchangeably.
[12.3.3] Illud vero nostrum quod in actione corporalium atque temporalium tractandorum ita versatur ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore rationale est quidem, sed ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia qua subhaeremus intellegibili atque incommutabili veritati tamquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est. Sicut enim in omnibus pecoribus non inventum est viro adiutorium simile illi nisi de illo detractum in coniugium formaretur, ita menti nostrae qua supernam et internam consulimus veritatem nullum est ad usum rerum corporalium quantum naturae hominis sat est simile adiutorium ex animae partibus quas communes cum pecoribus habemus. Et ideo quiddam rationale nostrum non ad unitatis divortium separatum sed in auxilium societatis quasi derivatum in sui operis dispertitur officio. Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et femina, sic intellectum nostrum et actionem, vel consilium et exsecutionem, vel rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si quo alio modo significatius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur ut quemadmodum de illis dictum est: Erunt duo in carne una sic de his dici possit: 'Duo in mente una.'	3. But that of our own which thus has to do with the handling of corporeal and temporal things, is indeed rational, in that it is not common to us with the beasts; but it is drawn, as it were, out of that rational substance of our mind, by which we depend upon and cleave to the intelligible and unchangeable truth, and which is deputed to handle and direct the inferior things. For as among all the beasts there was not found for the man a help like him, unless one were taken from himself, and formed to be his consort: so for that mind, by which we consult the supernal and inward truth, there is no like help for such employment as man's nature requires among things corporeal out of those parts of the soul which we have in common with the beasts. And so a certain part of our reason, not separated so as to sever unity, but, as it were, diverted so as to be a help to fellowship, is parted off for the performing of its proper work. And as the two is one flesh in the case of male and female, so in the mind one nature embraces our intellect and action, or our counsel and performance, or our reason and rational appetite, or whatever other more significant terms there may be by which to express them; so that, as it was said of the former, And they two shall be in one flesh, it may be said of these, they two are in one mind.
[12.4.4] Cum igitur disserimus de natura mentis humanae de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravi nisi per officia geminamus. Itaque cum in ea quaerimus trinitatem, in tota quaerimus non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus quo trinitas impleatur. Sed in tota natura mentis ita trinitatem reperiri opus est ut si desit actio temporalium cui operi necessarium sit adiutorium propter quod ad haec inferiora administranda derivetur aliquid mentis, in una nusquam dispertita mente trinitas inveniatur, et facta iam ista distributione in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum non solum trinitas sed etiam irnago dei; in hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago dei possit inveniri.	4. When, therefore, we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss a single subject, and do not double it into those two which I have mentioned, except in respect to its functions. Therefore, when we seek the trinity in the mind, we seek it in the whole mind, without separating the action of the reason in things temporal from the contemplation of things eternal, so as to have further to seek some third thing, by which a trinity may be completed. But this trinity must needs be so discovered in the whole nature of the mind, as that even if action upon temporal things were to be withdrawn, for which work that help is necessary, with a view to which some part of the mind is diverted in order to deal with these inferior things, yet a trinity would still be found in the one mind that is no where parted off; and that when this distribution has been already made, not only a trinity may be found, but also an image of God, in that alone which belongs to the contemplation of eternal things; while in that other which is diverted from it in the dealing with temporal things, although there may be a trinity, yet there cannot be found an image of God.
[12.5.5] Proinde non mihi videntur probabilem afferre sententiam qui sic arbitrantur trinitatem imaginis dei in tribus personis quod attinet ad humanam naturam posse reperiri ut in coniugio masculi et feminae atque in eorum prole compleatur, quod quasi vir ipse patris personam intimet, filii vero quod de illo ita processit ut nasceretur, atque ita tertiam personam velut spiritus dicunt esse mulierem quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa es set filius aut filia, quamvis ea concipiente proles nasceretur; dixit enim dominus de spiritu sancto quod a patre procedat et tamen filius non est. In huius igitur opinionis errore hoc solum probabiliter affertur quod in origine factae feminae secundum sanctae scripturae fidem satis ostenditur non omne quod de aliqua persona ita exsistit ut personam alteram faciat filium posse dici quandoquidem de viri persona exstitit persona mulieris nec tamen eius filia dicta est. Caetera sane ita sunt absurda, immo vero ita falsa, ut facillime redarguantur. Omitto enim quale sit spiritum sanctum matrem filii dei putare et coniugem patris. Fortassis quippe respondeatur haec in carnalibus habere offensionem dum corporei conceptus partusque cogitantur. Quamquam et haec ipsa castissime cogitent quibus mundis omnia munda sunt, immundis autem et infidelibus quorum polluta est et mens et conscientia ita nihil est mundum ut quosdam eorum etiam de virgine secundum carnem natus carnem natus Christus offendat. Sed tamen in spiritalibus illis summis, ubi non est aliquid violabile aut corruptibile nec natum ex tempore nec ex informi formatum, si qua dicuntur talia ad quorum similitudinem etiam ista inferioris creaturae genera quamvis longe remotissime facta sunt, non debent cuiusquam sobriam perturbare prudentiam ne cum uanum devitat horrorem in perniciosum incurrat errorem. Assuescat in corporibus ita spiritalium reperire uestigia ut cum inde sursum versus duce ratione ascendere coeperit, ut ad ipsam incommutabilem veritatem per quam facta sunt ista perveniat, non secum ad summa pertrahat quod contemnit in infimis. Nec enim erubuit quidam uxorem sibi eligere sapientiam quia nomen uxoris in prole gignenda corruptibilem concubitum ingerit cogitanti, aut vero ipsa sapientia sexu femina est quia feminini generis vocabulo et in graeca et in latina lingua enuntiatur.	5. Accordingly they do not seem to me to advance a probable opinion, who lay it down that a trinity of the image of God in three persons, so far as regards human nature, can so be discovered as to be completed in the marriage of male and female and in their offspring; in that the man himself, as it were, indicates the person of the Father, but that which has so proceeded from him as to be born, that of the Son; and so the third person as of the Spirit, is, they say, the woman, who has so proceeded from the man as not herself to be either son or daughter, although it was by her conception that the offspring was born. For the Lord has said of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from the Father, and yet he is not a son. In this erroneous opinion, then, the only point probably alleged, and indeed sufficiently shown according to the faith of the Holy Scripture, is this—in the account of the original creation of the woman—that what so comes into existence from some person as to make another person, cannot in every case be called a son; since the person of the woman came into existence from the person of the man, and yet she is not called his daughter. All the rest of this opinion is in truth so absurd, nay indeed so false, that it is most easy to refute it. For I pass over such a thing, as to think the Holy Spirit to be the mother of the Son of God, and the wife of the Father; since perhaps it may be answered that these things offend us in carnal things, because we think of bodily conceptions and births. Although these very things themselves are most chastely thought of by the pure, to whom all things are pure; but to the defiled and unbelieving, of whom both the mind and conscience are polluted, nothing is pure; so that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, is a stumbling-block to some of them. But yet in the case of those supreme spiritual things, after the likeness of which those kinds of the inferior creature also are made although most remotely, and where there is nothing that can be injured and nothing corruptible, nothing born in time, nothing formed from that which is formless, or whatever like expressions there may be; yet they ought not to disturb the sober prudence of any one, lest in avoiding empty disgust he run into pernicious error. Let him accustom himself so to find in corporeal things the traces of things spiritual, that when he begins to ascend upwards from thence, under the guidance of reason, in order to attain to the unchangeable truth itself through which these things were made, he may not draw with himself to things above what he despises in things below. For no one ever blushed to choose for himself wisdom as a wife, because the name of wife puts into a man's thoughts the corruptible connection which consists in begetting children; or because in truth wisdom itself is a woman in sex, since it is expressed in both Greek and Latin tongues by a word of the feminine gender.
