Authors/Augustine/On the Trinity/On the Trinity Book XIV

AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE BOOK XIV

• 14.1 Quae sit hominis vera sapientia. Chapter 1.— What the Wisdom is of Which We are Here to Treat. Whence the Name of Philosopher Arose. What Has Been Already Said Concerning the Distinction of Knowledge and Wisdom.
• 14.2 De fide quae licet ad aeterna perducat, temporalis tamen est et cum ad aeternitatem ventum fuerit cessatura. Chapter 2.— There is a Kind of Trinity in the Holding, Contemplating, and Loving of Faith Temporal, But One that Does Not Yet Attain to Being Properly an Image of God.
• 14.3 Quid illud sit animi in quo dei imago perpetua est et aeternae species trinitatis. Chapter 3.— A Difficulty Removed, Which Lies in the Way of What Has Just Been Said.
• 14.4 Quod natura animae etiam deformis et miserae nec vitam nec dei imaginem possit amittere. Chapter 4.— The Image of God is to Be Sought in the Immortality of the Rational Soul. How a Trinity is Demonstrated in the Mind.
• 14.5 An etiam paruulorum menses nosse se possint. Chapter 5.— Whether the Mind of Infants Knows Itself.
• 14.6 Quod mens hominis sine cogitatione sibimet conspicua esse non possit. Chapter 6.— How a Kind of Trinity Exists in the Mind Thinking of Itself. What is the Part of Thought in This Trinity.
• 14.7 Quod aliud sit aliquid non nosse, aliud non inde cogitare. Chapter 7.— The Thing is Made Plain by an Example. In What Way the Matter is Handled in Order to Help the Reader.
• 14.8 De principali mentis in quo intuenda est summae imago trinitatis. Chapter 8.— The Trinity Which is the Image of God is Now to Be Sought in the Noblest Part of the Mind.
• 14.9 An virtutes quibus ad aeternitatem tenditur desiturae sint cum ad aeterna perduxerint. Chapter 9.— Whether Justice and the Other Virtues Cease to Exist in the Future Life.
• 14.10 De cognoscibilibus temporalibus quorum alla cognitionem nostram praeveniunt, alla non praecedunt. Chapter 10.— How a Trinity is Produced by the Mind Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself.
• 14.11 An semper memoria praeteritarum rerum sit an vero etiam praesentium. Chapter 11.— Whether Memory is Also of Things Present.
• 14.12 Qua facultate mens rationalis obtineat ut in ea dei imago resplendeat. Chapter 12.— The Trinity in the Mind is the Image of God, in that It Remembers, Understands, and Loves God, Which to Do is Wisdom.
• 14.13 De reminiscentia in deum cuius semper capax est mentis natura. Chapter 13.— How Any One Can Forget and Remember God.
• 14.14 Quod etiam praua mens nec memoria sui careat nec cognitione nec amore. Chapter 14.— The Mind Loves God in Rightly Loving Itself; And If It Love Not God, It Must Be Said to Hate Itself. Even a Weak and Erring Mind is Always Strong in Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Itself. Let It Be Turned to God, that It May Be Blessed by Remembering, Understanding, and Loving Him.
• 14.15 De mutabilitate mentis humanae qua fit ut sicut misera facta est ex beata, ita beata possit esse ex misera. Chapter 15.— Although the Soul Hopes for Blessedness, Yet It Does Not Remember Lost Blessedness, But Remembers God and the Rules of Righteousness. The Unchangeable Rules of Right Living are Known Even to the Ungodly.
• 14.16 De refonnatione mentis ad imaginem dei et quot modis spiritus appellatio diversis assignetur naturis. Chapter 16.— How the Image of God is Formed Anew in Man.
• 14.17 Quid intersit inter regenerationem baptismi et renouationem qua proficitur de die in diem, in agnitionem dei. Chapter 17.— How the Image of God in the Mind is Renewed Until the Likeness of God is Perfected in It in Blessedness.
• 14.18 Posse hominem etiam corpore imaginem dei accipi secundum quod uerbum caro factum est cuius immortalitati omnes sancti conformabuntur. Chapter 18.— Whether the Sentence of John is to Be Understood of Our Future Likeness with the Son of God in the Immortality Itself Also of the Body.
• 14.19 Qua sui parte homo ad imaginem et similitudinem dei factus sit ad quam proficiendo renouatur. Chapter 19.— John is Rather to Be Understood of Our Perfect Likeness with the Trinity in Life Eternal. Wisdom is Perfected in Happiness.

Latin	Latin
LIBER XIV	On the Trinity (Book XIV)
	The true wisdom of man is treated of; and it is shown that the image of God, which man is in respect to his mind, is not placed properly in transitory things, as in memory, understanding, and love, whether of faith itself as existing in time, or even of the mind as busied with itself, but in things that are permanent; and that this wisdom is then perfected, when the mind is renewed in the knowledge of God, according to the image of Him who created man after His own Image, and thus attains to wisdom, wherein that which is contemplated is eternal.
[14.1.1] Nunc de sapientia nobis est disserendum, non illa dei quae procul dubio deus est (nam sapientia dei filius eius unigenitus dicitur), sed loquemur de hominis sapientia, vera tamen quae secundum deum est et verus ac praecipuus cultus eius est, quae uno nomine *theosebeia* graece appellatur. Quod nomen nostri sicut iam commemoravimus volentes et ipsi uno nomine interpretari 'pietatem' dixerunt, cum pietas apud graecos *eusebeia* usitatius nuncupetur, *theosebeia* vero quia uno verbo perfecte non potest, melius interpretatur duobus ut dicatur potius 'dei cultus.' Hanc esse hominis sapientiam, quod et in duodecimo huius operis volumine iam posuimus, scripturae sanctae auctoritate monstratur in libro serui dei Iob ubi legitur dei sapientiam dixisse homini: Ecce pietas est sapientia, abstinere autem a malis scientia (sive etiam ut nonnulli de graeco *epistemen* interpretati sunt, disciplina, quae utique a discendo nomen accepit, unde et scientia dici potest, ad hoc enim quaeque res discitur ut sciatur, quamvis alia notione in his quae pro peccatis suis mala quisque patitur ut corrigatur dici soleat disciplina. Unde illud est in epistula ad hebraeos: Quis enim est filius cui non det disciplinam pater eius?, et illud evidentius in eadem: Omnis vero disciplina ad tempus non gaudii videtur esse sed tristitiae, postea vero fructum pacificum his qui per eam certarunt reddet iustitiae). Deus ergo ipse summa sapientia; cultus autem dei sapientia est hominis de qua nunc loquimur. Nam sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud deum. Secundum hanc itaque sapientiam quae dei cultus est ait sancta scriptura: Multitudo sapientium sanitas est orbis terrarum.	1. We must now discourse concerning wisdom; not the wisdom of God, which without doubt is God, for His only-begotten Son is called the wisdom of God; but we will speak of the wisdom of man, yet of true wisdom, which is according to God, and is His true and chief worship, which is called in Greek by one term, ?e?s?ße?a . And this term, as we have already observed, when our own countrymen themselves also wished to interpret it by a single term, was by them rendered piety, whereas piety means more commonly what the Greeks call e?s?ße?a . But because ?e?s?ße?a cannot be translated perfectly by any one word, it is better translated by two, so as to render it rather by the worship of God. That this is the wisdom of man, as we have already laid down in the twelfth book of this work, is shown by the authority of Holy Scripture, in the book of God's servant Job, where we read that the Wisdom of God said to man, Behold piety, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is knowledge; or, as some have translated the Greek word ?p?st?µ??, learning, which certainly takes its name from learning, whence also it may be called knowledge. For everything is learned in order that it may be known. Although the same word, indeed, is employed in a different sense, where any one suffers evils for his sins, that he may be corrected. Whence is that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, For what son is he to whom the father gives not discipline? And this is still more apparent in the same epistle: Now no chastening for the present seems to be joyous, but grievous: nevertheless afterward it yields the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby. Therefore God Himself is the chiefest wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom of man, of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. It is in respect to this wisdom, therefore, which is the worship of God, that Holy Scripture says, The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the world.
[14.1.2] Sed si de sapientia disputare sapientium est, quid agemus? Numquidnam profiteri audebimus sapientiam ne sit nostra de illa impudens disputatio? Nonne terrebimur exemplo Pythagorae qui cum ausus non fuisset sapientem profiteri, philosophum potius, id est amatorem sapientiae, se esse respondit, a quo id nomen exortum ita deinceps posteris placuit ut quantalibet de rebus ad sapientiam pertinentibus doctrina quisque vel sibi vel aliis videretur excellere non nisi philosophus vocaretur? An ideo sapientem profiteri talium hominum nullus audebat quia sine ullo peccato putabant esse sapientem ? Hoc autem nostra scriptura non dicit quae dicit: Argue sapientem, et amabit te; profecto enim iudicat habere peccatum quem censet arguendum. Sed ego nec sic quidem sapientem me audeo profiteri. Satis est mihi quod etiam ipsi negare non possunt, esse etiam philosophi, id est amatoris sapientiae, de sapientia disputare. Non enim hoc illi facere destiterunt qui se amatores sapientiae potius quam sapientes esse professi sunt.	2. But if to dispute of wisdom belongs to wise men, what shall we do? Shall we dare indeed to profess wisdom, lest it should be mere impudence for ourselves to dispute about it? Shall we not be alarmed by the example of Pythagoras?— who dared not profess to be a wise man, but answered that he was a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom; whence arose the name, that became thenceforth so much the popular name, that no matter how great the learning wherein any one excelled, either in his own opinion or that of others, in things pertaining to wisdom, he was still called nothing more than philosopher. Or was it for this reason that no one, even of such as these, dared to profess himself a wise man—because they imagined that a wise man was one without sin? But our Scriptures do not say this, which say, Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you. For doubtless he who thinks a man ought to be rebuked, judges him to have sin. However, for my part, I dare not profess myself a wise man even in this sense; it is enough for me to assume, what they themselves cannot deny, that to dispute of wisdom belongs also to the philosopher, i.e., the lover of wisdom. For they have not given over so disputing who have professed to be lovers of wisdom rather than wise men.
[14.1.3] Disputantes autem de sapientia definierunt eam dicentes: Sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia. Unde ego quoque in libro superiore utrarumque rerum cognitionem, id est divinarum atque humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse non tacui. Verum secundum hanc distinctionem qua dixit apostolus: Alii datur sermo sapientiae alii sermo scientiae ista definitio dividenda est ut rerum divinarum scientia sapientia proprie nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat, de qua volumine tertio decimo disputavi, non utique quidquid sciri ab homine potest in rebus humanis ubi plurimum superuacaneae uanitatis et noxiae curiositatis est huic scientiae tribuens, sed illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. Qua scientia non pollens fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam quae non nisi aeterna est, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus. De qua prius cum loquerer ipsam praecipue fidem commendare curavi, a temporalibus aeterna breviter ante distinguens atque ibi de temporalibus disserens, aeterna vero in hunc librum differens, etiam de rebus aeternis fidem temporalem quidem et temporaliter in credentium cordibus habitare, necessariam tamen propter adipiscenda ipsa aeterna esse monstravi. Fidem quoque de temporalibus rebus quas pro nobis aeternus fecit et passus est in homine quem temporaliter gessit atque ad aeterna peruexit ad eandem aeternorum adeptionem prodesse disserui, virtutesque ipsas quibus in hac temporali mortalitate prudenter, fortiter temperanter et iuste vivitur, nisi ad eandem licet temporaiem fidem quae tamen ad aeterna perducit referantur, veras non esse virtutes.	3. In disputing, then, about wisdom, they have defined it thus: Wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine. And hence, in the last book, I have not withheld the admission, that the cognizance of both subjects, whether divine or human, may be called both knowledge and wisdom. But according to the distinction made in the apostle's words, To one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, this definition is to be divided, so that the knowledge of things divine shall be called wisdom, and that of things human appropriate to itself the name of knowledge; and of the latter I have treated in the thirteenth book, not indeed so as to attribute to this knowledge everything whatever that can be known by man about things human, wherein there is exceeding much of empty vanity and mischievous curiosity, but only those things by which that most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; and in this knowledge most of the faithful are not strong, however exceeding strong in the faith itself. For it is one thing to know only what man ought to believe in order to attain to a blessed life, which must needs be an eternal one; but another to know in what way this belief itself may both help the pious, and be defended against the impious, which last the apostle seems to call by the special name of knowledge. And when I was speaking of this knowledge before, my special business was to commend faith, first briefly distinguishing things eternal from things temporal, and there discoursing of things temporal; but while deferring things eternal to the present book, I showed also that faith respecting things eternal is itself a thing temporal, and dwells in time in the hearts of believers, and yet is necessary in order to attain the things eternal themselves. I argued also, that faith respecting the things temporal which He that is eternal did and suffered for us as man, which manhood He bare in time and carried on to things eternal, is profitable also for the obtaining of things eternal; and that the virtues themselves, whereby in this temporal and mortal life men live prudently, bravely, temperately, and justly, are not true virtues, unless they are referred to that same faith, temporal though it is, which leads on nevertheless to things eternal.
