Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4A

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 4
212 Iuxta hoc quaero in speciali, utrum sint ibi tantum duae productiones intrinsecae. Quod non sunt duae, sic arguo, quia unius naturae videtur esse unus modus communicandi secundum Averroem VIII Physicorum commento 48. ƿ	212. Next I ask in particular whether there are only there two intrinsic productions. That there are not two I argue thus, that of one nature there seems to be one mode of communicating according to Averroes, Physics VIII com.46.
213 Quod probatur per rationes suas ibidem: Primo, quia alterius materiae est altera forma, alioquin non esset propria forma huius materiae; sed materiae correspondentes diversis agentibus et productionibus sunt alterius et alterius rationis, quod patet in generatione per propagationem et putrefactionem, quia propagatum generatur ex semine, aliud non, sed ex aliquo corpore putrefacto; ergo etc.	213. This is proved by his own reasons in the same place: First, because of a second matter there is a second form, otherwise there would not be a proper form for this matter; but matters corresponding to diverse agents and productions belong to diverse ideas, which is plain in generation by propagation and putrefaction, because the thing propagated is generated from semen, while the other is not but from some putrefied body; therefore etc.
214 Secundo arguit sic, ex supposito illo inferendo, quod eadem species tunc esset a natura et a casu; ex quo infert quod homo posset generari et ex semine asini et ex infinitis materiis. Probat autem primum consequens esse inconveniens, quia quod fit a casu, est oppositum ei quod fit a natura, et propterea nulla species est ƿa casu, quia quae inveniuntur a casu, sunt monstruosa. Hoc totum est manifestum per se. Sed si natura haberet diversos modos communicandi, tunc secundum unum modum communicandi potest aliqua species esse a natura, et secundum alium modum communicandi potest esse a casu vel a fortuna,	214. Second he argues in this way, by inferring from that supposition [n.213] that the same species would be then both from nature and from chance; from which he infers that a man could be generated from the seed of an ass and from an infinite number of matters. Now he proves the first consequence to be discordant because what happens by chance is opposed to what happens by nature, and for that reason no species is by chance, because things found to exist by chance are monstrous. All of this is manifest of itself. But if a nature had diverse modes of communicating, then according to one mode of communicating a species can be by nature and according to another mode of communicating it can be by chance or by fortune.
215 Item arguitur pro conclusione Commentatoris sic, quia diversorum motuum specie, sunt diversi termini specie; ergo si communicationes vel productiones sunt alterius rationis, et termini.	215. Again, an argument for the conclusion of the Commentator [n.212] is as follows, that of changes diverse in species there are terms diverse in species; therefore if there are communications or productions of another nature there are also terms of another nature.
216 Item quod non tantum duae productiones, probo, quia Philosophus II Physicorum distinguit naturam et intellectum tamquam diversa principia activa; utriusque ratio vere invenitur in Deo, quia neutrum includit imperfectionem, et ad intra, quia neutrum ƿest productivum ad extra; ergo praeter productionem voluntatis erunt aliae duae productiones ad intra.	216. Again that there are not two productions I prove because the Philosopher, Physics 5.1.224b7-8, distinguishes nature and intellect as diverse active principles; the idea of both is truly found in God, because neither includes imperfection, and internally, because neither is productive externally; therefore besides the production of will there will be another two productions internally.
217 Hoc etiam probatur per Philosophum IX Metaphysicae cap. 2, ubi expresse videtur dicere quod potentia rationalis valet ad opposita, quia scientia est oppositorum. Si tunc intellectus ex ratione sui est indeterminatus ad opposita, et natura determinata est ad unum, ergo intellectus habebit aliam rationem principii quam natura; ergo etc.	217. This is also proved by the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.2.1046b1-11, where he expressly seems to say that a rational potency is capable of opposites, because science is of opposites. If then the intellect of its nature is indeterminate as to opposites, and nature is determined to one thing, then the intellect will have a different way of being a principle than nature; therefore etc.
218 Praeterea, potentia voluntatis est libera, ergo et productio eius est libera: igitur non determinatur ad unum, sed ex libertate sua potest esse ad opposita vel oppositorum; sed tantum creatura est possibilis esse et non esse, non autem persona divina; ergo voluntas tantum est principium producendi creaturam, non autem personam divinam.	218. Further, the power of the will is free, therefore its producing too is free; therefore it is not determined to one thing, but from its liberty it can be to opposites or of opposites; but only the creature is able to be and not be, not however a divine person; therefore the will is only a principle of producing creatures, but not a divine person.
219 Ad oppositum: Si non sunt tantum duae personae productae, ergo vel erunt plures personae quam tres vel pauciores quam tres, quod est falsum. Illae ergo auctoritates quibus ostenditur tantum tres esse personas in divinis, ostendunt quod tantum sunt duae personae productae. ƿ	219. To the opposite: If there are not two produced persons only, then there will either be more persons than three or fewer persons than three, which is false. Therefore those authorities by which it is shown that there are only three persons in divine reality show that there are only two produced persons.