Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book XIII

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK XIII

• 13.1 De gemino rationalis mentis officio quorum unum ad temporalia, aliud pertinet ad aeterna. Chapter 1.— The Attempt is Made to Distinguish Out of the Scriptures the Offices of Wisdom and of Knowledge. That in the Beginning of John Some Things that are Said Belong to Wisdom, Some to Knowledge. Some Things There are Only Known by the Help of Faith. How We See the Faith that is in Us. In the Same Narrative of John, Some Things are Known by the Sense of the Body, Others Only by the Reason of the Mind.
• 13.2 De fide quae licet per corporis sensum mente concepta sit, nihil tamen invenitur habere corporeum. Chapter 2.— Faith a Thing of the Heart, Not of the Body; How It is Common and One and the Same in All Believers. The Faith of Believers is One, No Otherwise than the Will of Those Who Will is One.
• 13.3 De voluntate quam et singuli propriam et omnes etiam non indicatam possum habere communem. Chapter 3.— Some Desires Being the Same in All, are Known to Each. The Poet Ennius.
• 13.4 De beatitudine quam omnes una voluntate expetunt sed non eadem omnes definitione noverunt. Chapter 4.— The Will to Possess Blessedness is One in All, But the Variety of Wills is Very Great Concerning that Blessedness Itself.
• 13.5 An omnes beati sint qui vivunt ut volunt. Chapter 5.— Of the Same Thing.
• 13.6 Propiorem esse beatitudini voluntatem rectam etiam non adeptam quod cupit quam prauam etiam si quod concupivit obtinuit. Chapter 6.— Why, When All Will to Be Blessed, that is Rather Chosen by Which One Withdraws from Being So.
• 13.7 Ad veram beatitudinem viam esse per fidem rectam sine qua nulla cuiquam possit fortitudo prodesse. Chapter 7.— Faith is Necessary, that Man May at Some Time Be Blessed, Which He Will Only Attain in the Future Life. The Blessedness of Proud Philosophers Ridiculous and Pitiable.
• 13.8 Perfectam beatitudinem nisi in aeterna vita esse non posse. Chapter 8.— Blessedness Cannot Exist Without Immortality.
• 13.9 An aeternitatis capax sit humana natura. Chapter 9.— We Say that Future Blessedness is Truly Eternal, Not Through Human Reasonings, But by the Help of Faith. The Immortality of Blessedness Becomes Credible from the Incarnation of the Son of God.
• 13.10 An alio modo omnipotens deus hominem aeternitati debuerit reformare quam ut sibi dei filius naturam uniret humanam. Chapter 10.— There Was No Other More Suitable Way of Freeing Man from the Misery of Mortality Than The Incarnation of the Word. The Merits Which are Called Ours are the Gifts of God.
• 13.11 Qua ratione in sanguine Christi iustificentur credentes, et quomodo in hoc sacramento totius sit trinitatis operatio. Chapter 11.— A Difficulty, How We are Justitified in the Blood of the Son of God.
• 13.12 Quo merito homo diabolicae sit traditus potestati. Chapter 12.— All, on Account of the Sin of Adam, Were Delivered into the Power of the Devil.
• 13.13 De consilio dei quo ei placuit ut potestas diaboli non potentia sed iustitia vinceretur. Chapter 13.— Man Was to Be Rescued from the Power of the Devil, Not by Power, But by Righteousness.
• 13.14 De omnium debito per nihil debentem Christum soluto. Chapter 14.— The Unobligated Death of Christ Has Freed Those Who Were Liable to Death.
• 13.15 In quo sit diabolus victus a Christo. Chapter 15.— Of the Same Subject.
• 13.16 Ad quam utilitatem fidelium renatorum male quae per originale peccatum sunt contracta conversa sint. Chapter 16.— The Remains of Death and the Evil Things of the World Turn to Good for the Elect. How Fitly the Death of Christ Was Chosen, that We Might Be Justified in His Blood. What the Anger of God is.
• 13.17 De his quae per incarnationem Christi sunt conlata credentibus. Chapter 17.— Other Advantages of the Incarnation.
• 13.18 De nativitate domini ex Maria virgine et spiritu sancto. Chapter 18.— Why the Son of God Took Man Upon Himself from the Race of Adam, and from a Virgin.
• 13.19 Quod verbum caro factum quod est Iesus Christus et sapientiae thesauros in se habeas et scientiae. Chapter 19.— What in the Incarnate Word Belongs to Knowledge, What to Wisdom.
• 13.20 Neminem posse sine fide ad veram beatitudinem pervenire. Chapter 20.— What Has Been Treated of in This Book. How We Have Reached by Steps to a Certain Trinity, Which is Found in Practical Knowledge and True Faith.

Latin	Latin
LIBER XIII	On the Trinity (Book XIII)
	The inquiry is prosecuted respecting knowledge, in which, as distinguished from wisdom, Augustine had begun in the former book to look for a kind of trinity. And occasion is taken of commending Christian faith, and of explaining how the faith of believers is one and common. Next, that all desire blessedness, yet that all have not the faith whereby we arrive at blessedness; and that this faith is defined in Christ, who in the flesh rose from the dead; and that no one is set free from the dominion of the devil through forgiveness of sins, save through Him. It is shown also at length that it was needful that the devil should be conquered by Christ, not by power, but by righteousness. Finally, that when the words of this faith are committed to memory, there is in the mind a kind of trinity, since there are, first, in the memory the sounds of the words, and this even when the man is not thinking of them; and next, the mind's eye of his recollection is formed thereupon when he thinks of them; and, lastly, the will, when he so thinks and remembers, combines both.
[13.1.1] In libro superiore huius operis duodecimo satis egimus discernere rationalis mentis officium in temporalibus rebus, ubi non sola cognitio verum et actio nostra versatur, ab excellentiore eiusdem mentis officio quod contemplandis aeternis rebus impenditur ac sola cognitione finitur. Commodius autem fieri puto ut de scripturis sanctis aliquid interseram quo facilius possit utrumque dinosci.	1. In the book before this, viz. the twelfth of this work, we have done enough to distinguish the office of the rational mind in temporal things, wherein not only our knowing but our action is concerned, from the more excellent office of the same mind, which is employed in contemplating eternal things, and is limited to knowing alone. But I think it more convenient that I should insert somewhat out of the Holy Scriptures, by which the two may more easily be distinguished.
[13.1.2] Euangelium suum Iohannes euangelista sic orsus est: In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud deum, et deus erat verbum, hoc erat in principio apud deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Fuit homo missus a deo cui nomen erat Iohannes, hic venit in testimonium ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum. Non erat ille lux sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lux vera quae inluminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Quotquot autem receperunt eum dedit eis potestatem filios dei feri, his qui credunt in nomine eius, qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex deo nati sunt. Et verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis. Et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Hoc totum quod ex euangelio posui in praecedentibus suis partibus habet quod immutabile ac sempiternum est, cuius contemplatio nos beatos facit; in consequentibus vero permixta cum temporalibus commemorantur aeterna. Ac per hoc aliqua ibi ad scientiam pertinent, aliqua ad sapientiam sicut in libro duodecimo praecessit nostra distinctio. Nam In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud deum, et deus erat verbum, hoc erat in principio apud deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt contemplativam vitam requirit et intellectuali mente cernendum est. Qua in re quanto magis quisque profecerit tanto fiet sine dubitatione sapientior. Sed propter id quod ait lux lucet in tenebris, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt fide utique opus erat qua crederetur quod non videtur. Tenebras quippe intellegi voluit aversa ab huiusmodi luce eamque minus idonea contueri corda mortalium, propter quod adiungit et dicit: Fuit homo missus a deo cui nomen erat Iohannes, hic venit in testimonium ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum. Hoc iam temporaliter gestum est et ad scientiam pertinet quae cognitione historica continetur. Hominem autem Iohannem in phantasia cogitamus quae de humanae naturae notitia impressa est nostrae memoriae. Et hoc eodem modo cogitant sive qui ista non credunt sive qui credunt. Utrisque enim notum est quid sit homo cuius exteriorem partem, id est corpus, per corporis lumina didicerunt; interiorem vero, id est animam, in se ipsis quia et ipsi homines sunt et per humanam conversationem cognitam tenent, ut possint cogitare quod dicitur Fuit homo cui nomen erat Iohannes quia et nomina sciunt loquendo et audiendo. Quod autem ibi est, misuss a deo, fide tenent qui tenent, et qui fide non tenent aut dubitatione ambigunt aut infidelitate derident. Utrique tamen, si non sunt ex numero nimis insipientium qui dicunt in corde quo: Non est deus haec audientes verba utrumque cogitant, et quid sit deus et quid sit mitti a deo, et si non sicut res se habent at certe sicut valent.	2. John the Evangelist has thus begun his Gospel: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without was Him not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father), full of grace and truth. This entire passage, which I have here taken from the Gospel, contains in its earlier portions what is immutable and eternal, the contemplation of which makes us blessed; but in those which follow, eternal things are mentioned in conjunction with temporal things. And hence some things there belong to knowledge, some to wisdom, according to our previous distinction in the twelfth book. For the words—In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not:— require a contemplative life, and must be discerned by the intellectual mind; and the more any one has profited in this, the wiser without doubt will he become. But on account of the verse, The light shines in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not, faith certainly was necessary, whereby that which was not seen might be believed. For by darkness he intended to signify the hearts of mortals turned away from light of this kind, and hardly able to behold it; for which reason he subjoins, There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. But here we come to a thing that was done in time, and belongs to knowledge, which is comprised in the cognizance of facts. And we think of the man John under that phantasy which is impressed on our memory from the notion of human nature. And whether men believe or not, they think this in the same manner. For both alike know what man is, the outer part of whom, that is, his body, they have learned through the eyes of the body; but of the inner, that is, the soul, they possess the knowledge in themselves, because they also themselves are men, and through intercourse with men; so that they are able to think what is said, There was a man, whose name was John, because they know the names also by interchange of speech. But that which is there also, viz. sent from God, they who hold at all, hold by faith; and they who do not hold it by faith, either hesitate through doubt, or deride it through unbelief. Yet both, if they are not in the number of those over-foolish ones, who say in their heart There is no God, when they hear these words, think both things, viz. both what God is, and what it is to be sent from God; and if they do not do this as the things themselves really are, they do it at any rate as they can.
[13.1.3] Fidem porro ipsam quam videt quisque in corde suo esse si credit, vel non esse si non credit, aliter novimus, non sicut corpora quae videmus oculis corporis et per ipsorum imagines quas memoria tenemus etiam absentia cogitamus; nec sicut ea quae non vidimus et ex his quae vidimus cogitatione utcumque formamus et memonae commendamus quo recurramus cum voluerimus ut illic ea, vel potius qualescumque imagines eorum quas ibi fiximus, similiter recordatione cernamus; nec sicut hominem vivum cuius animam etiamsi non videmus ex nostra conicimus, et ex motibus corporalibus hominem vivum sicut videndo didicimus intuemur etiam cogitando. Non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est ab eo cuius est, sed eam tenet certissima scientia clamatque conscientia. Cum itaque propterea credere iubeamur quia id quod credere iubemur videre non possumus, ipsam tamen fidem quando inest in nobis videmus in nobis quia et rerum absentium praesens est fides, et rerum quae foris sunt intus est fides, et rerum quae non videntur videtur fides, et ipsa tamen temporaliter fit in cordibus hominum; et si ex fidelibus infideles fiunt, perit ab eis. Aliquando autem et rebus falsis adcommodatur fides; loquimur enim sic ut dicamus: 'Habita est ei fides, et decepit.' Qualis fides, si tamen et ipsa dicenda est fides, non culpabiliter de cordibus perit quando eam inventa veritas pellit. Optabiliter autem rerum verarum in easdem res fides transit; non enim dicendum est: 'Perit,' quando ea quae credebantur videntur. Numquid enim adhuc fides dicenda est cum definita sit in epistula ad hebraeos fides dictumque sit eam esse conuictionem rerum quae non videntur?	3. Further, we know from other sources the faith itself which a man sees to be in his own heart, if he believes, or not to be there, if he does not believe: but not as we know bodies, which we see with the bodily eyes, and think of even when absent through the images of themselves which we retain in memory; nor yet as those things which we have not seen, and which we frame howsoever we can in thought from those which we have seen, and commit them to memory, that we may recur to them when we will, in order that therein we may similarly by recollection discern them, or rather discern the images of them, of what sort soever these are which we have fixed there; nor again as a living man, whose soul we do not indeed see, but conjecture from our own, and from corporeal motions gaze also in thought upon the living man, as we have learned him by sight. Faith as not so seen in the heart in which it is, by him whose it is; but most certain knowledge holds it fast, and conscience proclaims it. Although therefore we are bidden to believe in this account, because we cannot see what we are bidden to believe; nevertheless we see faith itself in ourselves, when that faith is in us; because faith even in absent things is present, and faith in things which are without us is within, and faith in things which are not seen is itself seen, and itself none the less comes into the hearts of men in time; and if any cease to be faithful and become unbelievers, then it perishes from them. And sometimes faith is accommodated even to falsehoods; for we sometimes so speak as to say, I put faith in him, and he deceived me. And this kind of faith, if indeed it too is to be called faith, perishes from the heart without blame, when truth is found and expels it. But faith in things that are true, passes, as one should wish it to pass, into the things themselves. For we must not say that faith perishes, when those things which were believed are seen. For is it indeed still to be called faith, when faith, according to the definition in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is the evidence of things not seen?
