Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D19/Q1

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 1	Question One Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem decimam nonam quaero primo utrum personae sint aequales secundum magnitudinem. Quod non: Quia in Praedicamentis dicitur quod ((quantitati proprium est quod secundum eam aequale vel inaequale dicatur aliquid)); quantitas non est in Deo, secundum Augustinum V De Trinitate: ((Deus est magnus sine quantitate, bonus sine qualitate)); ergo etc.	1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude. That they are not: Because in the Categories 6.6a26-27 is said that "it is proper to quantity that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;" but quantity is not in God, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.1 n.2, "God is great without quantity, good without quality;" therefore etc.
2 Item, nihil ponendum est in Deo quod dicit imperfectionem. Aequalitas est huiusmodi, - probatio, quia repugnat perfectioni in creaturis; quod patet per Augustinum 83 Quaestionum quaeƿstione 41: ((Si omnia)) - inquit - ((essent aequalia, iam non essent 'omnia')); ergo perfectio universi non posset stare cum aequalitate; aequalitas ergo non est in omnibus melior suo opposito, ergo non est perfectio simpliciter. Ergo non est ponenda in Deo tamquam essentiale vel tamquam commune tribus.	2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which asserts imperfection. Equality is of this sort, - the proof is that it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; the thing is plain from Augustine 83 Questions q.41: "If all things were equal," he says, "they would not now be 'all things';" therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand along with equality; equality, therefore, is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential feature or as common to the three persons.
3 Item, perfecta aequalitas est mutua; haec non est mutua, secundum Augustinum VI De Trinitate cap. ultimo: ((Imago, si perfecta est, coaequatur ei cuius est imago, non illud suae imagini)).	3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: "An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with what it is the image of, but not the latter with the image."
4 Oppositum in Symbolo Athanasii: ((Personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales)), - et Magister in littera probat hoc specialiter, per Augustinum De fide ad Petrum cap. 2.	4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: "The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal," - and the Master in the text gives a special proof of this from Augustine [rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4.
5 Hic primo videndum est de aequalitate proprie sumpta, secundo de ipsa generaliter sumpta, et tertio qualiter est aequalitas in proposito, et quarto ostendendum est quod hoc modo in divinis personis sit vere perfecta aequalitas. ƿ	5. Here one must look first at equality properly taken, second at equality taken generally, and third at how there is equality in the proposed case [sc. the divine persons], and fourth one must show that in this way [sc. of taking equality] there is perfect equality in the divine persons.
6 De primo Philosophus V Metaphysicae cap. 'De relatione' distinguit tres relationes fundatas super 'unum', scilicet idem, simile et aequale, - et loquendo de istis stricte et proprie, appropriantur distinctis generibus, ut identitas substantiae, aequalitas quantitati et similitudo qualitati. Et ita forte possunt aliae relationes fundari super rationes aliorum generum, sicut proportionalitas super relationem, - et hoc videtur Avicenna dicere, saltem de istis tribus relationibus communibus quas expresse ponit Philosophus.	6. On the first point the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a8-12 'On Relation', distinguishes three relations founded on unity or 'one', namely the same, the like, and the equal - and speaking of these strictly and properly he appropriates them to three categories, as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps other relations can be founded on the principles of other categories, as proportionality on relation, - and this is what Avicenna seems to say [Metaphysics III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.
7 Dico tamen quod fundamentum remotum istarum relationum est res illius generis, puta aequalitatis fundamentum est res de genere quantitatis, et similitudinis de genere qualitatis, et identitatis res de genere substantiae; proximum tamen fundamentum vel ratio proxima fundamenti est unitas talis rei, quia super rem talis generis, ut diversa est, fundantur relationes disparatae, et non communes.	7. However, I say that the remote foundation of these relations is the thing in the category, as that the foundation of equality is the thing in the category of quantity, and of likeness the thing in the category of quality, and of identity the thing in the category of substance; but the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of the foundation is the unity of such thing, because disparate and not common relations are founded on things in categories in the way those things are diverse.