[14.2.4] Quapropter, quondam sicut scriptum est: Quamdiu sumus in corpore peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus non per speciem profecto quamdiu iustus ex fide vivit, quamvis secundum interiorem hominem vivat, licet per eandem temporalem fidem ad veritatem nitatur et tendat aeternam, tamen in eiusdem fidei temporalis retentione contemplatione, dilectione nondum talis est trinitas ut dei iam imago dicenda sit ne in rebus temporalibus constitute videatur quae constituenda est in aeternis. Mens quippe humana cum fidem suam videt qua credit quod non videt non aliquid sempiternum videt. Non enim semper hoc erit, quod utique non erit quando ista peregrinatione finita qua peregrinamur a domino ut per fidem ambulare necesse sit species illa succedet per quam videbimus facie ad faciem, sicut modo non videntes, tamen quia credimus, videre merebimur atque ad speciem nos per fidem perductos esse gaudebimus. Neque enim iam fides erit qua credantur quae non videntur, sed species qua videantur quae credebantur. Tunc ergo etsi vitae huius mortalis transactae meminerimus et credidisse nos aliquando quae non videbamus memoriter recoluerimus, in praeteritis atque transactis deputabitur fides ista non in praesentibus rebus semperque manentib us, ac per hoc etiam trinit as ista quae nunc in eiusdem fidei praesentis ac manentis memoria contuitu, dilectione consistit tunc transacta et praeterita reperietur esse, non permanens. Ex quo colligitur ut si iam imago dei est ista trinitas, etiam ipsa non in eis quae semper sunt sed in rebus sit habenda transeuntibus.	4. Wherefore since, as it is written, While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight; undoubtedly, so long as the just man lives by faith, howsoever he lives according to the inner man, although he aims at truth and reaches on to things eternal by this same temporal faith, nevertheless in the holding, contemplating, and loving this temporal faith, we have not yet reached such a trinity as is to be called an image of God; lest that should seem to be constituted in things temporal which ought to be so in things eternal. For when the human mind sees its own faith, whereby it believes what it does not see, it does not see a thing eternal. For that will not always exist, which certainly will not then exist, when this pilgrimage, whereby we are absent from God, in such way that we must needs walk by faith, shall be ended, and that sight shall have succeeded it whereby we shall see face to face; just as now, because we believe although we do not see, we shall deserve to see, and shall rejoice at having been brought through faith to sight. For then it will be no longer faith, by which that is believed which is not seen; but sight, by which that is seen which is believed. And then, therefore, although we remember this past mortal life, and call to mind by recollection that we once believed what we did not see, yet that faith will be reckoned among things past and done with, not among things present and always continuing. And hence also that trinity which now consists in the remembering, contemplating, and loving this same faith while present and continuing, will then be found to be done with and past, and not still enduring. And hence it is to be gathered, that if that trinity is indeed an image of God, then this image itself would have to be reckoned, not among things that exist always, but among things transient.
[14.3.4] Absit autem ut cum animae natura sit immortalis nec ab initio quo creata est umquam deinceps esse desitat, id quo nihil melius habet non cum eius immortalitate perduret. Quid vero melius in eius natura creatum est quam quod ad sui creatoris imaginem facta est? Non igitur in fidei retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, quae non erit semper, sed in eo quod semper ent mvenienda est quam dici oporteat imaginem dei.	But far be it from us to think, that while the nature of the soul is immortal, and from the first beginning of its creation thenceforth never ceases to be, yet that that which is the best thing it has should not endure for ever with its own immortality. Yet what is there in its nature as created, better than that it is made after the image of its Creator? We must find then what may be fittingly called the image of God, not in the holding, contemplating, and loving that faith which will not exist always, but in that which will exist always.
[14.3.5] An adhuc utrum ita se res habeat aliquanto diligentius atque abstrusius perscrutabimur? Dici enim potest non perire istam trinitatem etiam cum fides ipsa transierit quia sicut nunc eam et memoria tenemus et cogitatione cernimus et voluntate diligimus, ita etiam tunc cum eam nos habuisse memoria tenebimus et recolemus et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate iungemus, eadem trinitas permanebit (quoniam si nullum in nobis quasi uestigium transiens reliquerit, profecto nec in memoria nostra eius aliquid habebimus quo recurramus eam praeteritam recordantes atque id utrumque intentione tertia copulantes, et quod erat scilicet in memoria non inde cogitantibus nobis et quod inde cogitatione formatur). Sed qui hoc dicit non discernit aliam nunc esse trinitatem quando praesentem fidem tenemus, videmus, amamus in nobis; aliam tunc futuram quando non ipsam sed eius velut imaginarium uestigium in memoria reconditum recordatione contuebimur, et duo haec, id est quod erat in memoria retinentis et quod inde imprimitur in acie recordantis, tertia voluntate iungemus. Quod ut possit intellegi, sumamus exemplum de corporalibus rebus de quibus in libro undecimo satis locuti sumus, nempe ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendentes vel ab exterioribus ad interiora ingredientes primam reperimus trinitatem in corpore quod videtur et acie videntis quae cum videt inde formatur et in voluntatis intentione quae utrumque coniungit. Huic trinitati similem constituamus cum fides quae nunc inest nobis tamquam corpus illud in loco ita in nostra memoria constituta est, de qua informatur cogitatio recordantis sicut ex illo corpore acies intuentis, quibus duobus ut trinitas impleatur adnumeratur tertia voluntas quae fidem in memoria constitutam et quandam eius effigiem in contuitu recordationis impressam conectit et iungit sicut in illa corporalis trinitate visionis formam corporis quod videtur et conformationem quae fit in cernentis aspectu coniungit intentio voluntatis. Faciamus ergo corpus illud quod cernebatur interisse dilapsum nec eius remansisse aliquid in ullo loco ad quod videndum recurrat aspectus. Numquid quia imago rei corporalis iam transactae atque praeteritae remanet in memoria unde informetur cogitantis obtutus atque id utrumque tertia voluntate iungatur, eadem trinitas esse dicenda est quae fuerat quando species in loco positi corporis videbatur? Non utique, sed prorsus alia. Nam praeter quod illa erat extrinsecus, haec intrinsecus, illam profecto faciebat species praesentis corporis, hanc imago praeteriti. Sic et in hac re de qua nunc agimus et propter quam putavimus adhibendum illud exemplum, fides quae nunc in animo nostro est velut illud corpus in loco dum tenetur, aspicitur, amatur quandam efficit trinitatem; sed non ipsa erit quando fides haec in animo sicut corpus illud in loco iam non erit. Quae vero tunc erit quando eam recordabimur in nobis fuisse, non esse, alia profecto erit. Hanc enim quae nunc est facit res ipsa praesens et animo credentis affixa, at illam quae tunc erit faciet rei praeteritae imaginatio in recordantis memoria derelicta.	5. Shall we then scrutinize somewhat more carefully and deeply whether the case is really thus? For it may be said that this trinity does not perish even when faith itself shall have passed away; because, as now we both hold it by memory, and discern it by thought, and love it by will; so then also, when we shall both hold in memory, and shall recollect, that we once had it, and shall unite these two by the third, namely will, the same trinity will still continue. Since, if it have left in its passage as it were no trace in us, doubtless we shall not have ought of it even in our memory, whereto to recur when recollecting it as past, and by the third, viz. purpose, coupling both these, to wit, what was in our memory though we were not thinking about it, and what is formed thence by conception. But he who speaks thus, does not perceive, that when we hold, see, and love in ourselves our present faith, we are concerned with a different trinity as now existing, from that trinity which will exist, when we shall contemplate by recollection, not the faith itself, but as it were the imagined trace of it laid up in the memory, and shall unite by the will, as by a third, these two things, viz. that which was in the memory of him who retains, and that which is impressed thence upon the vision of the mind of him who recollects. And that we may understand this, let us take an example from things corporeal, of which we have sufficiently spoken in the eleventh book. For as we ascend from lower to higher things, or pass inward from outer to inner things, we first find a trinity in the bodily object which is seen, and in the vision of the seer, which, when he sees it, is informed thereby, and in the purpose of the will which combines both. Let us assume a trinity like this, when the faith which is now in ourselves is so established in our memory as the bodily object we spoke of was in place, from which faith is formed the conception in recollection, as from that bodily object was formed the vision of the beholder; and to these two, to complete the trinity, will is to be reckoned as a third, which connects and combines the faith established in the memory, and a sort of effigy of that faith impressed upon the vision of recollection; just as in that trinity of corporeal vision, the form of the bodily object that is seen, and the corresponding form wrought in the vision of the beholder, are combined by the purpose of the will. Suppose, then, that this bodily object which was beheld was dissolved and had perished, and that nothing at all of it remained anywhere, to the vision of which the gaze might have recourse; are we then to say, that because the image of the bodily object thus now past and done with remains in the memory, whence to form the conception in recollecting, and to have the two united by will as a third, therefore it is the same trinity as that former one, when the appearance of the bodily object posited in place was seen? Certainly not, but altogether a different one: for, not to say that that was from without, while this is from within; the former certainly was produced by the appearance of a present bodily object, the latter by the image of that object now past. So, too, in the case of which we are now treating, to illustrate which we have thought good to adduce this example, the faith which is even now in our mind, as that bodily object was in place, while held, looked at, loved, produces a sort of trinity; but that trinity will exist no more, when this faith in the mind, like that bodily object in place, shall no longer exist. But that which will then exist, when we shall remember it to have been, but not now to be, in us, will doubtless be a different one. For that which now is, is wrought by the thing itself, actually present and attached to the mind of one who believes; but that which shall then be, will be wrought by the imagination of a past thing left in the memory of one who recollects.
[14.3.6] Nec illa igitur trinitas quae nunc non est imago dei erit, nec ista imago dei est quae tunc non erit, sed ea est invenienda in anima hominis, id est rationali sive intellectuali, imago creatoris quae immortaliter immortalitati eius est insita.	6. Therefore neither is that trinity an image of God, which is not now, nor is that other an image of God, which then will not be; but we must find in the soul of man, i.e., the rational or intellectual soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality.
[14.4.6] Nam sicut ipsa immortalitas animae secundum quendam modum dicitur (habet quippe et anima mortem suam cum vita beata caret quae vere animae vita dicenda est, sed immortalis ideo nuncupatur quoniam qualicumque vita etiam cum miserrima est numquam desinit vivere), ita quamvis ratio vel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc paruus, nunc magnus appareat, numquam nisi rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana; ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, sive ita obsoleta sit haec imago ut pene nulla sit sive obscura atque deformis sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est. Denique deformitatem dignitatis eius miserans divina scriptura: Quamquam, inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur, thesaurizat et nescit cui congregabit ea. Non itaque uanitatem imagini dei tribueret nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec tantum valere illam deformitatem ut auferat quod imago est satis ostendit dicendo: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo. Quapropter ex utraque parte veraciter pronuntiari potest ista sententia, ut quemadmodum dictum est: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur ita dicatur: 'Quamquam uane conturbatur homo, tamen in imagine ambulat.' Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen vitiari potuit quia summa non est; et quamquam vitiari potuerit quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae capax est et esse particeps potest, magna natura est. Quaeramus igitur in hac imagine dei quandam sui generis trinitatem adivuante ipso qui nos fecit ad imaginem suam. Non enim aliter possumus haec salubriter uestigare et secundum sapientiam quae ab illo est aliquid invenire, sed ea quae in superioribus libris et maxime in decimo de anima humana vel mente diximus si lectoris vel memoria teneantur atque recolantur vel diligentia in eisdem locis in quibus conscripta sunt recenseantur, non hic desiderabit prolixiorem de rei tantae inquisitione sermonem.	For as the immortality itself of the soul is spoken with a qualification; since the soul too has its proper death, when it lacks a blessed life, which is to be called the true life of the soul; but it is therefore called immortal, because it never ceases to live with some life or other, even when it is most miserable—so, although reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at another appears small, and at another great, yet the human soul is never anything save rational or intellectual; and hence, if it is made after the image of God in respect to this, that it is able to use reason and intellect in order to understand and behold God, then from the moment when that nature so marvellous and so great began to be, whether this image be so worn out as to be almost none at all, or whether it be obscure and defaced, or bright and beautiful, certainly it always is. Further, too, pitying the defaced condition of its dignity, divine Scripture tells us, that although man walks in an image, yet he disquiets himself in vain; he heaps up riches, and cannot tell who shall gather them. It would not therefore attribute vanity to the image of God, unless it perceived it to have been defaced. Yet it sufficiently shows that such defacing does not extend to the taking away its being an image, by saying, Although man walks in an image. Wherefore in both ways that sentence can be truly enunciated; in that, as it is said, Although man walks in an image, yet he disquiets himself in vain, so it may be said, Although man disquiets himself in vain, yet he walks in an image. For although the nature of the soul is great, yet it can be corrupted, because it is not the highest; and although it can be corrupted, because it is not the highest, yet because it is capable and can be partaker of the highest nature, it is a great nature. Let us seek, then, in this image of God a certain trinity of a special kind, with the aid of Him who Himself made us after His own image. For no otherwise can we healthfully investigate this subject, or arrive at any result according to the wisdom which is from Him. But if the reader will either hold in remembrance and recollect what we have said of the human soul or mind in former books, and especially in the tenth, or will carefully re-peruse it in the passages wherein it is contained, he will not require here any more lengthy discourse respecting the inquiry into so great a thing.
