Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D12/Q1
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Translated by Peter Simpson
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| Quaestio 1 | Question One |
| ƿ1 Circa distinctionem duodecimam quaero utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum omnino unum vel in quantum aliquo modo distincti. Quod in quantum distincti, probatio: Augustinus VI De Trinitate cap. 5: 'Spiritus Sanctus est communis unio (vel communio) Patris et Filii'. Ex hoc accipitur communiter quod est nexus amborum, - nexus autem non est aliquorum nisi in quantum sunt distincti; est autem nexus eorum in quantum procedit ab eis; ergo procedit ab eis in quantum distincti. | 1. About the twelfth distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one or insofar as they are in some way distinct. Proof that it is insofar as they are distinct: Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7: "The Holy Spirit is the common union (or the communion) of the Father and the Son." From this it is commonly received that he is the nexus of them both, - but a nexus is only of things insofar as they are distinct; and he is the nexus of them insofar as he proceeds from them; therefore he proceeds from them insofar as they are distinct. |
| 2 Item, actio est suppositi, ergo duorum suppositorum non est una actio; Spiritus Sanctus producitur actione Patris et Filii ut agentium; igitur in quantum distincti. ƿ | 2. Again, action belongs to a supposit, therefore to two supposits there does not belong one action; the Holy Spirit is produced by the action of the Father and the Son as agents; therefore to them insofar as they are distinct. |
| 3 Item, si producunt in quantum omnino unum, - aut in quantum unum in essentia, aut in quantum unum in persona, aut in quantum unum in vi spirativa: non in quantum unum in essentia, quia tunc Spiritus Sanctus produceret se, quia est unum in essentia cum Patre et Filio; nec secundo modo, patet; nec tertio modo, in quantum sunt unum in vi spirativa, quia tunc sequeretur quod Pater esset duo principia respectu Filii et Spiritus Sancti, propter duas vires productivas in ipso respectu eorum. | 3. Again, if they produce insofar as they are altogether one thing, - then either insofar as they are one thing in essence, or one thing in person, or one thing in inspiriting force; not insofar as they are one thing in essence, because then the Holy Spirit would produce himself, because he is one thing in essence with the Father and the Son; nor in the second way, as is plain; nor in the third way, insofar as they are one in inspiriting force, because then it would follow that the Father was two principles with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit, because of the two productive forces in him with respect to them. |
| 4 $a Item, amor notitiae genitae est tertia pars imaginis, ergo 'amor procedens' est amor Verbi. - Antecedens probatur distinctione 6, per Augustinum; responsionem quaere ibi. | 4. Again, the love of generated knowledge is the third part of the image, therefore 'the love that proceeds' is the love of the Word. - The proof of the antecedent is in distinction 6, from Augustine [I d.6 n.23]; look for the response there [ibid. n.27]. |
| 5 Tres actus sunt voluntatis: respectu obiecti, respectu actus complacentiae, imperii. Tertius nullo modo est in Deo, quia nec in nobis respectu primae intellectionis; primus principalior, secundus universalior, - uterque essentialis in Deo. Sed 'amor procedens' est principaliter amor obiecti, non Verbi nisi sit Patris (forte neutrius ex prima productione), sicut nec Verbum nisi essentiae; in nobis autem omnis amor est procedens, ibi non, sed tantum primi obiecti diligibilis cogniti. a$ ƿ | 5. There are three acts to the will: with respect to the object, with respect to the act of being well pleased, with respect to command. The third is in no way in God, since neither is it in us with respect to the first intellection; the first is more principal, the second is more universal [I d.6 n.26], - each is essential in God. But 'the love that proceeds' is principally love of the object, not of the Word unless it is the Father's (perhaps it belongs to neither from first production), just as neither is there a Word save of the essence; now all love in us is a love that proceeds, not there, however, but only love of the known lovable object. |
| 6 Contra: V De Trinitate cap. 17: 'Pater et Filius sunt unum principium ad Spiritum Sanctum, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unum principium ad creaturam'; creatura autem est a tribus in quantum unum, non in quantum distincti; ergo etc. | 6. On the contrary: Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15: "Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one principle for the creature;" but the creature is from the three insofar as they are one, not insofar as they are distinct; therefore etc. |
| 7 In ista quaestione planum est quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti. Hoc declaratum est in concilio generali Lugdunensi sub Gregorio X, sicut patet Extra, 'De summa Trinitate et fide catholica', et est hodie in VI libro Decretalium. Ratio huius veritatis est ista, quia ut dictum est distinctione 10, Pater prius origine habet actum fecunditatis intellectus quam voluntatis: in illo priore communicatur Filio fecunditas eadem quae est in Patre, quia in illo signo originis - in quo Filius producitur per fecunditatem intellectus - communicatur sibi a Patre quidquid sibi non repugnat, et ita fecunditas voluntatis; ergo in alio signo originis, quando producitur persona per actum fecunditatis secundae (scilicet voluntatis), producitur a Patre et Filio omnino ut ab uno principio, propter unam fecunditatem principii productivi in eis. ƿ | 7. In this question it is plain that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. This was made clear in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X, as is plain in the Extra, 'On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith', and it is today in book 6 of the Decretals [Sixth Book of the Decretals of Boniface VIII lib.1 tit.1 ch. un]. The reason for this truth is as follows, that, as was said in distinction 11, the Father has first in origin the act of fecundity of the intellect before that of the will [I d.11 n.13]; in that prior stage there is communicated to the Son the same fecundity as is in the Father, because in that moment of origin - in which the Son is produced by the fecundity of the intellect - there is communicated to him by the Father whatever is not repugnant to him, and so the fecundity of the will is communicated [ibid. n.12]; therefore, in the other moment of origin, when a person is produced by the act of the second fecundity (namely of the will), that person is produced by the Father and the Son as altogether by one principle, because of the one fecundity of the productive principle in them [ibid. n.18]. |
| 8 Sed est difficultas alia. Cum enim illa voluntas sit una in duobus suppositis, quae supposita concorditer volunt ista voluntate, et concordia connotet aliquam distinctionem suppositorum concordium, utrum Pater et Filius per se magis spirent hac voluntate in quantum una vel in quantum concors. | 8. But there is another difficulty. For since the will is single in two supposits, which supposits will concordantly with this will, and concord connotes some distinction of the concordant supposits, the difficulty is whether the Father and the Son per se inspirit more by this will insofar as they are one or insofar as they are concordant. |
| 9 Hic dicitur sic, quod supposita producentia sunt distincta, et propter illam distinctionem nullo modo concederentur spirare in quantum plures, - habent enim unam vim spirativam; sed ulterius, ista vis spirativa non omnino sub ratione unitatis suae est proximum principium fecundum ad spirandum, sed sub ratione concordis voluntatis, ubi connotatur aliqua distinctio: et propter illam distinctionem, connotatam ex parte principii 'quo', potest concedi quod spirant in quantum sunt distincti. - Ista opinio confirmatur per Richardum III De Trinitate cap. 16. ƿ | 9. Here the following is said [by Henry], that the producing supposits are distinct, and because of this distinction they would not in any way be conceded to inspirit insofar as they are plural, - for they have one inspiriting force; but further, this inspiriting force is not wholly under the idea of its unity the proximate fecund principle for inspiriting, but rather under the idea of concordant will, where some distinction is connoted; and, because of this distinction, connoted on the part of the principle 'by which', one can concede that they inspirit insofar as they are distinct. - This opinion is given confirmation through Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity III ch.16. |