8 De secundo dico quod quodcumque ens in se est 'quid' et habet in se aliquem gradum determinatum in entibus et est forma ƿvel habens formam; et secundum hoc, sicut tripliciter potest considerari quodcumque ens, ita etiam super ipsum potest fundari triplex relatio communiter sumpta: quia identitas super quodcumque ens in quantum est 'quid', aequalitas et inaequalitas super quodcumque ens in quantum habet magnitudinem aliquam perfectionis (quae dicitur 'quantitas virtutis', de qua dicit Augustinus VI De Trinitate quod ((in his quae non sunt mole magna, idem est melius esse quod maius esse))), similitudo autem vel dissimilitudo potest fundari super quodcumque ens in quantum est 'quale' et qualitas quaedam (de hoc modo qualitatis loquitur Philosophus V Metaphysicae cap. 'De qualitate', quod ((unus modus qualitatis est differentia substantiae)), id est substantialis, et hoc modo individua eiusdem speciei sunt essentialiter similia in quantum habent eandem differentiam specificam, quae est ut qualitas essentialis ipsorum).	8. On the second point [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a 'what', and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or has a form; and accordingly, just as any being can be considered in these three ways, so also there can be founded on it a triple relation taken commonly; because identity [and diversity] are founded on any being insofar as it is a 'what', equality and inequality are founded on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called 'quantity of virtue', about which Augustine says in On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 that "in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater"), while likeness and unlikeness can be founded on any being insofar as it is 'of a certain sort' and is a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5.14.1020a33 'On Quality', that "one mode of quality is difference in substance," that is, substantial difference, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were their essential quality).
9 Hoc modo, communiter scilicet accipiendo istas relationes communes et non stricte, dicit Philosophus X Metaphysicae quod 'omne ens omni enti comparatum, est idem vel diversum'; ita etiam omne ens omni enti comparatum, est aequale vel inaequale. Sicut ergo fundamentum identitatis, aequalitatis et similitudinis hoc modo communiter sumptae - est ens in communi, compaƿratum ad quodcumque ens in communi, ita etiam illae relationes sunt transcendentes (licet non convertibiles), tamen disiunctae, dividentes ens, sicut dividitur in necessarium et possibile.	9. In this way, namely taking the common relations and not the relations in the strict sense, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10.3.1054b25 that "any being compared with any being is the same or diverse;" so too any being compared with any being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness - taken in this common way - is being in general compared with any being in general, so also the relations are transcendental along with being (though not convertible with it), but they are disjuncts and divide being, as being is divided into necessary and possible.
10 De tertio dico quod sicut nullum genus nec aliquid alicuius generis dicitur de Deo formaliter, ita nec passio alicuius generis, et per consequens nec aliqua relationum communium secundum quod stricte sumuntur, ut scilicet sunt passiones generum determinatorum; sed quia ens dicitur formaliter de Deo et quaecumque passio convertibilis cum ente, et passionum non convertibilium - sed disiunctarum - semper extremum nobilius, ideo hoc modo illud extremum dicetur de Deo quod vel dicit nobilitatem vel non repugnat nobilitati, sed reliquum repugnat.	10. On the third point [n.5] I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither is a property of any genus so said of him, and consequently not any of the common relations either, in the way they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera or categories [n.6]; but because being is said formally of God, and any property convertible with being, and so always also the nobler extreme of non-convertible - but disjunct - properties, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God that either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, while the other extreme is repugnant. D. About Equality in the Divine Persons
11 De quarto (dimittendo nunc de identitate et similitudine, de quibus nunc non est quaestio) dico de aequalitate quod ipsa est perfecte in personis divinis. ƿ	11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.