[12.6.6] Non ergo propterea respuimus istam sententiam quia timemus sanctam et inuiolabilem atque incommutabilem caritatem tamquam coniugem dei patris de illo exsistentem sed non sicut prolem ad gignendum verbum per quod facta sunt omnia cogitare, sed quia eam falsam diuma scriptura evidenter ostendit. Dixit enim deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram paulo post autem dictum est: Et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei. Nostram certe quia pluralis est numerus non recte diceretur si homo ad unius personae imaginem fieret sive patris sive filii sive spiritus sancti, sed quia fiebat ad imaginem trinitatis propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram. Rursus autem ne in trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos cum sit eadem trinitas unus deus: Et fecit, inquit, deus hominem ad imaginem dei pro eo ac si diceret, ad imaginem suam.	6. We do not therefore reject this opinion, because we fear to think of that holy and inviolable and unchangeable Love, as the spouse of God the Father, existing as it does from Him, but not as an offspring in order to beget the Word by which all things are made; but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and a little after it is said, So God created man in the image of God. Certainly, in that it is of the plural number, the word our would not be rightly used if man were made in the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made in the image of the Trinity, on that account it is said, After our image. But again, lest we should think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, whereas the same Trinity is one God, it is said, So God created man in the image of God, instead of saying, In His own image.
[12.6.7] Sunt enim tales usitatae in illis litteris locutiones quas nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter advertunt ut putent ita dictum, Fecit deus ad imaginem dei quasi diceretur "Fecit pater ad imaginem filii" sic volentes asserere in scripturis sanctis deum dictum etiam filium quasi desint alla verissima et manifestissima documenta ubi non solum deus sed etiam verus deus dictus est filius. In hoc enim testimonio dum aliud soluere intendunt sic se implicant ut expedire non possint. Si enim pater fecit ad imaginem filii ita ut non sit homo imago patris sed filii, dissimilis est patri filius. Si autem pie fides docet, sicuti docet, filium esse ad aequalitatem essentiae similem patri, quod ad similitudinem filii factum est necesse est etiam ad similitudinem patris factum sit. Deinde si hominem pater non ad suam sed ad filii fecit imaginem, cur non ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 'tuam,' sed ait, nostram, nisi quia trinitatis imago fiebat in homine ut hoc modo esset homo imago unius veri dei quia ipsa trinitas unus verus deus est? Locutiones autem sunt innumerabiles tales in scripturis, sed has protulisse suffecerit. Est in psalmis ita dictum: Domini est salus, et super populum tuum benedictio tua quasi alteri dictum sit, non ei de quo dixerat, Domini est salus Et iterum: A te, inquit, eruar a temptatione, et in deo meo transgrediar murum quasi alteri dixerit, A te eruar a temptatione. Et iterum: Populi sub te cadent in corde inimicorum regis ac si diceret, in corde inimicorum 'tuorum'; ei quippe regi dixerat, id est, domino Iesu Christo, Populi sub te cadent, quem regem intellegi voluit cum diceret, in corde inimicorum regis. Rarius ista in novi testamenti litteris inveniuntur, sed tamen ad romanos apostolus: De filio suo, inquit, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, qui praedestinatus est filius dei in virtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi domini nostri tamquam de alio supra diceret. Quid est enim filius dei praedestinatus ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi nisi idem Iesus Christus qui praedestinatus est filius dei? Ergo quomodo hic cum audimus filius dei in virtute Iesu Christi, aut filius dei secundum spiritum sanctificationis Iesu Christi, aut filius dei ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi, cum dici potuisset usitate, in virtute 'sua,' aut secundum spiritum sanctificationis 'suae,' aut ex resurrectione mortuorum 'eius' vel mortuorum 'suorum,' non cogimur intellegere aliam personam sed unam eandemque, scilicet filii dei domini nostri Iesu Christi; ita cum audimus: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, quamvis posset usitatius dici, ad imaginem suam, non tamen cogimur aliam personam intellegere in trinitate, sed ipsam unam eandemque trinitatem qui est unus deus, ad cuius imaginem factus est homo.	7. For such expressions are customary in the Scriptures; and yet some persons, while maintaining the Catholic faith, do not carefully attend to them, in such wise that they think the words, God made man in the image of God, to mean that the Father made man after the image of the Son; and they thus desire to assert that the Son also is called God in the divine Scriptures, as if there were not other most true and clear proofs wherein the Son is called not only God, but also the true God. For while they aim at explaining another difficulty in this text, they become so entangled that they cannot extricate themselves. For if the Father made man after the image of the Son, so that he is not the image of the Father, but of the Son, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if a pious faith teaches us, as it does, that the Son is like the Father after an equality of essence, then that which is made in the likeness of the Son must needs also be made in the likeness of the Father. Further, if the Father made man not in His own image, but in the image of His Son, why does He not say, Let us make man after Your image and likeness, whereas He does say, our; unless it be because the image of the Trinity was made in man, that in this way man should be the image of the one true God, because the Trinity itself is the one true God? Such expressions are innumerable in the Scriptures, but it will suffice to have produced these. It is so said in the Psalms, Salvation belongs unto the Lord; Your blessing is upon Your people; as if the words were spoken to some one else, not to Him of whom it had been said, Salvation belongs unto the Lord. And again, For by You, he says, I shall be delivered from temptation, and by hoping in my God I shall leap over the wall; as if he said to some one else, By You I shall be delivered from temptation. And again, In the heart of the king's enemies; whereby the people fall under You; as if he were to say, in the heart of Your enemies. For he had said to that King, that is, to our Lord Jesus Christ, The people fall under You, whom he intended by the word King, when he said, In the heart of the king's enemies. Things of this kind are found more rarely in the New Testament. But yet the apostle says to the Romans, Concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ our Lord; as though he were speaking above of some one else. For what is meant by the Son of God declared by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, except of the same Jesus Christ who was declared to be Son of God with power? And as then in this passage, when we are told, the Son of God with power of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness of Jesus Christ, or the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ, whereas it might have been expressed in the ordinary way, In His own power, or according to the spirit of His own holiness, or by the resurrection of His dead, or of their dead: as, I say, we are not compelled to understand another person, but one and the same, that is, the person of the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ; so, when we are told that God made man in the image of God, although it might have been more usual to say, after His own image, yet we are not compelled to understand any other person in the Trinity, but the one and selfsame Trinity itself, who is one God, and after whose image man is made.
