Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D11/Q1

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 1	Question 1
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem undecimam quaero utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio. Quod non: Damascenus cap. 7: ((A Patre procedentem et in Filio quiescentem, Spiritum Sanctum dicimus)).	1. About the eleventh distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. That he does not: Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.7: "the one proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son we call the Holy Spirit."
2 Item, cap. 8: ((Ex Patre Spiritum Sanctum dicimus, ex Filio non dicimus)).	2. Again, ch.8: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, we do not say he is from the Son."
3 Item, idem in epistola De trisagio ad archimandritam, in fine: ((Pater et Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus)); et subdit: ((Ex Patre quidem; Filii autem, et non ex Filio, sed Spiritus oris Dei)).	3. Again, the same in his letter On the hymn the All Holy to the Archimandrite [Jordan] n.38, at the end: "Father and Word and Holy Spirit;" and he adds: "From the Father indeed; but of the Son, and not from the Son, but the Spirit of the mouth of God."
4 Item, per rationem graecorum: nihil tenendum est ut articulus fidei nisi quod continetur in Evangelio (quod confuse continet fidem), aut saltem in Scriptura Novi Testamenti; sed non videtur expressum in Novo Testamento quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio; ergo etc. ƿ	4. Again, by the reasoning of the Greeks: nothing is to be held as an article of the faith save what is contained in the Gospel (which confusedly contains the faith), or at any rate in the Scripture of the New Testament; but it is not seen expressed in the New Testament that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; therefore etc.
5 Item, dilectio in nobis non procedit a verbo, quia notitia non habet causalitatem respectu volitionis; ergo nec similiter in prototypo.	5. Again, love in us does not proceed from the word, because knowledge does not have causality with respect to volition; therefore likewise not in the prototype either.
6 $a Item, voluntas ponitur tertia pars imaginis, XV Trinitatis ultimo; ergo non est principium producendi, sed productum. - Responsio: dilectio vocatur 'voluntas'; sed voluntas 'potentia' pertinet ad parentem, licet non constituat parentem, sed quasi advenit sicut secunda fecunditas in Patre. a$	6. Again, the will is posited as the third part of the image, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.27 n.50; therefore it is not a principle of producing but a product. -Response: love is called 'will'; but will 'in potency' pertains to the parent, although it does not constitute the parent, but quasi-arrives as a second fecundity in the Father.
7 Item, spiratio passiva est propria uni personae in divinis, ergo et activa. - Probatio consequentiae: utraque enim videtur aeque perfecta et aeque incommunicabilis.	7. Again, passive inspiriting is proper to one person in divine reality, therefore active inspiriting is too. - Proof of the consequence: for each seems equally perfect and equally incommunicable.
8 Contra: In Symbolo Nicaeno: ((Ex Patre Filioque procedit)); et Athanasius, in Symbolo: ((Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio)).	8. On the contrary: In the Nicene Creed: "who proceeds from the Father and the Son;" and Athanasius in his Creed [Ps-Athanasius, Creed 'Quicunque vult']: "the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son."
9 In ista quaestione dicuntur graeci discordare a latinis, sicut videntur auctoritates Damasceni sonare. Sed de ista discordia dicit Lincolniensis (in notula quadam super finem epistolae De ƿtrisagio) quod ((sententia graecorum est quod Spiritus Sanctus est Spiritus Filii, sed non procedens a Filio sed a solo Patre, per Filium tamen; et videtur haec sententia contraria nostrae, qua dicimus Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio procedere. Sed forte, si duo sapientes - unus graecus et alter latinus - uterque verus amator veritatis et non propriae dictionis, unde propria est, de hac visa contrarietate disquirerent, pateret utrique tandem ipsam contrarietatem non esse veraciter realem, sicut est vocalis; alioquin vel ipsi graeci vel nos latini vere sumus haeretici. Sed quis audet hunc auctorem, scilicet Ioannem Damascenum, et beatos Basilium, Gregorium Theologum et Gregorium Nyssenum, Cyrillum, et consimiles Patres graecos, haereticos arguere? Quis utique arguet haereticum iterum beatos Hieronymum, Augustinum et Hilarium, et consimiles latinos? Verisimile ergo est quod non subest dictis verbis contrariis contrariorum sanctorum sententia: multipliciter enim dicitur (sicut hic 'huius', ita hic 'ex hoc' vel 'illo', vel 'ab illo'), qua multiplicitate forte subtilius intellecta et distincta, pateret contrariorum verborum non discors sententia)). ƿ	9. On this question the Greeks are said to disagree with the Latins, as the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] seem to indicate. But about this disagreement [the Bishop of] Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] says (in a certain note on the end of the letter On the hymn the Thrice Holy [ms. in Magdalen College, Oxford, 192, f. 215rb]) that "the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son but does not proceed from the Son, but only from the Father, although through the Son; and this opinion seems contrary to ours where we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But perhaps, if two wise men - one Greek and the other Latin - each a true lover of truth and not a lover of his own way of speaking, insofar as it is his own, were to inquire into this contrariety, it would eventually be plain to each that the contrariety is not truly real as it is verbal; otherwise either the Greeks themselves or we Latins are truly heretics. But who dares accuse this author, namely John Damascene, and blesseds Basil, Cyril, and other like Greek fathers, of being heretics? Who indeed will accuse again blesseds Jerome, Augustine, and Hilary and other like Latins of being heretics? It is likely then that there is not, under the said contrary words, an opinion of contrary saints; for the thing is said in many ways (just as here 'of this', so there 'out of this' or 'by that' of 'from that'), in which multiplicity of contrary words perhaps, when it is more subtly understood and distinguished, no opposed opinion would appear."