| 10 ((Quoniam intellectus perfectam fecunditatem ad productionem Verbi habere potest ut exsistit in una sola persona, voluntas autem perfectam fecunditatem ad productionem Spiritus Sancti non potest habere nisi coexsistat in gemina persona, et hoc quia fecunditas istius consistit in plenitudine perfectae sapientiae, quae potest esse in unico, dicente Richardo De Trinitate libro III cap. 16: 'Nihil definitur contrarium naturae, si plenitudo sapientiae dicatur posse subsistere in singularitate personae, nam si esset una sola persona in deitate, nihilominus plenitudinem sapientiae habere posset'; fecunditas autem voluntatis consistit in plenitudine amoris veri, qui non potest esse nisi in duobus, ad minus, dicente eodem Richardo cap. 3: 'Amor non potest esse iucundus nisi fuerit mutuus', quia cum in amore essentiali fecunditas voluntatis non possit esse nisi summe perfectus et iucundus sit amor, oportet quod si voluntas sit fecunda, quod sit amor mutuus, 'ut sit' - secundum eum cap. 3 - 'qui amorem impendat, et sit qui amorem ƿrependat', quia, ut dicit cap. 7, 'summe diligenti non sufficit, si summe dilectus summam dilectionem non rependat'. | 10. "Since[1] the intellect, as it exists in one person, can have perfect fecundity for the production of the Word, but the will, unless it exists in a double person, cannot have perfect fecundity for the production of the Holy Spirit, and this because the fecundity of the intellect consists in the fullness of perfect wisdom, which can exist in a single person, as Richard says [ibid.]: 'Nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom is said to be able to exist in only one person in the deity, for if there were only one person in the deity he could nevertheless have the fullness of wisdom'; but the fecundity of the will consists in the fullness of true love, which cannot exist save, at a minimum, in two persons, on the saying of the same Richard [ibid. ch.3]: 'Love cannot be delightful unless it is mutual', because, since the fecundity of the will cannot exist in essential love unless the love is supremely perfect and delightful, it is necessary that, if the will is fecund, the love be mutual, 'so that there may be' - according to him ch.3 - 'one who bestows love and one who pays it back', because, as he says in ch.7, 'there is no satisfaction for a supreme lover if the supreme loved does not pay back supreme love'. |
| 11 Et secundum hoc, ad hoc - ut supra dictum est - quod communis voluntas Patris et Filii sit fecunda ad spirandum Spiritum Sanctum non sufficit quod sit una voluntas amborum et amor essentialis in ipsa communis, qua ambo simul amant et volunt, sed oportet quod sit voluntas mutua et concors duorum, ita quod unus summum amorem alteri impendat, et ille versa vice eundem semper summum amorem eidem rependat: quo exsistente fecunda est voluntas ut ex ipsa producat amorem, qui est Spiritus Sanctus, dicente Richardo (ubi prius, cap. 11) quod 'in amore mutuo multumque fervente nihil praeclarius quam ut ab eo quem summe diligis et a quo summe diligeris, alium aeque diligi velis'; 'itaque in illo, sicut mutuo diligitur, utriusque dilectio ut consummata sit praehabitae dilectionis consortium requirit', et hoc per vim spirativam, quae est concors voluntas in mutuo amore, producendo Spiritum Sanctum, - non solum ut sunt unum in voluntate illa sive amore, sed ut sunt plures inter se distincti, quae distinctio connotatur per hoc quod voluntas dicitur esse concors et ƿamor mutuus: non potest esse nisi sit plurium secundum quod plures sunt inseparabiles, nam haec praepositio 'con' associationem importat, quae non est nisi plurium distinctorum (et propter hoc bene dicitur quod 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres coaeterni', cum tamen ista negetur 'Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres aeterni'). | 11. And for this reason, so that - as was said above [n.10] - the common will of the Father and the Son may be fecund for inspiriting the Holy Spirit, it is not enough that both have one will and an essential common love in it, whereby both of them love and will together, but it is necessary that both have a mutual and concordant will, such that one of them bestows supreme love on the other and the other in turn always pays supreme love back to the first; when this love exists, the will is fecund so that it produces love from itself, which love is the Holy Spirit, as Richard says (ibid. [n.10] xxxx): 'in love mutual and most fervent there is nothing more admirable than that by him whom you supremely love, and by whom you are supremely loved, you should wish another to be equally loved'; 'therefore in that love, as it is mutual, the love of each, in order to be consummate, requires there to be a sharer in the love already possessed', and this through the inspiriting force, which is concordant will in mutual love, by producing the Holy Spirit, - not only as they are one in that will or love, but as they are plural distinct among themselves, which distinction is connoted by the fact that the will is said to be concordant and the love mutual; this cannot be unless it be of more than one insofar as these plural are inseparable, for the prefix 'con' indicates association, which is only of serveral who are distinct (and, for this reason, it is well said that 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three co-eternals', although it is denied that 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three eternals'). |
| 12 Per hoc etiam quod ista voluntas concors est, et amor mutuus duorum licet sit unus et idem, tamen non est eadem ratio eius ut est a Patre in Filium impensus, et e converso ut est a Filio in Patrem repensus, - quoniam (secundum Richardum libro III cap. 20) 'quando duo diligunt se mutuo et summi desiderii affectus invicem rependunt, et istius in illum et illius in istum affectus discurrit, quasi in diversa tendit', quia quodammodo ratione diversus est; sed ista diversitas est in amore vel voluntate essentiali, qua non obstante fecunditas est penitus una et eadem in voluntate illa concordi et amore mutuo, in qua fecunditate Pater et Filius penitus sunt unum et uniformiter spirant Spiritum Sanctum, qui 'a duobus concorditer diligitur, duorum affectus tertii amoris incendio in unum conflatur', ut dicit idem Richardus. | 12. By the fact too that this will is concordant, and although the mutual love of both is one and the same, yet there is not the same idea to it as it is bestowed by the Father on the Son, and as, conversely, it is paid back by the Son to the Father, - since (according to Richard, ibid. ch.19) 'when the two love themselves mutually and pay each other back the affection of supreme desire, and the affection of the first runs round to the second and of the second round to the first, it tends as it were to things diverse', because it is in some way diverse in idea; but this diversity is in love and essential will, notwithstanding which, the fecundity is thoroughly one and the same in that concordant will and mutual love, in which fecundity the Father and the Son are one and they uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit, who 'is loved concordantly by both, and the affection of the two is melted into one by the fire of the third love', as the same Richard says. |
| 13 Et secundum hoc, in spiratione Spiritus Sancti dupliciter conƿsideranda est Patris et Filii distinctio: uno modo ut exprimuntur sicut elicientes actum, - alio modo ut intelliguntur esse concordes in amore mutuo et in voluntate, circa actum eliciendum. Et ex distinctione eius primo modo considerata, nullo modo dicendi sunt spirare ut plures; licet enim sint plures qui spirant, non tamen propter pluralitatem quae prior est in illis spirant, sed solum ex distinctione eorum secundo modo considerata: et sic Pater et Filius non spirant Spiritum Sanctum in quantum sunt plures in elicienda actione (licet concurrant in unam rationem secundum quam elicitur actio), sed ut sunt plures in una voluntate, quae est ratio eliciendi actum, concordando ad amorem suum, in illa mutuitate)). | 13. And accordingly, in the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit, a double distinction between Father and Son is to be considered; in one way as they are expressed in eliciting the act, - in another way as they are understood to be concordant in mutual love and will about the act to be elicited. And, by the distinction of inspiriting considered in the first way, they are in no way to be said to inspirit as plural; for although they are plural who inspirit, yet they do not inspirit because of the plurality that is prior in them, but only from the distinction between them considered in the second way; and thus the Father and the Son do not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are plural in eliciting the act (although they concur in the one idea according to which the act is elicited), but as they are plural in one will, which is the idea of eliciting the act, by being concordant in their love in that mutuality." |
| 14 Contra istam positionem. Si Pater et Filius producant Spiritum Sanctum voluntate in quantum concorditer amantes se ea, ergo est alius Spiritus Sanctus prius productus, - quod est inconveniens. | 14. Against this position. [First reason] - If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by will as by it loving themselves in concord, then there is another Holy Spirit produced beforehand, -which is a discordant result. |