[13.1.4] Deinde quod sequitur, hic venit in testimonium ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine ut omnes crederent per illum actio, ut diximus, temporalis est. Temporaliter enim testimonium perhibetur etiam de re sempiterna quod est intellegibile lumen. De quo ut testimonium perhiberet venit Iohannes qui non erat lux sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Adiungit enim: Erat lux vera quae inluminat omnem hominem venienter in hunc mundum. In mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. In propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Haec verba omnia qui latinam linguam sciunt ex rebus intellegunt quas noverunt. Quarum aliquae nobis innotuerunt per corporis sensus sicut homo, sicut ipse mundus cuius tam evidentem magnitudinem cernimus, sicut eorundem verborum soni; nam et auditus sensus est corporis. Aliquae autem per animi rationem sicut id quod dictum est, sui eum non receperunt; intellegitur enim, 'non in eum crediderunt,' quod quid sit nullo corporis sensu sed animi ratione cognovimus. Ipsorum etiam verborum non sonos sed significationes partim per corporis sensum, partim per animi rationem didicimus. Nec ea verba nunc primum audivimus, sed quae iam audieramus et non solum ipsa verum etiam quae significarent cognita memoria tenebamus et hic agnovimus. Hoc enim nomen disyllabum cum dicitur mundus, quoniam sonus est, res utique corporalis per corpus innotuit, id est per aurem; sed etiam quod significat per corpus innotuit, id est per oculos carnis. Mundus quippe in quantum notus est videntibus notus est. At hoc verbum quattuor syllabarum quod est 'crediderunt,' sono suo quoniam corpus est per aurem carnis inlabitur; quod autem significat nullo corporis sensu sed animi ratione cognoscitur. Nisi enim quid sit 'crediderunt' per animum nossemus, non intellegeremus quid non fecerint illi de quibus dictum est, et sui eum non receperunt. Sonus ergo verbi forinsecus instrepit auribus corporis et attingit sensum qui vocatur auditus. Species quoque hominis et in nobis ipsis nobis nota est et forinsecus in aliis adest corporis sensibus, oculis cum videtur, auribus cum auditur, tactui cum tenetur et tangitur Habet etiam in memoria nostra imaginem suam, incorporalem quidem sed corpori similem. Mundi denique ipsius mirabilis pulchritudo forinsecus praesto est et aspectibus nostris et ei sensui qui dicitur tactus si quid eius attingimus. Habet etiam ipse intus in memoria nostra imaginem suam ad quam recurrimus cum eum vel septi parietibus vel etiam in tenebris cogitamus. Sed de his imaginibus rerum corporalium incorporalibus quidem, habentibus tamen similitudines corporum et ad vitam exterioris hominis pertinentibus, iam satis in undecimo libro locuti sumus. Nunc autem agimus de homine interiore et eius ea scientia quae rerum est temporalium et mutabilium. In cuius intentionem cum assumitur aliquid etiam de rebus ad exteriorem hominem pertinentibus, ad hoc assumendum est ut aliquid inde doceatur quod rationalem adivuet scientiam, ac per hoc rerum quas communes cum animantibus inrationabilibus habemus rationalis usus ad interiorem hominem pertinet, nec recte dici potest cum inrationalibus animantibus eum nobis esse communem.	4. In the words which follow next, The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe; the action, as we have said, is one done in time. For to bear witness even to that which is eternal, as is that light that is intelligible, is a thing done in time. And of this it was that John came to bear witness who was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. For he adds That was the true Light that lights every man that comes into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. Now they who know the Latin language, understand all these words, from those things which they know: and of these, some have become known to us through the senses of the body, as man, as the world itself, of which the greatness is so evident to our sight; as again the sounds of the words themselves, for hearing also is a sense of the body; and some through the reason of the mind, as that which is said, And His own received Him not; for this means, that they did not believe in Him; and what belief is, we do not know by any sense of the body, but by the reason of the mind. We have learned, too, not the sounds, but the meanings of the words themselves, partly through the sense of the body, partly through the reason of the mind. Nor have we now heard those words for the first time, but they are words we had heard before. And we were retaining in our memory as things known, and we here recognized, not only the words themselves, but also what they meant. For when the bisyllabic word mundus is uttered, then something that is certainly corporeal, for it is a sound, has become known through the body, that is, through the ear. But that which it means also, has become known through the body, that is, through the eyes of the flesh. For so far as the world is known to us at all, it is known through sight. But the quadri-syllabic word crediderunt reaches us, so far as its sound, since that is a corporeal thing, through the ear of the flesh; but its meaning is discoverable by no sense of the body, but by the reason of the mind. For unless we knew through the mind what the word crediderunt meant, we should not understand what they did not do, of whom it is said, And His own received Him not. The sound then of the word rings upon the ears of the body from without, and reaches the sense which is called hearing. The species also of man is both known to us in ourselves, and is presented to the senses of the body from without, in other men; to the eyes, when it is seen; to the ears, when it is heard; to the touch, when it is held and touched; and it has, too, its image in our memory, incorporeal indeed, but like the body. Lastly, the wonderful beauty of the world itself is at hand from without, both to our gaze, and to that sense which is called touch, if we come in contact with any of it: and this also has its image within in our memory, to which we revert, when we think of it either in the enclosure of a room, or again in darkness. But we have already sufficiently spoken in the eleventh book of these images of corporeal things; incorporeal indeed, yet having the likeness of bodies, and belonging to the life of the outer man. But we are treating now of the inner man, and of his knowledge, namely, that knowledge which is of things temporal and changeable; into the purpose and scope of which, when anything is assumed, even of things belonging to the outer man, it must be assumed for this end, that something may thence be taught which may help rational knowledge. And hence the rational use of those things which we have in common with irrational animals belongs to the inner man; neither can it rightly be said that this is common to us with the irrational animals.
[13.2.5] Fides vero de qua in hoc libro aliquanto diutius disputare certa dispositionis nostrae ratione compellimur, quam qui habent fideles vocantur, et qui non habent infideles sicut hi qui venientem in propria dei filium non receperunt, quamvis ex auditu in nobis facta sit, non tamen ad eum sensum corpons pertinet qui appellatur auditus quoniam non est sonus, nec ad oculos huius carnis quoniam non est color aut corporis forma, nec ad eum qui dicitur tactus quoniam corpulentiae nihil habet, nec ad ullum omnino sensum corporis quoniam cordis est res ista non corporis, nec foris est a nobis sed in intimis nobis, nec eam quisquam hominum videt in alio sed unusquisque in semetipso, denique potest et simulationc confingi et putari esse in quo non est. Suam quisque igitur fidem apud se ipsum videt, in altero autem credit eam esse, non videt, et tanto firmius credit quanto fructus eius magis novit quos operari solet fides per dilectionem. Quamobrem omnibus de quibus euangelista subiungit et dicit: Quotquot autem receperunt eum dedit eis potcstatem filios dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius, qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex deo nati sunt fides ista communis est, non sicut aliqua corporis forma communis est ad videndum omnium oculis quibus praesto est (ex ipsa quippe una omnium cernentium quodam modo informatur aspectus), sed sicut dici potest omnibus hominibus esse facies humana communis. Nam hoc ita dicitur ut tamen singuli suas habeant. Ex una sane doctrina impressam fidem credentium cordibus singulorum qui hoc idem crcdunt verissime dicimus, sed aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud fides qua creduntur. Illa quippe in rebus sunt quae vel esse vel fuisse vel futura esse dicuntur; haec autem in animo credentis est, ei tantum conspicua cuius est, quamvis sit et in aliis, non ipsa sed similis. Non enim numero est una sed genere; propter similitudinem tamen et nullam diversitatem magis unam dicimus esse quam multas. Nam et duos homines simillimos cum videmus unam faciem dicimus et miramur amborum. Facilius itaque dicitur multas animas fuisse singulas utique singulorum de quibus legimus in actibus apostolorum quod eis fuerit anima una, quam ubi dixit apostolus, una fides, tot eas audet quisquam dicere quot fideles. Et tamen qui dicit: O mulier, magna est fides tua et alteri: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti? suam cuique esse significat. Sed ita dicitur eadem credentium fides una quemadmodum eadem volentium voluntas una cum et in ipsis qui hoc idem volunt sua voluntas sit cuique conspicua, alterius autem lateat quamvis idem velit et si aliquibus signis sesc indicet, creditur potius quam videtur. Unusquisque autem sui animi conscius non credit utiguc hanc esse suam sed plane peruidet voluntatem.	5. But faith, of which we are compelled, by reason of the arrangement of our subject, to dispute somewhat more at length in this book: faith I say, which they who have are called the faithful, and they who have not, unbelievers, as were those who did not receive the Son of God coming to His own; although it is wrought in us by hearing, yet does not belong to that sense of the body which is called hearing, since it is not a sound; nor to the eyes of this our flesh, since it is neither color nor bodily form; nor to that which is called touch, since it has nothing of bulk; nor to any sense of the body at all, since it is a thing of the heart, not of the body; nor is it without apart from us, but deeply seated within us; nor does any man see it in another, but each one in himself. Lastly, it is a thing that can both be feigned by pretence, and be thought to be in him in whom it is not. Therefore every one sees his own faith in himself; but does not see, but believes, that it is in another; and believes this the more firmly, the more he knows the fruits of it, which faith is wont to work by love. And therefore this faith is common to all of whom the evangelist subjoins, But as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe in His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God; common I say, not as any form of a bodily object is common, as regards sight, to the eyes of all to whom it is present, for in some way the gaze of all that behold it is informed by the same one form; but as the human countenance can be said to be common to all men; for this is so said that yet each certainly has his own. We say certainly with perfect truth, that the faith of believers is impressed from one doctrine upon the heart of each several person who believes the same thing. But that which is believed is a different thing from the faith by which it is believed. For the former is in things which are said either to be, or to have been or to be about to be; but the latter is in the mind of the believer, and is visible to him only whose it is; although not indeed itself but a faith like it, is also in others. For it is not one in number, but in kind; yet on account of the likeness, and the absence of all difference, we rather call it one than many. For when, too, we see two men exceedingly alike, we wonder, and say that both have one countenance. It is therefore more easily said that the souls were many—a several soul, of course, for each several person— of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles, that they were of one soul, — than it is, where the apostle speaks of one faith, for any one to venture to say that there are as many faiths as there are faithful. And yet He who says, O woman, great is your faith; and to another, O you of little faith, wherefore did you doubt? intimates that each has his own faith. But the like faith of believers is said to be one, in the same way as a like will of those who will is said to be one; since in the case also of those who have the same will, the will of each is visible to himself, but that of the other is not visible, although he wills the same thing; and if it intimate itself by any signs, it is believed rather than seen. But each being conscious of his own mind certainly does not believe, but manifestly sees outright, that this is his own will.
[13.3.6] Est quaedam sane eiusdem naturae viventis ct ratione utentis tanta conspiratio ut cum lateat alterum quid alter velit, nonnullae sint tamen voluntates omnium etiam singulis notae, et cum quisque homo nesciat quid homo alius unus velit, in quibusdam rebus possit scire quid omnes velint. Unde illa cuiusdam mimi facetissima praedicatur urbanitas qui cum se promisisset in theatro quid in animo haberent et quid vellent omnes aliis ludis esse dicturum, atque ad diem constitutum ingenti exspectatione maior multitudo conflueret suspensis et silentibus omnibus, dixisse perhibetur: Vili uultis emere et caro vendere. In quo dicto levissimi scenici omnes tamen conscientias invenerunt suas, eique vera ante oculos omnium constituta et tamen improvisa dicenti admirabili fauore plauserunt. Cur autem tam magna exspectatio facta est illo promittente omnium voluntatem se esse dicturum nisi quia latent hominem aliorum hominum voluntates? Sed numquid latuit ista istum? Numquid quemquam latet? Qua tandem causa nisi quia sunt quaedam quae non inconvenienter in aliis de se quisque coniciat compatiente vel conspirante vitio seu natura? Sed aliud est videre voluntatem suam, aliud quamvis certissima coniectura conicere alienam. Nam conditam Romam tam certum habeo in rebus humanis quam Constantinopolim, cum Romam viderim oculis meis, de illa vero nihil noverim nisi quod aliis testibus credidi. Et mimus quidem ille vel se ipsum intuendo vel alios quoque experiendo vili velle emere et caro vendere omnibus id credidit esse commune. Sed quoniam reuera vitium est, potest quisque adipisci eiusmodi iustitiam vel alicuius alterius vitii quod huic contrarium est incurrere pestilentiam qua huic resistat et vincat. Nam scio ipse hominem cum venalis codex ei fuisset oblatus pretiique eius ignarum et ideo quiddam exiguum poscentem cerneret venditorem, iustum pretium quod multo amplius erat nec opinanti dedisse. Quid si etiam sit quisquam tanta nequitia possessus ut vili vendat quae dimiserunt parentes et caro emat quae consumant libidines? Non est, ut opinor, incredibilis ista luxuries, et si quaerantur tales reperiantur, aut etiam non quaesiti lortassis occurrant qui nequitia maiore quam theatrica propositione vel pronuntiationi theatricae insultent magno pretio stupra emendo, paruo autem rura vendendo. Largitionis etiam gratia novimus quosdam emisse frumenta carius et vilius vendidisse suis civibus. Illud etiam quod uetus poeta dixit Ennius: Omnes mortales sese laudarier optant profecto et de se ipso et de his quos expertus fuerat coniecit in aliis, et videtur pronuntiasse hominum omnium voluntatem. Denique si et mimus ille dixisset: 'Laudari omnes uultis; nemo uestrum vult vituperari,' similiter quod esset omnium voluntatis dixisse videretur. Sunt tamen qui vitia sua oderint et in quibus sibi displicent ipsi nec ab aliis se laudari velint, gratiasque agant obiurgantium beneuolentiae cum ideo vituperantur ut corrigantur. At si dixisset: 'Omnes beati esse uultis; miseri esse non uultis,' dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate. Quidquid enim aliud quisquam latenter velit, ab hac voluntate quae omnibus et in omnibus satis nota est non recedit.	6. There is, indeed, so closely conspiring a harmony in the same nature living and using reason, that although one knows not what the other wills, yet there are some wills of all which are also known to each; and although each man does not know what any other one man wills, yet in some things he may know what all will. And hence comes that story of the comic actor's witty joke, who promised that he would say in the theatre, in some other play, what all had in their minds, and what all willed; and when a still greater crowd had come together on the day appointed, with great expectation, all being in suspense and silent, is affirmed to have said: You will to buy cheap, and sell dear. And mean actor though he was, yet all in his words recognized what themselves were conscious of, and applauded him with wonderful goodwill, for saying before the eyes of all what was confessedly true, yet what no one looked for. And why was so great expectation raised by his promising that he would say what was the will of all, unless because no man knows the wills of other men? But did not he know that will? Is there any one who does not know it? Yet why, unless because there are some things which not unfitly each conjectures from himself to be in others, through sympathy or agreement either in vice or virtue? But it is one thing to see one's own will; another to conjecture, however certainly, what is another's. For, in human affairs, I am as certain that Rome was built as that Constantinople was, although I have seen Rome with my eyes, but know nothing of the other city, except what I have believed on the testimony of others. And truly that comic actor believed it to be common to all to will to buy cheap and sell dear, either by observing himself or by making experiment also of others. But since such a will is in truth a fault, every one can attain the counter virtue, or run into the mischief of some other fault which is contrary to it, whereby to resist and conquer it. For I myself know a case where a manuscript was offered to a man for purchase, who perceived that the vendor was ignorant of its value, and was therefore asking something very small, and who thereupon gave him, though not expecting it, the just price, which was much more. Suppose even the case of a man possessed with wickedness so great as to sell cheap what his parents left to him, and to buy dear, in order to waste it on his own lusts? Such wanton extravagance, I fancy, is not incredible; and if such men are sought, they may be found, or even fall in one's way although not sought; who, by a wickedness more than that of the theatre, make a mock of the theatrical proposition or declaration, by buying dishonor at a great price, while selling lands at a small one. We have heard, too, of persons that, for the sake of distribution, have bought grain at a higher price, and sold it to their fellow citizens at a lower one. And note also what the old poet Ennius has said: that all mortals wish themselves to be praised; wherein, doubtless, he conjectured what was in others, both by himself, and by those whom he knew by experience; and so seems to have declared what it is that all men will. Lastly, if that comic actor himself, too, had said, You all will to be praised, no one of you wills to be abused; he would have seemed in like manner to have expressed what all will. Yet there are some who hate their own faults, and do not desire to be praised by others for that for which they are displeased with themselves; and who thank the kindness of those who rebuke them, when the purpose of that rebuke is their own amendment. But if he had said, You all will to be blessed, you do not will to be wretched; he would have said something which there is no one that would not recognize in his own will. For whatever else a man may will secretly, he does not withdraw from that will, which is well known to all men, and well known to be in all men.