[14.4.7] Inter caetera ergo in libro decimo diximus hominis mentem nosse semetipsam. Nihil enim tam novit mens quam id quod sibi praesto est, nec menti magis quidquam praesto est quam ipsa sibi. Et alia quantum satis visum est adhibuimus documenta quibus hoc certissime probaretur.	7. We said, then, among other things in the tenth book, that the mind of man knows itself. For the mind knows nothing so much as that which is close to itself; and nothing is more close to the mind than itself. We adduced also other evidences, as much as seemed sufficient, whereby this might be most certainly proved.
[14.5.7] Quid itaque dicendum est de infantis mente ita adhuc paruuli et in tam magna demersi rerum ignorantia ut illius mentis tenebras mens hominis quae aliquid novit exhorreat? An etiam ipsa se nosse credenda est, sed intenta nimis in eas res quas per corporis sensus tanto maiore quanto noviore coepit delectatione sentire, non ignorare se potest sed cogitare se non potest? Quanta porro intentione in ista quae foris sunt sensibilia feratur vel hinc solum conic) potest quod lucis huius hauriendae sic avida est ut si quisquam minus cautus aut nesciens quid inde possit accidere nocturnum lumen posuerit ubi facet infans, in ea parse ad quam iacentis oculi possint retorqueri nec ceruix possit inflecti, sic eius inde non removetur aspectus ut nonnullos ex hoc etiam strabones fieri noverimus eam formam tenentibus oculis quam teneris et mollibus consuetudo quodam modo infixit. Ita et in altos corporis sensus quantum sinit illa aetas intentione se quasi coartant animae paruulorum ut quidquid per carnem offendit aut allicit hoc solum abhorreant uehcmenter aut appetant; sua vero interiora non cogitent nec possint admoneri ut hoc faciant quia nondum admonentis signa noverunt ubi praecipuum locum verba obtinent quae sicut alla prorsus nesciunt. Quod autem aliud sit non se nosse, aliud non se cogitare iam in eodem volumine ostendimus.	What, then, is to be said of the mind of an infant, which is still so small, and buried in such profound ignorance of things, that the mind of a man which knows anything shrinks from the darkness of it? Is that too to be believed to know itself; but that, as being too intent upon those things which it has begun to perceive through the bodily senses, with the greater delight in proportion to their novelty, it is not able indeed to be ignorant of itself, but is also not able to think of itself? Moreover, how intently it is bent upon sensible things that are without it, may be conjectured from this one fact, that it is so greedy of sensible light, that if any one through carelessness, or ignorance of the possible consequences, place a light at nighttime where an infant is lying down, on that side to which the eyes of the child so lying down can be bent, but its neck cannot be turned, the gaze of that child will be so fixed in that direction, that we have known some to have come to squint by this means, in that the eyes retained that form which habit in some way impressed upon them while tender and soft. In the case, too, of the other bodily senses, the souls of infants, as far as their age permits, so narrow themselves as it were, and are bent upon them, that they either vehemently detest or vehemently desire that only which offends or allures through the flesh, but do not think of their own inward self, nor can be made to do so by admonition; because they do not yet know the signs that express admonition, whereof words are the chief, of which as of other things they are wholly ignorant. And that it is one thing not to know oneself, another not to think of oneself, we have shown already in the same book.
[14.5.8] Sed hanc aetatem omittamus quae nec interrogari potest quid in se agatur et nos ipsi eius valde obliti sumus. Hinc tantum certos nos esse suffecerit quod cum homo de animi sui natura cogitare potuerit atque invenire quod verum est, alibi non inveniet quam penes se ipsum. Inveniet autem non quod nesciebat sed unde non cogitabat. Quid enim scimus si quod est in nostra mente nescimus cum omnia quae scimus non nisi mente scire possimus?	8. But let us pass by the infantine age, since we cannot question it as to what goes on within itself, while we have ourselves pretty well forgotten it. Let it suffice only for us hence to be certain, that when man has come to be able to think of the nature of his own mind, and to find out what is the truth, he will find it nowhere else but in himself. And he will find, not what he did not know, but that of which he did not think. For what do we know, if we do not know what is in our own mind; when we can know nothing at all of what we do know, unless by the mind?
[14.6.8] Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis ut nec ipsa mens quodam modo se in conspectu suo ponat nisi quando se cogitat, ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu mentis est nisi unde cogitatur ut nec ipsa mens qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur aliter possit esse in conspectu suo nisi se ipsam cogitando. Quomodo autem quando se non cogitat in conspectu suo non sit cum sine se ipsa numquam esse possit quasi aliud sit ipsa, aliud conspectus eius, invenire non possum. Hoc quippe de oculo corporis non absurde dicitur. Ipse quippe oculus loco suo est fixus m corpore; aspectus autem eius in ea quae extra sunt tenditur et usque in sidera extenditur. Nec est oculus in conspectu suo quandoquidem non Conspicit se ipsum nisi speculo obiecto unde iam locuti sumus. Quod non fit utique quando se mens in suo conspectu sui cogitatione constituit. Numquid ergo alla sue parse aliam suam partem videt cum se conspicit cogitando sicut aliis membris nostris qui sunt oculi alla nostra membra conspicimus quae in nostro possum esse conspectu? Quid dici absurdius vel sentiri potest? Unde igitur aufertur mens nisi a se ipsa, et ubi ponitur in conspectu suo nisi ante se ipsam? Non ergo ibi crit ubi erat quando in conspectu suo non erat quia hic posita, inde sublata est. Sed si conspicienda migravit, conspectura ubi manebit? An quasi geminatur ut et illic sit et hic, id est et ubi conspicere et ubi conspici possit, ut in se sit conspiciens ante se conspicua? Nihil horum nobis veritas consulta respondet quondam quando isto modo cogitamus non nisi corporum fictas imagines cogitamus, quod mentem non esse paucis certissimum est mentibus a quibus potest de hac re veritas consuli. Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam quando se cogitat non quasi per loci spatium sed incorporea conversione reuocetur. Cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tamquam ipsa sibi sit memoria sui. Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritus ea quae novit eius memoria continentur, nec est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis eius nisi unde cogitat; caetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita quae memoria nuncupatur. Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus in memoria poneremus, ipsam vero conformationem tamquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur, at illud quo utrumque coniungitur amorem seu voluntatem. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intellegit se et recognoscit; gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. Res quippe incorporea intellecta conspicitur et intellegendo cognoscitur. Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens quando cogitando intellectam se conspicit tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit, sed ita sibi nota erat quemadmodum notae sunt res quae memoria continentur etiamsi non cogitentur (quoniam dicimus hominem nosse litteras etiam cum de aliis rebus, non de litteris cogitat). Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens. Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuandam mentis putavimus trinitatem, memoria, intellegentia, voluntate.	The function of thought, however, is so great, that not even the mind itself can, so to say, place itself in its own sight, except when it thinks of itself; and hence it is so far the case, that nothing is in the sight of the mind, except that which is being thought of, that not even the mind itself, whereby we think whatever we do think, can be in its own sight otherwise than by thinking of itself. But in what way it is not in its own sight when it is not thinking of itself, while it can never be without itself, as though itself were one thing, and the sight of itself another, it is not in my power to discover. For this is not unreasonably said of the eye of the body; for the eye itself of the body is fixed in its own proper place in the body, but its sight extends to things external to itself, and reaches even to the stars. And the eye is not in its own sight, since it does not look at itself, unless by means of a mirror, as is said above; a thing that certainly does not happen when the mind places itself in its own sight by thinking of itself. Does it then see one part of itself by means of another part of itself, when it looks at itself in thought, as we look at some of our members, which can be in our sight, with other also of our members, viz. with our eyes? What can be said or thought more absurd? For by what is the mind removed, except by itself? Or where is it placed so as to be in its own sight, except before itself? Therefore it will not be there, where it was, when it was not in its own sight; because it has been put down in one place, after being taken away from another. But if it migrated in order to be beheld, where will it remain in order to behold? Is it as it were doubled, so as to be in this and in that place at the same time, viz. both where it can behold, and where it can be beheld; that in itself it may be beholding, and before itself beheld? If we ask the truth, it will tell us nothing of the sort since it is but feigned images of bodily objects of which we conceive when we conceive thus; and that the mind is not such, is very certain to the few minds by which the truth on such a subject can be inquired. It appears, therefore, that the beholding of the mind is something pertaining to its nature, and is recalled to that nature when it conceives of itself, not as if by moving through space, but by an incorporeal conversion; but when it is not conceiving of itself, it appears that it is not indeed in its own sight, nor is its own perception formed from it, but yet that it knows itself as though it were to itself a remembrance of itself. Like one who is skilled in many branches of learning: the things which he knows are contained in his memory, but nothing thereof is in the sight of his mind except that of which he is conceiving; while all the rest are stored up in a kind of secret knowledge, which is called memory. The trinity, then, which we were setting forth, was constituted in this way: first, we placed in the memory the object by which the perception of the percipient was formed; next, the conformation, or as it were the image which is impressed thereby; lastly, love or will as that which combines the two. When the mind, then, beholds itself in conception, it understands and cognizes itself; it begets, therefore, this its own understanding and cognition. For an incorporeal thing is understood when it is beheld, and is cognized when understood. Yet certainly the mind does not so beget this knowledge of itself, when it beholds itself as understood by conception, as though it had before been unknown to itself; but it was known to itself, in the way in which things are known which are contained in the memory, but of which one is not thinking; since we say that a man knows letters even when he is thinking of something else, and not of letters. And these two, the begetter and the begotten, are coupled together by love, as by a third, which is nothing else than will, seeking or holding fast the enjoyment of something. We held, therefore, that a trinity of the mind is to be intimated also by these three terms, memory, intelligence, will.
[14.6.9] Sed quoniam mentem semper sui meminisse semperque se ipsam intellegere et amare, quamvis non semper se cogitare discretam ab eis quae non sunt quod ipsa est, circa eiusdem libri decimi finem diximus, quaerendum est quonam modo ad cogitationem pertineat intellectus, notitia vero cuiusque rei quae inest menti etiam quando non de ipsa cogitatur ad solam dicatur memoriam pertinere. Si enim hoc ita est, non habebat haec tria ut et sui meminisset et se intellegeret et amaret, sed meminerat sui tantum, et postea cum cogitare se coepit tunc se intellexit atque dilexit.	9. But since the mind, as we said near the end of the same tenth book, always remembers itself, and always understands and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as distinguished from those things which are not itself; we must inquire in what way understanding (intellectus) belongs to conception, while the notion (notitia) of each thing that is in the mind, even when one is not thinking of it, is said to belong only to the memory. For if this is so, then the mind had not these three things: viz. the remembrance, the understanding, and the love of itself; but it only remembered itself, and afterwards, when it began to think of itself, then it understood and loved itself.
[14.7.9] Quapropter diligentius illud consideremus exemplum quod adhibuimus ubi ostenderetur aliud esse rem quamque non nosse, aliud non cogitare, fierique posse ut noverit homo aliquid quod non cogitat quando aliunde, non inde cogitat. Duarum ergo vel plurium disciplinarum peritus quando unam cogitat, aliam vel alias etiam si non cogitat novit tamen. Sed numquid recte possumus dicere: 'Iste musicus novit quidem musicam sed nunc eam non intellegit quia non eam cogitat; intellegit autem nunc geometricam, hanc enim nunc cogitat'? Absurda est quantum apparet ista sententia. Quid etiam illa si dicamus: 'Iste musicus novit quidem musicam sed nunc eam non amat quando non eam cogitat; amat autem nunc geometricam quoniam nunc ipsam cogitat'? Nonne similiter absurda est? Rectissime vero dicimus: 'Iste quem perspicis de geometrica disputantem etiam perfectus est musicus. Nam et meminit eius disciplinae et intellegit et diligit eam, sed quamvis eam noverit et amet, nunc illam non cogitat quoniam geometricam de qua disputat cogitat.' Hinc admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarundam rerum quasdam notitias, et tunc quodam modo procedere in medium atque in conspectu mentis velut apertius constitui quando cogitantur; tunc enim se ipsa mens et meminisse et intellegere et amare invenit etiam unde non cogitabat quando aliunde cogitabat. Sed unde diu non cogitaverimus et unde cogitare nisi commoniti non valemus, id nos nescio quo eodemque miro modo si potest dici scire nescimus. Denique recte ab eo qui commemorat ei quem commemorat dicitur: 'Scis hoc sed scire te nescis; commemorabo et invenies te scientem quod te nescire putaveras.' Id agunt et litterae quae de his rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione veras esse invenit lector, non quas veras esse credit ei qui scripsit sicut legitur historia, sed quas veras esse etiam ipse invenit sive apud se sive in ipsa mentis duce veritate. Qui vero nec admonitus valet ista contueri magna caecitate cordis tenebris ignorantiae demersus est altius, et mirabiliore divina ope indiget ut possit ad veram sapientiam pervenire.	Wherefore let us consider more carefully that example which we have adduced, wherein it was shown that not knowing a thing is different from not thinking [conceiving] of it; and that it may so happen that a man knows something of which he is not thinking, when he is thinking of something else, not of that. When any one, then, who is skilled in two or more branches of knowledge is thinking of one of them, though he is not thinking of the other or others, yet he knows them. But can we rightly say, This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now understand it, because he is not thinking of it; but he does now understand geometry, for of that he is now thinking? Such an assertion, as far as appears, is absurd. What, again, if we were to say, This musician certainly knows music, but he does not now love it, while he is not now thinking of it; but he does now love geometry, because of that he is now thinking—is not this similarly absurd? But we say quite correctly, This person whom you perceive disputing about geometry is also a perfect musician, for he both remembers music, and understands, and loves it; but although he both knows and loves it, he is not now thinking of it, since he is thinking of geometry, of which he is disputing. And hence we are warned that we have a kind of knowledge of certain things stored up in the recesses of the mind, and that this, when it is thought of, as it were, steps forth in public, and is placed as if openly in the sight of the mind; for then the mind itself finds that it both remembers, and understands, and loves itself, even although it was not thinking of itself, when it was thinking of something else. But in the case of that of which we have not thought for a long time, and cannot think of it unless reminded; that, if the phrase is allowable, in some wonderful way I know not how, we do not know that we know. In short, it is rightly said by him who reminds, to him whom he reminds, You know this, but you do not know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will find that you know what you had thought you did not know. Books, too, lead to the same results, viz. those that are written upon subjects which the reader under the guidance of reason finds to be true; not those subjects which he believes to be true on the faith of the narrator, as in the case of history; but those which he himself also finds to be true, either of himself, or in that truth itself which is the light of the mind. But he who cannot contemplate these things, even when reminded, is too deeply buried in the darkness of ignorance, through great blindness of heart and too wonderfully needs divine help, to be able to attain to true wisdom.