12 Et licet aequalitas aliquorum entium creatorum posset sumi secundum quantitatem continuam vel discretam, et secundum continuam permanentem et successivam, ac per hoc posset quaeri 'utrum in personis divinis esset aequalitas secundum numerum' (si ibi esset perfectus numerus) et 'an esset ibi perfecta aequalitas secundum durationem sive secundum aeternitatem' (quae correspondet quantitati successivae in creaturis), - primum tamen non pertinet ad distinctionem istam sed ad distinctionem 24 (nec de hoc tangit hic aliquid Magister, quia non ponit ibi numerum positive, sicut forte tangetur in illa distinctione), de secundo vero aliqualiter tangit Magister (et adducit Magister Augustinum De fide ad Petrum, et probatum est distinctione 9). De tertio est quaestio, scilicet de aequalitate secundum magnitudinem.	12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask 'whether there is in the divine persons equality in number' (if perfect number were to exist there) and 'whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity' (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) - the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.
13 Et quod illa sit perfecta, probatur tum ex fundamento remoto, scilicet magnitudine, - tum ex ratione proxima fundamenti, scilicet unitate. Primum patet ex hoc quod magnitudo virtutis non est perfecta nisi sit infinita: quia non repugnat sibi infinitas, et nihil est perfectum 'cui non repugnat infinitas' nisi sit infinitum; omnis ƿautem alia magnitudo virtutis finita, sola ista infinita, sicut patuit distinctione 2.	13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, - and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7]. The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and nothing 'which infinity is not repugnant to' is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.
14 De secundo probatur propositum, quia in omnibus aliis aequalibus naturalibus est deminuta unitas magnitudinis, secundum quam aequales dicuntur, - quia illa magnitudo numeratur in ipsis aequalibus; hic autem est perfecta unitas magnitudinis, et tamen cum hoc distinctio sufficiens relatorum, quae requiritur ad relationem realem.	14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished - because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.
15 Sed hic est unum dubium, quia cum magnitudo transeat in essentiam, non videtur quod relatio fundata super magnitudinem sit alia a relatione fundata super essentiam ut est 'quid', et ita non videtur differre aequalitas ab identitate, - aut si aequalitas posset attendi in his quae videntur quasi passiones essentiae, non attenditur in eis nisi in quantum habent magnitudinem virtutis; ista autem magnitudo non est aliud attributum a tali perfectione quae dicit modum intrinsecum illius (sicut saepe supra dictum est); ergo si similitudo sit 'secundum talem proprietatem' aequalitas ƿsecundum magnitudinem illius proprietatis, non differret aequalitas a similitudine secundum istam proprietatem, - et ita videtur quod aequalitas secundum quod aequalitas, non sit hic ponenda, quia neque ut distinctum ab identitate, loquendo de aequalitate essentiae, neque ut distinctum a similitudine, loquendo de aequalitate quae est in magnitudine perfectionum attributalium.	15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a 'what', and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, - or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness etc.], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore if likeness 'in accord with such a property' [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property - and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.
16 Est etiam aliud dubium, quia videntur ponendae aequalitates infinitae personarum, si possent esse infinitae perfectiones attributales; quaelibet enim habet magnitudinem suam tamquam modum intrinsecum sui, secundum suam rationem propriam; ergo quot perfectiones attributales, tot magnitudines erunt et aequalitates.	16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.
17 Ad ista. Ad primum respondeo - quaere responsionem etc. ƿ	17. In response to these doubts. To the first I reply - see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7]. To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality; but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [Rep. IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, - which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other - and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.
18 Ad primum argumentum principale dico quod non est ibi quantitas molis, sed virtutis; et si nomen quantitatis appropriatur ad magnitudinem molis (magnitudo autem non appropriatur ad magnitudinem molis), tunc potest proprie concedi quod est ibi ƿmagnitudo sine quantitate: et illa magnitudo vere est fundamentum aequalitatis transcendentis, quia hoc modo omne ens est magnum vel parvum, et aequale vel inaequale, licet magnitudo illa non sit fundamentum aequalitatis prout est passio quantitatis, quae est genus. ƿ	18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is made proper to magnitude of bulk (but if magnitude is not made proper to magnitude of bulk), then one could concede that there is magnitude there without quantity; and this magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because every being is in this way great or small, and equal or unequal, although the magnitude is not a foundation of equality as equality is a property of quantity, which is a category.