| 15 Probatio consequentiae. Primo, quia in quocumque signo naturae vel originis est principium productivum perfectum in se, et in supposito conveniente actioni, in illo signo potest esse tali supƿposito ratio producendi; sed voluntas infinita ut est infinita voluntas, intellecta ante omne velle, habens obiectum infinitum sibi praesens, est sufficiens principium productivum amoris infiniti, et Pater et Filius sunt personae convenientes productioni; igitur voluntas ut in Patre et in Filio, non intellecta ut qua formaliter volunt sed ut voluntas est infinita habens essentiam divinam praesentem sibi per actum intelligentiae, erit Patri et Filio principium productivum Spiritus Sancti, - et ita si Spiritus Sanctus producatur per voluntatem in quantum volens, sive in quantum ea Pater et Filius diligunt se actu, sequitur quod ante Spiritum Sanctum productum voluntate volente est Spiritus Sanctus productus voluntate ut est actus primus, quod est inconveniens. | 15. Proof of the consequence. First because in whatever moment of nature, or of origin, the productive principle is in itself perfect and is in a supposit suited for the action, in that moment there can, on such a supposition, be a reason for producing; but infinite will, as it is infinite will, understood before all act of will, having an infinite object present to itself, is a sufficient productive principle of infinite love, and the Father and the Son are persons suited for production; therefore the will as it is in the Father and the Son, not understood as that by which they formally will but as it is an infinite will having the divine essence present to it by an act of intelligence, will be for the Father and the Son the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, - and so, if the Holy Spirit is produced by will insofar as it is in act of willing, or insofar as by it the Father and Son love themselves in act, it follows that, before the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is in act of willing, the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is first act, which is discordant. |
| 16 Ista ratio de voluntate, quod sit principium spirandi ut voluntas est, non autem ut actu volens est, - confirmatur dupliciter: primo per formalem rationem voluntatis in principiando, quae est libertas, quae non ita convenit ipsi velle; secundo per simile de intellectu. ƿ | 16. This reasoning about the will [n.15], that it is a principle of inspiriting as it is will, but not as it is in act of willing, is confirmed in two ways: first by the formal idea of the will in being a principle, which is liberty, and it does not in this way belong to the act of will itself; second by a likeness with the intellect. |
| 17 De primo arguitur sic: voluntas ut in nobis est actus primus, libera est ad habendum actum volendi, non autem ipse actus volendi liber est sive principium producendi aliquid libere, quia actus volendi est quaedam qualitas naturalis, - et si est principium alicuius actus, videtur esse principium naturale eius, non liberum (sicut si ex tali actu generaretur habitus appetitus, naturaliter generaretur, ita quod non est in potestate actus generatio talis habitus, ut videtur). Ergo videtur quod magis salvatur Spiritum Sanctum libere produci si producatur voluntate ut est actus primus, quam si producatur voluntate ut est actu volens, ut scilicet subintelligitur sub actu secundo. | 17. In the first way [n.16] the argument is as follows: the will, as it is first act in us, is free to have an act of willing, but the act itself of willing is not free, or a principle of producing anything freely, because an act of willing is a certain natural quality, - and, if it is a principle of any act, it seems to be a natural principle of it not a free one (in the way that, if a habit of appetite were generated from such an act, the habit would be naturally generated, so that the generation of such a habit is not, as it seems, in the power of the act). Therefore it seems that the free production of the Holy Spirit is more saved if he is produced by will as it is first act than if he is produced by will as it is in act of willing, namely as it is understood to be in second act. |
| 18 Secundo arguitur sic, quia Filius non producitur intellectu paterno ut actu intelligens est, ita quod actualis intellectio sit formalis ratio qua Pater generat Filium, sicut ostensum est supra distinctione 2; ergo a simili, voluntas ut actu volens non erit ƿprincipium producendi Spiritum Sanctum, sed voluntas ut actus primus | 18. In the second way [n.16] the argument is as follows, that the Son is not produced by the paternal intellect as it is in act of understanding, such that actual intellection is the formal idea by which the Father generates the Son, as was shown above in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.291-296]; therefore, by similarity, the will, as it is in act of willing, will not be the principle of producing the Holy Spirit, but the will as first act will be. |
| 19 Secundo probo consequentiam principalem sic, accipiendo eandem maiorem quam prius: 'in quocumque signo naturae vel originis', etc.; tunc addo hanc minorem, quod voluntas divina habens obiectum primum sibi praesens - est ratio producendi amorem adaequatum illi perfectius quam habens obiectum secundarium sibi praesens, vel saltem non minus perfecte; ergo cum essentia divina sit primum obiectum voluntatis divinae - non Pater ut Pater nec Filius ut Filius, quia tunc Pater esset formaliter beatus in pluribus obiectis distinctis - ergo voluntas habens essentiam divinam praesentem sibi (sive ut amabilem sive ut amatam, non curo in ista secunda probatione) magis erit principium producendi amorem adaequatum illi quam ut habet Patrem ut Patrem vel Filium ut Filium pro obiecto, vel saltem non minus, et ita cum voluntas prius habeat essentiam pro obiecto quam Patrem ut Pater est, prius spirabitur Spiritus Sanctus voluntate ut est essentiae divinae tamquam primi obiecti, quam voluntate ut est Patris tamquam obiecti, vel Filii tamquam obiecti. ƿ | 19. Next I prove the principal consequence [n.14] in this way, by taking the same major as before [n.15], 'in whatever moment of nature or of origin etc.'; then I add this minor, that the divine will - having the first object present to it - is the idea of producing a love adequate to that object more perfectly than when having a secondary object present to it, or at least it is not so less perfectly; therefore, since the divine essence is the first object of the divine will - not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then the Father would be formally blessed in several distinct objects - then the will that has the divine essence present to it (whether as lovable or as loved, I care not in this second proof [as opposed to the first proof, n.15]) will be more a principle of producing love adequate to the object, at any rate not less than it, and so, since the will has the essence for object before the Father as he is Father, the Holy Spirit will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence as first object before he is inspirited by the will as it is of the Father as of its object, or of the Son as of its object. |
| 20 Confirmatur ista ratio, quia essentia divina est formaliter infinita, paternitas ut paternitas non est formaliter infinita; ergo Spiritus Sanctus, qui est amor infinitus, et hoc non tantum ratione voluntatis infinitae sed ratione etiam obiecti infiniti, ut dictum est distinctione 10, - magis spirabitur voluntate ut est essentiae divinae (quod est obiectum infinitum) quam ut est Patris ut Patris vel Filii ut Filii, ut obiecti. | 20. A confirmation of this reason [n.19] is that the divine essence is formally infinite, but paternity as paternity is not formally infinite; therefore the Holy Spirit, who is infinite love, and this not only by reason of infinite will but by reason also of infinite object, as was said in distinction 10 [I d.10 nn.9, 30-31, 47-49], will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence (which is the infinite object) rather than as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son, as of its object. |
| 21 Si dicatur essentiam non esse primum obiectum voluntatis sed rationem formalem in primo obiecto quod est persona, - hoc est falsum, quia unum est obiectum primum voluntatis, tum quia ratio ƿformalis amati primo amatur; et concedit propositum, quia erit ratio formalis spirandi eo modo quo obiectum concurrit ad spirare. | 21. If it be said that the essence is not the first object of the will but the formal idea in the first object is, which is the person, - this is false, because there is one first object of the will, and because the idea of the formal loved is what is first loved; it also concedes the intended proposition, because it will be the formal idea of inspiriting in the way in which the object contributes to the inspiriting. |
| 22 Ex istis duabus probationibus concluditur quod Pater non spirat Spiritum Sanctum in quantum diligit Filium primo, nec Filius in quantum diligit Patrem, sed Pater et Filius in quantum habent essentiam divinam praesentem ut obiectum primum voluntatis suae, et hoc propter secundam probationem consequentiae principalis; similiter, quod spirant in quantum habent essentiam praesentem non in quantum actu amatam sed in quantum amabilem, praesentatam actu intelligentiae eorum, propter primam probationem consequentiae. | 22. From these two proofs [sc. nn.15, 19, proofs of the principal consequence, n.14] the conclusion is drawn that the Father does not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as he loves the Son first, nor the Son insofar as he loves the Father, but the Father and the Son insofar as they have the divine essence present to them as first object of their will, and this because of the second proof of the principal consequence [n.19]; likewise, the conclusion is drawn that they inspirit insofar as they have the essence present to them, not as actually loved, but as lovable, presented in an act of their intelligence, because of the first proof of the consequence [n.15]. |