[12.6.8] Quae cum ita sint, si eandem trinitatis imaginem non in uno sed in tribus hominibus acceperimus, patre et matre et filio, non erat ergo ad imaginem dei factus homo antequam uxor ei fieret et antequam filium propagarent quia nondum erat trinitas. An dicit aliquis: 'Iam trinitas erat quia etsi nondum forma propria, iam tamen originali natura et mulier erat in latere viri et filius in lumbis patris'? Cur ergo cum scriptura dixisset: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei contexuit dicens: Fecit eum masculum et feminam, fecit eos et benedixit eos (uel si ita distinguendum est: Et fecit deus hominem, ut deinde inferatur ad imaginem dei fecit eum, et tertia subiunctio sit masculum et feminam fecit eos, quidam enim timuerunt dicere: Fecit eum masculum et feminam ne quasi monstrosum aliquid intellegeretur sicuti sunt quos hermaphroditos vocant, cum etiam sic non mendaciter possit intellegi utrumque in numero singulari propter id quod dictum est: Duo in carne una)? Cur ergo, ut dicere coeperam, in natura hominis ad imaginem dei facta praeter masculum et feminam non commemorat scriptura? Ad implendam quippe imaginem trinitatis debuit addere et filium, quamvis adhuc in lumbis patris constitutum sicut mulier erat in latere. An forte iam facta erat et mulier, et scriptura brevi complexione constrinxerat quod postea quemadmodum sit factum diligentius explicaret, et propterea filius commemorari non potuit quia nondum erat natus? Quasi et hoc non poterat ea brevitate complecti spiritus suo loco postea natum filium narraturus, sicut mulierem de viri latere assumptam suo postmodum loco narravit et tamen hic eam nominare non praetermisit.	8. And since the case stands thus, if we are to accept the same image of the Trinity, as not in one, but in three human beings, father and mother and son, then the man was not made after the image of God before a wife was made for him, and before they procreated a son; because there was not yet a trinity. Will any one say there was already a trinity, because, although not yet in their proper form, yet in their original nature, both the woman was already in the side of the man, and the son in the loins of his father? Why then, when Scripture had said, God made man after the image of God, did it go on to say, God created him; male and female created He them: and God blessed them? (Or if it is to be so divided, And God created man, so that thereupon is to be added, in the image of God created He him, and then subjoined in the third place, male and female created He them; for some have feared to say, He made him male and female, lest something monstrous, as it were, should be understood, as are those whom they call hermaphrodites, although even so both might be understood not falsely in the singular number, on account of that which is said, Two in one flesh.) Why then, as I began by saying, in regard to the nature of man made after the image of God, does Scripture specify nothing except male and female? Certainly, in order to complete the image of the Trinity, it ought to have added also son, although still placed in the loins of his father, as the woman was in his side. Or was it perhaps that the woman also had been already made, and that Scripture had combined in a short and comprehensive statement, that of which it was going to explain afterwards more carefully, how it was done; and that therefore a son could not be mentioned, because no son was yet born? As if the Holy Spirit could not have comprehended this, too, in that brief statement, while about to narrate the birth of the son afterwards in its own place; as it narrated afterwards in its own place, that the woman was taken from the side of the man, and yet has not omitted here to name her.
[12.7.9] Non itaque ita debemus intellegere hominem factum ad imaginem summae trinitatis, hoc est ad imaginem dei, ut eadem im ago in trib us intellegatur hominib us praesertim cu m apostolus virum dicat esse imaginem dei, et propterea velamentum ei capitis demat quod mulieri adhibendum monet ita loquens: Vir quidem non debet velare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei. Mulier autem gloria viri est. Quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Si pro sua persona mulier adimplet imaginem trinitatis, cur ea detracta de latere viri adhuc ille imago dicitur? Aut si et una persona hominis ex tribus potest dici imago dei, sicut in ipsa summa trinitate et unaquaeque persona deus est, cur et mulier non est imago dei? Nam propterea caput velare praecipitur quod ille quia imago dei est prohibetur.	9. We ought not therefore so to understand that man is made in the image of the supreme Trinity, that is, in the image of God, as that the same image should be understood to be in three human beings; especially when the apostle says that the man is the image of God, and on that account removes the covering from his head, which he warns the woman to use, speaking thus: For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say to this? If the woman fills up the image of the trinity after the measure of her own person, why is the man still called that image after she has been taken out of his side? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God, as each person also is God in the supreme Trinity itself, why is the woman also not the image of God? For she is instructed for this very reason to cover her head, which he is forbidden to do because he is the image of God.
[12.7.10] Sed videndum est quomodo non sit contrarium quod dicit apostolus non mulierem sed virum esse imaginem dei huic quod scriptum est in genesi: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, fecit eum masculum et feminam; fecit eos et benedixit eos. Ad imaginem quippe dei naturam ipsam humanam factam dicit quae sexu utroque completur, nec ab intellegenda imagine dei separat feminam. Dicto enim quod fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, fecit eum, inquit, mascttlum et feminam, vel certe alia distinctione, masculum et feminam fecit eos. Quomodo ergo per apostolum audivimus virum esse imaginem dei unde caput velare prohibetur, mulierem autem non et ideo ipsa hoc facere iubetur nisi, credo, illud esse quod iam dixi cum de natura humanae mentis agerem, mulierem cum viro suo esse imaginem dei ut una imago sit tota illa substantia; cum autem ad adiutorium distribuitur, quod ad eam ipsam solam attinet non est imago dei; quod autem ad virum solum attinet imago dei est tam plena atque integra quam in unum coniuncta muliere? Sicut de natura humanae mentis diximus quia et si tota contempletur veritatem, imago dei est, et cum ex ea distribuitur aliquid et quadam intentione derivatur ad actionem rerum temporalium, nihilominus ex qua parte conspectam consulit veritatem imago dei est; ex qua vero intenditur in agenda inferiora non est imago dei. Et quoniam quantumcumque se extenderit in id quod aeternum est tanto magis inde formatur ad imaginem dei, et propterea non est cohibenda ut se inde contineat ac temperet, ideo vir non debet velare caput. Quia vero illi rationali actioni quae in rebus corporalibus temporalibusque versatur periculosa est nimia in inferiora progressio, debet habere potestatem super caput, quod indicat velamentum quo significatur esse cohibenda. Grata est enim sanctis angelis sacrata et pia significatio. Nam deus non ad tempus videt nec aliquid novi fit in eius visione atque scientia cum aliquid temporaliter ac transitorie geritur sicut inde afficiuntur sensus vel carnales animalium et hominum vel etiam caelestes angelorum.	10. But we must notice how that which the apostle says, that not the woman but the man is the image of God, is not contrary to that which is written in Genesis, God created man: in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them: and He blessed them. For this text says that human nature itself, which is complete [only] in both sexes, was made in the image of God; and it does not separate the woman from the image of God which it signifies. For after saying that God made man in the image of God, He created him, it says, male and female: or at any rate, punctuating the words otherwise, male and female created He them. How then did the apostle tell us that the man is the image of God, and therefore he is forbidden to cover his head; but that the woman is not so, and therefore is commanded to cover hers? Unless, forsooth, according to that which I have said already, when I was treating of the nature of the human mind, that the woman together with her own husband is the image of God, so that that whole substance may be one image; but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, which regards the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined with him in one. As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is divided from it, and diverted in order to the cognition of temporal things; nevertheless on that side on which it beholds and consults truth, here also it is the image of God, but on that side whereby it is directed to the cognition of the lower things, it is not the image of God. And since it is so much the more formed after the image of God, the more it has extended itself to that which is eternal, and is on that account not to be restrained, so as to withhold and refrain itself from thence; therefore the man ought not to cover his head. But because too great a progression towards inferior things is dangerous to that rational cognition that is conversant with things corporeal and temporal; this ought to have power on its head, which the covering indicates, by which it is signified that it ought to be restrained. For a holy and pious meaning is pleasing to the holy angels. For God sees not after the way of time, neither does anything new take place in His vision and knowledge, when anything is done in time and transitorily, after the way in which such things affect the senses, whether the carnal senses of animals and men, or even the heavenly senses of the angels.