19 Sed contra istud arguitur, quia non videtur quod aliquid possit dici de Deo, nisi illud quod est de intellectu illius dicatur de eo; igitur cum de intellectu magnitudinis sit quantitas, non potest concedi magnitudo in Deo et negari ibi quantitas.	19. But against this an argument is made that it does not seem anything can be said of God unless what belongs to the understanding of that thing is said of him; therefore, since quantity belongs to the understanding of magnitude, then magnitude cannot be conceded of God and quantity denied of him.
20 Item, quaerendo quantus est Deus, bene respondetur quod est immensus; si autem non esset ibi quantitas, quaestio nulla esset.	20. Again, when asking how great God is, one may well reply that he is immense; but if there is no quantity in God, no such question would arise.
21 Item, passio communis toti generi, non competit alicui per differentiam specificam; aequalitas est passio communis toti generi quantitatis; ergo non competit alicui per aliquam differentiam specificam de genere quantitatis, - et ita non potest poni in Deo aliqua differentia de genere quantitatis, negando ibi genus quantitatis et quod per talem differentiam sit ibi ratio aequalitatis.	21. Again, a property common to every being does not belong to any being by a specific difference; equality is a property common to every kind of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference in the category of quantity, - and thus one cannot posit in God any difference in the category of quantity by saying that the category of quantity is not there but that there is there, by a difference in quantity, the idea of equality.
22 Ad primum respondeo: magnitudo est aequivocum, secundum quod est species quantitatis distincta contra multitudinem (V Metaphysicae) et secundum quod opponitur parvitati, et eius concretum - quod est 'magnum' - opponitur parvo (ista distinctio satis habetur a Philosopho X Metaphysicae cap. 8, in simili 'de longo et brevi, multo et pauco, multo et uno'). Primo modo non transfertur magnitudo ad Deum, nec differentia eius ut aliquid eius, sicut patet ex distinctione 8, quia tunc transferretur genus ƿquod includitur in ea; neque etiam secundo modo, ut 'magnum' proprie sumitur et dicit passionem quantitatis, quia etiam propria passio non est sine suo proprio subiecto. Sed alio modo, magnitudo est passio entis, distincta contra parvum, et sic est in omni ente alterum extremum; hoc patet per Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. 'De quanto': ((Sunt autem magnum et parvum, maius et minus, secundum se dicta et ad aliquid: secundum se quidem quantitatis passiones; transferuntur etiam et ad alia haec nomina)) (quasi dicat: 'proprie sumpta' dicunt passiones quantitatis, 'communiter sumpta' dicunt passiones communes entis).	22. To the first [n.19] I reply that magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (Metaphysics 5.13.1020a7-10) and according as it is opposed to smallness and as its concrete from - that is, 'great' - is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.6.1056b3-14 in the likeness 'about long and short, great and small, many and one'). In the first sense magnitude is not applied to God, nor its difference as something belonging to him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then the genus included in it would be applied to him; nor is magnitude in the second sense applied to him, in the way 'great' is taken properly and states a property of quantity, because a property proper to a thing does not exist without its proper subject. But magnitude taken in another sense is a property of being, and it is distinct from small, and in this way one or other extreme exists in every being; this is plain from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5.13 1020a23-26, in the chapter on quantity: "But great and small, greater and smaller, are said absolutely and in relation to another; absolutely indeed they are properties of quantity; these names are also applied to other things" (as if he were to say: 'properly taken' they state properties of quantity, 'commonly taken' they state common properties of being).
23 Ad aliud - quantus est Deus - neganda est esse quaestio rationabilis, si negetur in Deo quantitas; si autem concedatur esse quaestio rationabilis, tunc concedenda est esse in Deo quantitas virtutis, non molis.	23. As to the other [n.20] - how great God is - a rational question should be denied if quantity is denied of God; but if a rational question is conceded then a quantity of virtue should be conceded in God, not a quantity of bulk.