10 Quidquid sit de eis, ex quo Ecclesia catholica declaravit hoc esse tenendum sicut de substantia fidei (sicut patet Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica': ((Firmiter credimus))), firmiter tenendum est quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit ((ab utroque)).	10. However it may be with these matters, from the time when the Catholic Church declared that this is to be held as of the substance of the faith (as is plain [in the Decretals of Gregory IX bk.1 tit.1 ch.1], 'About the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith': "We firmly believe"), one must firmly hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from both".
11 Ad hoc ratio est talis: habens principium perfectum productivum prius quam intelligatur habere productum, potest illo principio producere, quando scilicet principium est ita perfectum quod non dependet a passivo, nec potest per aliquid impediri; Filius habet voluntatem, quae est principium productivum amoris adaequati, et habet eam ut praeintelligitur 'producto actu voluntatis'; ergo potest ea producere, ergo et ea producit.	11. For this there is the following sort of reason: that which first has a perfect productive principle before it is understood to have a product can produce by that principle, namely when the principle is so perfect that it does not depend on something passive nor can be impeded by anything; the Son has will, which is a principle productive of adequate love, and he has it as it is pre-understood to 'the produced act of the will'; therefore he can produce it, therefore also he does produce it.
12 Probo minorem: generatio et spiratio habent aliquem ordinem, ita quod aliquo modo prius est generatio spiratione; in illo priore communicatur genito omnis perfectio divina quae sibi non repugnat, et ita voluntas; ergo habet tunc voluntatem ut priorem'producto per actum voluntatis', quia adhuc non intelligitur productio aliqua facta per modum vel per actum voluntatis.	12. I prove the minor [n.11]: generation and inspiriting have a certain order, so that in some way generation is prior to inspiriting; in that prior stage there is communicated to the one generated all the divine perfection that is not repugnant to it, and so the will is communicated; therefore the generated then has will as prior 'to what is produced by act of will', because there is not yet understood any production made by way, or by act, of will.
13 Assumptum etiam de ordine istarum productionum licet videatur esse manifestum ex ordine potentiarum, probatur tamen per hoc quod quando actus primi habent ordinem in aliquo - si uterque sit perfecte activus - habebunt etiam similem ordinem in eliciendo suos actus. Addidi autem 'perfecte activus' ad excludendum forƿmam substantialem et qualitatem, in corruptibilibus, ubi licet forma substantialis sit activa, et qualitas similiter, et forma substantialis sit prior qualitate, tamen qualitas habet actum suum prius: sed hoc est ex imperfectione activitatis formae substantialis. In Patre autem intellectus et voluntas sunt principia perfecte activa, et habent ordinem quemdam, quia fecunditas intellectus constituit Patrem, non autem fecunditas voluntatis. Igitur illa fecunditas intellectus aliquo modo prius habebit actum suum quam fecunditas voluntatis actum suum.	13. Also, the assumption about the order of these productions [n.12], although it seem to be manifest from the order of the powers, is however proved from the fact that when first acts have an order in something - provided each is perfectly active - they will also have a like order in eliciting their acts. But I have added the phrase 'perfectly active' to exclude substantial form and quality in the case of corruptible things, where, although the substantial form is active, and the quality likewise, and the substantial form is prior to the quality, yet the quality has its act first; but this comes from the imperfection of the activity of the substantial form. Now in the Father intellect and will are perfectly active principles, and they have a certain order, because the fecundity of the intellect has constituted the Father but not the fecundity of the will. Therefore the fecundity of the intellect will in some way have its act before the fecundity of the will has its act.
14 Probant alii istum ordinem productionis ad productionem per hoc quod sicut intelligere ad velle, ita dicere ad spirare.	14. Others prove this order of production to the product by the fact that, as understanding is to willing, so saying is to inspiriting.