[14.7.10] Propter hoc itaque volui de cogitatione adhibere qualecumque documentum quo posset ostendi quomodo ex his quae memoria continentur recordantis acies informetur et tale aliquid gignatur ubi homo cogitat quale in illo erat ubi ante cogitationem meminerat, quia facilius dinoscitur quod tempore accedit et ubi parens prolem spatio temporis antecedit. Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit et interiorem intellegentiam qua se intellegit et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul sunt et simul semper fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt sive cogitarentur sive non cogitarentur, videbitur quidem imago illius trinitatis et ad solam memoriam pertinere. Sed quia ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiore verbo quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intellegentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intellegentiam qua intellegimus cogitantes, id est quando eis repertis quae memoriae praesto fuerant sed non cogitabantur cogitatio nostra formatur, et eam voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit, et quodam modo utrisque communis est. Hinc factum est ut etiam per exteriora sensibilia quae per oculos carnis videntur legentium ducerem tarditatem, in undecimo scilicet libro, atque inde cum eis ingrederer ad hominis interioris eam potentiam qua ratiocinatur de temporalibus rebus differens illam principaliter dominantem qua contemplatur aeterna. Atque id duobus voluminibus egi, duodecimo utrumque discernens quorum unum est superius alterum inferius quod superiori esse subditum debet; tertio decimo autem de munere inferioris quo humanarum rerum scientia salubris continetur ut in hac temporali vita id agamus quo consequamur aeternam quanta potui veritate ac brevitate disserui, quandoquidem rem tam multiplicem atque copiosam multorum atque magnorum disputationibus multis magnisque celebratam uno strictim volumine inclusi, ostendens etiam in ipsa trinitatem sed nondum quae dei sit imago dicenda.	10. For this reason I have wished to adduce some kind of proof, be it what it might, respecting the act of conceiving, such as might serve to show in what way, out of the things contained in the memory, the mind's eye is informed in recollecting, and some such thing is begotten, when a man conceives, as was already in him when, before he conceived, he remembered; because it is easier to distinguish things that take place at successive times, and where the parent precedes the offspring by an interval of time. For if we refer ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three always are together, and always have been together since they began to be at all, whether they were being thought of or not; the image of this trinity will indeed appear to pertain even to the memory alone; but because in this case a word cannot be without a thought (for we think all that we say, even if it be said by that inner word which belongs to no separate language), this image is rather to be discerned in these three things, viz. memory, intelligence, will. And I mean now by intelligence that by which we understand in thought, that is, when our thought is formed by the finding of those things, which had been at hand to the memory but were not being thought of; and I mean that will, or love, or preference which combines this offspring and parent, and is in some way common to both. Hence it was that I tried also, viz. in the eleventh book, to lead on the slowness of readers by means of outward sensible things which are seen by the eyes of the flesh; and that I then proceeded to enter with them upon that power of the inner man whereby he reasons of things temporal, deferring the consideration of that which dominates as the higher power, by which he contemplates things eternal. And I discussed this in two books, distinguishing the two in the twelfth, the one of them being higher and the other lower, and that the lower ought to be subject to the higher; and in the thirteenth I discussed, with what truth and brevity I could, the office of the lower, in which the wholesome knowledge of things human is contained, in order that we may so act in this temporal life as to attain that which is eternal; since, indeed, I have cursorily included in a single book a subject so manifold and copious, and one so well known by the many and great arguments of many and great men, while manifesting that a trinity exists also in it, but not yet one that can be called an image of God.
[14.8.11] Nunc vero ad eam iam pervenimus disputationem ubi principale mentis humanae quo novit deum vel potest nosse considerandum suscepimus ut in eo reperiamus imaginem dei. Quamvis enim mens humana non sit eius naturae cuius est deus, imago tamen naturae illius qua natura melior nulla est ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed prius mens in se ipsa con sideranda est anteq u am sit particeps dei et in ea reperienda est imago eius. Diximus enim eam etsi amissa dei participatione obsoletam atque deformem dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest, quod tam magnum bonum nisi per hoc quod imago eius est non potest. Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem deum sed iam imaginem dei. Non forinsecus accepit memoria quod teneret, nec foris invenit quod aspiceret intellectus sicut corporis oculus, nec ista duo velut formam corporis et eam quae inde facta est in acie contuentis voluntas foris iunxit. Nec imaginem rei quae foris visa est quodam modo raptam et in memoria reconditam cogitatio cum ad eam converteretur invenit, et inde informatus est recordantis obtutus iungente utrumque tertia voluntate, sicut in eis ostendebamus trinitatibus fieri quae in rebus corporalibus reperiebantur vel ex corporibus per sensum corporis introrsus quodam modo trahebantur, de quibus omnibus in libro undecimo disseruimus. Nec sicut fiebat vel apparebat quando de illa scientia disserebamus iam in hominis interioris opibus constituta, quae distinguenda fuit a sapientia, unde quae sciuntur velut adventicia sunt in animo, sive cognitione historica inlata ut sunt facta et dicta quae tempore peraguntur et transeunt vel in natura rerum suis locis et regionibus constituta sunt, sive in ipso homine quae non erant oriuntur aut aliis docentibus aut cogitationibus propriis sicut fides quam plurimum in libro tertio decimo commendavimus, sicut virtutes quibus si verae sunt in hac mortalitate ideo bene vivitur ut beate in illa quae divinitus promittitur immortalitate vivatur. Haec atque huiusmodi habent in tempore ordinem suum in quo nobis trinitas memoriae, visionis et amoris facilius apparebat. Nam quaedam eorum praeveniunt cognitionem discentium; sunt enim cognoscibilia et antequam cognoscantur suique cognitionem in discentibus gignant. Sunt autem vel in locis suis vel quae tempore praeterierunt, quamvis quae praeterierunt non ipsa sint sed eorum quaedam signa praetentorum quibus visis vel auditis cognoscantur fuisse atque transisse. Quae signa vel in locis sita sunt sicut monumenta mortuorum et quaecumque similia, vel in litteris fide dignis sicut est omnis gravis et approbandae auctoritatis historia, vel in animis eorum qui ea iam noverunt (eis quippe iam nota, et aliis utique sunt noscibilia quorum scientiam praeuenerunt et qu~ ea nosse illis quibus nota sunt docentibus possunt). Quae omnia et quando discuntur quandam faciunt trinitatem specie sua quae noscibilis fuit etiam antequam nosceretur eique adiuncta cognitione discentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur ac tertia voluntate quae utrumque coniungit. Et cum cognita fuerint, alia trinitas dum recoluntur fit iam interius in ipso animo ex his imaginibus quae cum discerentur sunt impressae in memoria et informatione cogitationis ad ea con verso recordantis aspectu et ex voluntate quae tertia duo ista coniungit. Ea vero quae oriuntur in animo ubi non fuerunt sicut fides et caetera huiusmodi, etsi adventicia videntur cum doctrina inseruntur, non tamen foris posita vel foris peracta sunt sicut illa quae creduntur, sed intus omnino in ipso animo esse coeperunt. Fides enim non est quod creditur, sed qua creditur, et illud creditur, illa conspicitur. Tamen quia esse coepit in animo qui iam erat animus antequam in illo ista esse coepisset, adventicium quiddam videtur et in praeteritis habebitur quando succedente specie iam esse destiterit, aliamque nunc trinitatem facit per suam praesentiam, retenta, conspecta, dilecta; aliam tunc faciet per quoddam sui uestigium quod in memoria praeteriens dereliquerit sicut iam supra dictum est.	11. But we have come now to that argument in which we have undertaken to consider the noblest part of the human mind, by which it knows or can know God, in order that we may find in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing better. But the mind must first be considered as it is in itself, before it becomes partaker of God; and His image must be found in it. For, as we have said, although worn out and defaced by losing the participation of God, yet the image of God still remains. For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable of Him, and can be partaker of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His image. Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at last an image of God. The memory does not receive from without that which it is to hold; nor does the understanding find without that which it is to regard, as the eye of the body does; nor has will joined these two from without, as it joins the form of the bodily object and that which is thence wrought in the vision of the beholder; nor has conception, in being turned to it, found an image of a thing seen without, which has been somehow seized and laid up in the memory, whence the intuition of him that recollects has been formed, will as a third joining the two: as we showed to take place in those trinities which were discovered in things corporeal, or which were somehow drawn within from bodily objects by the bodily sense; of all which we have discoursed in the eleventh book. Nor, again, as it took place, or appeared to do so, when we went on further to discuss that knowledge, which had its place now in the workings of the inner man, and which was to be distinguished from wisdom; of which knowledge the subject-matter was, as it were, adventitious to the mind, and either was brought there by historical information—as deeds and words, which are performed in time and pass away, or which again are established in the nature of things in their own times and places—or arises in the man himself not being there before, whether on the information of others, or by his own thinking—as faith, which we commended at length in the thirteenth book, or as the virtues, by which, if they are true, one so lives well in this mortality as to live blessedly in that immortality which God promises. These and other things of the kind have their proper order in time, and in that order we discerned more easily a trinity of memory, sight, and love. For some of such things anticipate the knowledge of learners. For they are knowable also before they are known, and beget in the learner a knowledge of themselves. And they either exist in their own proper places, or have happened in time past; although things that are past do not themselves exist, but only certain signs of them as past, the sight or hearing of which makes it known that they have been and have passed away. And these signs are either situate in the places themselves, as e.g. monuments of the dead or the like; or exist in written books worthy of credit, as is all history that is of weight and approved authority; or are in the minds of those who already know them; since what is already known to them is knowable certainly to others also, whose knowledge it has anticipated, and who are able to know it on the information of those who do know it. And all these things, when they are learned, produce a certain kind of trinity, viz. by their own proper species, which was knowable also before it was known, and by the application to this of the knowledge of the learner, which then begins to exist when he learns them, and by will as a third which combines both; and when they are known, yet another trinity is produced in the recollecting of them, and this now inwardly in the mind itself, from those images which, when they were learned, were impressed upon the memory, and from the informing of the thought when the look has been turned upon these by recollection, and from the will which as a third combines these two. But those things which arise in the mind, not having been there before, as faith and other things of that kind, although they appear to be adventitious, since they are implanted by teaching, yet are not situate without or transacted without, as are those things which are believed; but began to be altogether within in the mind itself. For faith is not that which is believed, but that by which it is believed; and the former is believed, the latter seen. Nevertheless, because it began to be in the mind, which was a mind also before these things began to be in it, it seems to be somewhat adventitious, and will be reckoned among things past, when sight shall have succeeded, and itself shall have ceased to be. And it makes now by its presence, retained as it is, and beheld, and loved, a different trinity from that which it will then make by means of some trace of itself, which in passing it will have left in the memory: as has been already said above.