[12.7.11] In isto quippe manifesto sexu masculi et feminae apostolus Paulus occultioris cuiusdam rei figurasse mysterium vel hinc intellegi potest quod cum alio loco dicat veram viduam esse desolatam sine filiis et nepotibus, et tamen eam sperare debere in domino et persistere in orationibus nocte et die, hic dicat mulierem seductam in praeuaricatione factam saluam fieri per filiorum generationem et addidit: Si permanserint in fide et dilectione et sanctificatione cum sobrietate. Quasi vero possit obesse bonae viduae si vel filios non habuerit vel hi quos habuerit in bonis moribus permanere noluerint. Sed quia ea quae dicuntur opera bona tamquam filii sunt vitae nostrae secundum quam quaeritur cuius vitae sit quisque, id est quomodo agat haec temporalia, quam vitam graeci non *zoon* sed *bion* vocant, et haec opera bona maxime in officiis misericordiae frequentari solent (opera vero misericordiae nihil prosunt sive paganis sive iudaeis qui Christo non credunt sive quibusque haereticis vel schismaticis ubi fides et dilectio et sobria sanctificatio non invenitur), manifestum est quid apostolus significare voluerit, ideo figurate ac mystice quia de velando muliebri capite loquebatur, quod nisi ad aliquod secretum sacramenti referatur inane remanebit.	11. For that the Apostle Paul, when speaking outwardly of the sex of male and female, figured the mystery of some more hidden truth, may be understood from this, that when he says in another place that she is a widow indeed who is desolate, without children and nephews, and yet that she ought to trust in God, and to continue in prayers night and day, he here indicates, that the woman having been brought into the transgression by being deceived, is brought to salvation by child-bearing; and then he has added, If they continue in faith, and charity, and holiness, with sobriety. As if it could possibly hurt a good widow, if either she had not sons, or if those whom she had did not choose to continue in good works. But because those things which are called good works are, as it were, the sons of our life, according to that sense of life in which it answers to the question, What is a man's life? That is, How does he act in these temporal things? Which life the Greeks do not call ??? but ß???; and because these good works are chiefly performed in the way of offices of mercy, while works of mercy are of no profit, either to Pagans, or to Jews who do not believe in Christ, or to any heretics or schismstics whatsoever in whom faith and charity and sober holiness are not found: what the apostle meant to signify is plain, and in so far figuratively and mystically, because he was speaking of covering the head of the woman, which will remain mere empty words, unless referred to some hidden sacrament.
[12.7.12] Sicut enim non solum veracissima ratio sed etiam ipsius apostoli declarat auctoritas, non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem dei sed secundum rationalem mentem. Cogitatio quippe turpiter uana est quae opinatur deum membrorum corporalium lineamentis circumscribi atque definiri. Porro autem nonne idem beatus apostolus dicit: Renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem, eum qui secundum deum creatus est et alibi apertius: Exuentes vos, inquit, meterem hominem cum actibus eius induite nouum qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum? Si ergo spiritu mentis nostrae renouamur, et ipse est nouus homo qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, nulli dubium est non secundum corpus neque secundum quamlibet animi partem sed secundum rationalem mentem ubi potest esse agnitio dei hominem factum ad imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Secundum hanc autem renouationem efficimur etiam filii dei per baptismum Christi, et induentes nouum hominem Christum utique induimus per fidem. Quis est ergo qui ab hoc consortio feminas alienet cum sint nobiscum gratiae cohaeredes et alio loco idem apostolus dicat: Omnes enim filii dei estis per fidem in Christo Iesu. Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis Christum induistis. Non est iudaeus neque graecus, non est seruus neque liber, non est masculus et femina, omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Iesu? Numquidnam igitur fideles feminae sexum corporis amiserunt? Sed quia ibi renouantur ad imaginem dei ubi sexus nullus est, ibi factus est homo ad imaginem dei ubi sexus nullus est, hoc est in spiritu mentis suae. Cur ergo vir propterea non debet caput velare quia imago est et gloria dei, mulier autem debet quia gloria viri est, quasi mulier non renovetur spiritu mentis suae, qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum? Sed quia sexu corporis distat a viro, rite potuit in eius corporali velamento figurari pars illa rationis quae ad temporalia gubernanda deflectitur ut non maneat imago dei nisi ex qua parte mens hominis aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit, quam non solum masculos sed etiam feminas habere manifestum est.	12. For, as not only most true reason but also the authority of the apostle himself declares, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind. For the thought is a debased and empty one, which holds God to be circumscribed and limited by the lineaments of bodily members. But further, does not the same blessed apostle say, Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which is created after God; and in another place more clearly, Putting off the old man, he says, with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him? If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and he is the new man who is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him; no one can doubt, that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor indiscriminately according to any part of the mind, but according to the rational mind, wherein the knowledge of God can exist. And it is according to this renewal, also, that we are made sons of God by the baptism of Christ; and putting on the new man, certainly put on Christ through faith. Who is there, then, who will hold women to be alien from this fellowship, whereas they are fellow-heirs of grace with us; and whereas in another place the same apostle says, For you are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ: there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus? Pray, have faithful women then lost their bodily sex? But because they are there renewed after the image of God, where there is no sex; man is there made after the image of God, where there is no sex, that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why, then, is the man on that account not bound to cover his head, because he is the image and glory of God, while the woman is bound to do so, because she is the glory of the man; as though the woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, which spirit is renewed to the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created him? But because she differs from the man in bodily sex, it was possible rightly to represent under her bodily covering that part of the reason which is diverted to the government of temporal things; so that the image of God may remain on that side of the mind of man on which it cleaves to the beholding or the consulting of the eternal reasons of things; and this, it is clear, not men only, but also women have.
[12.7.13] Ergo in eorum mentibus communis natura cognoscitur; in eorum vero corporibus ipsius unius mentis distributio figuratur.	13. A common nature, therefore, is recognized in their minds, but in their bodies a division of that one mind itself is figured.
[12.8.13] Ascendentibus itaque introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes unde incipit aliquid occurrere quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio ubi iam homo interior possit agnosci. Qui etiam ipse si per illam rationem cui temporalium rerum administratio delegata est immoderato progressu nimis in exteriora prolabitur consentiente sibi capite suo, id est non eam cohibente atque refrenante illa quae in specula consilii praesidet quasi virili portione, inveteratur inter inimicos suos virtutis inuidos daemones cum suo principe diabolo, aeternorumque illa visio ab ipso etiam capite cum coniuge uetitum manducante subtrahitur ut lumen oculorum eius non sit cum illo, ac sic ab illa inlustratione veritatis ambo nudati, atque apertis oculis conscientiae ad videndum quam inhonesti atque indecori remanserint tamquam folia dulcium fructuum sed sine ipsis fructibus, ita sine fructu boni operis bona verba contexunt ut male viventes quasi bene loquendo contegant turpitudinem suam.	As we ascend, then, by certain steps of thought within, along the succession of the parts of the mind, there where something first meets us which is not common to ourselves with the beasts reason begins, so that here the inner man can now be recognized. And if this inner man himself, through that reason to which the administering of things temporal has been delegated, slips on too far by over-much progress into outward things, that which is his head moreover consenting, that is, the (so to call it) masculine part which presides in the watchtower of counsel not restraining or bridling it: then he waxes old because of all his enemies, viz. the demons with their prince the devil, who are envious of virtue; and that vision of eternal things is withdrawn also from the head himself, eating with his spouse that which was forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is gone from him; and so both being naked from that enlightenment of truth, and with the eyes of their conscience opened to behold how they were left shameful and unseemly, like the leaves of sweet fruits, but without the fruits themselves, they so weave together good words without the fruit of good works, as while living wickedly to cover over their disgrace as it were by speaking well.