15 Sed ista probatio videtur deficere: velle enim praesupponit intelligere, quia per illud 'intelligere' obiectum circa quod debet esse dilectio, est sufficienter praesens, et absque illa intellectione non sufficienter praesens esset voluntati ut posset velle; sed per actum dicendi non est praesens voluntati praecise obiectum cuius amor spiratur, quia etsi Pater voluntate spirat ut in eo, non tamen habet obiectum praesens formaliter per notitiam genitam (quia nihil novit notitia genita, ut dicit Augustinus VII De Trinitate), sed intellectione sibi ingenita habet obiectum sibi praesens, et ista est notitia quae praesupponitur actui spirandi; igitur non est similis ƿnecessitas quod generatio praesupponatur spirationi sicut quod intellectio praesupponatur volitioni.	15. But this proof [n.14] seems defective: for willing presupposes understanding, because the object, about which there is to be a love, is through this 'understanding' sufficiently present, and without this intellection it would not be sufficiently present to the will so that it might will; but through the act of speaking there is not present to the will precisely the object of which the love is inspirited, because, although the Father inspirits by the will as it is in him, yet he does not have the object formally present through generated knowledge (because he knows nothing by generated knowledge, as Augustine says On the Trinity VII ch.1 n2), but by the intellection ungenerated in him does he have the object present to him, and this is the knowledge presupposed to the act of inspiriting; therefore there is not the like necessity for generation to be presupposed to inspiriting as there is for intellection to be presupposed to volition.
16 Concedo quod ista instantia bene probat quod non est omnino similis necessitas, sed inter intellectionem et volitionem est ordo propter duo: unum est propter praesentiam iam dictam, aliud est propter ordinem istarum potentiarum in operando, quia istae potentiae tales sunt quod una est naturaliter ordinata posterius operari quam alia. Prima ratio non est ratio prioritatis generationis ad spirationem, sed secunda: sicut enim in quantum sunt potentiae operativae est aliquis ordo inter operationes earum, ita in quantum sunt potentiae productivae est aliquis ordo productionis earum, licet non sit ordo necessitatis propter praesentiam obiecti talem habendam.	16. I concede that this instance [n.15] well proves that there is not altogether a like necessity, but there is an order between intellection and will for two reasons: one is because of the presence [of the object] already stated [n.15], the other is because of the order of these powers in operating, because these powers are such that one is naturally ordered to operate after the other. The first reason is not the reason for the priority of generation to inspiriting, but the second is; for just as, to the extent they are operative powers, there is some order between their operations, so there, to the extent they are productive powers, there is some order between their productions, although no order of necessity is required by the need to have such a presence of the object.
17 Exemplum huius est: si in igne calor et siccitas sint causae activae, natae tamen ordinate elicere actus suos ita quod siccitas non potest desiccare nisi prius calor calefaciat, illa necessitas ordinis non est quia per calefactionem fit obiectum desiccabile praesens sicco, ut desiccetur, sed propter naturam istarum potentiarum activarum; et si in illo priore in quo calidum calore calefacit, communicaret calefacto vel produceret in calefacto non tantum calorem sed etiam siccitatem quam habuit, calefactum eadem siccitate desiccaret cum calefaciente, quia in illo instanti naturae in quo est desiccatio, una siccitas est in calefaciente et in calefacto.	17. An example of this: if in fire heat and dryness are active causes, yet of a nature to elicit their acts in ordered fashion such that dryness cannot dry unless heat first heats, the order of necessity is not because the dryable object is, by the heating, made present to the dry so that it might be dried, but it is because of the nature of these active powers; and if in the prior stage in which the hot heats by heat it should communicate to the heated, or produce in the heated, not only the heat but also the dryness which it had, the heated would be dried by the same dryness as is in the heater, because in the instant of nature in which there is drying, there is one dryness in the heater and in the heated.
18 Ita intelligendum est hic, quod in illo signo originis in quo Pater ƿproducit actu voluntatis, principium productivum idem est in Patre et in Filio, et ideo Filius eadem productione producit Spiritum Sanctum cum Patre.	18. So must it be understood here, that in the moment of origin in which the Father produces by an act of will, there is the same productive principle in the Father and in the Son, and therefore the Son produces the Holy Spirit with the same production as the Father does.