[13.4.7] Mirum est autem cum capessendae atque retinendae beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta exsistat de ipsa beatitudine rursus varietas et diversitas voluntatum, non quod aliquis eam nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim omnes eam nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi, aliis in corporis voluntate. aliis in utraque. et aliis atque aliis, alibi atque alibi. Ut enim eos quaeque res maxime delectavit ita in ea constituerunt vitam beatam. Quomodo igitur feruentissime amant omnes quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit, sicut iam de hac re in libris superioribus disputavi? Cur ergo beatitudo amatur ab omnibus nec tamen scitur ab omnibus? An forte sciunt omnes ipsa quae sit, sed non omnes sciunt ubi sit et inde contentio est? Quasi vero de aliquo mundi huius agatur loco ubi debeat quisque velle vivere qui vult beate viucre, ac non ita quaeratur ubi sit beatitudo sicut quaeritur quae sit. Nam utique si in corporis voluptate est, ille beatus est qui fruitur corporis voluptate; si in virtute animi, ille qui hac fruitur; si in utraque, ille qui fruitur utraque. Cum itaque alius dicit: 'Beate vivere est voluptate corporis frui,' alius autem: 'Beate vivere est virtute animi frui,' nonne aut ambo nesciunt quae sit beata vita aut non ambo sciunt? Quomodo ergo ambo amant eam si nemo potest amare quod nescit? An forte falsum est quod pro verissimo certissimoque posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines velle? Si enim beate vivere est verbi gratia secundum animi virtutem vivere, quomodo beate vivere vult qui hoc non vult? Nonne verius dixerimus: 'Homo iste non vult beate vivere quia non vult secundum virtutem vivere, quod solum est beate vivere'? Non igitur ommnes beate vivere volunt, immo pauci hoc volunt si non est beate vivere nisi secundum virtutem animi vivere, quod multi nolunt. Itane falsum erit unde nec ipse, cum academicis omnia dubia sint, academicus Cicero dubitavit qui cum vellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa de qua nullus ambigeret sumere suae disputationis exordium, Beati certe, inquit, omnes esse volumus? Absit ut hoc falsum esse dicamus. Quid igitur? An dicendum est etiamsi nihil sit aliud beate vivere quam secundum virtutem animi vivere, tamen et qui hoc non vult beate vult vivere? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale est enim ac si dicamus: 'Et qui non vult beate vivere beate vult vivere.' Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat? Et tamen ad hanc contrudit necessitas si et omnes beate velle vivere verum est, et non omnes sic volunt vivere quomodo solum vivitur beate.	7. It is wonderful, however, since the will to obtain and retain blessedness is one in all, whence comes, on the other hand, such a variety and diversity of wills concerning that blessedness itself; not that any one is unwilling to have it, but that all do not know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to be in goodness of mind; by others, in pleasure of body; by others, in both; and by some in one thing, by others in another. For as men find special delight in this thing or that, so have they placed in it their idea of a blessed life. How, then, do all love so warmly what not all know? Who can love what he does not know?— a subject which I have already discussed in the preceding books. Why, therefore, is blessedness loved by all, when it is not known by all? Is it perhaps that all know what it is itself, but all do not know where it is to be found, and that the dispute arises from this?— as if, forsooth, the business was about some place in this world, where every one ought to will to live who wills to live blessedly; and as if the question where blessedness is were not implied in the question what it is. For certainly, if it is in the pleasure of the body, he is blessed who enjoys the pleasure of the body; if in goodness of mind, he has it who enjoys this; if in both, he who enjoys both. When, therefore, one says, to live blessedly is to enjoy the pleasure of the body; but another, to live blessedly is to enjoy goodness of mind; is it not, that either both know, or both do not know, what a blessed life is? How, then, do both love it, if no one can love what he does not know? Or is that perhaps false which we have assumed to be most true and most certain, viz. that all men will to live blessedly? For if to live blessedly is, for argument's sake, to live according to goodness of mind, how does he will to live blessedly who does not will this? Should we not say more truly, That man does not will to live blessedly, because he does not wish to live according to goodness, which alone is to live blessedly? Therefore all men do not will to live blessedly; on the contrary, few wish it; if to live blessedly is nothing else but to live according to goodness of mind, which many do not will to do. Shall we, then, hold that to be false of which the Academic Cicero himself did not doubt (although Academics doubt every thing), who, when he wanted in the dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing, of which no one doubted, from which to start his argument, says, We certainly all will to be blessed? Far be it from me to say this is false. But what then? Are we to say that, although there is no other way of living blessedly than living according to goodness of mind, yet even he who does not will this, wills to live blessedly? This, indeed, seems too absurd. For it is much as if we should say, Even he who does not will to live blessedly, wills to live blessedly. Who could listen to, who could endure, such a contradiction? And yet necessity thrusts us into this strait, if it is both true that all will to live blessedly, and yet all do not will to live in that way in which alone one can live blessedly.
[13.5.8] An forte illud est quod nos ab his angustiis possit eruere, ut quoniam diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos maxime delectavit (ut voluptas Epicurum, virtus Zenonem, sic alium aliquid aliud), nihil dicamus esse beate vivere nisi vivere secundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum non esse quod omnes beate vivere velint quia omnes ita volunt ut quemque delectat? Nam et hoc populo si pronuntiatum esset in theatro, omnes id in suis voluntatibus invenirent. Sed hoc quoque Cicero cum sibi ex adverso proposuisset ita redarguit ut qui hoc sentiunt erubescant. Ait enim: Ecce autem non philosophi quidem sed prompti tamen ad disputandum omnes aiunt esse beatos qui vivant ut ipsi velint (hoc est quod nos diximus, ut quosque delectat). Sed mox ille subiecit: Falsum id quidem. Velle enim quod non deceat id est ipsum miserrimum, nec tam miserum est non adipisci quod velis quam adipisci velle quod non oporteat. Praeclarissime omnino atque verissime. Quis namque ita sit mente caecus et ab omni luce decoris alienus ac tenebris dedecoris inuolutus ut eum qui nequiter vivit ac turpiter et nullo prohibente, nullo ulciscente, nullo saltem reprehendere audente, insuper et laudantibus plurimis quoniam sicut ait scriptura divina: Laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et qui iniqua gerit benedicetur implet omnes suas facinorosissimas et flagitiosissimas voluntates, ideo beatum dicat quia vivit ut vult cum profecto, quamvis et sic miser esset, minus tamen esset si nihil eorum quae perperam voluisset habere potuisset? Etiam mala enim voluntate vel sola quisque miser efficitur, sed miserior potestate qua desiderium malae voluntatis impletur. Quapropter quoniam verum est quod omnes homines esse beati velint idque unum ardentissimo amore appetant et propter hoc caetera quaecumque appetunt, nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, nec potest nescire quid sit quod velle se scit, sequitur ut omnes beatam vitam sciant. Omnes autem beati habent quod volunt, quamvis non omnes qui habent quod volunt continuo sint beati; continuo autem miseri qui vel non habent quod volunt vel id habent quod non recte volunt. Beatus igitur non est nisi qui et habet omnia quae vult et nihil vult male.	8. Or is, perhaps, the deliverance from our difficulties to be found in this, that, since we have said that every one places his idea of a blessed life in that which has most pleased him, as pleasure pleased Epicurus, and goodness Zeno, and something else pleased other people, we say that to live blessedly is nothing else but to live according to one's own pleasure: so that it is not false that all will to live blessedly, because all will that which pleases each? For if this, too, had been proclaimed to the people in the theatre, all would have found it in their own wills. But when Cicero, too, had propounded this in opposition to himself, he so refuted it as to make them blush who thought so. For he says: But, behold! people who are not indeed philosophers, but who yet are prompt to dispute, say that all are blessed, whoever live as they will; which is what we mean by, as pleases each. But by and by he has subjoined: But this is indeed false. For to will what is not fitting, is itself most miserable; neither is it so miserable not to obtain what one wills, as to will to obtain what one ought not. Most excellently and altogether most truly does he speak. For who can be so blind in his mind, so alienated from all light of decency, and wrapped up in the darkness of indecency, as to call him blessed, because he lives as he will, who lives wickedly and disgracefully; and with no one restraining him, no one punishing, and no one daring even to blame him, nay more, too, with most people praising him, since, as divine Scripture says, The wicked is praised in his heart's desire: and he who works iniquity is blessed, gratifies all his most criminal and flagitious desires; when, doubtless, although even so he would be wretched, yet he would be less wretched, if he could have had nothing of those things which he had wrongly willed? For every one is made wretched by a wicked will also, even though it stop short with will but more wretched by the power by which the longing of a wicked will is fulfilled. And, therefore, since it is true that all men will to be blessed, and that they seek for this one thing with the most ardent love, and on account of this seek everything which they do seek; nor can any one love that of which he does not know at all what or of what sort it is, nor can be ignorant what that is which he knows that he wills; it follows that all know a blessed life. But all that are blessed have what they will, although not all who have what they will are forewith blessed. But they are forewith wretched, who either have not what they will, or have that which they do not rightly will. Therefore he only is a blessed man, who both has all things which he wills, and wills nothing ill.
[13.6.9] Cum ergo ex his duobus beata vita constet atque omnibus nota, omnibus cara sit, quid putamus esse causae cur horum duorum quando utrumque non possunt, magis eligant homines ut omnia quae volunt habeant quam ut omnia bene velint etiamsi non habeant? An ipsa est pravitas generis humani ut cum eos non lateat nec illum beatum esse qui quod vult non habet nec illum qui quod male vult habet, sed illum qui et habet quaecumque vult bona et nulla vult male, ex his duobus quibus beata vita perficitur quando utrumque non datur, id eligatur potius unde magis a beata vita receditur (longius quippe ab illa est quicumque adipiscitur male concupita quam qui non adipiscitur concupita), cum potius eligi debuerit voluntas bona atque praeponi etiam non adepta quae appetit? Propinquat enim beato qui bene vult quaecumque vult, et quae adeptus cum fuerit beatus erit. Et utique non mala sed bona beatum faciunt quando faciunt. Quorum bonorum habet aliquid iam idque non parui aestimandum, eam ipsam scilicet voluntatem bonam, qui de bonis quorum capax est humana natura, non de ullius mali perpetratione vel adeptione gaudere desiderat, et bona qualia et in hac misera vita esse possunt prudenti, temperanti, forti, et iusta mente sectatur et quantum datur assequitur ut etiam in malis sit bonus, et finitis malis omnibus atque impletis bonis omnibus sit beatus.	9. Since, then, a blessed life consists of these two things, and is known to all, and dear to all; what can we think to be the cause why, when they cannot have both, men choose, out of these two, to have all things that they will, rather than to will all things well, even although they do not have them? Is it the depravity itself of the human race, in such wise that, while they are not unaware that neither is he blessed who has not what he wills, nor he who has what he wills wrongly, but he who both has whatsoever good things he wills, and wills no evil ones, yet, when both are not granted of those two things in which the blessed life consists, that is rather chosen by which one is withdrawn the more from a blessed life (since he certainly is further from it who obtains things which he wickedly desired, than he who only does not obtain the things which he desired); whereas the good will ought rather to be chosen, and to be preferred, even if it do not obtain the things which it seeks? For he comes near to being a blessed man, who wills well whatsoever he wills, and wills things, which when he obtains, he will be blessed. And certainly not bad things, but good, make men blessed, when they do so make them. And of good things he already has something, and that, too, a something not to be lightly esteemed—namely, the very good will itself; who longs to rejoice in those good things of which human nature is capable, and not in the performance or the attainment of any evil; and who follows diligently, and attains as much as he can, with a prudent, temperate, courageous, and right mind, such good things as are possible in the present miserable life; so as to be good even in evils, and when all evils have been put an end to, and all good things fulfilled, then to be blessed.
