Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D1/Q1

Intelligentia inferior videns superiorem aut videt eam esse finitam, aut credit eam esse infinitam, aut nec videt eius finitatem nec infinitatem

English translation by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
n1 Circa distinctionem primam, ubi Magister tractat de frui et uti, quaero primo de obiecto ipsius fruitionis, et primo, utrum obiectum fruitionis per se sit finis ultimus. Arguitur quod non: Primo per auctoritatem Augustini 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30: ((Fruendum est bonis invisibilibus)), sed plura sunt bona invisibilia; ergo non tantum est fruendum ultimo fine.	1. On the first distinction, where the Master treats of enjoying and using, I ask first about the object of enjoyment itself, and first whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end. Argument that it is not: First, by the authority of Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.30: “Invisible goods are what is to be enjoyed;” but there are many invisible goods; therefore the ultimate end is not the only thing to be enjoyed.
n2 Item per rationem: capacitas fruentis est finita quia ratio sive natura subiecti est finita; ergo illa capacitas potest satiari aliquo finito. Sed fruendum est quocumque satiante capacitatem fruentis; ergo etc.	2. Again, by reason: the capacity of the enjoyer is finite because the idea or nature of the subject is finite; therefore the capacity can be satisfied by something finite. But whatever satisfies the capacity of the enjoyer should be enjoyed; therefore etc.
n3 Item, aliquid est maius capacitate animae, ut Deus, qui sufficit sibi ipsi, et aliquid minus capacitate eius, ut corpus; ergo aliquid est medium, scilicet aequale capacitati eius: illud est minus Deo; ergo habeo propositum, quod non tantum Deo vel ultimo fine est fruendum.	3. Again, there is something greater than the capacity of the soul, as God, who is sufficient for himself, and something less than the capacity of it, as the body; therefore there is something in the middle, namely what is equal to the capacity of it; this thing is less than God; therefore I have the proposition intended, that not only God or the ultimate end is to be enjoyed.
n4 Item, quaecumque forma satiat capacitatem materiae; ergo quodcumque obiectum satiat capacitatem potentiae. Consequentia probatur, quia potentia per formam receptam in ipsa respicit obiectum; et si forma una recepta satiat intrinsece, sequitur quod obiectum quod respicitur a potentia per illam formam satiat potentiam extrinsece sive terminative. Antecedens probatur, quia si aliqua forma non satiaret capacitatem materiae, stante illa forma in materia inclinaretur materia ad aliam formam naturaliter, et per consequens sub ista quiesceret violenter, nam quodcumque prohibens aliquid ab illo ad quod est inclinatio naturalis ipsius est violentum sibi, sicut apparet de quiete gravis extra centrum.	4. Again, any form at all satisfies the capacity of matter; therefore any object at all satisfies the capacity of a power. The proof of the consequence is that a power relates to the object through the form received; and if one received form satisfies intrinsically, the result is that the object that the power relates to through the form satisfies extrinsically or terminatively. The proof of the antecedent is that if any form does not satisfy the matter, then the matter, while that form is persisting in it, would be naturally inclined to another form, and it would as a result be violently at rest under that first form, for whatever prohibits something from what it has a natural inclination to is violent for it, as is clear in the case of a heavy body at rest away from the center.
n5 Item, firmius assentit intellectus alii vero quam primo vero; ergo a simili intensius potest voluntas assentire alii bono quam primo bono.	5. Again, the intellect assents more firmly to a truth other than the first truth; therefore, by similarity of reasoning, the will can assent more firmly to a good other than the first good.
n6 Ad oppositum est Augustinus I De doctrina christiana cap. 1: ((Res quibus fruendum est sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et hi tres sunt una res)), ergo etc.	6. To the opposite is Augustine On Christian Doctrine 1 ch.5 n.5: “The things one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one thing,” therefore etc.