| 23 Et si obicias contra primam probationem, 'nonne Pater et Filius sunt prius amantes essentiam in se quam spirent Spiritum Sanctum?', - responderi potest sicut dictum est prius distinctione 6 ƿde productione Filii, quomodo Pater aliquo modo prius origine intelligit quam Filius generatur, et tamen non sic quod actualis intellectio Patris sit ratio gignendi Filium, sed memoria in Patre; ita potest dici de dilectione qua Pater et Filius diligunt concorditer et formaliter, et de actu spirandi. | 23. And if you object to the first proof [n.15], 'surely the Father and the Son are lovers of the essence in itself before they inspirit the Holy Spirit?' - one can reply as was said before in distinction 6 [I d.6 n.15] about the production of the Son, how the Father in some way understands first in the origin before the Son is generated, and yet not such that the actual understanding of the Father is the idea of begetting the Son, but the memory in the Father [I d.2 nn.290-296]; one can speak in this way of the love by which the Father and the Son love concordantly and formally, and about the act of inspiriting. |
| 24 Item, secundo: principium aeque perfectum in uno supposito sicut in duobus, aeque est principium agendi in uno sicut in duobus, quia ad actionem non videtur requiri nisi principium perfectum 'quo' et suppositum perfectum agens; sed voluntas aeque perfecta est in uno supposito sicut in duobus, et unum suppositum aeque perfectum est - perfectione requisita ad suppositum agens - sicut duo; ergo voluntas aeque potest esse principium producendi in uno sicut in duobus, ita quod illa mutuitas non sit aliqua ratio producendi ex parte principii productivi. | 24. [Second reason] - Again, second [n.14]: a principle that is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two is a principle of acting as equally in one supposit as in two, because there seems to be required for action only a perfect principle 'by which' and a perfect acting supposit; but the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, and one supposit is as equally perfect - with the perfection requisite for an acting supposit -as two; therefore the will can be as equally a principle of producing in one as in two, such that the mutuality [sc. in concordant love] is not a reason for producing on the part of the productive principle. |
| 25 Maior probatur, quia principium 'quo' non accipit perfectionem sibi competentem a supposito, sed dat supposito - quia eo suppositum est perfectum - ut possit agere; ergo non est tale principium perfectius in pluribus quam in uno quando est idem principium in pluribus et in uno. | 25. The proof of the major [n.24] is that the principle 'by which' does not receive the perfection belonging to it from the supposit but gives it to the supposit - because by it the supposit is perfect - so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several supposits than in one when there is the same principle in several supposits and in one. |
| 26 Et si dicas quod illud principium non est in uno ut princiƿpium productivum est sed tantum sic est in duobus, et tantum derelictive in Patre, genito Filio, - hoc videtur absurdum, quia omnem realitatem, tam relativam quam absolutam, quam Pater potest habere, habet in se in primo signo originis: nullam ergo habet Filio genito, quam non praeintelligitur habere prius origine quam Filius generetur, - quare et illam fecunditatem, sive illa fecunditas ponatur relatio sive aliquod absolutum. | 26. And if you say [against the argument of n.24] that the principle is not in one person as it is a productive principle but only as it is in two, and only as residual in the Father after the Son has been generated, - this seems absurd, because all the reality, both relative and absolute, that the Father can have, he has in himself in the first moment of origin; therefore he has, after the Son has been generated, none that he is not pre-understood to have in origin before the Son is generated, - wherefore he has that fecundity [of inspiriting] too, whether the fecundity is posited as a relation or as something absolute [I d.3. n.584]. |
| 27 Hoc confirmatur per Augustinum IV De Trinitate cap. 18, ((Pater est principium totius deitatis)), et per ipsum - in auctoritate praeallegata V De Trinitate cap. 17 - patet quod sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti, omnino unum, sicut tres personae sunt unum principium creaturae: non autem 'uniformiter' omnino spirarent si Filius statim, in suo primo signo originis, haberet fecunƿditatem spirandi et Pater non haberet in primo signo suo omnem fecunditatem, sed tantum haberet in secundo signo, Filio genito. | 27. This is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity IV ch.20 n.29: "The Father is the principle of the whole deity," and from him - in the authority cited before [n.6] - it is plain that Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, altogether one, as the three persons are one principle of the creature; they do not, however, altogether 'uniformly' inspirit if the Son had at once, in the first moment of origin, the fecundity of inspiriting and the Father, in the first moment of origin, have all fecundity, did not but only had it in the second moment, after the Son has been generated. |
| 28 Et si instetur de potentia creandi, quod illa non sit in Patre ante productionem Filii et Spiritus Sancti, - patebit responsio partim hic, exponendo intentionem Richardi, et amplius 'de ordine productionum intrinsecarum ad extrinsecas'. | 28. And if an instance is made [against the response to the objection, n.26] about the power of creating, that it is not in the Father before the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, - the response will be clear partly here in the exposition of Richard's intention [nn.38-39], and more fully about 'the order of the intrinsic productions to the extrinsic ones' [II d.1 q.1]. |
| 29 $a Item, Si in Patre est perfecta voluntas, patet, prius origine quam in Filio; non tamen est principium perfectum spirandi, per te. - Quaero quid intelligitur addi huic principio ut sit perfectum principium spirandi? Non aliquod suppositum, quia illud nihil addit principio 'quo', sed tantum illo habet quod possit agere. Si dilectio mutua huius in illum, et e converso, ergo relatio duplex rationis erit ultimata ratio sive actualitas principii ƿspirandi; hoc est impossibile propter duo: primo, quia nulla relatio rationis praeexigitur productioni divinae (probatur distinctione 13, contra opinionem ponentem intellectum et voluntatem distingui tantum ratione), - secundo, quia tunc essent duo principia formalia proxima spirandi et ita duo supposita non spirarent omnino in quantum unum, quod est contra Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 17, sicut allegatum est opponendo. | 29. [Third reason] - Again, if there is perfect will in the Father, it is plain it is first in origin there before it is in the Son; but it is not a perfect principle of inspiriting, for you [sc. Henry]. - I ask what is understood to be added to the principle so that it be a perfect principle of inspiriting? Not some supposit, because that adds nothing to the principle 'by which', but by a supposit the principle only has that it can act. If it is the mutual love of this person for that, and conversely, then the double relation of reason will be the ultimate reason or actuality of the principle of inspiriting; this is impossible for two reasons: first, that no relation of reason is a prerequisite for divine production (it is proved in distinction 13, against the opinion positing that the intellect and will are only distinguished by reason [I d.13 nn.31-40]), - second, because then there would be two proximate formal principles of inspiriting, and so the two supposits would not inspirit entirely as they are one, which is contrary to Augustine On the Trinity, as cited in the argument to the contrary[n.6]. |
| 30 Item, si haberent duas voluntates, possent esse concordes tali mutuitate: igitur in quantum concordes spirare, non est 'ut unum principium' spirare, quia nec ut unum suppositum nec ut unum 'quo', in quantum concordes. | 30. [Fourth reason] - Again, if they had two wills, they could, with such mutuality, be concordant [n.24]; therefore to inspirit insofar as they are concordant is not to inspirit 'as one principle', because they do so neither as one supposit nor as one principle 'by which', insofar as they are concordant. |