[13.7.10] Ac per hoc in ista mortali vita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima praecipue fides est necessaria qua in deum creditur. Non enim quaecumque bona maximeque illa quibus quisque fit bonus et illa quibus fiet beatus, unde nisi a deo in hominem veniant et homini accedant inveniri potest. Cum autem ex hac vita ab eo qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus est ventum fuerit ad beatam, tunc erit vere quod nunc esse nullo modo potest ut sic homo vivat quomodo vult. Non enim volet male vivere in illa felicitate aut volet aliquid quod deerit aut deerit quod voluerit. Quidquid amabitur aderit, nec dcsiderabitur quod non aderit. Omne quod ibi erit bonum erit, et summus deus summum bonum erit atque ad fruendum amantibus praesto erit, et quod est omnino beatissimum ita semper fore certum erit. Nunc vero fecerunt quidem sibi philosophi sicut eorum cuique placuit vitas beatas suas ut quasi propria virtute possent quod communi mortahum conditione non poterant, sic scilicet vivere ut vellent. Sentiebant enim aliter beatum esse neminem posse nisi habendo quod vellet et nihil patiendo quod nollet. Quis autem non qualemcumque vitam qua delectatur et ideo beatam vocat vellet sic esse in sua potestate ut eam posset habere perpetuam? Et tamen quis ita est? Quis vult pati molestias quas fortiter toleret, quamvis eas velit possitque tolerare si patitur? Quis velit in tormentis vivere etiam qui potest in eis per patientiam tenendo iustitiam laudabiliter vivere? Transitura cogitaverunt haec mala qui ea pertulerunt vel cupiendo habere vel timendo amittere quod amabant, sive nequiter sive laudabiliter. Nam multi per transitoria mala ad permansura bona fortiter tetenderunt. Qui profecto spe beati sunt etiam cum sunt in transitoriis malis per quae ad bona non transitura perveniunt. Sed qui spe beatus est nondum beatus est. Exspectat namque per patientiam beatitudinem quam nondum tenet. Qui vero sine ulla spe tali, sine ulla tali mercede cruciatur quantamlibet adhibeat tolerantiam, non est beatus veraciter sed miser fortiter. Neque enim propterea miser non est quia miserior esset si et impatienter miseriam sustineret. Porro si ista non patitur quae nollet pati in suo corpore, ne tunc quidem beatus habendus est quoniam non vivit ut vult. Ut enim alia omittam quae corpore inlaeso ad animi pertinent offensiones sine quibus vivere vellemus et sunt innumerabilia vellet utique si posset ita saluum atque incolume habere corpus et nullas ex eo pati molestias, ut id haberet in potestate aut in ipsius incorruptione corporis; quod quia non habet ac pendet incerto, profecto non vivit ut vult. Quamvis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere et aequo ferre animo quidquid adversitatis acciderit, mauult tamen ut non accidat et si possit facit; atque ita paratus est in utrumque ut quantum in ipso est alterum optet, alterum vitet, et si quod vitat incurrerit, ideo volens ferat quia fieri non potuit quod volebat. Ne opprimatur ergo sustinet, sed premi nollet. Quomodo ergo vivit ut vult? An quia volens fortis est ad ferenda quae nollet inlata? Ideo igitur id vult quod potest quoniam quod vult non potest. Haec est tota, utrum ridenda an potius miseranda superborum beatitudo mortalium gloriantium se vivere ut volunt quia volentes patienter ferunt quae accidere sibi nolunt. Hoc est enim aiunt auod sapienter dixit Terentius: Quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis, Id velis quod possis. Commode hoc dictum esse quis negat? Sed consilium est datum misero ne esset miserior. Beato autem quales se esse omnes volunt non recte nec vere dicitur, non potest fieri quod vis. Si enim beatus est, quidquid vult fieri potest quia non vult quod fieri non potest. Sed non est mortalitatis huius haec vita, nec erit nisi quando et immortalitas erit. Quae si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur quia sine immortalitate non potest esse.	10. And on this account, faith, by which men believe in God, is above all things necessary in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships. For there are no good things whatever, and above all, not those by which any one is made good, or those by which he will become blessed, of which any other source can be found whence they come to man, and are added to man, unless it be from God. But when he who is good and faithful in these miseries shall have come from this life to the blessed life, then will truly come to pass what now is absolutely impossible—namely, that a man may live as he will. For he will not will to live badly in the midst of that felicity, nor will he will anything that will be wanting, nor will there be wanting anything which he shall have willed. Whatever shall be loved, will be present; nor will that be longed for, which shall not be present. Everything which will be there will be good, and the supreme God will be the supreme good and will be present for those to enjoy who love Him; and what altogether is most blessed, it will be certain that it will be so forever. But now, indeed, philosophers have made for themselves, according to the pleasure of each, their own ideals of a blessed life; that they might be able, as it were by their own power, to do that, which by the common conditions of mortals they were not able to do—namely, to live as they would. For they felt that no one could be blessed otherwise than by having what he would, and by suffering nothing which he would not. And who would not will, that the life whatsoever it be, with which he is delighted, and which he therefore calls blessed, were so in his own power, that he could have it continually? And yet who is in this condition? Who wills to suffer troubles in order that he may endure them manfully, although he both wills and is able to endure them if he does suffer them? Who would will to live in torments, even although he is able to live laudably by holding fast to righteousness in the midst of them through patience? They who have endured these evils, either in wishing to have or in fearing to lose what they loved, whether wickedly or laudably, have thought of them as transitory. For many have stretched boldly through transitory evils to good things which will last. And these, doubtless, are blessed through hope, even while actually suffering such transitory evils, through which they arrive at good things which will not be transitory. But he who is blessed through hope is not yet blessed: for he expects, through patience, a blessedness which he does not yet grasp. Whereas he, on the other hand, who is tormented without any such hope, without any such reward, let him use as much endurance as he pleases, is not truly blessed, but bravely miserable. For he is not on that account not miserable, because he would be more so if he also bore misery impatiently. Further, even if he does not suffer those things which he would not will to suffer in his own body, not even then is he to be esteemed blessed, inasmuch as he does not live as he wills. For to omit other things, which, while the body remains unhurt, belong to those annoyances of the mind, without which we should will to live, and which are innumerable; he would will, at any rate, if he were able, so to have his body safe and sound, and so to suffer no inconveniences from it, as to have it within his own control, or even to have it with an imperishableness of the body itself; and because he does not possess this, and hangs in doubt about it, he certainly does not live as he wills. For although he may be ready from fortitude to accept, and bear with an equal mind, whatever adversities may happen to him, yet he had rather they should not happen, and prevents them if he is able; and he is in such way ready for both alternatives, that, as much as is in him, he wishes for the one and shuns the other; and if he have fallen into that which he shuns, he therefore bears it willingly, because that could not happen which he willed. He bears it, therefore, in order that he may not be crushed; but he would not willingly be even burdened. How, then, does he live as he wills? Is it because he is willingly strong to bear what he would not will to be put upon him? Then he only wills what he can, because he cannot have what he wills. And here is the sum-total of the blessedness of proud mortals, I know not whether to be laughed at, or not rather to be pitied, who boast that they live as they will, because they willingly bear patiently what they are unwilling should happen to them. For this, they say, is like Terence's wise saying— Since that cannot be which you will, will that which you can. That this is aptly said, who denies? But it is advice given to the miserable man, that he may not be more miserable. And it is not rightly or truly said to the blessed man, such as all wish themselves to be, That cannot be which you will. For if he is blessed, whatever he wills can be; since he does not will that which cannot be. But such a life is not for this mortal state, neither will it come to pass unless when immortality also shall come to pass. And if this could not be given at all to man, blessedness too would be sought in vain, since it cannot be without immortality.
[13.8.11] Cum ergo beati esse omnes homines volunt si verum volunt, profecto esse et immortales volunt; aliter enim beati esse non possunt. Denique et de immortalitate interrogati sicut de beatitudine omnes eam se velle respondent. Sed qualiscumque beatitudo quae potius vocetur quam sit in hac vita quaeritur, immo vero fingitur, dum immortalitas desperatur sine qua vera beatitudo esse non potest. Ille quippe beate vivit, quod iam superius diximus et astruendo satis fiximus, qui vivit ut vult nec male aliquid vult. Nemo autem male vult immortalitatem si eius humana capax est deo donante natura; cuius si capax non est, nec beatitudinis capax est. Ut enim homo beate vivat oportet ut vivat. Quem porro morientem vita ipsa deserit beata vita cum illo manere qui potest? Cum autem deserit, aut nolentem procul dubio deserit aut volentem aut neutrum. Si nolentem, quomodo est beata vita quae ita est in voluntate ut non sit in potestate? Cumque beatus nemo sit aliquid volendo nec habendo, quanto minus beatus est qui non honore, non possessione, non qualibet alia re, sed ipsa beata vita nolens deseritur quando ei nulla vita erit? Unde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur quo sit misera (propterea enim beata vita discedit quoniam tota vita discedit), miser est tamen quamdiu sentit quia scit se nolente consumi propter quod caetera et quod prae caeteris diligit. Non igitur potest vita et beata esse et nolentem deserere quia beatus nemo nolens fit, ac per hoc guanto magis nolentem deserendo miserum facit quae si nolenti praesto esset miserum faceret? Si autem volentem deserit, etiam sic quomodo beata erat quam perire voluit qui habebat? Restat ut dicant neutrum esse in animo beati, id est eum deseri a beata vita, cum per mortem deserit tota vita, nec nolle nec velle, ad utrumque enim parato et aequo corde consistere. Sed nec ista beata est vita quae talis est ut quem beatum facit amore eius indigna sit. Quomodo enim est beata vita quam non amat beatus? Aut quomodo amatur quod utrum vigeat an pereat indifferenter accipitur? Nisi forte virtutes quas propter solam beatitudinem sic amamus persuadere nobis audent ut ipsam beatitudinem non amemus. Quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas utique amare desistimus quando illam propter quam solam istas amavimus non amamus. Deinde quomodo erit vera illa tam perspecta, tam examinata, tam eliquata, tam certa sententia, beatos esse omnes homines velle, si ipsi qui iam beati sunt beati esse nec nolunt nec volunt? Aut si volunt ut veritas clamat, ut natura compellit cui summe bonus et immutabiliter beatus creator hoc indidit, si volunt, inquam, beati esse qui beati sunt, beati non esse utique nolunt. Si autem beati non esse nolunt, procul dubio nolunt consumi et perire quod beati sunt. Nec nisi viventes beati esse possunt; nolunt igitur perire quod vivunt. Imrnortales ergo esse volunt quicumque vere beati vel sunt vel esse cupiunt. Non autem vivit beate cui non adest quod vult; nullo modo igitur esse poterit vita veraciter beata nisi fuerit sempiterna. [13.8.12] Hanc utrum capiat humana natura quam tamen desiderabilem confitetur non parua quaestio est. Sed si fides adsit quae inest eis quibus dedit potestatem Iesus filios dei fieri, nulla quaestio est.	11. As, therefore, all men will to be blessed, certainly, if they will truly, they will also to be immortal; for otherwise they could not be blessed. And further, if questioned also concerning immortality, as before concerning blessedness, all reply that they will it. But blessedness of what quality soever, such as is not so, but rather is so called, is sought, nay indeed is feigned in this life, while immortality is despaired of, without which true blessedness cannot be. Since he lives blessedly, as we have already said before, and have sufficiently proved and concluded, who lives as he wills, and wills nothing wrongly. But no one wrongly wills immortality, if human nature is by God's gift capable of it; and if it is not capable of it, it is not capable of blessedness. For, that a man may live blessedly, he must needs live. And if life quits him by his dying, how can a blessed life remain with him? And when it quits him, without doubt it either quits him unwilling, or willing, or neither. If unwilling, how is the life blessed which is so within his will as not to be within his power? And whereas no one is blessed who wills something that he does not have, how much less is he blessed who is quitted against his will, not by honor, nor by possessions, nor by any other thing, but by the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all? And hence, although no feeling is left for his life to be thereby miserable (for the blessed life quits him, because life altogether quits him), yet he is wretched as long as he feels, because he knows that against his will that is being destroyed for the sake of which he loves all else, and which he loves beyond all else. A life therefore cannot both be blessed, and yet quit a man against his will, since no one becomes blessed against his will; and hence how much more does it make a man miserable by quitting him against his will, when it would make him miserable if he had it against his will! But if it quit him with his will, even so how was that a blessed life, which he who had it willed should perish? It remains then for them to say, that neither of these is in the mind of the blessed man; that is, that he is neither unwilling nor willing to be quitted by a blessed life, when through death life quits him altogether; for that he stands firm with an even heart, prepared alike for either alternative. But neither is that a blessed life which is such as to be unworthy of his love whom it makes blessed. For how is that a blessed life which the blessed man does not love? Or how is that loved, of which it is received indifferently, whether it is to flourish or to perish? Unless perhaps the virtues, which we love in this way on account of blessedness alone, venture to persuade us that we do not love blessedness itself. Yet if they did this, we should certainly leave off loving the virtues themselves, when we do not love that on account of which alone we loved them. And further, how will that opinion be true, which has been so tried, and sifted, and thoroughly strained, and is so certain, viz. that all men will to be blessed, if they themselves who are already blessed neither will nor do not will to be blessed? Or if they will it, as truth proclaims, as nature constrains, in which indeed the supremely good and unchangeably blessed Creator has implanted that will: if, I say, they will to be blessed who are blessed, certainly they do not will to be not blessed. But if they do not will not to be blessed, without doubt they do not will to be annihilated and perish in regard to their blessedness. But they cannot be blessed except they are alive; therefore they do not will so to perish in regard to their life. Therefore, whoever are either truly blessed or desire to be so, will to be immortal. But he does not live blessedly who has not that which he wills. Therefore it follows that in no way can life be truly blessed unless it be eternal.
[13.9.12] Humanis quippe argumentationibus hacc invenire conantes vix pauci magno praediti ingenio abbundantes otio doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem pervenire potuerunt. Cui tamen animae beatam vitam non inucnerunt stabilem, id est veram. Ad miserias eam quippe vitae huius etiam post beatitudinem redire dixerunt. Et qui eorum de hac erubuerunt sententia et animam purgatam in sempiterna beatitudine sine corpore conlocandam putarunt talia de mundi retrorsus aeternitate sentiunt ut hanc de anima sententiam suam ipsi redarguant, quod hic longum est demonstrare sed in libro duodecimo de civitate dei satis a nobis est quantum arbitror explicatum. Fides autem ista totum hominem immortalem Iuturum, qui utique constat ex anima et corpore, et ob hoc vere beatum non argumentatione humana sed divina auctoritate promittit. Et ideo cum dictum esset in euangelio quod Iesus dederit potestatem filios dei fieri his qui receperunt eum et quid sit recepisse eum breviter fuisset expositum dicendo credentibus in nomine eius, quoque modo filii dei fierent esset adiunctum, quia non ex sangunibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex deo nati sunt ne ista hominum quam videmus et gestamus infirmitas tantam excellentiam desperaret ilico annexum est, Et verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, ut a contrario suaderetur quod incredibile videbatur. Si enim natura dei filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est hominis filius (hoc est enim, verbum caro factum est et habitavit in hominibus), quanto est credibilius natura filios hominis gratia dei fieri dei filios et habitare in deo in quo solo et de quo solo esse possint beati participes immortalitatis eius effecti, propter quod persuadendum dei filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effectus est?	12. Whether human nature can receive this, which yet it confesses to be desirable, is no small question. But if faith be present, which is in those to whom Jesus has given power to become the sons of God, then there is no question. Assuredly, of those who endeavor to discover it from human reasonings, scarcely a few, and they endued with great abilities, and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone. And even for the soul they have not found a blessed life that is stable, that is, true; since they have said that it returns to the miseries of this life even after blessedness. And they among them who are ashamed of this opinion, and have thought that the purified soul is to be placed in eternal happiness without a body, hold such opinions concerning the past eternity of the world, as to confute this opinion of theirs concerning the soul; a thing which here it is too long to demonstrate; but it has been, as I think, sufficiently explained by us in the twelfth book of the City of God. But that faith promises, not by human reasoning, but by divine authority, that the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body, shall be immortal, and on this account truly blessed. And so, when it had been said in the Gospel, that Jesus has given power to become the sons of God to them who received Him; and what it is to have received Him had been shortly explained by saying, To them that believe in His name; and it was further added in what way they are to become sons of God, viz., Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God;— lest that infirmity of men which we all see and bear should despair of attaining so great excellence, it is added in the same place, And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; that, on the contrary, men might be convinced of that which seemed incredible. For if He who is by nature the Son of God was made the Son of man through mercy for the sake of the sons of men—for this is what is meant by The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us men,— how much more credible is it that the sons of men by nature should be made the sons of God by the grace of God, and should dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone the blessed can be made partakers of that immortality; of which that we might be convinced, the Son of God was made partaker of our mortality?