n7 Ad istam quaestionem distinguam primo de fruitione ordinata et in communi sumpta, secundo dicam de obiecto primo fruitionis ordinatae, tertio de obiecto fruitionis in communi, quarto quomodo sit intelligendum fruitionem esse circa finem - sive vere ultimum finem, ut in secundo articulo, sive non vere ultimum, ut in tertio articulo.	7. In answer to this question I will first distinguish between enjoyment taken as ordered and taken in general, second I will speak of the first object of ordered enjoyment, third of the object of enjoyment in general, fourth of how one must understand enjoyment to be about the end – whether about the end truly ultimate, as in the second article, or about the end not truly ultimate, as in the third article.
n8 De primo dico quod fruitio in communi excedit fruitionem ordinatam, quia quandocumque aliqua potentia non determinatur ex se ad actum ordinatum, actus eius in communi universalior est actu eius speciali ordinato; voluntas autem ex se non determinatur ad ordinatam fruitionem, quod patet, quia perversitas summa potest esse in ea, ut quando utitur fruendis et fruitur utendis, secundum Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30. Est autem fruitio ordinata qualis nata est esse recta, quando scilicet ordinatur secundum debitas circumstantias, fruitio vero in communi est sive habeat illas circumstantias debitas sive non.	8. [Article 1] – I say that enjoyment in general is more extensive than ordered enjoyment, because whenever some power is not of itself determined to ordered act, its act in general is more universal than its special ordered act; now the will is not of itself determined to ordered enjoyment, as is plain because supreme perversity can exist in it, as when things to be enjoyed are used and things to be used are enjoyed, according to Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.30. Now ordered enjoyment is of the sort that is naturally right, namely when it is ordered according to the due circumstances, but enjoyment in general is whether it has those due circumstances or not.
n9 Quantum ad secundum videtur esse opinio Avicennae quod fruitio ordinata potest esse circa aliud a fine ultimo. Quod probatur ex dictis eius IX Metaphysicae cap. 4, ubi vult quod intelligentia superior per actum suum intelligendi causat inferiorem: tunc autem videtur productum esse perfectum quando attingit suum principium productivum, secundum illam propositionem Proc1i 35, quod ((unumquodque natum est converti ad illud a quo procedit)); in tali autem reditu videtur circulus esse completus et ita perfectio; ergo intelligentia producta perfecte quietatur in intelligentia producente.	9. [Article 2] – As to the second n.7 it seems to be the opinion of Avicenna that ordered enjoyment can be about something other than the ultimate end. The proof is from his remarks in Metaphysics 9 ch.4 (104vb-105rb), where he wants the higher intelligence to cause through its act of understanding the lower intelligence; but it seems that the thing produced is then perfect when it attains its own productive principle, according to the proposition of Proclus Theological Education ch.34 that: “each thing naturally turns back to that from which it proceeds;” but in such a return there seems to be a complete circle and so perfection; therefore the intelligence produced comes to perfect rest in the intelligence producing it.
n10 Contra istud arguitur sic: potentia non quietatur nisi ubi suum obiectum perfectissime invenitur esse et in summo; potentiae autem fruentis obiectum est ens in communi secundum Avicennam I Metaphysicae cap. 5; ergo non quietatur potentia fruens nisi ubi est perfectissimum ens. Hoc est summum tantum.	10. Argument against this is as follows: a power does not rest except where its object is found to exist most perfectly and at its highest; the object of the enjoying power is being in general, according to Avicenna in Metaphysics 1 ch.6 (72rb); therefore the enjoying power does not rest except where being is most perfect. This being is only the supreme being.
n11 $a Confirmatur per simile de materia ad formam: non quiescit nisi sub continente alias, tamen intrinsecum non sic satiat ut obiectum. a$	11. There is a confirmation by a likeness from matter to form: matter only rests under a form that contains the others, yet something intrinsic does not satisfy as the object does.