| 31 Item, aut Pater, voluntate et volitione ut in ipso, cum illa relatione ad Filium dilectum est totale principium spirandi, aut non. Si sic, sequitur quod Filius non spirat in quantum habet relationem, quia non habet rationem 'quo': non enim spirat in ƿquantum diligens, quo diligere circumscripto nihil minus spiraretur Spiritus Sanctus; sed circumscripta relatione nihil minus spiraretur Spiritus Sanctus a Patre ut totali principio, per suum velle ut tendit in Filium. Si detur in prima divisione quod non, sequitur quod uterque in quantum amans alterum non est nisi deminutum principium, et ambo simul sunt unum principium quasi per aggregationem (ut duo trahentes navem), non autem unum principium per identitatem principii perfecti. a$ | 31. [Fifth reason] - Again, the Father, by will and volition as they are in him, along with relation to the loved Son, is either the whole principle of inspiriting or he is not. If he is, it follows that the Son does not inspirit insofar as he has a relation, because he does not as such have the idea of the 'by which'; for he does not inspirit insofar as he loves if, when his loving is removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited; but, when the relation has been removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited by the Father as total principle, by his act of will as it tends to the Son. If it is granted instead (in the alternative above) that he is not, it follows that each, insofar as he loves the other, is only a diminished principle, and both together are one principle as it were by aggregation (as two people hauling a ship), but not one principle by identity of perfect principle. |
| 32 Praeterea, contra illas rationes quas innuit Richardus pro se, scilicet quod amor mutuus sit iucundissimus: ex hoc sequitur quod Pater esset formaliter beatus tali amore, quia amor quo est beatus, est iucundissimus, et tunc Pater non esset formaliter beatus in se sed in Filio, obiective, quod est haereticum | 32. [Against the reasons taken from Richard] - Further, against the reasons that Richard gestures to on his behalf [sc. Henry's], namely that mutual love is most delightful [n.10]; from this it follows that the Father would be formally blessed by such love, because the love by which he is blessed is most delightful, and then the Father would not be formally blessed in himself but in the Son, objectively, which is heretical. |
| 33 Item, secundo, contra illam rationem arguo sic: in nobis amor mutuus est iucundior, quia per talem mutuitatem habetur in diƿlecto amplior ratio diligibilitatis. Quicumque enim dilectus potens diligere, si rediligat, amabiliorem se facit, quia non tantum quaecumque bonitas sit in eo, est ratio diligibilitatis, sed redamatio est alia ratio diligibilitatis, et propter hoc ipse habens illam bonitatem quae est prima ratio diligibilitatis, et similiter redamationem, est diligibilior. Ergo oppositum erit in divinis, ubi ista ratio amabilitatis nullo modo poterit inveniri nec poni: non enim Filius est amabilior Patre, et magis redamans essentiam divinam (propter quam primo redamatur), nec ista redamatio est alia ratio diligibilitatis in Filio. | 33. Again, second, against that reason [n.32], I argue as follows: in us mutual love is more delightful because by such mutuality a fuller idea of lovability is had in the beloved. For any beloved able to love, if he loves back, makes himself more lovable, because not only is whatever goodness is in him the idea of lovability, but also loving back is another idea of lovability, and for this reason he who has the goodness which is the first idea of lovability, and likewise has loving back, is more lovable. Therefore it will be the opposite in divine reality, where this idea of lovability can in no way be found or posited; for the Son is not more lovable than the Father, or more a lover back of the divine essence (because of which he is first loved back), nor is this loving back another idea of lovability in the Son. |
| 34 Praeterea, amor mutuus in nobis non est iucundior nisi sciatur. Sicut enim non amatur bonitas nisi cognita, sic nec amatur redamans in quantum redamans, nisi cognoscatur eius redamatio. Sed si hoc modo deberet poni in divinis redamatio vel amor mutuus, iucundior, et propter hoc tali amore spirari Spiritum Sanctum, tunc Pater et Filius non in quantum redamantes se sed in quantum amantes et scientes se redamari, spirarent Spiritum Sanctum, ita quod cognitio redamationis videretur tunc esse formalius et immediatius principium spirandi Spiritum Sanctum quam amor, et ita ƿformalius et immediatius erit Spiritus Sanctus productus per intellectum quam per voluntatem. | 34. Further, mutual love in us is not more delightful unless it is known. For just as goodness is not loved unless it is known, so neither is he who loves back loved insofar as he loves back unless his loving back is known. But if loving back or mutual love must be posited in this way as more delightful in divine reality, and if for this reason the Holy Spirit is by such love inspirited, - then the Father and the Son would inspirit the Holy Spirit, not insofar as they love each other back, but insofar as they love and know they love each other back, such that the knowledge of being loved back would then seem to be a more formal and more immediate principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit than love, and so the Holy Spirit will be more formally and more immediately produced by the intellect than by the will. |
| 35 Praeterea, contra opinantem, quia tenet quod Spiritus Sanctus posset distingui a Filio etsi non procederet ab eo, propter eius modum distinctum procedendi a Patre. Si autem fecunditas voluntatis ad spirandum Spiritum Sanctum non est nisi ut formaliter voluntas est in duobus, non posset Spiritui Sancto competere suus modus procedendi - alius a modo procedendi Filii - nisi esset a Filio. Ergo videtur sibi ipsi contradicere. | 35. [Against the one holding the opinion] - Further, against the one who holds this opinion [sc. Henry], because he holds that the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if he did not proceed from the Son, because of his distinct mode of proceeding from the Father. But if the fecundity of the will for inspiriting the Holy Spirit exists only as it is formally the will in two persons, his own mode of proceeding - a mode other than the mode of proceeding of the Son - could not belong to the Holy Spirit unless he was from the Son. Therefore Henry seems to be contradicting himself. C. Scotus' own Opinion |
| 36 Quantum ad istum articulum concedo quod Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum Sanctum voluntate in quantum omnino una, quia ad rationem principii, praecise ut principium, non requiritur nisi perfectio eius in se et quod habeatur in persona antequam intelligatur habere terminum adaequatum: voluntas autem 'omnino una' est in Patre et in Filio, et ante origine in eis quam intelligatur habere terminum adaequatum (quia ambo sunt etiam spirativi), et ideo voluntas, ut in eis, est idem principium productivum respectu Spiritus Sancti. | 36. As to this article [n.8] I concede that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit by the will insofar as they are altogether one, because for the idea of principle, precisely as principle, there is only required its perfection in itself and that it be had in the person before it is understood to have an adequate term; but the will is 'altogether one' in the Father and the Son, and it exists in them by origin before it is understood to have an adequate term (because both persons are also inspiritive), and therefore the will, as it exists in them, is the same productive principle with respect to the Holy Spirit. |
| 37 Sed propter verba Richardi intelligenda, distinguo quod multipliciter potest intelligi 'voluntas concors': aut concordans in ƿaliquo actu secundo elicito, puta amando idem, et tunc vel creaturam vel Spiritum Sanctum; vel amando se et redamando, puta quod Pater ea diligat Filium et e converso; vel potest intelligi concors quasi habitualiter, in quantum actus primus natus est habere quasi actum secundum. Duobus primis modis non videtur quod Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum voluntate concordi, quia (ut probatum est in prima ratione per duas probationes) neque dilectione essentiae (ut probatum est in prima probatione) neque sui invicem (ut tactum est in secunda probatione) formaliter spirant. Ergo oportet ut intelligatur tertio modo: 'voluntate concordi', id est 'voluntate in quantum est actus primus, in qua nati sunt concordare in actu suo, concorditer producendo amorem'; tali - inquam - voluntate spirant, et magis una quam concordi, quia ut intelligitur actus primus, intelligitur una voluntas in eis et non habere concordiam nisi hoc modo loquendi 'quia illae personae intelliguntur posse concordare in actu quasi secundo, concorditer spirando'. | 37. But, for understanding the words of Richard [nn.11-12], I draw a distinction, that 'concordant will' can be understood in many ways; either concordant in some elicited second act, as in loving the same thing, and then loving either the creature or the Holy Spirit; or in loving themselves and in loving back, as that the Father loves thereby the Son and conversely; or 'concordant' can be understood habitually, insofar as first act is of a nature to have a second quasi-act. The Father and the Son do not seem to inspirit the Holy Spirit with a concordant will in the first two ways, because (as was proved in the first reason by two proofs [nn.14, 15, 19]) they do not formally inspirit either by love of the essence (as was proved in the first proof [n.15]) or by love of each other (as was touched on in the second proof [n.19]). Therefore the understanding must be taken in the third way: 'by concordant will' that is 'by will insofar as it is first act, in which they are of a nature to be concordant in their act, by concordantly producing love'; by such a will - I say - they inspirit, and more by a single will than by a concordant will, because, as the will is understood to be first act, it is understood to be one will in them and not to have concord save in the following way of speaking, 'because these persons are understood to be able to be concordant in their quasi-second act by concordantly inspiriting'. |