[12.9.14] Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima a communi universo ad privatam partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in universitate creaturae deum rectorem secuta legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid universo appetens atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius universitate, in curam partilem truditur et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et auaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum; totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges quibus universitas administratur agere nititur per corpus proprium gerit quod partiliter possidet, atque ita formis et motibus corporalibus delectata, quia intus ea secum non habet, cum eorum imaginibus quas memoriae fixit inuoluitur et phantastica fornicatione turpiter inquinatur omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut coenoso gurgite carnalis voluptatis immergitur.	14. For the soul loving its own power, slips onwards from the whole which is common, to a part, which belongs especially to itself. And that apostatizing pride, which is called the beginning of sin, whereas it might have been most excellently governed by the laws of God, if it had followed Him as its ruler in the universal creature, by seeking something more than the whole, and struggling to govern this by a law of its own, is thrust on, since nothing is more than the whole, into caring for a part; and thus by lusting after something more, is made less; whence also covetousness is called the root of all evil. And it administers that whole, wherein it strives to do something of its own against the laws by which the whole is governed, by its own body, which it possesses only in part; and so being delighted by corporeal forms and motions, because it has not the things themselves within itself, and because it is wrapped up in their images, which it has fixed in the memory, and is foully polluted by fornication of the phantasy, while it refers all its functions to those ends, for which it curiously seeks corporeal and temporal things through the senses of the body, either it affects with swelling arrogance to be more excellent than other souls that are given up to the corporeal senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of carnal pleasure.
[12.10.15] Cum ergo bona voluntate ad interiora ac superiora percipienda quae non privatim sed communiter ab omnibus qui talia diligunt sine ulla angustia vel inuidia casto possidentur amplexu vel sibi vel aliis consulit, etsi fallatur in aliquo per ignorantiam temporalium quia et hoc temporaliter gerit et modum agendi non teneat quem debebat, humana temptatio est. Et magnum est hanc vitam sic degere quam velut viam redeuntes carpimus ut temptatio nos non apprehendat nisi humana. Hoc enim peccatum extra corpus est nec fornicationi deputatur, et propterea facillime ignoscitur. Cum vero propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur propter experiendi vel excellendi vel contrectandi cupiditatem ut in his finem boni sui ponat aliquid agit, quidquid agit turpiter agit, et fornicatur in corpus proprium peccans, et corporearum rerum fallacia simulacra introrsus rapiens et uana meditatione componens ut ei nec divinum aliquid nisi tale videatur, privatim auara fetatur erroribus et privatim prodiga inanitur viribus. Nec ad tam turpem et miserabilem fornicationem semel ab exordio prosiliret, sed sicut scriptum est: Qui modica spernit paulatim decidet.	15. When the soul then consults either for itself or for others with a good will towards perceiving the inner and higher things, such as are possessed in a chaste embrace, without any narrowness or envy, not individually, but in common by all who love such things; then even if it be deceived in anything, through ignorance of things temporal (for its action in this case is a temporal one), and if it does not hold fast to that mode of acting which it ought, the temptation is but one common to man. And it is a great thing so to pass through this life, on which we travel, as it were, like a road on our return home, that no temptation may take us, but what is common to man. For this is a sin, without the body, and must not be reckoned fornication, and on that account is very easily pardoned. But when the soul does anything in order to attain those things which are perceived through the body, through lust of proving or of surpassing or of handling them, in order that it may place in them its final good, then whatever it does, it does wickedly, and commits fornication, sinning against its own body: and while snatching from within the deceitful images of corporeal things, and combining them by vain thought, so that nothing seems to it to be divine, unless it be of such a kind as this; by selfish greediness it is made fruitful in errors, and by selfish prodigality it is emptied of strength. Yet it would not leap on at once from the commencement to such shameless and miserable fornication, but, as it is written, He that despises small things, shall fall little by little.
[12.11.16] Quomodo enim coluber non apertis passibus sed squamarum minutissimis nisibus repit, sic lubricus deficiendi motus neglegentes minutatim occupat, et incipiens a peruerso appetitu similitudinis dei pervenit ad similitudinem pecorum. Inde est quod nudati stola prima pelliceas tunicas mortalitate meruerunt. Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo dei quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur. Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur deo quanto minus diligitur proprium. Cupiditate vero experiendae potestatis suae quodam nutu suo ad se ipsum tamquam ad medium proruit. Ita cum vult esse sicut ille sub nullo, et ab ipsa sui medietate poenaliter ad ima propellitur, id est ad ea quibus pecora laetantur; atque ita cum sit honor eius similitudo dei, dedecus autem eius similitudo pecoris: Homo in honore positus non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insensatis et similis factus est eis. Qua igitur tam longe transiret a summis ad infima nisi per medium sui? Cum enim neglecta caritate sapientiae quae semper eodem modo manet concupiscitur scientia ex mutabilium temporaliumque experimento, inflat non aedificat; ita praegrauatus animus quasi pondere suo a beatitudine expellitur, et per illud suae medietatis experimentum poena sua discit quid intersit inter bonum desertum malumque commissum, nec redire potest effusis ac perditis viribus nisi gratia conditoris sui ad poenitentiam vocantis et peccata donantis. Quis enim infelicem animam liberabit a corpore mortis huius nisi gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum? De qua gratia suo loco quando ipse praestiterit disseremus.	16. For as a snake does not creep on with open steps, but advances by the very minutest efforts of its several scales; so the slippery motion of falling away [from what is good] takes possession of the negligent only gradually, and beginning from a perverse desire for the likeness of God, arrives in the end at the likeness of beasts. Hence it is that being naked of their first garment, they earned by mortality coats of skins. For the true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in relation to Him by whom it is impressed. The less therefore that one loves what is one's own, the more one cleaves to God. But through the desire of making trial of his own power, man by his own bidding falls down to himself as to a sort of intermediate grade. And so, while he wishes to be as God is, that is, under no one, he is thrust on, even from his own middle grade, by way of punishment, to that which is lowest, that is, to those things in which beasts delight: and thus, while his honor is the likeness of God, but his dishonor is the likeness of the beast, Man being in honor abides not: he is compared to the beasts that are foolish, and is made like to them. By what path, then, could he pass so great a distance from the highest to the lowest, except through his own intermediate grade? For when he neglects the love of wisdom, which remains always after the same fashion, and lusts after knowledge by experiment upon things temporal and mutable, that knowledge puffs up, it does not edify: so the mind is overweighed and thrust out, as it were, by its own weight from blessedness; and learns by its own punishment, through that trial of its own intermediateness, what the difference is between the good it has abandoned and the bad to which it has committed itself; and having thrown away and destroyed its strength, it cannot return, unless by the grace of its Maker calling it to repentance, and forgiving its sins. For who will deliver the unhappy soul from the body of this death, unless the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? of which grace we will discourse in its place, so far as He Himself enables us.