n12 Item, intelligentia inferior videns superiorem aut videt eam esse finitam, aut credit eam esse infinitam, aut nec videt eius finitatem nec infinitatem. Si credit eam infinitam, ergo nec beatificatur in ea, quia ((stultius nihil dici potest quam quod falsa opinione sit anima beata)) secundum Augustinum X De civitate cap. 4. Si autem nec videt eius finitatem nec infinitatem, non videt eam perfecte, nec sic est beata. Si autem videt eam finitam, ergo potest intelligere aliquid posse eam excedere: ita autem experimur in nobis quod possumus appetere maius bonum, ultra quodcumque bonum finitum quod ostenditur, vel possumus appetere ultra quodcumque bonum, aliud, quod ostenditur maius bonum, et per consequens potest voluntas appetere amare illud maius bonum, et ita non quietatur in illa intelligentia.	12. Again, an inferior intelligence seeing the superior intelligence either sees it to be finite, or believes it to be infinite, or sees neither its finitude nor its infinity. If it believes it to be infinite then it is not beatified in it because “nothing more stupid can be asserted than that a soul might be blessed in false opinion,” according to Augustine On the City of God XI ch.4 n.2. But if it sees neither the superior intelligence’s finitude nor its infinity it does not see it perfectly and so is not blessed. But if it sees it finite, then it can understand that something else can exceed it; now we in this way experience in ourselves that we can desire a greater good beyond any finite good at all that is shown to us, or that we can desire beyond any good another good which is shown to be greater, and consequently the will can love the greater good, and so it does not rest in that intelligence.
n13 Alii arguunt contra istam opinionem sic: anima est imago Dei, ergo capax eius est et particeps esse potest, quia secundum Augustinum XIV De Trinitate cap. 8 ((eo anima imago Dei est quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest)); quidquid autem est capax Dei per nihil minus Deo satiari potest; ergo etc. Sed ista ratio non procedit contra philosophos, quia praemissa sumpta de imagine est tantum credita et non naturali ratione cognita; ratio enim imaginis quam nos concipimus est tantum credita, non autem naturaliter cognita rationc, quia ratio imaginis quam nos concipimus fundatur in anima ad Deum ut trinus est, et ideo non cognoscitur naturaliter, quia nec extremum ad quod est cognoscitur a nobis naturaliter.	13. Others argue against this opinion as follows: the soul is the image of God, therefore it is capable of him and can participate him, because according to Augustine On the Trinity XIV ch.8 n.11: “for this reason is the soul the image of God because it is capable of him and can participate him;” but whatever is capable of God can be satisfied by nothing less than God; therefore etc. But this reason does not proceed against the philosophers, because the assumed premise about the image is only something believed and is not known by natural reason; therefore the idea of image which we conceive is only something believed, but is not naturally known by reason, because the idea of image that we conceive is founded in the soul in relation to God as Triune, and therefore is not naturally known, because neither is the extreme it is related to naturally known by us.
n14 Alii arguunt contra rationem eius sic: anima creatur a Deo immediate, ergo in eo immediate quiescit et quietatur. Sed huius rationis antecedens est tantum creditum, et negaretur ab eis, quia ipse ponit eam immediate creatam ab ultima et infima intelligentia. Similiter consequentia non valet hic, nec etiam similis facta est pro opinione Avicennae: accidit enim quod in eodem coniungantur ratio primi effectivi et ratio finis, nec quietat in quantum primum effectivum sed in quantum obiectum perfectissimum, alioquin sensitiva nostra, quae a Deo creatur secundum unam opinionem, non posset perfecte quietari nisi in Deo; in proposito ergo idem est efficiens et finis quia in efficiente est plenitudo perfectionis obiecti, non autem in ratione efficientis unde efficiens est includitur ratio finis vel quietantis.	14. Others argue against his opinion n.9 in the following way: the soul is created immediately by God, therefore it does and would rest immediately in him. But the antecedent of this reason is only something believed, and it would be denied by them [sc. followers of Avicenna] because he himself [Avicenna] lays down that the soul is immediately created by the last and lowest intelligence. Likewise the consequence is not here valid, nor the like one either made [n.9] on behalf of the opinion of Avicenna; for it is an accident that the idea of first efficient and the idea of end are conjoined in the same thing, nor does the thing give rest as far as it is the first efficient but as far as it is the most perfect object, otherwise our sensitive power, which according to one opinion is created by God, could not perfectly rest save in God; in the proposed case, then, the same thing is efficient cause and end because there is in the efficient cause the fullness of perfection of the object, but in the efficient cause with respect to why it is efficient cause there is not included the idea of end and of cause of rest.