[14.9.12] Utrum autem etiam tunc virtutes quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur quia et ipsae incipiunt esse in animo qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat, desinant esse cum ad aeterna perduxerint nonnulla quaestio est. Quibusdam enim visum est desituras, et de tribus quidem, prudentia, fortitudine, temperantia cum hoc dicitur non nihil dici videtur. Iustitia vero immortalis est et magis tunc perficietur in nobis quam esse cessabit. De omnibus tamen quattuor magnus auctor eloquentiae Tullius in Hortensio dialogo disputans: Si nobis, inquit, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum insulis immortale aeuum, ut fabulae ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent, aut ipsis etiam virtutibus. Nec enim fortitudine egeremus, nullo proposito aut labore aut periculo, nec iustitia, cum esset nihil quod appeteretur alieni, nec temperantia, quae regeret eas quae nullae essent libidines, nec prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo delectu proposito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur essemus beati cognitione naturae et scientia, qua sola etiam deorum est vita laudanda. Ex quo intellegi potest, caetera necessitatis esse, unum hoc voluntatis. Ita ille tantus orator cum philosophiam praedicaret recolens ea quae a philosophis acceperat et praeclare ac suaviter explicans in hac tantum vita quam videmus aerumnis et erroribus plenam omnes quattuor necessarias dixit esse virtutes, nullam vero earum cum ex hac vita emigrabimus si liceat ibi vivere ubi vivitur beate, sed bonos animos sola beatos esse cognitione et scientia, hoc est contemplatione naturae in qua nihil est melius et amabilius ea natura quae creavit omnes caeteras instituitque naturas. Cui regenti esse subditum si iustitiae est, immortalis est omnino iustitia nec in illa esse beatitudine desinet sed talis ac tanta erit ut perfectior et maior esse non possit. Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnatione libidinum erunt in illa felicitate ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum deo praeponere vel aequare, fortitudinis ei firmissime cohaerere, temperantiae nullo defectu noxio delectari. Nunc autem quod agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis non ibi erit ubi nihil omnino mali erit. Ac per hoc ista virtutum opera quae huic mortali vitae sunt necessaria sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt in praeteritis habebuntur, et aliam nunc faciunt trinitatem, cum ea praesentia tenemus, aspicimus, amamus; aliam tunc factura sunt cum ea non esse sed fuisse per quaedam eorum uestigia quae praetereundo in memoria derelinquent reperiemus, quia et tunc trinitas erit cum illud qualecumque uestigium et memoriter retinebitur et agnoscetur veraciter et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate iungetur.	12. There is, however, some question raised, whether the virtues likewise by which one lives well in this present mortality, seeing that they themselves begin also to be in the mind, which was a mind none the less when it existed before without them, cease also to exist at that time when they have brought us to things eternal. For some have thought that they will cease, and in the case of three— prudence, fortitude, temperance— such an assertion seems to have something in it; but justice is immortal, and will rather then be made perfect in us than cease to be. Yet Tullius, the great author of eloquence, when arguing in the dialogue Hortensius, says of all four: If we were allowed, when we migrated from this life, to live forever in the islands of the blessed, as fables tell, what need were there of eloquence when there would be no trials, or what need, indeed, of the very virtues themselves? For we should not need fortitude when nothing of either toil or danger was proposed to us; nor justice, when there was nothing of anybody else's to be coveted; nor temperance, to govern lasts that would not exist; nor, indeed, should we need prudence, when there was no choice offered between good and evil. We should be blessed, therefore, solely by learning and knowing nature, by which alone also the life of the gods is praiseworthy. And hence we may perceive that everything else is a matter of necessity, but this is one of free choice. This great orator, then, when proclaiming the excellence of philosophy, going over again all that he had learned from philosophers, and excellently and pleasantly explaining it, has affirmed all four virtues to be necessary in this life only, which we see to be full of troubles and mistakes; but not one of them when we shall have migrated from this life, if we are permitted to live there where is a blessed life; but that blessed souls are blessed only in learning and knowing, i.e. in the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better and more lovable. It is that nature which created and appointed all other natures. And if it belongs to justice to be subject to the government of this nature then justice is certainly immortal; nor will it cease to be in that blessedness, but will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater. Perhaps, too, the other three virtues— prudence although no longer with any risk of error, and fortitude without the vexation of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust— will exist in that blessedness: so that it may be the part of prudence to prefer or equal no good thing to God; and of fortitude, to cleave to Him most steadfastly; and of temperance, to be pleased by no harmful defect. But that which justice is now concerned with in helping the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treachery, and fortitude in bearing troubles patiently, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not exist there, where there will be no evil at all. And hence those acts of the virtues which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred, will be reckoned among things past; and they make now a different trinity, while we hold, look at, and love them as present, from that which they will then make, when we shall discover them not to be, but to have been, by certain traces of them which they will have left in passing in the memory; since then, too, there will be a trinity, when that trace, be it of what sort it may, shall be retained in the memory, and truly recognized, and then these two be joined by will as a third.
[14.10.13] In omnium istarum quas commemoravimus temporalium rerum scientia quaedam cognoscibilia cognitionem interpositione temporis antecedunt sicut sunt ea sensibilia quae iam erant in rebus antequam cognoscerentur vel ea omnia quae per historiam cognoscuntur; quaedam vero simul esse incipiunt velut si aliquid visibile quod omnino non erat ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit, aut si aliquid sonet ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. Verumtamen sive tempore praecedentia sive simul esse incipientia cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignuntur. Cognitione vero facta cum ea quae cognovimus posita in memoria recordatione revisuntur, quis non videat priorem esse tempore in memoria retentionem quam in recordatione visionem et huius utriusque tertia voluntate iunctionem? Porro autem in mente non sic est; neque enim adventicia sibi ipsa est quasi ad se ipsam quae iam erat venerit aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat, aut non aliunde venerit sed in se ipsa quae iam erat nata sit ea ipsa quae non erat sicut in mente quae iam erat oritur fides quae non erat, aut post cognitionem sui recordando se ipsam velut in memoria sua constitutam videt quasi non ibi Iverit antequam se ipsam cognosceret, cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, numquam sui meminisse, numquam se mtellegere, numquam se amare destiterit sicut iam ostendimus. Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsam cogitatione convertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et verbum possit intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitatione, voluntate utrumque iungente. Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quaerimus.	13. In the knowledge of all these temporal things which we have mentioned, there are some knowable things which precede the acquisition of the knowledge of them by an interval of time, as in the case of those sensible objects which were already real before they were known, or of all those things that are learned through history; but some things begin to be at the same time with the knowing of them—just as, if any visible object, which did not exist before at all, were to rise up before our eyes, certainly it does not precede our knowing it; or if there be any sound made where there is some one to hear, no doubt the sound and the hearing that sound begin and end simultaneously. Yet none the less, whether preceding in time or beginning to exist simultaneously, knowable things generate knowledge, and are not generated by knowledge. But when knowledge has come to pass, whenever the things known and laid up in memory are reviewed by recollection, who does not see that the retaining them in the memory is prior in time to the sight of them in recollection, and to the uniting of the two things by will as a third? In the mind, howver, it is not so. For the mind is not adventitious to itself, as though there came to itself already existing, that same self not already existing, from somewhere else, or did not indeed come from somewhere else, but that in the mind itself already existing, there was born that same mind not already existing; just as faith, which before was not, arises in the mind which already was. Nor does the mind see itself, as it were, set up in its own memory by recollection subsequently to the knowing of itself, as though it was not there before it knew itself; whereas,doubtless, from the time when it began to be, it has never ceased to remember, to understand, and to love itself, as we have already shown. And hence, when it is turned to itself by thought, there arises a trinity, in which now at length we can discern also a word; since it is formed from thought itself, will uniting both. Here, then, we may recognize, more than we have hitherto done, the image of which we are in search.
[14.11.14] Sed dicet aliquis: 'Non est ista memoria qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur quae sibi semper est praesens; memoria enim praeteritorum est non praesentium.' Nam quidam cum de virtutibus agerent in quibus est etiam Tullius in tria ista prudentiam diviserunt, memoriam, intellegentiam, providentiam, memoriam scilicet praeteritis, intellegentiam praesentibus, providentiam rebus tribuentes futuris quam non habent certam nisi praescii futurorum, quod non est munus hominum nisi detur desuper, ut prophetis. Unde scriptura sapientiae de hominibus agens: Cogitationes, inquit, mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Memoria vero de praeteritis et intellegentia de praesentibus certa est (sed praesentibus utique incorporalibus rebus, nam corporales corporalium praesentes sunt aspectibus oculorum). Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium attendat quemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris ubi maioris curae fuit verborum integritas quam veritas rerum: nec talia passus Ulixes, Oblitusue sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. Vergilius cnim cum sui non oblitum diceret Vlixem, quid aliud intellegi voluit nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum sibi ergo praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset nisi et ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur qua fit ut valeant recoli et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens memoria sine absurditate dicenda est qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intellegi et utrumque sui amore coniungi.	14. But some one will say, That is not memory by which the mind, which is ever present to itself, is affirmed to remember itself; for memory is of things past, not of things present. For there are some, and among them Cicero, who, in treating of the virtues, have divided prudence into these three— memory, understanding, forethought: to wit, assigning memory to things past, understanding to things present, forethought to things future; which last is certain only in the case of those who are prescient of the future; and this is no gift of men, unless it be granted from above, as to the prophets. And hence the book of Wisdom, speaking of men, The thoughts of mortals, it says, are fearful, and our forethought uncertain. But memory of things past, and understanding of things present, are certain: certain, I mean, respecting things incorporeal, which are present; for things corporeal are present to the sight of the corporeal eyes. But let any one who denies that there is any memory of things present, attend to the language used even in profane literature, where exactness of words was more looked for than truth of things. Nor did Ulysses suffer such things, nor did the Ithacan forget himself in so great a peril. For when Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what else did he mean, except that he remembered himself? And since he was present to himself, he could not possibly remember himself, unless memory pertained to things present. And, therefore, as that is called memory in things past which makes it possible to recall and remember them; so in a thing present, as the mind is to itself, that is not unreasonably to be called memory, which makes the mind at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thought, and then both be joined together by love of itself.
[14.12.15] Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit seque intellegit ac diligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligat. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat deum non factum cuius ab eo capax facta est et cuius esse particeps potest; propter quod scriptum est: Ecce dei cultis est sapientia et non sua luce sed summae illius lucis participatione sapiens erit, atque ubi aeterna, ibi beata regnabit. Sic enim dicitur ista hominis sapientia ut etiam dei sit. Tunc enim vera est; nam si humana est, uana est. Verum non ita dei qua sapiens est deus; neque enim participatione sui sapiens est sicut mens participatione dei. Sed quemadmodum dicitur etiam iustitia dei non solum illa qua ipse iustus est sed quam dat homini cum iustificat impium, quam commendans apostolus ait de quibusdam: Ignorantes enim dei iustitiam et suam iustitiam volentes constituere iustitiae dei non sunt subiecti, sic enim dici etiam de quibusdam potest: 'Ignorantes dei sapientiam et suam volentes constituere sapientiae dei non sunt subiecti.'	15. This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in so doing it is made wise itself. But if it does not do so, even when it remembers, understands, and loves itself, then it is foolish. Let it then remember its God, after whose image it is made, and let it understand and love Him. Or to say the same thing more briefly, let it worship God, who is not made, by whom because itself was made, it is capable and can be partaker of Him; wherefore it is written, Behold, the worship of God, that is wisdom. And then it will be wise, not by its own light, but by participation of that supreme Light; and wherein it is eternal, therein shall reign in blessedness. For this wisdom of man is so called, in that it is also of God. For then it is true wisdom; for if it is human, it is vain. Yet not so of God, as is that wherewith God is wise. For He is not wise by partaking of Himself, as the mind is by partaking of God. But as we call it the righteousness of God, not only when we speak of that by which He Himself is righteous, but also of that which He gives to man when He justifies the ungodly, which latter righteousness the apostle commending, says of some, that not knowing the righteousness of God and going about to establish their own righteousness,they are not subject to the righteousness of God; so also it may be said of some, that not knowing the wisdom of God and going about to establish their own wisdom, they are not subject to the wisdom of God.
[14.12.16] Est igitur natura non lacta quae fecit omnes caeteras magnas paruasque naturas eis quas fecit sine dubitatione praestantior, ac per hoc hac etiam de qua loquimur rationali et intellectuali quae hominis mens est ad eius qui eam fecit imaginem facta. Illa autem caeteris natura praestantior deus est, et quidem non longe positus ab unoquoque nostrum sicut apostolus dicit adiungens: In illo enim vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quod si secundum corpus diceret, etiam de isto corporeo mundo posses intellegi. Nam et in illo secundum corpus vivimus et movemur et sumus. Unde secundum mentem quae facta est ad eius imagin em deb et hoc accipi excellen tiore quodam eodemque non visibili sed intellegibili modo. Nam quid non est in ipso de quo divina scriptum est: Quondam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia? Proinde si in ipso sunt omnia, in quo tandem possum vivere quae vivunt et moveri quae moventur nisi in quo sunt? Non tamen omnes cum illo sunt eo modo quo ei dictum est: Ego semper tecum nec ipse cum omnibus eo modo quo dicimus: 'Dominus vobiscum.' Magna itaque hominis miseria est cum illo non esse sine quo non potest esse. In quo enim est procul dubio sine illo non est, et tamen si eius non meminit eumque non intellegit nequc diligit, cum illo non est. Quod autem quisque penitus obliviscitur nec commoneri eius utique potest.	16. There is, then, a nature not made, which made all other natures, great and small, and is without doubt more excellent than those which it has made, and therefore also than that of which we are speaking; viz. than the rational and intellectual nature, which is the mind of man, made after the image of Him who made it. And that nature, more excellent than the rest, is God. And indeed He is not far from every one of us, as the apostle says, who adds, For in Him we live, and are moved, and have our being. And if this were said in respect to the body, it might be understood even of this corporeal world; for in it too in respect to the body, we live, and are moved, and have our being. And therefore it ought to be taken in a more excellent way, and one that is spiritual, not visible, in respect to the mind, which is made after His image. For what is there that is not in Him, of whom it is divinely written, For of Him, and through Him, and in Him, are all things? If, then, all things are in Him, in whom can any possibly live that do live, or be moved that are moved, except in Him in whom they are? Yet all are not with Him in that way in which it is said to Him, I am continually with You. Nor is He with all in that way in which we say, The Lord be with you. And so it is the special wretchedness of man not to be with Him, without whom he cannot be. For, beyond a doubt, he is not without Him in whom he is; and yet if he does not remember, and understand, and love Him, he is not with Him. And when any one absolutely forgets a thing, certainly it is impossible even to remind him of it.