[12.12.17] Nunc de illa parte rationis ad quam pertinet scientia, id est cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium nauandis vitae huius actionibus necessaria, susceptam considerationem quantum dominus adivuat peragamus. Sicut enim in illo manifesto coniugio duorum hominum qui primi facti sunt non manducavit serpens de arbore uetita sed tantummodo manducandum persuasit, mulier autem non manducavit sola sed viro suo dedit et simul manducaverunt, quamvis cum serpente sola locuta et ab eo sola seducta sit, ita et in hoc quod etiam in homine uno geritur et dinoscitur, occulto quodam secretoque coniugio carnalis, vel ut ita dicam qui in corporis sensus intenditur sensualis animae motus, qui nobis pecoribusque communis est, seclusus est a ratione sapientiae. Sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur; aeterna vero et incommutabilia spiritalia ratione sapientiae intelleguntur. Rationi autem scientiae appetitus vicinus est quandoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur ratiocinatur ea quae scientia dicitur actionis, si bene ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi boni; si autem male ut eis fruatur tamquam bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine conquiescat. Cum ergo huic intentioni mentis quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus propter actionis officium ratiocinandi vivacitate versatur carnalis ille sensus vel animalis ingerit quandam inlecebram fruendi sc, id est tamquam bono quodam privato et proprio non tamquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc velut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem inlecebrae consentire de ligno prohibito manducare est. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris vero auctoritate consilii ita membra retinentur ut non exhibeantur iniquitatis arma peccato, sic habendum existimo velut cibum uetitum mulier sola comederit. Si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum ut si potestas sit etiam corpore compleatur, intellegenda est illa mulier dedisse viro suo secum simul edendum inlicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suaviter verum etiam efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni nisi et illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi malae actioni cedat et seruiat.	17. Let us now complete, so far as the Lord helps us, the discussion which we have undertaken, respecting that part of reason to which knowledge belongs, that is, the cognizance of things temporal and changeable, which is necessary for managing the affairs of this life. For as in the case of that visible wedlock of the two human beings who were made first, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded them to eat of it; and the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they eat together; although she alone spoke with the serpent, and she alone was led away by him: so also in the case of that hidden and secret kind of wedlock, which is transacted and discerned in a single human being, the carnal, or as I may say, since it is directed to the senses of the body, the sensuous movement of the soul, which is common to us with beasts, is shut off from the reason of wisdom. For certainly bodily things are perceived by the sense of the body; but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. But the reason of knowledge has appetite very near to it: seeing that what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons concerning the bodily things which are perceived by the bodily sense; if well, in order that it may refer that knowledge to the end of the chief good; but if ill, in order that it may enjoy them as being such good things as those wherein it reposes with a false blessedness. Whenever, then, that carnal or animal sense introduces into this purpose of the mind which is conversant about things temporal and corporeal, with a view to the offices of a man's actions, by the living force of reason, some inducement to enjoy itself, that is, to enjoy itself as if it were some private good of its own, not as the public and common, which is the unchangeable, good; then, as it were, the serpent discourses with the woman. And to consent to this allurement, is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, but the members are so restrained by the authority of higher counsel that they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; this, I think, is to be considered as if the woman alone should have eaten the forbidden food. But if, in this consent to use wickedly the things which are perceived through the senses of the body, any sin at all is so determined upon, that if there is the power it is also fulfilled by the body; then that woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband with her, to be eaten together. For it is not possible for the mind to determine that a sin is not only to be thought of with pleasure, but also to be effectually committed, unless also that intention of the mind yields, and serves the bad action, with which rests the chief power of applying the members to an outward act, or of restraining them from one.
[12.12.18] Nec sane cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur inlicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et voluens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est pectusque percutiendum atque dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, faciendumque quod sequitur atque in oratione iungendum: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris. Neque enim sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset inlicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur; ita dici potest in homine uno si delectationibus inlicitis a quibus se continuo deberet avertere cogitatio libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala sed tantum suaviter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine viro posse damnari. Absit hoc credere. Haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata per mediatoris gratiam remittantur.	18. And yet, certainly, when the mind is pleased in thought alone with unlawful things, while not indeed determining that they are to be done, but yet holding and pondering gladly things which ought to have been rejected the very moment they touched the mind, it cannot be denied to be a sin, but far less than if it were also determined to accomplished it in outward act. And therefore pardon must be sought for such thoughts too, and the breast must be smitten, and it must be said, Forgive us our debts; and what follows must be done, and must be joined in our prayer, As we also forgive our debtors. For it is not as it was with those two first human beings, of which each one bare his own person; and so, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she certainly alone would have been smitten with the punishment of death: it cannot, I say, be so said also in the case of a single human being now, that if the thought, remaining alone, be gladly fed with unlawful pleasures, from which it ought to turn away directly, while yet there is no determination that the bad actions are to be done, but only that they are retained with pleasure in remembrance, the woman as it were can be condemned without the man. Far be it from us to believe this. For here is one person, one human being, and he as a whole will be condemned, unless those things which, as lacking the will to do, and yet having the will to please the mind with them, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator.
[12.12.19] Haec itaque disputatio qua in mente uniuscuiusque hominis quaesivimus quoddam rationale coniugium contemplationis et actionis, officiis per quaedam singula distributis tamen in utroque mentis unitate servata, salua illius veritatis historia quam de duobus primis hominibus, viro scilicet eiusque muliere de quibus propagatum est genus humanum, divina tradit auctoritas ad hoc tantummodo audienda est ut intellegatur apostolus imaginem dei viro tantum tribuendo non etiam feminae, quamvis in diverso sexu duorum hominum aliquid tamen significare voluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur.	19. This reasoning, then, whereby we have sought in the mind of each several human being a certain rational wedlock of contemplation and action, with functions distributed through each severally, yet with the unity of the mind preserved in both; saving meanwhile the truth of that history which divine testimony hands down respecting the first two human beings, that is, the man and his wife, from whom the human species is propagated; — this reasoning, I say, must be listened to only thus far, that the apostle may be understood to have intended to signify something to be sought in one individual man, by assigning the image of God to the man only, and not also to the woman, although in the merely different sex of two human beings.
[12.13.20] Nec me fugit quosdam qui fuerunt ante nos egregii defensores catholicae fidei et divini eloquii tractatores cum in homine uno cuius universam animam bonam quendam paradisum esse senserunt duo ista requirerent, virum mentem, mulierem vero dixisse corporis sensum. Et secundum hanc autem distributionem qua vir ponitur mens, sensus vero corporis mulier, videntur apte omnia convenire si considerata tractentur nisi quod in omnibus bestiis et volatilibus scriptum est non esse inventum viro adiutorium simile illi et tunc est ei mulier facta de latere. Propter quod ego non putavi pro muliere sensum corporis esse ponendum quem videmus nobis et bestiis esse communem, sed aliquid volui quod bestiae non haberent, sensumque corporis magis pro serpente intellegendum existimavi qui legitur sapientior omnibus pecoribus terrae. In eis quippe naturalibus bonis quae nobis et inrationabilibus animantibus videmus esse communia vivacitate quadam sensus excellit, non ille de quo scriptum est in epistula quae est ad hebraeos ubi legitur perfectorum esse solidum cibum qui per habitum exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo (illi quippe sensus naturae rationalis sunt ad intellegentiam pertinentes), sed iste sensus qui est quinquepertitus in corpore per quem non solum a nobis verum etiam a bestiis corporalis species motusque sentitur.	20. Nor does it escape me, that some who before us were eminent defenders of the Catholic faith and expounders of the word of God, while they looked for these two things in one human being, whose entire soul they perceived to be a sort of excellent paradise, asserted that the man was the mind, but that the woman was the bodily sense. And according to this distribution, by which the man is assumed to be the mind, but the woman the bodily sense, all things seem aptly to agree together if they are handled with due attention: unless that it is written, that in all the beasts and flying things there was not found for man an helpmate like to himself; and then the woman was made out of his side. And on this account I, for my part, have not thought that the bodily sense should be taken for the woman, which we see to be common to ourselves and to the beasts; but I have desired to find something which the beasts had not; and I have rather thought the bodily sense should be understood to be the serpent, whom we read to have been more subtle than all beasts of the field. For in those natural good things which we see are common to ourselves and to the irrational animals, the sense excels by a kind of living power; not the sense of which it is written in the epistle addressed to the Hebrews, where we read, that strong meat belongs to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil; for these senses belong to the rational nature and pertain to the understanding; but that sense which is divided into five parts in the body, through which corporeal species and motion is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by the beasts.