n15 Ideo teneo quantum ad istum articulum hanc conclusionem, quod videlicet fruitio ordinata habet tantum ultimum finem pro obiecto, quia sicut tantum est assentiendum per intellectum primo vero propter se ita tantum est assentiendum per voluntatem primo bono propter se.	15. Therefore I hold with respect to this article the following conclusion, namely that ordered enjoyment has the ultimate end alone for object, because, just as one should by the intellect assent to the first truth alone for its own sake, so one should by the will assent to the first good alone for its own sake.
n16 De tertio articulo dico quod obiectum fruitionis in communi, ut abstrahit ab ordinato et inordinato fine, est finis ultimus: vel verus finis, qui scilicet est finis ultimus ex natura rei, vel finis apparens, finis ultimus qui scilicet ostenditur a ratione errante tamquam finis ultimus, vel finis praestitutus, quem scilicet voluntas ex libertate sua vult tamquam finem ultimum. Duo prima membra satis patent. Tertium probo, quia sicut in potestate voluntatis est velle vel non velle, ita in potestate eius est modus volendi, scilicet referre vel non referre; ergo in potestate sua est aliquod bonum velle propter se, non referendo ad aliud bonum, et ita praestituendo sibi in eo finem.	16. [Article 3] – About the third article n.7 I say that the object of enjoyment in general, as it abstracts from ordered or disordered end, is the ultimate end: whether this be the true end, namely the end that from the nature of the thing is the ultimate end, or the apparent end, namely the ultimate end which is shown to be ultimate by an erring reason, or the prescribed end, namely the end which the will of its own freedom wills as ultimate end. The first two members are sufficiently plain. The proof of the third is that just as to will or not to will is in the power of the will, so the mode of willing is in its power, namely to refer or not to refer; therefore it is in its power to will some good for its own sake without referring it to some other good, and thus by prescribing the end for itself in that.
n17 De quarto articulo dico quod ratio finis non est ratio propria obiecti fruibilis neque in fruitione ordinata neque in fruitione communiter sumpta. Quod non in ordinata, patet: tum quia respectus non includitur in obiecto beatifico per se in quantum est obiectum beatificum, tum quia ille respectus est respectus rationis tantum, sicut et quilibet respectus Dei ad creaturam (respectus autem rationis non potest esse per se obiectum sive ratio per se obiecti fruitionis), tum quia si per impossibile esset aliquod obiectum summum ad quod non ordinaretur ista voluntas sicut ad finem, adhuc illud obiectum quietaret, in quo tamen per positum non est ratio finis. Respectu ergo fruitionis ordinatae ratio finis secundum veritatem non est propria ratio obiecti fruibilis, sed est concomitans obiectum fruibile; in fruitione inordinata finis apparentis ratio finis concomitatur obiectum fruibile $a forte in apprehensione praecedit fruitionem eliciendam, quasi ratio obiecti alliciens, aliter a$, sed in fruitione finis praefixi ratio finis sequitur actum, quia vel dicit modum actus vel modum obiecti ut talis finis praefixus actu terminat actum, quia voluntas volendo illud propter se tribuit sibi rationem finis.	17. [Article 4] – About the fourth article n.7 I say that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable object, neither in the case of ordered enjoyment nor in the case of enjoyment taken generally. That it is not so in the case of ordered enjoyment is plain; both because the respect [sc. of end] is not included in the beatific object per se as far as it is the beatific object; and because that respect is a respect of reason only, just as is any respect of God to creatures (but a respect of reason cannot be the per se object or the idea of the per se object of enjoyment); and because if per impossibile there were some supreme object to which the will was not ordered as to its end, the will would still rest in that object although there is, by supposition, no idea of the end in it. In respect therefore of ordered enjoyment the idea of end is not, in truth, the proper idea of the enjoyable object, but it is a concomitant of the enjoyable object; in disordered enjoyment of an apparent end the idea of end is a concomitant of the enjoyable object (perhaps in the apprehension it precedes the enjoyment that is to be elicited in some other way, as the enticing idea of the object), but in the case of enjoyment of a prefixed end the idea of end follows the act, because ‘prefixed end’ means either the mode of the act or the mode of the object in the way such a prefixed end actually terminates the act, because the will by willing it for its own sake attributes to it the idea of end.