| 38 Tunc salvando verba Richardi aliqualiter, dico quod quando in eodem aliquo sunt duo principia activa 'ordinate activa', illud non est in potentia proxima ad agendum principio secundo nisi ƿpraeintelligatur in actu primi principii, - exemplum de intellectu et voluntate in anima; ergo Pater non est omnino fecundus potentia propinqua ad spirandum (quod est actus voluntatis ut principii 'quo') nisi praeintelligatur in actu principii prioris (quod est intellectus), et per consequens voluntas non est proximum principium nisi ut est in duobus: hoc sequitur, quia per illam productionem priorem - sine qua non est ista potentia propinqua - voluntas est in duobus quia per actum primae fecunditatis communicatur personae productae secunda fecunditas, scilicet fecunditas voluntatis respectu spirationis Spiritus Sancti; non tamen est alia fecunditas - scilicet fecunditas voluntatis - in duobus quam in uno, sed eadem et in producente et producto. | 38. Then, by saving the words of Richard in some way, I say that, when in some one and the same thing there are two active principles 'active in an ordered way', that one thing is not in proximate power to acting with the second principle unless it is pre-understood in the act of the first principle, - an example is about intellect and will in the soul; therefore the Father is not altogether fecund with a power proximate to inspiriting (which is an act of the will as the principle 'by which') unless he is pre-understood in the act of the prior principle (which is the intellect), and consequently the will is not the proximate principle save as it is in the two of them; this follows because, by that prior production - without which this power is not proximate - the will is in the two of them because, by the act of the first fecundity, there is communicated to the produced person the second fecundity, namely the fecundity of the will with respect to the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit; there is however no other fecundity - namely fecundity of will - in the two than in the one, but the same in both the producer and the product. |
| 39 Exemplum istius est aliqualiter in nobis. Anima non est fecunda 'potentia propinqua' ad habendum actum volendi nisi sit in actuali intellectione, licet illa intellectione non formaliter producat actum amandi sed voluntate ut est actus primus, qui praeexsistit in anima ante intellectionem licet non in potentia omnino propinqua ad agendum. Si tunc anima producens intellectionem communicaret sibi fecunditatem voluntatis, non esset voluntas in potentia propinqua ad producendum amorem nisi esset prius productum verbum, et ita communicata sibi voluntate fecunda; et ita numquam esset voluntas proxime fecunda nisi in duobus, - non tamen ita quod ista fecunditas de ratione sua requirat esse in duobus quia ipsa non posset esse in uno (immo ipsa eadem iam praeexsisteret in ƿipsa mente), sed propter ordinem fecunditatum in producendo necessario oporteret secundam fecunditatem - quando est in potentia propinqua - esse in duobus. | 39. There is in some way an example of this in us. The soul is not fecund 'with proximate power' for having an act of willing unless it is in actual intellection, although it does not, by that intellection, formally produce the act of loving but by the will as it is first act, which preexists in the soul before intellection, although not in power altogether proximate to acting. If then the soul, in producing intellection, were to communicate to it the fecundity of volition, the will would not be in proximate power to producing love unless the word was first produced, and so after fecund will had been communicated to it; and thus the will would never be proximately fecund save in the two of them, - not however such that this fecundity should, of its idea, require existence in two because it could not exist in one (nay, it itself would already preexist in the mind itself); but, because of the order of fecundities in producing, there would necessarily have to be a second fecundity - when it is in proximate power - in the two of them. |
| 40 Potest ergo concedi quod Pater et Filius voluntate una, quae est in eis, spirant, quae est perfecte fecunda in duobus suppositis exsistens, quia prius intelligitur communicari supposito genito - et ita esse in duobus - quam quod ea Spiritus Sanctus producatur. | 40. It can therefore be conceded that the Father and the Son inspirit by the one will which is in them, and which is perfectly fecund existing in the two supposits, because it is understood to be communicated to the generated supposit - and so to exist in both supposits - before the Holy Spirit is produced by it. |
| 41 Sed quomodo dilectione mutua spiratur Spiritus Sanctus? Respondeo: dilectione, id est voluntate qua Pater et Filius ut in actu primo, nati sunt se mutuo diligere; hac - inquam - voluntate, ut exsistente in eis et nata esse talis qua diligant se mutuo, spiratur Spiritus Sanctus, non autem aliquo actu secundo quasi dilectionis actualis impensae et repensae. Sed si istud non sufficit ad intentionem Richardi, exponat eum qui poterit, quia non videtur eius determinatio bene posse stare cum dictis Augustini - qui attribuit Patri et Filio perfectam rationem unius principii respectu Spiritus Sancti sicut Trinitati respectu creaturae - si contradicat praedictis; qualiter autem Augustinus dicat quod Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, quasi sit ipsa mutua diƿlectio Patris et Filii (sicut videtur loqui De Trinitate libro VI cap. 5),exponetur distinctione 32, ubi Magister tractat de illa quaestione 'Utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto'. | 41. But how is the Holy Spirit inspirited by mutual love [n.11]? I reply: by love, that is by the will by which the Father and Son as in first act are of a nature to love themselves mutually; by this will - I say - as existing in them, and of a nature to be the sort by which they may love themselves mutually, the Holy Spirit is inspirited, but not by any second act as it were of love actually bestowed and requited. But if this does not suffice for the intention of Richard, let him expound him who can, because his determination does not seem to stand well with the statements of Augustine -who attributes to the Father and the Son the perfect idea of one principle with respect to the Holy Spirit as he does to the Trinity with respect to the creature [n.6] - if his determination contradict what was just said above; but as to how Augustine says that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as if the Holy Spirit is the very mutual love of the Father and the Son (as Augustine seems to say in On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7), it will be expounded in distinction 32 [I d.32 qq.1-2 nn.1, 11], where the Master [Lombard] treats of this question 'Whether the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit'. |
| 42 Iuxta istam quaestionem est una difficultas quasi grammaticalis: utrum Pater et Filius possent dici unus spirator vel duo spiratores. Ubi multipliciter dicitur, sed quia vis est de significato nominis, non multum immoror. Videtur enim quod nomen tale verbale significet principium tale agendi, ut illud natum est denominare suppositum activum; sicut enim 'lectio' significat actum quiditative per modum habitus et quietis, ita 'lector' significat principium huiusmodi actus per modum habitus et quietis, ut est denominativum suppositi activi; 'spiratio' igitur significat vim spirandi ut concernit suppositum, - et quia est una vis in Patre et Filio, et terminus numeralis appositus alicui determinabili ponit suum significatum circa illud, ideo non videtur concedendum de vi sermonis quod sint duo spiratores, quia vis spirativa videretur numerari in eis. ƿ | 42. Connected to this question [n.1] is a quasi-grammatical difficulty: whether the Father and the Son might be called one inspiriter or two inspiriters. Here the thing is said in many ways, but because the force of the question is about the signification of a name, I do not delay over it much. For it seems that such a verbal name [sc. 'inspiriter'] signifies such a principle of acting, as it is of a nature to denominate an active supposit; for just as 'reading' signifies an act quidditatively by way of habit and rest, so 'reader' signifies the principle of this sort of act by way of habit and rest as it is denominative of an active supposit; 'inspiriting' therefore signifies the force of inspiriting as it concerns the supposit - and because there is one force in the Father and the Son, and a numerical term attached to some determinable places on it its own signification, it does not therefore seem one should, as to the force of the word, concede that there are two inspiriters, because the inspiriting force would seem to be enumerated in these words. |