[12.13.21] Sed sive isto sive illo sive aliquo alio modo accipiendum sit quod apostolus virum dixit imaginem et gloriam dei mulierem autem gloriam viri, apparet tamen cum secundum deum vivimus, mentem nostram in inuisibilia eius intentam ex eius aeternitate, veritate, caritate proficienter debere formari, quiddam vero rationalis intentionis nostrae, hoc est eiusdem mentis, in usum mutabilium corporaliumque rerum sine quo haec vita non agitur dirigendum, non ut conformetur huic saeculo finem constituendo in bonis talibus et in ea detorquendo beatitudinis appetitum, sed ut quidquid in usu temporalium rationabiliter facimus aeternorum adipiscendorum contemplatione faciamus per ista transeuntes, illis inhaerentes.	21. But whether that the apostle calls the man the image and glory of God, but the woman the glory of the man, is to be received in this, or that, or in any other way; yet it is clear, that when we live according to God, our mind which is intent on the invisible things of Him ought to be fashioned with proficiency from His eternity, truth, charity; but that something of our own rational purpose, that is, of the same mind, must be directed to the using of changeable and corporeal things, without which this life does not go on; not that we may be conformed to this world, by placing our end in such good things, and by forcing the desire of blessedness towards them, but that whatever we do rationally in the using of temporal things, we may do it with the contemplation of attaining eternal things, passing through the former, but cleaving to the latter.
[12.14.21] Habet enim et scientia modum suum bonum si quod in ea inflat vel inflare assolet aeternorum caritate vincatur quae non inflat sed, ut scimus, aedificat. Sine scientia quippe nec virtutes ipsae quibus recte vivitur possunt haberi per quas haec vita misera sic gubernetur ut ad illam quae vere beata est perveniatur aeternam.	For knowledge also has its own good measure, if that in it which puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is conquered by love of eternal things, which does not puff up, but, as we know, edifies. Certainly without knowledge the virtues themselves, by which one lives rightly, cannot be possessed, by which this miserable life may be so governed, that we may attain to that eternal life which is truly blessed.
[12.14.22] Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. Quamvis enim et illa quae sapientia est possit scientia nuncupari sicut et apostolus loquitur ubi dicit: Nunc scio ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum quam scientiam profecto contemplationis dei vult intellegi quod sanctorum summum erit praemium; tamen ubi dicit: Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum haec utique duo sine dubitatione distinguit, licet non ibi explicet quid intersit et unde possit utrumque dinosci. Verum scripturarum sanctarum multiplicem copiam scrutatus invenio scriptum esse in libro Iob eodem sancto viro loquente: Ecce pietas est sapientia, abstinere autem a malis scientia est. In hac differentia intellegendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere. 'Pietatem' quippe hoc loco posuit 'dei cultum,' quae graece dicitur *theosebeia*; nam hoc verbum habet ista sententia in codicibus graecis. Et quid est in aeternis excellentius quam deus cuius solius immutabilis est natura? Et quis cultus eius nisi amor eius quo nunc desideramus eum videre credimusque et speramus nos esse visuros, et quantum proficimus videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem 'in manifestatione'? Hoc est enim quod ait apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem; hoc etiam quod Iohannes: Dilectissimi, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus. Scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. De his atque huiusmodi sermo ipse mihi videtur esse sermo sapientiae. Abstinere autem a malis quam Iob scientiam dixit esse rerum procul dubio temporalium est quoniam secundum tempus in malis sumus, a quibus abstinere debemus ut ad illa bona aeterna veniamus. Quamobrem quidquid prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste agimus ad eam pertinet scientiam sive disciplinam qua in evitandis malis bonisque appetendis actio nostra versatur, et quidquid propter exempla vel cavenda vel imitanda et propter quarumque rerum quae nostris adcommodata sunt usibus necessaria documenta historica cognitione colligimus.	22. Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to knowledge. For although that which is wisdom can also be called knowledge, as the apostle too speaks, where he says, Now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known; when doubtless he meant his words to be understood of the knowledge of the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints; yet where he says, For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit, certainly he distinguishes without doubt these two things, although he does not there explain the difference, nor in what way one may be discerned from the other. But having examined a great number of passages from the Holy Scriptures, I find it written in the Book of Job, that holy man being the speaker, Behold, piety, that is wisdom; but to depart from evil is knowledge. In thus distinguishing, it must be understood that wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he meant by piety the worship of God, which in Greek is called ?e?s?ße?a . For the sentence in the Greek mss. has that word. And what is there in eternal things more excellent than God, of whom alone the nature is unchangeable? And what is the worship of Him except the love of Him, by which we now desire to see Him, and we believe and hope that we shall see Him; and in proportion as we make progress, see now through a glass in an enigma, but then in clearness? For this is what the Apostle Paul means by face to face. This is also what John says, Beloved, now we are the sons of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. Discourse about these and the like subjects seems to me to be the discourse itself of wisdom. But to depart from evil, which Job says is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things. Since it is in reference to time [and this world] that we are in evil, from which we ought to abstain that we may come to those good eternal things. And therefore, whatsoever we do prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, belongs to that knowledge or discipline wherewith our action is conversant in avoiding evil and desiring good; and so also, whatsoever we gather by the knowledge that comes from inquiry, in the way of examples either to be guarded against or to be imitated, and in the way of necessary proofs respecting any subject, accommodated to our use.
[12.14.23] De his ergo sermo cum fit, eum scientiae sermonem puto discernendum a sermone sapientiae ad quam pertinent ea quae nec fuerunt nec futura sunt sed sunt, et propter eam aeternitatem in qua sunt et fuisse et esse et futura esse dicuntur sine ulla mutabilitate temporum. Non enim sic fuerunt ut esse desinerent aut sic futura sunt quasi nunc non sint, sed idipsum esse semper habuerunt, semper habitura sunt. Manent autem non tamquam in spatiis locorum fixa veluti corpora, sed in natura incorporali sic intellegibilia praesto sunt mentis aspectibus sicut ista in locis visibilia vel contrectabilia corporis sensibus. Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intellegibiles incorporalesque rationes, verum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie pervenire paucorum est, et cum pervenitur quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse peruentor, sed veluti acies ipsa reuerberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio. Quae tamen cogitatio transiens per disciplinas quibus eruditur animus memoriae commendatur ut sit quo redire possit quae cogitur inde transire, quamvis si ad memoriam cogitatio non rediret atque ibi quod commendaverat inveniret, velut rudis ad hoc sicut ducta fuerat duceretur idque inveniret ubi primum invenerat, in illa incorporea veritate unde rursus quasi descriptum in memoria figeretur. Neque enim sicut manet verbi gratia quadrati corporis incorporalis et immutabilis ratio sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio, si tamen ad eam sine phantasia spatii localis potuit pervenire. Aut si alicuius artificiosi et musici soni per moras temporis transeuntis numerositas comprehendatur sine tempore stans in quodam secreto altoque silentio, tamdiu saltem cogitari potest quamdiu potest ille cantus audiri; tamen quod inde rapuerit etsi transiens mentis aspectus et quasi glutiens in ventre ita in memoria reposuerit, poterit recordando quodam modo ruminare et in disciplinam quod sic didicerit traicere. Quod si fuerit omnimoda oblivione deletum, rursus doctrina duce ad id venietur quod penitus exciderat et sic invenietur ut erat.	23. When a discourse then relates to these things, I hold it to be a discourse belonging to knowledge, and to be distinguished from a discourse belonging to wisdom, to which those things belong, which neither have been, nor shall be, but are; and on account of that eternity in which they are, are said to have been, and to be, and to be about to be, without any changeableness of times. For neither have they been in such way as that they should cease to be, nor are they about to be in such way as if they were not now; but they have always had and always will have that very absolute being. And they abide, but not as if fixed in some place as are bodies; but as intelligible things in incorporeal nature, they are so at hand to the glance of the mind, as things visible or tangible in place are to the sense of the body. And not only in the case of sensible things posited in place, there abide also intelligible and incorporeal reasons of them apart from local space; but also of motions that pass by in successive times, apart from any transit in time, there stand also like reasons, themselves certainly intelligible, and not sensible. And to attain to these with the eye of the mind is the lot of few; and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to them does not abide in them, but is as it were repelled by the rebounding of the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a thing not transitory. And yet this transient thought is committed to the memory through the instructions by which the mind is taught; that the mind which is compelled to pass from thence, may be able to return there again; although, if the thought should not return to the memory and find there what it had committed to it, it would be led thereto like an uninstructed person, as it had been led before, and would find it where it had first found it, that is to say, in that incorporeal truth, whence yet once more it may be as it were written down and fixed in the mind. For the thought of man, for example, does not so abide in that incorporeal and unchangeable reason of a square body, as that reason itself abides: if, to be sure, it could attain to it at all without the phantasy of local space. Or if one were to apprehend the rhythm of any artificial or musical sound, passing through certain intervals of time, as it rested without time in some secret and deep silence, it could at least be thought as long as that song could be heard; yet what the glance of the mind, transient though it was, caught from thence, and, absorbing as it were into a belly, so laid up in the memory, over this it will be able to rumiuate in some measure by recollection, and to transfer what it has thus learned into systematic knowledge. But if this has been blotted out by absolute forgetfulness, yet once again, under the guidance of teaching, one will come to that which had altogether dropped away, and it will be found such as it was.