24 Tertia ratio non concludit nisi quod aequalitas, ut est passio generis quantitatis, non competit Deo per aliquam differentiam generis quantitatis, nec transfertur ad divina; et concedo quod nulla differentia de genere quantitatis competit Deo; nec aliqua passio illius generis, sed passio transcendens competit Deo. ƿ	24. The third argument [n.21] only concludes that equality as it is a property in the category of quantity does not belong to God by any difference in the category of quantity, and that it is not applied to divine reality; and I concede that no difference in the category of quantity belongs to God; nor does any property in that genus belong to him, but a transcendent property does so belong.
25 Ad aliud dico quod perfectio simpliciter, id est quae formaliter posset esse infinita, non dicit nisi aliquid quod potest esse essentiale in divinis et ad se (et tale aliquo modo praeintelligitur relationibus originis), cuiusmodi sunt sapientia et bonitas etc. Aequalitas autem non praeintelligitur relationibus originis, nec potest esse ad se: Pater enim non est aequalis sibi sed Filio, et ideo aequalitas hoc modo non dicit perfectionem simpliciter; dicit tamen perfectionem, quae in omni natura - comparando ad aliquid eiusdem naturae - melior est suo opposito, quia oppositum eius de necessitate dicit imperfectionem: non enim est inaequalitas in eadem natura nisi alterum individuum imperfecte habeat illam naturam. Ex quo ergo relatio potest esse inter supposita in ista natura, imperfectionis esset inaequalitas in eis, quia in altero poneret perfectionem deminutam; aequalitas autem non est ibi imperfectionis, immo magis praeexigit perfectionem simpliciter, quia praeexigit naturam perfectam et perfecte in utroque relato. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro De quantitate animae, loquens ad discipulum: ((Aequalitatem)) - inquit - ((inaequalitati iure praeponis, nec quemquam aestimo humano sensu praeditum cui non illud videatur)). Hoc utique verum est, comparando ad aliqua in eadem natura, et simpliciter - quibus compossibilis est aequalitas - magis possunt esse perfecta quam illa quibus aequalitas non est compossibilis, quia illorum necessario aliquod est imperfectum. ƿ	25. To the next [sc. principal argument, n.2] I say that perfection simply, that is, a perfection that could formally be infinite, only asserts that in divine reality which can be essential to it and self-referred (and such is what is in some way pre-understood in the relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness etc. But equality is not pre-understood in the relations of origin, nor can it be self-referred; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not state a perfection simply; yet it does state a perfection which, in the case of every nature - when comparing it to something of the same nature -, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for no inequality in the same nature exists unless a second individual has the nature imperfectly. From the fact, then, that a relation can exist between supposits in that nature, an inequality of imperfection might exist in them because it might posit a diminished perfection in one of them; but equality of imperfection does not exist there, nay rather equality first requires perfection simply, because it first requires a nature that is perfect and that exists perfectly in each of the terms of the relation. And this is what Augustine says in his book On the Quantity of the Soul ch.9 n.15 when he speaks to the disciple: "Equality," he says, "you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon there is anyone endowed with human sense to whom this would not be apparent." This is indeed true, when making comparisons with things in the same nature; and things with which equality is compossible are simply more able to be perfect than things with which equality is not compossible, because in the latter case one or other of them is imperfect.