19 Ad auctoritates Damasceni videtur posse responderi per notulam illam domini Lincolniensis, de qua dictum est. Prima tamen auctoritas eius posset exponi, si loquatur de voluntate et non de Spiritu Sancto: quia tunc posset dici quod voluntas, quae est principium spirandi, ipsa est 'a Patre in Filium' quia Pater communicat eam Filio; et 'quiescit in Filio', hoc est non ulterius communicatur sub ratione principii fecundi, licet eadem voluntas communicetur Spiritui Sancto, in se. Sed littera Damasceni ibidem videtur loqui de persona Spiritus Sancti, et non de voluntate qua spiratur.	19. To the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] it seems that a response can be made through that note of my Lord of Lincoln, about which we spoke [n.9]. However Damascene's first authority [n.1] might, if he is speaking of the will and not of the Holy Spirit, be given an exposition: because it could then be said that the will, which is the principle of inspiriting, is 'from the Father in the Son' because the Father communicates it to the Son; and 'it rests in the Son', that is, it is not further communicated under the idea of fecund principle, although the same will is communicated to the Holy Spirit, in himself. But the literal meaning of Damascene in the same place [n.1] seems to be that he is speaking of the Holy Spirit, and not of the will by which he is inspirited.
20 Ad rationem illam de Evangelio dico quod 'Christum descendisse ad inferna' non docetur in Evangelio, et tamen tenendum est sicut articulus fidei, quia ponitur in Symbolo apostolorum. Ita multa alia de sacramentis Ecclesiae non sunt expressa in Evangelio et tamen Ecclesia tenet illa tradita certitudinaliter ab apostolis, et periculosum esset errare circa illa quae non tantum ab apostolis descenderunt per scripta sed etiam quae per consuetudinem universalis Ecclesiae tenenda sunt. Nec Christus in Evangelio docuit omnia pertinentia ad dispensationem sacramentorum; dixit enim discipulis suis (in Ioan.): Adhuc habeo multa vobis dicere, sed vos non potestis ƿportare modo; cum autem venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Multa ergo docuit eos Spiritus Sanctus, quae non sunt scripta in Evangelio: et illa multa, quaedam per scripturam, quaedam per consuetudinem Ecclesiae, tradiderunt.	20. To the reasoning about the Gospel [n.4] I say that the doctrine 'Christ descended into hell' is not taught in the Gospel, and yet it is to be held as an article of faith, because it is placed in the Apostle's Creed. Thus are many other things about the sacraments of the Church not expressed in the Gospel and yet the Church holds them, handed down with certitude from the Apostles, and it would be dangerous to err about things which have not only come down from the Apostles but are also to be held by the custom of the universal Church. Nor did Christ in the Gospel teach all things pertaining to the dispensation of the sacraments; for he said to his disciples (John 16.12-13): "I have yet many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now; however when he, the Spirit of truth, has come, he will teach you all truth." Therefore the Holy Spirit taught them many things which are not written in the Gospel; and thus have many things, some by writing, some by the custom of the Church, been handed down.
21 Similiter, diversa Symbola diversis temporibus sunt edita contra diversas haereses de novo orientes, quia quando insurgebat nova haeresis necessarium erat declarare veritatem contra quam erat illa haeresis: quae veritas etsi prius erat de fide, non tamen erat prius tantum declarata sicut tunc, contra errorem eorum qui eam negabant.	21. Likewise, diverse creeds have at diverse times been put forth against diverse heresies newly arisen, because, when a new heresy was arising, it was necessary to declare the truth against which the heresy was; which truth, although it was before of the faith, was yet not before as much declared as it is now against the errors of those who were denying it.
22 Ad aliud, de verbo nostro, dico quod illud imperfectionis est in imagine creata, quia verbo non communicatur eadem natura cum mente, et ideo nec libertas formaliter et simpliciter. Verbo autem divino communicatur natura Patris et eadem voluntas cum Patre, et ideo habet eam ut fecundam respectu productionis Spiritus Sancti, quia intelligitur ordine originis praehabere illam antequam Spiritus Sanctus spiretur.	22. To the other point, about our word [n.5], I say that it is a mark of imperfection in the created image, because through our word the same nature as is in the mind is not communicated, and therefore not the liberty either, formally and simply. But to the divine Word is communicated the nature of the Father and the same will as is in the Father, and therefore the Word has the will as fecund with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit, because he is understood to have it first in order of origin before the Holy Spirit is inspirited.
23 Ad ultimum dico quod non sequitur, quia non potest natura divina pluribus productionibus haberi in una persona, sicut patebit in quaestione sequente, quia utraque productione haberet naturam et neutra haberet; tamen una persona potest pluribus productionibus communicare naturam, et plures personae possunt una productione producere personam: et ideo si passiva sit tantum in uno, non sequitur quod etiam activa sit tantum in uno. ƿ	23. To the final one [n.7], I say that it does not follow, because the divine nature cannot be had by one person in several productions, as will be plain in the following question [n.47], because in each production it would have the nature and in neither it would have the nature; yet one person can communicate nature in several productions, and several persons can produce a person in one production; and therefore if passive inspiriting is in one person alone, it does not follow that active inspiriting is in one alone.