[14.13.17] De visibilibus rebus ad hanc rem sumamus exemplum. Dicit tibi quispiam quem non recognoscis: 'Nosti me,' et ut commoneat dicit ubi, quando, quomodo tibi innotuerit. Omnibusque adhibitis signis quibus in memoriam reuoceris si non recognoscis, ita iam oblitus es ut omnis illa notitia penitus delete sit animo, nihilque aliud restet nisi aut credas ei qui tibi hoc dicit quod aliquando eum noveras, aut ne hoc quidem si fide dignus tibi esse qui loquitur non videtur. Si autem reminisceris, profecto redis in memoriam tuam et in ea invenis quod non fuerat penitus oblivione deletum. Redeamus ad illud propter quod adhibuimus humanae conversationis exemplum. Inter caetera psalmus nonus: Convertantur, inquit, peccatores in infernum, omnes gentes quae obliviscuntur deum. Porro autem vicesimus primus: Commemorabuntur, inquit, et convertentur ad dominum universi fines terrae. Non igitur sic erant oblitae istae gentes deum ut eius nec commemoratae recordarentur. Obliviscendo autem deum tamquam obliviscendo vitam suam conversae fuerant in mortem, hoc est in infernum. Commemoratae vero convertuntur ad dominum tamquam reviviscentes reminiscendo vitam cuius eas habebat oblivio. Item legitur in nonagesimo tertio: Intellegite nunc qui insipientes estis in populo, et stulti aliquando sapite. Qui plantavit aurem non audiet?... etc. Eis enim dictum est qui deum non intellegendo de illo uana dixerunt.	17. Let us take an instance for the purpose from visible things. Somebody whom you do not recognize, says to you, You know me; and in order to remind you, tells you where, when, and how he became known to you; and if, after the mention of every sign by which you might be recalled to remembrance, you still do not recognize him, then you have so come to forget, as that the whole of that knowledge is altogether blotted out of your mind; and nothing else remains, but that you take his word for it who tells you that you once knew him; or do not even do that, if you do not think the person who speaks to you to be worthy of credit. But if you do remember him, then no doubt you return to your own memory, and find in it that which had not been altogether blotted out by forgetfulness. Let us return to that which led us to adduce this instance from the intercourse of men. Among other things, the 9th Psalm says, The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations. that forget God; and again the 22d Psalm, All the ends of the world shall be reminded, and turned unto the Lord. These nations, then, will not so have forgotten God as to be unable to remember Him when reminded of Him; yet, by forgetting God, as though forgetting their own life, they had been turned into death, i.e. into hell. But when reminded they are turned to the Lord, as though coming to life again by remembering their proper life which they had forgotten. It is read also in the 94th Psalm, Perceive now, you who are unwise among the people; and you fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? etc. For this is spoken to those, who said vain things concerning God through not understanding Him.
[14.14.18] De dilectione autem dei plura reperiuntur in divinis eloquiis testimonia. Ibi enim et illa duo consequenter intelleguntur quia nemo diligit cuius non meminit et quod penitus nescit. Unde illud est notissimum praecipuumque praeceptum: Diliges dominum deum tuum. Sic itaque condita est mens humane ut numquam sui non meminerit, numquam se non intellegat, numquam se non diligat. Sed quondam qui odit aliquem nocere illi studet, non immerito et mens hominis quando sibi nocet odisse se dicitur. Nesciens enim sibi vult male dum non putat sibi obesse quod vult, sed tamen male sibi vult quando id vult quod obsit sibi, unde illud scriptum est: Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam. Qui ergo se diligere novit deum diligit; qui vero non diligit deum etiam si se diligit, quod ei naturaliter inditum est, tamen non inconvenienter odisse se dicitur cum id agit quod sibi adversatur et se ipsum tamquam suus inimicus insequitur. Qui profecto est error horrendus ut cum sibi omnes prodesse velint, multi non faciant nisi quod eis perniciosissimum sit. Similem morbum mutorum animalium cum poeta describeret: Dii, inquit, meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum! Discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. Cum morbus ille corporis fuerit, cur dixit errorem nisi quia omne animal cum sibi natura conciliatum sit ut se custodiat quantum potest, talis ille erat morbus ut ea quorum salutem appetebant sua membra laniarent? Cum autem deum diligit mens et sicut dictum est consequenter eius meminit eumque intellegit, recte illi de proximo suo praecipitur ut eum sicut se diligat. Iam enim se non peruerse sed recte diligit cum deum diligit cuius participatione imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex uetustate renouatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate beatificatur. Quamvis enim se ita diligat ut si alterutrum proponatur, malit omnia quae infra se diligit perdere quam perire, tamen superiorem deserendo ad quem solum posset custodire fortitudinem suam eoque frui lumine suo, cui canitur in psalmo: Fortitudinem meam ad te custodiam et in alio: Accedite ad eum et inluminamini sic infirma et tenebrosa facta est ut a se quoque ipsa in ea quae non sunt quod ipsa et quibus superior est ipsa infelicius laberetur per amores quos non valet vincere et errores a quibus non videt qua redire. Unde iam deo miserante poenitens clamat in psalmis: Deseruit me fortitudo mea et lumen oculorum meorum non est mecum.	18. But there are yet more testimonies in the divine Scriptures concerning the love of God. For in it, those other two [namely, memory and understanding] are understood by consequence, inasmuch as no one loves that which he does not remember, or of which he is wholly ignorant. And hence is that well known and primary commandment, You shall love the Lord your God. The human mind, then, is so constituted, that at no time does it not remember, and understand, and love itself. But since he who hates any one is anxious to injure him, not undeservedly is the mind of man also said to hate itself when it injures itself. For it wills ill to itself through ignorance, in that it does not think that what it wills is prejudicial to it; but it none the less does will ill to itself, when it wills what would be prejudicial to it. And hence it is written, He that loves iniquity, hates his own soul. He, therefore, who knows how to love himself, loves God; but he who does not love God, even if he does love himself—a thing implanted in him by nature,— yet is not unsuitably said to hate himself, inasmuch as he does that which is adverse to himself, and assails himself as though he were his own enemy. And this is no doubt a terrible delusion, that whereas all will to profit themselves, many do nothing but that which is most pernicious to themselves. When the poet was describing a like disease of dumb animals, May the gods, says he, grant better things to the pious, and assign that delusion to enemies. They were rending with bare teeth their own torn limbs. Since it was a disease of the body he was speaking of, why has he called it a delusion, unless because, while nature inclines every animal to take all the care it can of itself, that disease was such that those animals rent those very limbs of theirs which they desired should be safe and sound? But when the mind loves God, and by consequence, as has been said remembers and understands Him, then it is rightly enjoined also to love its neighbor as itself; for it has now come to love itself rightly and not perversely when it loves God, by partaking of whom that image not only exists, but is also renewed so as to be no longer old, and restored so as to be no longer defaced, and beatified so as to be no longer unhappy. For although it so love itself, that, supposing the alternative to be proposed to it, it would lose all things which it loves less than itself rather than perish; still, by abandoning Him who is above it, in dependence upon whom alone it could guard its own strength, and enjoy Him as its light, to whom it is sung in the Psalm, I will guard my strength in dependence upon You, and again, Draw near to Him, and be enlightened, — it has been made so weak and so dark, that it has fallen away unhappily from itself too, to those things that are not what itself is, and which are beneath itself, by affections that it cannot conquer, and delusions from which it sees no way to return. And hence, when by God's mercy now penitent, it cries out in the Psalms, My strength fails me; as for the light of my eyes, it also is gone from me.
[14.14.19] Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatis et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum et amorem sui. Propter quod merito dici potuit quod supra commemoravi: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen uane conturbatur. Thesaurizat et nescit cui congregabit ea. Cur enim thesaurizat nisi quia fortitudo eius deseruit eum per quam deum habens rei nullius indigeret? Et cur nescit cui congregabit ea nisi quia lumen oculorum eius non est cum eo? Et ideo non videt quod veritas ait: Stulte, hac nocte animam tuam repetunt abs te. Haec quae praeparasti cuius erunt? Verumtamen quia etiam talis in imagine ambulat homo, et habet memoriam et intellectum et amorem sui hominis mens, si ei manifestaretur quod utrumque habere non posset et unum e duobus permitteretur eligere alterum perditurus, aut thesauros quos congregavit aut mentem, quis usque adeo non habet mentem ut thesauros mallet habere quam mentem? Thesauri enim possunt mentem plerumque subuertere, et mens quae thesauris non subuertitur sine ullis thesauris facilius et expeditius potest vivere. Quis vero ullos thesauros nisi per mentem poterit possidere? Si enim puer infans quamvis ditissimus natus, cum sit dominus omnium quae iure sunt eius, nihil possidet mente sopita, quonam tandem modo quisquam quidquam mente possidebit amissa? Sed de thesauris quid loquor quod eius quilibet hominum si talis optio proponatur mauult carere quam mente cum eos nemo praeponat, nemo comparet luminibus corporis quibus non aurum rarus quisque homo sed omnis homo possidet caelum? Per lumina enim corporis quisque possidet quidquid libenter videt. Quis ergo si tenere utrumque non possit et alterutrum cogatur amittere, non thesauros quam oculos malit? Et tamen si ab eo simili conditione quaeratur utrum oculos malit amittere an mentem, quis mente non videat eum oculos malle quam mentem? Mens quippe sine oculis carnis humana est; oculi autem carnis sine mente belluini sunt. Quis porro non hommem se malit esse etiam carne caecum quam belluam videntem?	19. Yet, in the midst of these evils of weakness and delusion, great as they are, it could not lose its natural memory, understanding and love of itself. And therefore what I quoted above can be rightly said, Although man walks in an image, surely he is disquieted in vain: he heaps up treasures, and knows not who shall gather them. For why does he heap up treasures, unless because his strength has deserted him, through which he would have God, and so lack nothing? And why cannot he tell for whom he shall gather them, unless because the light of his eyes is taken from him? And so he does not see what the Truth says, You fool, this night your soul shall be required of you. Then whose shall those things be which you have provided? Yet because even such a man walks in an image, and the man's mind has remembrance, understanding, and love of itself; if it were made plain to it that it could not have both, while it was permitted to choose one and lose the other, viz. either the treasures it has heaped up, or the mind; who is so utterly without mind, as to prefer to have the treasures rather than the mind? For treasures commonly are able to subvert the mind, but the mind that is not subverted by treasures can live more easily and unencumberedly without any treasures. But who will be able to possess treasures unless it be by means of the mind? For if an infant, born as rich as you please, although lord of everything that is rightfully his, yet possesses nothing if his mind be unconscious, how can any one possibly possess anything whose mind is wholly lost? But why say of treasures, that anybody, if the choice be given him, prefers going without them to going without a mind; when there is no one that prefers, nay, no one that compares them, to those lights of the body, by which not one man only here and there, as in the case of gold, but every man, possesses the very heaven? For every one possesses by the eyes of the body whatever he gladly sees. Who then is there, who, if he could not keep both, but must lose one, would not rather lose his treasures than his eyes? And yet if it were put to him on the same condition, whether he would rather lose eyes than mind, who is there with a mind that does not see that he would rather lose the former than the latter? For a mind without the eyes of the flesh is still human, but the eyes of the flesh without a mind are bestial. And who would not rather be a man, even though blind in fleshly sight, than a beast that can see?
[14.14.20] Haec dixi ut etiam tardiores quamvis breviter commonerentur a me in quorum oculos vel aures hae litterae venerint quantum mens diligat se ipsam etiam infirma et errans male diligendo atque sectando quae sunt infra ipsam. Diligere porro se ipsam non posset si se omnino nesciret, id est si sui non meminisset nec se intellegeret. Qua in se imagine dei tam potens est ut ei cuius imago est valeat inhaerere. Sic enim ordinata est naturarum ordine non locorum ut supra illam non sit nisi ille. Denique cum illi penitus adhaeserit, unus erit spiritus, cui rei attestatur apostolus dicens: Qui autem adhaeret domino unus spiritus est accedente quidem ista ad participationem naturae, veritatis et beatitudinis illius, non tamen crescente illo in natura, veritate et beatitudine sua. In illa itaque natura cum feliciter adhaeserit immutabile videbit omne quod viderit. Tunc sicut ei divina scriptura promittit satiabitur in bonis desiderium eius, bonis immutabilibus, ipsa trinitate deo suo cuius imago est, et ne uspiam deinceps violetur erit in abscondito uultus eius tanta ubertate eius impleta ut eam numquam peccare delectet. Se ipsam vero nunc quando videt non aliquid immutabile videt.	20. I have said thus much, that even those who are slower of understanding, to whose eyes or ears this book may come, might be admonished, however briefly, how greatly even a weak and erring mind loves itself, in wrongly loving and pursuing things beneath itself. Now it could not love itself if it were altogether ignorant of itself, i.e. if it did not remember itself, nor understand itself by which image of God within itself it has such power as to be able to cleave to Him whose image it is. For it is so reckoned in the order, not of place, but of natures, as that there is none above it save Him. When, finally, it shall altogether cleave to Him, then it will be one spirit, as the apostle testifies, saying, But he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit. And this by its drawing near to partake of His nature, truth, and blessedness, yet not by His increasing in His own nature, truth and blessedness. In that nature, then, when it happily has cleaved to it, it will live unchangeably, and will see as unchangeable all that it does see. Then, as divine Scripture promises, His desire will be satisfied with good things, good things unchangeable—the very Trinity itself, its own God, whose image it is. And that it may not ever thenceforward suffer wrong, it will be in the hidden place of His presence, filled with so great fullness of Him, that sin thenceforth will never delight it. But now, when it sees itself, it sees something not unchangeable.