[13.10.l3] Eos itaque qui dicunt: 'Itane defuit deo modus alius quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum filium deum sibi coaeternum hominem fieri vellet induendo humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum mortem perpeti?,' parum est sic refellere ut istum modum quo nos per mediatorem dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum deus liberare dignatur asseramus bonum et divinae congruum dignitati, verum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem deo defuisse cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse nec esse oportuisse. Quid enim tam necessarium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram mentesque mortalium conditione ipsius mortalitatis abiectas ab immortalitatis desperatione liberandas quam ut demonstraretur nobis quanti nos penderet deus quantumque diligeret? Quid vero huius rei tanto isto indicio manifestius atque praeclarius quam ut dei filius immutabiliter bonus in se manens quod erat et a nobis pro nobis accipiens quod non erat praeter suae naturae detrimentum nostrae dignatus inire consortium prius sine ullo malo suo merito mala nostra perferret, ac sic iam credentibus quantum nos diligat deus et quod desperabamus iam sperantibus dona in nos sua sine ullis bonis meritis nostris, immo praecedentibus et malis meritis nostris, indebita largitate conferret?	13. Those then who say, What, had God no other way by which He might free men from the misery of this mortality, that He should will the only-begotten Son, God co-eternal with Himself, to become man, by putting on a human soul and flesh, and being made mortal to endure death?— these, I say, it is not enough so to refute, as to assert that that mode by which God deigns to free us through the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is good and suitable to the dignity of God; but we must show also, not indeed that no other mode was possible to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there neither was nor need have been any other mode more appropriate for curing our misery. For what was so necessary for the building up of our hope, and for the freeing the minds of mortals cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, than that it should be demonstrated to us at how great a price God rated us, and how greatly He loved us? But what is more manifest and evident in this so great proof hereof, than that the Son of God, unchangeably good, remaining what He was in Himself, and receiving from us and for us what He was not, apart from any loss of His own nature, and deigning to enter into the fellowship of ours, should first, without any evil desert of His own, bear our evils; and so with unobligated munificence should bestow His own gifts upon us, who now believe how much God loves us, and who now hope that of which we used to despair, without any good deserts of our own, nay, with our evil deserts too going before?
[13.10.14] Quia et ea quae dicuntur merita nostra dona sunt eius. Ut enim fides per dilectionem operetur, caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. Tunc est autem datus quando est Iesus resurrectione clarificatus, tunc enim eum se missurum esse promisit et misit quia tunc sicut de illo scriptum est et ante praedictum: Ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus. Haec dona sunt merita nostra quibus ad summum bonum immortalis beatitudinis pervenimus. Commendat autem, inquit apostolus, caritatem suam deus in nobis quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salui erimus ab ira per ipsum. Adhuc addit et dicit: Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salui erimus in vita ipsius. Quos peccatores dixit prius, hos posterius inimicos dei; et quos prius iustificatos in sanguine Iesu Christi, eos posterius reconciliatos per mortem filii dei; et quos prius saluos ab ira per ipsum eos postea saluos in vita ipsius. Non ergo ante istam gratiam quoquo modo peccatores, sed in talibus peccatis fuimus ut inimici essemus dei. Superius autem idem apostolus nos peccatores et inimicos dei duobus identidem nominibus appellavit, uno velut mitissimo, alio plane atrocissimo dicens: Si enim Christus cum infirmi essemus adhuc iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est. Quos infirmos eosdem impios nuncupavit. Leue aliquid videtur infirmitas, sed aliquando talis est ut impietas nominetur. Nisi tamen infirmitas esset, medicum necessarium non haberet, qui est hebraice Iesus, graece *soter* nostra autem locutione saluator. Quod verbum latina lingua antea non habebat, sed habere poterat sicut potuit quando voluit. Haec autem apostoli sententia praecedens ubi ait: Adhuc cum infirmi essemus iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est, cohaeret his duabus sequentibus quarum in una dixit peccatores, in alia inimicos dei, tamquam illis singulis reddiderit singula, peccatores ad infirmos, inimicos dei referens ad impios.	14. Since those also which are called our deserts, are His gifts. For, that faith may work by love, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us. And He was then given, when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection. For then He promised that He Himself would send Him, and He sent Him; because then, as it was written and foretold of Him, He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. These gifts constitute our deserts, by which we arrive at the chief good of an immortal blessedness. But God, says the apostle, commends His love towards as, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. To this he goes on to add, For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. Those whom he first calls sinners he afterwards calls the enemies of God; and those whom he first speaks of as justified by His blood, he afterwards speaks of as reconciled by the death of the Son of God; and those whom he speaks of first as saved from wrath through Him, he afterwards speaks of as saved by His life. We were not, therefore, before that grace merely anyhow sinners, but in such sins that we were enemies of God. But the same apostle calls us above several times by two appellations, viz. sinners and enemies of God—one as if the most mild, the other plainly the most harsh—saying, For if when we were yet weak, in due time Christ died for the ungodly. Those whom he called weak, the same he called ungodly. Weakness seems something slight; but sometimes it is such as to be called impiety. Yet except it were weakness, it would not need a physician, who is in the Hebrew Jesus, in the Greek S?t??, but in our speech Saviour. And this word the Latin language had not previously, but could have seeing that it could have it when it wanted it. And this foregoing sentence of the apostle, where he says, For when we were yet weak, in due time He died for the ungodly, coheres with those two following sentences; in the one of which he spoke of sinners, in the other of enemies of God, as though he referred each severally to each, viz. sinners to the weak, the enemies of God to the ungodly.
[13.11.15] Sed quid est iustificati in sanguine ipsius? Quae vis est huius sanguinis obsecro ut in eo iustificentur credentes? Et quid est reconciliati per mortem filii eius? Itane vero cum irasceretur nobis deus pater vidit mortem filii sui pro nobis et placatus est nobis? Numquid ergo filius eius usque adeo nobis iam placatus erat ut pro nobis etiam dignaretur mori, pater vero usque adeo adhuc irascebatur ut nisi filius pro nobis moreretur non placaretur? Et quid est quod alio loco idem ipse doctor gentium: Quid ergo, inquit, dicemus ad haec? Si deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donavit? Numquid nisi iam placatus esset pater proprio filio non parcens pro nobis eum traderet? Nonne videtur haec illi velut adversa esse sententia? In illa moritur pro nobis filius, et reconciliatur nobis peter per eius mortem; in hac autem tamquam prior nos dilexerit pater, ipse propter nos filio non parcit, ipse pro nobis eum tradit ad mortem. Sed video quod et antea pater dilexit nos non solum antequam pro nobis filius moreretur sed antequam conderet mundum ipso teste apostolo qui dicit: sicut elegit nos in ipso ante constitutionem mundi. Nec filius patre sibi non parcente pro nobis velut inuitus est traditus quia et de ipso dictum est: Qui me dilexit et tradidit se ipsum pro me. Omnia ergo simul et pater et filius et amborum spiritus pariter et concorditer operantur. Tamen iustificati sumus in Christi sanguine et reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius et quomodo id factum sit ut potero etiam hic quantum satis videbitur explicabo.	15. But what is meant by justified in His blood? What power is there in this blood, I beseech you, that they who believe should be justified in it? And what is meant by being reconciled by the death of His Son? Was it indeed so, that when God the Father was angry with us, He saw the death of His Son for us, and was appeased towards us? Was then His Son already so far appeased towards us, that He even deigned to die for us; while the Father was still so far angry, that except His Son died for us, He would not be appeased? And what, then, is that which the same teacher of the Gentiles himself says in another place: What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; how has He not with Him also freely given us all things? Pray, unless the Father had been already appeased, would He have delivered up His own Son, not sparing Him for us? Does not this opinion seem to be as it were contrary to that? In the one, the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us by His death; in the other, as though the Father first loved us, He Himself on our account does not spare the Son, He Himself for us delivers Him up to death. But I see that the Father loved us also before, not only before the Son died for us, but before He created the world; the apostle himself being witness, who says, According as He has chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world. Nor was the Son delivered up for us as it were unwillingly, the Father Himself not sparing Him; for it is said also concerning Him, Who loved me, and delivered up Himself for me. Therefore together both the Father and the Son, and the Spirit of both, work all things equally and harmoniously; yet we are justified in the blood of Christ, and we are reconciled to God by the death of His Son. And I will explain, as I shall be able, here also, how this was done, as much as may seem sufficient.
[13.12.16] Quadam iustitia dei in potestatem diaboli traditum est genus humanum peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter transeunte et parentum primorum debito universos posteros obligante. Haec traditio prius in genesi significata est ubi cum serpenti dictum esset: Terram manducabis homini dictum est: Terra es et in terram ibis. Eo quod dictum est in terram ibis mors corporis praenuntiata est quia nec ipsam fuerat experturus si permansisset ut factus est rectus; quod vero viventi ait Terra es ostendit totum hominem in deterius commutatum. Tale est enim "Terra es" quale illud: Non permanebit spiritus meus in hominibus istis quoniam caro sunt. Tunc ergo demonstravit ei traditum cui dictum fuerat: Terram manducabis. Apostolus autem apertius hoc praedicat ubi dicit: Et vos cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis uestris in quibus aliquando ambulastis secundum saeculum mundi huius, secundum principem potestatis aeris, spiritus eius qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae in quibus et nos omnes aliquando conversati sumus in desideriis carnis nostrae facientes voluntates carnis et affectionum, et eramus natura filii irae sicut et caeteri. Filii diffidentiae sunt infideles, et quis hoc non est antequam fidelis fiat? Quocirca omnes homines ab origine sub principe sunt potestatis aeris qui operatur in filiis diffidentiae. Et quod dixi 'ab origine' hoc est quod dicit apostolus natura, et se fuisse sicut et caeteros, nature scilicet ut est deprauata peccato non ut recta create est ab initio. Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem non ita debet intellegi tamquam hoc deus fecerit aut fieri iusserit sed quod tantum permiserit, iuste tamen. Illo enim deserente peccantem peccati auctor ilico inuasit. Nec ita sane deus deseruit creaturam suam ut non se illi exhiberet deum creantem et vivificantem et inter poenalia male etiam bona malis multa praestantem; non enim continuit in ira sua miserationes suas. Nec hominem a lege suae potestatis amisit quando in diaboli potestate esse permisit quia nec ipse diabolus a potestate omnipotentis alienus est sicut neque a bonitate. Nam et maligni angeli unde qualicumque subsisterent vita nisi per eum qui vivificat omnia? Si ergo commissio peccatorum per iram dei iustam hominem subdidit diabolo, profecto remissio peccatorum per reconciliationem dei benignam eruit hominem a diabolo.	16. By the justice of God in some sense, the human race was delivered into the power of the devil; the sin of the first man passing over originally into all of both sexes in their birth through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binding their whole posterity. This delivering up is first signified in Genesis, where, when it had been said to the serpent, Dust shall you eat, it was said to the man, Dust you are, and unto dust you shall return. In the words, Unto dust shall you return, the death of the body is fore-announced, because he would not have experienced that either, if he had continued to the end upright as he was made; but in that it is said to him while still living, Dust you are, it is shown that the whole man was changed for the worse. For Dust you are is much the same as, My spirit shall not always remain in these men, for that they also are flesh. Therefore it was at that time shown, that he was delivered to him, in that it had been said to him, Dust shall you eat. But the apostle declares this more clearly, where he says: And you who were dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now works in the children of unfaithfulness; among whom we also had our conversation in times past, in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. The children of unfaithfulness are the unbelievers; and who is not this before he becomes a believer? And therefore all men are originally under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the children of unfaithfulness. And that which I have expressed by originally is the same that the apostle expresses when he speaks of themselves who by nature were as others; viz. by nature as it has been depraved by sin, not as it was created upright from the beginning. But the way in which man was thus delivered into the power of the devil, ought not to be so understood as if God did this, or commanded it to be done; but that He only permitted it, yet that justly. For when He abandoned the sinner, the author of the sin immediately entered. Yet God did not certainly so abandon His own creature as not to show Himself to him as God creating and quickening, and among penal evils bestowing also many good things upon the evil. For He has not in anger shut up His tender mercies. Nor did He dismiss man from the law of His own power, when He permitted him to be in the power of the devil; since even the devil himself is not separated from the power of the Omnipotent, as neither from His goodness. For whence do even the evil angels subsist in whatever manner of life they have, except through Him who quickens all things? If, therefore, the commission of sins through the just anger of God subjected man to the devil, doubtless the remission of sins through the merciful reconciliation of God rescues man from the devil.