| 43 Et si obicias, sequitur 'sunt duo spirantes, ergo duo spiratores' (consequentia probatur, quia sicut singulare infert singulare, sic plurale infert plurale), - respondeo: dico quod consequentia non valet, quia participium significat actum ut in fieri, consignificat enim tempus sicut verbum, - et ita sicut conceditur quod Pater et Filius creant, sic conceditur quod sunt creantes; non autem conceditur quod sunt duo creatores sed unus creator, quia nomen verbale non significat actum per modum actus et in fieri sed per modum habitus et quietis. | 43. And if you object that this inference follows 'there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters' (the proof of the consequence is that just as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural), - I reply: I say that the consequence is not valid, because a participle signifies the act in its being done, for it co-signifies time as does a verb, - and so, just as it is conceded that the Father and the Son create, thus is it conceded that they are creating; but it is not conceded that they are two creators but one creator, because the verbal name does not signify the act by way of act and in its being done, but by way of habit and rest. |
| 44 Sed quae ratio quare terminus numeralis conceditur posse apponi terminis adiectivis, et non substantivis? Ponitur ista ratio, quia adiectiva adiacent suppositis et significant formam in adiacentia ad supposita, et ideo possunt numerari ƿad numerationem suppositorum; sed substantiva non sic significant formam in adiacentia ad supposita, sed quasi significant aliquo modo abstracto a suppositis: ideo non possunt sic numerari, quia sic significaretur ibi numeratio formae, et ideo non conceditur 'duo Dii' sicut 'duo habentes deitatem'. | 44. But what is the reason for conceding that a numerical term can be attached to adjectival terms but not to substantives? This reason is posited, that adjectives are added to supposits and signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, and therefore they can be counted by the number of the supposits; but substantives do not thus signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, but they as it were signify in a way that is abstracted from the supposits; therefore they cannot be thus counted, because the number of the form would there be signified, and so it is not conceded that 'there are two Gods' as it is conceded that 'there are two possessing deity'. |
| 45 Sed ista ratio non videtur sufficere, quia terminus numeralis ponit significatum suum circa significatum determinabilis; significatum autem adiectivi et substantivi idem est, - non differunt autem nisi in modo significandi; ergo videtur quod terminus numeralis primo ponat significatum suum circa idem, et ita si significetur numeratio formae determinabilis ex una parte et ex alia non, propter illam adiacentiam ad suppositum quae convenit uni et non alii, - non ratione significati sed ratione modi significandi poterit esse veritas in una et falsitas in alia. | 45. But this reason does not seem sufficient, because a numerical term puts its signification on the signification of the determinable; but what is signified by an adjective and a substantive is one and the same thing, - and they differ only in mode of signifying; therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily puts its signification on the same thing, and so, if a numbering of the determinable form is signified in one part and not in the other, because of the addition to the supposit that belongs to one and not to the other -then not by reason of the thing signified but by reason of the mode of signifying could there be truth in one and falsehood in the other. |
| 46 Assigno aliam rationem, talem: omne dependens dependet ad aliquid omnino et simpliciter independens (numquam enim dependentia alicuius sufficienter terminatur nisi ad aliquid omnino independens), et ideo quando duo aeque dependent, neutrum est natum terminare alterum, sed utrumque dependeret ad aliquod tertium, independens; adiectivum est dependens ad substantivum. ƿQuando igitur adiectivum additur substantivo, saltem invenit independens ad quod terminatur eius dependentia, - quando autem duo adiectiva adduntur sibi mutuo, neutrum dependet ad alterum, quia neutrum terminatur ad alterum, sed dependent ambo ad aliquid tertium, quod terminat sufficienter dependentiam amborum. Ergo quando terminus numeralis additur substantivo, sicut si dicatur 'duo spiratores', statim terminus numeralis adiectivus habet substantivum terminans, quia adiectivum determinat illud quod eius dependentiam terminat; ideo denotatur significatum sui substantivi numerari. Quando autem additur adiectivo, ut cum dicitur 'duo spirantes', utrumque est dependens, et ideo neutrum determinat alterum sicut neutrum terminat dependentiam alterius, sed ambo dependent ad tertium, quod terminat eorum dependentiam et determinatur per ipsa. Et hoc est in proposito 'aliqui' vel 'personae', quasi dicat 'tres aliqui' vel 'tres personae' creantes, quia licet usitate masculinum non sit substantivum, sed tantum neutrum sit substantivum, tamen in divinis quando adiectivum masculinum ponitur per se, tunc intelligitur ibi esse substantivum, ut 'quis' vel 'persona': ut cum dicitur 'Pater et Filius non sunt unus' - sicut dicunt auctoritates - licet sint unus Deus, quia 'unus' absolute positus significatur adiective et intelligitur habere suum substantiƿvum, id est 'quis'; unde significatur quod Pater et Filius sintunus quis vel unus aliquis, vel una persona. | 46. I assign another reason of this sort: everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive. When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate, where its dependence is terminated, - but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said 'two inspiriters', at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are 'two inspiriting', both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them. And this holds in the proposed case [n.43], 'somethings' or 'persons', as if to say 'three somethings' or 'three persons' creating, because although the masculine form is, by usage, not a substantive, but only the neuter form is a substantive[2] [I d.5 nn.36, 42], yet in divine reality, when a masculine adjective is set down by itself, it is then understood to be a substantive there, like 'someone' or 'person'; as when it is said 'the Father and the Son are one' - as the authorities say [n.47] - , although they are one God, because 'one' posited absolutely is signified adjectively and is understood to have its own substantive, that is 'someone'; hence [by 'the Father and the Son are one'] is signified that the Father and the Son are one-someone or one-person. |
| 47 Tunc ad illam consequentiam 'sunt duo spirantes, ergo duo spiratores', - nego eam. Et cum probas eam 'quia sicut singulare infert singulare, ita plurale plurale', dico quod non oportet - si ad aliquod antecedens sequatur aliquod consequens - quod ad distinctionem antecedentis sequatur distinctio consequentis, nisi quando consequens illud distinguitur in antecedentibus sicut genus distinguitur in speciebus. In proposito autem supposita spirantia distinguuntur, et ad 'suppositum spirans' sequitur 'spirator', sed istud consequens non distinguitur nec numeratur numerato antecedente; et ideo arguendo 'spirans, ergo spirator, - igitur si duo spirantes, igitur duo spiratores', est fallacia consequentis, arguendo a distinctione antecedentis ad distinctionem consequentis. Et si aliquando invenitur ab auctoribus quod Pater et Filius sunt duo spiratores, debent exponi eorum auctoritates et sane intelligi; multae enim auctoritates sanctorum, quae non sunt verae de virtute sermonis aliquando, sunt exponendae secundum Magistrum distinctione 12. ƿ | 47. Hence, as to this consequence 'there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters', - I deny it. And when you prove it 'because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural' [n.43], I say that it is not necessary - if on some antecedent some consequent follows - that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting supposits are distinguished, and on 'inspiriting supposit' there follows 'inspiriter', but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing 'inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, - therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters' there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent. And if it is sometimes found in authors that the Father and the Son are two inspiriters, these authorities should be given an exposition and understood soundly; for many authorities of the saints, which are sometimes not true as to the force of the speech, are to be expounded according to the Master [Lombard] in distinction 12 [Sentences I d.12 ch.2 nn.109-111]. |