[14.15.21] Quod ideo certe non dubitat quoniam misera est et beata esse desiderat, nec ob aliud fieri sperat hoc posse nisi quia est mutabilis. Nam si mutabilis non esset, sicut ex beata misera sic ex misera beata esse non posset. Et quid eam fecisset miseram sub omnipotente et bono domino nisi peccatum suum et iustitia domini sui? Et quid eam faciet beatam nisi meritum suum et praemium domini sui? Sed et meritum eius gratia est illius cuius praemium erit beatitudo eius. Iustitiam quippe sibi dare non potest quam perditam non habet. Hanc enim cum homo conderetur accepit et peccando utique perdidit. Accipit ergo iustitiam propter quam beatitudinem accipere mereatur. Unde veraciter ei dicitur ab apostolo quasi de suo bono superbire incipienti: Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? Quando autem bene recordatur domini sui spiritu eius accepto, sentit omnino quia hoc discit intimo magisterio, non nisi eius gratuito effectu posse se surgere, nonnisi suo voluntario defectu cadere potuisse. Non sane reminiscitur beatitudinis suae. Fuit quippe illa et non est, eiusque ista penitus oblita est, ideoque nec commemorari potest. Credit autem de illa fide dignis litteris dei sui per eius prophetas conscriptis narrantibus de felicitate paradisi atque illud primum et bonum hominis et malum historica traditione indicantibus. Domini autem dei sui reminiscitur. Ille quippe semper est, nec fuit et non est, nec est et non fuit, sed sicut numquam non erit ita numquam non erat. Et ubique totus est, propter quod ista in illo et vivit et movetur et est, et ideo eius reminisci potest. Non quia hoc recordatur quod eum noverat in Adam aut alibi alicubi ante huius corporis vitam aut cum primum facta est ut insereretur huic corpori; nihil enim horum omnino reminiscitur; quidquid horum est oblivione deletum est. Sed commemoratur ut convertatur ad dominum, tamquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo averteretur quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis iudicant nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura cum procul dubio mente ista videantur, eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles videat quisquis in eis et hoc videre potuerit; nec in habitu suae mentis cum illae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes vero eorum esse constet iniustas. Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit iustum et iniustus agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde omnis lex iusta describitur et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam non migrando sed tamquam imprimendo transfertur, sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit et anulum non relinquit? Qui vero non operatur et tamen videt quid operandum sit, ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur, a qua tamen tangitur. Qui autem nec videt quemadmodum sit vivendum excusabilius quidem peccat quia non est transgressor legis incognitae, sed etiam ipse splendore aliquotiens ubique praesentis veritatis attingitur quando admonitus confitetur.	21. And of this certainly it feels no doubt, that it is wretched, and longs to be blessed nor can it hope for the possibility of this on any other ground than its own changeableness for if it were not changeable, then, as it could not become wretched after being blessed, so neither could it become blessed after being wretched. And what could have made it wretched under an omnipotent and good God, except its own sin and the righteousness of its Lord? And what will make it blessed, unless its own merit, and its Lord's reward? But its merit, too, is His grace, whose reward will be its blessedness; for it cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost, and so has not. For this it received when man was created, and assuredly lost it by sinning. Therefore it receives righteousness, that on account of this it may deserve to receive blessedness; and hence the apostle truly says to it, when beginning to be proud as it were of its own good, For what have you that you did not receive? Now if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? But when it rightly remembers its own Lord, having received His Spirit, then, because it is so taught by an inward teaching, it feels wholly that it cannot rise save by His affection freely given, nor has been able to fall save by its own defection freely chosen. Certainly it does not remember its own blessedness; since that has been, but is not, and it has utterly forgotten it, and therefore cannot even be reminded of it. But it believes what the trustworthy Scriptures of its God tell of that blessedness, which were written by His prophet, and tell of the blessedness of Paradise, and hand down to us historical information of that first both good and ill of man. And it remembers the Lord its God; for He always is, nor has been and is not, nor is but has not been; but as He never will not be, so He never was not. And He is whole everywhere. And hence it both lives, and is moved, and is in Him; and so it can remember Him. Not because it recollects the having known Him in Adam or anywhere else before the life of this present body, or when it was first made in order to be implanted in this body; for it remembers nothing at all of all this. Whatever there is of this, it has been blotted out by forgetfulness. But it is reminded, that it may be turned to God, as though to that light by which it was in some way touched, even when turned away from Him. For hence it is that even the ungodly think of eternity, and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in the morals of men. And by what rules do they thus judge, except by those wherein they see how men ought to live, even though they themselves do not so live? And where do they see these rules? For they do not see them in their own [moral] nature; since no doubt these things are to be seen by the mind, and their minds are confessedly changeable, but these rules are seen as unchangeable by him who can see them at all; nor yet in the character of their own mind, since these rules are rules of righteousness, and their minds are confessedly unrighteous. Where indeed are these rules written, wherein even the unrighteous recognizes what is righteous, wherein he discerns that he ought to have what he himself has not? Where, then, are they written, unless in the book of that Light which is called Truth? Whence every righteous law is copied and transferred (not by migrating to it, but by being as it were impressed upon it) to the heart of the man that works righteousness; as the impression from a ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring. But he who works not, and yet sees how he ought to work, he is the man that is turned away from that light, which yet touches him. But he who does not even see how he ought to live, sins indeed with more excuse, because he is not a transgressor of a law that he knows; but even he too is just touched sometimes by the splendor of the everywhere present truth, when upon admonition he confesses.
[14.16.22] Qui vero commemorati convertuntur ad dominum ab ea deformitate qua per cupiditates saeculares conformabantur huic saeculo reformantur ex illo audientes apostolum dicentem: Nolite conformari huic saeculo sed reformamini in novitate mentis uestrae ut incipiat illa imago ab illo reformari a quo formata est; non enim reformare se ipsam potest sicut potuit deformare. Dicit etiam alibi: Renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem qui secundum deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis. Quod ait, secundum deum creatum, hoc alio loco dicitur, ad imaginem dei. Sed peccando iustitiam et sanctitatem veritatis amisit, propter quod haec imago deformis et decolor facta est; hanc recipit cum reformatur atque renouatur. Quod autem ait, spiritu mentis uestrae, non ibi duas res intellegi voluit quasi aliud sit mens, aliud spiritus mentis, sed quia omnis mens spiritus est, non autem omnis spiritus mens est. Est enim spiritus et deus qui renouari non potest quia nec ueterescere potest. Dicitur etiam spiritus in homine qui mens non sit, ad quem pertinent imaginationes similes corporum, de quo dicit ad corinthios ubi dicit: Si autem oravero lingua, spiritus meus orat, mens autem mea infructuosa est. Hoc enim ait quando id quod dicitur non intellegitur quia nec dici potest nisi corporalium vocum imagines sonum oris in spiritus cogitatione praeveniant. Dicitur et hominis anima spiritus, unde est in euangelio: Et inclinato capite tradidit spiritum quo significata est mors corporis anima exeunte. Dicitur spiritus etiam pecoris, quod in ecclesiaste libro Salomonis apertissime scriptum est ubi ait: Quis scit spiritus filiorum hominis si ascendet ipse sursum et spiritus pecoris si descendet ipse deorsum in terram? Scriptum est etiam in genesi ubi dicit diluuio mortuam universam carnem quae habebat in se spiritum vitae. Dicitur spiritus etiam ventus, res apertissime corporalis, unde illud est in psalmis: Ignis, grando, nix, glacies, spiritus tempestatis. Quia ergo tot modis dicitur spiritus, spiritum mentis dicere voluit eum spiritum quae mens vocatur. Sicut ait etiam idem apostolus: In exspoliatione corporis carnis. Non duas utique res intellegi voluit quasi aliud sit caro, aliud corpus carnis, sed quia corpus multarum rerum nomen est quarum nulla caro est (nam multa sunt excepta carne corpora caelestia et corpora terrestria), corpus carnis dixit, corpus quae caro est. Sic itaque spiritum mentis eum spiritum quae mens est. Alibi quoque apertius etiam imaginem nominavit, scilicet aliis verbis idipsum praecipiens: Exspoliantes vos, inquit, ueterem hominem cum actibus eius induite nouum hominem qui renouatur in agnitione dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Quod ergo ibi legitur: Induite nouum hominem qui secundum deum creatus est hoc isto loco: Induite nouum hominem qui renouatur secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Ibi autem ait, secundum deum; hic vero, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum. Pro eo vero quod ibi posuit, in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis, hoc posuit hic, in agnitione dei. Fit ergo ista renouatio reformatioque mentis secundum deum vel secundum imaginem dei. Sed ideo dicitur secundum deum ne secundum aliam creaturam fieri putetur; ideo autem secundum imaginem dei ut in ea re intellegatur fieri haec renouatio ubi est imago dei, id est in mente, quemadmodum dicimus secundum corpus mortuum, non secundum spiritum, eum qui de corpore fidelis et iustus abscedit. Quid enim dicimus 'secundum corpus mortuum' nisi corpore vel in corpore, non anima vel in anima mortuum? Aut si dicamus: 'Secundum corpus est pulcher,' aut: 'Secundum corpus fortis, non secundum animum,' quid est aliud quam, 'Corpore non animo pulcher aut fortis est'? Et innumerabiliter ita loquimur. Non itaque sic intellegamus secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum quasi alla sit imago secundum quam renouatur, non ipsa qua renouatur.	22. But those who, by being reminded, are turned to the Lord from that deformity whereby they were through worldly lusts conformed to this world, are formed anew from the world, when they hearken to the apostle, saying, Be not conformed to this world, but be formed again in the renewing of your mind; that that image may begin to be formed again by Him by whom it had been formed at first. For that image cannot form itself again, as it could deform itself. He says again elsewhere: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put ye on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness. That which is meant by created after God, is expressed in another place by after the image of God. But it lost righteousness and true holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and tarnished; and this it recovers when it is formed again and renewed. But when he says, In the spirit of your mind, he does not intend to be understood of two things, as though mind were one, and the spirit of the mind another; but he speaks thus, because all mind is spirit, but all spirit is not mind. For there is a Spirit also that is God, which cannot be renewed, because it cannot grow old. And we speak also of a spirit in man distinct from the mind, to which spirit belong the images that are formed after the likeness of bodies; and of this the apostle speaks to the Corinthians, where he says, But if I shall have prayed with a tongue, my spirit prays, but my understanding is unfruitful. For he speaks thus, when that which is said is not understood; since it cannot even be said, unless the images of the corporeal articulate sounds anticipate the oral sound by the thought of the spirit. The soul of man is also called spirit, whence are the words in the Gospel, And He bowed His head, and gave up His spirit; by which the death of the body, through the spirit's leaving it, is signified. We speak also of the spirit of a beast, as it is expressly written in the book of Solomon called Ecclesiastes; Who knows the spirit of man that goes upward, and the spirit of the beast that goes downward to the earth? It is written too in Genesis, where it is said that by the deluge all flesh died which had in it the spirit of life. We speak also of the spirit, meaning the wind, a thing most manifestly corporeal; whence is that in the Psalms, Fire and hail, snow and ice, the spirit of the storm. Since spirit, then, is a word of so many meanings, the apostle intended to express by the spirit of the mind that spirit which is called the mind. As the same apostle also, when he says, In putting off the body of the flesh, certainly did not intend two things, as though flesh were one, and the body of the flesh another; but because body is the name of many things that have no flesh (for besides the flesh, there are many bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial), he expressed by the body of the flesh that body which is flesh. In like manner, therefore, by the spirit of the mind, that spirit which is mind. Elsewhere, too, he has even more plainly called it an image, while enforcing the same thing in other words. Do you, he says, putting off the old man with his deeds, put on the new man, which is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him that created him. Where the one passage reads, Put on the new man, which is created after God, the other has, Put on the new man, which is renewed after the image of Him that created him.In the one place he says, After God; in the other, After the image of Him that created him. But instead of saying, as in the former passages In righteousness and true holiness, he has put in the latter, In the knowledge of God. This renewal, then, and forming again of the mind, is wrought either after God, or after the image of God. But it is said to be after God, in order that it may not be supposed to be after another creature; and to be after the image of God, in order that this renewing may be understood to take place in that wherein is the image of God, i.e. in the mind. Just as we say, that he who has departed from the body a faithful and righteous man, is dead after the body, not after the spirit. For what do we mean by dead after the body, unless as to the body or in the body, and not dead as to the soul or in the soul? Or if we want to say he is handsome after the body, or strong after the body, not after the mind; what else is this, than that he is handsome or strong in body, not in mind? And the same is the case with numberless other instances. Let us not therefore so understand the words, After the image of Him that created him, as though it were a different image after which he is renewed, and not the very same which is itself renewed.