26 Tunc cum probas de perfectione creaturae, - respondeo quod aliqua sunt necessaria ad perfectionem creaturarum quae tamen non dicunt perfectionem simpliciter; et hoc est, quia creaturae de se imperfectae - sine illis non possunt habere perfectam perfectionem (quanta et qualis est eis possibilis), et ideo illa aliqualiter supplent imperfectionem creaturarum, sicut dictum est supra distinctione 7, ubi negatum est quod differentia specifica alicuius sit perfectio simpliciter. Ita dico quod perfectio limitata non potest esse tanta in una natura limitata, sicut potest esse in pluribus naturis ordinatis; et ideo ibi ordo naturae, id est perfectionis inaequalis, necessarius est ad maximam perfectionem eis possibilem, non autem est simpliciter necessarius ad perfectionem maximam, quia illa potest esse in natura perfectissima illimitata, sine ordine imperfectionis.	26. Next, as to the proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], - I reply that some things are necessary for perfection in creatures that do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures - being of themselves imperfect - cannot without these things have perfect perfection (as much perfection as they can have and of the sort they can have), and therefore these things in some way make up for the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything was a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several natures that are ordered; and so there an order of nature, that is an order of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection they are capable of, - but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can exist in the most perfect unlimited nature, without an order of imperfection.
27 Et si arguas quod ordo est perfectionis, et ordo videtur requirere inaequalitatem, - respondeo: dico quod ordo originis stat cum perfectione, ordo autem inaequalitatis non stat cum perfectione. Non ergo omnis ordo est perfectionis, sed aliquis stat cum perfectione in eadem natura, et aliquis non.	27. And if you argue that order belongs to perfection and that order seems to require inequality, - I make reply: I say that an order of origin stands along with perfection but that an order of inequality does not stand along with perfection. Therefore not every order belongs to perfection, but some order stands along with perfection in the same nature and some order does not.
28 Ad tertium dico quod aliquando super aliquam relationem communem fundantur relationes oppositae aequiparantiae, sicut si dicatur 'assimilans et assimilatum'. Ista dicunt relationem activi ƿad passivum, fundatas super hanc relationem communem quae est 'similitudo': assimilans enim est causans similitudinem sicut dealbans est causans albedinem, et assimilatum est causatum secundum similitudinem sicut dealbatum est causatum secundum albedinem. Est ergo hic relatio activi et passivi in assimilante et assimilato, sicut in dealbante et dealbato; sed in dealbante, illud in quo fundatur relatio activi est absolutum, hic autem - scilicet in assimilante - illud in quo fundatur relatio activi est relatio aequiparantiae. Et tale nomen importat duas relationes, tales: unam communem et aliam disquiparantiae. Quantum ad illam communem relationem, mutuitatem habet ad correlativum illius relationis, non autem habet mutuitatem ad correlativum secundum relationem disquiparantiae. - Ita etiam hic, coaequari importat relationem coaequati ad coaequans, et ita illa aequalitas mutua est: Filius enim, qui coaequatur Patri, aequalis est Patri et e converso. Sed alia relatio, per modum passivi, scilicet 'accipere aequalitatem ab alio', illa non est mutua sed competit praecise Filio, et relatio opposita disquiparantiae - scilicet coaequare - competit Patri, hoc est 'dare aequalitatem Filio'. Est ergo imago aequalis, et e converso, sed sola imago coaequatur intelligendo duas relationes praedictas. ƿ	28. To the third [principal argument, n.3] I say that sometimes equivalent opposite relations are founded on a common relation, just as if one were to speak of 'the assimilating and the assimilated'. These state a relation of the active to the passive, founded on this common relation of 'likeness'; for the assimilating is what causes likeness as the whiten-ing is what causes whiteness, and the assimilated is what is caused as to likeness just as the whitened is what is caused as to whiteness. There is here, then, a relation of active to passive in the assimilating and the assimilated, just as in the whitening and the whitened; but, in the case of the whiten-ing, that on which the relation of the active is founded is something absolute, but here - namely in the case of the assimilating - that on which the relation of the active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And such a name imports two relations of the following sort: one common and one of non-equivalence. As to the common relation, it exists in mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not exist in mutuality with the correlative according to a relation of non-equivalence. - So also here, to be made co-equal imports the relation of the co-equaled with the co-equaling, and so the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is made co-equal with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely 'to receive equality from another', is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence - namely to make co-equal - belongs to the Father, that is 'to give equality to the Son'. The image then [i.e. the Son] is equal, and conversely, but only the image is made co-equal in the sense of the two aforesaid relations.