| 48 Ad argumenta. Ad primum, cum arguitur de nexu, - dico quod Pater et Filius nectuntur in Spiritu Sancto sicut in communi producto: licet sint distincti (alioquin non conecterentur), tamen non habent commune productum in quantum sunt distincti, sed in quantum unum; unde productum unum est ab eis in quantum sunt unum producens, et ita auctoritas illa est in oppositum. | 48. To the arguments. To the first, when an argument is made about the nexus [n.1], - I say that the Father and the Son have a nexus in the Holy Spirit as in a common product; for although they are distinct (otherwise the two would not have a nexus), yet they do not have a common product insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one; hence the one product is from them insofar as they are one producing, and so the authority in question [sc. from Augustine] is to the opposite side. |
| 49 Ad secundum dico quod actio est 'singularis per se exsistentis', - non oportet autem esse alicuius singularis incommunicabilis per se exsistentis, sicut dictum est distinctione 4. Quomodo haec est vera 'Deus creat', vel 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus', ita ponitur quod est aliquis 'hic spirator', cui primo conveniat - id est adaequate - spirare, qui praeintelligitur aliquo modo in Patre et in Filio, quibus convenit actus spirandi, quia uterque est 'hic spirator': et tunc diceretur quod illius 'per se exsistentis', quod est quasi commune quoddam in re ad Patrem et Filium, est una actio, licet illud non sit unum suppositum (id est incommunicabile), sicut nec Trinitas est unum suppositum, una tamen creatione creat. | 49. To the second [n.2] I say that action is 'of a per se existent singular' - but it need not be of any incommunicable per se existent singular, as was said in distinction 4 [I d.4 nn.11-13]. In the way that this proposition is true 'God creates' or 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', so is it posited that there is some 'this inspiriter' to whom it first belongs - that is adequately belongs - to inspirit, and who is somehow pre-understood in the Father and in the Son, to whom the act of inspiriting belongs, because both are 'this inspiriter'; and then it would be said of this 'per se existent', which is as it were something common in real being to the Father and to the Son, that there is one action, although it is not one supposit (that is, incommunicable), just as neither is the Trinity one supposit, yet it does create with one creation. |
| 50 Istud non videtur hic probabile sicut ibi 'Deus creat', quia ƿnon videtur hic aliquis per se exsistens, communis Patri et Filio et non Spiritui Sancto, quia tunc illud singulare per se exsistens, licet non incommunicabiliter - realiter tamen referretur ad Spiritum Sanctum, et esset aliquid realiter relatum ad intra prius aliquo modo quam intelligeretur esse persona prima, et ita quod non omnis relatio realis ad intra esset personae, quod non videretur probabile. | 50. This does not seem as probable here as 'God creates' is there, because there does not seem to be here someone per se existent, common to the Father and to the Son but not to the Holy Spirit, because then that singular per se existent would, although not incommunicably, yet really be referred to the Holy Spirit, and it would be something really related inwardly prior in some way to the first person being understood, and so not every real relation inwardly would be of a person, which would not seem probable. |
| 51 Aliter potest dici quod actio non denominat ultimata denominatione nisi suppositum, vel habentem modum suppositi. Dico 'modum suppositi', pro anima separata et pro accidentibus separatis per miraculum, quae denominantur ab actione ultimata denominatione, quia per se exsistunt, - licet non incommunicabiliter, quia nata sunt communicare esse suppositis; dum tamen nihil communicant, nihil denominatur ab actione eorum nisi ipsa ultimata denominatione. Sed omnis forma, exsistens in alio ut forma, sicut dat illi esse ita dat illi aliquo modo denominari a sua actione, et licet forma in supposito denominaretur ab actione sua, non tamen ultimata denominatione, sed ulterius denominaretur suppositum ab eadem actione; si tamen aliqua forma per se exsistens nata esset habere aliquam actionem propriam, si ipsa daret idem esse pluribus, - ex quo supposita non denominantur actione formae ƿnisi quia habent esse per formam, denominarentur ab eadem actione, sicut haberent idem esse illius formae activae (exemplum: si una albedo esset in duabus superficiebus, una immutatione immutarent): ita ergo cum 'voluntas fecunda' sit unum principium spirandi, quidquid denominatur ab ista actione, - per hoc quod habet esse ista forma, denominatur eadem actione. Quando ergo dicit 'actio est suppositi, ergo plurium suppositorum sunt plures actiones', nego consequentiam, nisi quando plurificatur in eis illud quod est ratio agendi, per quod dans esse ista dicuntur denominative agere. | 51. In another way it could be said that action denominates with ultimate denomination only the supposit, or something having the mode of a supposit. I say 'mode of a supposit' for the separated soul and for accidents separated by miracle, which are denominated by action with ultimate denomination, because they per se exist, - although not incommunicably, because they are of a nature to communicate being to supposits; but while they are communicating nothing, nothing is denominated by their action save by ultimate denomination itself. But every form, existing in another as a form, just as it gives that other being so it gives it to be in some way denominated by the form's action, not however with ultimate denomination, but there is denomination further of the supposit by the same action; but if some per se existing form were of a nature to have some proper action, and if it were to give the same being to several supposits, then, from the fact that the supposits are not denominated by the action of the form save because they have being through the form, they would be denominated by the same action, just as they would have the same being of that active form (an example: if one whiteness were in two surfaces, the surfaces would cause a change [sc. in the eye] with one change); so therefore, since 'fecund will' is one principle of inspiriting, whatever is denominated by this action would, by the fact that it has being by this form, be denominated by the same action. When therefore he [sc. Henry] says [n.2] that 'action belongs to a supposit, therefore several actions belong to several supposits', I deny the consequence, except when that is multiplied in them which is the idea of the acting, by which, when it gives being, they are said denominatively to act. |
| 52 Et si obicias, ab una anima hominis sunt multae operationes distinctae (ut intelligere et velle), et etiam multae operationes partium sensitivarum (ut videre, audire, et talia multa), et si partes illae essent supposita, essent eorum agentium plures actiones, ƿrespondeo: dico quod non semper unica res est unica ratio agendi; immo unica res potest includere in se plures rationes agendi, sicut dicetur de anima respectu suarum potentiarum, si de hoc fiat quaestio. Dictum est autem in ista responsione iam habita, de una ratione simpliciter agendi, qualis ratio est in Patre et Filio respectu productionis vel ad producendum Spiritum Sanctum. | 52. And if you object that from the one soul of a man there are many distinct operations (as to understand and to will), and also many operations of the sensitive parts (as to see, to hear, and many such), and, if these parts were supposits, there would be many actions of them when they are acting, - I reply that one thing is not always one idea of acting; rather, one thing can include in itself several ideas of acting, as will be said of the soul in respect of its powers, if question is made about this [II Suppl. d.16 q. un nn.15-19], IV d.49 p.1 qq.1-2 n.18]. But it was said in the response already given [n.51] what sort of idea there is in the Father and the Son with respect to the production or the producing of the Holy Spirit. |
| 53 Ad tertium dico quod Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum Sanctum in quantum sunt omnino unum: et non in quantum unum in essentia, nec in quantum unum in persona, sed in quantum sunt unum in vi spirativa. Et cum infers 'ergo Pater esset duo principia productiva, propter duplicem fecunditatem in eo', nego consequentiam, quia ad hoc ut dicantur 'plura producentia' requiritur numeratio suppositorum: non enim dicitur aliquis 'plures scientes', licet habeat plures scientias, sed oporteret esse plura supposita ad hoc quod sequeretur (de hoc alias, in III libro, ubi quaeritur 'utrum si plures naturae assumerentur a Verbo, esset unus vel plures homines'). ƿ | 53. To the third [n.3] I say that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one; and not insofar as they are one in essence, nor insofar as they are one in person, but insofar as they are one in inspiriting force. And when you infer 'therefore the Father would be two productive principles, because of the double fecundity in him' [n.3], I deny the consequence, because in order to say 'several producers' a numbering of the supposits is required; for someone is not said to be 'several knowers' although he has several sciences, but there would have to be several supposits for this to follow (about this elsewhere, in book III, where the question is raised 'whether, if several natures were assumed by the Word, he would be one or several men' |