[12.15.24] Unde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est vixisse hic animas hominum et antequam ista corpora gererent, et hinc esse quod ea quae discuntur reminiscuntur potius cognita quam cognoscuntur noua. Retulit enim puerum quendam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum sic respondisse tamquam esset illius peritissimus disciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose interrogatus videbat quod videndum erat dicebatque quod viderat. Sed si recordatio haec esset rerum antea cognitarum, non utique omnes vel pene omnes cum illo modo interrogarentur hoc possent, non enim omnes in priore vita geometrae fuerunt cum tam rari sint in genere humano ut vix possit aliquis inveniri. Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam ut rebus intellegibilibus naturali ordine disponente conditore subiuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. Non enim et ipse ideo sine magistro alba et nigra discernit quia ista iam noverat antequam in hac carne crearetur. Denique cur de solis rebus intellegibilibus id fieri potest ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat quod ad quamque pertinet disciplinam etiamsi eius ignarus est? Cur hoc facere de rebus sensibilibus nullus potest nisi quas isto vidit in corpore constitutus aut eis qui noverant indicantibus credidit seu litteris cuiusque seu verbis? Non enim adquiescendum est eis qui samium Pythagoram ferunt recordatum fuisse talia nonnulla quae fuerat expertus cum hic alio iam fuisset in corpore et alios nonnullos narrant alii eiusmodi aliquid in suis mentibus passos. Quas falsas fuisse memorias quales plerumque experimur in somnis quando nobis videmur reminisci quasi egerimus aut viderimus quod nec egimus omnino nec vidimus, et eo modo affectas esse illorum mentes etiam vigilantium instinctu spirituum malignorum atque fallacium quibus curae est de reu olutionibus animarum falsam opinion em ad decipiendos homines firmare vel serere, ex hoc conici potest quia si vere illa recordarentur quae hic in aliis antea positi corporibus viderant, multis ac pene omnibus id contingeret quandoquidem ut de vivis mortuos, ita de mortuis vivos tamquam de vigilantib us dormientes et de dormi en tibu s vigilantes sine cessatione fieri suspicantur.	24. And hence that noble philosopher Plato endeavored to persuade us that the souls of men lived even before they bare these bodies; and that hence those things which are learned are rather remembered, as having been known already, than taken into knowledge as things new. For he has told us that a boy, when questioned I know not what respecting geometry, replied as if he were perfectly skilled in that branch of learning. For being questioned step by step and skillfully, he saw what was to be seen, and said that which he saw. But if this had been a recollecting of things previously known, then certainly every one, or almost every one, would not have been able so to answer when questioned. For not every one was a geometrician in the former life, since geometricians are so few among men that scarcely one can be found anywhere. But we ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things, which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of an unique kind; as the eye of the flesh sees things adjacent to itself in this bodily light, of which light it is made to be receptive, and adapted to it. For none the more does this fleshly eye, too, distinguish black things from white without a teacher, because it had already known them before it was created in this flesh. Why, lastly, is it possible only in intelligible things that any one properly questioned should answer according to any branch of learning, although ignorant of it? Why can no one do this with things sensible, except those which he has seen in this his present body, or has believed the information of others who knew them, whether somebody's writings or words? For we must not acquiesce in their story, who assert that the Samian Pythagoras recollected some things of this kind, which he had experienced when he was previously here in another body; and others tell yet of others, that they experienced something of the same sort in their minds: but it may be conjectured that these were untrue recollections, such as we commonly experience in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done or seen it, what we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these persons, even though awake, were affected in this way at the suggestion of malignant and deceitful spirits, whose care it is to confirm or to sow some false belief concerning the changes of souls, in order to deceive men. This, I say, may be conjectured from this, that if they really remembered those things which they had seen here before, while occupying other bodies, the same thing would happen to many, nay to almost all; since they suppose that as the dead from the living, so, without cessation and continually, the living are coming into existence from the dead; as sleepers from those that are awake, and those that are awake from them that sleep.
[12.15.25] Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis, ad scientiam vero temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis, quid cui praeponendum sive postponendum sit non est difficile iudicare. Si autem alia est adhibenda discretio qua dinoscantur haec duo quae procul dubio distare apostolus docet dicens: Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, tamen etiam istorum duorum quae nos posuimus evidentissima differentia est quod alia sit intellectualis cognitio aeternarum rerum, alia rationalis temporalium, et huic illam praeferendam esse ambigit nemo. Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae exterioris sunt hominis et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intellegebilium atquesummarum quae sempiternae sunt veniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis occurrit. Etiam in hac igitur inveniamus si possumus aliquam trinitatem sicut inveniebamus in sensibus corporis et in his quae per eos in animam vel spiritum nostrum imaginaliter intraverunt, ut pro corporalibus rebus quas corporeo foris positas attingimus sensu intus corporum similitudines haberemus impressas memoriae ex quibus cogitatio formaretur tertia voluntate utrumque iungente, sicut formabatur foris acies oculorum, quam voluntas ut visio fieret adhibebat rei visibili et utrumque iungebat etiam illic ipsa se admovens tertiam. Sed non est hoc coartandum in hunc librum ut in eo qui sequitur si deus adivuerit convenienter possit inquiri et quod inventum fuerit explicari.	25. If therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge, it is not difficult to judge which is to be preferred or postponed to which. But if we must employ some other distinction by which to know these two apart, which without doubt the apostle teaches us are different, saying, To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit: still the difference between those two which we have laid down is a most evident one, in that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things is one thing, the rational cognizance of temporal things another; and no one doubts but that the former is to be preferred to the latter. As then we leave behind those things which belong to the outer man, and desire to ascend within from those things which we have in common with beasts, before we come to the cognizance of things intelligible and supreme, which are eternal, the rational cognizance of temporal things presents itself. Let us then find a trinity in this also, if we can, as we found one in the senses of the body, and in those things which through them entered in the way of images into our soul or spirit; so that instead of corporeal things which we touch by corporeal sense, placed as they are without us, we might have resemblances of bodies impressed within on the memory from which thought might be formed, while the will as a third united them; just as the sight of the eyes was formed from without, which the will applied to the visible thing in order to produce vision, and united both, while itself also added itself thereto as a third. But this subject must not be compressed into this book; so that in that which follows, if God help, it may be suitably examined, and the conclusions to which we come may be unfolded.	}