[14.17.23] Sane ista renouatio non momento uno fit ipsius conversionis sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renouatio remissione omnium peccatorum; neque enim vel unum quantulumcumque remanet quod non remittatur. Sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate quae febribus facta est reualescere, itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud uulnus quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare. Ita prima curatio est causam removere languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renouatione huius imaginis. Quae duo demonstrantur in psalmo ubi legitur: Qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis quod fit in baptismo; deinde sequitur: Qui sanat omnes languores tuos quod fit cotidianis accessibus cum haec imago renouatur. De qua re apostolus apertissime locutus est dicens: Et si exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renouatur de die in diem. Renouatur autem in agnitione dei, hoc est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis sicut sese habent apostolica testimonia quae paulo ante memoravi. In agnitione igitur dei iustitiaque et sanctitate veritatis qui de die in diem proficiendo renouatur transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a visibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minvere illisque se caritate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit quantum divinitus adivuatur. Dei quippe sententia est: Sine me nihil potestis facere. In quo provectu et accessu tenentem mediatoris fidem cum dies vitae huius ultimus quemque compererit, perducendus ad deum quem coluit et ab eo perficiendus excipietur ab angelis sanctis, incorruptibile corpus in fine saeculi non ad poenam sed ad gloriam recepturus. In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit dei similitudo quando dei perfecta erit visio. De qua dicit apostolus Paulus: Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Item dicit: Nos autem reuelata facie gloriam domini speculantes in eandem imaginem transformamur de gloria in gloriam tamquam a domini spiritu hoc est quod fit de die in diem bene proficientibus.	23. Certainly this renewal does not take place in the single moment of conversion itself, as that renewal in baptism takes place in a single moment by the remission of all sins; for not one, be it ever so small, remains unremitted. But as it is one thing to be free from fever, and another to grow strong again from the infirmity which the fever produced; and one thing again to pluck out of the body a weapon thrust into it, and another to heal the wound thereby made by a prosperous cure; so the first cure is to remove the cause of infirmity, and this is wrought by the forgiving of all sins; but the second cure is to heal the infirmity itself, and this takes place gradually by making progress in the renewal of that image: which two things are plainly shown in the Psalm, where we read, Who forgives all your iniquities, which takes place in baptism; and then follows, and heals all your infirmities; and this takes place by daily additions, while this image is being renewed. And the apostle has spoken of this most expressly, saying, And though our outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day. And it is renewed in the knowledge of God, i.e. in righteousness and true holiness, according to the testimonies of the apostle cited a little before. He, then, who is day by day renewed by making progress in the knowledge of God, and in righteousness and true holiness, transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual; and diligently perseveres in bridling and lessening his desire for the former, and in binding himself by love to the latter. And he does this in proportion as he is helped by God. For it is the sentence of God Himself, Without me you can do nothing. And when the last day of life shall have found any one holding fast faith in the Mediator in such progress and growth as this, he will be welcomed by the holy angels, to be led to God, whom he has worshipped, and to be made perfect by Him; and so will receive in the end of the world an incorruptible body, in order not to punishment, but to glory. For the likeness of God will then be perfected in this image, when the sight of God shall be perfected. And of this the Apostle Paul speaks: Now we see through a glass, in an enigma, but then face to face. And again: But we with open face, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the spirit of the Lord. And this is what happens from day to day in those that make good progress.
[14.17.24] Apostolus autem Iohannes: Dilectissimi, inquit, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus. Scimus quia cum apparuerit similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem quando eius plenam perceperit visionem.	24. But the Apostle John says, Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it does not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. Hence it appears, that the full likeness of God is to take place in that image of God at that time when it shall receive the full sight of God.
[14.18.24] Quamquam possit hoc a Iohanne apostolo etiam de immortalitate corporis dictum videri. Et in hac quippe similes erimus deo sed tantummodo filio quia solus in trinitate corpus accepit in quo mortuus resurrexit atque id ad superna peruexit. Nam dicitur etiam ista imago filii dei in qua sicut ille immortale corpus habebimus conformes facti in hac parse non patris imaginis aut spiritus sancti sed tantummodo filii quia de hoc solo legitur et fide sanissima accipitur: Verbum caro factum est. Propter quod apostolus: Quos ante, inquit, praescivit et praedestinavit conformes imaginis filii sui ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Primogenitus utique a mortuis secundum eundem apostolum, qua morte seminata est caro eius in contumelia, resurrexit in gloria. Secundum hanc imaginem filii cui per immortalitatem conformamur in corpore etiam illud agimus quod item dicit idem apostolus: Sicut portavimus imaginem terreni portemus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est ut scilicet qui secundum Adam mortales fuimus secundum Christum immortales nos futuros esse fide vera et spe certa firmaque teneamus. Sic enim nunc eandem imaginem portare possumus, nondum in visione sed in fide, nondum in re sed in spe. De corporis quippe resurrectione tune loquebatur apostolus cum haec diceret.	And yet this may also possibly seem to be said by the Apostle John of the immortality of the body. For we shall be like to God in this too, but only to the Son, because He only in the Trinity took a body, in which He died and rose again, and which He carried with Him to heaven above. For this, too, is called an image of the Son of God, in which we shall have, as He has, an immortal body, being conformed in this respect not to the image of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Son, because of Him alone is it read and received by a sound faith, that the Word was made flesh. And for this reason the apostle says, Whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren. The first-born certainly from the dead, according to the same apostle; by which death His flesh was sown in dishonor, and rose again in glory. According to this image of the Son, to which we are conformed in the body by immortality, we also do that of which the same apostle speaks, As we have borne the image of the earthy, so shall we also bear the image of the heavenly; to wit, that we who are mortal after Adam, may hold by a true faith, and a sure and certain hope, that we shall be immortal after Christ. For so can we now bear the same image, not yet in sight, but in faith; not yet in fact, but in hope. For the apostle, when he said this, was speaking of the resurrection of the body.
[14.19.25] At vero illa imago de qua dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram quia non dictum est, ad 'meam' vel 'tuam,' ad imaginem trinitatis factum hominem credimus, et quanta potuimus investigatione comprehendimus. Et ideo secundum hanc potius et illud intellegendum est quod ait apostolus Iohannes: Similes ei erimus quondam videbimus eum sicuti est quia et de illo dixit de quo dixerat: Filii dei sumus. Et immortalitas carnis illo perficietur momento resurrectionis de quo ait apostolus Paulus: In ictu oculi, in novissima tuba et mortui resurgent incorrupti et nos immutabimur. In ipso namque ictu oculi ante iudicium resurget in virtute, in incorruptione, in gloria corpus spiritale quod nunc seminatur in infirmitate, corruptione, contumelia corpus animale. Imago vero quae renouatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione dei non exterius sed interius de die in diem, ipsa perficietur visione quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem, nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate. Propter cuius perfectionem dictum intellegendum est: Similes ei erimus quondam videbimus eum sicuti est. Hoc enim donum tunc nobis dabitur cum dictum fuerit: Venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum. Tunc quippe tolletur impius ut non videat claritatem domini quando ibunt sinistri in supplicium aeternum euntibus dextris in vitam aeternam. Haec est autem, sicut ait veritas, vita aeterna ut cognoscant te, inquit, unum verum deum et quem misisti Iesum Christum.	25. But in respect to that image indeed, of which it is said, Let us make man after our image and likeness, we believe—and, after the utmost search we have been able to make, understand—that man was made after the image of the Trinity, because it is not said, After my, or After your image. And therefore that place too of the Apostle John must be understood rather according to this image, when he says, We shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is; because he spoke too of Him of whom he had said, We are the sons of God. And the immortality of the flesh will be perfected in that moment of the resurrection, of which the Apostle Paul says, In the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For in that very twinkling of an eye, before the judgment, the spiritual body shall rise again in power, in incorruption, in glory, which is now sown a natural body in weakness, in corruption, in dishonor. But the image which is renewed in the spirit of the mind in the knowledge of God, not outwardly, but inwardly, from day to day, shall be perfected by that sight itself; which then after the judgment shall be face to face, but now makes progress as through a glass in an enigma. And we must understand it to be said on account of this perfection, that we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is. For this gift will be given to us at that time, when it shall have been said, Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you. For then will the ungodly be taken away, so that he shall not see the glory of the Lord, when those on the left hand shall go into eternal punishment, while those on the right go into life eternal. But this is eternal life, as the Truth tells us; to know You, He says, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.
[14.19.26] Hanc contemplativam sapientiam, quam proprie puto in litteris sanctis ab scientia distinctam sapientiam nuncupari dumtaxat hominis, quae quidem ilk non est nisi ab illo cuius participatione vere sapiens fieri mens rationalis et intellectualis potest, Cicero commendans in fine dialogi Hortensii: Quae nobis, inquit, dies noctesque considerantibus acuentibusque intellegentiam quae est mentis acies caventibusque ne quando illa hebescat, id est in philosophia viventibus, magna spes est, aut si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mrtale et caducum est, incundum nobis perfunctis muneribus humanis occasum neque molestam exstinctionem et quasi quietem vitae fore, aut si ut antiquis philosophis hisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit aeternos animos ac divinos habemus sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fmerint semper in suo cursu, id est in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicaverint hominum vitiis et erroribus, hoc his faciliorem ascensum et reditum in caelum fore. Deinde addens hanc ipsam clausulam repetendoque sermonem finiens: Quapropter, inquit, ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille volumus cum in his artibus vixerintus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est. Hic miror hominem tanti ingenii perfunctis muneribus humanis hominibus in philosophia viventibus quae contemplatione veritatis beatos facit iucundum promittere occasum si hoc quod sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est, quasi hoc moriatur et intercidat quod non diligebamus vel potius quod atrociter oderamus ut iucundus nobis sit eius occasus. Verum hoc non didicerat a philosophis quos magnis laudibus praedicat, sed ex illa noua academia ubi ei dubitare etiam de rebus manifestissimis placuit ista sententia redolebat. A philosophis autem sicut ipse confitetur, maximis longeque clarissimis, aeternos esse animos acceperat. Aeterni quippe animi non inconvenienter hac exhortatione excitantur ut in suo cursu reperiantur cum venerit vitae huius extremum, id est in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, minusque se admisceant atque implicent hominum vitiis et erroribus ut eis facilior sit regressus ad deum. Sed iste cursus qui constituitur in amore atque investigatione veritatis non sufficit miseris, id est omnibus cum ista sola ratione mortalibus sine fide mediatoris, quod in libris superioribus huius operis, maxime in quarto et tertio decimo cuantum potui demonstrare curavi.	26. This contemplative wisdom, which I believe is properly called wisdom as distinct from knowledge in the sacred writings; but wisdom only of man, which yet man has not except from Him, by partaking of whom a rational and intellectual mind can be made truly wise—this contemplative wisdom, I say, it is that Cicero commends, in the end of the dialogue Hortensius, when he says: While, then, we consider these things night and day, and sharpen our understanding, which is the eye of the mind, taking care that it be not ever dulled, that is, while we live in philosophy; we, I say, in so doing, have great hope that, if, on the one hand, this sentiment and wisdom of ours is mortal and perishable, we shall still, when we have discharged our human offices, have a pleasant setting, and a not painful extinction, and as it were a rest from life: or if, on the other, as ancient philosophers thought—and those, too, the greatest and far the most celebrated—we have souls eternal and divine, then must we needs think, that the more these shall have always kept in their own proper course, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and the less they shall have mixed and entangled themselves in the vices and errors of men, the more easy ascent and return they will have to heaven. And then he says, adding this short sentence, and finishing his discourse by repeating it: Wherefore, to end my discourse at last, if we wish either for a tranquil extinction, after living in the pursuit of these subjects, or if to migrate without delay from this present home to another in no little measure better, we must bestow all our labor and care upon these pursuits. And here I marvel, that a man of such great ability should promise to men living in philosophy, which makes man blessed by contemplation of truth, a pleasant setting after the discharge of human offices, if this our sentiment and wisdom is mortal and perishable; as if that which we did not love, or rather which we fiercely hated, were then to die and come to nothing, so that its setting would be pleasant to us! But indeed he had not learned this from the philosophers, whom he extols with great praise; but this sentiment is redolent of that New Academy, wherein it pleased him to doubt of even the plainest things. But from the philosophers that were greatest and far most celebrated, as he himself confesses, he had learned that souls are eternal. For souls that are eternal are not unsuitably stirred up by the exhortation to be found in their own proper course, when the end of this life shall have come, i.e. in reason and in the desire of inquiry, and to mix and entangle themselves the less in the vices and errors of men, in order that they may have an easier return to God. But that course which consists in the love and investigation of truth does not suffice for the wretched, i.e. for all mortals who have only this kind of reason, and are without faith in the Mediator; as I have taken pains to prove, as much as I could, in former books of this work, especially in the fourth and thirteenth.