[13.13.17] Non autem diabolus potentia dei sed iustitia superandus fuit. Nam quid omnipotente potentius, aut cuius creaturae potestas potestati creatoris comparari potest? Sed cum diabolus vitio peruersitatis suae factus sit amator potentiae et desertor oppugnatorque iustitiae (sic enim et homines eum tanto magis imitantur quanto magis neglecta vel etiam perosa iustitia potentiae student eiusque vel adeptione laetantur vel inflammantur cupiditate), placuit deo ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate non potentia diabolus sed iustitia vinceretur, atque ita et homines imitantes Christum iustitia quaererent diabolum vincere non potentia. Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit, sed ordo servandus est quo prior est iustitia. Nam quanta potentia potest esse mortalium? Teneant ergo mortales iustitiam; potentia immortalibus dabitur. Cui comparata quantalibet eorum hominum qui potentes vocantur in terra ridicula infirmitas invenitur, et ibi foditur peccatori fovea ubi videntur mali plurimum posse. Cantat autem iustus et dicit: Beatus homo quem tu erudieris, domine, et ex lege tua docueris eum ut mitiges eum a diebus malignis donec fodiatur peccatori fovea. Quoniam non repellet dominus plebem suam et haereditatem suam non derelinquet quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium, et qui habent eam omnes recto sunt corde. Hoc igitur tempore quo differtur potentia populi dei non repellet dominibus plebem suam et haereditatem suam non derelinquet quantalibet acerba et indigna ipsa humilis atque infirma patiatur quoadusque iustitia quam nunc habet infirmitas piorum convertatur in indicium, hoc est iudicandi accipiat potestatem, quod iustis in finem servatur cum praecedentem iustitiam ordine suo fuerit potentia subsecuta. Potentia quippe adiuncta iustitiae vel iustitia accedente potentiae iudiciariam potestatem facit. Pertinet autem iustitia ad voluntatem bonam, unde dictum est ab angelis nato Christo: Gloria in excelsis deo et in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis. Potentia vero sequi debet iustitiam non praeire, ideo et in rebus secundis ponitur, id est prosperis; 'secundae' autem a 'sequendo' sunt dictae. Cum enim beatum faciant sicut superius disputavimus duae res bene velle et posse quod velis, non debet esse illa peruersitas quae in eadem disputatione notata est ut ex duabus rebus quae faciunt beatum posse quod velit homo eligat et velle quod oportet negligat cum prius debeat habere voluntatem bonam, magnam vero postea potestatem. Bona porro voluntas purganda est a vitiis a quibus si vincitur homo, ad hoc vincitur ut male velit, et bona iam voluntas eius quomodo erit? Optandum est itaque ut potestas nunc detur sed contra vitia propter quae vincenda potentes esse nolunt homines et volunt propter vincendos homines. Ut quid hoc nisi ut vere victi falso vincant, nec sint veritate sed opinione victores? Velit homo prudens esse, velit fortis, velit temperans, velit iustus, atque ut haec veraciter possit potentiam plane optet, atque appetat ut potens sit in se ipso et miro modo adversum se ipsum pro se ipso. Caetera vero quae bene vult et tamen non potest sicuti est immortalitas et vera ac plena felicitas desiderare non cesset et patienter exspectet.	17. But the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, but by His righteousness. For what is more powerful than the Omnipotent? Or what creature is there of which the power can be compared to the power of the Creator? But since the devil, by the fault of his own perversity, was made a lover of power, and a forsaker and assailant of righteousness—for thus also men imitate him so much the more in proportion as they set their hearts on power, to the neglect or even hatred of righteousness, and as they either rejoice in the attainment of power, or are inflamed by the lust of it—it pleased God, that in order to the rescuing of man from the grasp of the devil, the devil should be conquered, not by power, but by righteousness; and that so also men, imitating Christ, should seek to conquer the devil by righteousness, not by power. Not that power is to be shunned as as though it were something evil; but the order must be preserved, whereby righteousness is before it. For how great can be the power of mortals? Therefore let mortals cleave to righteousness; power will be given to immortals. And compared to this, the power, how great soever, of those men who are called powerful on earth, is found to be ridiculous weakness, and a pitfall is dug there for the sinner, where the wicked seem to be most powerful. And the righteous man says in his song, Blessed is the man whom You chasten, O Lord, and teach out of Your law: that You may give him rest from the days of adversity, until the pit be dug for the wicked. For the Lord will not cast off His people, neither will He forsake His inheritance, until righteousness return unto judgment, and all who follow it are upright in heart. At this present time, then, in which the might of the people of God is delayed, the Lord will not cast off His people, neither will He forsake His inheritance, how bitter and unworthy things soever it may suffer in its humility and weakness; until the righteousness, which the weakness of the pious now possesses, shall return to judgment, that is, shall receive the power of judging; which is preserved in the end for the righteous when power in its due order shall have followed after righteousness going before. For power joined to righteousness, or righteousness added to power, constitutes a judicial authority. But righteousness belongs to a good will; whence it was said by the angels when Christ was born: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will. But power ought to follow righteousness, not to go before it; and accordingly it is placed in second, that is, prosperous fortune; and this is called second, from following. For whereas two things make a man blessed, as we have argued above, to will well, and to be able to do what one wills, people ought not to be so perverse, as has been noted in the same discussion, as that a man should choose from the two things which make him blessed, the being able to do what he wills, and should neglect to will what he ought; whereas he ought first to have a good will, but great power afterwards. Further, a good will must be purged from vices, by which if a man is overcome, he is in such wise overcome as that he wills evil; and then how will his will be still good? It is to be wished, then, that power may now be given, but power against vices, to conquer which men do not wish to be powerful, while they wish to be so in order to conquer men; and why is this, unless that, being in truth conquered, they feignedly conquer, and are conquerors not in truth, but in opinion? Let a man will to be prudent, will to be strong, will to be temperate, will to be just; and that he may be able to have these things truly, let him certainly desire power, and seek to be powerful in himself, and (strange though it be) against himself for himself. But all the other things which he wills rightly, and yet is not able to have, as, for instance, immortality and true and full felicity, let him not cease to long for, and let him patiently expect.
[13.14.18] Quae est igitur iustitia qua victus est diabolus? Quae nisi iustitia Iesu Christi? Et quomodo victus est? Quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum tamen. Et utique iustum est ut debitores quos tenebat liberi dimittantur in eum credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. Hoc est quod iustificari dicimur in Christi sanguine. Sic quippe in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum innocens ille sanguis effusus est. Unde se dicit in psalmis in mortuis liberum; solus enim a debito mortis liber est mortuus. Hinc et in alio psalmo dicit: Quae non rapui tunc exsoluebam rapinam volens intellegi peccatum quia usurpatum est contra licitum. Unde per os etiam carnis suae sicut in euangelio legitur dicit: Ecce venit princeps huius mundi et in me nihil invenit id est nullum peccatum, sed ut sciant omnes, inquit, quia voluntatem patris mei facio, surgite, eamus hinc. Et pergit inde ad passionem ut pro debitoribus nobis quod ipse non debebat exsolueret. Numquid isto iure aequissimo diabolus vinceretur si potentia Christus cum illo agere non iustitia voluisset? Sed, postposuit quod potuit ut prius ageret quod oportuit; ideo autem illum esse opus erat et hominem et deum. Nisi enim homo esset, non posset occidi; nisi et deus esset, non crederetur noluisse quod potuit sed non potuisse quod voluit, nec ab eo potentiae praelatam fuisse iustitiam sed ei defuisse potentiam putaremus. Nunc vero humana pro nobis passus est quia homo erat; sed si noluisset, etiam hoc non pati potuisset quia et deus erat. Ideo gratior facta est in humilitate iustitia quia posset si noluisset humilitatem non perpeti tanta in divinitate potentia, ac sic a moriente tam potente nobis mortalib us imp ot entibus et comme n data est iustitia et promissa potentia. Horum enim duorum unum fecit moriendo alterum resurgendo. Quid enim iustius quam usque ad mortem crucis pro iustitia pervenire? Et quid potentius quam resurgere a mortuis et in caelum cum ipsa carne in qua est occisus ascendere? Et iustitia ergo prius et potentia postea diabolum vicit, iustitia scilicet quia nullum peccatunt habuit et ab illo est iniustissime occisus, potentia vero quia revixit mortnus nu.mqua1n postea moriturus. Sed potentia diabolum vicisset ettamsi ab illo non potuisset occidi, quamvis maioris sit potentiae etiam ipsam mortem vincere resurgendo quam vitare vinendo. Sed aliud est propter quod iustificamur in Christi sanguqne cum per remissionem peccatorum eruimur de diaboli potestate; hoc ad id pertinet quod a Christo iustitia diabolus vincitur non potentia. Ex infirmitate quippe quam suscepit in carne mortali non ex immortali potentia crucifixus est Christus, de qua tamen infirmitate ait apostolus: Quod infirmum est dei fortius est hominibus.	18. What, then, is the righteousness by which the devil was conquered? What, except the righteousness of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because, when he found in Him nothing worthy of death, yet he slew Him. And certainly it is just, that we whom he held as debtors, should be dismissed free by believing in Him whom he slew without any debt. In this way it is that we are said to be justified in the blood of Christ. For so that innocent blood was shed for the remission of our sins. Whence He calls Himself in the Psalms, Free among the dead. For he only that is dead is free from the debt of death. Hence also in another psalm He says, Then I restored that which I seized not; meaning sin by the thing seized, because sin is laid hold of against what is lawful. Whence also He says, by the mouth of His own Flesh, as is read in the Gospel: For the prince of this world comes, and has nothing in me, that is, no sin; but that the world may know, He says, that I do the commandment of the Father; arise, let us go hence. And hence He proceeds to His passion, that He might pay for us debtors that which He Himself did not owe. Would then the devil be conquered by this most just right, if Christ had willed to deal with him by power, not by righteousness? But He held back what was possible to Him, in order that He might first do what was fitting. And hence it was necessary that He should be both man and God. For unless He had been man, He could not have been slain; unless He had been God, men would not have believed that He would not do what He could, but that He could not do what He would; nor should we have thought that righteousness was preferred by Him to power, but that He lacked power. But now He suffered for us things belonging to man, because He was man; but if He had been unwilling, it would have been in His power to not so to suffer, because He was also God. And righteousness was therefore made more acceptable in humility, because so great power as was in His Divinity, if He had been unwilling, would have been able not to suffer humility; and thus by Him who died, being thus powerful, both righteousness was commended, and power promised, to us, weak mortals. For He did one of these two things by dying, the other by rising again. For what is more righteous, than to come even to the death of the cross for righteousness? And what more powerful, than to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven with that very flesh in which He was slain? And therefore He conquered the devil first by righteousness, and afterwards by power: namely, by righteousness, because He had no sin, and was slain by him most unjustly; but by power, because having been dead He lived again, never afterwards to die. But He would have conquered the devil by power, even though He could not have been slain by him: although it belongs to a greater power to conquer death itself also by rising again, than to avoid it by living. But the reason is really a different one, why we are justified in the blood of Christ, when we are rescued from the power of the devil through the remission of sins: it pertains to this, that the devil is conquered by Christ by righteousness, not by power. For Christ was crucified, not through immortal power, but through the weakness which He took upon Him in mortal flesh; of which weakness nevertheless the apostle says, that the weakness of God is stronger than men.
[13.15.19] Non est itaque difficile videre diabolum victum quando qui ab illo occisus est resurrexit. Illud est maius et ad intellegendum profundius, videre diabolum victum quando sibi vicisse videbatur, id est quando Christus occisus est. Tunc enim sanguis ille, quoniam eius erat qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum, ad reqnissionem nostrorum fusus est peccatorum ut quia eos diabolus merito tenebat quos peccati reos conditione mortis obstrinxit, hos per eum merito dimitteret quem nullius peccati reum immerito poena mortis affecit. Hac iustitia victus et hoc vinculo vinctus est fortis ut uasa eius eriperentur quae apud eum cum ipso et angelis eius fuerant uasa irae et in ttasa misericordiae verterentur. Haec quippe verba ipsius domini Iesu Christi de caelo ad se facta cum primum vocatus est, narrat apostolus Paulus. Nam inter caetera quae audivit etiam hoc sibi dictum sic loquitur: Ad hoc enim tibi apparui ut constituam te ministrum et testem eorum quae a me vides, quibus etiam praceo tibi liberans te de populo et de gentibus in quas ego mitto te aperire oculos caecorum ut avertantur a tenebris et potestate satanae ad deum ut accipiant remissionem peccatorum et sortem quae in sanctis et fidem quae in me est. Unde et exhortans idem apostolus credentes ad gratiarum actionem deo patri: Qui eruit nos, inquit, de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae, in quo habemus redemptionem in remissionem peccatorum. In hac redemptione tamquam pretium pro nobis datus est sanguis Christi, quo accepto diabolus non ditatus est sed ligatus, ut nos ab eius nexibus solueremur, nec quemquam secum eorum quos Christus ab omni debito liber indebite fuso suo sanguine redemisset peccatorum retibus inuolutum traheret ad secundae ac sempiternae mortis exitium, sed hactenus morerentur ad Christi gratiam pertinentes, praecogniti et praedestinati et electi ante constitutionem mundi quatenus proillis ipse mortuus est Christus carnis tantum morte non spiritus.	19. It is not then difficult to see that the devil was conquered, when he who was slain by Him rose again. It is something more, and more profound of comprehension, to see that the devil was conquered when he thought himself to have conquered, that is, when Christ was slain. For then that blood, since it was His who had no sin at all, was poured out for the remission of our sins; that, because the devil deservedly held those whom, as guilty of sin, he bound by the condition of death, he might deservedly loose them through Him, whom, as guilty of no sin, the punishment of death undeservedly affected. The strong man was conquered by this righteousness, and bound with this chain, that his vessels might be spoiled, which with himself and his angels had been vessels of wrath while with him, and might be turned into vessels of mercy. For the Apostle Paul tells us, that these words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself were spoken from heaven to him when he was first called. For among the other things which he heard, he speaks also of this as said to him thus: For I have appeared unto you for this purpose, to make you a minister and a witness both of these things which you have seen from me, and of those things in the which I will appear unto you; delivering you from the people, and from the Gentiles, unto whom now I send you, to open the eyes of the blind, and to turn them from darkness [to light], and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified, and faith that is in me. And hence the same apostle also, exhorting believers to the giving of thanks to God the Father, says: Who has delivered us from the power of darkness and has translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son: in whom we have redemption, even the forgiveness of sins. In this redemption, the blood of Christ was given, as it were, as a price for us, by accepting which the devil was not enriched, but bound: that we might be loosened from his bonds, and that he might not with himself involve in the meshes of sins, and so deliver to the destruction of the second and eternal death, any one of those whom Christ, free from all debt, had redeemed by pouring out His own blood unindebtedly; but that they who belong to the grace of Christ, foreknown, and predestinated, and elected before the foundation of the world should only so far die as Christ Himself died for them, i.e. only by the death of the flesh, not of the spirit.
[13.16.20] Quamvis enim et ipsa mors carnis de peccato primi hominis originaliter venerit, tamen bonus eius usus gloriosissimos martyres fecit. Et ideo non solum ipsa sed omnia saeculi huius mala, dolores laboresque hominum, quamquam de peccatorum et maxime de peccati originalis meritis veniant unde facta est et ipsa vita vinculo mortis obstricta, tamen et remissis peccatis remanere debuerunt cum quibus homo pro veritate certaret et unde exerceretur virtus fidelium ut nouus homo per testamentum nouum inter mala huius saeculi nouo saeculo praepararetur, miseriam quam meruit vita ista damnata sapienter tolerans, et quia finietur prudenter gratulans, beatitudinem vero quam liberata vita futura sine fine habitura est fideliter et patienter exspectans. Diabolus enim a dominatu et a cordibus fidelium foras missus in quorum damnatione atque infidelitate licet damnatus etiam ipse regnabat, tantum pro conditione mortalitatis huius adversari sinitur quantum eis expedire novit de quo sacrae litterae personant per os apostolicum: Fidelis deus qui non permittat vos temptari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet cum temptatione etiam exitum ut possitis sustinere. Prosunt autem ista mala quae fideles pie perferunt vel ad emendanda peccata vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam vel ad demonstrandam vitae huius miseriam ut illa ubi erit beatitudo vera atque perpetua et desideretur ardentius et instantius inquiratur. Sed circa eos ista servantur de quibus apostolus dicit: Scimus quoniam diligentibus deum omnia cooperatur in bonum, his qui secundum propositum vocati sunt. Quoniam quos ante praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes imaginis filii eius ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Quos autem praedestinavit. illos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, ipsos et iustificavit, quos autem iustificavit, ipsos et glorificavit. Horum praedestinatorum nemo cum diabolo perit; nemo usque ad mortem sub diaboli potestate remanebit. Deinde sequitur quod iam supra commemoravi: Quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Si deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, quomodo non et cum illo omnia nobis donavit?	20. For although the death, too, of the flesh itself came originally from the sin of the first man, yet the good use of it has made most glorious martyrs. And so not only that death itself, bat all the evils of this world, and the griefs and labors of men, although they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence life itself too became bound by the bond of death, yet have fitly remained, even when sin is forgiven; that man might have wherewith to contend for truth, and whereby the goodness of the faithful might be exercised; in order that the new man through the new covenant might be made ready among the evils of this world for a new world, by bearing wisely the misery which this condemned life deserved, and by rejoicing soberly because it will be finished, but expecting faithfully and patiently the blessedness which the future life, being set free, will have for ever. For the devil being cast forth from his dominion, and from the hearts of the faithful, in the condemnation and faithlessness of whom he, although himself also condemned, yet reigned, is only so far permitted to be an adversary according to the condition of this mortality, as God knows to be expedient for them: concerning which the sacred writings speak through the mouth of the apostle: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that you may be able to bear it. And those evils which the faithful endure piously, are of profit either for the correction of sins, or for the exercising and proving of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of this life, that the life where will be that true and perpetual blessedness may be desired more ardently, and sought out more earnestly. But it is on their account that these evils are still kept in being, of whom the apostle says: For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called to be holy according to His purpose. For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified. It is of these who are predestinated, that not one shall perish with the devil; not one shall remain even to death under the power of the devil. And then follows what I have already cited above: What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all; how has He not with Him also freely given us all things?