n18 Ad primum argumentum principale dico quod frui accipitur extensive, pro amore honesti distincto contra amorem utilis et delectabilis, vel 'honesta' dicuntur ibi in plurali non propter pluralitatem essentiarum sed propter pluralitatem perfectionum in Deo fruibilium.	18. To the first principal argument n.1 I say that ‘to enjoy’ is taken in an extended sense for a love of the honorable that is distinct from love of the useful or of the pleasant; or ‘things honorable’ [sc. invisible goods] are there spoken of in the plural, not because of a plurality of essences, but because of a plurality of enjoyable perfections in God.
n19 Ad secundum dico quod relatio aliqua finita necessario est ad terminum vel obiectum simpliciter infinitum, quia quod est ad finem in quantum tale est finitum, etiam acceptum ut est omnino proximum fini, cum omnibus videlicet quae sufficiunt ad immediate attingendum finem ultimum, et tamen relatio finis, ad quem est illud immediate, non fundatur nisi in infinito. Et hoc frequenter accidit in relationibus proportionum vel proportionalitatum et non similitudinum, quia ibi prima extrema sunt maxime dissimilia. Ita dico in proposito quod inter potentiam et obiectum non est relatio similitudinis sed proportionis, et ideo bene potest capacitas finita esse in natura finita sicut natura est finita et tamen ad terminum et obiectum simpliciter infinitum sicut ad correlativum. $a Contra, obiectum adaequatum satiat. - Respondeo: non adaequatum realiter sed in ratione obiecti; talis adaequatio est secundum proportionem et correspondentiam. a$	19. To the second n.2 I say that a relation to a term or object that is simply infinite is necessarily finite, because what is for an end is, insofar as it is such, finite, even when taken as altogether proximate to the end, namely when taken along with everything that suffices for immediately attaining the ultimate end, and yet the idea of 12 end, to which it is immediately related, is based only on the infinite. And this often happens in the case of relations of proportions or of proportionalities, but not of likenesses, because the first extremes are there maximally dissimilar. Thus in the proposed case I say that the relation between the power and the object is not one of likeness but of proportion, and therefore a finite capacity can be finite in nature, in the way its nature is finite, and yet be related to a term or object, as to its correlative, that is simply infinite. On the contrary, an adequate object would satisfy. – I reply: not one that is adequate in reality, but one adequate in the idea of object; such adequacy accords with proportion and correspondence.
n20 Per idem ad aliud dico quod nihil est maius in ratione obiecti obiecto proportionato animae; aliquid tamen est maius, hoc est, maiori modo vel meliori attingibile quam possit ab anima attingi, sed ista maioritas non est in obiecto sed in actu. Quod declaro per exemplum: si ponatur aliquod album visibile secundum decem gradus, et ponatur visus capiens illud album et aliam albedinem secundum unum gradum et alius visus perfectior secundum decem gradus, ille secundus visus perfecte capiet illud album quantum ad omnes gradus visibilitatis suae, quia videbit illud obiectum sic album quantum est visibile ex parte obiecti, et tamen si fuerit tertius visus, perfectior illo secundo et acutior, perfectius videbit illud album. Unde non erit ibi excessus ex parte visibilis et obiecti in se vel graduum obiecti, quia idem est simpliciter et uniformiter se habens, sed excessus erit ex parte videntium et actuum videndi.	20. I use the same reply to the other argument n.3, that nothing is greater in the idea of object than the object that is proportioned to the soul; yet there is something greater, namely something that is attainable in a greater or better way than can be attained by the soul, but this ‘greater’ is not in the object but in the act. I explain this by an example: if one posits some white object that has ten grades of visibility, and if one posits a sight that grasps that white thing and some whiteness according to one grade and another more perfect sight that grasps them according to the ten grades, the second sight will perfectly grasp that white thing as to all grades of its visibility, because it will see that object with as much whiteness as can on the part of the object be seen; and yet if there were a third sight, more perfect than the second and more acute, it will see that white thing more perfectly. Hence there will not in that case be an excess on the part of the visible thing and of the object in itself, or of the grades of the object, because simply and in its uniform disposition it is the same thing, but the excess will be on the part of the seers and the acts of seeing.