[13.16.21] Cur ergo non fieret mors Christi? Immo cur non praetermissis aliis innumerabilibus modis quibus ad nos liberandos uti posses omnipotens ipsa potissimum eligeretur ut fieret ubi nec de divinitate eius aliquid imminutum est aut mutatum et de humanitate suscepta tantum beneficii conlatum est hominibus ut a dei filio sempiterno eodemque hominis filio mors temporalis indebita redderetur qua eos a sempiterna morte debita liberaret? Peccata nostra diabolus tenebat et per illa nos merito figebat in morte. Dimisit ea ille qui sue non habebat, et ab illo immerito est perductus ad mortem. Tanti valuit sanguis ille ut neminem Christo indutum in aeterna morte debita detinere debuerit qui Christum morte indebita vel ad tempus occidit. Commendat ergo caritatem suam deus in nobis quondam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortults est. Multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salui erimus ab ira per ipsum. Iustificati, inquit, in sanguine ipsius, iustificati plane in eo quod a peccatis omnibus liberati, liberati autem a peccatis omnibus quondam pro nobis est dei filius qui nullum habebat occisus. Salui ergo erimus ab ira per ipsum, ab ira utique dei quae nihil est aliud quam iusta vindicta. Non enim sicut hominis animi perturbatio est ire dei, sed illius ire est cui dicit alio loco sancta scriptura: Tu autem dominus virtutum cum tranquillitate iudicas. Si ergo iusta divina vindicta tale nomen accepit, etiam reconciliatio dei quae recte intellegitur nisi cum talis ire finitur? Nec inimici eramus deo nisi quemadmodum iustitiae sunt inimica peccata, quibus remissis tales inimicitiae finiuntur et reconciliantur iusto quos ipse iustificat. Quos tamen etiam inimicos utique dilexit quandoquidem filio proprio non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus, cum adhuc inimici essemus, tradidit eum. Recte ergo apostolus secutus adiunxit: Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus deo per mortem filii eius per quam facta est illa remissio peccatorum, multo magis reconciliati salui erimus in vita ipsius, in vita salui qui per mortem reconciliati. Quis enim dubitet daturum amicis vitam suam pro quibus inimicis dedit mortem suam? Non solum autem, inquit, sed et gloriamur in deo per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus. Non solum, ait, salui erimus, sed et gloriamur; nec in nobis sed in deo; nec per nos sed per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus secundum ea quae superius disputata sunt. Deinde subiungit apostolus: Propter hoc sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit et per peccatum mors , et ita in omnes homines pertransiit in quo omnes peccaverunt... etc. in quibus prolixius de duobus hominibus disputat; uno eodemque primo Adam per cuius peccatum et mortem tamquam haereditariis malis posteri eius obligati sumus; altero autem secundo Adam qui non homo tantum sed etiam deus est quo pro nobis soluente quod non debebat a debitis et paternis et propriis liberati sumus. Proinde quoniam propter unum illum tenebat diabolus omnes per eius vitiatam carnalem concupiscentiam generatos, iustum est ut propter hunc unum dimittat omnes per ipsius immaculatam gratiam spiritalem regeneratos.	21. Why then should the death of Christ not have come to pass? Nay, rather, why should not that death itself have been chosen above all else to be brought to pass, to the passing by of the other innumerable ways which He who is omnipotent could have employed to free us; that death, I say, wherein neither was anything diminished or changed from His divinity, and so great benefit was conferred upon men, from the humanity which He took upon Him, that a temporal death, which was not due, was rendered by the eternal Son of God, who was also the Son of man, whereby He might free them from an eternal death which was due? The devil was holding fast our sins, and through them was fixing us deservedly in death. He discharged them, who had none of His own, and who was led by him to death undeservedly. That blood was of such price, that he who even slew Christ for a time by a death which was not due, can as his due detain no one, who has put on Christ, in the eternal death which was due. Therefore God commends His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified in His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. Justified, he says, in His blood,— justified plainly, in that we are freed from all sin; and freed from all sin, because the Son of God, who knew no sin, was slain for us. Therefore we shall be saved from wrath through Him; from the wrath certainly of God, which is nothing else but just retribution. For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a perturbation of the mind; but it is the wrath of Him to whom Holy Scripture says in another place, But You, O Lord, mastering Your power, judgest with calmness. If, therefore, the just retribution of God has received such a name, what can be the right understanding also of the reconciliation of God, unless that then such wrath comes to an end? Neither were we enemies to God, except as sins are enemies to righteousness; which being forgiven, such enmities come to an end, and they whom He Himself justifies are reconciled to the Just One. And yet certainly He loved them even while still enemies, since He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, when we were still enemies. And therefore the apostle has rightly added: For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, by which that remission of sins was made, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved in His life. Saved in life, who were reconciled by death. For who can doubt that He will give His life for His friends, for whom, when enemies, He gave His death? And not only so, he says, but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement. Not only, he says, shall we be saved, but we also joy; and not in ourselves, but in God; nor through ourselves, but through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement, as we have argued above. Then the apostle adds, Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned; etc.: in which he disputes at some length concerning the two men; the one the first Adam, through whose sin and death we, his descendants, are bound by, as it were, hereditary evils; and the other the second Adam, who is not only man, but also God, by whose payment for us of what He owed not, we are freed from the debts both of our first father and of ourselves. Further, since on account of that one the devil held all who were begotten through his corrupted carnal concupiscence, it is just that on account of this one he should loose all who are regenerated through His immaculate spiritual grace.
[13.17.22] Sunt et alia multa quae in Christi incarnatione quae superbis displicet, salubriter intuenda atque cogitanda sunt. Quorum est unum quod demonstratum est homini quem locum haberet in rebus quas deus condidit quandoquidem sic deo coniungi potuit humana natura ut ex duabus substantiis fieret una persona ac per hoc iam ex tribus, deo, anima et carne, ut superbi illi maligni spiritus qui se ad decipiendum quasi ad adivuandum medios interponunt non ideo se audeant homini praeponere quia non habent carnem maxime quia et mori in eadem carne dignatus est ne ideo illi tamquam deos se coli persuadeant quia videntur esse immortales. Deinde ut gratia dei nobis sine ullis praecedentibus meritis in homine Christo commendaretur quia nec ipse ut tanta unitate vero deo coniunctus una cum illo persona filius dei fieret ullis est praecedentibus meritis assecutus, sed ex quo esse homo coepit, ex illo est et deus, unde dictum est: Verbum caro factum est. Est etiam illud ut superbia hominis quae maximo impedimento est ne inhaereatur deo per tantam dei humilitatem redargui posset atque sanari. Discit quoque homo quam longe recesserit a deo, quod illi valeat ad medicinalem dolorem, quando per talem mediatorem redit qui hominibus et deus divinitate subvenit et homo infirmitate convenit. Quod autem maius obedientiae nobis praeberetur exemplum qui per inobedientiam perieramus quam deo patri deus filius obediens usque ad mortem crucis? Quid praemium ipsius obedientiae ubi ostenderetur melius quam in carne tanti mediatoris quae ad vitam resurrexit aeternam? Pertinebat etiam ad iustitiam bonitatemque creatoris ut per eandem rationalem creaturam superaretur diabolus quam se superasse gaudebat, et de ipso genere venientem quod genus origine vitiata per unum tenebat universum.	22. There are many other things also in the incarnation of Christ, displeasing as it is to the proud, that are to be observed and thought of advantageously. And one of them is, that it has been demonstrated to man what place he has in the things which God has created; since human nature could so be joined to God, that one person could be made of two substances, and thereby indeed of three— God, soul, and flesh: so that those proud malignant spirits, who interpose themselves as mediators to deceive, although as if to help, do not therefore dare to place themselves above man because they have not flesh; and chiefly because the Son of God deigned to die also in the same flesh, lest they, because they seem to be immortal, should therefore succeed in getting themselves worshipped as gods. Further, that the grace of God might be commended to us in the man Christ without any precedent merits; because not even He Himself obtained by any precedent merits that He should be joined in such great unity with the true God, and should become the Son of God, one Person with Him; but from the time when He began to be man, from that time He is also God; whence it is said, The Word was made flesh. Then, again, there is this, that the pride of man, which is the chief hindrance against his cleaving to God, can be confuted and healed through such great humility of God. Man learns also how far he has gone away from God; and what it is worth to him as a pain to cure him, when he returns through such a Mediator, who both as God assists men by His divinity, and as man agrees with men by His weakness. For what greater example of obedience could be given to us, who had perished through disobedience, than God the Son obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross? Nay, wherein could the reward of obedience itself be better shown, than in the flesh of so great a Mediator, which rose again to eternal life? It belonged also to the justice and goodness of the Creator, that the devil should be conquered by the same rational creature which he rejoiced to have conquered, and by one that came from that same race which, by the corruption of its origin through one, he held altogether.
[13.18.23] Poterat enim utique deus hominem aliunde suscipere in quo esset mediator dei et hominum, non de genere illius Adam qui peccato suo genus obligavit humanum, sicut ipsum quem primum creavit non de genere creavit alicuius. Poterat ergo vel sic vel alio quo vellet modo creare unum alium de quo vinceretur victor prioris, sed melius iudicavit et de ipso quod victum fuerat genere assumere hominem deus per quem generis humani vinceret inimicum, et tamen ex virgine cuius conceptum spiritus non caro, fides non libido praevenit. Nec interfuit carnis concupiscentia per quam seminantur et concipiuntur caeteri qui trahunt originale peccatum, sed ea penitus remotissima credendo non concumbendo sancta est fecundata virginitas ut illud quod nascebatur ex propagine primi hominis tantummodo generis non et criminis originem duceret. Nascebatur namque non transgressionis contagione vitiata natura sed omnium talium vitiorum sola medicina. Nascebatur, inquam, homo nullum habens, nullum habiturus omnino peccatum, per quem renascerentur liberandi a peccato qui nasci non possent sine peccato. Quamvis enim carnali concupiscentia quae inest genitalibus membris bene utatur castitas coniugalis, habet tamen motus non voluntarios quibus ostendit vel nullam se in paradiso ante peccatum esse potuisse vel non talem fuisse si fuit ut aliquando resisteret moluntati. Nunc autem illam talem esse sentimus ut repugnans legimentis etiam si nulla est causa generandi stimulus ingerat coeundi, ubi si ei ceditur, peccando satietur, si nor1 ceditur, dissentiendo frenetur, quae duo aliena fuisse a paradiso ante peccatum, dubitare quis possit? Nam neque illa honestas faciebat aliquid indecorum neque illa felicitas patietatur aliquid impacatum. Oportebat itaque ut ista carnalis concupiscentia nulla ibi esset omnino quando concipiebatur virginis partus in quo nihil morte dignum fuerat inventurus, et eum tamen occisurus auctor mortis auctoris vitae morte vincendus. Victor primi Adam et tenens genus humanum victus a secundo Adam et amittens genus christianum liberatum ex humano genere ab humano crimine per eum qui non erat in crimine, quamvis esset ex genere, ut deceptor ille ab eo vinceretur genere quod vicerat crimine. Et hoc ita gestum est ut homo non extollatur, sed qui gloriatur in domino glorietur. Qui enim victus est homo tantum erat, et ideo victus est quia superbe deus esse cupiebat; qui autem vicit et homo et deus erat, et ideo sic vicit natus ex virgine quia deus humiliter, non quomodo alios sanctos regebat illum hominem, sed gerebat. Haec tanta dei dona et si qua alia sunt quae de hac re nobis et quaerere nunc et disserere longum est nisi verbum caro fieret, nulla essent.	23. For assuredly God could have taken upon Himself to be man, that in that manhood He might be the Mediator between God and men, from some other source, and not from the race of that Adam who bound the human race by his sin; as He did not create him whom He first created, of the race of some one else. Therefore He was able, either so, or in any other mode that He would, to create yet one other, by whom the conqueror of the first might be conquered. But God judged it better both to take upon Him man through whom to conquer the enemy of the human race, from the race itself that had been conquered; and yet to do this of a virgin, whose conception, not flesh but spirit, not lust but faith, preceded. Nor did that concupiscence of the flesh intervene, by which the rest of men, who derive original sin, are propagated and conceived; but holy virginity became pregnant, not by conjugal intercourse, but by faith—lust being utterly absent—so that that which was born from the root of the first man might derive only the origin of race, not also of guilt. For there was born, not a nature corrupted by the contagion of transgression, but the one only remedy of all such corruptions. There was born, I say, a Man having nothing at all, and to have nothing at all, of sin; through whom they were to be born again so as to be freed from sin, who could not be born without sin. For although conjugal chastity makes a right use of the carnal concupiscence which is in our members; yet it is liable to motions not voluntary, by which it shows either that it could not have existed at all in paradise before sin, or if it did, that it was not then such as that sometimes it should resist the will. But now we feel it to be such, that in opposition to the law of the mind, and even if there is no question of begetting, it works in us the incitement of sexual intercourse; and if in this men yield to it, then it is satisfied by an act of sin; if they do not, then it is bridled by an act of refusal: which two things who could doubt to have been alien from paradise before sin? For neither did the chastity that then was do anything indecorous, nor did the pleasure that then was suffer anything unquiet. It was necessary, therefore, that this carnal concupiscence should be entirely absent, when the offspring of the Virgin was conceived; in whom the author of death was to find nothing worthy of death, and yet was to slay Him in order that he might be conquered by the death of the Author of life: the conqueror of the first Adam, who held fast the human race, conquered by the second Adam, and losing the Christian race, freed out of the human race from human guilt, through Him who was not in the guilt, although He was of the race; that that deceiver might be conquered by that race which he had conquered by guilt. And this was so done, in order that man may not be lifted up, but that he that glories should glory in the Lord. For he who was conquered was only man; and he was therefore conquered, because he lusted proudly to be a god. But He who conquered was both man and God; and therefore He so conquered, being born of a virgin, because God in humility did not, as He governs other saints, so govern that Man, but bare Him [as a Son]. These so great gifts of God, and whatever else there are, which it is too long for us now upon this subject both to inquire and to discuss, could not exist unless the Word had been made flesh.