n21 Ad quartum dico quod non quaecumque forma satiat appetitum materiae totaliter extensive, quia tot sunt appetitus materiae ad formas quot sunt formae receptibiles in materia; nulla igitur una forma potest satiare omnes appetitus eius, sed una satiat perfectissime, scilicet forma perfectissima; illa tamen non satiat omnes appetitus materiae nisi in illa una forma includerentur omnes aliae. Ad propositum dico quod unum obiectum potest includere omnia obiecta aliquo modo, et ideo solum illud obiectum perfecte quietat potentiam quantum potest quietari. Non tamen est omnino simile de quiete intra et extra, nam quodcumque receptivum quietatur intra finito aliquo recepto; sed extra sive terminative non oportet quod in finito quietetur, quia ad perfectius potest ordinari quam possit in se recipere formaliter; quia finitum non recipit formam nisi finitam, bene tamen habet obiectum infinitum. - Cum probatur quod quaelibet forma quietat materiam, quia aliter sub quacumque forma violenter quiesceret, dico quod violenta quies numquam est nisi quiescens determinate inclinetur ad oppositum, sicut exemplificatur de gravi respectu descensus deorsum et quiete eius super trabem; materia autem prima ad nullam formam inclinatur sic determinate, et ideo sub quacumque quiescit; non violenter sed naturaliter quiescit, propter indeterminatam inclinationem ad quamcumque.	21. To the fourth n.4 I say that not just any form satisfies the appetite of matter in its total extent, because there are as many appetites of matter to forms as there are forms that can be received in matter; therefore no one form can satisfy all matter’s appetites, but one form might satisfy it most perfectly, namely the most perfect form; but that form would not satisfy all the appetites of matter unless in that one form were included all the others. To the proposed case, then, I say that one object can include all objects in a way, and therefore only that object would make the power rest to the extent that the power can be made to rest. But things are not altogether alike as to internal and external rest, because anything that is receptive is at rest internally when some finite thing has been received; but externally or terminatively it ought not to rest in something finite, because it can be ordered to something more perfect than it can receive formally in itself; because a finite thing can only receive a finite form although it very well has an infinite object. – When it is proved that any form brings matter to rest, because otherwise it would be violently at rest under any form whatever n.4, I say that violent rest never happens except when the thing at rest is determinately inclined to the opposite, as in the example of a heavy object with respect to descent downwards and its being at rest on a beam [n.4]; but prime matter is inclined thus determinately to no form, and therefore it is at rest under any form at all; it is not violently at rest but naturally, because of its indeterminate inclination to any form.
n22 Ad quintum dico quod intellectus assentit cuilibet vero secundum evidentiam ipsius veri quam natum est facere de se in intellectu, et ideo non est in potestate intellectus firmius vel minus firmiter assentire vero sed tantum secundum proportionem ipsius veri moventis; in potestate autem voluntatis est intensius assentire bono vel non assentire, licet imperfectius viso, et ideo consequentia non valet de vero respectu intellectus et de bono respectu voluntatis.	22. To the fifth n.5 I say that the intellect assents to any truth because of the evidence of that very truth – the evidence which the truth produces naturally of itself in the intellect – and therefore it is not in the power of the intellect to assent to a truth more or less firmly but only according to the proportion of the very truth that moves it; but it is in the power of the will to assent more intensely to the good, or not to assent, although less perfectly than when the good is seen, and therefore the consequence does not hold of the true with respect to the intellect as it does of the good with respect to the will.