[13.19.24] Haec autem omnia quae pro nobis verbum caro factum temporaliter et localiter fecit et pertulit secundum distinctionem quam demonstrare suscepimus ad scientiam pertinent non ad sapientiam. Quod autem verbum est sine tempore et sine loco est patri coaeternum et ubique totum, de quo si quisquam potest quantum potest veracem proferre sermonem, sermo erit ille sapientiae; ac per hoc verbum caro factum, quod est Christus Iesus et sapientiae thesauros habet et scientiae. Nam scribens apostolus ad colossenses: Volo enim vos scire, inquit, quantum certamen habeam pro vobis et pro his qui Laodiciae sunt et quicumque non viderunt faciem meam in carne ut consolentur corda eorum copulati in caritate et in omnibus divitiis plenitudinis intellectus ad cognoscendum mysterium dei quod est Christus in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Quatenus noverat apostolus thesauros istos, quantum eorum penetraverat et in eis ad quanta peruenerat, quis potest nosse? Ego tamen secundum id quod scriptum est: Unicuique autem nostrum datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum si ita inter se distant haec duo ut sapientia divinis, scientia humanis attributa sit rebus, utrumque agnosco in Christo et mecum omnis eius fidelis. Et cum lego verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, in verbo intellego verum dei filium, in carne agnosco verum hominis lilium, et utrumque simul in unam personam dei et hominis ineffabili gratiae largitate coniunctum. Propter quod sequitur ac dicit: Et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatais. Si gratiam referamus ad scientiam, veritatem ad sapientiam, puto nos ab illa duarum istarum rerum distinctione quam commendavimus non abhorrere. In rebus enim per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est quod homo in unitatem personae coniunctus est deo, in rebus vero aeternis summa veritas recte tribuitur dei verbo. Quod vero idem ipse est unigenitus a patre plenus gratiae et veritatis, id actuary est ut idem ipse sit in rebus pro nobis temporaliter gestis cui per eandem fidem mundamur ut eum stabiliter contemplemur in rebus aeternis. Illi autem praecipui gentium philosophi qui inuisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicere potuerunt, tamen quia sine mediatore, id est sine homine Christo philosophati sunt, quem nec venturum prophetis nec venisse apostolis crediderunt, veritatem detinverunt sicut de illis dictum est in iniquitate. Non potuerunt enim in his rebus infimis constituti nisi quaerere aliqua media per quae ad illa quae intellexerant sublimia pervenirent, atque ita in deceptores daemones inciderunt per quos factum est ut immutarent gloriam incorruptibilis dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium. In talibus enim formis etiam idola instituerunt sive coluerunt. Scientia ergo nostra Christus est, sapientia quoque nostra idem Christus est. Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit; ipse de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Per ipsum pergimus ad ipsum, tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam; ab uno tamen eodemque Christo non recedimus in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Sed nunc de scientia loquimur, post de sapientia quantum ipse donaverit locuturi. Nec ista duo sic accipiamus quasi non liceat dicere vel istam sapientiam quae in rebus humanis est vel illam scientiam quae in divinis. Loquendi enim latiore consuetudine utraque sapientia, utraque scientia dici potest. Nullo modo tamen scriptum esset apud apostolum, alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae nisi et proprie singulis nominibus haec singula vocarentur, de quorum distinctione nunc agimus.	24. And all these things which the Word made flesh did and bare for us in time and place, belong, according to the distinction which we have undertaken to demonstrate, to knowledge, not to wisdom. And as the Word is without time and without place, it is co-eternal with the Father, and in its wholeness everywhere; and if any one can, and as much as he can, speak truly concerning this Word, then his discourse will pertain to wisdom. And hence the Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, has the treasures both of wisdom and of knowledge. For the apostle, writing to the Colossians, says: For I would that you knew what great conflict I have for you, and for them at Laodicea, and for as many as have not seen my face in the flesh; that their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgment of the mystery of God which is Christ Jesus: in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. To what extent the apostle knew all those treasures, how much of them he had penetrated, and in them to how great things he had reached, who can know? Yet, for my part, according to that which is written, But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal; for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; if these two are in such way to be distinguished from each other, that wisdom is to be assigned to divine things, knowledge to human, I acknowledge both in Christ, and so with me do all His faithful ones. And when I read, The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, I understand by the Word the true Son of God, I acknowledge in the flesh the true Son of man, and both together joined into one Person of God and man, by an ineffable copiousness of grace. And on account of this, the apostle goes on to say, And we beheld His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. If we refer grace to knowledge, and truth to wisdom, I think we shall not swerve from that distinction between these two things which we have commended. For in those things that have their origin in time, this is the highest grace, that man is joined with God in unity of person; but in things eternal the highest truth is rightly attributed to the Word of God. But that the same is Himself the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth—this took place, in order that He Himself in things done for us in time should be the same for whom we are cleansed by the same faith, that we may contemplate Him steadfastly in things eternal. And those distinguished philosophers of the heathen who have been able to understand and discern the invisible things of God by those things which are made, have yet, as is said of them, held down the truth in iniquity; because they philosophized without a Mediator, that is, without the man Christ, whom they neither believed to be about to come at the word of the prophets, nor to have come at that of the apostles. For, placed as they were in these lowest things, they could not but seek some media through which they might attain to those lofty things which they had understood; and so they fell upon deceitful spirits, through whom it came to pass, that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. For in such forms also they set up or worshipped idols. Therefore Christ is our knowledge, and the same Christ is also our wisdom. He Himself implants in us faith concerning temporal things, He Himself shows forth the truth concerning eternal things. Through Him we reach on to Himself: we stretch through knowledge to wisdom; yet we do not withdraw from one and the same Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and of knowledge. But now we speak of knowledge, and will hereafter speak of wisdom as much as He Himself shall grant. And let us not so take these two things, as if it were not allowable to speak either of the wisdom which is in human things, or of the knowledge which is in divine. For after a laxer custom of speech, both can be called wisdom, and both knowledge. Yet the apostle could not in any way have written, To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, except also these several things had been properly called by the several names, of the distinction between which we are now treating.
[13.20.25] Iam itaque videamus quid sermo iste prolixus effecerit, quid collegerit, quo peruenerit. Beatos esse se velle omnium hominum est, nec tamen omnium est fides qua cor mundante ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ita fit ut per istam quam non omnes volunt ad illam tendendum sit quam nemo potest esse qui nolit. Beatos esse se velle omnes in corde suo vident, tantaque est in hac re naturae humanae conspiratio ut non fallatur homo qui hoc ex animo suo de animo conicit alieno; denique omnes id velle nos novimus. Multi vero immortales se esse posse desperant, cum id quod omnes volunt, id est beatus, nullus esse aliter possit; volunt tamen etiam immortales esse si possint, sed non credendo quod possint non ita vivunt ut possint. Necessaria est ergo fides ut beatitudinem consequamur omnibus humanae naturae bonds, id est et animi et corporis. Hanc autem fidem in Christo esse definitam qui in carne resurrexit a mortuis non moriturus ulterius nec nisi per illum quemquam liberari a diaboli dominatu per remissionem peccatorum, in cuius diaboli partibus necesse est esse miseram vitam eandemque perpetuam, quae mors potius est dicenda quam vita, eadem fides habet. De qua et in hoc libro sicut potui pro spatio temporis disputavi, cum iam et in quarto libro huius operis multa de hac dixerim, sed ibi propter aliud, hic propter aliud; ibi scilicet ut ostenderem cur et quomodo Christus in plenitudine temporis a patre sit missus propter eos qui dicunt eum qui misit et eum qui missus est acquales natura esse non posse; hic autem ad distinguendam activam scientiam a contemplativa sapientia.	25. Now, therefore, let us see what this prolix discourse has effected, what it has gathered, whereto it has reached. It belongs to all men to will to be blessed; yet all men have not faith, whereby the heart is cleansed, and so blessedness is reached. And thus it comes to pass, that by means of the faith which not all men will, we have to reach on to the blessedness which every one wills. All see in their own heart that they will to be blessed; and so great is the agreement of human nature on this subject, that the man is not deceived who conjectures this concerning another's mind, out of his own: in short, we know ourselves that all will this. But many despair of being immortal, although no otherwise can any one be that which all will, that is, blessed. Yet they will also to be immortal if they could; but through not believing that they can, they do not so live that they can. Therefore faith is necessary, that we may attain blessedness in all the good things of human nature, that is, of both soul and body. But that same faith requires that this faith be limited in Christ, who rose in the flesh from the dead, not to die any more; and that no one is freed from the dominion of the devil, through the forgiveness of sins, save by Him; and that in the abiding place of the devil, life must needs be at once miserable and never-ending, which ought rather to be called death than life. All which I have also argued, so far as space permitted, in this book, while I have already said much on the subject in the fourth book of this work as well; but in that place for one purpose, here for another—namely, there, that I might show why and how Christ was sent in the fullness of time by the Father, on account of those who say that He who sent and He who was sent cannot be equal in nature; but here, in order to distinguish practical knowlege from contemplative wisdom.
[13.20.26] Placuit quippe velut gradatim ascendentibus in utraque requirere apud interiorem hominem quandam sui cuiusque generis trinitatem sicut prius apud exteriorem quaesivimus ut ad illam trinitatem quae deus est pro nostro modulo, si tamen vel hoc possumus, saltem in aenigmate et per speculum contuendam exercitatiore in his inferioribus rebus mente veniamus. Huius igitur verba fidei quisquis in solis vocibus memoriae commendaverit nesciens quid significent (sicut solent qui graece nesciunt verba graeca tenere memoriter, vel latina similiter vel cuiusque alterius linguae, qui eius ignari sunt), nonne habent quandam in suo animo trinitatem quia et in memoria sunt illi verborum soni etiam quando inde non cogitat, et inde formatur acies recordationis eius quando de his cogitat, et voluntas recordantis atque cogitantis utrumque coniungit? Nullo modo tamen dixerimus istum cum hoc agit secundum trinitatem interioris hominis agere sed potius exterioris quia id solum meminit et quando vult quantum vult intuetur quod ad sensum corporis pertinet qui vocatur auditus, nec aliud quam corporalium rerum, id est sonorum, tali cogitatione imagines versat. Si autem quod verba illa significant teneat et recolat, iam quidem aliquid interioris hominis agit, sed nondum dicendus vel putandus est vivere secundum interioris hominis trinitatem si ea non diligit quae ibi praedicantur, praecipiuntur, promittuntur. Potest enim etiam ad hoc tenere atque cogitare ut falsa esse existimans conetur etiam redarguere. Voluntas ergo illa quae ibi coniungit ea quae memoria tenebantur et ea quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt implet quidem aliquam trinitatem cum ipsa sit tertia, sed non secundum eam vivitur quando illa quae cogitantur velut falsa non placent. Cum autem vera esse creduntur et quae ibi diligenda sunt diliguntur, iam secundum trinitatem interioris hominis vivitur; secundum hoc enim vivit quisque quod diligit. Quomodo autem diligantur quae nesciuntur sed tantum creduntur? Iam quaestio ista tractata est in superioribus libris, et inventum neminem diligere quod penitus ignorat; ex his autem quae nota sunt diligi quando diligi dicuntur ignota. Nunc librum istum ita claudimus ut admoneamus quod iustus ex fide vivit, quae fides per dilectionem operatur ita ut virtutes quoque ipsae quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, iusteque vivitur omnes ad eandem referantur fidem; non enim aliter verae poterunt esse virtutes. Quae tamen in hac vita non valent tantum ut aliquando non sit hic necessaria qualiumcumque remissio peccatorum, quae non fit nisi per eum qui sanguine suo vicit principem peccatorum. Ex hac fide et tali vita quaecumque notiones sunt in animo fidelis hominis cum memoria continentur et recordatione inspiciuntur et voluntati placent, reddunt quandam sui generis trinitatem. Sed imago dei de qua in eius adiutorio post loquemur nondum in ipsa est, quod tunc melius apparebit cum demonstratum fuerit ubi sit, quod in futuro volumine lector exspectet.	26. For we wished to ascend, as it were, by steps, and to seek in the inner man, both in knowledge and in wisdom, a sort of trinity of its own special kind, such as we sought before in the outer man; in order that we may come, with a mind more practised in these lower things, to the contemplation of that Trinity which is God, according to our little measure, if indeed, we can even do this, at least in a riddle and as through a glass. If, then, any one have committed to memory the words of this faith in their sounds alone, not knowing what they mean, as they commonly who do not know Greek hold in memory Greek words, or similarly Latin ones, or those of any other language of which they are ignorant, has not he a sort of trinity in his mind? Because, first, those sounds of words are in his memory, even when he does not think thereupon; and next, the mental vision (acies) of his act of recollection is formed thence when he conceives of them; and next, the will of him who remembers and thinks unites both. Yet we should by no means say that the man in so doing busies himself with a trinity of the interior man, but rather of the exterior; because he remembers, and when he wills, contemplates as much as he wills, that alone which belongs to the sense of the body, which is called hearing. Nor in such an act of thought does he do anything else than deal with images of corporeal things, that is, of sounds. But if he holds and recollects what those words signify, now indeed something of the inner man is brought into action; not yet, however, ought he to be said or thought to live according to a trinity of the inner man, if he does not love those things which are there declared, enjoined, promised. For it is possible for him also to hold and conceive these things, supposing them to be false, in order that he may endeavor to disprove them. Therefore that will, which in this case unites those things which are held in the memory with those things which are thence impressed on the mind's eye in conception, completes, indeed, some kind of trinity, since itself is a third added to two others; but the man does not live according to this, when those things which are conceived are taken to be false, and are not accepted. But when those things are believed to be true, and those things which therein ought to be loved, are loved, then at last the man does live according to a trinity of the inner man; for every one lives according to that which he loves. But how can things be loved which are not known, but only believed? This question has been already treated of in former books; and we found, that no one loves what he is wholly ignorant of, but that when things not known are said to be loved, they are loved from those things which are known. And now we so conclude this book, that we admonish the just to live by faith, which faith works by love, so that the virtues also themselves, by which one lives prudently, boldly, temperately, and justly, be all referred to the same faith; for not otherwise can they be true virtues. And yet these in this life are not of so great worth, as that the remission of sins, of some kind or other, is not sometimes necessary here; and this remission comes not to pass, except through Him, who by His own blood conquered the prince of sinners. Whatsoever ideas are in the mind of the faithful man from this faith, and from such a life, when they are contained in the memory, and are looked at by recollection, and please the will, set forth a kind of trinity of its own sort. But the image of God, of which by His help we shall afterwards speak, is not yet in that trinity; a thing which will then be more apparent, when it shall have been shown where it is, which the reader may expect in a succeeding book.	}